ML20107J792

Proposed Findings in Reply to Proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law on Dieckamp Mailgram Issue Submitted by TMI Alert & Nrc.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20107J792
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	02/25/1985
From:	Blake E GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP., SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE
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SP, NUDOCS 8502280021
Download: ML20107J792 (137)

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• Me GOCKETED FeMEdWry 25, 1985

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• NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION -

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In the Matter of ,

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METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-289-59)

) (Restart Remand (Three Mile Island Nuclear ) on Management)

Station, Unit No. 1) )

LICENSEE'S PROPOSED FINDINGS IN REPLY TO PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON DIECKAMP MAILGRAM ISSUE SUBMITTED BY TMIA AND NRC STAFF Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge i Ernest L. Blake, Jr., P.C.

! David R. Lewis ,

I Counsel for Licensee 1

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• BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING-BOARD"--~~-

In the Matter of )

)

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-289

) (Restart Remand (Three Mile Island Nuclear ) on Management)

Station, Unit No. 1) )

LICENSEE'S PROPOSED FINDINGS IN REPLY TO PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON DIECKAMP MAILGRAM ISSUE SUBMITTED BY TMIA AND NRC STAFF Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge Ernest L. Blake, Jr., P.C.

David R. Lewis Counsel for Licensee

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REPLY FINDINGS TABLE OF CONTENTS Licensee Proposed Findings Section Subject Page Introduction ................................... 5 (Response to TMIA PF 5, 8-10, 12)

I.B. On What Information Did Mr. Dieckamp Base His Mailgram? ............................ 9 (Response-to TMIA PF 191-194, 197-204, 207-217, 221-226, 228-236, 241, 284-303)

Lowe's Discovery of the Significance of the Pressure Spike ...................... 9 Dieckamp's Information from Miller and Herbein ................................ 18 Dieckamp's Information from Keaten ......... 27 Dieckamp's Understanding of Core Damage .... 31 II.A. What Evidence Existed on May 9, 1979, and What Conclusions should dave Been Drawn From That Evidence, as to Whether Anyone Inter-preted the Pressure Spike or Initiation of Containment Spray in Terms of Core Damage at the Time the Spike Occurred on March 28, 1979, or Withheld any Such Information? ......... 38 (Response to TMIA PF 304--309)

III.B. Whether Susequent Statements By Anyone, Including Interviews and Testimony of Messrs. Chwastyk, Mehler and Illjes, justify the Conclusion That One or More Individuals at the Time the Spike Occurred on March 28, 1979, in Fact Interpreted the Pressure Spike or Initiation of Containment Spray in Terms of Core Damage? ...... 40 L (Response to TMIA PF 15-169)

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Awareness of Pressure Spike ............ 41 Chwastyk's and Mehler's Interpretation ..... 50 Miller's and Herbein's Interpretation . . . . . . 67 Questionnaire Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 GPUSC Engineers' Knowledge ................. .

92 IV.B. Whether Mr. Dieckamp Had a Reasonable Basis to Continue to Believe That No One Interpreted the Pressure Spike or Initiation of Containment Spray in Terms of Core Damage?.... 102 (Response to TMIA PF 170, 239-283)

Absolute Proof ............................. 103 Complex Analysis ........................... 106 Dieckamp's Analysis of Chwastyk, Mehler and Illjes Statements ............. 108 Dieckamp's Consideration of NUREG-0760 . . . . . 113 IV.C. Whether There is Evidence that Mr. Dieckamp Expected the NRC to Rely on the Mailgram For Any Regulatory Purpose? ......................... 114 (Response to TMIA-PF 174-178)

IV.D. Whether it Would have Served Any Public or Regulatory Purpose for Mr. Dieckamp to Report the Subsequent Statements to the Extent They Constitute Some Evidence That Such an Interpre-tation Had Been Made at the Time the Spike Occurred on March 28, 1979, or That Any Such Information Was Withheld? ....................... 118 (Response to TMIA PF 312-315) l i

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' APPENDIX A: .Index -- Licensee, NRC Staff and TMIA Proposed

~ Findings and Licensee Reply Findings.

APPENDIX B: Index - . Licensee Reply to TMIA Proposed Findings.

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February 25, 1985-UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE~ ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In'the Matter of )

)

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-289 SP

) (Restart Remand

-(Three Mile' Island Nuclear ) on Management)

Station, Unit No. 1) )

LICENSEE'S PROPOSED FINDINGS IN REPLY TO PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON DIECKAMP MAILGRAM ISSUE SUBMITTED BY TMIA AND NRC STAFF Licensee submits herein its Reply Findings. Licensee sub-s mitted its-initial setaof proposed findings on January 28, 1985.

These findings were organized in the foim of a Partial Initial De-

-cision and followed an outline previously proposed by Licensee, provided to the other parties,-and accepted by the Licensing

' Board. See Tr. 31,699-706. The NRC Staff's findings, which largely adopt Licensee's findings, followed the same outline, although the Staff proposed an additional section'(II.D.) regard-ing NUREG-0760 and the testimony of Norman Moseley and David Gam-' ,

ble. Intervenor TMIA, on the other hand, pursued 'its own outline

-of the case in structuring its proposed findings.

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In this Reply, Licensee addresses the findings proposed by TMIA'and the Staff. Licensee's Reply again follows the outline accepted by the Board, and it proposes additional paragraphs in a Partial Initial Decision to discuss the proposed findings of the parties.1/ Licensee chose this organizationai approach to facil-itate correlation and comparison of the three parties' arguments, and to'best consolidate reply to TMIA's arguments where they ap-pear at'several different places in TMIA's findings. Noted at the beginning of each section of the Reply are the numbered paragraphs of TMIA's findings to which Licensee has explicitly replied, to further assist in locating corresponding arguments.2/

Licensee correlated TMIA's proposed findings with Staff's and

-Licensee's; proposed findings as follows: The first section of TMIA's proposed findings (TMIA PF 1-14) was introductory and was correlated to Staff's and Licensee's introductory findings (LIC PF 1-6). TMIA'sSection II, entitled "Is the Dieckamp Mailgram False orlInaccurate" (TMIA PF 15-170), was the counterpart of Section III.E of Staff's and Licensee's proposed findings, which addressed whether subsequently adduced evidence justified the conclusion

.that'someone had interpreted the pressure spike in terms of cere

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1/ Thus, for example, Licensee's Reply to the other parties' in--

troductory sections would be inserted after paragraph 6, the last paragraph in Licensee's introductory' findings of January 28, 1985.

2/ Appendix A attached to this Reply provides a complete index to pages on which er.ch of the numbered proposed findings.of.

JLicensee, Staff, TM1A and Licensee Reply appear. Appendix B atta-ched. hereto provides an index by TMIA finding number to the loca-tion of Licensee's Reply.

p damage at the time of the spike. Part A of TMIA'sSection III, entitled "The Purpose of the Mailgram" (TMIA PF 171-178) was the

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counterpart of. Staff's and Licensee'sSection IV.C, which addressed whether Mr. Dieckamp expected the NRC to rely on'the mailgram for any regulatory purpose. The remaining parts B and C of TMIA Section III (TMIA PF 179-237) argue that Mr. Dieckamp knew the mailgram was false, and are best correlated to Staff's and Licensee'sSection I.B, "On What Information Did Mr. Dieckamp Base

-His Mailgram".

TMIA Section IV, which is entitled " Assuming that Dieckamp Did Not Know the Statements in His Mailgram Were False at the Time He Sent the Mailgram He Should Have Known They Were False,"

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contains a number of arguments unrelated to this issue. TMIA for-mulates five arguments which it attributes to Licensee or Mr.

Dieckamp (TMIA PF 238-241) and to which it then replies.

Subsection IV.A (TMIA PF 239-240, 243-247) attacks what TMIA alleges is Mr. Dieckamp's unduly restrictive definition of the issue before the Board. Subsection IV.B (TMIA PF 248-256) attacks what TMIA alleges is Licensee's argument that a complex technical analysis is needed to determine that the pressure spike was caused by_a hydrogen burn due to a zirconium-water reaction. Subsection IV.C (TMIA PF- 257-270). attacks what TMIA contends is Mr.

Dieckamp's analysis of~ prior statements by Messrs. Chwastyk, Mehler and Illjes. Subsection IV.D (TMIA PF 271-283) attacks the t

support NUREG-0760 provides to.Mr. Dieckamp's conclusion. These four subsections correspond to Staff's and Licensee's Section

IV.B, which addresses whether Mr. Dieckamp has a reasonable basis to continue to believe that no one interpreted the pressure spike in-terms of core damage. TMIA's subsection IV.E (TMIA PF 284-303) disputes that Mr. Dieckamp could have believed William Lowe was

,the first person to' discover the significance of the pressure spike; this subsection is best correlated to Staff's and Licens-ee'sSection I.B, "On What Information Did Mr. Dieckamp Base His Mailgram." Only TMIA subsection IV.E (TMIA PF 304-307) addresses whether-there was any evidence of which Mr. Dieckamp should have been aware; this last subsection is the counterpart of Staff's and Licensee'sSection II.A.

Finally, TMIA Section V (TMIA PF 312-315) addresses whether Mr. Dieckamp should have corrected the mailgram after the fact.

This section is the counterpart of Staff's and Licensee'sSection IV.D.

Licensee does not address every proposed finding of the other parties. With respect to the Staff's proposed findings Licensee has no objection and sees nc need for specific' comment. With-re-spect.to.TMIA's proposed' findings, Licensee replies to virtually all-the. arguments made by TMIA. Licensee has ignored in its writ-ten reply only those TMIA findings which are essentially the same as Licensee's position, or are conclusory, irrelevant, immaterial, beyond the scope,'or-totally unsupported by any citation whatsoev-er.

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c REPLY FINDINGS INTRODUCTION 3/

(Response to TMIA PF 5, 8-10, 12)

REPLY 1. On January 28, 1985, in accordance with the Board's directive (Tr. 31,713-19), Licensee filed Licensee's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusion.= of Law in the Form of a Partial Initial Decision on the Dieckamp Mailgram (hereinafter cited as

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"LIC PF"). On February 8, 1985, TMIA, with the permission of the Board and parties, late filed Three Mile Island Alert's Proposed I Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Dieckamp Mailgram Issue (hereinafter c'ited as "TMIA PF"). TMIA subsequently provided cor-rections and additions on February 11, 1985, and on February 12, 1985. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania did not file proposed findings, and has therefore defaulted.4/ 10 C.F.R. 9 2.754(b).

See Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-717, 17 N.R.C. 346, 371 (1983). The NRC Staff filed its Proposed Findings (hereinafter cited as " STAFF 3/ The Reply Findings in this section are intended to follow LIC PF 6 in Licensee's proposed findings of January 28, 1985.

4/ By letter dated February 6, 1985, the Commonwealth informed the Board of its intent not to file proposed findings, but stated it reserved its right to reply to or comment on the proposed find-ings filed by the other parties. The Commonwealth, however, has no such right. An opportunity for the Commonwealth to comment on Licensee's proposed findings was provided by the staggered sched-ule for proposed findings, and has been missed. Other than this missed opportunity, the Commonwealth has no right to file reply findings, a right which is reserved under the Commission's Rules of Practice for the party with the burden of proof -- Licensee.

See 10 C.F.R. $ 2.754(a)(3).

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'PF") on February 15, 1985, and on February 25, 1985, Licensee filed Reply Findings(hereinafter cited as "LIC REPLY").

REPLY 2. The Board notes that adop' tion of TMIA's proposed  !

findings would call'for this Board to reject as false the testi-  ;

' mony of approximately 80 percent of the witnesses who appeared under oath in this proceeding. The Board observed and listened to the witnesses carefully. It is not the first time that Board mem-

'bers.have observed some of these same witnesses.5/ Although the Board believes some witnesses were mistaken in their present rec-ollection of events which occurred over five years earlier, it concludes that the witnesses were generally open and truthful.

The Board's rejection o'f TMIA's widespread and indiscriminate at-tack on the credibility of witnesses, particularly (as pointed out below) where inaccurate record citations (both ac to substance and

.to location) are relied upon, is sufficient ground in itself to reject TMIA's proposed findings in their entirety.

-REPLY 3. Despite the fact that TMIA's proposed findings are collectively unsound in their portrayal of false testimony, the Board has reviewed individually each of TMIA's proposed findings as well as the findings proposed by Licensee and the Staff, as discussed throughout this decision. Any finding of fact or con-clusion of-law. proposed by TMIA or the other parties and not

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5/. Members of this Board have previously observed as witnesses Messrs. Broughton, Keaten and Dieckamp, to name a few. See

'Broughton, ff Tr. 5,038; Keaten,' ff Tr. 13,242; Dieckamp, ff Tr.

--13,434 (Restart Proceeding) and see Broughton, ff Tr. 328 (TMI-1 Steam Generator Repair Proceeding).

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incorporated directly'or inferentially in this Partial Initial De-cision.is rejected as unsupported in law or fact or as unnecessary to'the rendering of this decision.

REPLY'4. Ihe Board accepts Licensee's introductory section which was adopted by the Staff (LIC PF/ STAFF PF 1-6). While TMIA's 'iritroduction generally describes the procedural background of this case, there are a number of inaccurate or irrelevant statements.in TMIA's introduction which the Board cannot accept as noted below.

REPLY 5. TMIA states that in the August 1981 Partial Initial Decision, the central question concerning information flow was "whether Dieckamp deliberately or negligently made false and inac-curate statement: in the mailgram." TMIA PF 5. TMIA misreads our

. prior decision. The Dieckamp mailgram issue was merely one. topic related~to--information flow.into which-the Board made preliminary inquiry. See, e.g., Tr. 13,'069, 13,060-64. It was not a matter..

litigated, particularly by TMIA which defaulted in its pursuit of-

" information flow issues. T r '. 30,976. See also, LBP-81-12, 14

~ N . R . C .~ 381, 541-542, 551,,556 (1981).

REPLY 6. TMIA proposes a finding concerning information flow beyond the Dieckamp mailgram issue. TMIA PF.8. The' Appeal

' Board's ruling on information flow issues other than the Dieckamp mailgram is irrelevant to this decision; of these issues only the Dieckamp mailgram issue was remanded to this Board. See ALAB-772, 19.N.R.C. 1193, 1268 (1984).

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REPLYi7. Norldo we ' share TMIA's reading of ALAB-772 in other respects. 1TMIA PF 9. The Appeal Board did not direct the Licens-ing Board to consider the implications of Dieckamp's actions in terms.of the influence he has on the overall management of the corporation. The issue defined by the Appeal Board is as stated

. precisely by Licensee'(LIC PF 2).

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-REPLY 8. The Board categorically rejects TMIA's suggestion that-Licensee's litigative position on the'Dieckamp mailgram issue

. impugns the integrity of Licensee's current management. See TMIA PF 10. First, TMIA misstates Licensee's current position.

Licensee maintains that the mailgram was accurate when sent-and that its thrust -- that-no one interpreted the pressure spike or spray actuation in terms of core damage at the. time of the spike

-- remains a reasonable conclusion. Second, TMIA's suggestion is bootstrapping and.is inherently unfair. Licensee was entitled,-

indeed obliged,-to present its views on the Dieckamp mailgram issue. Those views were. honest, straightforward, and persuasive.

REPLY 9. Finally with. respect to the background of this pro-ceeding'we reject.TMIA's characterization of this Board's July 9, 1984 Prehearing-Conference-Order. See TMIA PF 12. The Prehearing Conference Order did not rephrase the mailgram issues as stated by

'TMIA~ . TMIA fails to state accurately a single issue or subissue.

. . . . . . J

I.B. On What Information Did Mr. Dieckamp Base His Mailgram?6/

(Response to TMIA PF 191-194, 197-204, 207-217, 221-226, 228-236, 241, 284-303)

REPLY 10. TMIA attacks Mr. Dieckamp's expressed basis for his mailgram on four grounds. See generally TMIA PF 241. TMIA

- first argues Dieckamp's belief that William Lowe was the first to interpret the pressure spike the night of March 29th/30th was not reasonable. Next TMIA argues Dieckamp knew better because Herbein and Miller briefed him on plant status on March 28th, including the fact that a hydrogen burn had occurred. Third, TMIA contends that Robert Keaten, on the basis of information obtained from Gary Broughton .at the site the morning of March 29th, briefed Dieckamp on plant status and informed Dieckamp at that time of the hydrogen burn. Finally, TMIA argues that Dieckamp's understanding of the degree of core damage on the 28th or early on the 29th implied that he was aware of the hydrogen burn at that time.

Lowe's Discovery of the Signi ficance of the Pressure Spike REPLY 11. TMIA argues that Dieckamp could not have rea-sonably understood that William Lowe was the first person to cor-rectly interpret the pressure spike. See TMIA PF 284-303. To make this point, TMIA attempts te discredit Lowe's testimony, mainly by arguing that a number of engineers recognized the 6/ The Reply Findings in this section are intended to folice LIC PF 32 in Licensee'n proposed findings of January 28, 1985.

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- significance of the pressure spike during . meeting on March 29th i held several hours 7/ before Lowe recognized it.

REPLY 12. At the outset, the Board notes that even if it were true that someone at that March 29th afternoon meeting cor-rectly interpreted the pressure spike, it would neither affect the accuracy of the mailgram nor discredit Dieckamp's reliance on Lowe's recognition of the pressure spike. Dieckamp's mailgram would still be true if the spike had been first interpreted in _

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terms of core damage in that meeting which took place more than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after the pressure spike. One could not reasonably inter-pret the phrase "at the time of the spike" as extending to this time. In addition TMIA does not deny the significance of Lowe's recognition of and communications about the pressure spike, par-ticularly with respect to the flurry of analytical activity that recognition invoked. It dramatically altered the-response to the accident. See, e.g. Lowe, ff Tr. 28,151, at 10-14. Lowe's recog-nition of the spike was certainly a milestone in this saga -- an event of profound significance of which Dieckamp became aware and

. upon which he reasonably relied.

REPLY 13. As discussed below, however, the Board finds that the pressure spike was not interpreted in terms of core damage 7/ .The first meeting of the Events Analysis and Recovery Team, at,which TMIA claims the spike was correctly interpreted, ran from about.3:30 to 5:00 or 6:00 p.m. on the 29th. Lowe, ff Tr. 28,151, at 3-4. Lowe testified he recognized the significance of the

- pressure spike at about 11:00 p.m. -- give or take a couple of

' hours. Id., at 6-8.

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during the meeting in question. The Board therefore concludes that Dieckamp was correct in his reliance on a belief that William Lowe first recognised the significance of the spike.

REPLY 14. TMIA commences its attack on Lowe's testimony by remarking that Lowe has stated that he does not know whether he was the first to recognize the significance of the pressure spike.

TMIA PF 287. This statement does not detract from Lowe's credi-

'bility. Lowe was not present at TMI on March 28th and does not claim to know what people believed on that day. He did testify, however, that he " believed" he was the first to recognize its sig-nificance. Tr. 28,154-55 (Lowe). See also, Tr. 28,216-17 (Lowe).

This testimony presents no contradiction. As he testified, "I find it inconceivable that if anyone had known hydrogen was present in containment and had ignited, they would have co~ncealed that knowledge from peers or managers and that the on-site techni-cal support. team would not have been told of it." Lowe, ff Tr.

28,151, at 14.

REFaY 15. TMIA next attempts to discredit Lowe by referring to his testimony concerning a telephone conversation he had with Jack Thorpe on March 28th. TMIA PF 288-289. Lowe testified that Thorpe reported that the plant thought core cooling was recovered.

Lowe, ff Tr. 28,151, at 3. TMIA observes that a note of this con-versation dictated by Lowe states " Plant thinks core ic recovered but proof not yet established." See TMIA Mailgram Exh. 1. TMIA asserts that this phrase'means that *Se core had been uncovered.

TMIA ignores, however, Lowe's explanation during cross-examination J

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'that in the industry, recovery is a term of art meaning the return to an understandable status. Tr. 28,163 (Lowe). Moreover, TMIA also ignores the context.of the paragraph from which it plucks the statement in question. That entire paragraph refers _to attempts to' establish core cooling, which indicates that " core recovery" l

indeed referred to the reestablishment of understandable core cooling. See TMIA Mailgram Exh.' l.

. REPLY 16. TMIA then begins its argument that Lowe's story is l incredible because, as.TMIA claims, "it appears that there were general discussions about the pressure spike, hydrogen burn and hydrogen build-up in the reactor building during the afternoon of March-29, fully eight hours 8/ prior to Lowe's alleged revelation."

TMIA PF 290. TMIA prefaces its argument by referring to notes taken at'the time concerning a statement made by Richard Wilson at the'first meeting of the Events Analysis and Recovery Team. TMIA PF 291 (presumably referring to TMIA PF~230). According to the notes, Wilson referred to the financial loss they should assume-from the core damage. See TMIA PF 230.

REPLY 17. TMIA does not explain why this statement is sig-nificant. Wilson testified in this proceeding that his assessment-of core damage was derived from radiation levels which indicated that a large number of fuel ~ pins had failed. Wilson, ff Tr.

31,504: Tr. 31,539 (Wilson). He recognized from this that the plant would not be operative f1r an extended period of time'. Tr.

8/ With regard to the timing of these purported discussions, see CIC REPLY 11 n.7, supra.

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31,539 (Wilson). Wilson's statement does not support TMIA's prop-osition that-the occurrence of a hydrogen explosion was known or discussed.

-REPLY-18. TMIA also refers to statements by Julien

• Abramovici to. support the proposition that there was concern for hydrogen buildup to four percent and discussion of hooking up a hydrogen recombiner during this.same meeting. TMIA PF 292-293, 298-300. TMIA claims that only by a circonium-water reaction could hydrogen accumulate to four percent in so short a time.

