ML20116C459

Notice of Info of Potential Interest to Commission,Aslb & Aslab. Nuclear Safety & Compliance Committee Rept 2 to Gpu Board of Directors. Mgt Response to Operators on RHR Rept, 850415 & 24 Ltrs & 850401 Memo Encl

ML20116C459
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	04/25/1985
From:	Bauser D GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP., SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE
To:
References
CON-#285-719 SP, NUDOCS 8504290009
Download: ML20116C459 (117)

Text

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April 25, 1985 U RC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION $ gg BEFORE THE COMMISSION- 0FFICJ OF SECRa49 00ChtTING & SERVict BRANCH In the Matter of )

)

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPAEY ) Docket No. 50-289f)O

) (Restart-Management (Three Mile Island Nuclear ) Phase)

Station, Unit No. 1) )

NOTICE TO COMMISSION, APPEAL BOARD, LICENSING BOARD AND PARTIES In accordance with our practice of notifying the Commis-sion, the Appeal Board, the Licensing Board and the parties of information of potential interest, enclosed are three sets cf documents related to the restart proceeding.

Enclosure 1 is an April 24, 1985 letter from Mr. Philip Clark, President, GPU Nuclear Corp. to Mr. Harold Denton, Di-rector, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, forwarding the second semi-annual report of the Nuclear Safety and Compliance Committee of the GPU Nuclear Board of Directors and the letter transmitting the report, copies of which are attached. In sum-mary, the Committee's report provides some constructive obser-vations to the Board of Directors, identifies no instances of non-compliance, and concludes that safety attitudes and prac-tices at GPU Nuclear are satisfactory.

llj4290009850425 C ADOCK 05000289 PDR 3

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Enclosure 2 consists of three letters, with attachments, each dated April 15, 1985, that are responsive to the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty, Dated July 22, 1983. Two of these letters are from Mr. Floyd Smith, Pres-ident, Metropolitan Edison Company to Mr. James M. Taylor, Di-rector, Office of Inspection and Enforcement; the other letter is from Mr. Philip Clark, President, GPU Nuclear, to Mr.

Taylor.

Enclosure 3 is a February, 1985 report entitled Manage-ment's Response to the Operators on the RHR Report, along with the April 1, 1985 memorandum from Mr. Henry Hukill, Vice Presi-dent & Director, TMI-1, to the TMI-l licensed operators and op-erators in training forwarding the report. The February, 1985 report updates the December, 1984 status report on Licensee's response to the RHR Report, which was served on the parties to the remanded proceeding on training on December 31, 1984.

Respectfully submitted, A h /S b Deborah B. Bauser SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE 1800 M Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036 l (202) 822-1215 l Counsel for Licensee cc: Service List l

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B UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION .

00f.KETED USNRC BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD

'85 APR 26 A10:42 In the htter of )

0FFICE OF SECRtTAR' METROPCLITAN EDISQN COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-289 00EfgG

)

(Three Mile Island Nuclear )

Station, Unit No. 1) )

SERVICE LIST Nunzio J. Pallad:.no, Chairman Administrative Judge U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission John E. Buck Washington, D.C. 20555 Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Board Thomas M. Roberts, Commissioner U.S. Nuclear Regulaccry Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissic:

Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 James K. Asselstine, Commissioner Administrative Judge Christine N. Kohl U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Washin gton , D.C. 20555 Board Frederick Sern:hal, Commissioner U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissio:

Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l Washington, D.C. 20555 Administrative Judge Ivan W. SmAth, Chairman

( Lando W. Zach Jr., Commissioner Atomic Safety & Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commisstor Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Administrative Judge Administrative Judge Gary J. Edles, Chairman Sheldon J. Wolfe Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissic:

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D. C. 20555 t

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AdministrctivG Judga Mr. Mcnry D. Mukill Gustave A. Linenberger, Jr. Vico Prosidcnt Atomic Safety & Licensing Board . GPU Nuclear Corporation P.O. gex 430 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Middletown, PA Washington, D.C. 20555 17057 Docketing and Service Section (3) Mr. and Mrs. Norman Aamodt Office of the Secretary 200 North Church Street U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Parkesburg, PA 19365 Washington, D.C. 20555 Ms. Louise Bradford Atomic Safety & Licensing Board TMI ALERT Panel 1011 Green SP.reet U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Harrisburg, PA 17102 Washington, D.C. 20555 Joanne Dorochow, Esquire Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal The Cnristic Institute Board Panel 1324 North Capitol Street U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20002 washington, D.C. 20555 Lynne Bernabei, Esq.

Government Accountability Jack R. Goldberg, Esq. (4)

Office of the Executive Legal .?{ConacticutAvenue Washington, D.C. 20036 U.S . c ar Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Ellyn R. Weiss, Esq.

Mar on, Weiss & Jordan Thomas Y. Au, Esq. 200L S Street, N.W., Suite ;33 Office of Chief Counsel Washington, D.C. 20003 Department of Environmental Resources Michael F. McBride, Esq.

505 Executive House LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae P.O. Box 2357 L3 3 3 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W Harrisburg, PA 17120 Suite 1100 Washington, D.C. 20036 Michael'W. Maupin, Esq.

Hunten & Wtiltams

'07 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Ricn=cnd, '/A 23212 l

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h. 3 h gp USNRC t oo lniercace Fa'k asy Pars cca y New Jersey o7:54 '145 l (2011263-6500

• 85 APR 26 A10vorMR..Ex '36 er's O tect Dia'82 Neber CFFlCE OF SECF.t.iM -

April 24,1985 00catimG A SEPa(201) 263-6797 ORANCH Mr. Harold Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 205S5

Dear Mr. Denton:

My letter dated November 1,1984 provided the first report of the Nuclear Safety & Compliance Committee (NSCC) to the GPU Nuclear Corporation Board of Directors.

Mr. J. F. O' Leary, Chaiman of the Board, GPU Nuclear Corporation, has requested that I provide to you the NSCC's second report. A copy of the report is enclosed.

We are also proceeding to serve it on the parties to the TMI-1 Restart Proceeding.

Very truly yours, f ,$ - N P. R. Clark President l

pfk Enclosure i

cc: J, F. O' Leary, Cha'-rman of the Board, GPUN E. Blake, Esq aire, Shar, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge J. R. Thorpe, Director, Licensing & Regulatory Affairs l

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GPu %c ea cc cerat.cr .s a s.cs cis y cf Genew Pette U:. t es cerecratzen

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'Y April 15, 1985 Mr. John F. O' Leary. Chairman Board of Directors CPU Nuclear 100 Interpace Parkway Parsippany, New Jersey 07054

Dear Mr. O' Leary:

The Nuclear Safety and Ccepliance Committee of the GPUN Board of Directors transmits herewith its second semi-annual report, in acccedance with Section V of the Ccmmittee's Charter. A few observations are included which are intended to improve icng-term assurance and maintenance.

The Cocmittee identified no instances of non-compliance. Safety attitudes and practices are satisfac: cry.

Sincerely, T , .

& Y, t6 or R. V. Laney 4

Chairman, NSCO RVLicbs i

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04 25 $5 11:02 G:U re: LEAF CCFC tC.CC7 C04

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NUCLEAR SAFETY AND COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE REPORT NO. 2 to the GPU NUCLEAR BCARD OF DIREC2CRS N April 15, 1985 l

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l APPROVED:

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R. V. Laney L. L. humphreysy V 8

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I. S' MARY During the period of this reinrt, tne Naclear Safety and Ctzc-l pliance Q3mmittee met montnly with its Staff, twice witn Quir: nan John O'*unarf and President Phil clarx, ard once with the GPU 03rporate l soard. Se 0:xnmittee visited the Oyster Creek Station twice and M -1 l once. Se meetings with Mr. o'laarf and Mr. Clark were for the ;urpose I of reporting observations made bf the JSCC Staff in tne course of its evaluations which might be beneficial to management to improve operations bat had no safety or acqpliance significance.

De Staff's evaluations were concerned with a rarge of station activities that could affact the safe operation of M -1 and oyster l Creek. Beir purpose was to deter.nine whether each activity is beirg j performs $ safely and in compliance with governing requirements and sound t

operating practices. me Staff develiaed its evaluations through direct observations at operating stations, iMarviews with various managers ard supervisors, and review of relevant wnteen policies, procedures, and reports.

et At M-1, the Staff conducted evfluations incitxting operations, preventive arx1 corrective maintenance,' chemistry, records management, l cammitment tracking, radiological controls, special processes aantrol, l design change processire, accreditation of training, procurement ani control of repair parts, and several specific events.

At Oyster Creek, the Staff conducted evaluations including training facilities and program, preventive maintenance ard surveil-lance, chemistry, radiological controls, control room audits, non-control roczn shift operations, instructor training, control of special processes, control of regulatory cx:strdtzents, normal and emerge.Ty operating procedures, procurement and control of parts, records manageant, and several specific events.

In general, tne Staff found safety attitudes and practices to be satisfactorf. Station operating personnel, supervisors, and managers exhibit professionalism and coveten in the iglementation of policies. Staff evaluation of two scrams wnich occurred during Oyster Creek s:artop in late 1964 revealed a need for improved adherence to procedures and strengthened post-repair maintenance practices. NSCC notes that management's responses to these events were prcrgt and appropriate.

• Management's response to tne NSCC's report of October 15, 1984, (Clark, 4/1/85) is noted by the NSCC and fourd to be satisfactory. he NSOC encourages the GPW management to reduce response time.

Significant observations are reported in the followirg secticns cn M -1 ani Oyster Creek.

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II. LMI-l OERVATIOtG operations - control rocn activities are conducted in a professional manner witn an appropriate degree of formality.

Maintenance - Staff exhibits a professional attitude towards nuclear safety a:d ampliance. Administrative procedares are adequate.

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memistry - Department has staff, procedures, aM equipment to ensure adequate control. Omntinued management attention to calculaticnal methods for E oar and primary-to-semndarf leak rate is in order. The natural sulfate background levels in condensate storage should continue to be examinai.

Preventive Maintenance ard Surveillance - Established programs are found satisfactory, acquiatory Q:mitnant Trackirva - Tracking System in use is apprcpriate.

The percentage of past due items, however, exceeds carporate goals.

Radiological 03ntrols - Program is comprenensive and meets or exceecs all regulatory requirements for an operating plant. Improved coccanications to personnel outside those in RAD-CJti is encouraged in the area of the Radiological k areness Report system.

Special Processes Cbntrol - Q:ntrol of special processes is adequately administered. Efforts to cc:plete tne Carporate Welding Manual cn schedule are important.

Processing of Design ca.1e Packages - his review, while not yet ccrplete, shows adequate c esign configuration control. The area of welding procedures for certain materials is being furtner evaluated due to some inadequate welding results.

Accreditation of Training - NSCC notes that LIPD accreditation was granted for five impartant operator, snift technical advisor, and radiological technician training programs.

Control Rcx2n Monitoring - The extent of control roczn monitoring sub-i stantially ex:meis regulator / reqairecents; however, no adverse effects due to this mcnitoring on control rcxr operations were observed.

Ebliowing startup, tnis should be onitored to assure there is no distracticn of operators from operating functions.

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- (bre Spray Injection, Oct. 29, 1984 - Difficulty in following an extensive cne-time temporary procedure change was the root cause of this event. Management attention to improve in this area is apparent.

Peactor scrams, Oct. 31 aM Dec. 3.1984 - he NscC believes that these scrams were both related to Oyster Creek's long maintenance outage ard the resulting lack of operating opportunity. In both cases, operator and plant responses to the scrams were proper and effective. Root causes have been determined and appropriate remedial steps taken.

Preventive Maintenance and Surveillance - bare is a need to strergthen _

the priority system to assure that important-towafety equipment is regularly assignal higher priority than other equignent.

Drywell Ventilation Valve Modifications - A special NSCC investigaticn of modificaticms performed on four ma:.n drywell ventilaticn inlet and outlet valves found that tne :sodification decision was prudent and tnat it was offactively performed.

Chemistry - Department has adequate tecnnical and administrative proce-dures to ensure safe operations of chemistry-related systems. Upgrade of laboratory facilities, now in progress, extend the ability to detect chlorides and sulphates at very low concentraticns.

Cbntrol acom Atriits - (bntrol Ibom auditing activities are well plannai

• and scheduled. Auditing reports reflect cranpliance witn check lists and QA plans.

Instructor Training and Oaalification - Current instructors are quali-fied in accordanca with appropriate regulaticns. There is a ptential snortage of Smior Rector Operator li nsed instructors. Until addi-tional instructors are qualified, any significant increase in projected training scoedules would be un reain.

Records Managenent 'Ibe records management system is in order.

Cberective Maintenance - Mainistrative controls are adequate.

Cbatrol of_Special Processes (welding, brazing, heat treating, solder-ing, cutting, and ourning) - te program in place is effective and meets the requirements of the QA plan and the intent of 10CRSO 7ppendix s.

Procurement and Cbntrol of Parts - he promsses in use are acceptable.

'Ihe concept of snelt life vs assuranm of materials being acceptable prior to use bears examinaticxt.

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Nor:ral aM Dnergency 0;mratina Procedures - M,quats writtcn gaidance

! .~ is provided to the operotors for cofs operation of plant systc:o ani

. cocpsnents. de mechanism for keeping operators infor:ned of new or cha.W proondares appears to be satisfactory.

Radiological controls - Meq.: ate radiological controls exist. Improve-monts in follwing procedures and ti:nely response to awareness and deficiency reports can be unde.

Non-control Room Shif t operations - hase operations were found to be in 5:nnpliance. Trainee progress through the operator requalification program suggests the need for attention.

Regulatory h.itments - 16 safet/ or cxxnpliance findirgs were noted.

'n,a nusoer of overdue items are being vigorousif pursued to bring them in line with corporate goals.

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ENCTOSURE 2 I

Metropolitan Edison Company ii L - Post Office Box 542 Reading Pennsylvania 19640 215 929 3604 0 METED USMC Wnter's D rect Dial Number April 15, 1985 APR 26 A10:42 CFFICE of SECRt.Tsv DOCHETIteG & SEpvi; Mr. James M. Taylor, Director ANCH Office of Inspection and Enforcement Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Re: Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2

("TMI-1" and "TMI-2")

Operating License Nos. DPR-50 and DPR-73 Dockets Nos. 50-289 and 50-320 Partial Answer Pursuant to 10 CFR S 2.201 to Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty, Dated July 22, 1983 ("NOV")

Dear Sir:

This Partial Answer to the Notice of Violation and Proposed Impositicn of Civil Penalty, dated July 22, 1983 ("NOV")

is submitted by Metropolitan Edison Company (" Met-Ed") which was the licensee of TMI-l and TMI-2 at the time that the actions and omissions in 1979 specified in the NOV took place. This Partial Answer is directed to the portions of the NOV which require the Licensee to submit "a written statement or explanation including for each violation: (1) admission or denial of the alleged violation; (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted."

The balance of the answer to the requirements of the NOV requiring "a written statement or explanation (of] ...(3) the corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved; (4) the corrective steps which have been taken to avoid further viola-tions; and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved" Yet coc'tr Ec son Cc ca+, s a */c re c e Ge e a P.: c u o es 5,ste-

h Mr. James M. Taylor, Director April 15, 1985 Page is being provided in a contemporaneous written submittal by GPU Nuclear Corporation ("GPUNC"), the current licensee of TMI-l and TMI-2.

(1) Admission or denial of the alleged violations A. With respect to the alleged violation set forth in Item A on page 2 of the NOV:

Neither the undersigned nor any other present offi-cer of Met-Ed has first-hand knowledge of, or contemporaneous involvement with, the facts and surrounding circumstances concern-ing the charge made in Item A, page 2, of the NOV sufficient to provide a basis for either affirming or denying the specific citation set forth in this Item. However, based on my review of the relevant portions of the Partial Initial Decision ("PID"),

dated July 27, 1982, of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

("ASLB"), in Docket 50-289, the Report, dated March 21, 1983 of the Commission's Office of Investigations and its Attachments (collectively, the "OI Report"), and the two reports (" Speaker I" and " Speaker II") of Fred Speaker, a member of the Pepper, Hamilton

& Sheetz law firm, I am unable to conclude that the specific violations alleged in this Item have been fully substantiated.

There is enclosed, in accordance with the instructions in the penultimate paragraph of the NOV, a Separate Answer in accor-dance with 10 CFR 2.205 requesting mitigation or partial remission of the civil penalty. As set forth in that Separate Answer and its accompanying Memorandum, Met-Ed believes that violations occurred but that the nature of those violations differs from that stated in Item A of the NOV, and Met Ed, therefore, requests that Item A of the NOV be modified to eliminate the characterization of the violations as " willful" and that a portion of the civil penalty be remitted.

Notwithstanding that view, there is enclosed, under protest, Met-Ed's check in the amount of S100,000 in payment of the civil penalty of $100,000 imposed by Item A of the NOV.

B. With respect to the alleged violation set forth in Item B on page 3 of the NOV:

Met Ed admits that, as charged in the NOV:

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a Mr. James M. Taylor, Director April 15, 1985 Page "On August 9, 1979 the Commission ordered Three Mile Island, Unit No. 1 to remain in cold shutdown until certain short-term actions were completed and until reasonable progress was made toward satisfactory completion of certain long-term actions. Metropolitan Edison Company (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1),

CLI-79-8, 10 NRC 141 (1979). The order in-cluded a provision concerning augmentation of

' retraining of all Reactor Operators and Senior Reactor Operators assigned to the control room including training in the areas of natural circulation and small break loss of coolant accidents. . . ' Id. at 144.

"In the licenree's September 12 and 14, 1979 responses to the Order, [ Met-Ed] committed to establish an Operator Accelerated Retraining Program (OARP) to accomplish certain objectives necessary for resuming operation of TMI-1. ~

Operators who failed portions of the exam given at the end of the OARP were required to attend lectures and take weekly quizzes to enable the licensee to evaluate its trainees' knowledge level.

" Contrary to the above, the implementation of the licensee's training program was not capable of ensuring proper training of operators and senior operators or of accurately evaluating trainee knowledge level in areas necessary for safe operation of the plant in that cheating occurred during the licensee administered quizzes on November 2 and 26, 1980, December 19, 1980, March 27, 1981 and the mock exam on

April 2-3, 1981."

The imposition of a civil penalty in the amount of S40,000 with respect to this item was not contested and payment of that amount was made on or about August 2, 1984.

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Mr. James M. Taylor, Director April 15, 1985 Page (2) The reasons for the violations if admitted As to Item A Met Ed believes that the reasons for the violation are as stated in the Separate Answer pursuant to 10 CFR 2.205 and its accompanying Memorandum.

As to Item B This matter has been the subject of hearings in the Commission's Docket 50-289, resulting in the July 27, 1982 PID of the ASLB, which sets forth the reasons for the violations.

