ML20212D020

Aamodt Reply Findings to Those of Other Parties (Submitted in Form of Recommended Decision).* W/Certification of Svc

ML20212D020
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	02/17/1987
From:	Aamodt M, Aamodt N AAMODTS
To:
References
CON-#187-2591 86-519-02-SP, 86-519-2-SP, LRP, NUDOCS 8703040044
Download: ML20212D020 (18)

Text

• Q S9/

J DOCKETED UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Ul*@C NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCtNISSION BEFORE 'INE PRESIDING BOARD 87 FEB 26 P3 :40 v.

In the Matter of

. )

)

INQUIRY INTO 'lHREE MILE ISLAND UNIT 2 ') D cket No. IRP LEAK RATE DATA FALSIFICATION )

) ASLBP No. 86-519-02 SP AAMOIYP REPLY FINDINGS

'IO 'lHOSE OF OTHER PARTIES (SUBMITTED IN 'IHE FORM OF A RECOPNENDED DECISION) 4 Marjorie M. Aamodt Norman O. Aamodt 180 Bear Cub Road, Box 652 Lake Placid, N.Y. 12946 (518) 523-2370 February 17, 1987 i

8703040044 870217 PDR ADOCK 05000320 C

PDR l

[

l

. 3 TABLE OF CONTEMIS AAMOIyP REPLY FINDINGS

'IO 'IHOSE OF OWER PARTIES (SUBMITTED IN 'IHE FORM OF A REC 0bHENDED DECISION)

Pace (s).

'IO 'IHOSE OF JOHN G . HERBEIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6 (#1-11 )

'IO THOSE OF GARY P . MILLER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7-12 (#12-20)

TO 'mOSE OF NUMEROUS EMPMYEES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-14 (#21-25)

'IO 'IEOSE OF GPU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14-15 (#26-27) l l

l l

l l

l l

1 i

i e

. o

'IO '1 HOSE OF JOHN G. HERBEIN

1. 1. The Board rejects the notion (presented withoat' record basis) at HF*#3,5 that Herbein was not responsible for the operation of 'IMI-2 in violation of technical specifications for unidentified leakage from the reactor coolant system by the manipulation of leak rate reports to the NRC. Herbein as the vice-president (generation) of Metropoliton Edison Company, was responsible for the operation of maintenance, admini-stration, quality assurance and related technical engineering support activities for TMI-2, as was admitted in HR#5. Herbein testified that he was ultimately responsible for the leak rate falsifications. Tr. 5383; Herbein ff. Tr. 5268 at 14. Herbein presented no evidence that he was absent from his position during the period of leak rate falsifications.

Herbein presented no evidence that someone or some entity above his level in the chain of command had stripped him of his authority to deal with leak rate surveillance at 'IMI-2. Herbein did testify that he had suffi-cient resources and organization to carry out his responsibilities through a chain of conmand, Id. at 5-9; Tr. 5281; 5293-4; 5301-6. This is also admitted at HF# 4-6. Herbein described 'a four-tiered chain of cocmand with four oversight committees reporting to him. Herbein ff. Tr. 5268 at 5-9.

Herbein did not point out any deficiencies in his nuclear education or experience which would have hindered him from carrying out his responsi-bilities. Id. at 1-3. Therefore, Herbein was responsible for the leak rate surveillance at 'IMI-2.

1. 2. The record clearly shows that Herbein had specific involvement with surveillance and administrative procedures, contrary to his assertion now at HF#10. The Plant Daily Status Report came to the company offices in Reading and was reviewed each day with the unit superintendent and station i

'

• HF = Herbein Finding. A similar system is used to denote other parties' findings. _1,

, . - - - - . - - - - , . _ , . _ , _._.,-.- - , _v_ ____,-------m

_ - . . _ _ - - _y-- . - _ . r - ---- - - - ,- . --

Ex.1-A, cuperintendant by cither Herbein cr his imediata subordinato.

Riller ff. Tr. 5039 at 12-13.

Vol. VI(G), 7-1Qd The leak rate test result was reported on the PDSRs.

Id., Vol. V(B), Tab. 10. Herbein testified to his responsibility for surveillances, including the leak rate surveillance, by his creation of "a system and a new job position" (GMS coordinator) to more closely monitor performance of surveillance tests, as is admitted in HF#10.

