ML20108D745
| ML20108D745 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 02/14/1985 |
| From: | Stolz J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Crouse R TOLEDO EDISON CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20108D749 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0660, RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-660, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-1.D.1, TASK-TM TAC-56116, TAC-65255, NUDOCS 8503110643 | |
| Download: ML20108D745 (25) | |
Text
dk FEB 141985 Docket No. 50-346 DISTRTRUT"0N ACRS-10 d cket Fip PMcKee nnu VUR JPartlow Mr. Richard P. Crouse L PDR Ringram Vice President, Nuclear ORB #4 Rdg ADe Agazio Toledo Edison Company DEisenhut Gray File Edison Plaza - Stop 712 OELD EBlackwood 300 Madison Avenue EJordan H0rnstein Toledo, Ohio 43652
Dear Mr. Crouse:
Subject:
DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW; NEED FOR SUPPLEMENT TO
SUMMARY
REPORT The staff has completed a review of the Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) Summary Report submitted June 29,~1984. The NRC staff was assisted by Science Applications, Inc. (SAI) with this review. SAI provided a Technical Evaluation Report which is included as Enclosure A to the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) which accompanies this letter.
Our review indicates that Toledo Edison Company has conducted a DCRDR for the Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station that meets many of the requirements of Supplement 1, NUREG-0737. However, there are a number of items which we could not evaluate either because of insufficient information or lack of information.
These items are identified in the SER.
The information required to complete our review is identified in the Conclusion section of the SER. Toledo Edison Company should provide a supplement to the DCRDR Summary Report which should be submitted shortly after the series of special studies which provide for the disposition of and schedule for correcting all HED's identified by the DCRDR program. These special studies were scheduled to be completed during January 1985. The staff plans to conduct a pre-implementation audit of the facility within one month after receipt of the supplemental sunmary report.
Please advise us no later than March 29, 1984, of the status of the special studies and your schedule for submitting the supplemental summary report.
Sincerely, "OdnWJ. Sifl5D ITh" John F. Stolz, Chief B503110643 850214 Operating Reactors Branch #4 PDR ADOCK 05000346 F
PDR Division of Licensing
Enclosure:
As Stated cc w/ enclosure:
See next page ORBf4:
ORRf4:
ADe Ao JStol 21)f/
21248S t
Toledo Edison Company ccw/ enclosure (s):
,Mr. Donald H. Hauser..Esq.
U.S. Nuclear' Regulatory Comission The Cleveland Electric.
' Resident Inspector's Office Illuminating Company 5503 N. State Route 2 P. O. Box 5000 Oak Harbor, Ohio 43449 Cleveland, Ohio 44101 Gerald Charnoff, Esq.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge 1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C.
20036-Paul M. Smart Esq.
Fuller & Henry
~~
300 Itadison Avenue
~
P.- 0. Box 2088 Regional Radiation Representative Toledo, Ohio 43603 EPA Region V 230 South Dearborn Street Mr. Robert B. Borsum Chicago, Illinois 60604 Babcock & Wilcox Nuclear Power Generation Division 7910 Woodmont Avenue, suite 220
~~
Bethesda,11aryland 20814 Ohio Department of Health ATTN: Radiological Health Program Director P. O. Box 118 President, Board of County Columbus, Ohio 43216 Comissioners of Ottawa County Port Clinton, Ohio 43452 Attorney General as d
e James W. Harris, Director (Addressee Only)
Columbus, Ohio 43215 Division of Power Generation Ohio Department of Industrial Relations Harold Kohn, Staff Scientist 2323 West 5th Avenue Power Siting Commission P. O. Box 825 361 East Broad Street Columbus, Ohio 43216 Columbus, Ohio 43216 Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Region III 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137
_Mr. Rotiert F. Peters Managet,' Nuclear Licensing Toled( Edison Company Edison Plaza 300 Madison Avenue Toledo, Ohio 43652
w a ne og UNITED STATES
{
g NUCLEAR REGULATOFtY COMMISSION G
4j WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 k*****/
February 14, 1935 Docket No. 50-346 Mr. Richard P. Crouse Vice President, Nuclear Toledo Edison Company Edison Plaza - Stop 712 300 Madison Avenue Toledo, Ohio 43652
Dear Mr. Crouse:
Subject:
DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW; NEED FOR SUPPLEMENT TO
SUMMARY
REPORT The staff has completed a review of the Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) Sumary Report submitted June 29, 1984. The NRC staff was assisted by Science Applications, Inc. (SAI) with this review.