Very truly yours, d

Floy J. Smith President Enclosure cc: J. Stolz T. Murley R. Conte Sworn to and Subscribed Before me this /5" day of April, 1985

% (A,Ami /h KJ k Notary Public /

SUSAN UNGER Notary Pue c. 5ts:e v *.e* 'crx No.JI-4ed,2,3 Quali@J h feQ A ' o'k OMt e Com.s.i....,n Empr es f.t.r :n e,. . .; 7

i g GPU Nuclear Corporation UCgM7 100 lnterpace Parkway Parsippany. New Jersey 07054-114'-

(201)263 6500 TELEX 136-482 Writer 5 Direct Dial Numter:

April 15, 1985 5211-85-2044 Mr. James M. Taylor, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement Nuclear Regulatcry Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Re: Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Units 1 ard 2

(" M -1" and " M -2")

Operating License Nos. DPR-50 and DPR-73 Dockets Nos. 50-289 and 50-320 Partial Answer Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201 to Notice of Violation and Preposed Irposition of Civil Penalty, dated July 22, 1983 ("NOV")

Dear Sir:

This partial answer to the Notice of Violation and Proposed Impositien of Civil Penalty, dated July 22,1983 ("NOV") is submitted by GPU Nuclear Corpor-aticn ("GPUN") which is the current Licensee of M-1 and 'IMI-2. This partial answer is directed to the requirements of the NOV which require the Licensee to sutcit "a written statement or explanation: (of) . . . (3) the corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved; (4) the corrective steps which have been taken to avoid further violations; and (5) the date when full ccepliance will be achieved" The balance of the requirements of the NOV reqairing "a written statement or explanation: (of) . .. (1) admission er denial of the alleged violation; and (2) the reasons for the violation" is being provided in a contemporaneous written statement submitted by Metro-politan Edison Ccepany (" Met Ed"), the licensee of TMI-l and M-2 at the time that the events addressed in the NOV took place. This Partial Answer and the Met-Ed response are being submitted by April 16, 1985, pursuant to an exten-sion of time to that date granted by J. M. Taylor on April 2,1985.

GPU %c' ear Cerecration is a s cscary of General Puthc Utat es Corporat:cn

4 Jameg M. Tcylor i April 15, 1985 Page No. 2 Item A (3) The Corrective Steps Which Have Eeen Taken and the Results Achieved The matters discussed in Item A of the NOV were the-subject of scrutiny in one aspect of the 'D1I-l Restart proceeding, and are discussed in the Partial Initial Decision ("PID"), dated July 27, 1982, of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ("ASLB") in Docket No. 50-289. They were also investigated by the Commission's Office of Investigations as discussed in its Report, dated March 21, 1983 (the "OI Report"). In addition, subsequent to the issuance of the PID, GPUN retained Fred Speaker, Esq., a member of the law firm of Pepper, Hamilton & Sheetz, to make an independent investigation c:xi to furnish a report with respect to these matters. Mr. Speaker was subsequently requested to make a further investigation and to render a further report. Copies of the Speaker Repcrts have previously been furnished to the NRC Staff.

In the PID, the operator who submitted work prepared by another operator in corpletion of a take-hcce examination is identified as "W",

the other operator who prepared such work is identified as "0", and the

'IMI Station Manager is identified as Mr. Gary Miller. 'Ihose identifica-tions are used in this letter.

The Corrective Steps Taken Are:

(a) The actions taken by Metropolitan Edisen Corpany against W in 1979 are discussed in paragraphs 2277-2286 of the PID and were found appropriate by the ASLB. Following W's testimony during the Reopened Restart Proceeding, additional acticn was taken with respect to W as set forth in R. C. Arnold memorandum to J. R. Floyd, dated March 4,1983, copy attached, because of the variance between what he told G. Miller in 1979 and his hearing test!nony. On April 22, 1983, W resigned as an e. ployee of GPUN and since that tite has not been employed 17y any GPU System Ccepany.

(b) In an order dated #ngust 3, 1982, the ASLB added an additicnn.1 condi-tion to its PID requiring tint any participation by Gary Miller in the start-up, testing or cperation of 'IMI-1 te under the direct supervision of a1 appro-priately qualified official cif GPUN. By a letter, dated August 19, 1982, the then President of GPUN advised Mr. Miller that he would be transferred from GPUN to an affiliated public utility corpany. (A ccpy of that letter is Attachment 25 to the OI Paport.) Mr. Miller was subsequently so transferred and is not involved in GPUN activities.

(c) As noted in Paragraph 2059 of the PID, Licensee recognized that it could te legitimately criticized for not having a formal process and a written

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/ James M. Taylor April 15, 1985 Page No. 3 procedure for operator qualification certification and committed itself to establish such a procedure.

21I-1 Administrative Procedures 1058, " Requirements for Certification of Candidates for NPC Operator Licenses and Instructor Certifications," and 31I-2 Administrative Procedure 4210-Ani-2610.01 (formerly AP-1006), " Requirements for Certificatica of Candidates for NIC Operator Licenses," to correct this deficiency and carry out this commitment were prepared and were inplemented on February 3, 1982 and September 1, 1982, respectively.

In addition, through letters, and interviews with employees and senior management, Licensee repeatedly emphasized to all elements of its organization the need for rigcrous compliance with all requirements.

The detailed investigation of these matters reflected (a) in the pro-ceeding before the Special Master, (b) in the OI and Speaker Reports, and (c) your Notice of Violation, and the media attention they have received has, of course, underscored for all elements of Licensee's organization the importance of such compliance.

(4) The Corrective Steps hhich Have Been Taken To Avoid Further Violation The response to (3) is also applicable here. In addition, Licensee has established a policy to remind its personnel regularly and periodi-cally of the necessity for full compliance. In addition, as discussed in our response to Item B below, the Licensee had undertaken to deter cheating and to detect cheating if such should occur. These Licensee's procedures were the subject of extensive review during the recent Reopened Proceeding on training, and in the Licensing Board Response to CLI-85-2, the Board found that GPUN had established "(s)tringent security measures." In addition, the emphasis on open channels of communication between Licensee management and staff, a process also endorsed by the -

Licensing Board in their April 11, 1985 Response to CLI-85-2, will provide further assurance of rigorous regulatory compliance.

(5) The Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved Licensee believes that full compliance has been achieved.

Item B (3) The Corrective Steps hhich Have Been Taken and the Results Achieved At the ccrrencement of the NRC's investigation of cheating on its

I j Jamea M. Taylor April 15, 1985 Pace No. 4

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April 1981 examination, operators O and W were suspended from their duties and subsequently their employment was terminated. Investigations were conducted by Licensee as well as the NRC to determine whether there had been cheating on Licensee examinations as well as the tmC exams. The investigations included interviews of all operators to determine if there were other known instances of cheating and to emphasize to them Licensee's policy that cheating on examinations was not permissible under any circum-stances. The results of these investigations were included in the reopened restart hearing presided over by the Special fiaster. Licensee's investigation determined that proctoring on some of the " Category T" examinations was inadequate. Therefore, all individuals who had not received a grade of 90% or more on the initial examination in #4ril of 1980 were required to be reexamined.,

Actions regarding other individuals, determined by the ASLB to have been involved in cheating on licensee administered examinations, were taken consistent with recommendations of the ASLB.

In addition, upon receipt of the PID in the stuner of 1982, Licensee urriertook an extensive internal effort with the Training Department management as well as Operations personnel to assure that the causes of the cheating, including most particularly the " attitudes" involved, were understood and their responsibility to help ensure that proper attitudes existed and that any improper attitudes are detected and corrected.

Licensee also underteck an assessment of other operator attitudes (FER study) ard followed through on results of that study acst recently reported to the Ccemission on Decerber 31, 1984.

In addition, Licensee has accepted all the conditions in this. area required by the ASLB's Partial Initial Decision and has taken the following steps:

a. The Director of Training and Education issued procedure 6200-ACM--

2600.01, October 20, 1981, pertaining to control and administration of examinations. This procedure was followed by a supplemental pro-cedure for Operator Training, 6210-Artb2604.01, December 1, 1982, which contained provisions for review of all examinations within +-

2% of passire for consistency in grading and for reviews of a sarple l

of examinations for evidence cf collusion. In accordance with an ASLB requirement, this latter procedure has been submitted to and approved by the NRC.

b. An Instructor qualification program fer Operator Training instructors was implemented in December 1982. This procedure, 6210-Atti-2610.02, was also submitted to and approved by the NPC.

e James M. T;.ylor I April 15, 1985 Page tb. 5

c. An instructor evaluation program, which had been conducted informally, was formalized and implemented on January 12, 1983. This procedure, 6210-Ant-2631.02, meets a condition of the ASLB.

d. An independent audit was conducted by Data-Design Laboratories to assess the adequacy of Operator Training and Radiological Controls Technician Training. A verification of the efficacy of the operator training and testing program will be achieved by another independent audit to meet a condition of the ASLB.

e. Licensee developed and implemented thorough procedures for the certi-fication of operators for license renewal and of candidates for NRC licensing examinations. Assignment of a full-time administrative assistant to the Operator Training Section to track training require-ments has also helped to ensure that certification requirements are met.

f. Licensee's senior management issued letters to, and conducted inter-views with, management and operational personnel to emphasize Licensee's intolerance of cheating and to reinforce the significance of, and need for, examinations conducted by the NPC and Licensee.

Interviews of all licensed operators to keep these issues squarely before them have been continued on an annual basis by the 'INI-l Vice President.

Licensee believes that such corrective steps have been successful in instilling prcper attitudes and an awareness throughout Licensee's organi-zation of the importance of preventing further violations.

(4) The Corrective Steps Which Have Been Taken To Avoid Further Violations The steps discussed under (3) are designed to avoid further viola-tions. Licensee has continued to improve its training program and evalua-tiens to assure operators are fully prepared for their duties and the related licensing examinations and thus eliminate the potential incentives for cheating. In addition, the ASLB Partial Initial Decision imposes a two-year post 'IMI-1 restart probation period and, during that period, the second independent audit referred to in 3(d) above will be completed.

(5) The Date When Full Ccmpliance Will Be Achieve i

Licensee believes that full compliance has been achieved. I Very truly yours,

. M P. R. Clark

! President

. . , . . _ _ - - - _ . . . . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ , . _ _ . - . _ -_ _ _ _ . . _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . , . . _ . _ _ . , . _ - . - ~ . _ . . . .

James M. Taylor April 15, 1985 Page No. 6 Sworn to and Subscribed Before me this i dday of April, 1985

/1 i AJ Notary Public VERCt';CA A GEARHART G M PUGUCOFt;Ey;JEge5y f.t> C.c:::sici EGZ M:y 10.1537 i

I e

i i

GPU Nucl2ar Ccrparcti n y Pest Oflice Box 480 II QJ f g [Q' @ 7 Route 441 Soutn Miccletown. Pennsylvania 17CU 717 944 7621 TELEX 84 2386

Wnter"s Direct Dial Numoer March 4,1983 C, -

h'M - 7 l- . .

Mr. James R. Floyd fiUCLE.u ....,Ji E ..

P.O. Box 613 Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057

Dear Mr. Floyd:

In July,1979, you were involved in an incident in which you turned in training assignments for which portions of the answers were written for you by another employee. The training assignments were required in orcer for you to maintain satisfactory standing in TMI's Licensed Operator Requalification Program. This incident was the subject of extensive review and testimony in the course of THI Unit 1 ASLB proceedings. As a result of the issues raised during those pro-ceedings, the Company initiated an independent investigation. Those issues also have been tne subject of an NRC investigation.

In my review of that incident shortly after it occurred, I understood from your management, based upon their discussions with you, that:

1. You believed that by studying the answers suoplied by another that you had satisfied the requirements of the assignments;

2. You did not view the assistance you received as improper;

3. You had made no effort to disguise the receipt of the assistance; and

4. You had readily discussed the incident openly.

Your testimony during the ASLB hearing, confir ed by our investigation, provides a substantively different explanation of your understanding of the requirements you were obligated to fulfill. Specifically, on Page 26,660 of the transcript of hearings held by Judge Milhollin you state:

"I wanted the substitutien of someone else's work for my own to buy me enougn time to do it at a time that was more convenient for me. And when I submitted Mr. O's work in with my answers, I was firmly con-vinced that the system of checks and balances that we had designed into the internal operation of Three liile Island would detect that it was not my handwriting or my printing as the case may be and that GPU Nu0 feat Cerocrat On is a sutsic;ary c! tne General Puth: Utilities C0'c rati:-

,.- e i

Mr. James R. Floyd Page 2 March 4,1983 .

> those answers would be totally unacceptable to the Training Depart-ment, and that therefore I would have to do some additional work before I could be recertified."

You go on on Page 26,661 to say:

"And I opted to go on vacation the next day knowing full well that there was probably some punishment in store for me when I returned from vacation."

In August,1979, based upon my understanding of your explanation of the cir-cumstances surrounding that incident, I accepted that you had made an error in judgment on administrative requirements but that you had not realized what you did was in violation of Company requirements. The additional information i

developed more recently shows that you clearly understood at the time that what you did was improper. Had I realized in August, 1979, that you had that uncerstanding, that would have altered considerably my judgment as to tne proper response by the Company. The discipline for deliberate misconduct by 4 a member of management is much more severe than that for inacequate performance

- and exercise of poor judgment.

I have reviewed the record now available as to your actions in 1979. I have also considered the fact that your work performance since then has been erratic, and you have not performed up to the level required from someone in the senior technical positions you have held.

Consicering all of these factors, you are being placed on probation for the balance of 1983. Your performance will be evaluated at the end of each cal-encar quarter with particular emphasis on thoroughness and timeliness in com-pleting your assigned tasks. I emphasize these points because you have needed

close supervision and specificity for your assignments characteristic of a relatively inexperienced engineer.

At the end of 198b (or if circumstances warrant, any time during the year) we will decioe whether your performance is such that it is in the best interest of the Company to continue your employment.

4 Very truly yours, f

/* f;

~

I G 4}~ -

R. CS rnold President slm i

cc: P. R. Clark B. K. Kanga J. J. Barton

_.-y

l copies sent to:

J. Stolz T. Murley R. Conte

Metropolitan Edison Company e Post Office Box 542 Reading Pennsylvania 19640 215 929 3601 Writer's Direct Dial Number April 15, 1985 Mr. James M. Taylor, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Re: Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2

("TMI-1" and "TMI-2")

Operating License Nos. DPR-50 and DPR-73 Dockets Nos. 50-289 and 50-320 Separate Answer Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.205 to Item' A of Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty, dated July 22, 1983 ("NOV")

Dear Sir:

This Separate Answer Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.205 with respect to Item A of the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty, dated July 22, 1983 ("NOV"), is submitted by Metropolitan Edison Company (" Met-Ed") which was the licensee of TMI-l and TMI-2 at the time that the actions and l omissions in 1979 specified in the NOV took place.

l For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum, l Met Ed believes that (1) the violations charged in Item A of the NOV are not fully substantiated in that such violations should not be characterized as " willful" and, therefore, that the statement of violations should be modified, and (2) the civil penalty imposed by the NOV should be appropriately mitigated or remitted.

Very truly yours, o *

. VJ . Smith President cc: J. Stolz T. Murley R. Conte ibed l

Sworn Beforetome andthisSubsc{

/5' day I of l

%gril1985 em LL Notary Publih i

Sosen Ungr- /

YitDoyk3"

i Qua71ed in New York Coun commm n .. Ma@& hson Company 's a Member of the General Pubhc Utnes System

MEMORANDUM of METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY Accompanying Separate Answer, Dated April 15, 1985 Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.205 with Respect to Item A of the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty, Dated July 22 1983.

April 15, 1985

e4 FOREWORD I am Floyd J. Smith, President of Metropolitan Edison Company (" Met Ed").

At the time of the Three Mile Island Unit No. 2 ("TMI-2")

accident on March 28, 1979, I was Vice President-Administration of GPU Service Corporation ("GPUSC"). On September .1, 1979, while remaining Vice President-Administration of GPUSC, I became a Senior Vice President of Met Ed. I retained these positions until February 1, 1982, when, following my election as President of Met Ed, I resigned my position as Vice President-Administration of GPUSC. In addition, I have been a director of Met-Ed since October 1979, of GPUSC since January 1982, and of GPU Nuclear Corporation since January 1982.

The Office of Inspection and Enforcement ("I&E") of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (" Commission" or "NRC") has issued a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty,' dated

' July 22, 1983 ("NOV"). Item A of the NOV relates in part to a letter, dated August 3, 1979, to lthe NRC signed by G. P. Miller, then TMI station Manager, certify'ing that an operator (identified as "VV" in the proceeding hereinafter mentioned and in this M,emorand um) , who was then the TMI-2 Supervisor of Operations (but who was shortly thereafter reassigned), had received a satisfactory rating upon completion of the TMI operator accelerated requalifica-(

(i) i

e tion program. The NOV asserts that the August 3, 1979 letter and a subsequent November 15, 1979 certification of the operator contain willful material false statements.

Neither I nor any other present officer of Met Ed has any first-hand knowledge of, or contemporaneous involvement with, facts and surrounding circumstances concerning the charge made in Item A of the NOV to provide a basis for affirming or denying the accuracy of the charges in 'the NOV. However, these matters were, in part, the subject of a hearing before a Special Master in the Reopened TMI-1 Restart Proceeding that resulted in a report of the Special Master, dated April 28, 1982 and a Partial Initial Decision, dated July 27, 1982 ("PID"), of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ("ASLB"), assigned to conduct the proceeding in Docket No. 50-289. I have read with care what have been identified for me as the portions of the PID relevant to Item A of the NOV.

The PID of the ASLB recommended that the Commission direct the NRC staff to conduct an investigation into the August 3, 1979 letter certification of VV to the NRC for operator license

! renewal. In its Memorandum and Order, dated October 14, 1982, the l

l Commission agreed with the ASLB that there was reasonable cause to inquire further into the matter and directed its Office of Investi-gations ("OI"), which had already commenced an investigation, to continue with that investigation and to provide its findings, when

available, to I&E.

l

[

(ii)

OI conducted its investigation and, under date of March 21, 1983, issued (for limited distribution) its 57' 'page detailed report with 28 Attachments (many of which are multi-page documents) and a 3-1/2 page summary (collectively, the "OI Report"). The OI Report was made available to Met Ed about February 1, 1985. I have read with care the OI Report and its Attachments.

The TMI-2 accident occurred more than six years ago. The certification of VV in the August 3, 1979 letter occurred almost six years ago. The hearings on these matters before the Special Master were held in November and December 1981. The OI investiga-tion was conducted in the Fall of 1982. I concluded that it was unlikely (given both the investigations heretofore made and the passage of time since the events in question) that additional probative evidence could be developed at this late date, either by attempting to retread the same investigative ground that had

-already been so extensively covered by OI or by undertaking new lines of inquiry. I also concluded that the OI investigation had demonstrated that some of the assumptions made, and concerns expressed, by the ASLB were without compelling substantive founda-tion, and that these assumptions and concerns of the ASLB were probably the consequence of what the ASLB itself recognized was an inadequate record compiled before the Special Master upon which the ASLB was functioning.

Assuming the accuracy and completeness of the information contained in the OI Report, this Memorandum presents the conclu-(iii) 21 -_

sions that I have reached based on review of the OI Report, portibns of the PID and the NOV. I do wish to point out that, while I have fully participated in the preparation of this Memorandum and the separate answer of Met Ed Pursuant to 10 CFR S 2.205 which it accompanies, I have had the assistance of counsel in their preparation.

There is one caveat that I wish to note. On or about June 15, 1984, VV was indicted by a Grand Jury of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania under a four-count indictment. Count I indicted VV for violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1001 and 2, for knowingly and

- willfully using a f alse writing knowing the same to contain mate-rial false statements, namely, that VV submitted as his own work an examination on principles of reactor theory (Section A of VV's FSR quiz] when such examination did not represent VV's own work, but rather had been substantially prepared by another. Count II of that indictment made a similar charge with respect to the submis-sion by VV as his own work of an examination on fuel handling and core perimeters (sic) (Section H of VV's FSR quiz]. VV was convicted of those charges and, on March 12, 1985, sentenced to pay a fine of $2,000 and placed on probation for a period of ,

two years, with a specified condition of probation that he shall perform 400 hours0.00463 days <br />0.111 hours <br />6.613757e-4 weeks <br />1.522e-4 months <br /> of community service work.

Count III.of that indictment charged that, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1001 and 2, VV knowingly (iv)

and willfully caused a false statement and misrepresentation of a material fact to be made by causing a letter to be sent to the NRC which stated that VV had achieved a score of 89.1% on a requalifi-cation program test dealing with principles of reactor theory

[Section A] when he had not legitimately obtained that grade.