1. 3 Herbein is at fault for not having taken sufficient and timely actions af ter the NRC inspection of October 1978 which brought to his attention the misinterpretation of the leak rate surveillance by most of the operations staff, contrary to the statement of HF#13. Herbein had the responsibility and resources to correct the problem identified by the NRC inspection, as is attested by his signature on the letter forwarding the licensee event report (LER) to the NRC and his testimony concerning his resources. Herbein ff. 5268 at 5, 8,12; Ex.1-A, Vol. V(C), Tabs. 28-30 (29). Tr. 5281, #1 supra. Herbein did not need to rely on presumptions nor to suffer from gaps in information. The NRC inspection brought the leak rate problems to his attention (see #5 infra).

1. 4. Herbein's claimed loss of memory of the LER (HF#4) is a mere ruse.

The length of time between the issuance of the LER and Herbein's testimony in this proceeding is not relevant. Herbein has had good reason to focus sharply on the LER episode since March of 1980 when Harold Hartman went public with his allegations of leak rate report falsification at 'IMI-2. _See_ Ex.2, Vol. 4 Doc. 5. Miller indicated that the matter of leak rate testing probicm3 was raised as early as March 28, 1979, the day of the accident. Miller ff. Tr.

5039 at 18. The imediate and continuous investigations following the accident served to focus the 'IMI players on the events prior to the accident and would have ingrained them in their memories. The leak rate issue continued in prominence following the NRC, Department of Justice (TX17) and company investigations of 1980, through the GPU v. B&W trial in 1982 to become the

priority inu2 of the MI-1 r: start proceeding from 1983 until the matt r was separated for investigation in the instant proceeding. Beginning in March 1979 after the accident, Herbein only needed to reach back to January of that year when the LER episode was raised again by the NRC's closeout of the matter with him. The Board concludes that Herbein's claimed loss of memory is merly self-serving -- an attempt to minimize investigation of his knowledge of the events.

1. 5. HF#15 is not correct in stating that LER 78-62/1T did not put Herbein on notice that there were significant problems with leak rate testing.

The LER stated that the plant was operating in violation of technical speci-fications for a period spanning four days because of an improper interpreta-tion of the procedure. Herbein had to know that most of the operations staff was involved since -- during the period of four days between the times stated --

all of the operations staff could have been involved and at the least 20 of the 27 CR0s (four shifts) had to have been involved in addition to the shift supervision. (Actually all shifts were involved due to the shift rotation mid-way during the period under consideration, and Herbein could have easily determined this, and should have, in reviewing vehther the LER was responsive.) Since leak rate testing is a matter of priority in the operation of a plant (see M I-2 Final Safety Analysis Report, Supp. 3, Ex. 1-A, Vol. IV, Tab. 15 and U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.45, p.45-1, Id., Tab. 12), Herbein can be presumed to have checked to determine the extent of the problem. Herbein's testimony concerning the superficiality of his review (Tr. 5271-3) is not credible because Herbein claimed that he did not remember the events surrounding the LER. Sfe. HF#4. Also, Herbein testified that'he did review the sufficiency of the LER (Tr. ff.

5268 at 5, 8, 12. The evidence of the LER, on its face, sets aside the conclusions of Stier cited at HF#15 and 17. The Haverkamp testimony used to maka it Appear that Htv:rkamp considered the 'LER cpisod2 a " routine

matter is not supported by an examination of the record evidence cited.

See Tr.'2161-3. Haverkamp did not agree when the Board asked if~he agreed that the matter was " routine". Nor did Haverkamp rely, as Herbein testifies he did, on the LER to determine whether the matter could be closed out.

Haverkamp spoke with operators, confirmed that the operators had taken notice of the LER by their initials on the attached sheet, and was aware of the operations memorandum of October 20, 1978 which had been issued to explain the LER to the operators. Id.

1. 6. Herbein's excuse at HF#18, that he depended on the NRC's closeout of the LER to satisfy himself that the matters which caused the LER had been resolved, is preposterous. Herbein was aware of the nature of NRC in-spections of that time period as reviews of information provided by the licensee, by the nature of his responsibilities. See #1 supra.

1. 7. Herbein's denial in HF# 19-21 of knowledge of the extent of the operators' difficulties in conducHng the leak rate surveillance is not borne out by tle record. Herbein was noticed of the problem by the LER.

See #5 supra. Herbein testified to some kind of review. See Id.