SAI provided a Technical Evaluation Report which is included as Enclosure A to the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) which accompanies this letter.
.Our review indicates that Toledo Edison Company has. conducted a DCRDR for the Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station that meets many of the requirements of Supplement 1 NUREG-0737. However, there are a number of items which we could
. not evaluate either because of insufficient infomation or lack of information.
These items are identified in the SER.
The information required to complete our review is identified in the Conclusion section of the SER. Toledo Edison Company should provide a supplement to the DCRDR Sumary Report which should be submitted shortly after the series of special studies which provide for the disposition of and schedule for correcting all HED's identified by the DCRDR program.
These special studies were scheduled to be completed during January 1985. The staff plans to conduct a pre-implementation audit of the facility within one month after receipt of the supplemental sumary report.
Please advise us no later than March 29, 1984, of the status of the special studies and your schedule for submitting the supplemental sumary report.
l Sincerely, n? W John F.
olz, Chief Operating Reactors Branch f4 Division of Licensing
Enclosure:
As Stated cc w/ enclosure:
See next page i
O D
- 1. -
HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING BRANCH DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW SAFETY EVALUATION FOR DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1 POSITION Action Plan Item I.D.1, " Control Room Design Reviews" (NUREG-0660), states that operating reactor Itcensees and applicants for operating licenses will be required to perform a Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) to identify and correct design discrepancies. The objective, as stated in NUREG-0660, is to improve the ability of nuclear power plant control room operators to prevent or cope with accidents, if they occur, by improving the information provided to them. Supplement I to NUREG-0737, dated December 17, 1982, confirmed and clarified the DCRDR requirement in NUREG-0660. As a i
result of Supplement I to NUREG-0737, each applicant or licensee is required to conduct their DCRDR on a schedule negotiated with NRC.
NUREG-0700 describes four phases of the DCRDR to be performed by the applicant and licensee. These phases are (1) planning, (2) review, (3) assessment and (4) reporting.
i l
The draft of NUREG-0801, " Evaluation Criteria for Detailed Control Room 4
Design Review," provides the necessary criteria for evaluating each phase.
l l
1
{
On e4 l
. Supplement I to NUREG-0737 requires applicants and licensees to' submit a i
Program Plan that describes how they will:
l 1
Establish a qualified multidisciplinary review team.
2.
Perform function and task analyses to identify control room operator tasks and infonnation and control requirements and j
respective characteristics during emergency operations.
3.
Compare display and control requirements with a control room
~
inventory.
4.
Survey the control room to identify deviations from accepted human factors principles.
l l
S.
AssessHumanEngineeringDiscrepancies(HEDs)todeterminewhich HEDs are significant and should be corrected.
l 6.
Select design improvements.
7.
Verify the selected design improvements will provide the necessary correction.
8.
Verify that improvements will not introduce new HEDs, and
,,4 n
9.
Coordinate control room improvemen'ts with' changes from other programs such as the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS),
operator training, R.G.1.97 instrumentation, and upgrade of emergency operating procedures.
1 i
The NRC requires each aoplicant and licensee to submit a Sunnary Report at the end of the DCRDR process. The report should describe the proposed control room changes and implementation. schedules and provide justification for leaving safety significant HEDs uncorrected or partially corrected.
The staff will evaluate the organization, process, and results of each DCRDR with Supplement 1 of NUREG-0737. The evaluation of the applicant's and licensee's DCRDR efforts will consist of the following, as described in draft NUREG-0801:
1.