Also, Count IV of that indictment charged that, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1001 and 2, on November 15, 1979 VV had knowingly and willfully made a false statement and representation of a material fact by representing to the NRC that during the previous term of his Senior Reactor Operator's license he had satisfactorily completed the Met Ed operator requalification program when in fact he had submitted as his own work written examinations which had been done by another. It is my understand-ing that Counts III and IV were dismissed.

I do not know whether the transcript of VV's trial will provide relevant information concerning the subject matter of the NOV. Counsel who have been assisting me in the preparation of this Memorandum have been informed that the transcripts of the hearings in that trial have not yet been made available. I intend to review the transcripts of the hearings in that trial when they are avail-able and, if they provide relevant information, to supplement this Memorandum. l spectfully submitted, d

Floyf J/ Smith (v)

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 II. Summary of My Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 III. Detailed Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 A. The Basis for Recertification of VV . . . . . . . 17 Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 (a) OI Interview of Dennis J. Boltz . . . . . 18 (b) OI Interview of Richard W. Zechman . . . . . 18 (c) OI Interview of Marshall L. Beers . . . . . 20 (d) OI Interview of Nelson D. Brown . . . . . 21 (e) OI Interview of Lawrence L. Lawyer . . . . . 22 (f) OI Interview of Thomas L. Hombach . . . . . 22 (g) OI Interview of VV . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 B. The 89.1% Score on Section A . . . . . . . . . . 27 Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 C. The Oral Testing of VV . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 D. The Comments, Dated May 19, 1982, of Miller Through His Counsel Submitted to the ASLB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 E. Materiality With Respect to Both the PID and the NOV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 IV. The November 15, 1979 Certification by Met Ed . . . . 51 A. The November 15, 1979 Certification . . . . . . . 51 B. The ASLB's PID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 C. The OI Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 V. Developments Subsequent to Issuance of the PID . . . 53

c

'i t

6 f

. MEMORANDUM OF METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY (" MET ED")

Accompanying Separate Answer, dated April 15, 1985 Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.205 with respect to Item A of the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty, dated July 22, 1983 ("NOV").

This memorandum accompanies the Separate Answer, dated April 15, 1985, Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.205 of Metropolitan Edison Company (" Met Ed") with respect to Item A of the Notice of Viola-tion and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty, dated July 22, 1983

("NOV"), of the Of fice of Inspection and Enforcement ("I&E") of'the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC").

I. Background A. The background giving rise to the issues herein discussed is summarized in paragraphs 2272-2274 of the Partial Initial Deci-sion, dated July 27, 1982 ("PID"), of the Atomic Safety and Licens-ing Board ("ASLB") of the NRC, assigned to conduct the proceedings in Docket No. 50-289. Those paragraphs of the PID, quoted in full text, are:

"2272. VV was the supervisor of operations at TMI-2 as of July 1979 and until he was relieved of that assign-ment shortly t.hereafter. O is the person discussed throughout this proceeding as one of the cheaters on the April 1981 NRC licensing examination. The events involved in this incident do not directly relate to the reasons for reopening the evidentiary hearing. The matter is signifi-cant in that it relates to management's general response to cheating and the conduct of Gary Miller, who was then 4

l

' TMI station manager and who is now GPU Nuclear's start-up and test director.

t

F' "2273. In August 1977, VV who then held a TMI-1 op-erator license, passed a cross-licensing exam for Unit 2 with an overall grade of 70%. Because of an NRC-required administrative procedure (Administrative Procedure 1006, TMIA Ex. 65) he had to participate in a special portion of the next company requalification program known as Funda-mentals and SystemRegwp scored less than 80% .

(FSR) in two areas where he On his TMI-1 operator's requalification exam in February 1978 he passed, but this time he failed to score the needed 80% on three areas.

One weak area was also a weak area on the cross-licensing exam, so he had to train in four FSR sections.

"244/ Under current grading criteria an overall grade of 70% is not enough. The candidate must achieve 70% in each area and 80% overall. See PID 1 268, 14 NRC at 476, citing NUREG-06bO, Task 1.A.3.

"2274. He d idn ' t attend FSR classes and therefore was given closed-book take home exam's which he didn't return. Because of a grace period, it wasn't until July 1, 1979 that he finally faced suspension from licensed duties. By then he was desperate. On the evening of July 1, 1979 he was faced with an absolute deadline, and he was also faced with vacation plans beginning the next day.

After work VV induced O to help him. VV (or someone on his behalf) turned in O's work, in O's handwriting, as part of VV's own work. The training department detected the handwriting differences. O was absolved, VV was said to be disciplined for his conduct, and VV was later recertified to the NRC for his license renewal based in part, as we find, upon work done for him by O. The incident raised three issues: Did Licensee deal correctly with 0; with VV; and with the NRC in recertifying VV?"

B. VV went on vacation after turning in his FSR quizzes which included O's work in connection with the answers to two portions of the FSR quizzes, one called "Section A: Principles of Reactor Theory" -

sometimes also referred to as " Category A", and the other called "Section H: Fuel Handling and Core Parameters",

sometimes also referred to as " Category H." While VV's FSR quizzes were being graded by Edward R. Frederick of the TMI Training Department, Frederick noted the apparent handwriting discrepancies.

Frederick called the handwriting discrepancies to the attention of Richard W. Zechman, Supervisor of Training, who asked Frederick to complete the grading. Frederick did so and apparently assigned a grade of 89.1% to the Section A answers and of 64% to the Section H answers. (Frederick, Zechman and others have provided sworn statements that they did not consider the Section A and Section H answers submitted by VV as acceptable.) Apart from the handwriting discrepancies on Section A, VV had failed to achieve the required 80% grades on two other Sections (one of which was Section H) . The Met Ed Administrative Procedure ("AP-1006") required that an operator who had failed to achieve an 80% score on two or more sections be relieved of his duties and be assigned full-time to the Training Department for an Accelerated Requalification Prog ram

("ARP"), which requires that the operator achieve 80% or better grades on each of the subjects covered in the ARP. While Floyd was on vacation, he was assigned full-time to the Training Department for an ARP.

C. The central issue raised by the ASLB with respect to this matter wast Did VV's ARP and examination with respect thereto include Section A materials. The ASLB stated in PID Paragraph 2295 that it did not, but the ASLB d id not state the basis for that conclusion.

D. Apparently based on the view that VV's ARP (including the ARP exam) did not include Section A materials, the ASLB assumed that the certification of VV for license renewal was based in part on the grade assigned to Section A of VV's FSR quiz (which included the work of 0) and that such certification was a false material statement.

E. Proceeding from that assumption, the ASLB stated its view in paragraphs, 2287 and 2296 of the PID, which are quoted in full text:

"2287. On August 3, 1979 Gary Miller, the TMI Sta-tion Manager, certified to Paul Collins, Chief of the NRC Operator Licensing Branch, that VV had satisfactorily com-pleted the 1978-79 requalification program. TMIA Ex. 74.

This certification is the center of an important issue as to whether Mr. Miller had certified VV to the NRC for license renewal knowing that o's improper assistance con-tributed to the completion of the requalification program by VV. We conclude below that he did and that there is reasonable cause to inquire further whether Mr. Miller, thus the Licensee, has made a false material statement in connection with the recertification of VV."

"2296. On August 3, 1979 Mr. Miller wrote to Mr.

Collins of the NRC that on retesting, VV had received 89.1% on Section A, 80.5% on Section G, and, as a result of the accelerated requalification program, a score of 99.8% on the other two sections, E and H. TMIA Ex. 74.

These would have been satisfactory scores on all four areas of weakness. The letter did not mention the inci-dent involving O's help to VV. The August 3, letter was, we conclude, a false material statement to the NRC.

It was the basis for vv's operator's license renewal."

l l F. The following is the full text of the letter from Mr.

I j Miller to Mr. Collins referred to in Paragraphs 2287 and 2296 of i

i the PID:

l MET-ED GPU Metropolitan Edison Company Post Office Box 480 j Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 j

August 3, 1979 Mr. Paul F. Collins U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Of fice of Nuclear Regulations Washington, D.C. 2-555

Dear Mr. Collins:

Re: James R. Floyd (SOP-2051-3)

In accordance with Three Mile Island Administrative Procedure 1006, Metropolitan Edison Operator Requali-fication Prog ram , I hereby certify the satisfactory rating of Mr. Floyd, based upon his completion of an accelerated requalification program in which he achieved a score of 99.8.

By way of background during the 1978-79 requalifica-tion year, Mr. Floyd was found to be deficient in four category sections:

Section A: Principles of Reactor Theory Section E: Safety and Emergency Systems Section G: Radiation Control Section H: Fuel Handling and Core Parameters As a consequence he was required to upgrade these areas in response to Administrative Procedure 1006 and, on retesting, received the following grades:

Section A: 89.1 Section E: 75.6 Section G: 80.5 Section H: 64 Since he received two scores less than 80%, a specif-ically tailored program was instituted which enabled him to improve in the areas of demonstrated weakness and to attain the level of proficiency indicated by the test score in paragraph I above.

Sincerely, G. P. Miller Station Manager GPM/WHP/lcs cca M. L. Beers J. R. Floyd H. G. Herbein L. L. Lawyer R. W. Zechman G. The ASLB recommended (at Paragraphs 2312-2314 and 2419 (2) of the PID) that the Commission direct the NRC Staff to conduct an investigation into the August 3,1979 certification of W to the NRC for operator's license renewal in accordance with the ASLB's discussions at PID Paragraphs 2313-2314. In its Memorandum and Order (CLI-82-31), dated October 14, 1982, the NRC agreed with the ASLB that there was reasonable cause to inquire further into the matter and directed its Of fice of Investigations ("OI"), which had already commenced its investigation, to provide its findings, when available, to Ist.

H. The ASLB, in PID Paragraphs 2312-2314, had delineated the scope of the Staff investigation that it recommended into what the ASLB characterized as "all of the uncertainties mentioned in the foregoing discussion of the certification for W's renewal." Under date of March 21, 1983, OI issued a 57 page detailed report with 28 Attachments (many of which are multi-page documents), and a 3-1/2 l page summary (collectively, the "OI Report"). It appears that 4

l the OI Report carried out the investigation that the ASLB had recommended. Based upon my review of the OI Report, it appears f

t that many of what the ASLB characterized (in the relevant portion of the PID) as " findings," " conclusions," or " holdings" were the

! product of the " uncertainties" to which the ASLB referred and which f caused the ASLB to recommend the investigation. For example, the PID states at Paragraph 2316:

]

{  !

~ . . - - - - . . . . . _ _ _

" Messrs. Zechman, Beers and Lawyer are involved only to the extent that Mr. Miller states that i they knew and approved of his action (Tr. 24,440 (Miller)), and of course these individuals have not been given any opportunity to explain their role."

I. The OI investigation not only provided such an opportunity to those individuals, but it also provided such an opportunity to Messrs. Dennis J. Boltz, Nelson D. Brown, Thomas Hombach, and William H. Parker, all of whom were involved in some aspects of the matter and who apparently had not previously had such an opportunity. The OI investigation also included interviews with VV, Miller and others. It also provided some additional documentation. Most importantly, the OI investigation has provided an opportunity to gain an appreciation of how (1) the lack in 1979 of an appropriate procedure and process for certification of operator requalification, (2) Miller's failure to ascertain and identify with precision the appropriate course of action to be taken following his investigation of the facts relating to VV's submittal of the work of 0 as part of the answers to the FSR quiz materials required to be submitted by VV, (3) Miller's inadequate and sometimes cryptic - instructions to his subordinates, (4)

Miller's lack of sufficient personal follow-through, and (5) the beleagured state of affairs at TMI only a few months after the accident, could give rise to the apparently incorrect assumptions and misunderstandings reflected in the PID.

i l

II. Summary of My Conclusions A. Since the presentation of the evidentiary basis for the conclusions that I have reached requires a detailed review of many of the documents in the OI Repdrt, I' believe it is appropriate to summarize my conclusions here. Those conclusions are:

1. The ASLB's conclusion (in PID Paragraph 2295) that VV was not assigned to an ARP on Section A is not substantiated by the weight of the evidence presented in the OI Report. On the contrary, in their sworn statements that are Attachments to the OI Report, those responnible for developing and administering the ARP for VV in July 1979 have -

provided sworn statements that VV's ARP included Section A materials and have also identified the basis for that view in the outline of VV's ARP program, as well as in their statements concerning their oral discussions of Section A materials held with VV while he was in the ARP. (The ARP program includes oral discussions with instructors as well as the review of written materials.)

2. Although the PID does not explicitly address the issue of whether VV's written examination at the conclusion of VV's ARP included an examination of VV on Section A mate-rials, it is apparent from the ASLB's PID that the ASLB assumed that it did not. However, in their sworn statements that are Attachments to the OI Report, those responsible for preparing, proctoring, administering and approving the results of that examination have stated that that ARP examination included Section A materials and have identified the basis for that view in W's ARP written examination. W also stated under oath that that written examination included Se tion A materials and has identified in that examination the basis for that belief.

3. The initial assignment by the Training Department of a grade of 89.1% for Section materials in the FSR quiz submit-ted by W on or about July 1, 1979 was proLably an appropriate interim action while an investigation was being made as to whether the work submitted by W on Section A materials in his FSR quiz included work done by O. However, at least by the time that W admitted, on July 9, 1979, that he had submitted the work of O as part of his Section A FSR quiz answer (if not earlier), that grade should have been expunged from the Training Department records. The OI Report does not address the issue of why that was not done. I am left with the impression that there was no follow-through by the Training Department supervision in correcting the records, and that this was an oversight in a poorly-administered record-keeping process rather than a conscious decision by the Training Department.

4. Although Miller believed that he had directed the Training Department to include Section A materials in W's l

ARP, no written memorandum from Miller to that effect has been found and it may never have existed. However, since, as stated above, key members of the Training Department have provided sworn statements that VV's ARP program and ARP written exam included Section A materials, the absence of such a memorandum does not appear to be significant. There may have been a failure in communication between Miller and Zechman, since, on July 11, 1979, Zechman sent a memorandum to Floyd with a copy to Miller, stating that:

"In addition to the assignments made as part of your Accelerated Training Program, you are requested to re-do FSR assignment for Category A. This exam is attached for your use. This extra work is at the request of G. P. Miller to insure validity of this section of FSR."

While Zechman was unable to explain the purpose of that directive, his sworn statement was that the re-doing of that FSR assignment would not have been an acceptable means of complying with VV's ARP requirements, and as stated above, that VV's ARP program and written ARP exam did include the

) Section A materials.

5. Miller's explanation (at pages 27-28 of the OI Report) is that he never gave much thought to the specifics of how VV would address the third (Section A) materials, but that he had called Zechman on the phone and told Zechman to have the Section A materials redone as well. Miller's view i

e was that the July 11, 1979 memorandum from Zechman to VV was Zechman's way of completing the requirement that Miller had imposed.

6. When Miller received the handwritten July 26, 1979 draft (which had been prepared by Beers of the TMI Training Department) of the certification letter for VV to be sent to the NRC, Miller wrote a note on i.t addressed to Blake (a lawyer working with Met Ed who has no recollection of ever seeing that note) which stated:

"I only reference two sections in the make-up. He actually problem."

studied 3 sections due to the handwriting Miller stated (at page 28 of the OI Report) that his secretary put the handwritten draft and note in typewritten form, dated July 27, 1979, and sent them to Blake, John G. Herbein, then a Met Ed Vice President and Miller's supervisor (who also had no recollection of seeing the note or draft letter), and William H. Parker, then TMI supervisor of Administration.

Miller stated (at pages 29-30 of the OI Report) that he "would have assumed that Parker would have followed up on what (Miller) wrote." He also said that the purpose of his note to Blake was (1) to have Blake review the draf t of the letter and (2) to tell Parker to finalize the letter. Miller also stated (OI Report, pages 28-29) that it was his belief that Parker inserted the grades for the FSR quizzes in the final version of the August 3, 1979 letter and that, when Miller was given the letter on August 3, 1979, he "was told the letter was acceptable to sign" and he signed it (OI Report, page 30). He also said (OI Report, page 30) that "when he gave it to Bill Parker (he] depended on him to resolve anybody's comments, and when (Parker) stuck it in front of (him] on August 3rd, (he]

probably did not review it to any great extent because the two versus three wasn't critical in (his) mind. That was in the background of the letter."

7. According to Parker's sworn statement, Parker took the draft of the letter that had been prepared by Beers and "put it in paragraph form". He state'd that at that time he was unaware of the NRC requirements for relicensing or re-qualification or the specific grade requirements. He was also unaware of what the reference in Mille.r's note to Blake may mean nor can he explain why the third section (Section Al relating to the handwriting problem was not addressed in preparing the final revision of the letter. When he received the initial draft there were no test scores written and he cannot recall who gave him the scores preparatory to his completing the preparation of the final version of the letter.

He doesn't believe that, until the date of his OI interview (on October 18, 1982), he was aware that the 89.1% grade on section A was on a section containing handwriting other than VV's.

8. By a letter dated August 19, 1982 (OI Report, Attach-ment 25), Miller was informed that it was ehe Licensee's position that Miller's August 3, 1979 letter to the NRC '

certifying the status of VV in Met Ed's training program was incorrect as to the basis for certification and that, given Miller's knowledge of the circumstance at that time, Miller should have been more diligent in providing assurances to himself as to the accuracy of the information in the certifi-cation. However, it appears to me that this does not con-tradict the fact that the weight of the evidence provided by the OI Report supports the view that a proper basis existed on

) August 3, 1979 for the certification of VV as requalified even though Miller did not personally have all the details to demonstrate that this was the case.

9. Clearly, the statement in the August 3, 1975 letter, which was there stated to be provided by way of background, that VV had received two scores less than 80% in his FSR quizzes was incorrect and should not have been so reported.

I But if, as the weight of the evidence provided in the OI Report indicates is the case, VV should have been certified on the basis of an ARP written examination that included section A materials, the procedural and administrative deficiencies that led to that incorrect statement concerning the FSR quiz results appear to assume a greatly diminished significance.

I suggest that that view is supported by the summary in the OI

Report of an OI investigator's interview of Don H. Beckham, Chief of the Operator Licensing Branch ("OLB"), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ("NRR"), of the NRC. The OI Report states (at page 49):

"Beckham opined that (Met Ed ' s] AP-1006 appeared to require that the licensee merely provide certifica-tion of the license holder's satisfactory rating on the ARP and not the background information contained in the letter; however, he felt that since that information was included, it should have been accurate and truthful. Beckham stated that the foundation of an effective regulatory program is based upon the agency's ability to trust and rely upon the accuracy of the information it receives from licensees."

10. Two other items deserve brief mention in this summary and are more fully dealt with below:

(a) The ASLB discusses testimony by Miller (PID Paragraphs 2300 and 2302) in a way that suggests that Miller was stating that the sole basis for certifying VV on Section A materials was an oral examinations of VV. This appears to me to be a questionable reading of that testimony. See, e .3, . , Miller's testimony at Tr.

24,434 where Miller stated:

"In addition to that, in the [ written ARP]

exam we looked at earlier with the 99.8 there were questions from section A."

(b) The ASLB discusses (at PID Paragraph 2304) the Comments submitted by Miller's counsel to the ASLB and attributes to page 13 of those Comments the statement that t

I  !

t 1

r

...the sole purpose of the August 3 letter was to certify that VV attained a satisfac- (

i tory rating on his accelerated retraining  !

, tests (only Sections E and H)" (emphasis supplied) i The statement in the Comments does not contain the 1

underscored material. The actual statement in the  !

\

i ,

Comme,nts was:

i j "

...the sole purpose of the August 3 letter '

was to certify that VV, who had been in an accelerated requalification program, had obtained a satisfactory rating on his accel-erated requalification tests."