Herbein, or someona in Reading reporting to Herbein, received a call from Seelinger and M11*.er concerning the LER. See #8 infra. Herbein already .

had the informat'on of negative leak rate reports ~ on the PDSRs -- which informed Herbeir. that leak rate surveillance was in trouble. Nngative leak rates -- signifying the incredulous situation that the plant was creating water -- appeared on the PDSRs throughout the operation of 'IMI-2.

See Ex. 1-A, Vol. V.(B), Tab. 10. When negative reports appeared -- as they did -- during the period proceeding the accident when leakage was rapidly increasing and severe -- Herbein should have been sensitive to the negative values and alarmed. _Se_e 5-A, Tests for period February 15 - March 27, 1979.

Simply the fact of the rapid increase in leakage and the severity of the leakage, approaching 10 gpm, should have alerted Herbein to the dif:liculty

oper tors would be experi:ncing in quantifying 1 gpm unidantified ic:kag),

the limiting condition for operation. That was clearly the case as was reported by Stier:

February 11 - March 28,1979 (Leak Rate Test Manipulation )

Our examination of tests filed between February 11 and March 28, 1979 revealed the clearest evidence of manipulation of leak rate tests by members of the Operations Department.

Between February 11 and March 28, 1979, 45 tests were filed.

Thirty-four of those. tests were influenced by either hydrogen or water additions to the makeup Lank. One of those tests was influenced by both...

Ex. 1-A, Vol. 1, pp.82, 90, and goes on to note that the same tests were filed on consecutive days showing as long a period as five shifts (40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br />) during which a leak rate test below limits could not be calculated despite the manipulations that were in use. Id. p. 101.

1. 8. HF#20 omits the more important evidence -- a call from James Seelinger and Gary Miller (in Miller's office) to someone in Reading, possibly Herbein. Tr. 4723-4 (Seelinger). The call considered in HF#20 and reported by the U.S. Attorney (Ex.1-A, Vol. V(A), Ta,b. 2) may also have been placed to Herbein. Chastwyk's testinony is dubious: Chastwyk claimed before this Board that he did not realize.that the U.S. Attorney was reporting his interview; then, without disturbing the essential facts of what was reported (Id.), recalled precisely the character of the U.S.

l l

Attorney's questioning and the meaning of his testimony in what appeared l

to be a brief encounter. The Board finds the U.S. Attorney's statement of facts more convincing than Chastwyk's denial.

1. 9. Contrary to the assertion of HF#25, Herbein's testimony was not

" forthright, candid and crediblea . If, as Herbein testified, noone in his chain of comand informed him concerning the serious matter of problems with f 1 .

the leak rato curveillence, it is improbabin that II:rbein would now be describing these individuals in the glowing terms he used in this hearing.

Tr. 5281, 5288, 5294-5, 5303-4. Despite the Board's solicitation, Herbein could not find a single deficiency in those who reported to him and who failed, either willfully or negligently, to notify him. The result of this failure was no small thing: The company was indicted for criminal conduct and paid one million dollars as part of a plea bargain as well as legal expenses

- which began in 1980 and continue through this hearing. Had D(U held a hearing, Herbein and other company and corporate officers would have been investigated for criminal involvement. If, as Herbein states, noone among his subordinates informed him, Herbein's testimony is not rational. Ncr is Herbein's claimed confusion credible in response to the Board's puzzle-mont concerning the failure of the competent organization at DiI-2 to have resolved the problem. Herbein replied, "I don't know." Tr. 5315.

Herbein has been in the best position to know for a number of years as to "whyh" The Board concludes that Herbein knows why, but that he is not willing to share his knowledge.

1. 10. Herbein can be presumed to have had a part in Metropolitan Edison's choice, in bargaining for dismissal of the eleven criminal charges brought by DOJ, to plead guilty to the relatively innocuous charge --that the company did not provide the operators with a suitable procedure to perform the leak rate tests. This was a deception since the company knew that the procedure was the same one used, and probably still in use, at Babcock & Wilcox plants, including DiI-1. Spo_ Miller ff. Tr. 5039 at 15-16.

1. 11. The Board cannot clear John Herbein for future employment in the nuclear industry by virtue of the record he has established concerning his performance in not assuring safe operation of DtI-2 as a chief officer.