An evaluation of the Program Plan Report submitted by the licensee / applicant A visit to some of the plant sites to audit the progress of the 2.
I i
DCRDR process l
l 3.
An evaluation of the licensee / applicant DCRDR Summary Report i
i 4.
A possible pre-implementation audit, if necessary, and, Q
,p.
.-.,____...-___,m,.,-
~
5.
The preparation of a Safety Evaluation Report presenting the results of the NRC evaluation of the overall DCRDR Program.
Significant HEDs should be corrected.
Improvements that can be accomplished with an enhancement program should be done promptly.
DISCUSSION Toledo Edison Company (TED) submitted its Program Plan for conducting a DCRDR of the Davis-Besse Unit No. I control room on June 15, 1983. The staff reviewed the Program Plan in accordance with the requirements of Supplement I to NUREG-0737 and the guidance provided in NUREG-0700 and draft NUREG-0801 and transmitted comments to the. Division of Licensing on October 7,1983, to be forwarded to TED for its use in conducting the DCRDR. The staff has also completed review of the TED Sumary Report for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit No. I dated June 29, 1984. Consultants from Science Applications Inc., (SAI) assisted the staff in reviewing the Summary Report.
The NRC has adopted most of the technical evaluations, conclusions, and recomendations contained in the SAI Technical Evaluation Report. The Technical Evaluation Report is provided as Enclosure 1 to this SER.
Toledo Edison Company's (TED) DCRDR Sumary Report demonstrates a strong comitment towards meeting many of the requirements of NUREG-0737, i
Supplement 1.
The documentation submitted includes a thorough and comprehensive discussion of review activities conducted to perform a DCRDR l
k
and indicates that TED has satisf'ied many of the DCRDP. requirements of Supplement I to NUREG-0737. However, additional infonr.ation is required to complete the review and tc assure that TED has satisfied all of the requirements of Supplement I to NUREG-0737. The following is a sunnary of the staff's connents on TEU's compliance with each of the nine (9) DCRDR review requirements.
4 Establishment Of A Qualified Multidisciplinary Review Team Although the program plan described an acceptable organization for the review team, the actual team composition and task assignments made to conduct the DCRDR appear to have deviated from that described in the' program plan.
For some of the DCRDR tasks. TED provided. a description of the personnel involved, but did not however, indicate the extent of their involvement.
Although TED has satisfied most of the requirements for establishing a multidisciplinary DCRDR Review team, to complete our review of this element, we will need to review additional documentation with respect to the types of 1
individuals and the extent of their involvement in perfonning the systems function review, task analysis verification of equipment availability, and the selection of control room design improvements.
Function and Task Analysis j
The basis for TED's System Functions Review and Task Analysis was the Davis-BesseAbnormalTransientOperatingGuidelines(ATOGs). The Davis-Besse 4
ATOGs were generated to develop symptom-oriented emergency operating procedures. One of the products of the methodology for developing the
6-Davis-BesseAT0Gswa'sthe.generationofSafetySequencsDiagrams-(SSDs). The SSDs were functional flow diagrams which showed:
1.
The systems whose responses are necessary for providing the 3
functions required to mitigate the consequences of postulated events.
~
2.
The series of system functions which comprise the success pat.hs for achieving safety functions.
3.
The input signals, logic, setpoints, output adtions, parameters monitored, required operator functions, and location of operator functions (e.g., control room, local or both).
These SSDs were used as the data base for perfoming the system functions review and the subsequent task analysis.
The system functions review consisted of two parts which were performed in parallel. Thisapproachconsistedofa(1)procedurebasedsystemfunctions reviewanda(2) top-downsystemfunctionsreview. However, the procedure based system functions review was used in performing the task analysis. This involved:
1.
Reviewing each step of the symptom oriented emergency operating procedures to identify the required operator actions, l
l 3--.-,,
-..~r_---,----.--
-.------r
-O'
m-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ^ - ' - - -
. '2.