1 Thus, the quoted statement in the PID is not an accurate 9

paraphrase of the actual statement in the Comments in i that the Comments did not say that the accelerated 4

c ,

j requalification program was limited to Section E and H  :

(

I materials.

! [

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f

11. My review of the OI Report leads me to the '

i following conclusions: L i

j (a) The statement in the third paragraph of the t

j August 3, 1979 letter that VV had received a score on l Section A of 89.1% [on his FSR quiz] was incorrect, i and, in that sense " false;"* I

!, l j (b) The statement in the fourth paragraph of that i letter thats i 1

I

• The statement in that same paragraph of the August 3, 1979 letter l{' that VV had received a score on Section H of 644 (on his FSR quiz)  !

i j

4 was also incorrect since O's work was also included in the answer to VV's FSR quiz on Section H.

Presumably because the 644 was a '

i f ailing grade and it was not questioned that VV's ARP had included t l Section X, the ASLB paid little attention to the statement in the

letter concerning Section H. '

i l

i

"Since he (VV] received two scores less than 80%, a specifically tailored program was instituted..."

could have reasonably implied that that was the only reason for assigning VV to the ARP. Upon that basis, that statement was inaccurate and incomplete; and (c) The weight of the evidence produced in the OI Report does not support the view that the statement in the first paragraph of that' letter was inaccurate.

12. I am unable to evaluate the issue of whether the incorrect and . incomplete statements referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 11 are material, since that requires a judgment as to what the NRC would have done it' it had been furnished with accurate and complete in ormation: d However, as set forth below, there are some indications that, in the 1979 time frame when the letter was submit-ted (as distinguished from the present time) the incorrect and incomplete statement may not have been regarded as material.

13. I find it difficult to believe that the inac-curate and incomplete statements referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b), even if material, are sufficient to substantiate the charge in Item A of the NOV that the statements made in the August 3, 1979 letter constitute " willful" material falso statements.

III. Detailed Review A. The Basis for Recertification of VV.

The ASLB PID states:

"This certification was based in part upon the score achieved by VV with O's assistance" (presumably in VV's answer to Section A of the FSR quizzes] (PID at 1 2048.)

"...VV was later recertified to the NRC for his license renewal based in part, as we find, upon work done for him by 0" (PID at 1 2274).

"This certification is the center of an important issue as to whether Mr. Miller had certified VV to the NRC for license renewal knowing that O's improper assistance contributed to the completion of the requalification program by VV. We conclude that he did and that there is reasonable cause to inquire ,

further whether Mr. Miller, thus the Licensee, has made a false material statement in connection with the recertification of VV." (PID at 1 2287) .

Comments (1) These conclusions appear to be based upon the ASLB's assumptions, in Paragraph 2295 of the PID, that VV was not assigned to the accelerated requalification program

("ARP") on Section A and that the written test on the comple-tion of the ARP which VV took did not cover Section A mate-rials.

(2) As previously noted, the ASLB recognized (PID 5 2316) that the record before it was incomplete and re-commended that the NRC direct its staff to undertake the investigation which was conducted by OI. That investigation by OI resulted in the 01 Report which discloses the following:

~

(a) OI Interview of Dennis J. Boltz In his statement, sworn to on October 6, 1982, of the results of his OI interview, held October 5, 1982 (OI Report, Attachment 1), Dennis J.

Boltz, assigned as a TMI Administrator of Nuclear Technical Training in 1979, stated that:

(i) While Boltz did not participate in the decision to assign VV to the ARP, Boltz may have con-tributed to developing some of the work assignments based on what others decided needed to be covered; ARP; (11) Section A materials were covered in VV's (iii) At the conclusion of VV's ARP, VV took a comprehensive written exam which was prepared, proc-tored and graded by Boltz; (iv) VV's written ARP exam included Section A materials; (v) While Boltz cannot recall if he was given any guidelines in preparing the ARP exam, Boltz did not believe that he would have included the Section A materials on that exam if he was not told by someone that they were among VV's weak areas which need to be covered; and (vi) while VV was assigned full-time to the Training Department, VV spent quite a bit of time in Boltz's office and Boltz feels that during that time, Boltz and VV discussed Section A materials.

(b) OI Interview of Richard W. Zechman In his statement, sworn to on October 1, 1982 of the results of his OI interview, held September 29, 1982 (OI Report, Attachment 13),

Richard W. Zechman, TMI supervisor of Training in l

July 1979, stated: '

(i) The ARP program for VV was prepared by Marshall Beers (TMI Group Supervisor, Training) and that the ARP for VV covered Section A material.

(ii) The opening paragraph of Zechman's memo, dated July 6, 1979, to VV describing that ARP and outlining the assignments, discussions and written examination which would be required of VV only addresses the fact that VV received less than 80% on two FSR quizzes, and does not explicitly state that VV's ARP would include Section A materials. In his view in retrospect it is regrettable that the issue was not directly mentioned in Zec? nan's July 6, 1979 memo, but Zechman unqualifiedly st<tes that VV was required to cover the Section A materia,s in his ARP and to be tested on it as a part of the ARv prior to the August 3, 1979 letter being sent to the NRC.

(iii) In a meeting held in Miller's office about July 9, 1979, in which Tom Hombach from Personnel was present and Zechman was present part-time, Zechman was told that VV was being assigned to Training on a full-time basis until he finished the ARP prog ram and passed the exam on the weak areas identified, which included the two FSR sections in which VV scored less than 80% and the one he submitted using some of o's material (Section A].

(iv) Zechman attests to the fact that VV com-pleted all the work of the ARP training package and successfully passed a written test which covered all the deficient areas, including Section A. This exam, which was proctored and graded by Dennis Boltz, should have been the basis for VV's certification since he received a score of 99.8% on that exam.

(v) Zechman also attests to VV's competence in the Section A area since Boltz and Zechman had dis-cussions with VV during his assigned week in which he demonstrated an understandin,g of the material.

However, no written record of those discussions was maintained.

(vi) In his ARP, VV incorrectly answered the question on subscritical multiplication, which is Section A material and had to be reassigned additional problems which he then successfully completed. Since VV had demonstrated a weakness in the subcritical multipli-cation area, that area was included as part of the final ARP exam VV took and passed on July 23, 1979. Zechman provided the OI investigators with copies of the ARP program and exam specially made for and taken by VV and marked the portions which pertain to Section A.

(vii) When VV successfully completed the ARP on or about July 23, 1979, VV's exam was graded by Boltz, reviewed by Zechman and L. L. Lawyer (Manager of Train-ing) and forwarded to Miller for certification. Shortly afterwards, Zechman received a call from Miller thanking Zechman for getting VV squared away and telling Zechman that he (Miller) would take care of both the follow-up to the NRC and any further actions concerning VV.

(c) OI Interview of Marshall L. Beers In his statement, sworn to on October 6, 1982, of the results of his OI interview, held on October 1 and 4, 1982 (OI Report, Attachment 9), Marshall L. Beers, who was in July 1979 a TMI Supervisor of Licensed Training stated:

(i) The ARP for VV was made up by Richard Zechman, Dennis Boltz, Nelson Brown and Beers.

(ii) VV was assigned to Training on a full-time basis until he completed the ARP , at the conclusion of which VV was given and passed a comprehensive written examination on all his identified weak areas, which included Section A.

(iii) Beers does not know who drafted the July 6, 1979 memo from Zechman to VV and does not know why it only addresses the two areas in which VV scored less than 804.

(iv) At.the request of the OI investigators, Beers compared the questions on W's FSR Section A quiz with those on the comprehensive ARP exam. While the FSR has more questions on Section A, the compre-hensive ARP exam has questions which require an equal depth of understanding of the Section A material.

(v) It is unfortunate that the initial draft (a handwritten draft, dated July 26, 1979, which was prepared by Beers), the typewritten draft (dated July 27, 1979) and the final version (dated August 3, 1979) of the letter sent to the NRC certifying W do not say that W received three scores less than 80%

instead of addressing only the fact that two such scores require participation in the ARP. In any event W was required to participate in an ARP which covered all his demonstrated weak areas, including Section A, and W did successfully pass a comprehen-sive exam on all the material.

(vi) Beers is not aware of any oral examination given to W on Section A; this would have been unnec-essary since W received a comprehensive written exam at the conclusion of the ARP which included Section A as well as the other weak areas in W's FSR program.

(d) OI Interview of Nelson D. Brown In a statement, sworn to on October 7, 1982 of the results of his OI interview, held on October 5, 1982 (OI Report, Attachment 7), Nelson D. Brown, who was in July 1979 a TMI Administrator of Nuclear Technical Training (Instructor), stated:

(i) The OI investigator showed Brown a copy of the ARP and the comprehensive exam given to W at the conclusion. With respect to the ARP, both item (1)

[ reactivity balance) and item (2) are related to reactor theory (Cat. A/H). With respect to the ARP exam, questions numbers 2, 3 and 4 require an under-standing of reactor theory (CategoryA/H). After reviewing both the ARP and the comprehensive exam, Brown feels that their successful completion repre-sents an adequate demonstration of competence in the area of reactor theory (Section A].

(e) OI Interview of Lawrence L. Lawyer In a sworn OI interview, held October 18, 1982 (OI Report, Attachment 14), Lawrence L. Lawyer, who was in July 1979 TMI Manager of Training, stated:

(i) In July 1979, training was not yet Lawyer's primary assignment as he had other duties as well.

(ii) Lawyer was not familiar with VV's situation in 1979 as it applies to the number of weak areas VV had to redo for the FSR.

(iii) Lawyer cannot recall having seen a memo from Zechman to VV detailing VV's ARP assignments.

In reviewing it, however, certain parts of it seem to address the Section A area. These are the first and second assignments.

( f) OI Interview of Thomas L. Hombach In the report of an OI interview, held October 6, 1982 (OI Report, Attachment 17), Thomas L. Hombach, who q

was at the time TMI Personnel Director, was reported to have said:

(i) Hombach's knowledge and participation in connection with VV's submittal of FSR exams in July 1979 was limited to attendance at a meeting in Miller's office in July or August 1979 when the examination improprieties were discussed with VV.

Present at that meeting vere Miller, VV, Zechman and Hombach.

t (ii) When VV was confronted with the handwriting discrepancies appearing in the exams he had submit-ted, VV did not deny that some of tile material was not his.

(iii) Miller admonished VV that his conduct was inappropriate and unacceptable and would not be tolerated again.

i

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i 4

(iv) Hombach could not recall whether VV's demonstrated areas of. weakness requiring additional training were indicated during the meeting. He did recollect that the necessity of VV being " retested" was mentioned.

(g) OI Interview o5 VV i

In a statement, sworn to by VV on October 7, 1982, following an OI interview on October 5, 1982 (OI Report, i

Attachment 15), VV stated:

(i) VV submitted FSR examination material,

.' during the later part of June or the first part of July 1979, and then went on vacation. When he returned to work on July 9, 1979, he found a note indicating that Miller wanted to see him and he immediately went to Miller's of fice and had a meet-ing with Miller, Hombach and Zechman. VV was confronted with the fact that some of the FSR examination material he had turned in contained another individual's handwriting and VV admitted that

i. this was the case.

3 (ii) VV does not specifically recall that he received a memo, dated July 6, 1979, concerning VV's placement into the ARP and identifying the material to be covered, but does not dispute that he did. However, he had read that memo recently.

Areas 1 and 2 of that memo pertain to section A materials and they could be applicable to Section

, H.

('iii) To the best of his knowledge, VV satisf ac-torily completed all training requirements in the ARP. However, VV cannot recall whether or not he had

" sit down" sessions with training department person-

nel to determine if all necesary sections / categories had been4 covered.

l

.' '(iv)_ VV did take a written exam and achieved a

' score of 99.8%. He cannot specifically recall i

whether Section A material was covered in this written exam. He may have taken other written or oral exams during the ARP but cannot recall any.

I l

(v) The OI investigator showed VV a copy of VV's ARP exam. After reviewing that exam, VV identi-fled the following questions as containing Section A materials: #4 (sub-critical multiplication), #11 (sic] (reactivity balance) and #2A (Sections A and H). Overlapping of categories [ sections) existed in the exam questions and answers. VV would like to point out that by achieving a score of 99.8% on this exam, he demonstrated his knowledge of Section A.

(3) Thus, contrary to the above-quoted statements from the PID, the sworn statements (resulting from their OI interviews) attached to the OI Report cf Messrs. Boltz, Zechman, Beers, Brown, Lawyer and VV, lead to the conclusion that (a) VV was in fact assigned to the ARP on Sec-tion A materials; (b) The written test which VV took on the com-pletion of the ARP did in fact cover Section A mate-rials; and (c) It was that written test (in which VV achieved a score of 99.8%) which was the proper basis for the certification, in the August 3, 1979 letter from Miller to Collins (of the NRC) of the satisfac-tory rating of VV, based upon his completion of an ARP in which VV achieved a score of 99.8%.

(4) These sworn statements referred to in paragraph (3) above, have contemporaneous supporting documentation in Attachment 3 to the OI Report, which is a copy of the

_ ARP Program for VV with the examination given to VV and the answer key for that examination. A copy of the examina-l tion score sheet which is a part of Attachment 3 is reproduced immediately below:

i i

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- ACCZZ. 3ATED REQUALITICATION TRAnrCTG FRCGRAM EXAM i

FOR J. 1. FLOTD JUET 1979 y

MIN 70DfTS Z 40 MAX. PCDITS 3 30 50 too

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fb 7Y Manager of T % Data I car ify tha on the ed che o above

• licensee shall be returned to normal licensed ductas ba cs of this amant and completica of the program.

1. c 7-J/-757 flaakgert Data

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(5) Page 51 of the OI Report states that a copy of VV's ARP and his comprehensive exam (with answer key) had been provided to Bruce Boger of the Operator Licensing Branch

("OLB"), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ("NRR") of the NRC, who stated, in a note dated October 7, 1982, that

...in his opinion the accelerated riequal exam [did] not adequately re-examine [the] ar*.ias of weakness identified in Categories A, E, G and H."

Insofar as Category [Section] A is concerned, the OI Report, states that Mr. Boger's stated reasons were:

"(3) The shutdown margin calculation (No. 3) is essentially the same as the reactivity balance calculation performed as part of the accelerated training program. The same initial conditions were used on both calculations, so the same points on the reactivity graphs were used. Therefore, I question whether knowledge of the subject matter required in Cat. A has been demonstrated."

I am not sure that I fully understand Mr. Boger's quoted reason, but it seems to me that it confirms that Section A material was covered both in the ARP instruction program and in the ARP exam, but criticizes the adequacy of the ARP exam because it employed the same initial conditions i

as were used in the ARP instruction program.

i

(

l 1

l

I am not a nuclear engineer and I am not competent to express an opinion as to whether Mr. Boger's comment is justified. However, there is generally room for reason-able differences of opinion concerning the adequacy and completeness of examinations to test an individual's know-ledge. More significantly, even accepting that Mr. Boger's above-quoted opinion and question are completely correct, this does not gainsay the fact that, as stated above, the sworn statements of those responsible for, and involved in, the preparation and administration of vv's ARP and written examination and the grading and approval of that exam believed that the ARP and the ARP exam did cover Section A.

B. The 89.1% Score on Section A.

The ASLB PID states:

"Despite the fact that Mr. Zechman knew that the work (in VV's answer to his FSR quizzes) on Section A, Princi-ples of Reactor Theory, was not all VV's work, and despite the fact that Mr. Miller knew directly from O and VV that O had helped vv on Section A, the Training Department as-signed VV a passing score of 89.1% on that section. TMIA l Ex. 70. That exact score, 89.1%, is very significant, as will be seen below." (PID at 1 2294)

The view of the ASLB that the 89.1% score on Section A referred to in the August 3, 1979 letter was very significant is emphasized in several other portions of the PID. See, e.g., 11 2296, 2303, 2304,.2305, 2306 and 2307. That emphasis j l l

appears to be predicated on the assumption (referred to in Section A of this Part III of this memorandum) that:

"An important point to remember is that VV was not assigned to the accelerated requalification program on Section A." (PID at 1 2295)

"...the certification letter did not reveal the fact that...VV had not been assigned to the accelerated requalification program on Section A." (PID at 1 2307)

Based on that view, the ASLB apparently reasoned that, so far as Section A materials are concerned, the requalification ,

certification of VV must have been based on the 89.1% score in the answers to the FSR quiz or, alternatively, that there was n'o basis for certifying the requalification of VV on Section A. See, e.g., PID at 11 2304 and 2307.

Comments:

(1) I have discussed in Section A of Part III of this Memorandum the f act that the ASLB's view that VV had not been assigned to the ARP on Section A is contradicted by the record compiled by the OI investigation. On that basis, the 89.1%

l score on the answers to the FSR quizzes would have been irrelevant as a basis for requalifying VV --

i.e., VV's l requalification with respect to Section A as well as other i

Sections for which he was required to requalify through the ARP was based on his score in his July 23, 1979 ARP written examination and the 89.1% score improperly granted to him on

the answers to the FSR quizzes would have been accorded no weight. However, since the ASLB found the 89.1% score so troublesome, it deserves further comment. i (2) The 89.1% score on the answers to VV's FSR quizzes appears to have originated in the course of the routine i l

grading by Edward Frederick, an instructor in the Training Department, of the answers to VV's FSR quizzes. Frederick noted the handwriting discrepancies, suspected that part of the answers were in O's handwriting, verified this with Boltz, another instructor in the Training Department, and reported this to Zechman (the Supervisor of Training), who appeared concerned and asked Frederick to complete the grading. (OI Report, Attachment 6). As an interim step, while the hand-writing issue was being investigated, this appears to me to have not been unreasonable.

(3) Zechman promptly advised Seelinger, who in turn advised Miller, of the handwriting discrepancies, as well as the fact that VV had failed his FSR quizzes on two other l Sections. Prompt steps were taken to relieve VV of his l

operator duties and to assign him full time to an ARP in the l

l Training Department. (OI Report, Attachment 13).

(4) Although it was clear at least by July 6, 1979 --

and was admitted by VV on July 9, 1979 -- that vv deserved no i credit for Section A in his FSR quizzes because O's work was submitted as part of VV's answers, it appears probable that I

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the Training Department records were not corrected to eliminate the 89.1% score for Section A. If so, this was a violation of the requirement that Met Ed maintain accurate and 4

complete training records

• and had troublesome consequences, because it appears probable that those uncorrected Training Department records were the source of the inaccurate statement i in the August 3, 1979 letter.