'IO '1110SE OF GARY P. MILLER

1. 12. Contrary to the assertion of Miller in MF#3, he, as unit super-intendent and station manager, did have the ultimate responsibility for the performance of the leak rate testr because he had the ultimate responsibility cnsite for the safe operation of TMI-2. See Miller ff. 5039 at 2. The perfornance of the leak rate test was critical to assurance that the plant was being operated safely. Wermici ff. Tr. 376 at 3-4. Miller knew, or should have known, that the performance of the leak eate test was critical to an assurance that the plant was being operated safely. Miller, therefore, was ultimately responsible for the performance of leak rate testing.

1. 13. Miller's finding MF#4 that Stier did not find that Miller exerted pressure on the operators to manipulate the leak rate tests is irrelevant.

Miller could not havo exerted pressure on the operators because Miller adhered to supervision by strict use of the chain of command, and Miller was removed from the supervision of the operators by three intermediary icvels of super-vision. Tr. 5053 (Miller); Miller ff. 5039 at 2 - 5.

1. 14. Miller's assertion MF#5 : " ..he was never advised prior to Furch 28, 1979 that acceptablo leak rates could not be consistently obtained" is not sdpported by the preponderance of evidence on the record. Miller received and reviewed the PDSR every morning. The leak rate as well as 30 other parameters was listed on the PDSR. The report showed negative leak rate numbers throughout the operation of TMI-2, reflecting the impossible condition of the reactor manufacturing water. Although Miller did not admit to noticing irregularities in the leak rate reported in this hearing **, he should, and most likely did, notice the leak rates reported. The leak rato surveillance was a critical surveillance for operation of the plant in a safe manner.

By mid-October, Miller was clearly on notico that thoro were problems by virtuo of the fact that an LER was issued describing the problem

• Miller so testified before the NRC (OI Report, August 1984, Ex.106 at 15) that ha observed negativo numbers.

- . (see #5 supra.) and becluso James Seelinger, the Superintendent of Technical Support, consulted Millsr concerning the LER. Tr. 4723-4 (Seelinger); cee

1. 16 ifra. Miller knew that the problems with the leak rate test were re-solved by the practice of rounding-off the result to the 1 <Jpm limit. _Se_e Ex.-2, Vol. 2, pp. 57, 156. Miller could not have unaware of the hich and increasing leakage during the weeks prior to the accident because of his responsibility for maintenance (Tr. 5083), the many hours (approximately 80 per week) he consistently spent in the plant (ff.5039 at 6) as well as his daily review of the PDSR (Id. at 12). See Aamodt Findings, 2/2/87 at Att. 3.

Miller's awareness of the high leakage should have alerted him to problems attendant to performing the leak rate test; his review of the PDSR for the period of high and increasing leakage prior to the accident should have, and most reasonably did, alert him as leak rates renained the sama for several days.

See Ex. 1-A, Vol. 1, p. 101. Finally, Miller had the turnover sheets of the shift supervisors on a daily basis, and these provided several instances, in clear and direct language, that problems were being experienced by them, as '

well as the operators, in obtaining a " good" leak rate. See Ex. 1-A, Vol. V(B),

Tab. 10. Since Miller received the turnover sheets (Tr. 3875 - 3877, 3903 Mehler),

Miller knew that on several occasions the shift was having problems with,the surveillance. Two of the notations, "Still could not get a leak rate", "Didn't get a good leak rate yet", as well as the use of the terrr " good" on several other occasions should have alerted Miller to continued problems in performance and interpretation of the test. Miller knew a great deal about the leak rate surveillance from his work in developing and testing the procedure for 'IMI-2.

Miller ff. Tr. 5039 at 15. The preponderance of evidence supports the Board's conclusion that Miller was aware of the problems operators were experiencing in performing the leak rate surveillance. The clear and convincing evidence of the interaction of Seelinger (who knew -- about the discard of tests, at a minimum, see. #17, p.12 infra.) with Miller concerning leak rate testing provides evidence that Miller knew as does Miller's awareness of the rounding-off practice.

1. 15. Miller's recollection, cited at MP#17, that he "had no current recollection of the LER opisodo" is not credible. In 1980, Miller recalled to GPU's investigators that ho remembered the practico of " rounding-off" Icak rates that was used to resolve the problem of high leak rates that re-suited in the LER. _S,e_e Ex. 2, Vol. 2, pp. 57, 156. Since Miller remembered this practice associated with the LER, Miller remembered the LER episode in 1980. Miller cannot have forgotten what he remembered in 1980 about the leak rate problems when he was constantly under investigation concerning the matter since that time. See #4 supra.