'Identif91n'g the " instrumentation and ccatrol requirements" for the operator actions based on the experience of an analyst, and 3.
Identifying the existing Davis-Besse instrumentation and controls using control board mockups and a control room inventory.
she data from this review was documented on System Functions Review Tables (SFRTs)-and these tabl.es provided the basis for the. task analysis and verification of task performance capability.
The SFRTs were used to identify functions, tasks, task iequences, and information and control requirements nece.sary to maintain plant safety given I
system failures. The task analysis was performed in two steps: (1) identification of functions, tasks, and task sequences using the SFRTs and (2)analysisoftasksandtasksaquences,usingtheSFRTsandtasklists,to determine "information requirements, control requirements, communication requirements, constraints (time, etc.) on task performance, and to document 4
task requirements in an accessible, usable format for each task and task sequence."
In addition, Spatial-Operational Sequences Diagrams, which graphically pre'sent the sequential tasks on line drawings of board layouts, were constructed to identify " instrumentation and communications requirements" for task performance and to ass'ess operator workload.
Although the task analysis methodology described was rigorous and comprehensive, and satisfies the requirements of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 e=S-
8-to ths exter.t that it was performed, it does not identify operator infennation and control needs in terms of instrument and control characteristics.
In order for the NRC to complete its review of this element, the licensee will be required to provide documentation which demonstrates that the task analysis performed yielded the following types of display and control information:
The appropriate means of displaying the parameters (e.g., trends, statusindications, digital, analog)
Theparameterunits(e.g.,PSIG,inchesofH0,GPM) 2 l
The accuracy or precision with which the readings must be made (not the same as the " range" column in the tables)
' Acceptable tolerances The type of control capability needed (e.g., discrete versus continuous)
The control operation if the control capability needed is discrete (e.g., detented versus spring-loaded, momentary contact positioning) '
1 e-L -
,/
g..
.l
["j The rate, gain,. and response characteristics, etc.
I
,-s s
A Comparison of Display and Contro_1 Requirements with a Control Room Inventory The licensee did not develop a spe~cific control room inventory, but instead, perf6med a task described as " verification of equipment availability." The 3
objectives of this task were to " identify availability of required f
- instrumentation and controls in the control room to support performance of systems functions." The criteria used to perfom this task were: (1)the control and display designs should match the task needs and operator's capabilities; (2) frequently Aquired or important instruments or controls should be located in the control room; and (3) infrequently used or unimportant instrumentation should be excluded from the primary panel l
locations in the control room.. The method used to verify equipment 4
availability included walk-and talk-throughs of the control panel, responding to the following questions:
"Is all the information you require present in the control room to perfom the task (s).
All needed contruls are provided to perfom the task (s)
Do the controls and/or displays provide the appropriate range of information/ control e4*
4
-... ~, -,,.. - - - -
Are the controls / displays adequate in terms of precision and accuracy?"
These criteria for verifying the availability of equipment appear to be sufficient to allow an adequate evaluation of the presence or absence of needed instruments and controls as well as a partial evaluation of the suitability of instruments and controls. Of these four criteria only the first three could be answered by comparing the data collected during the task analysis with the tasks that were walked-and talked-through. The data did not provide information on the types of displays and controls, precision and accuracy, range, momentary or continuous switch action,'etc., which are needed to display and control required parameters from the control room i
during emergency operations. The suitability of existing instrumentation appeared to be determined on an ad hoc basis during walk-talk-throughs of panels by an analyst " based upon his experience to identify these indicators and/or controls that the operator would need to execute the operator action requirements." The licensee did not provide documentation that the " analyst" possessed the required technical and human factors expertise to conduct an objective analysis to determine the adequacy of existing information and I
control capability.
Control Room Survey TED conducted a control room survey at Davis-Besse to determine the extent to which human factors guidelines were applied during the design of-the control l
O e**
v
-e-
.. boards and panels. TED d.ivided the control room survey activity into the-following surveys or tasks:
1.
Workspace Survey 2.
Anthropometric Survey 3.