(5) In 'his statement, sworn to on October 6, 1982, of the results of his OI interviews on October 1 and October 4, 1982 (OI Report, Attachment 9), Marshall L. Beers stated that he prepared the first (handwritten) draf t, dated July 26, 1979 (OI Report, Attachment 11) of the letter to be sent by Miller

to Collins of the NRC. Beers stated that normally the draft I

• While this is no excuse for this failure by the Met Ed Training Department, my own experience in administration causes me to believe that it is not completely extraordinary for individuals who have identified a problem and dealt with it substantively to fail to follow through by backtracking to correct the records to re-flect that substantive action. Indeed, while I am not personally familiar with the fact, I have been informed that, on at least one i

occasion, there was a similar failure on the part of the NRC Staff. Specifically, I am advised that during the course of the

, Reopened Restart Proceeding, the NRC staff presented an exhibit i (NRC Staff Exhibit 32), dated November 30, 1981, which included a chart showing the results of the April 1981 NRC-administered exam keyed to the letter designation system for individuals. I am informed that that chart indicates that O received an RO score of 84.4 and an SRO score of 96 and that W received an RO score of 82.1 and an SRO score of 94, and that there is no indication on the chart that the NRC had found that O and W had cooperated during their examination; moreover, while the chart shows failing (and therefore, unacceptable) scores for other operators by circling those scores, the scores of O and W shown on the chart are not circled.

t t

I

. s would have been prepared by Zechman, but Zechman was in training and Beers therefore prepared it. The OI investigator asked Beers whether other letters concerning individuals in ARPs also addressed only the two minimum areas requiring sucn individuals' participation in a special training or if such letters addressed all areas of weakness. Beers replied that VV's case was the first of a kind. In Beers' draft the results of FSR grades were left blank. It is not clear from his statement why he made provision for the inclusion of the FSR grades in the letter, since he stated that "the grades cited in the letter were irrelevant in light of the fact that the ARP covered all the deficient areas." This view finds support in the OI interview of Don H. Beckham, Chief of the OLB, reported at page 49 of the OI Report, that Met Ed's Administrative Procedure AP-1006

". . . appeared to require that the licensee merely provide certification of the license holder's satisfactory rating on the ARP and not the background information contained in the letter; however, he felt that since the information was included, it should have been accurate and truthful."*

Beers' draft was, at best, a mechanical and not well-thought out effort, perhaps forgiveable in the light of his limited

, Although I have not read any portion of the transcript of I

the hearings before the Special Master other than those specifi-cally identified in this Memorandum, I have read the Comments, dated May 19, 1982, of Miller's counsel submitted to the ASLB.

l I have noted that page 12 of those Comments quotes testimony of i

Mr. Crocker of the NRC (at Transcript pages 25,102) which appear to be substantially to the same ef fect as the above-quoted summary of Mr. Beckham's statement.

l

. s i

experience and the fact that he was dealing with the first of a kind situation. But it needed careful and thoughtful review

, and this it did not receive.

' (6) 'My reading of the OI Report does not provide me with any indication of why provision for including the scores on VV's FSR quizzes was included in the initial draft or later versions of the August 3, 1979 letter. It also does not provide me with any indication of who supplied the information on FSR scores to fill in the blanks in the draft. Miller stated in his OI interview (OI Report, pages 28-29) that he believed Parker filled it in, based on the fact that Parker's initials appear on the bottom of the final version of the

.i August 3, 1979 letter. Parker stated that, when he received

, the draft of the August 3, 1979 letter that had been prepared

, by Beers, there were no [FSR] test scores written and that he cannot recall who gave him the scores preparatory to complet-

! ing -the final version of the letter. (OI Report, Attachment 1

20) Parker also stated that, in 1979, he had no knowledge of NRC licensing or requalification requirements or the specific grades required. A reasonable guess is that he obtained the scores from someone in the Training Department, but that has to be a guess.

(7) The ASLB, in recommending that an investigation should be made by the NRC stated:

"A determination should be made whether there was agreement among some or all of them to represent knowingly to the NRC that VV had attained an 89.1%

t

- .- ._. - _ = _ -

i 1

score on Section A, or to make any other inaccurate representation to the NRC." (PID at 1 2314)

- My reading of the OI Report does not indicate that there was any such agreement. Specifically

(a) The OI investigators asked some, but not all,

. of those interviewed whether such an agreement existed, f or whether they were aware of any pressure or requests to i

i expedite VV through his ARP because his license was i

needed. All those who were asked such questions by the

OI investigators, stated, in substance, that there was no 4

such agreement by them or pressure or requests. See, Boltz (OI Report, Attachment 1 at page 5), techman (OI Report, Attachment 13 at page 8), Lawyer (OI Report, Attachment 14 at page 2), Parker (OI Report, Attachment 20 at page 2), Herbein (OI Report, Attachment 23, at pages 3 and 8) and Miller (OI Report, page 32).

(b) Thus, my reading of the OI Report is that the inclusion of the 89.14 score was the product of (i) the i

lack by Met Ed in 1979 of a formal process and written procedure for operator qualification certification and negligence in its operator license certification procedures in certifying VV, for which Mee Ed was justly criticized by the ASLB (PID at 1 2059), (ii) an apparent failure to correct VV's FSR training records

! after the handeriting discrepancies were confirmed, i

(iii) delegation of the task of preparation and completion of the cortification lohkor withouk adoquako inokruction to individunio who were not sufficiently familiar with the process and (iv)

Miller's action in signing the letter without adequate steps on his part to provide himself with personal assurances that the letter was accurate and complete. l l

C. The Oral Testing of W i l l The ASLB stated in the PIC (at Paragraphs 2300-2302):

"2300. Mr. Miller stated on several occasions that i

the Training Department orally reexamined W. Tr. 24,415; 24,419; Tr. 24,434-35. No documentation or corroboration of this fact was ever produced at the hearing. Appendix A to Part 55, Requalification Program Requirements, Item 5, requires that records be kept for a period of two years following the date of the recorded event to document the required participation of the licensed operator. The evidentiary record does not reveal who orally examined W, or when, or whether the results were given to Mr. Miller '

orally or in writing. More than two years have passed from the asserted event until the beginning of the hear-ing, but other documents recording the W-o episode sur-vived. We would have expected some record of W's oral examination. It was an important matter."

"2301. Mr. Miller stated that, in a memorandum pre-pared by Mr. Zechman, Supervisor of Training, at Miller's direction, W was told that he would have to be reexamined on the section that 'he had passed' but was in 'another's

, handwriting.' Miller, ff. Tr. 24,358, at 2. But the July 11, 1979 memorandum referred to by Mr. Miller does l not indicate that W was to be reexamined orally. To the l contrary, Mr. Zechman made a specific request to W that he, VV, 're-do FSR assignment for Category A' and he attached a copy of that exam for W's use. Staff Ex. 26, Enclosure 1, at 7. As we noted above the FSR (Fundamen-tals and System Review) program requires written evalua-

tion quizzes. TMIA Ex. 65, AP #1006, at 6.247/

Moreover, ony the day before Mr. Zechman had informed Mr.

Miller that the FSR procedure requires written quizzes.

TMIA Ex. 66. It would be absurd to infer that VV was again provided his FSR Section A quiz for take-home oral compliance.

"247/ Here again the episode presents a disturbing aspect of the handling of VV. From Mr. Zechman's memo we infer that VV would again be trusted to requalify on Section A by another unauthorized take-home exam.

"2302. Mr. Miller testified further that as a result of the ' oral' examination of VV, the Training Department determined that he had adequate knowledge of Section A.

Tr. 24,415; 24,419; 24,434-35. At the hearing when VV was examined on the training consequences of having used O's work, he reported only having passed a proctored examina-tion, and does not mention the oral exam referred to by Mr. Miller. Tr. 26,641, 26,665."

Comments (1) The OI Report, in summarizing Miller's sworn OI interview, reports that Miller was asked, during that inter-view, to explain the basis upon which he had testified before the Special Master in 1981 and summarizes Miller's response as follows (OI Report at 31-32):

"He (Miller) explained that in reviewing the documen-tation he possessed prior to testifying, he himself had had a question as to how FLOYD's testing had been accomplished. According to MILLER, he sent his administrative assistant, Merrill SHAFFER, to the Training Department to look into the matter. SHAFFER provided MILLER with a two page handwritten note which outlined the information he obtained from Training (Attachment 19). The undated note, which was reportedly based on information provided by ZECHMAN, said that FLOYD had not retaken the Section A reexam as MILLER had directed. It also said that

ELOYD was ' orally quizzed and questions on Section A naterial were given in the written reexam of the failed exams.' Finally, the note said that 'the 89.1% on Section A was the exam in O handwritting (sic) but the statement concerning 99.8% overall on reexam meant Section A was covered.' . .

" MILLER stated that the foregoing represented more than he knew at the time he wrote the August 3, 1979 certification letter. He said that in 1981, the (SHAFFER) note was a sufficient basis for him to be satisfied that FLOYD had been orally examined (on Section A). MILLER said he knew his requirements (to redo the Section A FSR quiz) had not been met and he asked why. According to MILLER, the response from Training came through SHAFFER's note and said, in effect, that they (Training) felt he was qualified on Section A because of the oral testing plus the questions on the comprehensive exam. MILLER said he could not explain why no record of any oral testing of FLOYD appears to exist. He added that there had been a lot of people going through TMI records at that time, expecially in the area of training. While he offered that as a possible explanation, he said that any records would have been in the Training Department and he had no way of finding or control-ling them.

" MILLER was asked if there was ever any intent on his part to submit a document to the NRC which would knowingly mislead the agency in the matter of the licensing of FLOYD. He was also asked if there was ever any conversation or agreement between any of the individuals involved with the FLOYD issue to mislead the NRC in any way so that FLOYD could keep

. his license or because the licensee needed his license. To both questions, MILLER replied in the negative."

(2) The two page handwritten note from M. Shaffer to Miller (OI Report, Attachment 19) referred to in the preceding paragraph is undated, but it states that the information which it contains was given to J. Wilson, M. Maupin and E. Blake on

October 29, 1981. That note from Shaffer, reporting on information that Shaf fer had said he had obtained from Zechman states, in relevant part:

"B. 'VV' was orally quizzed and questions on Section A material were given in the written [ARP] reexam of the failed sections. This they felt recertified VV sufficiently well on Section 'A'.

"C. The memo to NRC (Collins) stated that VV was reexamined with an overall grade of 99.8%. The 89.1%

on Section 'A' was the exam in 'O's handwritting (sic) but the statement concerning 99.8% overall on reexam meant Section 'A' was covered.

" Reexamination on Sections E & H (99.8%) 7/79 "l) total of 6_ questions

' "2) Questions 2, 3 & 4 were on Section A material Question E&

5 was a crossover of Section A and H."

(3) In his sworn statement provided to the OI investi-gators (OI Report, Attachment 13), Zechman discussed this subject (at page 7) and stated:

"I have been told that Miller has stated that the Training Dept. orally examined FLOYD and determined FLOYD's adequate knowledge of Category A. Miller was most likely referring to the hasty conversation we had with him prior to his testimony before the Special Master in which BEERS, BOLTZ and myself were quickly trying to recall and reconstruct the events of three years past. I believe we told MILLER of the oral discussions on reactor theory that BOLTZ and I had with FLOYD. In addition to what we believe was oral questioning that took place between FLOYD and BROWN during his accelerated program on the subject of fuel handling, subcritical multiplication and reactivity balance, it should be noted that FLOYD in his accelerated assignment incorrectly answered the question on suberitical multiplication and had to be

reassigned additional problems which he then success-fully completed. Since FLOYD had demonstrated a weakness in the area of suberitical multiplication, which is Cat. A material, this area was included as part of the final accel. program exam he took and passed on 7/23/79."

(4) With the benefit of hindsight, it appears that Shaffer's note to Miller and the " hasty conversation" referred to by Zechman may have caused Miller to attach greater sig-nificance to the oral discussions on reactor theory that Boltz and Zechman had had with VV than they warranted. For example, in his sworn statement provided to the OI investig ation (OI Report, Attachment 1), Boltz stated (at pages 4-5):

"Mr. Baci told me that Gary MILLER had said that FLOYD was tested orally on the Cat. A material. I know that the material was covered in his ARP program and on the final exam; the only oral testing I can think of would be the many discussions FLOYD and I had in my of fice when he was assigned to Training.

These discussions, which I mentioned earlier, covered some Cat. A material. In fact, I remember one such discussion in which we talked about a negative reactor period following very small reactivity insertions (less than a B fraction). I believe FLOYD even called someone at Penn State about this."

And, in his sworn statement provided to the OI investigators (OI Report, Attachment 9), Beers stated (at pages 4-5):

" Finally, I am not aware of any oral examination given to FLOYD on Category A; this would have been unnecessary since he received a comprehensive written examination at the conclusion of the ARP which included Category A as well as the other weak areas on his FSR program."

(5) As previously stated, I have not read the entire Transcript of the hearing before the Special Master. I have,

^

. . \

l however, read the portion of that Transcript cited in the above-quoted Paragraphs of the PID, and I have also read the prepared testimony of Miller that appears in that Transcript.

In my view, these portions of Miller's testimony, although l i

less than crystal-clear, do not require the reading that the ASLB apparently gave it that the Section A materials were not

covered in VV's ARP written exam, and that the sole reliance for certifying VV with respect to Section A materials was the oral testing of VV. Specifically:

(a) At pages 5-6 of his prepared testimony submitted on November 17, 1981 in the hearing before the Special Master (such prepared testimony appears in the Transcript i

of that hearing immediately following Transcript page 24,358),

Miller stated:

"As to Mr. VV, he completed the accelerated program successfully and expeditiously. He was tested by written exam on the two sections which he had failed.

The written exam for these sections included ques-tions on the subject matter covered by the section which O had answered, and VV was also tested orally on this subject to ensure his comprehension of the

! material. Following successful completion of this testing, NRC was notified of his failures in the make-up exams, his relief from responsibilities and participation in an accelerated program of instruc-l tion, and his successful. completion of the program."

(emphasis supplied)

(b) At Tr. p. 24,415, Miller stated:

...that area (Section A] was reviewed with him orally and it was determined that he had adequate

! knowledge of that area. So the handwriting problem was not an issue as far as his technical competence in that area."

_ _ -_ _a _

___m . _ _ 2 ___._____u___ t &

1 . .

i i

(c) At Tr. 24,419 Miller stated:

"The letter was written in accordance with the administrative procedure for requal, which required that we recertify Mr. VV in the area of deficiency.

"He was examined in all areas of deficiency and in fact on the section or part that had been completed by another person, he had been orally examined to be sure that his knowledge of that area was in fact l valid. That was the basis of signing the letter."

(d) At Tr. pages 24,434 -

24,436 Miller stated:

"Q I believe you indicated in your prepared state-ment that you initially recommended only a retesting in the areas where Mr. VV had actually failed and not in the additional area where VV gave o's answers. Is that correct?

"A [ Miller] Yes. I indicated in the one area where they both had handwriting -- that is Section A -- I requested that the Training Department separately verify Mr. VV's knowledge in that category.

"Q Why did you not believe it necessary to retest him in that area?

"A I believe he was retested in that area.

"Q Why did you believe it not necessary to retest him in the same manner as he was retested in the other areas?

"A I issued a formal memo to Training requiring them to re-examine him. They orally reexamined him, and as I stated, they had to go back and look the answers up. He was very proficient in the area.

"In addition to that, in the exam we looked at earlier with the 99.8 there were questions from Section A. So the Training Department felt that he had adequate knowledge of Category A when he turned in the [FSR] assignment, even though some of the questions were handwritten by another individual.

(Emphasis supplied)

"O was it the Training Department's decision to retest Mr. VV on Section A in a primarily oral fashion, or was that a direction of yours to them?

"A I wrote them a formal memo saying to verify his

' knowledge in that category and they made the decision as' to the exact way to do it and the administrative procedure some judgment.

allowed an oral or a written; it allowed "O So it would have allowed them, if they chose, to examine him orally on all of the sections, is that correct?

"A I think on the two --

I think they could have, but I think on the two he clearly was below 80 that he had to do some written work. The requirement of the administrative procedure was a special tail-ored program be initiated.

That is what Section 2.6 says: that is what was given in the July 6 memo -- a specific program for Mr. VV to take care of his areas of weakness.

"And in addition to that memo I sent a memo on July 11 saying be sure you certify the validity of his work on Section A, and that was all done.

"Q In TMIA Exhibit 74, the letter of August 3 from you to Mr. Collins of the NRC, you refer to the 99.8 score. That I assume was the score on the written materials.

"A Yes."

I suggest that that testimony may reasonably be read as stating both that (i) VV was orally tested by the Training Department so that the Training Department was satisfied that VV had adequate valid knowledge and technical competence concerning Section A materials and (ii) VV's written ARP examination included questions covering Section A materials.

I also suggest that the questions asked of Miller that are l

shown on pages 24,434 - 24,436 of the Transcript (paragraph (d) above) are not correct paraphrases of his prepared state-ment, even though he did not challenge those questions on that basis. Since I was not present at that hearing, I don't know whether he was aware of the inaccurate paraphrasing or was not in a position to challenge those inaccuracies.

(7) I was critical earlier of Miller's action in failing to obtain personal knowledge of the precise way in which W's requalification under the ARP would be carried out, in dele-gating the task of completing the August 3, 1979 letter to Parker without adequate instructions, and in signing the August 3, 1979 letter without adequate personal assurances of the basis for tha: letter. These deficiencies were an impor-tant element in the letter, dated August 19, 1982, to him (OI Report, Attachment 25). In the same vein, I am critical of l Miller's apparent failure to prepare adequately for his testimony before the Special Master and apparent reliance,

instead, on Shaffer's investigation and handwritten note and l on what Zechman characterized as a " hasty conversation" with Zechman, Boltz and Beers. I believe that that lack of adequate preparation may have contributed to the misunder-standings and concerns reflected in the PID. But, I suggest, it does not gainsay the fact demonstrated by the OI Report and the earlier discussion in this Memorandum that there was a proper basis for certifying W in the August 3, 1979 letter which did not rely upon the oral examination of W.

t 0 -

j I.

)

D. The Comments, Dated May 19, 1982, of Miller i

Throuch His Counsel Submitted to the ASLB The ASLB stated in the PID:

"Mr. Miller now states, through counsel, that the August 3 letter was not accurate and that, in retrospect, it should not have ' suggested' that W had passed Section A. Comments at 14-15. The August 3 letter did not 'suggest' that W had passed with 89.14; the letter stated in definite language that he had attained that score. See TMIA Ex. 74.

Moreover, the statement by Mr. T 11er's counsel (comments at 13) that the sole purpose of the August 3 letter was to certify that vv attained a satisfactory rating on his accelerated retraining tests (only Sections E and H) is simply not in accord with the express language of the letter. Further-more, if that had been the sole purpose of the letter, it would then not account for the two other Section weaknesses in VV's FSR reexaminations.  !

That therefore would be a false certification as to his complete requalification." (PID at 1 2304)

(Emphasis supplied)

, (1) This does not seem to me to be a wholly accurate paraphrase o'f the relevant portion of the statement made at page 13 of the Comments, in that it includes the parenthetical i phrase (which I have underscored) that was not a part of the l original. The relevant statement in the Comments was:

, "Thus, the sole purpose of the August 3 letter was i

to certify that W, who had been in an accelerated requalification program, had obtained a satisfactory rating on his accelerated requalification tests."

(2) Given the ASLB's assumption that W's ARP program and exam did not include Section A materials, it is possibly understandable that the ASLB read into the comments something that they did not say. But, in the light of the evidence t

i

__ = - . . _ _ - . _ _ - - - - _ _ . _ _ _ - - . . _ -. _ - - - .. .

iO

• protet.ted in the OI Report discussed above that VV's ARP program and exam did include Section A materials, this incorrect paraphrane of the Comments is given a significance by the ASLB that is unjustified.

E. Materiality with respect to both the PID and the NOV:

I previously stated (at Section II, paragraph 12 of

, this Memorandum) that I was unable to evaluate the issue of i-whether the statements in the August 3, 1979 letter therein referred to were material. Those statements were:

(a) The statement in the third paragraph of the August 3, 1979 letter that VV had received a score of 89.1% (on his FSR quiz] which was incorrect, and, in that sense " false"; and (b) The statement in the fourth paragraph of

, that letter that:

l "Since he (VV] received two scores less than 80%, a specifically tailored program was instituted "

which could have reasonably implied that that was the only reason for assigning VV to the ARP. Upon that basis, that statement was inaccurate and incomplete.

I explained that my inability to evaluate that issue stemmed

] from the fact that such an evaluation requires a judgment as to what the NRC would have done if it had been furnished with accurate and complete information. I also stated that there are some indications that in the 1979 time frame when the letter was submitted (as distinguished from the present), they may not have been regarded as material.