TMIA concludes the discussion must therefore have been predicated.

on a recognition that a circonium-water reaction had occurred.

TMIA PF'293.

REPLY 19. Abramovici, however,.never testified that there f

was. concern expressed for hydrogen from a circonium-water reac-tion. Abramovici stated that George Kunder raised the concern over hydrogen, but Abramovici did not recall discussion of how hy-drogen might have been produced.9/ TMIA Mailgram Exh. 32H, at 43-44. Kunder testified in this proceeding : hat he merely men-tioned long-term hydrogen generation as a topic for recovery pit.n-ning. Tr. 30,007-08 (Kunder). On March 29th, Kunder did not

'9/ Abramovici thought that Kunder had the results of a contain-ment atmospheric sample which indicated four percent hydrogen.

TMIA Mailgram Exh. 32H, at 43. However, the first containment at-mospheric sample was not taken until March 31 and that sample

showed 1.7% hydrogen. Lowe, ff Tr. 28,151, at 13. In addition l Kunder testified that he did not have any knowledge of hydrogen

' . concentration until the weekend (March 31-April 1). Tr. 30,011 (Kunder).

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consider the possibility of a circonium-water reaction, and had no concern that hydrogen had reached flammable limits. Tr.

30,007-08, 30,016 (Kunder). Kunder's testimony is consistent with his prior: statements. See JME 1(c)(80), at 74-75; JME 1(c)(118),

at 52-55.

REPLY 20. Since Kunder's concern was only with long-term hy-drogen generation and not prompted by a specific knowledge of a hydrogen concentration, whatever discussion ensued on the 29th concerning setting up a hydrogen recombiner says.nothing about circonium-water reaction'and is'thus irrelevant. Urgent attempts to contact people to assist.in setting up hydrogen recombiners did not occur until Friday, March'30th, after th: significance of the pressure spike had been recognized. Tr. 31,010-11, 30,018-019 (Henrie).10/

REPLY 21. TMIA next refers to written statements by Thomas Crimmins made during discovery. TMIA PF 294-296. TMIA infers from Crimmins' statements that tlu chart showing the pressure spike.was. viewed and discussed by everybody at the March 29th meeting; TMIA then suggests that Lowe must also have seen the pressure spike and must immediately have recognized its signifi-cance. Crimmins, however, stated that he (Crimmins). viewed and 10/ TMIA refers to Dieckamp's notes of the 30th to suggest that Licensee attempted to contact-Atomics International a few hours earlier on the-30th than Henrie remembers. TMIA PF 300. See TMIA Mailgram Exh.'27, at 3. Dieckamp's notes,.however, do not indi-cate who was contacted; but even if it had been Henrie, the in-ability to remember a precise hour of a day almost six years ago simply does not detract from the credibility of his testimony.

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discussed the' spike during the meeting, and that the spike was as-sessed to have been a spurious in.ecrumentation problem.11/

.Crimmins did not state that the pressure spike was shown to Lowe L

or to anyone else. TMIA Mailgram Exh. 32F. Lowe testified that he was not shown the strip chart, although'he did remember someone mentioning at some point on the 29th the pressure spike as a spu-rious indication. Lowe,'ff Tr. 28,151, at 10; Tr. 28,177-78 (Lowe). The Board finds this testimony consistent, not contradic-tory. It also indicates strongly that at the time of this meet-ing, more than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after the pressure spike, the significance of the pressure spike had not yet been recognized.

2 L -REPLY 22. Finally, TMIA refers to testimony by Kunder. TMIA PF 297. -TMIA states that Kunder " recall [ed] that the pressure spike ~was discussed at the-first meeting of the Task Force."

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.Kunder, however, testified that "I became aware of the pressure spike ~either on the 29th or 30th either during or after a meeting that I attended in Unit-2 to-begin the assessment of the acci-dent."- Tr. 29,998 (Kunder) (emphasis added). When TMIA's counsel suggested to Kunder that he had previously testified that he re-membered the discussion at the first meeting of the task force --

11/ That the pressure chart was'seen by Crimmins the late after-noon of March 29th is conceivable but by no means clear. The chart was removed about. noon on the 29th. See LIC PF 98-103; LIC

-REPLY 165-168 infra. It.was the subject of discussions among plant personnel the evening of March 29th before it was shown to Lowe in the control room at about 11:00 p.m. See LIC PF 22-23, 100. No one has testified nor is there other probative evidence,-

~however, that~anyone understood the cause of the spike prior to-Lowe's interpretation of the pressure chart at about 11:00 p.m.

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on the 29th -- Kunder subscribed to the suggestion and stated that it was about the same time. Tr. 29,999 (Kunder). TMIA's sugges-tion, however, was inaccurate. In a May 1979 interview, Kunder stated that he. learned of the spike "somewhere around Friday that would have been the 30th." JME 1(c)(37), at 50. He stated that it was either during the Events Analysis and Recovery Group meet-ing or during a discussion he had with Broughton's group of engineers. Id. In a September 1979 interview, Kunder stated that it was sometime after, though perhaps at, the Events Analysis and Recovery Group meeting that he was informed of the pressure spike.

JME 1(c)(80), at 74-75.

REPLY 23. Kunder also testified in this proceeding that he thought Gary Broughton was the individual who showed him the chart. Tr. 30,001 (Kunder). Kunder believed that hydrogen, along with instrument malfunction, was offered as a possible explanation

-- possibilities that needed to be examined. Tr. 30,004-05 (Kunder). Kunder also previously stated that the individual who showed him the pressure spike told him it had occurred that day.

JME 1(c)(37), at 51.

REPLY 24. Broughton testified in this proceeding that he re-membered no discussion or observation of the pressure spike at the meeting or with Kunder on the 29th. Tr. 31,159, 31,166 (Broughton). Moreover, he testified with confidence that he did not learn there had been a hydrogen explosion until Friday morning (March 30). Tr. 31,198-201 (Broughton). In addition, Broughton testified that when he was informed of the pressure spike, he at

. _ - . _____ ___ _ _ _ _ _O

. . . . .. . . = - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

first did not understand that:it-had not just occurred. Tr.

~

31,'199 (Broughton). Since Kunder remembers being told of the spike-by Broughton and also remembers being told that the spike had occurred that day, it appears extremely likely that any con-versation with Kunder occurred on Friday.

REPLY 25. Accordingly, the Board finds that the testimony or evidence to which.TMIA refers does not discredit Dieckamp's belief

-- a belief which the Board accepts -- that William Lowe was the first person to correctly interpret the pressure spike.

REPLY 26. Finally, TMIA states that Abramovici recalls dur-

'ing.the afternoon meeting on March 29th discussion concerning the need to contact Atomics International in order to hook up a hydro-gen recombiner. TMIA points to a log entry for 8:55 a.m.12/ as evidence of the startup of a hydrogen recombiner. TMIA PF 298.

TMIA's inference that a hydrogen recombiner was started at 8:55 a.m. on March 30, 1979 approaches the impossible. Kunder c testified that he knew of no efforts to start a recombiner on March 30th and since he was given the full-time assignment to co-ordinate the effort to hook up a recombiner during the week-end of March 31st, he would have been aware of any prior efforts to hook

-up and operate a hydrogen recombiner. Tr. 30,041-45, 30,087-089 (Kunder). Kunderd'escribed the effort to hook up and check out the recombiner as an around-the-clock effort for two to two and a half days. Tr. 30,087-88 (Kunder).

12/. TMIA does not say what day this entry refers to. The Board's

. review of'TMIA Mailgram Exh. 16,-at 6 suggests the 8:55 a.m. entry probably refers to. March 30, 1979. See Tr. 30,042-043 (Kunder).

REPLY 27. TMIA in footnote 30 (TMIA PF 298 n.30) of its pro-posed findings cites James Henrie's testimony that the hydrogen recombiner was started on Monday, April 2, 1979 (TMIA incorrectly states that Monday was April 1). However TMIA misstates that Atomics International personnel were not asked to come to TMI until March 31, 1979, "[p]resumably (because] Licensee had no se-rious concern about hydrogen in the reactor building...until that time." TMIA's statement reflects a total lack of understanding of the events associated with the accident as well as the evidence adduced in this proceeding: Henrie testified that he was first contacted by GPU on Friday, March 30th, probably before noon; he was asked to be on standby alert to go to TMI and was requested to get approvals to go. Tr. 31,010 (Henrie). Through the afternoon and evening of March 30th a series of telephone conversations oc-curred between GPU and Henrie. Tr. 31,011 (Henrie). This squares with the flurry of activity on that day following Lowe's discov-ery. See LIC RE:-LY 12, 20 and 20 n.10, infra. Compare Tr. 31,011 (Henrie) (questions by AI to GPU of need for hydrogen recombiners R

on March 28 and 29 met with negative response).

Dieckamp's Information from Miller and Herbein REPLY 28. Through a remarkable interpretation of the evi-dence, TMIA would have us find that Herbein and Miller briefed, Dieckamp during the afternoon of March 28th, either during'their short conversation on the steps of the Capitol or after their meeting with the Lieutenant Governor, on incore thermocouple l

l

i readings greater than 2200 F, the pressure spike and the hydrogen burn. TMIA PF 197,'200-202. Mr. Dieckamp, on the other hand, testified that at no time on the 28th or 29th did anyone mention

- to him such-incore thermocouple _ readings, the pressure spike, or hydrogen. Dieckamp, ff Tr. 28,316, at 5. Inasmuch as we conclude that Herbein and Miller did not know in the afternoon of the 28th

, that there had been a pressure spike, did not know that it had

- been caused by a hydrogen explosion, and dfd not believe that the reported thermocouple indications were accurate (Herbein did not know of the incore temperature readings in the range of 2200.F),

we necessarily conclude that they did.not pass such information on b to Dieckamp. See LIC REPLY 107-137 infra. Even if we were to as-sume that Miller and Herbein were aware of or appreciated these facts, their passing them to Dieckamp is unadulterated supposi-tion.

-REPLY 29. TMIA suggests two times when Miller and Herbein could have briefed Dieckamp on the 28th on the status of the 7.lant

-- just before and just after the Lieutenant Governor's meeting.

TMIA PF 197, 200-202. TMIA's argument, however, is supported solely by attacks on the credibility of the alleged participants.

REPLY 30. In an attempt to bolster its position that Dieckamp received such a briefing-by Miller and Herbein on the 28th despite.Dieckamp's denial, TMIA suggests that Dieckamp's statement to the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PaPUC) made at 11:30 in'the morning of the 28th that "there is no evi-7 dence of any radiation that is detectable above the background L

v a

F .

h

[-

r levels in the area" was a misrepresentation.13/ TMIA PF 192-194.

Thus, TMIA argues, if Dieckamp's statements to the PaPUC regarding I

radiation readings were not accurate, we should question his

. testimony ~on his knowledge of the pressure spike. It was estab-lished during the hearings by a preponderance of the evidence, most of which TMIA chooses to ignore, that contrary to TMIA's sug-gestion Dieckamp's statement to the PaPUC reflected his knowledge at the time.

REPLY 31. TMIA attempts to show that Dieckamp was informed by Walter Creitz, President of Metropolitan Edison Company (Met-Ed), of.off-site radiation readings above background prior to addressing the PaPUC at 11:30 a.m. TMIA PF 192. We find it un-

' likely, however, for a number of reasons that Creit talked to Dieckamp before Dieckamp addressed the PaPUC at 11:30.14/

13/ TMIA also asserts that Dieckamp omitted information on the accident from an earlier statement to the PaPUC at about 9 a.m. on the 28th. TMIA PF 193 n.21. See TMIA Mailgram Exh. 4.

' Dieckamp's knowledge at that time of off-normal radiation releases and his concern regarding the functioning of-the ECCS form the basis for TMIA's assertion. Dieckamp explained that the-off-normal radiation releases of which he was aware were within ,

the plant (Tr. 28,386, 28,609-10 (Dieckamp)), and that the Pres;-

dent.of Metropolitan' Edison Company,. Walter Creitz, had informed

- him just prior to the.PaPUC meeting that there had been no off-site-radiation readings above background (Tr. 28,937-38 (Dieckamp)).

As.to the functioning of the ECCS, there is no evi-dence showing that Dieckamp's concern led him to believe~a danger to the public existed. See JME 1(c)(66), at 123 sDieckamp);

Dieckamp, ff Tr. 28,316, at 6. We find his e.arlier statement to

- the PaPUC reflected Dieckamp's appreciation of the seriousness o#

- the' accident at the time it was made.

. 14/ This would have been a-second conversation between Creit: and

- Dieckump. It is uncontroverted that Creitz earlier spoke with Dieckamp prior to the start'of-the PaPUC meeting at 9:00 a.m., in-

- forming Dieckamp of no off-site radiation readings above back-p ' ground. _ See LIC REPLY 30 n.13, suora.

u.-..

T REPLY 32. First, Dieckamp does not recall Creitz informing him of off-site radiation readings (Tr. 28,301, 28,390, 28,400 (Dieckamp)) and questions the timing of the call (Tr. 28,940 (Dieckamp)). Second, Creitz fixed the time of his conversation with Dieckamp " prior to noon", not prior to Dieckamp's appearance before the PaPUC at 11:30. Creitz deposition, ff Tr. 29,708, at

25. Third, while Creitz stated that he learned of off-site readings prior to 11:00 a.m. (Creitz deposition, ff Tr. 29,708, at 24), the first off-site radiation readings were measured after 11:00 a.m.15/ Creitz could have learned about them and informed Dieckamp only after that. However, Dieckamp attended a press briefing being given by the Lieutenant Governor which began at 10:55 a.m. (JME 1(c)(143), App. C, at 131 (Udall Report); Tr.

28,401 (Dieckamp)) and ran about 30 minutes. Tr. 28,938 (Dieckamp). Fourth, Creitz testified that he called the Lieuten-ant Governor about the off-site readings after the press briefing but before he call?d Dieckamp.16/ Creitz deposition, ff Tr.

15/ TMIA cites an MRC Preliminary Notification issued on MarcP 28th which states that a 3 mR per hour reading had been recorded off-site oy 10:45 a.m. for the proposition that off-site radiation readings had been recorded that early. TMIA PF 193. This infor-mation appears to be inaccurate. 'eadings of that magnitude had been measured before 10:45 a.m., but on-site in the Morth Parking Lot. See Tr.'28,961-62 (Dieckamp). The first off-site readings above background were measured after 11:00 a.m. JME 1(c)(62),

App. II C, at II-C-1 (NUREG-0600). If Creitz had information regarding radiation readings prior to 11:00 a.m. they had to be on-site readings. Creitz's own notes relied upon by TMIA confirm this to be the case. TMIA Mailgram Exh. 9, at 5-6.

16/ Creitz's notes fix the time of his call to the Lieutenant Governor at about 11:30. TMII. Mailgram Exh. 9, at 5.

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29,708, at 29. Creitz would therefore have had to have made two calls in the 11:25 to 11:30 a.m. time period if he talked with Dieckamp before Dieckamp addressed the PaPUC at 11:30 a.m. While it may be physically possible for Creitz to have spoken with both the Lieutencnt Governor and Dieckamp between 11:25 and 11:30 a.m.

it is very unlikely. It would have required extremely fortuitous timing for Creits to have caught up with and talked to the Lieu-tenant Governor and then to have talked to Dieckamp in a time win-dow of just a few minutes.

REPLY 33. Lactly, Creitz testified that when he talked with Dieckamp'he told him that he had already talked with the Lieuten-ant Governor. Creitz deposition, ff Tr. 29,708, at 29. Had Dieckamp just learned of information he knew literally had just been given to the Lieutenant Governor, we find it inconceivable that he would not have provided that information to the PaPUC.

REPLY 34. Though the timing of Dieckamp's conversation with Creitz is in doubt, there is no doubt that Dieckamp had heard in the Lieutenant Governor's press conference just prior to his ad-dressing the PaPUC that no radiation readings above background had been measured. JME 1(c)(143), App. C, at 131-32 (Udall Report).

Dieckamp also knew that the Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation Pro-tection (BRP) was in continuous contact with plant personnel (Tr.

28,400-401, 28,925-26 (Dieckamp)) and a representative of the SRP participated in the briefing (JME 1(c)(143), App. C, at 131-132 (Udall Report)).

F

-REPLY 35. Based on the above we find Dieckamp's statement to the'PaPUC was.aniaccurate reflection of what he knew at the time.

REPLY 36. L'fMIA continues its attack on the credibility of Dieckamp, as well as the credibility of Herbein, Miller and Kunder.

by arguing that.it.is incredible that the participants in the con-

.versation on the Capitol steps do not remember-more being said.17/

TMIA PF 197. However, the testimony of the participants was that very little wasidiscussed, not that they do not recall what was discussed. Tr. 28,402-03 (Dieckamp); Tr. 30,071 (Kunder); Tr.

30,214-16'(Miller); Tr. 30,378-79, 30,381 (Herbein). It is quite l r.easonable that little was discussed,.since Miller, Herbein'and Kunder were already late for their meeting with the Lieutenant Governor'(Tr.' 28,402-03 (Dieckamp); Tr. 30,215-16 (Miller)) and

< Dieckamp was concerned that they proceed to the meeting as quickly

, as possible (Tr. 30,071 (Kunder)).

17/ TMIA also questions Herbein's credibility by making the whol-ly unsupported statement that Herbein told the Lieutenant Governor

~

-during their 2:30 p.m.' meeting "that Met-Ed had measured no off-site radiation releases" eved though he knew such measurements had been made. TMIA PF 203-204. The only document cited by TMIA in support of this statement, JME 1(c)(142), at 42, makes no mnntion of Herbein, has no description of what Herbein, Miller or Kunder said'at the meeting and says nothing about what they knew. We find no reason to doubt Herbein's testimony to the effect that if he knew about off-site readings.above background he told the Lieu-tenant' Governor about them. Tr. 30,374-75, 30,377 (Herbein). We also note that the only off-site releases above background that had been measured up until the meeting, had been taken after 11:00 a.m. (See JME 1(c)(62), App. II-C, at II-C-1 (NUREG-0600)) and were apparently passed on to the Lieutenant Governor by Creitz at

-about 11:30 a.m. (TMIA Mailgram Exh. 9, at 5), 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> before the meeting with Miller, Kunder and Herbein.

I'

REPLY.37. TMIA argues that it is incredible that Dieckamp would return to Parsippany, New Jersey after talking with Miller, Herbein and Kunder without seeking further information, either from them or from other sources. TMIA PF 198-199, 202. Dieckamp

'has- testified that he felt he did not need additional information because he had been given the impression that the plant was stable from the conversation on the Capitol steps wit.h directly involved and,.to him, the most knowledgeable plant personnel. Tr. 28,333, 28,403-05 (Dieckamp). He also felt that to go to the plan't would unnecessarily interfere with whatever recovery efforts were in process. JME 1(c)(123), at 10-11 (Dieckamp). We find Dieckamp's testimony reasonable and uncontroverted.

REPLY 38. In further support of their~ argument that Miller, Herbein and Kunder briefed Dieckamp after the meeting, TMIA at-tempts to correlate what it refers to as " time gaps." TMIA PF 200-202. These " time gaps" are periods of time, after the_ meeting with the Lieutenant Governor, during which. Miller, Herbein and Kunder have testified that they cannot recall what they did other than return to the site. See Tr. 30,072-73 (Kunder); Tr. 30,220 (Miller) Tr. 30,382-83'(Herbein). Dieckamp has testified that he returne'd to Parsippany but has no specific recollection of.his ac-tivities other.than hearing a radio broadcast of a statement by the Lieuten, ant Governor during his return trip. Tr. 28,892 (Dieckamp). The mere fact that Herbein, Miller and Kunder do not-recall anything that they did during the period following the Lieutenant Governor's meeting other than to return to the site

.does not constitute evidence that they briefed Dieckamp. The sim-ple statement of the proposition reveals its absurdity.

' REPLY 39. In addition, the alleged " time gap" is quite short if it exists at all. Miller, Herbein and Kunder left TMI at about 2:00 p.m. Tr. 30,245-47 (Miller); 30,419 (Herbein). The trip to the capitol takes 30 minutes. Tr. 30,246 (Miller). The meeting with the Lieutenant' Governor lasted between one half an hour and-one hour. JME 1(c)(67), at 17 (Herbein) ("a little less than an hour"); JME 1(c)(62), App. IA,.at I-A-89 (NUREG-0600)-("3C-45 minutes"). Considering that the return trip to TMI took 30 minutes, the earliest they conceivably could have been back at TMI is between 3:30 p.m. and 4:00 p.m., assuming there were no delays for.any reason at any-point in the trip. Some accounts place Miller at the site at at 4:00 p.m.; others, at 4:30.18/ JME

~1(c)(10), at 21 (Miller et al.); JME 1(c)(62) App. IA, at I-A-103 (NUREG-0600). This hardly supports the one and one half to'two hours TMIA asserts. See TMIA PF 201. In all likelihood there is no " time gap". That there is not today a recollection of the re-turn trip may represent no more than an absence of anything impor-tant which they can recall, not the basis for filling the time

.with a. trumped-up, clandestine meeting. Indeed, all four individ-uals have consistently testified that there was no such meeting (Tr. 28,408 (Dieckamp); Tr. 30,072 (Kunder); Tr. 30,214-15,-30,221 18/ Miller, Herbein and Kunder traveled together to Harrisburg,to brief the Lieutenant Governor. Tr. 30,213 (Miller); Tr. 30,343, l ^30,382 (Herbein); Tr. 30,070 (Kunder).

l l

I

- _ - ~ . - _ _. - . _._ . . , _ . _ . . - . , . _ , _ _ _ - . _ _ , . . , _ - _ . . . , - . . . . , ,, -

r (Miller);-Tr. 30,382-83-(Herbein)) and nothing prompts us to ques-tion that testimony.