1. 16. The testimony of operators cited in MF#8-13 that they did not remember discussing their problems with the leak rate surveillance with Miller is not important evidence. Hartman, who was deeply concerned about the leak rate surveillance, did not discuss his concerns with anyono other than his +

follow operators and his shift foreman. Hartman presumed that management know about the leak rate problems because the problems were comon knowledge.

Ex. 2, Vol. 4, Doc. 3, 14-16, 18-21, Doc. 6, 81-85. Hartman was asked:

can you give me any estimato of how many times you would have expressed that concern to someone? Response: Five, six. Question: When you' expressed it, who would you express it to? Response: It was usually Bernie Smith. Question:

And Dornie"s response was? Response: Well, he would just say, "Well, we aro working on it. We are working on it." Question: Did you have available to you, other than going and talking, say, to Bernio, any other means of ex-prossing the concern you had? Responso: Well, I suppose I could have mentioned it to Jim Floyd, but I saw no point in it becauso, like I said in the one re-port, it was a widespread problem. I thought that it was just the fact that ovarybody know that those Icak rates were hard to got, and that wo had to tako devious means to got somo sometimos c0 we could stay operating.

The most rolovant testimony concerning Millor's knowledgo would be that of those who reported to Millor: James Floyd, Suporintendant of Operations,

. I

-Jaraes Seelinger, Superintendent of Technical Support, who filic.d in for Miller as unit superintendent, and Joseph Iogan who replaced Millar as unit superintendent. Seelinger appeared the most credible of the three witnesses (see #17 and 18 infra.) Seelinger testified that he went to Miller's office to discuss the reportability of high leak rate reports discovered by an NRC in-spector in mid-October of 1978. Tr. 4724-7 (Seelinger). Miller's finding #17, 18 that the discussion was restricted to procedural aspects relative to pre-l paring an LER is contrary to the record evidence that Miller later admitted that he was aware of the " rounding-off" practice that was instituted to resolve the continued high leak rates subsequent to those which resulted in the LER.

See Ex. 2, Vol. 2, pp. 57,156. Further, it is unlikely that the scrious con- l cerns that Seolinger had concerning his knowledge of the discard of high leak rate tests prior to the NRC inspection were not raised by Seelinger. See Tr. 4745, 4756 (Seelinger). If Seelinger had prevailed ovar Floyd in having the practico of discarding of leak ratos disbanded, the circumstancos of the NRC's identification of the violation of operating outside the leak rato speci-fication would not have occurred. It is not unlikely that Scolinger had already discussed his concern cvar the diogard of tests with Miller prior to the NRC inspection. It lu not likely that Soolinger, who was quick to point out that his jcb levol was higher than that of Floyd's (Tr. 4725-6 ) uould have acquiesced j to Floyd concerning discard of tests without seeking resolution by a higher authority. Miller as unit and staticn nuperintendent was the proper authority in the chain of comand. Miller testified that he was "porsonally closo" to l Seelinger, hence, it is most likely that Seelinger discussed all his problems with Miller, including his concern that he vould bo embarrassed if the imC discovered the practico of discard of tests shouing high loak ratos and his instructions to the oporators that tests of high leakago should bo concealed.

l i

-m.--.4- - _ , .

- Further, a shift tupervisor tratified that Hiller w:c "on top of Gv2rything" and that he was in the control room or in touch with the control room Et all time 3.

Tr.3877-8 (Mehler) Since Miller cannot have helped but to have known that the plant was experiencing increasing and excessive leakage in the weeks prior to the accident from his contacts with the control room, Miller knew that performance of the leak rate test would be increasing difficult, if not impossible. In fact, clear evidence exists in Miller's statement to the NRC (OI Report, August 1984, Ex. 106, p.43) that Miller knew that leakage was approaching 10 gpm.

With the vall known difficulties in quantifying identified leakago outside the drain tank, the measurement of unidentified leakage would be nearly im-possible or impossible. Such was the case. See Ex. 1-A, Vol. 1, pp. 82, 90-1, 101; #7 supra, pp. 4-5 (5) for quotation of citation in part.

1. 17. Joseph Iogan's testimony does not provido probative ovidence that Iogan did not inform Miller, contrary to the implications of Miller findings #22-24. Iogan's testimony was clearly incredible. Iogan testified that he did not believo that thoro was a great deal of leakago at the plant in the period prior to the accident. Tr. 5137. Clearly, the plant was leaking increasingly and sevoroly for weeks beforo the accident.