The particular violation charged in the NOV does not focus on the 89.1% score with respect to Section A materials to which the ASLB accorded special significance, and I cannot tell whether this was an intentional omission or whether I&E intended that the particular violation charged in the NOV also i embraced the 89.1% score. In any event, this discussion is

) .

intended to cover the statement in the August 3, 1979 letter j i t

with respect to the 89.1% score on Section A as well as the l i

particular violation charged in the NOV. Specifically, i.

Item A of the NOV states, in pertinent part:

l "On August 3, 1979, in a letter to the NRC, the l Station Manager at GPU certified that an operator, who was the Supervisor of Operations, had received a satisfactory rating upon completion of the operator

requalification program. On November 15, 1979, the i operator's application for license renewal stated

! that he, the operator, had satisfactorily completed the operator requalification program. These state- '

ments were made even though the. operator and the l Station Manager were aware that the operator had used L

another person's work in completion of examinations required in the requalification program.

r j Contrary to Section 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the statements in the August 3, i 1979 letter and the November 15, 1979 license appli-cation and attached certification constitute mate-1 rial false statements. The August 3, 1979 letter contained false statements in that (1) it identified only two of the three weak areas in the Operator  :

Requalification Program that required additional i training, and (2) it omitted any reference to the cheating which occurred on the Operator Requalifica-tion Examination. The November 15, 1979 license application contained a f alse statement in that Vv's license application stated that he had satisfactor-ily completed the operator requalification program, although he had cheated on at least some portion of it.

e .

If the NRC had known the correct information, includ-ing the fact that the operator cheated, it would have required more direct evidence of retesting on the sections in which the operator received help.

Therefore, the statements made in the August 3, 1979 and November 15, 1979 submittals, are considered material. Because the operator and the Station Manager knew that their statements were false when they made them, they constitute willful material false statements, and each day the statements re-mained uncorrected despite opportunities to correct them up until the time NRC became aware of them in 1981 is a separate omission and, therefore, a material false statement."

That formulation of the violation has, I suggest, two ele-ments, namely, (i) the statements actually made or omitted, and (ii) the non-disclosure of Vv's action in submitting O's work as part of VV's answers to VV's FSR quizzes. This is not to say that I fail to recognize that the two elements combined may have a greater impact than each element taken separately.

Comments (1) As previously discussed in this Memorandum, so far as the charge made in the first paragraph of Item A of the NOV is concerned, the OI Report indicates that that charge is not substantiated by the weight of the evidence -- i.e., the OI Report indicates that the satisfactory completion of VV's operator requalification was based upon VV's ARP program (in-I cluding the ARP written examination) and that the work done by 0 in connection with the FSR quizzes was not a part of the

{ basis for the statement in the August 3, 1979 letter that:

f i

i l t

f I

"...I hereby certify the satisfactory rating of (vv] ,

based upon his completion of an accelerated requali-fication program in which he achieved a score of 99.8." (emphasis supplied)

(2) The charge made in the second paragraph of Item A of the NOV that "The August 3, 1979 letter contained false statements in that (1) it identified only two of the three weak areas in the Operator Requalification Program that required additional training..."

requires examination of the portion (S 2.6) of AP-1006 dealing with Accelerated Requalification Programs, which provided:

"2.6 Accelerated Requalification Program "An operator who does not clear deficiencies assigned due to performance below standards on either the annual written or oral evaluations will be relieved of responsibilities and enter a full time accelerated requalification program.

"The program duration and content will be dic-tated by the nature of the deficiency. Program duration will be determined by individual per-formance. When the license holder is (1) able to satisfactorily pass an equivalent written or oral examination and (2) certification of his satisfactory rating is sent to the NRC, he shall resume his on-shift responsibilities. During the period of accelerated requalification, attendance at the OR lecture series is required.

If the license holder is off-shift for more than 4 months, Section 2.7 dealing with lengthy absences applies."

It will be noted that AP-1006 did not require, in connection with the certification of the satisfactory rating of a li-censed operator who has satisf actorily passed an ARP written or oral examination, any statement of the operator's prior l performance on his FSR quizzes. As previously noted, Don H.

l t

Beckham, Chief of the OLB, in his OI interview, expressed the opinion that:

...AP-1006 appeared to require that the-licensee merely provide certification of the licensee holder's satisfactory rating on the ARP and not the background information contained in the (August 3, 1979] letter; however, he felt that since that information was in-cluded, it should have been accurate and truthful."

Thus, the absence from the certification letter of any infor-mation concerning the results of VV's FSR quizzes would not appear to have been the basis of NRC's grant or denial of VV's license renewal. For example, *o sharpen the issue, assume that Vv's responses to his FSR quizzes had been based solely on his own work and that he had failed three FSR quiz sections on that basis, but had subsequently eliminated the deficiency on all sections by an ARP prog ram and ARP exam and thereby achieved a satisfactory rating. Assume also that the certifi-cation letter had furnishea the [not-required] informa-tion that VV had failed two sections of his FSR quizzes, rather than the three he had in fact failed. Under those circumstances, I find it hard to believe that an incorrect reference to failure on two -- rather than three -- FSR quiz sections would have been viewed as a material false statement.

Instead, it appears to me that the major focus of the charge in the second paragraph of Item A of the NOV should be on the omission of reference to the fact that VV had submitted as his own work that was done by O.

J (3) Miller testified before the Special Master that: ,

"I did not indicate to the NRC by formal correspon-dence that I had that problem. I had a written internal document by thetoCommission. Mr. Herbein which would have been auditable I did not feel at this

. tent.

time the handwriting notification was a require-The letter was written in accordance with the administrative procedure for requal, which required that (TR. we 24,418recertify

- 24,419) Mr. VV in the areas of deficiency."

" JUDGE MILHOLLIN: But you did not inform NRC at this time of the handwriting event, the handwriting situation.

"[ Miller]: Did not inform them of it because we considered it an internal supervisory problem and i

dealt with it on that basis and not a problem with the license." (TR. 24,420)

I (4) That this view was not wholly devoid of merit is suggested by the testimony of NRC witness Crocker, summarized in the following terms at page 12 of the Comments filed by ~

Miller's counsel:

"On the question of whether Licensee should have described the VV-O episode to NRC, Crocker equivocated. He said at first that he ' guessed' the Licensee should have provided the information.

Tr. 25,102 (Crocker). But he then said:

l 'Now, they could very well have looked at it and decided that, in spite of all this, that he still was a suitable candi-date for a license. I do not know how they j udged . it, sir. I do not think that there was any obligation that the Licensee would have to inform the NRC of what amounted to i

internal problems in a company when they came in for the license certification.'

(Emphasis added in the Comments)

Tr. 25,102 (Crocker).

t l

l

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s.

"The Special Master insisted on a clear answer. Crocker then testified:

'I do not believe that there is any requirement that the Licensee provide the 1

NRC with a blow by blow description of the individuals and any problems they may have had along the line. Basically when they are certifying them for the license, if the guy technically is capable of passing the examination in all probability and that the Licensee has enough trust in the indi-vidual to let him operate a plant if he does get a license --

but. I do not think that there is any requirement that they go

! back into great detail as to the individ-uals (sic] history.'

! Id."

(5) I do not dispute the proposition that the NRC should have been promptly advised of VV's submission as his own of the work done by 0, whether or not this arose in the context of the submission to the NRC of a certification of VV. It was more than an " internal supervisory problem." I also do not question that such advice could have caused the NRC to scru-tinize more carefully Vv's license renewal application to check that all deficiencies on VV's part had been corrected as Beckham and Collins stated in their OI interviews would have been the case (at OI Report, pages 50 and 53), and, therefore, that the omission of such notification was mate-rial. But, given the pressures that Miller and the entire TMI organization were under at that . time -- barely three months after the TMI-2 accident, when the task of ensuring that the

7 ,

n< > '

, i i

public healkh and safety consequences were under control 1

was paramount --

and the possible arabig ui ty of reporting requirements concerning VV's action, I suggest that it is undulv harsh (and not substantiated by the OI Report) to S

characterize the failure to report the incident as a willful material false! statement.

IV. The November 15, 1979 Certification by Met Ed A. The November 15, 1979 Certification.

By a letter dated November 15, 1979, VV submitted to 1

Collins (of the NRC) an application for renewal of his senior J  ;

operator license (OI Report, Attachment 27)'. In that application 4 I- VV stated:

) .

"7. Requalification Program: During the effective term of my , license I have satisfactorily completed the Metropolitan Edison Company Operator Requalifi-cation Program."

That applicstion of VV was accompanied by a certification, dated  ;

November 15,'1979, signed by Miller (part of OI Report, Attachment

27) which stated: l "This is to certify that (VV] has discharged his l license responsibilities in a competent and safe '

manner during his current license period."

l B. The ASLB's PID The PID does not discuss the November 15, 1979 certifica-tions. I do not know whether the ASLB i

was aware of them.

1 i

t k

m

, . . m C. The OI Report The OI Report deals only peripherally with the November 15, 1979 :ertifications. Those certifications are not discussed in the OI 'Aeport Summary or in the sworn statements of interviews conducted by OI that are Attachments to the Report. As previously noted, the certifications are Attachment 27 to the OI Report.

The November 15, 1979 certifications are briefly dis-cussed in the OI interviews of Beckham (OI Report, at pages 48-52) and Collins (OI Report, at pages 53-54). As there reported, Beckham stated that the NRC would have relied upon the information earlier provided in Miller's August 3, 1979 letter when it consid-ered whether to renew VV's license, and that, if the NRC had been aware of the inaccuracies and omissions in that August 3, 1979 letter, VV's license might have been revoked, suspended or modified when it was presented for renewal.

As also reported in the OI Report, Collins stated that, if Miller's August 3, 1979 letter had accurately described how VV had a total of three weak areas due to the cheating incident in his FSR quizzes, Collins would have expected some indication of pro-l posed remedial action in the letter and would have made a note to I himself to check that all deficiencies had been corrected when VV next came up for license renewal.

Based upon the foregoing, it appears to me that earlier discussion and comments in this Memorandum with respect to the E I

w s August 3, 1979 letter are also applicable to the November 15, 1979 certifications.

In the Foreword to this Memorandum, I referred to the four-count indictment and to the conviction of VV on the Counts I and II of that indictment and to the fact that Counts III and IV had been dismissed. Count IV of that indictment is the only Count

-dealing with the November 15, 1979 certification. I do not know whether that dismissal is relevant to the aspects of the November 15, 1979 certification referred to in Item A of the NOV. Moreover, as I also stated in the Foreword , I do not know whether the tran-script of the trial following that indictment will shed any light on any aspect of the NOV, but I plan to review it when that tran-script is available.

V. Developments Subsequent to Issuance of the PID In the PID, the ASLB stated (at 1 2050):

"The information concerning VV and his certification to the NRC was first brought to the attention of the NRC at the direction of Robert Arnold, President of GPU Nuclear Corporation. We believe that it is representative of the Licensee's efforts to make a full disclosure on all matters of possible relevance to the cheating incidents. We have also found that Licensee's handling of the matter with respect to VV was satisfactory. However, there was no evidence presented as to whether the Licensee has taken, intends to take, or should take any personnel action against any other employee involved in the certifica-tion incident."

The ASLB alluded to the same subject in 1 2057 of the PID.

e:E t a

While this subject is not addressed in the OI Report or in .the NOV, in the interest of completeness the following information is provided.

As previously noted, by a letter, dated August 19, 1982 Miller was informed of the Licensee's dissatisfaction with his handling of the August 3, 1979 letter. Shortly thereafter, and in keeping with earlier discussions with him, he was transferred to a non-nuclear assignment with Met-Ed.

The ASLB pointed out (at PID, 1 2316) that, at the time of issuance of the PID, Herbein was not employed by GPU Nuclear.

He is an employee of Met-Ed's affiliate, Pennsylvania Electric Company.

Fred Speaker of the Pepper, Hamilton & Sheetz law firm and a former Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was commissioned to conduct an independent investigation of these matters. He provided two reports, copies of which were furnished to the NRC staff after they were received. Those reports did not provide a basis for disciplinary action or a change in assignments of other personnel. Moreover, as I read the OI Report, it does not provide such a basis. 17owever, with the passage of time and in an effort to better match their capabilities with their assignments, Zechman is now assigned as TMI Technician Training Manager and Parker is GPU Nuclear's Manager of Facilities. Marshall Beers terminated his employment with the Licensee on October 14, 1982.

n L4fS wK~

F oyQ J. ith

' ENCLOSURE 3 a.

I iMClear -

Memorandum APR s3 905 00CKETED USNRC

Subject:

RHR REPO R Date: April 1, 1985

'85 RPR 26 Mo 52 From: Vice President & Director, TMI-l ~#:- n ' ,, ' Location: TMI - Trailer #122 H. D. Hukill 7

' File: Contr/ Consul / Vendors -

General To: ALL LICENSED OPERATORS AND PERSCENEL IN 3000-85-074 TPAINING FOR LICENSING, TMI-1 (IESS TEQWICAL FUNCTIONS)

GU Nuclear Corporation (@UN) places the highest priority aM value on the safe operation of its nuclear power plants and has made safety of operation the primary corporate objective. This objective cxmtinues to receive the highest level of management support.

As one element in its efforts to this end, senior management ergaged the firm of Ibhrer, Hibler, aM Replogle, Inc., recognized specialists in psychological counseling, to conduct a study of operator concerns at both TMI-l and Oyster Creek. With safe operation as a primary concern, we were interested in seeing what effect the TMI-2 accident and the resultirg pressures had on the attiMvh and values of operators. The primary intention of this consultation was threefold:

1. To assess the attitudes of operators, particularly with reference to safe operation.

2. To prioritize operator concerns.

3. To recmmend appropriate action steps. .

crmancing in the Stmmer of 1982, RHR consultants interviewed a small sa:mle of licensed reactor and senior reactor operators at both TMI-l and Oyster Creek. A custatized survey was then developed and achtinistered to essentially all licensed operators at both plants. A final report entitled, j " Priority Concerns of Licensed Nuclear Operators at TMI and Oyster Creek l ani Suggested Action Steps" dated March 15, 1983 was issued.

Since the concerns of the operators involved most of the other GPUN departments, the reccmmended steps required actions ard responses frcan t several departments. The corrective action steps were tracked by the Nuclear Assurance Division and progress was reported in a series of l presentations for managment review and action.

We believe we have now essentially ccupleted all significant steps recm mended by RHR. A final report entitled, "Managment's Pesponse to

! the Operators on the IER Report" was issued in February of 1985, a copy of j which is attached for you.

aoooops s.s3 L

I ALL LICENSED OPEPAIOPS AND PERSONNEL April 1, 1985 IN TPAINING FOR LICENSING, DfI-l 3000-85-074 (IESS TEGNICAL IUNCTIONS)

This letter is being forwarded to all licensed personnel in an attstpt to cxxmunicate GPUN's management response to the concerns of the licensed operators which were identified in the PHR Report.

We believe the actions taken have been effective. We intend to continue discussions with licensed operators and want to arphasize that you have access to all levels of your supervision to discuss any of your concerns as licensed operators.

If, after reading the report, you have any questions about PHR or our response, please contact your appropriate management or me in Trailer 122, telephone extension 8161.

.5 L .)/ h )f

. D. Hukill Vice President & Director, DE-1 HDH/pjl Attachment cc: Operator Training Manager - B. P. Isonard Vice President & Director, Ntriear Assurance - R. L. Iorg (w/o attachnent)

Manager, Plant Training, DfI - S. L. Newton (w/o attachment)

Operations & Maintenance Director, D!I-l - R. J. Toole

e 4

April 1, 1985 3000-85-074 DISTRIBLTION L. G. Noll S. W. Brantley D. E. Smith M. E. Wynne D. A. Smith G. M. Davis D. L. Hass D. C. Janes J. C. Herman R. E. Bcyer W. A. Fraser T. L. Crouse S. K. Martin H. K. Olive H. B. Shipnan M. J. Ibss, Sr.

J. R. Paules B. J. Keller J. L. Masters D. G. Treadway M. B. Bezilla R. J. Iane D. T. Niland D. J. Gorse R. S. Canpbell P. F. Chalecki J. E. Boltz J. J. Walsh R. A. Heilman M. D. W111enbecher J. R. Gallagher D. M. May T. H. Goodlavage G. Hernelsey R. C. Bugelholl N. J. 2 nson G. J. Bixler D. W. Atherholt D. L. Reese i M. Thanas G. R. Hoek J. A. Flowers J. A. Barone J. C. Enders J. A. Stubbs D. J. Boltz F. J. Kacinko, Jr.

D. L. Wilt R. H. Maag J. E. N ore D. F. Spath W. S. Stanley

i Nuclear memorandum Suoject. Management's Response to the Operators Date March 22, 1985 on the RHR Report 1352K NA/859 From: L catiom Director-Nuclear Assurance Parsippany Robert L. Long To:

Chairman-G0RBs, I. R. Finfrock, Jr.

Comptroller, F. A. Donofrio Director-Administration, R. P. Fasulo Director-Cormunications, W. L. Gifford Director-Human Resources, D. G. Murray Director-Maintenance & Construction, F. F. Manganaro Director-0yster Creek, P. B. Ffedler Director-Rad. & Environ. Controls, R. W. Heward, Jr.

Director-Technical Functions, R. F. Wilson Director-THI-1, H. D. Hukill Director-TMI-2, F. R. Standerfer Enclosed please find a copy of the Managenent's Response to the Operators on the RHR Report, and a sample letter of transmittal to GPUN licensed personnel. The report, which is our final response to RHR, will be transmitted to Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge for appropriate distribution outside of the company.

All ifcensed personnel in GPUN are to receive a copy of the report and this should be transmitted through their divisio,1 head. Non-licensed personnel can receive a copy at your discretion. Additional copies of the report can be requested through T. L. Myers, Organizatior, Development Director, Ext. 6174 Parsippany. Should you have any questions about the report and its transmittal please contact me at Ext. 2420.

b) fn' R. L. L ek cc: Executive Vice President, E. E. Kintner AOOOO648 8 83

l l

Nuclear I

I Management's Response to the Operator.s on the RHR Report February 1985

4 INTRODUCTION General Public Utilities Nuclear Corporation (GPUN) places the highest priority and value on the safe cperation of its nuclear power plants and has made " safe performance" one of its primary corporate objectives. This has been an on-going objective and continues to receive the highest level of management support.

On the morning of March 28, 1979, Oyster Creek (OC) had just shut down and Three Mlle Island, Unit 1 (TMI-1) was starting up in cycle five. Upon receiving nottftcation of the accident in Unit 2, GPUN management made the decision to voluntarily shut down Unit 1. Several months later the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Issued formal shut-down orders and directed the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASL8) to hold hearings. From October 1980 through June 1981, the ASLB conducted those hearings.

In July 1981 GPUN was informed of a cheating incident during the NRC license examinations. During August of 1981, the ASLB issued its management Partial Initial Decision (PID), and in October of that year, all TMI-1 Operators were required to retake the license examination. During November and December of 1981, hearings were conducted before the Special Master on cheating. In April 1982, the Special Master issued his report and four months later the ASLB issued a second PIO on the cheating issues. Concerned about this unprecedented focus and attention, and the activities following the Three Mlle Island, Unit 2 (TMI-2) accident, senior management engaged the firm of Rohrer, Hibler and Replogie, Inc. (RHR), specialists in psychological counseling, to conduct aa in-depth study of Operator concerns at both TMI-l and OC. With safe operation as a primary concern, senior management was interested to. see what effect all of this attention had on the attitudes of the Operators.