REPLY 40. TMIA asserts that it is not believable that Dieckamp did not take immediate action in response to the Lieuten-ant-Governor's public statement in the afternoon of the 28th that the accident was more " complex"19/ than the company had first led them to believe. TMIA PF 191. Dieckamp explained that though he was stunned to hear the Lieutenant Governor's public statement on the car radio during his return trip to New Jersey, he felt no need'to alter his plans and continued home. Tr. 28,409-10 (Dieckamp). The public statement did not appear to Dieckamp to

! reflect information different from what he gathered from Herbein, Miller and Kunder. I d'. Dieckamp had reason to be comforted as to the outcome of the Herbein meeting with the Lieutenant Governor.

The' Lieutenant Governor's public statement which Dieckamp heard said there was no danger _to the public health and while the Com-

- pany had given the public and the state conflicting information, "He just concluded a meeting with Company officials and hope this briefing will clear up most of your questions." JME 1(c)(143),

App'. D, at 133 (Udall Report). We find Dieckamp's explanation reasonable and credible.

l 19/ TMIA has the Lieutenant Governor stating that Met-Ed misled

. him as to the " seriousness" of the accident. TMIA PF 191.

Comeare JME 1(c)(143), App. D, at 133 (Udall Report).

L

v.

'Dieckamp's Information from Keaten i

REPLY 41. TMIA would have us find,.despite consistent and

. repeated. testimony to the. contrary-by Broughton and Keaten, that Broughton told Keaten of~the hydrogen burn early on March 29th and~

that Keaten passed that information on to Dieckamp immediately thereafter. TMIA-PF 207, 211, 222, 224-226.

p REPLY 42. TMIA's argument centers around a telephone

' briefing Broughton gave Keaten which included a statement that th'ere had been a hydrogen explosion in the containment. See TMIA PF 207. 'Both:Broughton and Keaten have unequivocally stated that

, that. briefing took place on March 30th. Tr. 31,131, 31,148-49 (Broughton); Tr. 31,269-71, 31,292,'31,297 (Keaten).

REPLY 43. .The first flawed element of TMIA's argument that

- the briefing took place on March 29th is TMIA's assertion that L Broughton knew early on the 29th that the pressure spike had been a hydrogen explosion, and that there had been a circonium-water reaction. TMIA PF 211. As previously noted, Broughton testified he did not have this information on the 29th. See LIC REPLY 24,

. supra.20/-

[ REPLY 44. TMIA argues that Broughton would not have talked with Keaten after Wilson-(Keaten's superior) arrived at the site on the afternoon of the 29th and thus the Broughton/Keaten conver-sation must have. occurred the morning of the 29th. TMIA PF 20/ With regard generally to information gathered by GPUSC engi-neers on March 28, see LIC REPLY 155-172, infra.

1-

I i

l 208-210,'212. Although~it is true that Wilson took charge of the initial effort at TMI in which Broughton was participating, proba-bly.on the'29th,'there is'certainly no evidence that Broughton was precluded from passing information on to Keaten subsequent to Wilson's' arrival. Indeed, Keaten has testified that their conver-l '

l sation on the 30th was pre-arranged to help him brief Dieckamp

'that morning. Tr. 31,248, 31,254-56 (Keaten).

l REPLY 45. As early as June 1, 1979, Keaten positively fixed i the date of his telephohe conversation with Broughton as the 30th.

He explained during an NRC. interview on that date that on Thursday, March 29th, he left work early (which indicated that the l magnitude of the accident was not then appreciated). JME 1(c)('45), at 6. That evening Arnold called Keaten and arranged for Keaten to talk with the GPUSC engineers'(i.e., Broughton) at the

' site and then brief Dieckamp on what he learned. Tr. 31,254-56 (Keaten). Friday morning, March 30, Keaten went to the Morristown

-Airport.to take a flying lesson (which is a further indication that he did not understand how serious the accident was). He met Arnold there who explained then that the accident was more serious than previously thought and that he, Arnold, was going to the site. Keaten then went to work and talked with Wilson and Broughton and thereafter to Dieckamp. It was at this point that Keaten was first aware of the severity of the accident. JME 1(c)(45), at 6-8 (Keaten). Nothing in Keaten's actions on the 29th give a hint that he had been told of the hydrogen explosion the morning of March 29th; Keaten at the time was Manager of l Systems Engineering (See Tr. 31,237 (Keaten)).

t i

l

REPLY 46. TMIA then proceeds to Keaten's notes of his con-versation with Broughton to support its position. TMIA PF 213-217. Keaten originally noted "3/29/79" at the top of the first page of the notes of the conversation, but later realized that was an error and so indicated by adding in red ink a question mark and "3/30." Tr. 31,260-61, 31,270-71 (Keaten). The correc-tion was made prior to an October 1979 SIG interview (Tr. 31,271 (Keaten)) and Keaten clearly identified these notes as early as June 1, 1979 as taken during his March 30th conversation with Broughton (JME 1(c)(45), at 6-8 (Keaten)). TMIA would have the Board ignore the correction, but Keaten't consistent testimony on this point is credible and we believe he was in error when he first wrote "3/29/79." We find particularly persuasive the inclu-sion in the same Keaten notes of the results of a primary coolant sample along with the words "last night." See TMIA Mailgram Exh.

10, at 14. Keaten pointed out that a sample of the same quantity and yielding the same results as indicated.in his notes was taken on Thursday night, the 29th, according to NUREG-0600. Tr. 31,296-97 (Keaten). See JME 1(c)(62), App. IIA, at II-A-59 (NUREG-0600).

TMIA's observation that Broughton included a summary of Dieckamp's activities of the previous day in his report to Keaten and Keaten noted those activities adds little to TMIA's argument. See TMIA PF 223. It is hardly surprising in a conversation whose very pur-pose was to provide Keaten information in order to brief Dieckamp (Tr. 31,254-56 (Keaten)), tha,t Broughton would pass on information regarding Dieckamp's activities of which he was aware.

n_.

REPLY 47. TMIA refers to two other points in Keaten's notes

.in an effort to place them on March 29th. TMIA PF 221 n.23. The first is a reference to Keaten's notation of the size of the bub-ble in the reactor vessel. See id. TMIA argues that the number shown could be read either as "1000" or "2000" cubic feet. Id.

_But see TMIA PF 216 (where TMIA cites the figure as "1000"). TMIA points to Lowe's initial calculation of 1500 cubic ft. the night of the 29th/30th and concocts that the 1000 or 2000 estimate in Keaten" s notes must have been an earlier, rougher calculation of which no one has been aware to this point. See TMIA PF 221 n.3.

Apart from the complete lack of evidence that such an earlier cal-culation was ever made as postulated by TMIA, the fact is that Lowe made more than one calculation. Lowe calculated the bubble size to be 1100 cubic feet after he calculated the 1500 cubic foot volume. Lowe, ff Tr. 28,151, at 12. 'It is therefore more likely that the Keaten notes simply reflect 1000 which corresponds closely to Lowe's second calculation of 1100 made during the night of the 29th/30th.

REPLY 48. TMIA also argues that inclusion by Keaten in his notes of primary system pressures and temperatures recorded on March 29th under "present status" fixes the date of the notes as March 29th. However, evidence was not adduced showing that these pressures and temperatures were unique to March 29th and did not also exist on March 30th as well. In addition, TMIA's ex-trapolation of the pressure and temperature readings which it claims were taken at 1:30 p.m. on March 29th, to the morning of

the 29th to make them coincide with TMIA's version of the Broughton/Keaten conversation (TMIA PF 221 n.23) _s completely unsupported by the record. Moreover, the particular entry in Seelinger's notes, to which TMIA refers, was made at 6:30 p.m.,

not 1:30 p.m. (i.e., 1830, not 1330). See TMIA Mailgram Exh. 2, at 7.

REPLY 49. We conclude that Broughton passed the information contained in Keaten's notes to Keaten on the morning of March 30th and that Keaten passed that information on to Cieckamp that same day.21/ -

Dieckamo's Understanding of Core Damage REPLY 50. The Board is requested by TMIA to find that Dieckamp had sufficient knowledge of core damage on March 28 or early March 29, 1979, to imply that he was then aware of the hy-drogen burn. TMIA PF 236. TMIA would have us find that Dieckamp discussed core damage on March 29th with Robert Arnold and that Dieckamp meant in that discussion core damage caused by a zirc-water reaction. TMIA PF 228. TMIA would also have us find that this discussion with Arnold preceded Dieckamp's signing a memorandum authorizing the formation of a Task Force. TMIA's ar-gument is misplaced in two respects. First, the sequence is not as clear as TMIA suggests.22/ Arnold's testimony cited by TMIA 21/ We so find recognizing that Mr. Dieckamp no longer remembers his briefing by Keaten on the 30th. See Tr. 28,646-47 (Dieckamp).

22/ The sequence is material to TMIA's position that Dieckamp provided his views on core damage to Wilson at the time Dieckamp (Continued Next Page)

l suggests that the core damage discussion with Dieckamp occurred I after signing the memorandum. Arnold testified: j "I believe we went over and talked with Dieckamp about.11:00 o' clock, before Wilson departed for the site,Eto review with Dieckamp the conclusions that Wilson and I had come to as to the scope and interface of the task force with the plant, and to

. have Dieckamp sign the letter which established the

' task group.

Dieckamp and I at that time had some conversations about core damage. I think at that time, or very shortly thereafter, we talked about the possibility or the-likelihood really that we had experienced some core damage and I think that at that time we were of the opinion that there probably had been some of what I would term in our perspective of that time period significant core damage.

Arnold deposition, ff Tr. 28,635, at 25. The Board also ob-serves that, with respect to the understanding of "significant

. core damage" held by Dieckamp on March 29th, Arnold went on to testify "If someone wanted me to quantify it [significant core damage], I would say half a percent or a percent failed fuel type situation". Id. TMIA provides three citations to Arnold *s testimony; two of these citations (JME l-C (84), at 24-26, and Arnold deposition, ff Tr. 28,635) refer to the iden-tical portions of Arnold's testimony found at separate places in our record, and the third citation simply is not relevant to the proposition set forth by TMIA. Dieckamp explained to our satisfaction what he meant on March 29th by core damage: "...a (Continued) signed the memorandum appointing Wilson to head up the Task Force.

See LIC REPLY 52, infra.

9

sense of local and limited fuel damage. At no time on March 28 or 29 did anyone mention to me core temperatures in excess of 2000 F, pressure spike, =irconium-water reaction, hydrogen, or core damage beyond failed fuel." Dieckamp, ff Tr. 28,316, at

5. TMIA's quoted text of Dieckamp's definition of "significant core damage" does not appear at the location cited by TMIA, but is #^und at page 121 of Dieckamp's deposition inserted follow-ing Tr. 28,632. TMIA there portrays Dieckamp as evidencing a degree of glibness when it states "Dieckamp claimed that 'sig-nificant core damage' meant little more than ' cracked fuel....'" TMIA PF 228. The context of this quoted portion does not support that attitude by Dieckamp. Further, Dieckamp supports the relevance of his interpretation of what he meant by core damage as being " consistent with the radiation observa-tions." Id. TMIA, to bolster its argument that Dieckamp had reason to know of significant core damage the morning of March 29th, cites page 27 of JME 1(c)(84) (Arnold) for the proposi-tion that "[ijt appears that Dieckamp was informed by Arnold on the morning of March 29 that HPI had been throttled the previ-ous day." TMIA PF 228 n.24. TMIA would have the Board believe that Arnold had actual knowledge that HPI (high pressure injec-tion) was throttled and so informed Dieckamp. However, in the same exchange with the interviewer on the very next page after that cited by TMIA, Arnold states just the opposite:

I don't think it was a case of where we knew high pressure injection had been cur-l tailed and therefore concluded that fuel damage had occurred, but we had other l

a -

1 I

evidence that there was fuel damage and that without having had curtailment of high .

pressure injection tha't would seem to us to be very surprising.

JME 1(c)(84), at 28 (Arnold). Arnold and Dieckamp were appar-ently merely theorizing as an explanation of the known, high radiation levels, that if the ECCS had functioned correctly HPI must have been throttled. TMIA's contrary characterization of this evidence is flatly wrong.

REPLY 51. In TMIA's attempt to establish Dieckamp was aware of the hydrogen burn it sets forth two scenarios -- the evolution of Richard Wilson's appreciation of core damage lead-

ing to statements which Wilson made during a meeting in the af-i ternoon of March 29th (TMIA PF 228-231), and the background for a memorandum from GPUSC vice president, Bud Cherry, to Mr.

Dieckamp, dated March 29, 1979 (TMIA PE 232-235). TMIA's sce-narios do not withstand cerutiny.

REPLY 52. Wilson has no recollection today as to what he specifically stated at the meeting regarding core status.

Wilson, ff Tr. 31,504. However he does recall the sources of his information at that time and explained what they would have meant to him in terms of core damage. Wilson recalls that the latest information available to him was derived at a Congres-sional briefing conducted at the TMI observation Center on March 29th, where he heard accounts of radiation levels. This information, together with general information he obtained the prior day from telephone conversations with the plant and with 9

t-l i

Arnold formed the bases for his knowledge at the time of the 29th meeting. Tr. 31,519-20 (Wilson). Arnold did not give Wilson his assessment of the degree of core damage or fuel failure on March 28th; there were " simply general discussions

throughout the day of the 28th about the accident at TMI." Tr.

31,513-14 (Wilson). See also Tr. 31,516-19, 31,521-22 (Wilson). During the morning of March 29th, Wilson recalls briefly discussing with Dieckamp his assignment to head up a i

Task Force but Wilson does not recall any assessment by Dieckamp of the degree of core damage or fuel failure. Tr.

31,514-15 (Wilson).

! REPLY 53. Wilson testified that on March 28th and 29th he believed core damage to mean "something considerably above and beyond what was normal for operating reactors or reactors which had suffered some fuel pin damage...." Tr. 31,531 (Wilson).

Further he stated " core damage can occur in discrete intervals from one pin all the way up to the totality [all the fuel pins]." Tr. 31,532 (Wilson). In response to Judge Wolfe's and Judge Smith's questions, Wilson testified (Tr. 31,538-40):

THE WITNESS: I don't have an absolute or clear recollec-tion of my exact words on anything that af-ternoon, but my understanding today and what I think transpired at that meeting would be that I had no basis to make such a statement, but would have had a technical feeling that a substantial number of fuel rods, fuel elements had breached their cladding integrity. And if somebody would

, interpret that as core loss or interpret it some other way, I just couldn't say.

JUDGE WOLFE: And the radiation levels were not high enough on that date to indicate to you that there had been core damage?

- - . .. ~ _ _ _ - _ - - _

l THE WITNESS: Oh, the radiation levels on the 29th were clearly high enough to indicate fuel pins, large numbers of fuel pins of the core had

~ breached their integrity.

JUDGE WOLFE: But not to the e:ttent to indicate that the core was lost?

i l

. _THE WITNESS: I don't think I would have come to the con-I clusion that the core was lost at that  ;

time, and my recollection of even a number of days after that meeting when the under-standing had continued to develop was still e not that the core was lost.

JUDGE. SMITH: Mr. Wilson, if you had, as you perceived it

-to be, a substantial number of failed fuel I- pins, could that be an indication of two it things > and I want an either/or of them. ,

I One is that the plant would not be operated f

. for a substantial amount of time? Answer '

that.

l THE WITNESS: Yes, given the fact that the extent of the radiation problem that was described about the plant, clearly the plant would not be operative for an extended period of time.

l JUDGE SMITH: And would that amount of failed fuel sug-gest the possibility that all of the fuel pins were lost, economically lost I mean, lost as far as their economic value or >

their ability to be used in the core?

THE WITNESS: .I am speculating now, but my personal opin-ion would be that that determination could not be made until one looked at the thermal l and other transients of the core and tried to assess whether just simple things like overtemperature or hydraulic problems would cause you to conclude that a fuel element which might even look like it had its in- 4 tegrity could reasonably be reused.

So I don't think you could come to that conclusion without a great deal of analysis and possibly even investigation of the fuel. i-JUDGE SMITH: At least you held no such concept or ap-praisal in your mind at the March 29th meeting?

l. -

i l i L i

THE WITNESS: I don't believe so, no.

REPLY 54. The Board believes Wilson did form his opinion on.the extent of core damage from the sources he stated, and not from Dieckamp or Arnold based upon information from the GPUSC engineers provide'd to corporate headquarters in New

' Jersey as TMIA proposes. (See LIC REPLY 49, supra, where we found that.Broughton did not provide the information to head-quarters until. March 30th.) We'further find in any event that Wilson's understanding of core status does not impute back to Dieckamp an awareness that.a hydrogen burn had occurred or that

-TMI-2 had suffered serious core damage. See TMIA PF 231.

REPLY 55. TMIA's reliance on the content of the March 29th Bud Cherry memorandum is similarly flawed. The memorandum centers on communications generally following the initiation of the accident at TMI-2. TMIA Mailgram Exh. 5 (Cherry memoran-dum). It, however, is not of probative evidentiary value to support a conclusion that Dieckamp had been informed on March 28th of the high incore temperature readings and the hydrogen burn which would lead tc.a correct assessment that TMI-2 had suffered serious core damage, as proposed by TMIA. TMIA PF 235. As stated earlier (LIC REPLY 28, 49, supra), we find that Dieckamp did not receive this information on March 28th. The

• memorandum contains no mention of plant conditions which may have concerned Cherry, except for radiation levels. Cherry s' imply wanted to avoid a perpetuation of the weaknesses in communcations he perceived on the initial day of the accident

from going unaddressed for future events -- "to improve our ability to react. . . ." TMIA Mailgram Exh. 5, at 1 (Cherry memorandum).

REPLY 56. We find no support in the Cherry memorandum for l the proposition that Diechamp understood by the morning of March 29th that TMI-2 had suffered serious core damage much less that it demonstrates his awareness of the hydrogen burn.

II.A. What Evidence Existed on May 9, 1979, and What Conclusions Should Have Been Drawn From That Evidence, as to Whether Anyone Interpreted the Pressure Spike or Initiation of Containment Spray in Terms of Core Damage at the Time the Spike Occurred on March 28, 1979, or Withheld any Such Information?23/

l (Response to TMIA PF 304-309)

REPLY 57. TMIA points to two statements -- the sole body l

of what TMIA claims to be "some evidence" in existence prior to the mailgram -- as indicating someone had interpreted the pres-sure spike in terms of core damage. These statements are a March 29, 1979 chronology of Hugh McGovern (JME 1(c)(1)) and an April 6, 1979 interview of Craig Faust (JME 1(c)(8)). TMIA PF 304-309.

REPLY 58. The McGovern-dictated chronology and the April 6, 1979 Faust interview are discussed in Licensee's Proposed Findings. See LIC PF 35-43. Neither of the statements 23/ The Reply Findings in this section are intended to follow LIC PF 52 in Licensee's proposed findings of January 28, 1985.

L l

l L. _

mentions hydrogen; neither mentions core damage. Neither evi-dences an understanding of the pressure spike. In contrast, in-a'May 4, 1979. interview.. conducted by Licensee, McGovern stated "At the time we thought the spike on the recorder was an elec-trical spike and not an actual pressure spike." JME 1(c)(21),

at 8. Faust, on the other hand, did not provide prior to May 9 a clear explanation of his understanding of the spike at the time i.t occurred.24/ However, the most that could be inferred from Faust's pre-mailgram interview is that he suspected the spike.vas caused by water flashing to steam and entering con-tainment via the drain tank during an attempt to draw a bubble.

See JME 1(c)(2), at 11 (Faust).

REPLY 59. TMIA argues, without support, that the only plausible explanation for the pressure spike was a hydrogen ex-plosion. TMIA PF 307. .TMIA continues that since these state-ments indicate awareness of a pressure increase, they must also evidence recognition of the pressure spike as a hydrogen explo-sion. TMIA PF 307, 309.

REPLY 60. The Board cannot accept such a syllogism. It assumes that both McGovern and Faust analyzed the pressure spike. TMIA does not show that either did;'and given the cir-cumstances under which they were operating on the 28th, the Board cannot assume they had the opportunity. Second, it 24/ Faust's post-mailgram statements indicate that he too be-lieved the spike was caused by an instrument malfunction. LIC PF

.43.

l l

assumes that they'had a' degree of knowledge-that would preclude

_.. a wrong conclusion. This too TMIA does not show. In fact, the evidence demonstrates that operators were not trained to expect

' -- even to suspect -- hydrogen produced by a zirconium-water reaction. See LIC REPLY 67, 183, infra. Accordingly, the Board takes the' statements of these individuals as evidence of no more than they state -- that they were aware of a pressure i

spike. The Board therefore finds that no evidence existed on f

l or before May 9, 1979, that anyone interpreted the pressure -

spike or-spray actuation in terms of core damage.