See Aamodt Findings, 2/2/87, Att. 3. Iogan's description subsequently of the hazardous process used to seal off Icaking valos shouad that Ingan know that the plant was leaking. Tr. 5146. Ingan's avaroness that Floyd was allegedly keeping a list of leaks and visually estimating leakage shouod that togan was aware of the leakage. Tr. 5194. 'If logan know Floyd uas using visual inspection to quantify leakaqo, then Ingan knew that the leak rate test was not providing results that woro "acceptablo". iiiller admits (MF#23) that logan knew that the operators had difficulty obtaining acceptablo leak rato tost results. _S_oo_ Ex.1-A, Vol. VI (G), at 49. Since Logan know about the Icak rate problems, Iogan discussed these problems with Millor, his ir:vnediate suporvisor, who had long experience at mI carapared to Logan's inoxperienco on nuclear power reactors and recent arrival at 'INI.

1. 18. James Floyd's t ctimony, cited by Millcr at #14 and 15, does not provide evidence that Floyd was not aware of leak rate surveillance problems nor that Floyd did not discuss leak rate problems with Miller.

On the contrary, Floyd's testimony cited (#15) that the leak rate test was a "close enough" indication of unidentified leakage reveals that Floyd was aware that the operators were not getting test results that were valid.

Since Floyd testified that Miller was not inaccessible and that he would have taken a problem to Miller, Floyd can be more reasonable presumed to have discussed with Miller whether Miller thought the test results were adequate, particularly since Miller developed the procedure for the leak rate test at

'IMI-2. See Tr. 5006; Miller Tr. ff. 5039 at 15.

1. 19. It is unlikely that Miller did not know about the discard of leak rate tests, as alleged in MF#40-43. As discussed in #16 supra, Seelinger most likely told Miller Miller knew from the IER episode that the operators were disregarding tests; Miller must have known from the turnover sheets that operators were discarding tests (see #14 suora).

1. 20. '1his Board cannot clear Gary Miller for future employment in

-the nuclear industry. Miller was responsible for leak rate falsification at 'IMI-2.

e 4

0

~

'IO 'lHOSE OF '1HE NUMEROUS EMPIDYEES

1. 21. Suffice it is to say that the evidence presented in defonso of the innocence of the employees, profforod in their findings, does not support the conclusions claimed to havo been derived therefrom.

The Board is fully aware, having interviewed thoso individuals (with the exception of John Blessing), that they woro engaged in a systematic attempt to obtain and report leak rates within the technical specifica-tions. The Board depends on the numerous interviews of Harold Wayne l

Hartman, Jr. on the record, Ex. 2, Vol. 4, and the corroborative testimony of John Blessing, Ex. 5-A, Ex. 6. Ilartman appeared before the Board, willingly and without counsel, and forthrightly confirmed his earlier interviews. Hartman ff. Tr. 2239 - 2309. Hartman and Diessing testified i that the manipulation and falsification of leak rate tests reports were l

! used when a " good test" (under limits) was needed. The NRC, GPU con-

sultants, and DCAI confirmed Hartman's testimony that icak rato reports l

vere falsified at MI-2. The investigators established that the means

< t

! Hartman described were used for falsifying the reports. The Board found

that about 70% of the tests filed with the NRC during the last six months

of the operation of mI-2 woro affected by tho manipulations. Ex. 6 at

! 15. The Board found that these manipulations were doliberato actions I designed to offect the Icak rate test. Ex.2, Vol. 4, (Hartman interviews);

Ex. 5-A, Ex. 6 (Blessing): Aamodt Findings, 2/2/87, #13-17. About 2000 tests aro estimated to have boon discarded. Ex. 2, Vol. 2, pp. 111-2.

~

, #22. The oporators who testified that they woro unawaro of the practico of manipulation of tests havo not spokon the truth. From the conditions of oxtremo and increasing leakago in existenco from mid- Fo,bruary i 1979 until the accident, a poriod of somo six wooks (sco Aamodt Findings, 2/2/87, Att. 3), tho operators had to know that the leak rato reports to the NRC woro not valid. Tho operatore testimony that they used alternativo

, - - - , , - , - - -- ,,. ,-- -,- - -_.-,.- n - - - - , , , - , , , , - - . _ . . - - - - .