Illumination Survey 4.
Ambient Noise Survey 5.
Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning Survey 6.
Emergency Equipment Survey
~
7.
Maintainability Survey 8.
Communications Survey 9.
Annunciator Survey 10.
Controls Survey 11.
Displays Survey 12.
Labels and Location Aids Survey 13.
Conventions Survey 14.
Compute: System Survey The methodology used to conduct the surveys varied depending on which of the above surveys or tasks were being performed. TED and the Essex Corporation (the human factors consultant) established task plans for each of the above surveys or tasks in order to develop a standardized and organized approach to conducting and documenting the control room survey. Although the summary report did not include the task plans, it did present an outline of the e
o
~
' contents of a task plan.
In addition, the summary report provided an 1
overview of each of the surveys which included the following information:
1.
Objectives 2.
Scope 3.
Applicable Criteria from NUREG-0700 4.
Methodology 5.
Findings i
In summary, we found that the methodologies and findings described in the summary report were comprehensive and indicative of a valid approach. The l
use of standardized and practical task plans contributed to the effectiveness i
of the survey approach. We believe that TED has demonstrated the performance of a control room survey which meets this requirement in Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737.
Assessment of Human Engineering Discrepancies (HEDs) to Determine Which HEDs e
Are Significant and Should Be Corrected The methodology and criteria for assessing HEDs appear to be sound. TED states that the committee which reviews the HEDs consists of, as a minimum, two human factors specialists, two systems engineers, two I&C engineers, and i
two Davis-Besse operations specialists. TED divided the assessment methodology into four steps:
C
-e-e
13 -
1.
Assess extent of deviation from NUREG-0700 guidelines.
2.
Assess Human Engineering Discrepancy impact on error occurrence 3.
Assess potential consequences of error occurrence on plant 4
operation / safety 4.
Assign Human Engineering Discrepancy scheduling priority The review committee astigned a subjective rating of 1-5 (low to high) to each HED for the extent of the deviation from the guidelines in NUREG-0700.
Following this, HEDs were assessed for the probability of inducing operator errors with a "1" indicating a low probability and "5" indicating a high probability. TED used three categories for classification of HEDs. HEDs classified in Category 1 are those which have been noted from documented operational errors or problems reported by the operators (such as those HEDs identified in the operating experience review). HEDs classified in Category II are those which have no documented cases of operator error but have an error potential greater than "1".
Those HEDs placed in Category III were those which have no documented cases of operator error and have "little or not impact on operator performance." TED is now in the process of determining the consequerices of Category 1 HED errors to assign an " ultimate scheduling prio,rity" for correcting the Category 1 HEDs. TED did not provide a schedule for correcting HEDs, nor did TED discuss whether it intended to correct all significant HEDs.
In. summary, the description of the methodology,~ criteria, and personnel used to assess the significance of HEDs identified in the review phase was e
w
-mt y
=-
- - - =
w y
e+--i---
m
-,y,--
l
[
l l l
l l
satisfactory. With the e,xception of,the absence of a logic diagram which is l
planned for us'e in assigning scheduling priorities for correcting Category I i
HEDs, the information provided in the summary report demonstrates that TED possesses the knowledge and capability for assessing HEDs and meeting this requirement of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737. However. TED needs to provide the logic diagram to be used for assigning scheduling priorities to correct Category I HEDs.
Selection of Design Improvements l}
. The licensee has provided little documentation or discussion to assure this element of a DCRDR has been satisfied. The licensee has in fact provided; (1) a table which lists "HEDs For.Which Short Tem Corrective Actions Have Been Identified" without describing the process used for selecting the l
proposed design change and without defining what is meant by "short tenn;"
and (2) an appendix of "HED Susunary Tables," which lists HEDs by number and provides a disposition of the HED, without describing the process used to l
selg the proposed design change, or detemine that an HED is N/A or should be deleted.
In addition, the licensee does not discuss corrective actions for Category I HEDs which "are those which have been noted from documented operational errors or problems reported by operators" which the licensee indicated would be corrected.