III.B. 'Whether Subsequent Statements By Anyone, Including Interviews and Testimony of l Messrs..Chwastyk, Mehler and Illjes, Justify l the Conclusion That One or More Individuals >

l at the Time the Spike occurred on March 28,

! 1979, in Fact Interpreted the Pressure Spik -

l or Initiation of Containment Spray in Terms of Core Damage?25/

l (Response to TMIA PF 15-169) l REPLY 61. TMIA asserts that the Dieckamp mailgram contained false information because control room operators and management understood the significance of the spike at the time it occurred. In support of thin assertion,.TMIA argues (1) that there was a general knowledge of the pressure spike and [

-related events by TMI personnel (TMIA PF 21-25); (2) that the

. pressure spike was correctly interpreted by Joseph Chwastyk and e

25/ The Reply Findings in this section are intended to follow LIC PF 119 in Licensee's proposed findings of-January 28, 1985.

l

?

l  ! h 1

i

e

r -

Brian Mehler (TMIA PF 26-70); (3) that the pressure spike was

~

understood by Gary Miller and John Herbein (TMIA PF 71-101);

(4) that the occurrence of the pressure spike and a hydrogen burn was common knowledge among site personnel on March 28th (TMIA PF 102-136); and, (5) that GPUSC engineers were awari of the pressure spike and hydrogen burn on March 28th and early March 29th (TMIA PF 137-167). But as discussed in Licensee's and Staff's proposed findings and as elaborated upon below, all of the persons to whom TMIA refers, with the exception of l Chwastyk, have stated that.they did not interpret the pressure spike in terms of core damage on March 28, 1979; and with re-l l spect to Chwastyk, the Board finds his present recollection unccrroborated and colored by post-accident learnings.

Awareness of Pressure Spike REPLY 62. TMIA's first argument, that there was a general awareness of the pressure spike and related events by TMI per-sonnel (TMIA PF 15-25), is by itself irrelevant. Dieckamp has never denied that some individuals were aware of the pressure spike. What is at issue is whether anyone interpreted the pressure spike in terms of core damage. Perhaps to overcome this infirmity in its argument, TMIA claims there was also gen-eral awareness of certain plant conditions (TMIA PF 16, 18-19,

26) -- presumably to imply that those aware of the pressure spike must have been aware of its significance. TMIA's pro-posed findings, however, contain inaccuracies and exaggerations, and do not support such inference.

REPLY 63. TMIA correctly states that at the time of the spike, some individuals heard a thud; but TMIA continues: "one person in the control room described it as ' shock waves'."

TMIA PF 17. This proposed finding suggests that the individual (Craig Faust) heard the thud and described it as a shock wave, when in fact in the very interview which TMIA cites, Faust stated he did not hear the thud. JME 1(c)(8), at 5 (Faust).

Rather, Faust's reference to shock waves appears to be a post hoc description of the shape of the spike on the reactor build-ing pressure recorder strip chart. Id.

REPLY 64. In TMIA PF 21, TMIA lists fifteen individuals in addition to Faust who it claims were aware of one or more of the indications of the pressure spike. However, two of these individuals -- NRC Inspector Higgins and George Kunder -- stat-ed quite clearly that they were not aware of any indications of the pressure spike on the 28th. JME 1(c)(37), at 50, 52 (Kunder); JME 1(c)(72), at 25 (Kunder); JME 1(c)(19), at 24 (Higgins). Another, Michael Benscn, stated he did not know on what day he learned of the spike. JME 1(c)(126), at 4-11.

Three of the individuals -- Gary Miller, Joseph Logan, and Leland Rogers -- indicated that they only heard a thud and were aware of no more; moreover, these three individuals did not characterize'the noise as "an explosive sound caused by the hy-drogen burn," as TMIA characterizes it.26/ With respect to the 26/ LIC PF 45; JME 1(c)(23), Tapes 159-160, at 70-71 (Miller).

l lIC PF 108 (Rogers). LIC PF 52,109 (Logan). These individuals (Continued Mext Page) nine remaining individuals listed, not one stated he inter-preted the pressure spike or any of its indications in terms of circonium-water reaction or core damage.27/

REPLY 65. In total, TMIA identified some 30 individuals (accounting for redundancy by TMIA) who were aware of any indi-cation of the spike (e.g. even just hearing a noise), although Licensee identified over 450 individuals who were related in some manner to the TMI-2 accident and surveyed them as to their knowledge of the sp*ike. TMIA PF 21-23. The Board does not accept TMIA's characterization of this awareness as " general knowledge," particularly since NRC inspectors (Higgins and Neely) and several other individuals (e.g., Rogers and Logan) present in the control room stated that they too were unaware of the pressure spike. See LIC PF 113. As do all the parties, the Board recognizes that some people were aware of indications of the pressure spike, but will not impute such awareness to individuals who have stated they were not.28/

(Continued) indicated the thud was attributed to the closing of ventilation dampers. See LIC REPLY 109, infra.

27/ LIC PF 45; JME 1(c)(113), at 2-12 (Berry). LIC PF 46; JME 1(c)(109), at 38-4I (Flint). LIC PF 114 (Frederick). LIC PF 116!

(Marshall). LIC PF 37-38 (McGovern). LIC PF 115 (A. Miller). .

LIC PF 118 (Ross). JME 1(c)(134), at 3-13 (Scheimann). LIC PF 51, 114 (Wright).

28/ TMIA asserts "there is also evidence that knowledge of the spike may have reached corporate headquarters in Parsippany, New Jersey, on March 28, although the individual who has so testified (Continued Next Page)

REPLY.66; TMIA asserts that at the time of the pressure l-spike operating personnel were also aware of incore tempera-tures in the range of 2500*F indicating the =irconium cladding was reacting with stsam to produce significant amounts of hy-

-drogen. TMIA PF 18. .TMIA cites the (Modified] Stipulation of Parties on Mailgram Evidence and an August 1979 interview of John Herbein (JME 1(c)(67)) in support of this assertion. Nei-ther is' supportive. Licensee did not stipulate that operating personnel were aware of 2500 F incore temperatures. See Modified Stipulation of Parties on Mailgram Evidence, JME 1(A),

ff Tr. 27,896, at 9. Nor does the Herbein statement cited by TMIA support its position. See JME 1(c)(67), at 39, which TMIA cites. In fact, as the record reveals, relatively few op-erating personnel were aware of incore thermocouple readings in l

the range of 2500*F and those who were aware of such readings largely discounted them as erratic and unreliable.29/

(Continued) attempts in the same interview to deny knowledge." TMIA PF 24.

TMIA cites the NRC I&E interview of Donald Croneberger. In that interview, however, Croneberger stated only that Parsippany was-asked when containment isolation would occur and what would be the significance. JME 1(c)(41), at 12-13. Croneberger specifically stated he did not recall the pressure spike being discussed. Id.,

at 14. TMIA's assertion is misleading.

29/ Incore thermocouple readings that were taken on the 28th are discussed at LIC REPLY 123-131, infra. TMIA makes no attempt to correlate those operating personnel aware of the pressure spike with those aware of high incore thermocouple readings. The testi-l mony of the principal persons who TMIA claims understood t,he spike, however, clearly indicates that they either did not know of L (Continued Next Page) i I

44

r REPLY 67. TMIA also asserts that expert witnesses testified that flammable hydrogen is enly reached when hydrogen reaches a volume of four percent of total containment, and this amount could only be produced within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> through a circon-ium-water reaction.30/ TMIA PF 18. The implication is that a massive circonium-water reaction was therefore the only and ob-vious explanation for the spike. It ignorea other explanations for a pressure signal, such as an erroneous signal or a steam (Continued) .

the readings or were told and believed the readings were unreliable. Thus, Mehler has stated that he was not aware of incore thermocouple readings on the 28th. JME 1(c)(89), at 11.

Chwastyk knew readings had been taken, but did not know specific temperatures and understood the readings to be unreliable. JME 1(c)(88), at 16; JME 1(c)(117), at 88.

TMIA again claims in TMIA PF 26 n.5 that incore temperatures were considered accurate and believed to be an indicator of core temperatures and possible core uncovery. In addition to Miller, whose belief is discussed at LIC REPLY 123, 126, 133, infra, TMIA refers to John Flint, William Zewe and three of the instrumentmen who on the morning of the 28th manually took incore thermocouple readings. Elint, however, was unaware that readings had been man-ually taken; he monitored only those readings that were printed out on the computer printout -- readings that printed out as "???"

temperatures in excess of 700 F. JME 1(c)(56), at 25-26, 34-36.

Zewe was also unaware of readings that had been manually taken.

JME 1(c)(75), at 100. And while some of the instrumentmen may have believed the manual readings they took were accurate, it ap-pears that they did not communicate their concerns to operating personnel; they were evacuated offsite shortly after the readings were taken,.along with other nonessential personnel. See LIC REPLY 123 n.50, infra, and citations therein.

TMIA also asserts in TMIA PF 26 n.5 that concern over core damage and high incore temperatures reached corporate headquarters in Parsippany. TMIA's citations JME 1(c)(94), at 6 and JME l 1(c)(74), at 37-38, simply do not support this assertion.

30/ In addition to testimony, TMIA cites JME 1(c)(6), at 195 to support the proposition. This citation, however, is nonsup-portive. ,

l _- . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _

excursion.31/ While it is apparent in retroopect that such other explanations could be ruled out through investigation and analysis (and indeed have been since the accident), it is equally apparent that a hydrogen burn was not intuitive to op-erators at the time. The operators were simply not trained to anticipate the occurrence of a circonium-water reaction. Tr.

29,853-55 (Moseley);.Tr. 30,069-70 (Kunder); Tr. 28,540-41 (Zebroski); JME 1(c)(124), at 51 (Ross); JME 1(c)(75), at 258-59 (Zewe).

REPLY 68. TMIA baldly asserts that operator awareness of incore thermocouple temperatures led them to a correct analysis of the reactor condition and a correct analysis of the pressure spike as a hydrogen burn at the time it occurred. TMIA PF 19.

TMIA's lone citation, "See also, JME 1(c)(4), at-59-68, 73-74, 130," is nonsupportive. TMIA does not indicate which operators it claims were aware of both high incore. thermocouple tempera-tures'and the pressure spike -- operators who supposedi.y might

'have interpreted the pressure spike correctly as a result. See LIC REPLY 66 n.27, supra. The Board rejects.TMIA's conjecture.

REPLY 69. TMIA also claims that " core uncovery and cig-nificant core damage was a major concern" early in the acci-dent. TMIA PF 26. TMIA claims that this concern provides the 31/ It also ignores the possibility of hydrogen from other sources (e.g., leaking from gas cylinders)~or the possibility of a localized burn. See Zebroski, ff Tr. 28,441, at 7; Tr. 28,538-40 (Zebroski).

m.

.a . -

I

\

p context in.which to evaluate whether key people understood the pressure spike, and TMIA in its footnote 5 provides a string citation ostensibly to support its argument. TMIA's citations, however, do not evidence-the type of concern TMIA implies. The

' " concern" for: ". core uncovery" was largely a concern to ensure the core was and-remained covered, and not a recognition that the core was'in fact uncovered. The concern.was unfortunately allayed when attempts to flood the core suggested there had been little loss in inventory. JME 1(c)(87), at 35-38

- (Rogers); JME 1(c)(79), at 44 (Higgins); JME 1(c)(93), at 5-7, 10-12 (Miller); 7ME 1(c)(61),- at 21-23 (Herbein).  :

REPLY 70. TMIA's reference to concern for "significant-core damage" (TMIA PF 26) is similarly misleading. As is evi-r dent from.the citations, the core damage feared on the first day of the accident was the damage made evident by the high ra ,

'diation readings in conpainment -- some amount of failed fuel.

It was this damage that was, by the standards of the time, per-e ceived as significant. JME 1(c)(61), at 16-18, 20 (Herbein);

JME 1(c)(72), at 17, JME 1(c)(37.), at 52 (Kunder); JME 1(c)(121), at 4-6 (Arnold); JME 1(c)(123), at 9-10 (Dieckamp).

REPLY 71. Ac'cordingly, the Board rejects TMIA's supposi-

. tion. Contrary to TMIA's claim and speculation, the Board does not find key personnel were primed to appreciate the signifi-l cance of the pressure spike.32/ In the same vein, while

! i L  !

l , 32/ TMIA claims control 1 room operators understood the pressure l spike and therefore changed the core cooling strategy. TMIA PF (Continued Next Page) l

,/  !

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recognizing some persons were aware of the pressure spike, the Board will not infer that the spike was interpreted in terms of core damage.

REPLY 72. Much later in its findings (in concluding para-graphs), TMIA raises another argument and suggests that state-ments supposedly made by operators on the morning of the 29th indicate they recognized the pressure spike as a hydrogen ex-plosion. TMIA PF 166-169. TMIA first asserts that site per-sonnel being debriefed in the Observation Center spoke of the hydrogen explosion; TMIA bases its assertion on a statement by Gary Broughton.33/ TMIA PF 168, citing JME 1(c)(48), at 19 (Broughton). The debriefings Broughton refers to in the inter-view which TMIA cites are debriefings conducted on the night of March 29th and morning of March 30th. JME 1(c)(48), at 18-19.34/ These debriefings were conducted b'y members of the

. Events Analysis and Recovery Team. JME 1(c)(50), at 11 (Abramovici); JME 1(c)(43), at 17 (Wilson). See also Lowe, ff (Centinued)

20. The finding is vague (identifying none of the operators to which it is purportedly referring), is conclusory, and is nct sup-ported by a single citation. With regard generally to re-pressurization, see LIC REPLY 99-105, infra.

33/ TMIA's entire argument is contained in one sentence which suggests the. weight it is accorded by TMIA.

34/ In TMIA PF 168 n.18, TMIA refers to statements discussing debriefings on the evening of March 28/ morning of March 29. The, reference to these early debriefings, which were not conducted by the Events Analysis and* Recovery Team and not referred to by Broughton, does nothing but obfascate Broughton's testimony.

Tr. 28,151, at 3. Moreover, Broughton did not state that "op-erators coming off-site for debriefing in the Observation Cen-ter spoke of the hydrogen explosion," as TMIA alleges. What Broughton said was that some of the people who had been con-ducting interviews during the night of the 29th had learned of a possible hydrogen explosion. JME 1(c)(48), at 19. This statement is hardly surprising, since the night of the 29th was when Lowe recognized the pressure spike as a hydrogen explosion and informed other Team members. Lowe, ff Tr. 28,151, at 7,

11. Broughton did state, however, "That was I believe, that came out of a discussion in an interview. I believe it also came out of some of the data which had been plotted up during the night." JME 1(c)(48), at 19. It is apparent from this very statement that Broughton did not know exactly what the source of the information was. The Board observes that two op-erator interviews from the night of the 29th/30th are in evi-dence. JME 1(c)(2) (Faust); JME 1(c)(3) (McGovern). The pres-sure spike was mentioned in one of these interviews, but it was not characterized as either an explosion or a hydrogen explo-sion. JME 1(c)(2), at 11 (Faust).

REPLY 73. TMIA next refers to a September 1980 NRC inter-view of William Zewe as support for its assertion that hydrogen was discussed on the morning of the 29th. TMIA PF 168, citing JME 1(c)(119), at 42-43.35/ The Board has reviewed Zewe's 35/ TMIA adds a string of citations not one of which provides support for the proposition that the pressure spike was correlated to hydrogen in the early morning of March 29th.

deposition. Zewe' stated that he did not believe the pressure spike.was real on the 28th. Zewe did recall some discussion of l hydrogen explosion on the 29th, but had considerable difficulty remembering the time or substance of any particular discussion.

He " guessed" that the discussion occurred on the morning of the 29th. JME 1(c)(119), at 42-43 (Zewe). .

REPLY 74. Although Zewe " guessed" the time of the discus-sion was.before noon on the 29th, he did recall Marshall, and perhaps Bensel, were participants. Id. Both these individuals i

were previously interviewed by the Special Inquiry Group.

Bensel stated he learned of the spike on the evening of the 29th. JME-1(c)(107), at 54 (Rogovin/Frampton Memorandum).

~ Marshall stated that his discussion of the pressure spike and

'hy'drogen-with Bensel and others occurred after 10 p.m. on the 29'th. Id., at 55, 61. It is apparent, therefore, that Zewe

. was mistaken or intended to refer to the morning hours of the 30th.

- Chwastyk's and Mehler's' Interpretation REPLY 75. TMIA argues at length that the Dieckamp mail-gram is inaccurate because Chwastyk and Mehler correctly inter-e l . preted the pressure spike. -TMIA PF 27-70. With respect to Mehler, this :Us indeed a remarkable assertion. Mehler has con-sistently indicated, :ba this proceeding and in_ past interviews, that he did not on March 28th recognize the pressure spike as a hydrogen explosion. See LIC PF 79-89. TMIA in.effect proposes t

,1%. .

that the Board ignore the direct testimony of this witness and

'instead accept TMIA's unsupported surmise. We refuse to do so.

. REPLY 76. Chwastyk's testimony in this proceeding and in past statements, on the other hand, is evolutionary and not consistent, and reasonable men could indeed find support for differing conclusions. On balance the Board concludes that Chwastyk. did not interpret the pressure spike in terms of core damage at the time of the spike. See LIC PF 59-78. Moreover, the Board notes at the outset that TMIA points to no evidence 1979 (the date when the mail-in existence on or before May 9, gram was sent) to indicate Chwastyk understood the significance

'of the pressure spike. Chwastyk's statements cannot, there-

~ fore, make Dieckamp's mailgram inaccurate when sent.

~ REPLY 77, TMIA describes-Mehler and Chwastyk's conclu-sions concerning core or fuel damage on the morning of the 28th. TMIA PF 27-28. As did everybody else who was aware of the radiation alarms, Mehler and Chwastyk recognized that there .

'had been some fuel damage. However, with respect to Mehler, TMIA states:by reference to a prior interview that he " deter-mined that perhaps one-third of the core had been uncovered."

TMIA PF~27, Mehler himself characterized his statement not as evidencing a conclusion that one-third of the core had been uncovered, but rather as a guess, a possibility he considerad prior to core flood. Tr. 29,432 (Mehler).

REPLY 78. TMIA states that Chwastyk. directed operations and. reported directly to Station Manager Gary Miller. TMIA PF

29. TMIA cites Tr. 29,118 (Chwastyk). This statement is inac-curate. Chwastyk at the very page cited by TMIA stated that it i

was not a direct reporting line. Chwastyk in fact reported to Michael Ross, who Miller had placed in charge of operations to direct the shift supervisor. JME 1(c)(10), at 2 (Miller et al.). See also JME 1(c)(95), at 25 (Miller).

REPLY 79. After describing the observation of the pres-sure spike by Mehler and Chwastyk (TMIA PF 31-32), TMIA di-gresses and refers to statements by Walter Marshall and Hugh McGovern. TMIA PF 33-34. .Neither Marshall nor McGovern gives any indication that Chwastyk or Mehler correctly interpreted the pressure spike. Both stated the spike was attributed to an instrument problem. See LIC PF 37-38, 116.36/

REPLY 80. TMIA also states that the steam generator and reactor coolant pressure indicators indicated a coincident but inverted pressure spike. TMIA PF 35. Viewed after the fact the reactor coolant pressure recorder strip chart does indicate an inverted spike, but there is no indication that anyone in the control room appreciated this at the time as substantiation of the containment pressure spike. On the other hand, the graphs of steam generator pressure to which TMIA refers in JME 36/ Marshall's statement regarding Miller's awareness of the spike is irrelevant to TMIA's argument that Chwastyk or Mehler correctly interpreted the pressure spike. Marshall's statement is addressed in the discussion of Miller's awareness below. See LIC REPLY 116, infra. Similarly,'Mehler's impression of Miller's awareness of the spike, which TMIA discussed at TMIA PF 36, is addressed at LIC REPLY 115, infra.

1 1(c)(63) are derived from reactimeter data plotted after the accident. See JME 1(c)(63), App. TH, Figures TH4-TH7 (NSAC Re-port) (which state reactimeter channel at the bottom of each plot). See also JME 1(c)(63), App. PDS, at 1-3 (NSAC Report)

(explaining the react 1 meter and its channels). Chwastyk, whom TMIA questioned 'on the steam generator pressures, testified that he remembered an instantaneous steam generator pressure indicator, but could not recall there being a steam generator pressure c art. Tr. 29,407 (Chwastyk). As JME 1(c)(63), App.

PDS, at 5-6 (MSAC Report) demonstrates, no such strip chart ex-isted.

REPLY 81. TMIA correctly states that Chwastyk and Mehler discussed the pressure spike (TMIA PF 37), but' incorrectly sug-

-gests by the order of its proposed findings that the conversa-

tion occurred before the spray pumps had been secured.37/

See TMIA PF 37-39. Chwastyk clearly stated that he discussed the pressure spike with Mehler after the spray pumps.had been se-cured (i.e. six or more minutes after the pressure spike). Tr.

29,338 (Chwastyk). See also JME 1(c)(117), at 9-10. This con-versation lasted perhaps one or two minutes. See Tr. 29,338 (Chwastyk).

-REPLY 82. TMIA then recounts how Chwastyk ordered certain checks to verify containment integrity. TMIA PF 39. This fact J

. 37/ The sequence of events and conversations with Chwastyk is im-portant in evaluating Miller's knowledge of the spike on the 28th.

See LIC REPLY 185 n.39, infra.

does not indicate that Chwastyk believed the pressure spike to

'ndicate i a hydrogen explosion. It merely indicates Chwastyk perceived the pressure spike might reflect a real pressure in-crease. In fact, Chwastyk has previously stated that he or-

. dered a containment check out of a concern that the pressure increase and-decrease was caused by a steam leak followed by breach of containment. JME 1(c)(ll7), at 33. Chwastyk testified that he ordered valve positions checked and asked for an external check of containment (a visual inspection).33/ Tr.

29,127 (Chwastyk). Mehler.only confirmed that valves and piping were checked. Tr. 29,486 (Mehler).