--e,, --r.-, ,-- e - - . v.,, -r-a- . --

means to check the accuracy of the unidentified leak rate report was shown to be a ruse by the testimony of GPU's consultants that they found no definitive evidence of the systematic calculation of unidentified leak rates at 'mI-2 other than the water inventory balance (which was manipulated).

Ex. 2. Vol. 2, p. 139. Floyd admitted, under cross-examination by the Board, that his testimony concerning visual inspection and quantification was not supported by what actually happened. Tr. 4%1. He admitted that areas of the plant -- which could have been leaking -- were inaccessible.

Id. He admitted that,where inspection and quantification could be made, that a valid estimate of the rate of leakage could not be made. Tr. 4%2.

1. 23. The idea, as claimed by the Numerous Employcos, that the shift and plant supervision could be unaware of the, difficulties in obtain-ing valid unidentified leak rates in view of the conditions of extreme and increasing leakago for a six week period prior to the accident, is pro-posterous. C1carly, tho finding in Aamodt Findings of Fact at Attachment 3 provides this Board with the cicar and convincing evidence that invalid Icak reports vero being obtained and provided to the NRC with the full and complicit knowledge of all on-sito personnel.

1. 24. Additional evidence, provided by the Aamodt finding'(Id.) is that the claim of use of radiation monitors to signal excess unidentifiod leakago was a ruso. Tho leaking conditions that oxisted would have caused monitors to alarm. Sinco the monitors did not alarm (Tr. 3654 A.

Millor),the operators know that tho monitors woro either not working or turned off.

1. 25. The findings of the Numerous Employcos are an offenso to logical reasoning. Tho dofonso of the employcos' interest is clearly questionablo.

'IO 'lHOSE OF GPU

1. 26. The evidence concerning Floyd and Seelinger provides clear and convincinJ proof of willful conduct. See #7, 14 (p. 8), 16 (p. 9),.

17 (p. 10), 22 (pp. 13-4), 23 and 24 (p. 14) suora.

1. 27. Findings suggesting that the leak rate falsifications were not causal of the accident on March 28, 1979 are not based on probative '

evidence. The issue was not considered in this hearing.

f i

s tfully submitted, d[kt1 Rll ir (Rih rjorie M. Aamodt

'! ./

pdttuna haufbl

! Norman O. Aanodt February 17, 1987 I

d 4

a

CORRECTED

..gn UNITES STATES OF AMERICA r NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE PRESIDING BOARD .g7 FEg 26 P3 :40

) vf t h ;I

) . i ,4 .

• In the Matter of Docket No. LRP

)

INQUIRY INTO THREE MILE ISLAND UNIT 2 )

LEAK RATE DATA FALSIFICATION ) ASLBP No. 86-519-02 SP

)

This is to certify that copies of AAMOITT REPLY FINDINGS 10 '1110SE OF Orl11ER PARTIES (SUBMI1TED IN THE FORM OF A RECOffiENDED DECISION) were served on the following parties by Express 11 on February 18, 1987 and on the Board by uire.

lbfA hLl ts W Marjorip2 M. Aamodt February 18, 1987 Service List Harry H. Voigt. Esq.

/TheHonorablesIudgesJamesL.Kelley(Chairman)

James H. Carpenter Michael F. McBride, Esq.

Glenn O. Bright Robert St. John Roper, Esq.

Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Molly S. Boast Esq.

James W. Moeller, Esq.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Marlene L. Stein, Esq.

' Washington, D. C. 20555 C. Christopher Sprague Esq.

LeBoeuf Lamb, Leiby & MacRae Dockating & Service Branch U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Suite 1100 1333 New Hampshire Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20036 Jack Goldberg, Esq. Smith B. Gephart, Esq.

Mary Wagner, Esq. Jane G. Penny, Esq.

Of fice of Legal Staf f Terrence C. McGowan. Esq.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Killian & Gephart Washington, D.C. 20555 216-18 Pine Street Harrisburg, PA 17108 Ernest L. Blake, Jr., Esq.

John H. Nassikas. III, Esq. Michael W. Haupin, Esq.

Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge Maria C. Hensley, Esq.

2300 N Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20037 Hunton & Williams P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, VA 23212 1 sham, Lincoln & Beate Three First National Plaza '

Sutto 5200 Chicago, IL 60602

• M ossrs. Goldborg and Gophart sorved by U.S. Mail, First Class.

.