In summary, the licensee did not describe the process or analysis it used or will use to select design improvements to correct significant HEDs.
In addition, the licensee has opted to ccnduct a number of "Special Studies" to l
l
determine the disposition of all HEDs and "in January,1985, TED will provide detailed schedules for the completion of the short term actions and the special studies." Based on these facts, we conclude that the scheduling l
information and disposition of HEDs contained in the TED summary report are not conclusive and, therefore, no judgment as to their adequacy can be made at this~ time.
We have determined that the licensee has not complied with the requirements for this element of a DCRDR and for a sunnary report.
~
Verification that Selected Design Improvements Will provide the Necessary Corrections Without Introducing New HEDs TED states that "the goal of the disposition process was an integrated t
control room design improvement effort that will solve problems cost effectively without introducing new problems" and that "the objective of each special study will be as a minimum to review and resolve each associated HED listed while assuring that the resolution does not generate any additional 1
HEDs." Although TED appears to recognize the need to ensure that the 4
resolutions do not introduce new HEDs, no such attention is paid to the f
. necessity of ensuring that the selected improvements provided the necessary corrections.
In addition, no methodology was provided in the summary report which described how TED was going to ensure that resolutions do not introduce new HEDs. We conclude from the information provided in the summary report that TED has not demonstrated either the understanding of this requirement or t
l
-n.,,._._,-
i 16 -
' the.coinnitment' necessary.in order to successfully meet this requirement of Supplement I to NUREG-0737.
Coordination of the DCRDR With Other Improvement Programs Such as SPDS, Operator Training, Reg. Guide 1.97 Instrumentation and Upgraded Emergency Operating Procedures TED demonstrated that it recognized the need to integrate and coordinate the DCRDR with other improvement programs, that "the organization and scheduling reflected in the Program Plan were selected to coincide with other Toledo
~
Edison ERC initiatives (e.g., Reg. Guide 1.97, E0P upgrade, SPDS implementation,etc.)" Except for the description of th'e role the E0Ps serve in the system function review and task analysis, no other reference was made concerning the coordination and integration of the DCRDR program with i
other ERC initiatives.
In addition, the summary report does not clarify l
whether or not the upgraded E0Ps are validated with the instruments and j
controls list generated from the top-down system function review (which was compared with the lists generated in the procedures-based, system function review). The integration of the upgraded E0Ps in the DCRDR is described, however, the integration of the DCRDR results (from the system function review and task analysis) into the upgraded E0Ps is not described.
In suonary, the upgraded E0Ps were the only source of information from other ERC initiatives that were integrated into the DCRDR. TED should provide documentation which describes the process used to coordinate and integrate l
the DCRDR program with other ERC initiatives. We conclude that from the
.e-
= = = = = ' - * *
- v w
e
~ ~ = =
m
.ma
~
-e
~e-
-- J
information provided by TED -in the summa'ry rep 6rt, the coordination of the DCRDR with other improvement programs was minimal and did not demonstrate either the understanding of this requirement or the connitment necessary to successfully meet this ' requirement of Supplement I to NUREG-0737.
CONCLUSIONS
~
The licensee addressed all elements for conducting a DCRDR except for: (1) describing the process use.d for sc!1ecting design improvements to. correct HEDs, and (2) Verifying that the selected design improvements in the control room will provide the necessary correction. However, except for the 1-discussions on the integration procedures for performing the systems function review, the task analysis, and verification of task performance capabilities, the summary report lacked sufficient depth in describing the analysis, methodologies, and systems used to accomplish the remaining DCRDR activities.
Furthermore, a complete evaluation of the HED resolutions and their implementation schedules could not be made since all of the HEDs will be reviewed for disposition during special studies to be conducted. The selection and implementation schedules of all HED corrections will be i
finalized by January of 1985.