REPLY 83. TMIA next refers to a radiation check that was logged as being conducted shortly after the pressure spike and

. cites ~a June 12, 1979 statement by Leland Rogers to suggest-this radiation check was conducted in response to the pressure spike. :TMIA PF 40. This suggestion is incorrect. Rogers did not' state that a radiation check was conducted in response to

. the pressure spike. The relevant-log entry is-one of many 33/ Chwastyk previously stated that he asked for "an inspection" of containment; he could not recall who he asked to perform the inspection, but stated it was not a health physics or radiatien control: person. JME 1(c)(117), at 34. Chwastyk could not recall who he asked to-perform an external check of containment. Nobody has ever_ corroborated Chwastyk's statement that such a check was ordered or performed. See, e.g., JME 1(c)(122), at 122-123 (Mill-

'er); JME'1(c)(124), at 48-49 (Ross); JME 1(c)(126), at 11-12

- (Benson); JME 1(c)(133), at lO (Faust); JME 1(c)(134), at 5-7 (Scheimann); ,JME 1(c)(136), at 54-55 (Logan); and JME 1(c)(137),

at 11-12-(A. Miller). -Chwastyk himself could not remember receiving any results. Tr. 29,129, 29,187 (Chwastyk); JME 1(c)(117), at-35-36.

1

m recorded radiation checks in the vicinity of TMI and states

" West, at security fence, around Unit 2 reactor building." Tr.

31,342 (Mulle~avy) (reading TMIA Mailgram Exh. 32B (Log of Ra-diological Checks)). Rogers in the June 12, 1979 statement in-ldicated that monitoring team reports led to the conclusion that containment;had not been breached by the pressure spike. JME 1(c)(51), at.22.~ However, as Rogers stated in a cover sheet accompanying the June 12, 1979 statement, the information and conclusion in his statement was based in part on post trip re-view of data and interviews. Mor'eover, in a September 2, 1980 NRC interview, Rogers stated that this very conclusion in his June 1979 statement was one he made in reviewing data during the days succeeding the accident. It was not a conclusion drawn on the 28th; Rogers was aware of no concern for contain-ment' integrity on the day of the accident. JME 1(c)(110), at 31-35. The~ log entry to which TMIA referred is'probably the one noted by' Rogers in his post accident review and on which:he based his conclusion -- after the> fact -- that containment had not.been breached. TMIA's argument is simply a bootstrap.

REPLY 84. TMIA next states "[s]ome individuals in'the control room recall an explosion at or near the-time of the spike." TMIA PF 41. TMIA, however, refers to the statements

.of'only'one' individual -- Craig Faust -- who stated ten days -

after the accident that they probably had some sort of explo-sion. See LIC PF 39. TMIA does not explain the relevance of L

this statement to Mehler's or Chwastyk's interpretation of the t

pressure spike. Perhaps TMIA is attempting to tie this state-ment to Chwastyk's recollection that his understanding of the j

. pressure spike was triggered by someone mentioning having heard

a noise. Tr ~ 29,319 (Chwastyk); JME 1(c)(99), at 10 (Chwastyk). Faust, however, stated he did not hear any noise.

LIC REPLY 63, supra.

-REPLY 85. TMIA proceeds to recount Chwastyk's purported conversation with Gary Miller. TMIA PF 42. TMIA states that this conversation occurred "[w}ithin minutes after the spike."

Chwastyk, however, indicates that the conversation occurred several. minutes after the spray pumps had been secured (i.e.,

eight to ten minutes after the spike). Tr. 29,338-40 (Chwastyk).39/. TMIA also exaggerates the testimony of Chwastyk which it cites. In the testimony cited by TMIA (Tr. 29,131-32)

(Chwastyk), Chwastyk stated that he impressed on Miller that he thought they had "a real pressure increase." He did not testi-fy that he told Miller of a loud noise that had been reported to him, and he testified only that he " believes" but l's not certain that he told Miller the pressure increase coincide'd with the cycling of the EMOV. Tr. 29,131-32 (Chwastyk). He did not recall mentioning hydrogen or hydrogen explocion. Tr.

29,141,.29,154, 29,280-81, 29,350-51, 29,358 (Chwastyk). These

. statements do not evidence an understanding that a hydrogen 39/- The timing is important; Miller must literally have been on his way out the door to brief the Lieutenant Governor. See LIC PF 70.

-$6-2-. _

r-

explosion had just occurred and was due to a. zirconium-water reaction.40/

REPLY 86. TMIA suggests that Mehler may have discussed hydrogen with Chwastyk. TMIA PF 45. This assertion contra-dicts the direct testimony of both Mehler and Chwastyk. LIC PF

67. See also LIC PF 84 n.17.

~

REPLY 87. TMIA refers to Mehler's October 11, 1979 state-ment, in which Mehler speculated that someone on the 28th must have connected the pressure spike with the opening of the EMOV because an instruction was.given not to start electrical equip-ment. TMIA PF 46, citing JME 1(c)(89), at 15. Mehler, how-ever, subsequently retracted his statement and he today states

'the instruction could have been given on March 29th. Tr.

29,503, 29,520-22, 29,574-78 (Mehler). See LIC PF 86-93.

Moreover, Mehler stated that his belief that the instruction was given to avoid a hydrogen ignition was merely an inference he subsequently drew. Tr. 29,510-12 (Mehler).

REPLY 88. TMIA suggests that Mehler changed his statement about the timing of the instruction after an article concerning his testimony was published in the New York Times. TMIA PF 47.

However, Mehler was shown the article to which TMIA referred (TMIA-Mailgram Exh. 17) and-stated that he had never before seen it. Tr. 29,516 (Mehler). Mehler did admit becoming 40/ With regard to Miller's understanding, TMIA PF 42-44 are dis-cussed at LIC REPLY 111-114, infra.

concerned about the accuracy of his testimony following news accounts (Tr. 29,518-19 (Mehler)), but stated that his change in recollection was due to his having thought about the matter, reviewed logs, and explored the issue with co-workers. See LIC PF-86-88.

REPLY 89. TMIA argues that Mehler connects the instruc-tion with his operating lift and backstop pumps, and that he can now only specifically recall starting these pumps on the 2 8 th'. TMIA PF 48. The record clearly establishes, however, that these pumps were started on both the 29th and the 30th, when Mehler was also on duty. See LIC PF 86, 91. Mehler in fact identified a log entry at 9:14 p.m. on March 29, which stated: "Placed RCP Lif t Pumps in off -(minimize sparking potential in RB)." Tr. 29,530-33, 29,574 (Mehler). See TMIA Mailgram Exh. 16, at 4. This entry indicated to.Mehler that the-lift pumps had been started in case it were necessary to start another reactor coolant pump. Tr. 29,531-33 (Mehler).

Mehler acknowledged that this could have been the event tliat occasioned the remarks he remembered, tho' ugh he is not certain.

Tr. 29,578 (Mehler).

REPLY 90. TMIA attempts to bolster Mehler's October 11, 1979 statement that an instruction not to start' equipment was

.given on March 28th, by referring to two interviews of Theodore

-Illjes. TMIA PF 49. TMIA asserts that Illjes recalled a dis-cussion on the 28th in which the cycling of the EMOV was corre-lated with the spike. TMIA's citation, however, does not

support this claim.41/ Illjes stated that he could not state that correlation of the spike with the EMOV was discussed on the 28th. JME 1(c)(36), at 9-10.

REPLY 91. TMIA also attempts to bolster Mehler's re-tracted statement by referring to'Chsastyk's present testimony and past statements. TMIA PF 50. These statements, however, are fatally contradictory. Chwastyk'was first asked in an October 30, 1979 NRC Special Inquiry Group (SIG) deposition if he remembered an instruction not to operate electrical equip-ment. He replied he did not believe such an instruction had been given on March 28th. JME 1(c)(99), at 15-16. He also told Mehler that'the instruction had been given on the 29th.

Tr. 29,567 (Mehler); JME 1(c)(98), at 15-16 (Mehler). See also

'JME 1(c)(117), at 36-40 (Chwastyk).

REPLY 92. When next questioned about the instruction, Chwastyk informed the NRC that he now remembered the instruc-tion being given on the 28th; and he recalled that when it was given he could have kicked himself for not having thought of it first. JME 1(c)(117), at 16.

REPLY 93. Today, Chwastyk remembers three separate in-structions on.the 28th'not to operate electrical equipment, the first of which he originated. Tr. 29,152, 29,154-55 (Chwastyk). -That Chwastyk originated this instruction is 41/ In JME 1(c)(12[7]), which TMIA miscites, the interviewer --

not Illjes -- states the spike was correlated with the EMOV. JME

-1(c)(127), at 4.

T

f implausible, given his first recollection occurred six years n hence and his prior statement that he could have kicked himself .

for not thinking to give such an instruction. ,

REPLY 94. Choosing between a number of possible combina-7 tions, TMIA stresses a consistency between Chwastyk's present ..

TMIA PF h recollection and Mehler's October 11, 1979 statement.  ;

51. TMIA ignores, however, the inconsistency in other combina-tions of their testimonies and as well the internal contradic-tion between Chwastyk's present testimony and his 1979 deposi-

. tion testimony. It is quite plausible that Chwastyk's recollection was at some point unconsciously affected by review of post accident documents, in this instance Mehler's prior statement -- a trend the Board has perceived elsewhere in Chwastyk's various statements and testimony.

REPLY 95. TMIA states that others have testified "that an instruction was given after acknowledgment of the hydrogen

-burn." and cites statements by Zewe and Ross (JME 1(c)(119) and TMIA PF 52. However, the state-JME 1(c)(124) respectively).

ments of both these individuals indicate the instruction was-not given on the 28th, but rather on the 29th or 30th. JME 1(c)(119), at 46 (Zewe); JME 1(c)(124), at 66 (Ross). In the same vein,_ eleven other individuals who were present in the control room, including two NRC inspectors, recalled no such instruction on the 28th. See LIC PF 92.

REPLY 96. Finally, after some forty related proposed findings advocating the adoption of conjecture and surmise and ignoring or rejecting direct, persuasive testimony and evi- ,

.'b 9

'dence, TMIA finally states the gravamen of its case -- that Chwastyk testified that he understood the pressure spike to be .

caused by a hydrogen burn and that the hydrogen had been pro-duced by a zirconium-water reaction. TMIA PF 53. TMIA claims that the process by which Chwastyk supposedly reached these conclusions was " credibly explained" and that Chwastyk was

" trained on the zirconium-water reaction at TMI and perhaps in the Nuclear Navy." Id.

REPLY 97. Chwastyk explained he used a process of elimi-nation in reaching his conclusion. Tr. 29,374-76 (Chwastyk).

But according to Chwastyk, after going through this thought process, he "really didn't know." Tr. 29,377 (Chwastyk). With respect to his training, Chwastyk could not remember if he had Tr.

had training on hydrogen buildup under accident scenarios.

29,283 (Chwastyk). Nor did he know whether he had received training on the zirconium-water reaction while he was in the Navy. Tr. 29,310 (Chwastyk). As the testimony of other indi-viduals in this proceeding makes clear, Chwastyk's training which was similar to others' (See Tr. 29,310 (Chwastyk)) would not have. led him to expect a zirconium-water reaction or rapid hydrogen buildup. See LIC REPLY 67, supra.

REPLY 98. Nor does the Board find Chwastyk's present rec-ollection particularly persuasive given the many inconsisten-cies and uncertainties in his prior statements. See LIC PF 59-

78. The Board is particularly convinced that Chwastyk's

h t not one of the peo- 'pf,t '

recollection is faulty given the fact t a

$,pi

q s ple with whom Chwastyk believes he discussed the significance n *b5 d .

l i st" of the pressure spike remembers Chwastyk mentioning a hy roge ,. yw cxplosion or discussing the significance of the pressure spike '$

See LIC PF 66-76. *llY in terms of core damage.  !;7 ~

TMIA'then attempts to bolster Chuastyk's testi- ~}

REPLY 99. t ';;

dicative mony by pointing to his attempt to draw a bubble as in TMIA PF 54-64. .,

of his interpretation of the pressure spike. e TMIA, however, ignores the fact that control room operators -

have stated in prior interviews that they were already at- '

d.

tempting to draw a bubble when the pressure spike occurre TMIA also apparently recognizes that drawing a bub-LIC PF 69.

ble was not an action particularly responsive to the pressure spike.

Indeed, Chwastyk himself has stated that he had sought JME parmission to draw a bubble prior to the pressure spike.

Accordingly, TMIA 1(c)(88), at 18; Tr. 29,322 (Chwastyk). uriza-tries very hard to equate drawing the bubble with repress Chwastyk, however, testified that drawing a bubble is tion.

Tr. 29,291 (Chwastyk).

not the same as repressurization. '

20-5:30 Chwastyk testified that repressurization occurred at 5:

Moreover, Chwastyk's prior state-p.m. Tr. 29,151 (Chwastyk). iven, ments indicate that when the order to repressurize was g he resisted increasing high pressure injection -- the action JME 1(c)(88), at 43, most responsive to the pressure spike.

47; JME 1(c)(35), at 26.

r

.. MW a7;'.$)

TMIA refers to the Nuclear Safety Analysis 6,3 REPLY 100. contrary to  :

C nter (NSAC) Report (JME 1(c)(63)) to suggest, .'5;ld

,C that repressurization occurred at 3:08 .' pl' Chwestyk's testimony, h,h The NSAC Report divides the accident into a _" N p.m. TMIA PF 57.

. v-y including what it calls a repressurization number of phases, s closed.

lj y ',ig phane commencing at 3:08 p.m. when the block as the valve report makeswa -

However, Sag JME 1(c)(63), App. TH, at 3. Id., at bitrary.

clear, the selection of phases is somewhat ar t the ,

2.

Furthermore,.the NSAC report quite plainly states thaat '-

t (i.e.,

reactor was repressurized 13-1/2 hours into the even initi- -

5:30 p.m.) when sustained high pressure injection was at 7. See also JME etzd. JME 1(c)(63), Summary Description, at 6 (stating that the primary system was 1(c)(63), App. TH,

-- 13:23 hours into the event --

repressurized at 5:23 p.m.

with the start of makeup pump MU-P-1C).

REPLY 101. TMIA also refers to an interview of Mehler to TMIA PF 58.

cuggest repressurization occurred refore 5:30 p.m. hler was However, in the interview to which TMIA refers, Me nded that asked when the decision to go solid was made and respo -

He then guessed that it was "between maybe 2 he did not know JME 1(c)(68), at 11. This statement casts no cnd 4 o' clock."

TMIA also states that in the doubt on the objective evidence.

that the primary concern of same interview Mehler " confirm [ed] ering from a site personnel after the pressure spike was recov TMIA PF 58. . What Mehler stated, however, was damaged core."

plant personnel were that at the time of the pressure spike, trying to recover from a damaged core; and because of this ef-fort, consideration of the pressure spike " fell by the way-side." JME 1(c)(68), at 11. He did not intimate that anyone interpreted the pressure spike as indicating a damaged core.

REPLY 102. TMIA also attempts to obfuscate the ti:ae at which repressurization occurred by referring to deposition testimony of Michael Ross. TMIA PF 62. It was Ross' recollec-tion that the think tank group had discussed repressurization and had decided to start a repressurization action when the order to repressurize was received from John Herbein. TMIA Mailgram Exh. 32J, at 22. Ross also clearly indicated, how-ever, that the think tank discussion of repressurization oc-curred after Gary Miller returned from the Lieutenant Gover-nor's briefing; Ross stated that Miller was part of the group discussing repressurization and was relaying information offsite when the order to repressurize was given. Id., at 22-24. Moreover, Ross clearly indicated that he could no longer remember the precise timing of these events and that he personally did not communicate with Herbein. Id., at 19.

REPLY 103. Ross' present recollection as to the timing of repressurization in no manner suggests that Chwastyk was at-tempting to repressurize the reactor coolant system earlier in the afternoon. Miller did not return to the site until about 4:00 p.m. or 4:30 p.m. (See LIC REPLY 39, supra), so any think tank discussion and decision regarding repressurization was made long after the closing of the block valve or purported Chwastyk attempt to draw a bubble. Furthermore, it is clear g that Ross did not know what Herbein had already told Miller be- I" fore and during the think tank discussion; but Ross did know that Herbein gave the order to repressurize, at which point the .

See TMIA Mailgram Exh. 32J, at 22, 25. See plant. staff did. .

c also JME 1(c)(81), at 39-41, 46-47 (Ross).

REPLY 104. TMIA claims that Dieckamp's testimony concern-ing repressurization is contrary to the evidence. TMIA PF 59- ,

61. TMIA's claim is incorrect, since it is quite apparent from objective evidence and testimony, including Chwastyk's own testimony, that drawing a bubble was not the same as repres-surization and that repressurization occurred at about 5:30 p.m. The actions of the plant staff do not indicate the adop-tion of or change in strategy in response to the pressure That Chwastyk may have attempted, unsuccessfully, to spike.

draw a bubble earlier in the afternoon -- a possibility not disputed -- is simply irrelevant.

REPLY 105. TMIA concludes that both Chwastyk and Mehler interpreted the pressure spike to indicate core damage. TMIA PF 65-67. With respect to Mehler, TMIA supports its claim by taking a statement in an early interview out of context (See LIC REPLY 101, supra), and ignores all of Mehler's statements and testimony to the contrary. With respect to Chwastyk, this Board cone'ludes he is simply mistaken in his present belief.

See LIC PF 59-78. TMIA states that Chwastyk testified that his immediate concern was to ensure the core was covered; but

ensuring core coverage was a concern held by many on the first [.

h day of the accident. Moreover, the Board finds that Chwastyk Y

did not seek.to repressurize the system; and when a decision to ,

I repressurize was made by other people, Chwastyk resisted the instruction.to increase HPI. One cannot reconcile these ac-tions with an un'derstanding of the pressure spike. 7 REPLY 106. - Nor does the Board agree with TMIA's claim that Chwastyk's account is corroborated by statements of .

Theodore Illjes and Charl es Mell. TMIA PF 68-70. Neither of

'these individuals has ever recalled being informed by Chwastyk of the occurrence of a hydrogen explosion. Both individuals stated that during a-turnover the afternoon of the 28th they were merely told there had been a pressure spike. See LIC PF See also LIC'PF 94-104.42/ It is, in fact, this con-72-73.

sistent lack of-corroboration which the Board finds most per-suasive in not-accepting Chwastyk's.present recollection.

Although.Chwastyk states that he told quite a few people of his conclusion, not one of those people recall any such concern ex-pressed by Chwastyk -- including Chwastyk's peers and subordi-nates and an NRC inspector. Given this lack of corroboration, 42/ TMIA also refers to statementsPlumlee's by NRC Inspector Plumlee sup-statements, however, posedly to corroborate Chwastyk.

have very little to do with Chwastyk's recollection or belief.

~

Plumlee's recollection concerning on hydrogen related primarily to the 28th about high hydrogen whether the NRC knew by 8:00 a.m.Plumlee's statement is effectively concentrations in containment.

refuted by everybody Plumlee mentioned in connection with the mat-See also JME ter. See JME 1(c)(142), at 29-31 (NUREG-0760).

1(c)(139) (OIA Interview Memos),

l.

1 i

I

e. -_,--.n ,.-.r,,,. -, ..,-,.,--, _ -_,__ ____ _ _ n , n.,-~wr,,,,rnn, -~,+

i we do not believe that Chwastyk on the day of the accident un-derstood and explained the significance of the pressure spike.

To find otherwise would require concluding that Chwastyk under-stood but told no one or understood and told others, all of whom deny it.

Miller's and Herbein's Interoretation REPLY 107. TMIA's third argument is that' Gary Miller and John Herbein both correctly interpreted the pressure spike.

TMIA PF 71-101. In making this argument, TMIA necessarily ad-vocates rejection of the direct testimony of both these indi-viduals in this proceeding and in a number of past statements.

Miller testified that he heard a thud which was subsequently correlated to the time of the spike. Tr. 30,186 (Miller). He does not believe he was aware either of spray actuation or the spike. Tr. 30,190, 30,200 (Miller). Herbein testified that he too was unaware of the spike. Tr. 30,417-18 (Herbein). Their testimony is corroborated by many prior statements. See, e.g.,

JME 1(c)(27), at 26-27 (Herbein); JME 1(c)(29), at 298 (Udall Committee Task Force Hearing); JME 1(c)(39), at 57-59, 63 (Miller); JME 1(c)(67), at 19 (Herbein); JME 1(c)(83), at 31-32 (Miller); JME 1(c)(93), at 28-29 (Miller); JME 1(c)(95), at 18-22 (Miller); and JME 1(c)(122), at 111-23 (Miller).

REPLY 108. TMIA commences the argument by claiming, with-out supporting citation, that Miller was not only aware of the pressure spike, but that "his knowledge of plant conditions

.I l

e including an-awareness of superheated43/ temperatures enabled i

-him to understand that a hydrogen explosion was the cause. -.

i

'TMIA PF 71.

REPLY 109. With respect to Miller's alleged awareness of

)

the spike, TMIA states that Miller " acknowledges that he heard

.the ' thud'" and " recalls some discussion about a ventilation damper. shifting." .TMIA PF 72. TMIA does not explain the rele-Miller has indeed consistently vance of these statements.

stated that he heard a thud. Perhaps TMIA is implying that the .

thud had to be recognized as an explosive sound. The noise, however, was attributed to the closing of ventilation dampers.

See JME 1(c)(108), at 139 (Hart Report) (Richard Dubiel told Miller the noise was ventilation dampers closing). See also

~JME 1(c)(11), at 4'(Flint); JME 1(c)(56), at 12.(Flint); JME 1(c)(83), at 31-32.(Miller); JME 1(c)(93), at 29 (Miller); JME 1(c)(124), at 51 (Ross); JME 1(c)(87), at 47-48 (Rogers); JME 1(c)(100), at 49-50 (Rogers); JME 1(c)(25), at 72-73 (Rogers);

Moreover, after investigation, i JME 1(c)(136), at 53 (Logan).

the Special Inquiry Group determined that the sound was proba-JME bly a water hammer in the containment spray system.