The primary thrust of the consultation was ' threefold:

1. To assess the attitudes of Operators, particularly in reference to safe operation.

2. To prioritize Operator issues in terms of importance to the Operators.

3. To reccmmend action steps.

Commencing in the summer of 1982, RHR consultants initially interviewed a small sample of Licensed Reactor and Senior Reactor Operators (SRO) at botn TMI and OC to determine the range of their concerns. A customized survey was then developed and administered to essentially all Licensed Operators at each nuclear power plant. After giving the Operators an opportunity to complete the survey, the consultants met with small groups of Operators to refine, prioritize and gain the Operators input on proposed action items. The results of the survey were computer analyzed for further use in identifying the Operators concerns. Preliminary oral reports were presented to GPUN senior management as the work progressed in the fall and early winter of 1982. A final report was prepared, " Priority Concerns of Licensed Operators at TMI and OC and Suggested Action Steps " dated March 15, 1983.

GPUN management considers the Licensed Operators to have a pivotal role in the safe operation of the plants and as such, sees other departments in a support mode. Since the concerns of the Operators involved most of the other

, I

departments the recommended action steps required resconses frcm these departments. This information was tracked by the Nuclear Assurance Olvision and presented in a series of response updates for management review and action. Copies of these response reports can be obtained frem the Ofrector of Training and Education in Parsippany.

The results of the survey, the recommended action steps, and the GPUN Olvision responses, were presented to and discussed with GPUN's senior management. The action steps and the responses by GPUN taken to address them are discussed on the following pages.

2-

O TABLE OF CONTENTS ACTION STEPS PAGE NO.

Safety 4 Training 10 Career 16 Cooperation 17 Pay 21 Rotating Shift 22 Quality of Management 23 Implementation Phase 25 Glossary 26

i SAFETY ACTION STEPS

1. Simpilfication of emergency coerating procedures.

At Three Mile Island, Unit I (TMI-1) the emergency operating procedures have been replaced by Abnormal Transient Precedures (ATP) based on the Abnormal Transient Operating Guidelines (ATOG). ATOG is based on input from the Ooerators and their management and the ATP's are a significant Imorovement and simplification over the emergency procedures they replaced. The ATOG process f'acilitates identification of correct procedures for handling a plant transient. Special training on ATOG and the ATP's was conducted on the Power Safety, Inc.

(PSI), formerly Babcock and Wilcox (B&W), Simulator in Lynchburg, Virginia. Existing administrative procedures have been revised to conform to ATOG guidelines and additional precautions have been added which precede the required action steps. Procedural steps are contained in the text and are not annotated in the notes.

At OC reviews of approximately sixty (60) new Abnormal Operating Event Procedures (A0EP) and thirty (30) new System Diagnostic and Restoration Procedures (50RP-> have been completed by Operators and the staff. All comments have been forwarded to the Engineering Division for resolution. These new procedures have been incorporated into the Operator Requalification Program in order to famillarize licensed personnel with this new information. Operator and Training and Education Department comments are solicitled during Requalification to determine if a further revision to the content is necessary.

Approximately thirty (30) hours of formal classrocm training on draft A0EP's and forty-four (44) hours on draft E0P's were conducted as part of the Licensed Operator Requalification Program.

OC's draft E0P's and A0EP's were used during the six (6) day annual requalification training at the General Electric Simulator in Morris, Illinois, A special study was conducted to validate the accuracy of the draft E0P's and A0EP's used in the training sessions. The results of this study indicated no significant changes were necessary to the E0P's.

However. It did identify several significant changes to the A0EP's, which resulted in a special training session to explain the differences to all licensed shift personnel prior to plant restart on October 27, 1984.

2. Dialogue on and analysis of procedural compliance issues in special cases.

Procedural compliance requirements are now regularly discussed with Shift Supervisors, SRO, and Reactor Operators (RO) at TMI and OC. At THI-1 the procedure owner concept is used which allows Operators to have direct input and identifies a specific contact person for any problems in a given situation. The majority of the plant operations procedures are assigned to an SRO and the remainder are assigned to Operations Engineering.

.4 s

9 e

Detailed instructions concerning procedural compliance are contained in the TMI-1 Administrative Procedure 1029. and at OC in Administrative Procedure 106. These procedures contain instructions for emergency situations wnere an existing procedure cannot be followed or when an operator needs information on symotems. It provides specific authority to take immediate action to prevent or correct an unsafe or casualty situation which could adversely effect the health and safety of the plant personnel and puditc. Authority is also given to prevent serious equipment / system damage even when such actions are outside-the requirements and guidelines of approved procedures.

At OC and TMI, Operations Management continues to stress rigorous compliance with procecures. In line with this concept, a continuing dialogue is maintained with shift supervisors. This serves to identify and correct those areas where problems are caused due to unique plant conditions. Utilization of Procedure control 107 at OC, and Administrative Procedure 1001A at TMI-1, allows Operators to make changes, if conditions warrant, on a one-time basis to support the compilance requirements. GPUN's efforts in this area have received very positive feedback from the NRC in recent Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) reports on Plant Operations at both sites.

The dialogue is continuing at both sites and procedural compliance is stressed as an integral part of the conduct of operations.

3. Improve speed of feedback on procedural change recommendations made by Operators. Establish policy on this.

At TMI and OC the responsibility for operating procedures lies with the Operations Olvision. Efforts to streamline the required administrative and review processes continues. At TMI-1 the procedure owner concept has resulted in a significant improvement. This concept places responsibility for every procedure with a specific individual.

The Vice President of THI-1 specifically covers this topic in his annual one-on-one discussion with each Licensed Operator. Procedural compilance requirements are frequently reviewed with all members of

, , the THI-1 staff. This way, every member of the plant staff knows exactly who to see if s/he has a correction or suggested improvement for a procedure. THI-I Plant Administrative Procedure 1029, Conduct of Operations, provides detailed guidelines for procedural compliance.

An OC Operations Department Goal for 1983 was to " Improve Procedures and Enhance Procedures Review Compliance Through a Complete Evaluation / Review of all Operations Department Procedures." As of 4

October 31, 1984, on-shift Operators had reviewed the majority of the operating procedures which resulted in the submission of procedure change requests for nearly half of the operating procedures. In addition to the on-shift review, the Operations Department reviewed i approximately (90%) of the operating procedures These combined l reviews resulted in Change Requests for more than seventy-five percent 1 (75%) of the procedures. Approximately ninety percent (907.) of the review process was completed by December 1984.

i i

4 Imorove mechanism of consultations with operationsf;n,deveicoment of procedures.

and

5. Improve process of review of procedures.

At OC, the review process for procedures has been improved by obtaining the necessary Operator review. Procedures primarily used by the Operations Department are forwarded to tne Operations Control Manager who determines which procedures should be sent to Operators for review. Operator comments are collected and evaluated and necessary procedure change requests are submitted.

At TMI the procedure owner concept has improved the consultation process. Major procedural changes, especially emergency procedures, are checked out on the B&W Simulator before being implemented at TMI.

Once approved, all shifts are trained on these procedures.

During the 1983/1984 outage at OC, virtually all operations procedures were upgraded to include new plant modifications. New and revised procedures currently receive an independent technical safety review by the Technical Functions Division.

Communications and consultation with the Technical Functions Olvision concerning procedure changes has improved at both sites.

6. Cooperation Between Departments: Especially speed repair of backuo equipment.

GPUN Corporate Goal 9, "Olscussions With Exempt Employees on GPUN Organizations" and TMI-1, Goal 2. " Individual Otscussions by the Vice-President, THI-l With Plant Employees," are specifically designed to improve Interdivisional cooperation. Other divisions have taken similar action and are currently working together toward these common goals.

One of the TMI-I goals for 1984 stated, "Each department head / manager must review the GPUN organizational structure and the role, responsibilities, interrelations and goals of the various divisions t

with all members of his/her staff during calendar year 1984."

Management interface meetings were conducted during each training cycle by senior members of THI-I management, at which time overall corporation and departmental goals, progress, and achievements were reviewed with all personnel. Also, during the past two (2) years, all

! Vice Presidents, as well as many Senior Ofrectors from other divisions, have attended the TMI-1 Managers meetings to review their department's objectives, concerns, and progress. The daily 4:00 p.m.

l and Biweekly Project Status meetings involve members from all i divisions, and provided an opportunity to coordinate each division's l efforts in support of the overall plant objectives and schedule. This is an ongoing process.

L

At OC the Operations Olvision interfaces daily with the Maintenance and Construction Olvision and the Plant Material Department to identify repairs needed to plant equipment. Plant tours are conducted on a routine basis, with the major emphasis on improved housekeeping and mutual identification of plant concerns. A concentrated effort to improve cooperation between GPUN Olvisions/ Departments is being l practiced at the managerial level and is strongly endorsed at the supervisory level. Included in this framework is the " Reduction of Backlog Maintenance Job Orders" as the numeer one priority on ene urgent needs list generated by the Plant Olvision. The support of the Maintenance and Construction Olvision has resulted in a dedicated effort to address this outage backlog. As a result, all "short forms," which are an abbreviated form of the Backlog Maintenance Job Orders, required for restart were completed prior to the plant startup.

Through an increased number of broadbased interface Olvision/ Department meetings at all levels, efforts continue to promote good communications. The Maintenance and Construction

, Olvision demonstrates additional sensitivity to priorities for equipment repairs, changes and improvements established by OC Operations.

7. Union and Management at Oyster Creek.

4 Several meetings were held with union officials, GPUN management and JCP&L to resolve the union's concerns regarding the RHR survey and report. At the January 27, 1984 meeting, GPUN management explained to RHR that the union's objections to their study were resolved prior to the beginning of the formal RHR survey.

Prior to the RHR survey and report, the Company had included Labor <

Management Relations training at both OC and TMI to assure that all supervisors involved with contract administration were knowledgable

concerning the Company's responsibilities to the Union. The ongoing

! supervisory training program includes specific sessions on Labor-Management Relations, grievance procedures, and contract interpretation.

i

8. Operator Experience: Increase " Hands-On" experience; more time of trainees in plant and with equipment; more coaching from shift I supervisors; refine efforts for keeping instructors of trainees and Licensed Operators current on plant equipment, instrumentation and procedural changes.

I At TMI-1 the Basic Principles Training Simulator (BPTS) has been installed and is being used to train Operators. The Replica Simulator is scheduled for delivery by late 1985 and will be 1ccated in the new training building at TMI.

Licensed Operators were trained at the B&W Simulator in Lynchburg, Virginia during three different sessions in 1983, and twice in 1984, l to give them more in-depth training on Once-Thru-Steam-Generator

(OSTG) tube s

_ _ . , . . . . _ , , - , _ . . _ . _ . _ . . ~ . , _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . , , , , , _ _ , - _ _ _ _ , _ _ . . _ _ , , , . _ . _ _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ , _ , - . . . , _ _ _ _ .

O leak / rupture procedures ATOG, and low power operations. Future simulator training will be given once a year with additional training as necessary. The Realacement Operator Training Program has been revised and includes guidelines for action, knowledge and skills required for successful completion of each On-The-Job Training (0]T) task or checkout. The recommendations of the Operator Training Review Committee were included in the revised OJT guidelines. Startup OJT qualification cards have been developed for all Operators and will be completed for each TMI-l Licensed Operator during hot plant testing and the initial startup and test period.

In 1984, a Task Force was appointed to conduct a job analysis of the TMI-I Operator positions. The results of the Task Force's findings have been used to validate and revise present and future classroom, simulator and OJT training programs. The Institute of Nuclear Power Organizations (INPO) accreditatto.1 of the TMI-1 Licensed Operator training program is in progress and should be completed in early 1985.

Licensed and Certified Instructors at THI-1 are required to maintain proficiencies through attendance at classroom training for Licensed Operator Requalification. In addition, Licensed Operators are required to meet minimum watchstanding requirements.

During 1984, OC revised and expanded its formal Replacement Operator training program from fourteen (14) to twenty-five (25) weeks.

established plans for instructor participation in Licensed Operator Requalification Training, and increased the length of Replacement Operator Certification at the Morris Simulator from six (6) to eleven (11) days.

A 8 PTS is scheduled for delivery in the First Quarter 1985 at OC. It will be utilized in the same manner as the BPTS at TMI. A formal qualification program, which includes practical hands-on experience, has been established and implemented for Simulator Training Instructors at THI-1. A similar program will be implemented at OC.

After the extended 1983-1984 outage the OC Startup Plan incorporated refresher " hands-on" training for Licensed Operators. Training included taking reactor critical system line-up changes, additional surveillance testing and system equipment operations. The new Supervisory Development Program, which includes the Shift Supervisors, offers employee coaching as one of its major segments.

9. Personnel and Family Problems: Determine utilization rates by Licensed Operators of Stress Control Services.

Ten (10) Control Room Operators utilized the Employee Assistance Program (EAP) under the direction of Stress Control, Inc. at OC and TMI through March 1984. This represented approximately 20%

uttilzation while the national average group utilization of an EAP was in the 4% to 6% population range. The Operators who participated in the EAP expressed no concern regarding confidentiality.

l I

s

In April 1984, the services provided by Stress Control were transferred to EQUIFAC, INC. for psychological screening, and to the Institute of Human Resources for employee assistance.

10. Olsseminate information en confidentiality and on availablitty of services through Stress Control and alternate sources.

GPUN continues to recommend the use of the EAP, wnen appropriate, to all employees at the Company sites.

As discussed in Action Step #9, Stress Control services were transferred to two private consulting firms in April 1984. An employee's use of the EAP is strictly confidential unless his/her unescorted access is impacted. This is to be determined by the EAP psychologist / psychiatrist, whose goal is to rehabilitate, i.e., return the employee to his/her previous assignment. A designated company representative may be contacted to help if needed. In addition to the news articles and bulletin board postings, a new EAP brochure was distributed in January 1985. Each site Human Resources Department has a complete listing of official agencies which provide employee assistance and it is available upon request.

11. Consensus on Components of Safety: Develop consensus between top management and Operators on those factors contributing to safety on which there is a divergence.

This issue was discussed in detall during an April 1984 meeting of the President's staff. Af ter reviewing RHR Table 11, it was generally agreed there was no significant deviation of opinions, considering the different perspectives of Operators and management. The Operator's day-to'-day proximity to Plant Operations, and management's

" big-picture" approach to "overall public safety," results in somewhat different positions. Management understands the Operator's position, but does not feel the divergences affect the safe operation of the plants.

12. Develop consensus within top management on those factors contributing to safety on which there is a divergence.

A distribution of the responses made by management was obtained from RHR. A discussion of those items was held at a December 1983, President's staff meeting. A further discussion of the nine (9) items, in which the distribution of responses was spread over five or more numbers, was held at the President's Staff Meeting on Friday, January 13, 1984. The meeting resulted in a general agreement and clear understanding that the divergences were due to a variety of interpretations of a particular issue. There was no significant divergence of opinion among GPUN Corporate Officers with respect to the various factors contributing to public safety. Subsequently, documentation of concurrence was issued to the GPUN Board of Olrectors, in memorandum NA/514. " Consensus on Factors Contributing to Safety," dated January 17, 1984 by R. L. Long, Vice President, Nuclear Assurance.

s

TRAINING ACTION STEPS

13. Requalification: Eliminate "Comorehensive Test" portion of the requalification test.

Af ter a thorough review of the concerns and educational advantages / disadvantages created by the annual comprenensive requalification examination, both OC and TMI-1 Operations and Training and Education management jointly agreed the annual examination should be continued. A contributing factor was the difficulty of preparing for and scheduling the NRC's periodic independent comorehensive requalification examinations, which are given on a random samp1tng basis.

Operators at both plants were advised that the annual comprehensive requalification examination would remain an ongoing practice.

14. Make repetitive parts of requalification more attractive. j The BPTS at TMI-1 has had a significant impact on this concern and has been enthusiastically accepted by the Operators. Installation and use of the TMI-1 Replica Simulator will make the repetitive parts of requalification training even more attractive, interesting, and meaningful.

The use of the BPTS enables Instructors to directly relate theoretical concepts in the areas of reactor theory and principles, heat transfer, fluid flow, and thermodynamics to practical applications in the plant via demonstrations and exercises on the BPTS and the use of its graphic Cathode Ray Tubes (CRT) displays.

OC will acquire a BPTS during First Quarter 1985. Like THI, this Simulator will be integrated into the requalification training program. Increased student hands-on involvement is a training objective at both sites.

15. Post schedule for coming year of requalification training including outilne of content on Operator Bulletin Board at each facility.

Each Trainee receives a copy of the training schedule for the subsequent six (6) months. During the first cycle of training, time is spent discussing plans for the upcoming year. Similar scheduling procedures are used at THI-l and OC. Training and Education will publish an annual schedule at the three (3) GPUN sites by the end of January 1985. The annual schedule will be supplemented by a more detailed quarterly schedule. Weekly schedules will continue to be published and will contain final details such as classroom location and instructor assignments.

16. Content and Methods: Include industry and community issues as well .

as GPU Nuclear approach to these issues in the training of Operators. l l

OC Ooerations conducts plant status / discussion sessions with each i shift during the training week. OC Communications works with Training and )

l l

Education and Operations to periodically present the current status of important issues during discussion sessions with the Operators. This will be evaluated for effectiveness by Operations.

At both sites industry issues, events. and information are transmitted to the coerating shifts on a regular basis through the Operating Expertence and Assessment Group Required Reading Program anc the internally controlled Operations Division Required Reading System.

During each training week at THI-1 a management interface session is scheduled as part of requalification training where issues are addressed and management is available to answer questions.

The Communications 01 vision provides all employees with information on GPUN activities, industry, and community issues.

17. Retntroduction of " systems approach" for Navy trainees to understand role of equipment in plant.

Current Control Room Operator programs on-shift time have been expanded. At TMI, the Ex-Navy trainees receive additional systems training and complete practical factors which are required as part of the A0 program. In addition, tne basic Control Room Operator program for all candidates has been changed to include three (3) additional weeks of in-plant on-the-job training.

The OC schedule and systems instruction have been tailored to Ex-Navy Nukes and the amount of time on-shift has been increased.from fourteen (14) to twenty-five (25) weeks. The upgraded qualification cards, which define systems knowledge and practical factors requirements, have been developed and implemented.

18. Develop diversified approach for mastery of theory for Ex-Navy Nukes and Trainees coming up from plant.

The BPTS will aid in reducing the number of classroom lectures and allow Operators hands on experience at the simulator on all systems they are required to know and operate. The BPTS is highly interactive and provides a graphics display of the fundamentals underlying the principles behind power plant operations. The Equipment Operator Program at OC has been upgraded to include theoretical training on all systems E0's operate. Theory instruction to Non-Licensed Operators at both sites has been increased in the areas of reactor theory, heat transfer, chemistry, individualized controls, mechanical and electrical fundamentals, math, physics, and radiation control. In addition, THI-1 recently introduced voluntary programs in reactor theory for those Auxiliary Operators (AO) who wish to become Control Room Operator (CRO).

THI-1 offers validation examination (" test out") in theory to Ex-Navy Nukes in training for Reactor Operator licenses. A similar waiver in selected subjects, such as math, physics, and heat transfer fundamentals is available at OC.

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19. Simulator specific to TMI.

The TMI-1 Replica $1mulator is scheduled to be delivered by Decemcer 1985. It will replace tne B&W simulator currently being used for training Licensed Operators anc Shift Tecnnical Advisors.

20. Develop method for trainee to gauge his growth in competency to operate during training period.

The BPTS will aid in this area, as will increased guidance in the form of the OJT qualification cards. At OC the on-shift time for the new Replacement Operator class has been increased from fourteen (14) to twenty-five (25) weeks to allow students sufficient time to complete the qualification card system.

The training programs at both sites require qualification card check-offs which assist trainees to judge their growth and accomplishments. Through interaction with quallfled Operators, each trainee will obtain an assessment of his/her knowledge in relation to the requirements for operating plant systems and the overall plant. A portion of this assessment will be gained during plant walkthroughs and by obtaining qualification card checkoffs. At both sites revised guidelines for OJT Training checkoffs have been issued for CRO, SRO, and EO-A0 programs. This checkoff Ilst provides minimum uniform standards of required knowledge with all requirements broken down into specific increments.