The following is a list of items for which additional information is needed before we can complete our evaluation of the Davis-Besse DCRDR program:
i c,
d'
,y
-,e
i I
I l l Function and Task Analysis A description of the types of personnel used to perform the systems functions review, task analysis, verification of equipment availability, and the extent of each individual's responsibility and participation in conducting these activities.
A description of the criteria used to analyze operator traffic patterns and the specific HEDs identified from this analysis.
!~
A description of the process used and the analysis conducted to develop information and control requirements independent of existing control room instrumentation which are extensive enough to encompass a comprehensive set of operator E0P tasks.
Assessment of HEDs A description of the logic or analysis used for assigning priorities to Category I HEDs.
Selection of Design Improvements A description of the methodology used to conduct each of the l
special studies.
i A description of the process and the analysis used to provide disposition of HEDs and to determine schedules for correcting HEDs.
.w
Information on the dispo'ition of significan't HEDs to be left s
uncorrected and HEDs being deferred to the special studies.
A description of the criteria and methodology used for selecting actions to correct HEDs.
A discussion of the personnel used to (1) perform each of the special studies, (2) coordinate and integrate the control room design improvement effort (including any system or organization established to support this function), and (3) approve reconnendations of the special studies gro0p.
Verification that Improvements Will Provide the Necessary Corrections Without Introducing New HEDs A description of the methodology used for verifying that design improvements in the control room do not introduce new problems or HEDs.
f A description of the system used for verifying that selected design improvements provide the necessary human factors corrections to HEDs.
l Coordination of the DCRDR With Other Improvement Programs A description of the process used to integrate the DCRDR with the results from the system functions review, task analysis, and M'
e w
-e
. verification, of task performance capabilities in the upgraded E0Ps.
A description of the process used to integrate the changes resulting from the DCRDR with other improvement programs, such as the SPDS, Regulatory Guide 1.97 review, and operator training and changes from these programs into the DCRDR.
- A description of the personnel and the system used to perfonn the integration or coordination function.
Remote Shutdown Panel A discussion on the results of the human factors evaluation of the remote shutdown panel.
Other Post TMI Action Items A discussion of control room modifications and additions made or planned as a result of other post TMI Actions (such as controls and displays for inadequate core cooling, reactor vents and lessons learned from the Salem ATWS events) and how these modifications or changes were incorporated into the DCRDR process.
m-
-T'
The licensee should provide the above information and the results of its special studies in a supplemental sumary report. We plan to conduct a pre-implementation audit at Davis-Besse within one month after receipt of the supplemental sumary report.
W G
e 4
4 4
e
REFERENCES 1.
" Detailed Control Room Design Review for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power l
Plant" summary report, attachment to letter from R. P. Crouse. TED, to J. F. Stolz, NRC, dated June 29, 1984.
2.-
" Detailed Control Room Design Review Program Plan for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant," attachment to letter from R. P. Crouse. TED, to J.
F. Stolz, NRC, dated June 15, 1984.
3.
"DCRDR Program Plan Evaluation for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant,"
Science Applications, Inc., September 13, 1983.
4.
"NRC Review Comments on Davis-Besse DCRDR Plan," attachment to memorandum from W. T. Russell, NRC to G. C. Lainas, NRC, dated i
October 7,1983.
5.
NUREG-0660 Vol. 1 "NRC Action Plan Developed as a Result of the TMI-2 Accident," USNRC, Washington, D.C., May 1980; Rev. 1, August 1980.
6.
NUREG-0737, " Requirements for Emergency Response Capability," USNRC, Washington, D.C., November 1980.
7.
NUREG-0737, Supplement 1, " Requirements for Emergency Response Capability," USNRC, Washingtan, D.C., Decemb.er 1982, transmitted to reactor licensees via Generic Letter 82-33, December 17, 1982.
8.
NUREG-0700, " Guidelines for Control Room Design Reviews," USNRC, Washington, D.C., September 1981.
l 9.
NUREG-0801, " Evaluation Criteria for Detailed Control Room Design j
Reviews," USNRC, Washington, D.C., October 1981, draft report.
l 1
+-
~
'