1(c)(106), at 42.

l 43/ TMIA' discusses Miller's alleged TMIA's awareness of "superheated citation in TMIA PF 86 does temperatures" in'TMIA PF 86.

not support TMIA's claim that Miller recognized superheated condi-tions. See LIC REPLY 126, infra.

REPLY 110. TMIA continues by stating that both Chwastyk and Mehler testified that they spoke with Miller about the pressure spike. According to TMIA, Chwastyk and Mehler also testified that Miller appeared to understand that the pressure spike, actuation of containment sprays, cycling of the EMOV, ,

and the loud noise or thud, had all occurred simultaneously.

As discussed below, TMIA's statements are inaccurate and unsupported.

REPLY 111. TMIA refers to a " moving conversation" Chwastyk had with Miller. TMIA PF 73. TMIA does not recount what Chwastyk supposedly told Miller, but TMIA states that Miller responded "let's not get everybody all excited about it." Id.

REPLY 112. As previously noted, Chwastyk testified that he told Miller that he thought there had been "a real pressure increase." See LIC REPLY 85, supra. TMIA states that during Chwastyk's " moving conversation" with Miller, it appeared to Chwastyk that Miller was looking at parameters to verify what Chwastyk was telling him. TMIA PF 43. Chwastyk also stated, however, that he thought that Miller was looking at parameters to prepare himself for the Lieutenant Governor's briefing. Tr.

29,280 (Chwastyk). Compare Tr. 29,169-70 (Chwastyk). Indeed, Chwastyk testified that Miller was preoccupied and that Miller gave no indication that he understood the spike was real or a hydrogen explosion. Tr. 29,321, 29,381-82 (Chwastyk).

9 REPLY 113. Miller remembers no such conversation with Chwastyk. Tr. 30,204 (Miller). See also JME 1(c)(122), at 122-123; JME 1(c)(95), at 22. Moreover, Miller would have ex-pected Chwastyk to go to Ross more than himself, because Miller

" pretty much that day stayed away from dealing directly with the shift supervisors." JME 1(c)(95), at 25.44/ Miller felt Ross controlled operations: "That is as simple as that, and I dealt with him." JME 1(c)(122), at 124. If Chwastyk's recol-lection is taken at face value, it is not surprising. Miller was already late for the Lieutenant Governor's briefing. Tr.

30,228 (Miller). If Chwastyk merely told Miller, just as Mill-er was rushing to leave for a late appointment with the Lieu-tenant Governor, that containment pressure increased when the EMOV was cycled, Miller could hardly have understood that a 28-pound pressure increase in containment had just occurred or that Chwastyk believed there had been a hydrogen explosion.

REPLY 114. TMIA infers from Miller's response that Miller understood the significance of what was being told him. How-ever, as Chwastyk testified, Miller's statement -- "let's not get everybody excited about it" -- indicated Miller had much on his mind and did not have time to investigate the matter.45/

i l

44/ Chwastyk, too, in describing whom he may have directed to check containment integrity after the spike, acknowledged an understanding of the concept of " chain of command." JME 1(c)(ll7), at 34.

45/ Chwastyk on his own initiative stated to the Board that he had a reputation at the time of the accident as the Shift Supervi-(Continued Next Page) l

4 Tr. 29,424 (Chwastyk). The Board concludes that if Chwastyk l

did indeed say anything to Miller, Miller simply did not grasp its import.

REPLY 115. TMIA also claims that Mehler testified that Miller was aware of the pressure spike. TMIA PF 75. Mehler testified, however, that he had merely " assumed" Miller was aware of the pressure spike because of Miller's presence in the control room and Miller's remark about hearing a noise. Tr.

29,483 (Mehler). See also JME 1(c)(89), at 29 (Mehler). More-over, Mehler's assumption hardly supports TMIA's claim that Mehler spoke to Miller about the spike. See TMIA PF 72.

Mehler has in fact stated that he does not remember discussing the pressure spike with Miller. JME 1(c)(115), at 14. With regard to whether Miller was aware of spray initiation, TMIA is inaccurate in stating that "Mehler agreed that everyone in the control room knew about the sprays. . . ." TMIA PF 36. Mehler testified only that he would assume people at the console --

himself, Chwastyk, and the control room operators -- were aware of spray actuation. Tr. 29,483 (Mehler).

REPLY 116. TMIA next claims that other operators in the

' control room " agreed with Chwastyk and Mehler that Miller was (Continued) sor, to basically jump in and get things done. Thus, Chwastyk be-lieved that anything Ross or Miller said to him about not getting everyboc'.y excited was meant for him to remain calm. See Tr.

29,423-25 (Chwastyk).

aware of the pressure spike, or one of the events accompanying 1

the pressure spike, such as actuation of the containment l sprays, the alarms, or ES signal." TMIA PF 76. TMIA's refer-I .

1 ence to statements by Walter Marshall and William Zewe do not support this claim. Marshall stated that he did not know whether Miller was aware of the pressure spike; when pressed i

for speculation, he stated that he would think that Miller was aware of spray act'uation because Miller was in the vicinity of the control panel. TMIA Mailgram Exh. 32G at 10, 15-16. Zewe only stated that he found it hard to believe that anyone in the control room missed the pressure spike or the spray pumps being turned off. JME 1(c)(75), at 260 (Zewe et al.).

REPLY 117. TMIA also claims that NRC Inspector James Higgins " testified that he believed Miller told him that he knew of the pressure spike on March 28." Inspector Higgins, however, stated that Miller said he had " heard" the spike. JME j 1(c)(19), at 24 (Higgins). That Miller heard a thud has never been at issue. Furthermore, while Inspector Higgins stated that it was his impression that Miller had momentarily been aware of the pressure spike on Wednesday -- Inspector Higgins i-apparently equating Miller's hearing the thud with awareness of the pressure spike -- it was also Inspector Higgins' impression that Miller did not understand its significance until Friday, March 30. JME 1(c)(79), at 50-51 (Higgins); JME 1(c)(129), at 23-29-(Higgins).

p .,

REPLY 118. TMIA refers to an April 14, 1979 group state-ment in which, TMIA claims, Miller states he was aware not only of the thud but also of containment spray actuation. TMIA PF

77. That statement says:

It should be noted that at approximately 1400 I heard a loud deep noise and at that time the Re-actor Building spray pumps started and subse-quent to the events of this day I learned that this was a 30 lb. pressure spike which occurred in the Reactor Building due to hydrogen.4s/

JME 1(c)(10), at 21-22 (Miller et al.). Miller states only that he heard a noise. He does not state that he was aware of spray actuation. Nor can one accept such an inference when the statement is viewed in the context of all his statements.

Miller stated in an NRC interview on May 7, 1979 -- long before the present controversy --

I was aware of a loud noise in the reactor building, I heard it at the control panel, in fact, I asked what that was. To my knowledge the other people standing there didn' t hear it. One operator tells me or one engineer tells me that when I said that 43/ Prefatory language in Miller's group statement (JME 1(c)(10),

at 2 (Miller et al.)) to the effect that the facts in the state-ment are " based on the knowledge we (the group of persons identi-fled on page 1] had and the assessment we made" suggests to the Board that Miller may have attributed knowledge to himself when he really was conveying knowledge of the group. An example of the misuse of the pronoun "I" by Miller occurs at page 21 where Miller states that he was directed to stop steaming "because it was felt that I was releasing radioactive steam." Another example where the pronoun "I" was misused also occurred at page 21 where Miller states "I was making attempts to redraw vacuum and secure that steaming." Another example of the misuse of the pronoun "I" is "I was at this time attempting to get preparations underway to start the reactor coolant pump. I had lost some vital switchgear which disabled the lift and backstop oil pumps for the reactor coolant pumps." JME 1(c)(10), at 24 (Miller et al.).

r.

l ~he looked over and the building spray pumps had turned on which means that we had over 28 pounds.

JME 1(c)(23), Tapes 159 and 160, at'70 (Miller). It is clecr, therefore, that Miller's awareness that the thud coincided with spray actuation is the result of his being subsequently so in-formed by another person. Indeed, he has consistently explained that the April 1979 group statement reflects informa-tion derived from others. Tr. 30,191-92 (Miller); JME 1(c)(122), at 114-15 (Miller).

REPLY 119. TMIA also states that Miller, despite evidence oto the contrary, claims he was unaware of both the alarms and the engineered safeguards (ES) signal at the time of the pres-

, sure spike. TMIA PF 78. TMIA then uses Gary Broughton's testimony as well as the alarm printer printout (TMIA Mailgram Exh. 21) as evidence of the various alarms that were activated by the pressure spike to challenge its own characterization of Miller's testimony. There are'two problems with TMIA's argu-ment. First, Miller only testified that he can no longer re-call if he heard or observed the alarms. Tr. 30,199 (Miller).

Second, according to Broughton, no more than eighteen or nine-teen alarms were likely activated although it is impossible to determine in retrospect. Broughton, ff Tr. 31,225, at 1-2; Tr.

31',231 (Broughton). Furthermore, the ES signal and corre-sponding alarm 3 actuate at four pounds containment pressure; if Miller did not observe that containment sprays had actuated, he might well have failed to realize that there had been a u-

r; 30-pound signal. JME 1(c)(122), at 116-118 (Miller). See also

'JME 1(c)(124), at 55 (Ross). There had in fact been two previ-ous ES signals that day. Tr. 30,195 (Miller). A large number of alarms had occurred throughout the day, making the activation of further alarms less noticeable. JME 1(c)(136),

at 53-54 (Logan). The Board concludes that Miller probably did not understand the significance of the particular (albeit cru-cial in retrospect) alarms that actuated at the time of the spike, if in fact he saw or heard them at all.

REPLY 120. TMIA claims that Miller authorized Chwastyk to draw a bubble in the pressurized. TMIA asserts that Miller therefore understood the significance of the spike. TMIA PF

79. As previously discussed, drawing a bubble was not particu-larly responsive to the spike. See LIC REPLY 99, supra. Nev-ertheless, Miller testified that he does not believe he gave such permission. Tr. 30,205 (Miller).

REPLY 121. TMIA points to Miller's instruction upon leaving 47/ the control room that plant status should not be changed without his permission to support its view that Miller authorized Chwastyk to draw a bubble. TMIA PF 79. This in-struction would contradict rather than support the proposition that Miller gave permission to draw the bubble. Ross, who was in charge of, operations, has stated that he was unaware of 47/ TMIA claims, without support, that Miller left in the 2:00-2:30 p.m. time frame. The evidence is that Miller left at or before 2:00 p.m. See LIC PF 70.

attempts to draw a bubble. JME 1(c)(96), at 13 (Ross). Unless Miller thought that drawing a bubble was an insignificant ac-tion, it would seem unlikely that Miller would tell Ross not to change plant status and yet tell Chwastyk to draw a bubble.48/

REPLY 122. TMIA then states, "similarly incredible is Miller's denial that he gave an instruction not to activate equipment in the reactor building for fear of causing a spark on March 28." TMIA PF 80. TMIA argues that the instruction could not have been given on the 29th, as some have theorized, because Miller left at about 7:00 p.m., before the time the in-struction was noted in James Seelinger's notes. This argument is flawed. Miller did not give the instruction on the 29th; George Kunder did. Tr. 30,028-34 (Kunder).49/ See LIC PF 91.

48/ TMIA claims that Miller " admitted that shutting the block valve at 3:08 p.m. would lead to the kind of change in status which he expected to authorize." Miller, however, testified that closing the block valve for two hours and turning on the pressur-izer heaters at the same time would be actions for which he would have expected to have been asked permission. Tr. 30,207-08 (Mill-er). The question has little relevance, since the block valve was opened twice during the two hour period after 3:08 p.m., and pres-surizer heater operation was sporadic. JME 1(c)(63), Sequence of Events, at 48-50 (NSAC Report). See also JME 1(c)(142), at 28 (NUREG-0760).

49/ Contrary to TMIA's unsupported conclusion, Chwastyk and Mehler did not both testify that Miller gave the instruction on the 28th. Chwastyk could not recall who gave the instruction.

Tr. 29,155 (Chwastyk). Mehler did not testify that the instruc-tion was given on the 28th, and was uncertain who gave it; when asked, he replied "the best that I recall, yes, Mr. Miller did."

Tr. 29,508 (Mehler). However, in his October 11, 1979 SIG deposi-tion, Mehler testified that he did not know who gave the instruc-tion. JME 1(c)(89), at 15 (Mehler). Given Mehler's equivocal present recollection and his prior lack of knowledge, his present testimony is not particularly probative.

REPLY 123. The second prong of TMIA's argument is that because of Miller's awareness of a complete set of incore thermocouple readings, Miller must have interpreted the pres-sure spike as a hydrogen burn. TMIA PF 81. Since it appears that Miller was unaware of the pressure spike, the argument is irrelevant. Nevertheless, Miller also testified that he was aware of only a few in core readings -- readings that he was led to believe were unreliable. Tr. 30,140, 30,151 (Mill-er).50/

REPLY 124. TMIA states that at Miller's request I"an Por-ter reported computer printout readings to Miller, " including temperature readings greater than 700 F." TMIA PF 83. TMIA's citation, however, does not support the statement that Miller was initially informed of readings greater than 700 F. Miller stated that he did not know the computer program well enough to 50/ Incore thermocouples were installed at TMI-2 to support the startup and test program. Although they were neither utilized by plant operating personnel nor relied upon in any procedures, incore thermocouple temperatures could be printed out on the con-trol room alarm computer printout. The computer's range was lim-ited to 700 F. Readings in excess of 700 F were printed out as question marks. On the morning of the accident, Miller, because of his experience with incore thermocouples in a prior Navy re-search setting, was prompted to ask for incore data. Several instrumentmen were dispatched to the cable spreading room to take manual readings off the analog input points in the computer multi-plexer cabinet. Ivan Porter, the lead instrumentation engineer, was present while the first several readings were taken -- some of which were high and some of which were low. Porter reported these readings to Miller, but told Miller the readings were erratic and unreliable. See generally JME 1(c)(106), at 898-902 (SIG Report);

JME 1(c)(107), attachment at 1-7, 14-16, 36-42, 63-72 (Rogovin/Frampton Memorandum).

interpret a question mark in terms of either an off-scale reading or a non-functioning thermocouple. Tr. 30,133-34 (Miller). Miller did, however, ask that readings be taken off the computer inputs. Tr. 30,138 (Miller).

REPLY 125. TMIA states correctly that readings were taken and that one of the instrumentmen who took the readings stated that he perceived the readings as real. TMIA PF 84. Porter, however, did not believe the readings were accurate, and so testified'in this proceeding. Tr. 31,484-85 (Porter).

REPLY 126. Porter obtained and reported to Miller several readings-which. ranged from 0 to 2500 F. Tr. 30,139-40, 30,143-44 (Miller). Porter informed Miller the readings were unreliable. Tr. 30,144-51-(Miller). TMIA claims, however, that Miller-stated he relied on these readings and "used the 2500 degree figure as a ' gross indicator,' of superheated con-ditions."51/ TMIA PF 86, citing JME 1(c)(23), at 56 (Miller).

This statement is inaccurate. In the interview TMIA cites, Miller stated that he asked Porter to obtain incore thermocouple readings because, although not extremely accurate devices, they would provide an indicator (of core temperature 51/ -Superheated conditions refers to the presence of superheated steam in the reactor coolant' system. Superheated steam is steam that is heated further after becoming steam; it is therefore at temperatures exceeding the boiling point of water at system pres-sure. LSteam becomes superheated at temperatures well below the temperatures needed to have a zirconium-water reaction (i.e.,

about 620 compared to about 2200 ). See generally JME 1(c)(108),

at-108 (Hart Report); JME-1(c)(142), at 18 (NUREG-0760).

-- not of superheated conditions]. JME 1(c)(23), Tapes 159 and 160, at 55. After Porter obtained the readings, Miller con-cluded that the core was " hot" based upon Porter's belief that the thermocouple junctions had melted. Id., at 56. Miller did not state that he picked 2500 F as a gross indicator of core temperature. _Rather, he stated that the incore thermocouple readings ranged to "2500 or so" -- and he indicated he was picking 2500 F in responding to the question. Id. In addi-tion, Miller did not state that he recognized superheated con-ditions. What he stated was: "I know we were superheated and all that sort of thing, I don't think we tumbled to that kind of lo(gic]. . . ." Id. TMIA's citation indicates that Miller believed the core was " hot." It does not indicate that Miller accepted the incore thermocouple readings as accurate and un-derstood core temperatures were in fact 2500 F or anywhere near that figure.

REPLY 127. TMIA asserts that in addition to the several erratic readings which Porter obtained and relayed to Miller, Porter and Miller were also aware of a complete set of incore thermocouple readings taken on March 28.52/ TMIA PF 90. TMIA seeks to support this assertion by referring to its depositions of Richard Lentz and William Yeager.

.52/ TMIA claims that the complete set of readings indicated that the core was uncovered, the zirconium-water reaction was occur-ring, and.that there was no assurance that the ECCS would func-tion. TMIA PF 89. TMIA provides no support for this statement.

See LIC REPLY 161 n.57, infra with respect to TMIA claims regard-ing ECCS.

r REPLY 128. TMIA asserts that Lentz stated that a few days after the accident Porter showed him a complete set of incore thermocouple readings. According to TMIA, Lentz stated that Porter told him that Porter had shown this complete set of readings to Miller on March 28. TMIA PF 90.

REPLY 129. TMIA's assertions are inaccurate. Lentz did not state that Porter showed him a complete set of readings.

Rather, Lentz stated that several days after the accident his investigative team got hold of a complete set of readings that Porter "had taken" (i.e., readings that Porter had his instru-mentmen take). Lentz did not see these readings himself for several weeks. TMIA Mailgram Exh. 32I, at 118-119. Lentz did refer to a conversation he had with Porter several days after'

.the accident during which, according to Lentz, Porter stated that readings had been taken off the computer inputs on the day lof the accident. Lentz stated that Porter told him that the readings had been passed on to Miller, but it appeared that the thermocouples had failed. Id., at 122. Lentz stated, however, that he did not discuss the number of readings that had been taken and had no way of telling what information was passed to Miller. Id., at 128. Accordingly, Lentz's deposition state-ments.(which are mulriple hearsay) do not establish that either Porter or Miller were aware en March 28 of a complete set of incore thermocouple readings.

REPLY 130. TMIA's reference to Instrumentman Yeager's deposition also fails to indicate that either Porter or Miller 1

were aware on March 28 of a complete set of incore thermocouple readings. _Yeager recalled taking no more than nine to eleven

- readings. TMIA Mailgram Exh. 32D, at 31, 77-82. TMIA there-fore implies that Porter personally took the readings. TMIA PF f

92. TMIA, however, makes no mention of the prior statements-of Nelson _Bennett, the foreman who was in charge of instrumentmen, including Yeager, taking the readings. Bennett has stated that after the instrumentmen took the first couple of readings, Bennett himself decided to have the instrumentmen take a com-plete set of readings; Bennett_also recorded the readings in a computer point identification book. JME 1(c)(53), at 12, 17 (Bennett). Bennett has also stated that Porter had only 1

directed that a few readings be taken, not a complete set. JME 1(c)(128), at 11 (Bennett). He also stated that Porter was only present for a few readings. Id. TMIA's implication that

]

Porter personally took a complete set of incore thermocouple readings is, therefore, unfounded.

REPLY 131. Accordingly, the Board rejects TMIA's asser-r tion that Miller had a full set of incore thermocouple data on L-March 28 (TMIA PF 93). TMIA's assertion is unsupported and contrary to the uncontradicted direct testimony in this pro-ceeding of both Miller and Porter.

-REPLY 132. TMIA also asserts that George Kunder's prior testimony indicates he knew Porter had relayed incore tempera-l ture. readings greater than 2200*F to Miller on March 28. TMIA

( PF 94. -Kunder testified in this proceeding, however, that he I

L

I was not aware of incore temperature readings in that range until weeks after the accident. Tr. 30,060 (Kunder). Kunder l testified that his knowledge concerning what information Porter l had relayed to Miller was derived from having heard testimony n

on this point in hearings before the Kemeny Commission. JME 1(c)(59), at 13 (Kunder). See also Tr. 30,065-68 (Kunder).

REPLY 133. Finally, TMIA asserts that incore temperatures were known in the think tank. TMIA PF 95. TM1A's citation, however, does not indicate that any high incore thermocouple readings were accepted as accurate. TMIA cites two prior statements by Ross, both of which indicate that the incore thermocouple readings were believed to be inaccurate. JME ,

h 1(c)(81), at 23-26 (Ross); JME 1(c)(124), at 46-(Ross). TMIA also cites statements by Leland Rogers, who also indicated that incore thermocouple readings were disbelieved. JME 1(c)(87), j at 29-30 (Rogers).53/ In addition, TMIA cites six prior state-ments by Kunder, which indicate quite clearly that Kunder was not aware of high incore. thermocouple readings on the 28th.

See JME 1(c)(18), at 49-50; JME 1(c)(30), at 44; JME 1(c)(37),

at 52-53; JME 1(c)(59), at 10-11 (which discussed hot leg tem--

peratures and is irrelevant); JME 1(c)(72), at 20-22; and JME 1(c)(118), at 27 (Kunder). Similarly, TMIA cites from prior j statements by Miller. Three of these indicate that Miller did 53/ TMIA also cites irrelevant sections of two other statements by Rogers. See JME 1(c)(20), at 10; JME 1(c)(100), at 63-65.

r 1

t Yl

~

r not believe incore thermocouple readings were reliable. JME 1(c)(95), at 49-50; JME 1(c)(122), at 66-67, 77-78; JME 1(c)(138), at 147-49 (Miller). TMIA's fourth citation (JME 1(c)(23), at 37, 75 (Miller)) is irrelevant.54/

REPLY 134. TMIA next claims that John Herbein was aware of incore thermocouple temperatures in excess of 2400 F. TMIA PF 96. TMIA advocates rejecting as incredible Herbein's direct testimony that he did not know of incore thermocouple readings in the range of 2400 F on March 28. Tr. 30,301 (Herbein).