21. Tighten standards and evaluation of Trainees.

More stringent performance standards have been incorporated into the qualification cards for trainees. Revised OJT Training Guidelines for the Reactor Operator Training Program were issued in February 1984, at TMI, and in May 1984, at CC.

In addition to the information contained in Action Step #8, the Licensed Operator Certification procedures contribute to high standards and in-depth evaluation of trainees. The completion of the Operations Plant Manual (OPM) at THI-l has provided the Operator with learning objectives for each of the OPM's sections. These objectives will be used to conduct assessments of the Operators knowledge.

An OPM similar to THI-I is planned for OC. The project will begin by mid 1985 and should be completed by late 1986.

22. Evaluate instructor on pedagogic skills with view to coaching and improving.

This is being done on a continuing basis through the Instructor Development Program and the Instructor Evaluation Program conducted at the three sites.

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The system, used to assess instructional skills, allows each instructor to be formally evaluated as frequently as eight (8) times per year. One of these evaluations is performed by the Educational Development Section. Each Manager and Supervisor concucts nis/ner own evaluations which are then factored into the periodic coaching / appraisal meetings held with the instructor. Educational Development also locks for specific as well as generic weaknesses with individual coaching available on an ongoing basis. The content of the Basic and Advanced Instructor Training Programs are constantly reviewed relative to this data. Additional audits of the training programs are performed periodically by Quality Assurance.

23. Develop method for monitoring and improving consistency between training for licensing and requalification and testing for the same.

In the area of Initial licensing examinations prepared and

, administered by the NRC, significant progress has been made in improving the consistency between the Company's training programs and the Commissions examinaticns by providing the NRC with updated training materials and precedures, including the learning objectives, prior to each examination. Questions from the GPUN examination bank

'- are also provided. ,

In the area of company administered examinations, consistency has been improved by increased emphasis on testing the behavioral learning objectives presented in the classroom. At TMI-1, the INPO Accreditation Team concurred that the behavioral learning objectives-are being tested. It is expected the work being done in the job analysts areas will lead to further improvements by strengthening and refining the behavioral learning objectives. In addition, letters on the requalification examination are sent to the Operators at both sites annually. These letters provide broad guidance on the major topics covered on the examinations and aid the trainees in preparing for the examinations by refreshing their memories on what has been covered and which areas will be tested.

The OC and TMI-I Operator Training Review Committees addressed this issue through an in-depth review of operator training at both sites.

The Committees have been disbanded, but will be reconvened as needed.

24. Develop methods for monitoring and improving consistency between training and ability to operate.

The Training and Education Department regularly seeks feedback from Operations and other user groups concerning their perception of training effectiveness. Regular Operations / Training meetings at OC and THI assure this feedback process. .This systematic approach results in identifying exactly what training is required and the most effective and efficient way to present it. At OC and TMI, Training and Education and Operations Management meet regularly to discuss mutual concerns, define time spent by Operators, and assess training needs, content and administration. Comments are evaluated and concerns addressed by making changes to

l l training programs when appropria2e. Training 2horoughly evalea2es .

feedback / comments and integrates appreorlate suggestions into tne program.

l General course material such as " Tour Training" for E0's has been modified and implemented to recognize the specific concitions at OC.

l The results of job and task analysts will continue to imorove consistency between training and the ability to operate, by linking i the training program even more closely to performance based l

objectives.

l Training and Education has developed a Training Systems Development (T50) Model for all sites to provide better guidance on systematically developing performance based training.

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This model is being incorporated into a series of guidelines to be used by Training and Education to develop lesson materials. T&E has reviewed all their theory courses to ensure compatibility with plant specific examples.

25. Task Analyses of what Operators actually do as a basis for training relevance.

The Training and Education Department subscribes to and utilizes the task analysts approach.

The GPUN Training Systems Development Model using the task analysis approach, has been approved by INPO. At TMI-l the INPO Job Task list for the B&W Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) was utillzed in conducting surveys resulting in TMI-l specific task lists for SRO, CR0 and A0 positions. The lists are being refined and compared to existing programs to determine what changes, if any, are needed. This will result in further upgrading of the classroom and OJT Training programs prior to the start of the next class in each area.

At OC an effort has been initiated which will provide for the completion of the CR0 task analysis. More than one hundred fifty (150) site specific items have currently been validated by INPO. The remaining three (3) to four (4) hundred Items will be complete and validated by the end of May 1985.

26. Administration - Promote improved relationships between Operations Training personnel. ,

The Managers of Plant Training regularly attend the site Vice President's staff meetings. The Manager of Corporate Training regularly attends the staff meetings of the Vice President of Technical Functions.

Training and fducation established a Training Advisory Council in 1983, which centinues to address improved relationships as well as other training issues. Council memcership consists of a representative from each division each of whom is at the level reporting to a Olvision Vice President.

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At both CC and TMI regular meetings and joint efforts between Operations and Training and Education have cromoted improved relationships. '

At TMI the joint efforts of the Operations Olvision and the Training and Education Department resulted in the develcoment of the ATCG Program, the transfer of an SRO and two (2) AO's frem Operations to Operator Training and the involvement of the Operators in *he Simulator Development croject. Operations at OC made a similar effort by assigning two (2) SRO's to Training and Education.

27. Targeted interviews in Training and Education Department to explore 4 issues. and other Departments.

The Training and Education Department has had several follow-up discussions with RHR. Their responses to RhR recommendations were reviewed and RHR helped clarify issues as they applied to TMI-I and OC.

It was decided not to use RHR to conduct interviews of instructors.

The various issues have been addressed through the Operator Training Review Ccmmittees at each site, and Training and Education Management is responsible for soliciting instructor input and concerns during the

' feedback meetings which are held after every evaluative classroom observation. In addition to regular staff meetings the Director of Training and Education meets annually with all new instructors to discuss a variety of training related matters, i

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CAREER ACTION STEPS

23. Imorove pay differenttal between Licensed Operators and other Departments.

Since the RO's are memoers of the International Brotnernood of Electrical Workers (IBEN). all ecmoensation matters are subject to negotiation between the ISEW and JCP&L for OC. and Metropolitan Edison (Met-Ed) for TMI. Prior to each negotiaticn, the companies uncertake a compensation survey with other utilities for key bargaining unit positions to assure that Company rates are competitive with the industry, i.e., hourly rates, bonuses and shift differentials.

29. Provide some training in theory for Auxillary Operators with potential for Reactor Operator.

The Training and Education Department has increased theory training for Non-Licensed Operators at both sites.

The TMI-l AO's and OC E0's initial training program provides extensive theory training to give a better appreciation and understanding of the Reactor Operator's job, knowledges required, and to build the confidence necessary to ultimately perform as a Reactor Operator. It also provides a better appreciation of the consequences of their

, actions in accurately performing their current duties.

30. College Credentials - Facilitate getting of degrees; credit for in-house courses, programs in area colleges Career Counsel.

The Training and Education Department continues to develop and deliver educational career counseling programs. Additional programs from local colleges / universities are being considered for inclusion.at GPUN sites. At OC, a Masters of Susiness Administration degree and a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering programs have started on-site. .At TM! a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering was initiated in 1984.

GPUN employees through the Educational Assistance Coordinator can get college credit for Navy Nuclear expertence selected GPUN training programs and relevant work experience. Training and Education is presently investigating the certification of various GPUN training programs through the New York Board of Regents. Completion of this effort is targeted for late 1985.

Human Resources has established a divisional goal to offer career counselling on a company-wide basis.

31. Career Paths - Develop and publish possible career paths and qualifications for them.

Oraft progressions outlining career opportunttles for Operators are in the process of development. Additional career path opportunittes are being s

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l reviewed and will be made available provided sufficient flexibility can be worked into shift schedules.

A Committee was established within GPUN, composed of rearesentatives j from THI-1, TMI-2, OC, and Corporate Headquarters to review and j develop applicable recommendations to management. Ccmmittee action l

will commence in the first quarter of 1985. In addition, Training and i Education has develooed a family of instructor jcbs which identify additional career paths for Operators and other plant personnel.

Individual counseling is available through the site Human Resources Department.

COOPERATION ACTION STEPS

32. Emphasis on Cooperation - Olscussion of issues with Department Heads.

and 3 3 ,- Reinforce concept of orgtntrational structure that operations is a key  ;

I function and other departments have support function.  !

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34. Make cooperation between departments a GPU Nuclear Corporation Objective.

l The entire RHR Report has been reviewed by the Office of the President and the Olvision Vice Presidents. ~0lvisions have discussed the need for interdivisional cooperation with all of their employees and l periodic follow-up sessions are held by Department Heads.

Organizational effectiveness through interdivisional cooperation is emphasized in management development programs.

It is the continuing common goal of all Departments to increase interdepartmental understanding and cooperation. Roundtables with Senior Management are conducted at the end of Management and Supervisory Development Programs. All Olvisions are emphasizing the

" concept

• of cooperation through staff and employee meetings, interdivisional meetings, and when required, development of interface agreements and procedures. This is an ongoing activity.

"J 5 . Develop system for evaluating managers on cooperation.

This was included in the Performance Appraisal Plan implemented in 1983. The Performance Appraisal Form. Section 3 under Performance Factors which is defined as " contributing to, and cooperating with others in a common effort." In each evaluation, this factor is reviewed by the immediate supervisor and the next higher level of management.

Emphasis on cooperation / teamwork is also included in the Management /

Supervisory Development Programs.

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36. Facilitating Cooperation - Identification of problems of interfaces between departments. Intergroup problem sciving meetings.

This was covered under GPUN Corporate Objective No. 5, "...to improve GPUN's functional capabilities." Staff and employee meetings emphasize the " concept" of cooperation. For examole, the Vice President of Nuclear Assurance holds regular amployee meetings to explore these types of issues.

Evidence of progress was seen in the very supportive attitude of the various organizational groups during the final weeks of the recently completed Oyster Creek outage. Comoletion of the Restart Certification Book leading to final signoff by the Plant Director required hundreds of verification signatures, numerous problem solving meetings between various organizational elements, and the successful resolution of thousands of items. The Technical Functions Division with the assistance of the Training and Education Department is currently working to address organizational interface and training related issues.

At TMI-1, the successful completion of major plant modifications, such as the replacement of a main coolant pump and the steam generator repairs, resulted in close ongoing interaction and cooperation among all Departments.

Efforts will be made to assure that this type of cooperation among all departments is ongoing.

37. Educate departments on each other's roles.

The following steps have been taken to promote a greater understanding between departments:

A. A synopsis of the Organization Plan has Seen distributed to all employees at each site and is on file in each Control Room. At TMI and OC an Organization Chart which reflects new assignments or changes is sent to the Control Room each month.

8. Organization and Division functions are discussed by a designated representative in each training program, including CR0 training.

C. At OC an organization guide has been published which lists the reporting relationship and responsibilities for all management personnel at the Oyster Creek / Forked River sites.

D. Senior Management conducted a two (2) day management retreat in November 1984 to identify and discuss current organizational issues and to reinforce the role of each department in the GPUN organization.

E. The role of each Department is reinforced through the " Nuclear Today" pubilcation "Old You Know."

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38. Training: Train supervisors in cooperation. operators in persuasion versus authoritarian approach, suoport department memoers fresh frem school in importance of cooperation.

The GPUN Superviser Training Program addresses these issues. Key segments of the program, which is behavior modeling based, emphasizes the importance of leadership, productivity, cooperation, and overall performance management.

39. Get people acquainted across fepartments. Post photographs of both Licensed Operators and support department Foremen and Supervisors at each facility with name and function, circulate current rosters of department Foremen with areas of responsibility, location and telephone number.

,i Corporate directories are published to address part of this issue. At

? '- OC Operations posts pictures of all Department personnel. Training and Education is planning to photograph and post the names of its personnel at each training center during the first quarter of 1985.

TMI-1 management has not approved the concept of posting photographs.

Both the Supervisory and Management Development programs bring students together from the various sites. The Management Development Program, which is conducted at all three (3) sites, provides an opportunity to meet and interface with personnel from other, sites as well as senior management.

40. Work toward sufficient flow of trainees so that those with operations experience can join support departments.

At OC, an cbjective of the Operations Division is to provide a career path and options for Operators to move into areas where their experience and knowledge can benefit the Corporation. In 1985, with six (6) shift rotation, there will be more emphasis on moving Operators, i.e., Group Operating Supervisor (GOS) and Group Shift Supervisor (GSS) into permanent positions throughout GPUN.

TMI-1 now has fifteen (15) licensed SRO's and seventeen (17) Licensed RO's on their operating crews. This provides the flexibility to move personnel to support Divisions and still maintain enough Licensed Operators to support the six (6) shift rotation. During the past two (2) years Operators have made the following moves:

Oyster Creek 3 SRO's to Training 1 SRO to Industrial Site Safety Review Group (Nuclear Assurance) 1 RO to Nuclear Assurance Division.

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1 SRO to Training as Supervisor of Licensed Operator Training i 1 SRO to Training for Operator Training 2 AO's to Training as Instructors 1 RO to Training as. Instructor 2 RO's Temporarily assigned to Training for Simulator Develcoment i

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PAY ACTION STEPS

41. Pay Differentials - Develcp data on pay differentials between Licensed Operators and other disciplines at GPUN.

and

42. Develop data on pay differentials in Nuclear Plants run by other utt11 ties.

and

43. Use data to reassess policies and plan appropriate a-: tion steps.

1. GPUN performs annual salary surveys with other utilities to assure that Company rates are competitive. Internally, GPUN attempts to maintain a salary differential between the RO's.and the two (2) levels of SRO Supervisory positlons, Shift or Group Shift Supervisors, and Shift Foremen or Group Operating Sauervisors to provide upgrading and promotion potential to management positions for RO's.

2. Inasmuch as GPUN wage and license bonus amounts are subject to local bargaining unit agreements, differentials can only be adjusted through union negotiation.

3. Several actions have been taken in the past few years to ensure equitable pay for Licensed Operators and to make certain GPUN remains competitive with surrounding utilities.

4. Specific salary information.is available from supervisors or the site Human Resources Department.

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4 ROTATING SHIFT ACTION STEPS

44. Work to initiate six (6) shifts at OC as soon as possible.

Both THI-l and OC now have a six (6) shif t coerations staff rotation in place.

At OC action by the Maintenance and Construction Division has also been taken to implement a six (6) shif t rotation of its crews to provide operational maintenance support. It is planned that the on-shift maintenance crew will rotate in parallel with the Operations Department so increased training, better cooperation, and round-the-clock support to the Control Room will be available. TMI-I Maintenance personnel are on a six (6) shift rotation.

45.* Shift Scheduling - Study feasibility of each rotation being consistently eight (8) hours later than previous at OC. Study feasibility of twelve (12) hour shifts.

This matter has been reviewed by the Nuclear Assurance and the Human Resources Departments with applicable divisional management and operating company labor relations representation.

Since a six (6) shif t operation has recently been initiated at OC, it is not practical to study the feasibility of rotating shif ts eight (8) hours later at this time.

Management does not consider the twelve (12) hour shift concept feasible because of the fatigue factor, difficulty in scheduling, reduced alertness and productivity, and the need to negotiate this item with the union.

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o QUALITY OF MANAGEMENT ACTION STEPS

46. Provide advance warning of changas in shift scheduling.

1. At both THI and OC the Operations Division is committed to providing as much advance notice as possible of shift scheduling changes.

2. At THI-1 the Agreement between Met-Ed and IBEW, Article 3.1, and

1. 25 Memorandum of Understanding, notification to the Union at least forty-eight (48) hours prior to a shift change is required.

3. In addition, OC Operations has submitted a proposed sche:dule change, based on Operator input, to the JCP&L, and the Human Resources Department for Union concurrence. This proposed shift-schedule is the one preferred by the Operators and implementation is indicative of Management's desire to respond to their concerns.

47. Interviews with cross-section of management on issues, concerns and quality of management.

Several internal efforts are being pursued to address concerns of supervisors and managers. The Director of Training and Education and the Vice President of Nuclear Assurance have discussed this action step with various Olvision Managers.

The Management Development and Supervisory Development Programs provide opportunities to a cross-section of management to identify and address issues and concerns to Management. Group interaction of Management from all sites serves to improve the overall quc11ty of management.

To address issues, concerns and quality of management, the Technical Functions Division has undertaken a major effort, with the assistance of Training and Education, to interview various levels of its management on this subject and is following-up with action plans to address this.

Human Resources recently distributed a management / supervisory training needs assessment survey and will work closely with Training and Education to address these needs.

l Training and Education has reviewed programs available to evaluate and assess Individual management styles and practices. They will continue i

to pursue opportunities to upgrade the Management Development Program l and assist in identifying the concerns of supervisors and managers.

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48. Assessment of managers; developmental coaching with individual managers; management training.

The Management Development Program has been revised to target behavioral objectiv95 and managerial skills development. The Human Resources and the Training and Education Departments are working closely together to train Managers at all levels. A senior level program has been selected for the Vice Presidential and Director levels, which will be integrated into the overall Management Development Program being designed.

In January 1985, the office of the President initiated a series of interviews to be conducted by Dr. Paul O'Arcy of RHR. Dr. D'Arcy will interview all of the Olvision Directors and direct management reports to the President to continue identification and assessment of GPUN management issues, concerns, and quality.

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T IMPLEMENTATION PHASE ACTION STEPS

49. Presentation of findings to departments (so that departments understand background of action steps.)

The RHR Report was distributed to Management personnel in each Division. Status reports of RHR action items were distributed by the Nuclear Assurance 01 vision in 1983 and 1984.

50. Review of suggested action steps to determine feasibility, timing, and participants.

GPUN Management recorgnizes the value of the information provided in the RHR Report and has made a concerted effort to improve conditions for the Operators. The action steps contained in the RHR Report have been discussed and reviewed in-depth with appropriate employee groups within GPUN. Of the fifty (50) action steps identified, eightly-six percent (86%) have been fully implemented and ten percent (10%) are underway and targeted for completion as soon as practicable.

Management has decided not to take action on the remaining four percent (4%) since they do not feel they are appropriate at this time. . Management's decision with respect to these two items has been formally communicated to the Operators.

This report has been prepared to summarize GPUN Management's formal response to the concerns of the Licensed Operators which were identified in the RHR Report. In the opinion of Management, the actions taken have been effective and an ongoing follow-up and dialogue will continue with the Licensed Operators of GPU Nuclear Corporation.

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v GLOSSARY A0 Auxiliary Ocerator - THI-1 A0EP Abnormal Operating Event Procedures ASLB Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ATP Abnormal Transient Procedures ATOG Abnormal Transient Operating Guidelines B&W Babcock and Wilcox 8 PTS Basic Principles Training Simulator BWR Bolling Hater Reactor CRT Cathode Ray Tube EAP Employee Assistance Program EO Equipment Operator - OC EOP Emergency Operating Procedures GOS Group Operating Supervisor GPUN General Pubite Utilities Nuclear Corporation GSS Group Shift Supervisor IBEW International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers INPO Institute of Nuclear Power Operations JCP&L Jersey Central Power and Light MET-ED Metropolitan Edison NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission OC Oyster Creek OJT On-The-Job-Training OPM Operations Plant Manual OSA Oparating Shift Assistant OSTG Once-Thru-Steam-Generator PID Partial Initial Decision PSI Power Safety, Inc.

PWR Pressurized dater Reactor RHR Rohrer, Hibler and Replogie. Inc.

R0 Reactor Operator SALP Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance SDRP System Diagnostic and Restoration Procedures SRO Senior Reactor Operator THI Three Mile Island THI-1 Three Mile Island, Unit 1 THI-2 Three Mile Island, Unit 2 TSO Training Systems Development i

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