REPLY 135. TMIA refers to a July 29, 1979 interview of Herbein before the Kemeny Commission. One could infer from that interview that Herbein had been informed of widely varying ,

thermocouple temperatures up to 2400 F. JME 1(c)(61), at 15 (Herbein). Herbein, however, did not state that this informa-tion was relayed to him on March 28, nor did he intend to imply that he knew on March 28 of 2400 F incore temperatures. Tr.

'30,304 (Herbein). See also TMIA Mailgram Exh. 26, at 28-34 (Herbein).

REPLY 136. TMIA also suggests that Herbein would have learned of such temperatures in a " briefing" of GPUSC engineers by Richard Bensel at about 5 p.m. on March 28. Herbein, how-l l ever, testified that he did not remember this briefing and that 54/ TMIA also cites two interviews of John Herbein -- JME 1(c)(61) and JME 1(c)(82). Herbein was not part of the think tank. His knowledge of incore thermocouple readings is discussed at LIC REPLY 134-137, infra.

y- - -- _ -

( 'i 4

w ihe was probably in his office. Tr. 30,334-35 (Herbein). No evidence was adduced in this proceeding to indicate that Herbein listened-to Bensel's briefing.

REPLY 137. In conclusion, the Board finds that neither Miller nor Herbein were aware of the pressure spike, as evi-denced by their direct testimony and many consistent prior statements. See LIC REPLY 107, supra. The Board rejects TMIA PF 99-100. The weight of the evidence indicates that Miller was only aware of a thud that occurred at the time of the spike (see LIC REPLY 107-122, supra) and that Chwastyk did not en-

-lighten him (see LIC REPLY 111-114, supra). The Board finds illogical TMIA's argument that since Herbein would have wanted Miller to inform him of any information Miller had concerning the pressure spike, or incore thermocouple temperatures, it follows that Miller did inform Herbein of the occurrences.

TMIA PF 98, 101. The argument is a non sequitur.

t Questionnaire Responses

. REPLY 138. In an effort to show that the pressure spike and hydrogen' burn were common knowledge among site personnel on l ' March 28th, TMIA called as witnesses individuals who had i

checked "yes" that they were aware or informed on March 28th of I the hydrogen burn on a questionnaire sent out by Licensee dur -

l -ing the discovery phase. The questionnaire had been sent to

- 456 individuals, identified as having been related in some man-l-

ner to the TMI-2 accident, to assist Licensee in responding to l

l I -

e TMIA discovery requests. TMIA Mailgram Exh. 32A, at 1; id.,

attachment 2. Those who received the questionnaire were asked whether_they were aware or informed on March 28, 1979 that there had been a hydrogen burn in the TMI-2 containment on that day (Question 3a). Id., attachment 1, at 5. Twenty-one indi-viduals responded affirmatively. Id., at 3. If accurate, these affirmative responses constituted new information, dia-metrically opposed to Licensee's understanding regarding appre-ciation of the significance of the pressure spike on March 28, 1979. Thus, Licensee undertook to investigate these responses.

REPLY 139. Licensee attorneys attempted to contact all twenty-one individuals who answered affirmatively. Id.,

~

attachment 3. All accounts of these contacts and of the dis-cussions which followed paint a picture of a good faith effort by Licensee to gain additional information. Contrary to TMIA's assertions (TMIA PF-111, 116, 120, 127, 129, 134), the record does not evidence that these attorneys suggested to those indi-viduals that their responses to question 3(a) were inaccurate, let alone evidence that pressure was exerted to obtain modifi-cations of their responses. See, e.g., Tr. 31,334-35 (Mulleavy); Tr. 31,379-80, 31,382-91 (Conrad); Tr. 31,411 l -(Zeiter); 31,444-47, 31,450-55 (Rochino); Tr. 31,557-62 (Boyer).

REPLY 140. Upon being asked about the basis for their re-l sponses to question 3(a),-twenty of these individuals acknowl-edged that their responses were in error and explained that i

i they had no knowledge on March 28th that there had been a hy-drogen burn. TMIA Mailgram Exh. 32A, attachment 3. See also Tr. 31,334 (Mulleavy); Tr. 31,385-87, 31,389 (Conrad); Tr.

31,445-46 (Rochino); Tr. 31,560 (Boyer). One ex-employee, J.

Riggenbach, could not be contacted. The individuals' explana-tions were later confirmed in letters sent to each of them by Licensee's Manager of Licensing J. Thorpe. Foreseeing a poten-tial challenge to the reliability of those letters, Licensee attorneys asked each recipient to personally acknowledge the Thorpe letters. TMIA Mailgram Exh. 32A, attachment 3.

REPLY 141. TMIA called six of these twenty-one individ-uals to explore the circumstances surrounding their question .

naire responses, the discussions with Licensee's attorneys and the Thorpe letters confirming their explanation of their ques-tion 3(a) responses. The six witnesses were Thomas Mulleavy, Joseph DeMan, Curtis Conrad, David Zeiter, A.P. (Lee) Rochino and Robert Boyer.

REPLY 142. TMIA would have us find that Thomas Mulleavy understood the hydrogen burn to be a significant event and took steps to deal with it. TMIA PF 105. Mulleavy testified he was in the control room at the time of the spike, heard a " thud,

saw the pressure recorder rise and heard someone exclaim that the thud sounded like an explosion. But as to the cause of the explosion, Mulleavy stated unequivocally that he did not know on March 28th that it had been hydrogen. Tr. 31,323-24, 31,334 (Mulleavy). Mulleavy explained that he had overlooked the word I

i

" hydrogen" in the questionnaire. Tr. 31,334 (Mulleavy). There is no evidence which supports TMIA's implied conclusion set forth~in-TMIA PF 105 that Mulleavy or anyone he saw in the con-trol room understood that the pressure spike had been caused by a hydrogen explosion or "took steps to deal with it." Indeed, TMIA cites nothing to support this conclusion.

REPLY 143. TMIA has observed and attempted to attach some significance to Mulleavy's informing B. Good of the spike, the same person who recorded a radiation check made at 1405 on the 28th, and to the fact that three of the individuals who an-swered the questionnaire affirmatively were supervised by Mulleavy. TMIA PF 106-107. See Tr. 31,335-37 (Mulleavy).

This amounts to nothing more than irrelevant coincidence.55/

REPLY 144. There is no support for TMIA's conclusion that "it is reasonable to suspect that if Mulleavy were aware of the hydrogen burn, others in his Health Physics group would also have become aware. . . ." TMIA PF 107. Mulleavy's testimony is that he discussed the spike with no one except Good. Tr.

31,328-30, 31,335-37 (Mulleavy). No evidence was adduced which contradicts that testimony.

REPLY 145. TMIA would have us find that Joseph DeMan was noncredible in that he was aware on March 28th of a hydrogen burn. TMIA PF 111. DeMan testified that he first learned that 55/ We have also observed earlier (See LIC REPLY 79) that the 1405 radiation check was not done in response to the pressure spike.

there had been a hydrogen explosion from reading various re-ports. Tr. 31,351 (DeMan). No evidence other than DeMan's bare questionnaire response was adduced which conflicts with this statement and DeMan explained that_the questionnaire re-sponse was based on hindsight and not on what he knew on March 28, 1979. Tr. 31,357 (DeMan).

REPLY 146. TMIA attacked DeMan's credibility. TMIA PF 109-110. TMIA states that he could not remember whether he was in the control room at the time of the spike; however, DeMan merely. stated that he could not be certain that he left the control room prior to 2:00 p.m. on the 28th. There is no ref-erence to his leaving before or after the spike in his testi-mony. We find it unsurprising that DeMan could not remember the exact time he left the control room on March 28, 1979, almost six years ago. As to TMIA's claim that DeMan disavowed earlier deposition testimony (TMIA PF 109), DeMan explained he

had been confused-by the questioning. Tr. 31,352-53 (DeMan).

DeMan's testimony that he learned about the pressure spike from an individual who mentioned it in passing is not inconsistent with his testimony that he learned of the hydrogen explosion from reading reports. His testimony that he learned about the i

i pressure spike before he moved to the training department (in 1981) is consistent with his testimony to a Senate Committee on October 16, 1979, wherein he stated he learned of the spike within the three days following the accident. Tr. 31,356-57 l

l (DeMan). We do rot find it. surprising that DeMan has l

l forgotten, with the passage of time, when he learned of the spike.

REPLY 147. TMIA would have us find that Curtis Conrad's testimony _is non-credible and that he was aware of the pressure spike and hydrogen burn on March 28th. TMIA PF 115. Conrad testified at the hearing that he was at the Observation Center at the time the pressure spike occurred. Tr. 31,367 (Conrad).

TMIA's unsupported proposed finding, that Conrad's question-naire response that he was in the vicinity of TMI-2 at.the time of the spike is at variance with his testimony on this point, is silly. TMIA PF 113. Conrad's consistent testimony was that he-considered the Observation Center to be in the vicinity of TMI-2. Tr. 31,374-75 (Conrad).

REPLY 148. Conrad had apparently confused the March 30th concern with the hydrogen bubble in the reactor vessel with the March 28th hydrogen burn in the containment building when he answered the questionnaire. He understood the difference be-tween the spike and bubble.only recently during preparation-for appearing before this Board. What appear to be inconsistencies inLhis testimony at the hearing arise out of this misconcep-tion. Tr. 31,378-80, 31,386-87 (Conrad). Conrad also explained that he had misread the questionnaire and had inter-preted it as asking whether he knew about events which occurred on March 28, not about what he knew on that date. Tr. 31,387 (Conrad). In any case, Conrad's uncontroverted testimony at the hearing was that he had no knowledge on the 28th of the hydrogen burn. Tr. 31,367, 31,378-80 (Conrad).

REPLY 149. TMIA would have us find that David Zeiter was also aware of the hydrogen burn on March 28th. TMIA PF 120.

Zeiter said in his discussion with Licensee's attorney, as con-firmed in the Thorpe letter, that he had learned of the hydro-gen burn on March 30th and that he had misread the question-naire (TMIA Exh. 32A, attachment 3), however in preparing for the hearing he realized he never knew there had been a hydrogen burn or spike. He had confused the March 30th concern over a hydrogen bubble in the reactor with the containment hydrogen burn. Tr. 31,402-03 (Zeiter). His explanation to Licensee's attorney as confirmed by Thorpe was therefore not technically correct as he explained. See Tr. 31,409 (Zeiter). These facts do not' support TMIA's proposed finding that all of Zeiter's testimony is not credible and we decline to so find.

REPLY 150. TMIA would have us find that Lee Rochino was aware of the hydrogen burn on March 28th. TMIA PF 127.

Rochino testified consistently that his first knowledge that the spike had been caused by a hydrogen explosion came during a

" vigil" session which he explained was an open telephone line between Mountain Lakes, New Jersey and the TMI site. Tr.

31,427, 31,431-34 (Rochino). Rochino placed his initial par-ticipation in the vigil on Friday evening, March 30th. Tr.

31,427, 31,449 (Rochino). Other than Rochino's questionnaire response which he testified was filled out upon return from a vacation, no evidence was adduced which controverted his testi-mony. See Tr. 31,429-30 (Rochino). TMIA's discussion of

i. .

l various reporte regarding the pressure spike which Rochino re-ceived years after the accident adds nothing to TMIA's argu-ment. See TMIA PF 125. The date of the spike or even of the accident was not a relevant part of those reports. See TMIA Mailgram Exhs. 35, 36, 37. TMIA has also completely mischaracterized Rochino's connection with those reports. He I did not participate in the containment shock wave study as TMIA has stated, he merely reviewed it. Tr. 31',418-24 (Rochino).

I REPLY 151. TMIA would have us find that Robert Boyer was

non-credible and was informed on March 28th of the hydrogen i burn. TMIA PF 132. Boyer testified that he did not remember when he first learned that there had been a hydrogen explosion.

1 Tr. 31,556-58 (Boyer). Boyer, as did others, simply misread the questionnaire. Tr. 31,558 (Boyer). No evidence other than Boyer's bare questionnaire was adduced which conflicted with his testimony.

REPLY 152. We find that the live testimony of these six witnesses in the presence of the Board, under oath and subject to cross examination is more reliable than their questionnaire

responses. TMIA's only attack on these witnesses was on their 1

credibility, however we find their explanations of their ques-tionnaire responses to be reasonable and credible. None testified that he was aware on March 28th that there had been a hydrogen burn. Further, we find that TMIA adduced no evidence which calls into question the veracity of the letters from the remaining 14 individuals who answered their questionnaires affirmatively, explaining that they were not aware of the hy-drogen burn on the 28th. I 1

REPLY 153. There is not evidence which supports TMIA's position that these six witnesses (or the other 14 individuals) were " pressured" into changing their questionnaire responses. l We do not accept the assumption implicit in TMIA's proposed findings that all of those witnesses perjured themselves and that the twenty individuals who acknowledged Mr. Thorpe's let-ters did so inappropriately. .

REPLY 154. The Board also observes that TMIA's various allegations with regard to the 3(a) witnesses amount to allega-tions of perjury and with regard to the attorneys who talked with them subornation of perjury. Inasmuch as there is no evi-dence which supports these allegations, the Board finds that paragraphs 103, 111, 116, 120, 127, 129, and 134 of TMIA's Pro-posed Findings are scurrilous and specifically rejects them.

GPUSC Engineers' Knowledge REPLY 155. TMIA's last argument regarding the accuracy of the mailgram is that the mailgram is false because CPUSC engi-neers who had been sent to the site on the first day of the accident were aware of the pressure spike and interpreted it as a hydrogen explosion.56/ TMIA PF 137. As discussed below, s6/ TMIA gratuitously mentions in its introduction (TMIA PF 137)

- and conclusion (TMIA PF 167) to this argument that the GPUSC engi-neers learned of noncondensible gases in the primary reactor coolant system on the 28th. TMIA cites no evidence, and there is none. ,

[I i

this argument is unfounded.

l L REPLY 156. TMIA states that Gary Broughton, who was GPUSC's Control and Safety Analysis Manager, was given the re-l . sponsibility to obtain data to put together a sequence of events and to address the question of whether the core was uncovered. -TMIA PF 139. Broughton testified, however, he did not know whether the question "was the core covered" was a spe-cific assignment. Rather, he suggested that it was the type of-question that they would have been able to answer after the data was collected and subsequently analyzed. Tr. 31,708

. (Broughton).

REPLY 157. While TMIA points to Broughton's testimony that "they might collect strip chart recordings to evaluate the transient" (TMIA PF 139), that statement alone creates a false impression of the materiality of strip charts to GPUSC engi-neers. Broughton testified: "[glenerally when we looked at a transient like this we didn't rely on strip charts...In some

- cases we had to fall back on the strip charts because that information wasn't available through some other source." Tr.

31,081 (Broughton).

REPLY 158. TMIA asserts that "[a]1though Broughton denied that Keaten emphasized the urgency of his task, [Keaten]

testified during a previous interview that he understood early in the morning that the incident at TMI was serious and that GPUSC engineers needed to travel quickly to the site and report back immediately to GPUSC headquarters." TMIA PF 140. This F

proposed finding contains a number of inaccuracies. First, Keaten's prior statement indicates that it was about 11:00 a.m.

when he learned the accident might be more serious than origi-nally known. JME 1(c)(45), at 5 (Keaten). See also LIC REPLY 45, supra (as to Keaten's growing knowledge of the seriousness of the accident on the 28th, 29th and 30th). Second, Broughton did not " deny that Keaten emphasized the urgency of his task" but merely did not recall a particular discussion about trying to complete the analysis quickly. Tr. 31,083 (Broughton).

Third, Keaten's prior statement did not state that "GPUSC engi-neers needed to report back immediately to GPUSC headquarters."

See JME 1(c)(45), at 5-6 (Keaten), cited in TMIA PF 140.

REPLY 159. TMIA commences its argument by attempting to attribute generally to the GPUSC engineers knowledge of incore thermocouple temperatures greater than 2500*F. TMIA PF 142-146. Notes taken by the first GPUSC engineer to arrive at TMI -- James Moore -- indicate that Moore was told at approxi-mately 5 p.m. on March 28th by Richard Bensel about incore thermocouple readings greater than 2500 F. TMIA Mailgram Exh.

32K, deposition Exhibit 2, at 6. TMIA continues, however, claiming that "Mr. Moore stated that after being briefed about temperatures greater than 2500 F he understood that there had been some core damage." TMIA PF 142, citing TMIA Mailgram Exh.

32K, at 126. The citation indicates that Moore concluded that there was core damage based on a 1000 R dome reading -- infor-mation also provided to Mr. Moore by Mr. Bensel at 5 p.m.

Moore's statement only indicates he reached a conclusion regarding core damage after the 5 p.m. briefing, and does not indicate that he based his conclusion on high incore thermocou-ple readings as TMIA suggests. Moore in fact testified that he did not know that core temperatures in excess of 2200 F indi-cated that a zirconium-water reaction would occur or that hy-drogen would be produced. Id., at 87-88.

REPLY 160. TMIA next asserts that Moore has stated he subsequently informed Broughton of all relevant information including the incore thermocouple termperature readings greater than 2500 F. TMIA PF 143. Not one of TMIA's citations, how-ever, supports this claim. Moore has not stated that he in-formed Broughton of the incore thermocouple readings. Moore only recalled having informed Broughton of what he had learned as a whole. Moore could not remember if he showed his notes to Broughton, although Moore added that it would be reasonable for him to have provided the notes to Broughton. Id., at 13, 107.

REPLY 161. TMIA observes that Broughton stated he has no way of disagreeing with James Moore's memory. TMIA PF 144.

Since Broughton testified that he does not today recall Moore briefing him or showing him notes (Tr. 31,092 (Broughton)),

this statement has little significance. Broughton, however, as early as a June 11, 1979 NRC I&E interview, sta'ted that he did not have any knowledge of incore thermocouple readings on the 28th.57/ JME 1(c)(48), at 29 (Broughton).

57/ TMIA claims that Broughton states that at temperatures greater than 2200 F one knows that the ECCS had failed to perform (Continued Next Page)

REPLY 162. TMIA proposes that the Board conclude "It is clear ... that Broughton was aware of superheated tempera-tures...." TMIA PF 146. The Board cannot accept this conclu-sion -- a conclusion TMIA bases on witnesses' lack of memory.

The only affirmative piece of evidence before the Board --

Broughton's I&E interview -- indicates that Broughton was not informed of incore thermocouple temperatures. The Board also rejects TMIA's claim that "GPUSC engineers were also aware that a significant amount of hydrogen had been produced by a zirconium-steam reaction." TMIA PF 146. TMIA cites not one whit of evidence in support of this claim.

REPLY 163. TMIA next attempts to attribute to the GPUSC engineers knowledge of the pressure spike. TMIA first refers to a briefing of the engineers by George Kunder at about 6 p.m., but TMIA does not claim that any mention was made of the pressure spike. TMIA PF 147.

(Continued) in accordance with ECCS criteria. TMIA PF 145 n.16. TMIA mis-states Broughton's testimony. Additionally, TMIA apparently fails to realize that the ECCS criteria set forth in the Commission's regulations at 10 C.F.R. 5 50.46 are design criteria. See Tr.

31,097-103, 31,177 (Broughton).

In any case, realization that temperatures in excess of 2200 F exceeded ECCS criteria is not necessary to understand how serious the existence of such temperatures is. Had the report of such temperatures been believed or understood when it was first made, Licensee does not dispute that there might have been a much greater appreciation of the seriousness or extent of potential core damage. See JME 1(a), ff Tr. 27,896, at 9.

REPLY 164. TMIA then refers to the data gathering efforts of one of the engineers -- Richard Lentz -- the evening of March 28th. TMIA PF 148. TMIA asserts that Lentz testified to the NRC in 1979 that he had gathered 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> of alarm printout. TMIA PF 149. TMIA acknowledges that Lentz has since denied photocopying twelve hours worth of data, but counters (incorrectly) that Lentz has also denied gathering any of the alarm printout. TMIA PF 149. TMIA advocates ignoring Lentz's present testimony on the theory that the earliest statement is the most reliable. TMIA PF 151. TMIA ignores the basis for Lentz's present belief that he could not have photocopied twelve hours worth of alarm printer data. Lentz explained that he simply could not physically have photocopied that amount of material during the time he was at Unit 2. Tr. 33,026 (Lentz);

LIC Mailgram Exh. 2, at 55, 56. Furthermore, Lentz testified that he does not deny and has not denied bringing back some portion of the alarm printer. Tr. 33,025-26 (Lentz). Lentz's present testimony does not therefore appear inconsistent with the information provided during discovery -- that about several hours worth of data was provided. Licensee Mailgram Exh. 3.

Nor is Lentz's testimony inconsistent with Julien Abramovici's notes, which TMIA showed to Lentz to indicate that a three-hour portion of the alarm printout was obtained. Tr. 33,025 (Lentz). Accordingly, the Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence indicates approximately three to four hours of the alarm printout were collected by Richard Lentz.58/

58/ The Board notes that even if twelve hours of data had been brought back, it would not demonstrate that GPUSC engineers were (Continued Next Page)

I REPLY 165. TMIA also claims that Lentz photocopied the strip chart. TMIA PF 152. TMIA ignores Lentz's present testi-mony and prior statement. Lentz testified that he did not ob-tain a photocopy of the pressure spike on the evening of the 28th. Lentz, ff Tr. 32,972, at 2. Lentz previously stated in an NRC interview on June 1, 1979 that he photocopied no analog output. JME 1(c)(47), at 9 (Lentz).

REPLY 166. TMIA cites no evidence indicating that Lentz photocopied the strip chart. Instead, TMIA refers to Theodore Illjes' NRC I&E interview (TMIA PF 152), in which Illjes stated that someone (whom Illjes could not remember) asked for a copy of the strip chart. See JME 1(c)(36), at 9 (Illjes). Illjes stated that he could not remember if the person was an NRC in-spector or a B&W representative. Id. Even if the Board were to accept Illjes' statement in his I&E interview, the Board could not accept TMIA's assertion that "it must have been Lentz who made the photocopy." See TMIA PF 153.

REPLY 167. Illjes' NRC I&E interview cannot, however, be accepted at face value -- particularly with regard to whether (Continued) aware on March 28th of the pressure spike. First, TMIA states that Lentz remained in the Unit 2 control room until about mid-night. TMIA PF 148. The alarm printout would therefore not have been available to the GPUSC engineers in the Observation Center on the 28th. Second, no evidence indicates that any GPUSC engineer reviewed or was interested in reviewing the period of the accident around the time of the spike. Broughton's initial analysis on the 28th covered only the first eight minutes of the accident. Tr.

31,198 (Broughton); TMIA Mailgram Exh. 28, at 7-8.

c i l the strip chart was photocopied on the 28th. Illjes' statement has been widely discredited. The possibility that the strip chart was photocopied on March 28 was examined and rejected in NUREG-0600 and in the SIG Report. See LIC PF 99-100. Illjes now believes that the discussion of hydrogen, which he remem-bered in conjunction with the chart being photocopied, occurred on Friday, March 30. See LIC PF 95. In addition, other testi-mony.and physical evidence strongly indicates that the pressure chart was not removed on the 28th. See LIC PF 102-03.59/

REPLY 168. TMIA claims added support for its conclusion by alleging that Lentz "was responsible for preserving analog data, including strip charts on March 28." TMIA PF 161. But Lentz testified that this responsibility was not assigned to him until a day or two after the accident. Tr. 32,997 I

(Lentz).60/

59/ TMIA claims that a portion of the chart was cut from the re-mainder without disrupting the recording trace. TMIA PF 155-159.

TMIA claims that "(slince Licensee has provided no reason whatso-ever for the cutting of the pressure spike strip chart, it is a reasonable inference that the chart was cut at some time before the strip chart paper ran out at about noon on March 29." TMIA PF 158. This argument is nonsensical. Further, Richard Brill testified that he had reviewed strip charts covering the period of the accident and "found that of the seventoen [,] fourteen of those were cut in two places to preserve the accident information.

One was not cut. And two were cut in one place." Tr. 31,650 (Brill).

TMIA also advocates rejecting as speculative Brill's testi-mony that the strip chart did not show signs of retaping that would be necessary had a portion been cut. TMIA PF 159. His testimony was uncontroverted and reasonable; his observations were sensible and appropriate for lay opinion. See Brill, ff Tr.

31,610, at 4; Tr. 31,640-46, 31,661-64 (Brill). l 1

60/ In TMIA PF 161, TMIA claims that there are other indications that GPUSC engineers had information available to them that could (Continued Next Page) -

REPLY 169. TMIA also observes that one GPUSC engineer in Parsippany and one GPUSC engineer who was at TMI indicated in response to Licensee's discovery questionnaire that they were aware of spray actuation. TMIA PF 163-164. TMIA then seeks to imply that their questionnaire responses indicate that the alarm printout was brought to the Observation Center. The Board finds this claim no more than speculation. Even assuming the questionnaire responses were accurate in this respect, there is no evidence that the alarm printout was the source of their information.61/

REPLY 170. TMIA credits Richard Bensel with being "able to understand the significance of the spike upon seeing" the alarm printout. TMIA PF 165. TMIA then attempts without i

(Continued) only have come from the alarm printout or strip chart. TMIA re-fers to Abramovici's notes for March 28th. These notes, however, give no indication that the strip chart had been copied; and with respect to the alarm printout, the notes only indicate that GPUSC engineers had available a portion corresponding to three hours in the morning of the 28th (before the pressure spike). Tr. 33,025 (Lent:). In TMIA PF 162, TMIA makes a similar claim with respect to data plotted by Broughton. Broughton, however, only plotted data for the first eight minutes of the accident. Tr. 31,198 (Broughton); TMIA Mailgram Exh. 28, at 7-8. The ES, the time for which TMIA claims was necessarily derived from the alarm printout, occurred at the outset of the accident, between 4:02 and 4:03 a.m.

Broughton's plot, therefore, gives no indication that GPUSC engi-neers had availability to the strip chart or the portion of the alarm printout corresponding to the pressure spike -- ten hours worth of data later.

61/ Abramovici, for example, could have heard this information from Hugh McGovern during the chronology McGovern dictated to Walter Marshall in the early morning of March 29th. See JME 1(c)(1) (McGovern Chronology).

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support to attribute this ability to GPUSC engineers. In fact Bensel did not state that. Bensel responded "yes" to the ques-tion by TMIA "[ijf someone with the proper experience such as yourself (Bensel) had reviewed the alarm printout on its own, could he have or she have determined that the containment sprays had been actuated?" TMIA Ma11 gram Exh. 32E, at 27. It is a far cry from being able to recognize by reviewing the alarm printout that containment spray actuated, to TMIA's prop-osition that Bensel understood the significance of the spike.

Even if GPUSC engineers had the portion of the alarm printout corresponding to the pressure spike -- and we find they did not

-- they would not have automatically understood the signifi-cance of the spike.

REPLY 171. TMIA's last point is that Mr. Keaten's notes

" confirm this hypothesis" that GPUSC engineers understood the pressure spike. TMIA PF 166. This point rests on the faulty premise that Keaten's notes were written on March 29th. As discussed above, they were not. See LIC REPLY 46-48, supra.

REPLY 172. For the reasons discussed above, the Board re-jects as unsupported and contrary to evidence TMIA's claim that GPUSC engineers interpreted the pressure spike as a hydrogen explosion and in terms of core damage on the 28th. See TMIA PF 167.

REPLY 173. Accordingly, having considered all of TMIA's arguments with regard to the accuracy of the Dieckamp ma11 gram, the Board finds that no one interpreted the pressure spike or

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r

)

I spray actuation in terms of core damage at the time of the I

spike.62/

IV.B. Whether Mr. Dieckamp Had a Reasonable Basis to Continue to Believe That No One Interpreted the Pressure Spike or Initiation of Containment Spray in Terms of Core Damage?63/

(Response to TMIA PF 170, 239-283)

REPLY 174. TMIA devotes considerable argument in its findings to respond to four arguments of TMIA's own wording, but which it attributes either to Licensee or to Dieckamp. See generally TMIA PF 239-283. First, TMIA attacks what it alleges is Dieckamp's unduly restrictive definition of the issue before the Board. See TMIA PF 239-240, 243-247. Second, TMIA attacks what it alleges is Licensee's argument that a complex technical 62/ In one lone paragraph in a proposed conclusion, TMIA raises a different attack on the accuracy of the Dieckamp mailgram. TMIA argues that since the NRC in Washington and Bethesda and the Com-monwealth of Pennsylvania did not become aware of the hydrogen detonation until March 30th, information was withheld and thus the mailgram contains "significant, false information." TMIA PF 170.

" Withholding", however, connotes a conscious act and at the very least knowledge of the information not reported. If plant man-agement did not realize that there had been a hydrogen detonation, they simply could not have reported the fact, and such non-reporting cannot constitute withholding of information. Such has always been Mr. Dieckamp's belief. Dieckamp, ff. Tr. 28,316, at 18. As the Board has found that the significance of the pres-sure spike was not understood, it concludes that there was no withholding of such information. The Board observes that once the significance of the spike was understood, the information was re-ported. JME 1(c)(107) at 55 (Rogovin/Frampton Memorandum). See also JME 1(c)(62), at I-4-49 (NUREG-0600).

63/ The Reply Findings in this section are intended to follow LIC PF 132 in Licensee's proposed findings of January 28, 1985.

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analysis is needed to determine that the pressure spike was caused by a hydrogen burn. See TMIA PF 241, 248-256. Third, TMIA attacks what it contends is Dieckamp's analysis of prior statements by Chwastyk, Mehler, and Illjes. See TMIA PF 241, 257-270. Fourth, TMIA attacks the support that NUREG-0760 pro-vides to Dieckamp's conclusion. See TMIA PF 241, 271-283.

TMIA claims that these four arguments in support of Dieckamp's position have eroded under close scrutiny in this hearing.

TMIA PF 241.

Absolute Proof REPLY 175. TMIA's first point is difficult to understand, but it appears that TMIA assigns'to Dieckamp the tenet that only information that has been absolutely proven need be re-ported to the NRC. See TMIA PF 239-240. TMIA then argues that it is not Licensee's responsibility to determine what informa-tion is reported to the NRC, and that "all potentially useful information about critical reactor parameters was required to be disclosed to the agency during the accident."64/ TMIA PF 240.

REPLY 176. Neither Dieckamp nor Licensee has ever advo-cated restricting disclosure of information to that absolutely proven. In the testimony contorted by TMIA to support its position, Dieckamp only stated:

64/ TMIA provides no support for its standard of disclosure. The Board notes that the Commission's reporting requirements are a matter of regulation. See e.g., 10 C.F.R. 5 50.72.

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r My reading of post-mailgram statements does not provide me with absolute proof of the state of knowledge on the day of the acci-dent but neither.does it undermine my-be-lief in the accuracy of-the judgment ex-

' pressed in the mailgram.

Dieckamp, ff Tr. 28,316, at 15. He does not state that infor-mation should not be disclosed unless absolutely proven; nor does he state, as perhaps TMIA seeks to imply, that only abso-lute proof can render the mailgram inaccurate. What Dieckamp states, in simple'English, is that he still believes that no

.one. interpreted the pressure spike in terms of core damage,

-though he cannot provide absolute proof that his belief is cor-rect. ,

REPLY 177. TMIA attempts to show, by reference to an April 12, 1979 interview of TMI personnel by Dr. Robert Long, that Dieckamp subscribes to a practice of restricting disclo-sure to proven or documented material. TMIA PF 244-245. 'TMIA refers to a statement by Robert Long in that interview indicating that Dieckamp ordered that "no report was to be

' issued prior-to his review and approval." ..TMIA PF 244. 'EMIA also suggests this instruction applied to operator interviews.

See TMIA PF 245.

REPLY 178. If one reads the entire page of the cited transcript, however, it is quite apparent that'Dr. Long was re-ferring only to an accident chronology that Licensee was preparing in the days following the accident. TMIA Mailgram Exh. 12, at 3-4. See also Tr. 28,666-67 (Dieckamp). There is s

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?

L_1 __ _

nothing particularly remarkable about the fact that Dieckamp would have wanted to review such a chronology of events and en-

=sure its accuracy prior to its release. As Mr. Dieckamp explained, the concern he and others had was to ensure the chronology was accurate; they therefore sought to base the 1

chronology on objective facts and avoid conjecture. Tr. 28,667 (Dieckamp). Moreover, the operator interviews themselves, which contained factual data on which the chronology was being based, were neither reviewed nor approved by Dieckamp prior to public release. Tr. 28,661 (Dieckamp). See also Tr. 28,951-52 (Dieckamp). In no way does this address Licensee's reporting responsibilities of plant status as it became known during the accident; Dieckamp was simply insisting that a post-accident assessment of the accident should be soundly based and accurate before it was released.

REPLY 179. Accordingly, the Board determines that TMIA mischaracterizes both Dieckamp's testimony and conduct. More-over, during his testimony in this proceeding, Dieckamp was open and forthright. The answers that he gave to questions demonstrated to the Board that Dieckamp did indeed accept the necessity for full disclosure and reporting. See e.g. Tr.

28,940-41 (Dieckamp). TMIA's unwarranted suggestion (TMIA PF 246, 247) that Dieckamp is unconcerned by the withholding of potentially useful information is unsubstantiated and is re-jected.

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Complex Analysis REPLY 180. TMIA asserts next that one of Licensee's argu-ments is that a complex analysis, beyond the training and capa-bilities of TMI-2 operators was required to determine the pres-sure spike was caused by a hydrogen burn and demonstrated core

' damage. TMIA PF 241, 248-256.

LREPLY 181. TMIA does not cite, nor can the Board find in

. Licensee's Proposed Findings, any argument by Licensee that a complex anaylsis was required to determine the pressure spike was caused by a hydrogen burn and demonstrated core damage.

Notwithstanding the fact that Licensee does not take this posi-tion in its Proposed Findings, TMIA contends that testimony by Licensee's witnesses Van Witbeck, Lowe and Zebroski on the-ne-cessity for a complex analysis in order to understand the ex-

-tent of core damage creates an inference that a complex analysis was also necessary to understand the significance of the pressure spike. TMIA PF 248-256. TMIA goes on to state that Dieckamp among others recognized on March 30th and 31st

" core damage at TMI as very serious." According to TMIA, "This s

was apparently based on a proper analysis of the pressure spike, which Dieckamp himself characterized as the Rosetta stone of_ deducing the degrees of core damage." TMIA PF 255, citing Tr. 28,364 (Dieckamp). This argument, which TMIA itself generates by citing Chwastyk's testimony "that site personnel were most interested in-stabilizing the reactor and not in

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making fine. analyses of the amount of core damage," is simply not Licensee's position. TMIA PF 253.

REPLY 182. Although Licensee has not argued that such a

~ complex analysis'was necessary to understand the significance of the pressure spike, Licensee has argued that the operators e at TMI-2 on the' day of the accident did not have sufficient tra'ining or experience to render obvious the significance of the pressure spike. LIC REPLY 67, supra.

REPLY 183. The Board has previously addressed the point that an. understanding of the significance of the pressure spike was beyond the training and experience of those aware of the

_ pressure spike on March 28. See LIC REPLY 67, supra. In addi-tion,. operators in the control room at the time of the pressure

-spike have testified that although they were aware of the pres-sure spike on March 28, they did not understand it. LIC PF-

]

114. -Further, the. Board has heard testimony in this proceeding

.that training received by operators prior to the accident did

~not encompass the concept of vast amounts.of hydrogen-being

. produced in the first' hours of a loss of coolant accident. Tr.

30,016 (Kunder); Tr. 29,852-54 (Moseley); JME 1(c)(75), at 258

'(Zewe); JME 1(c)(124),.at 51 (Ross). The training that opera-tors received on the-concept of hydrogen generation as a result

'of a loss of coolant accident was related~to long-term genera-tion.of hydrogen from chemical reactions in the reactor build-ing. Tr. 30,075-77-(Kunder). Indeed, testimony adduced in

.this/ hearing suggests that the1 Final Safety Analysis Report'for

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- .- . . - . .- . - - ~ - . . _ _ - . . - _ . . . - .- ..

I i

TMI-2 analyzed the post-accident generation of combustible l.

L gases in.the reactor building which did not contemplate the I

rapid generation of' hydrogen. Tr. 29,852-54, 29,934-35, 29,937 (Moseley);.Tr. 30,016, 30,075-80 (Kunder). Accordingly the Board concludes that, in light of typical operator training at l TMI-2 coupled with the Final Safety Analysis Report evaluation 3.

l of post-accident generation of hydrogen, an operator at TMI-2

+

.on March 28, 1979, could not have been expected to correctly interpret the validity of the reactor building pressure record-er strip chart indication as a real pressure spike resulting from a hydrogen explosion where the hydrogen had been produced by a zirconium-steam. reaction in the reactor core.

Dieckamp's Analysis of Chwastyk, Mehler and Illjes Statements REPLY 184. TMIA claims that Dieckamp's analysis of the

interviews of Chwastyk, Mehler, and Illjes is " misleading."

TMIA'PF 257. It is nothing of the sort. Dieckamp's analysis is

' straightforward and reasonable.

REPLY 185. TMIA claims that Dieckamp's testimony is mis-

-leading insofar as it suggests that Mehler has always been un-certain of the date o'f the " instruction not to activate equip-ment'in the reactor building. . . ." TMIA PF 258. Dieckamp made no such statement. Dieckamp quite properly stated simply that Mehler "is uncertain about'the timing of equipment limita-tions." Dieckamp, ff Tr.-28,316, at 13 (emphasis added). This.

uncertainty is reflected in Mehler's October 30,1979 4

g '- 108-

deposition, in his September 4, 1980 interview, and in his present' testimony.65/ See LIC PF 86-88. See also LIC REPLY 87-89, supra.

REPLY 186. TMIA also attacks Dieckamp's analysis of Illjes' prior statements; TMIA contends that contrary to an as-sertion it attributes to Dieckamp, Illjes' recollection of dis-cussing a hydrogen explosion on the 28th was not associated with his recollection of photocopying the' strip chart. TMIA PF 259. The contention is frivolous. In Illjes' May 1979 inter-view, when asked when in the evening of the 28th he remembered a discussion of a hydrogen explosion, he stated:

... (W]e were discussing (a hydrogen explosion) with, I can't remember if it was one of our en-gineers. But we did have a pressure spike. We pulled it out and I don't know who wanted a copy but we made a couple of copies of the chart."

JME 1(c)(36), at 7 (Illjes). The interviewer left no doubt as to the association:

A. ... [W] hen it was turned over it was men-tiened that we did have a pressure spike, when we turned over. That was the only thing that was mentioned, and that they had recovered from reactor building isolation.

Q. So a pressure spike was discussed at the turn over, when you first came in, about 3:45. And then somewhere about 8:00 fur-ther discussion and also xerox copies?

A. Right 65/ The Board in fact noted the basis for Dieckamp's statement

- during TMIA's cross-examination. Tr. 28,796-806. See also Tr.

28,835-36.

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L Id., at 8-9 (emphasis added). Illjes further stated:

We didn't really have that much time to do a-lot of discussion, but we talked about it and when I walked away from the panel, the guy that wanted the copy, you know, he wanted it now, and I had to walk away from the panel to make sure that the other guy, my shift supervisor, was there while I walked, away, so ...

Id., at 10. Illjes clearly connected the discussion of hydro-gen with request for photocopies of the strip chart -- and Illjes' present testimony, the statements of many other indi-viduals, and the physical evidence demonstrate that neither oc- .

curred on the evening of the 28th. See LIC PF 94-104.

REPLY 187. TMIA states that Dieckamp " fails to mention that Illjes reaffirmed his early testimony in a September 24, 1980 NRC interview, stating three times that he recalls a dis-cussion of hydrogen or noncondensible gas on March 28." TMIA PF 260. TMIA's characterization of Illjes' September 1980 statement is inaccurate. Illjes would not confirm that hydro-

_ gen was discussed:

Q. Is it still your recollection that hydrogen was discussed on March 28, 1979, as a pos-sible cause of the pressure spike?

A. To my recollection, we discussed the pres-sure spike.

Q. Was hydrogen a part of those discussions, do you recall?

A. I don't remember.

Q. When you said " pressure spike," you used

'- that intentionally? You were talking about the pressure. spike?

-110-

A. Yes.

Q. And not necessarily hydrogen?

A. It's hard for me to separate all the dis-cussion that was made on-that night. I can't really say, because it was discussed how many times thereafter, and that far apart, I can't relate the difference.

JME 1(c)(127), at 6-7 (Illjes). Similarly, in this interview, Illjes remembered a problem with a bubble in the reactor ves-sel, but did not confirm that the' bubble was a hydrogen bubble.

Id., at 10.

REPLY 188. With respect to Chwastyk, TMIA again accuses Dieckamp of demanding absolute proof. TMIA PF 261-64. This accusation is simply a distortion of Dieckamp's testimony. See LIC REPLY 176, supra. Dieckamp reviewed Chwastyk's statements.

Dieckamp noted that in Chwastyk's initial May 21, 1979 inter-view, Chwastyk referred to the pressure spike only as being the result of "some kind of explosion" and that Chwastyk stated he did not understand its cause. He did not even mention the word hydrogen. Dieckamp, ff Tr. 28,316, at 14. See LIC PF 61.

Dieckamp traced the evolution in Chwastyk's recollection, and noted that it was not until September 1980 that Chwastyk indi-cated that he deduced from the pressure spike that a zirconium-water reaction had occurred. Id., at 15. Even then, Dieckamp noted~a lack of any meaningful discussion evidencing Chwastyk's

-understanding of the phenomenon. Id., at 15-16, quoting JME 1(c)(117), at 95-96 (Chwastyk). Dieckamp also noted that Chwastyk left the block valve open for more than an hour after

-111-

the spike and subsequently resisted the instruction to increase high pressure injection, actions which demonstrate a lack of appreciation for the cause of the spike. Tr. 28,719-20, 28,821-22, 28,829-42, 28,936-37 (Dieckamp). Based on this rea-soned analysis, Dieckamp could not conclude that Chwastyk cor-rectly interpreted the pressure spike. The Board finds, con-trary to TMIA's characterization, that Dieckamp's analysis was not only reasonable, but well substantiated.

REPLY 189. TMIA also argues that "it reflects poorly on Dieckamp's integrity that he refuses to acknowledge the Chwastyk, Mehler and Illjes' interviews as 'some evidence.'"

TMIA PF 265. Dieckamp, however, did in fact acknowledge post-mailgram interviews as some evidence and indicated that if he were drafting the mailgram today, he would delete the phrase, "no evidence." Tr. 28,757, 28,357 (Dieckamp). See also LIC PF 134.

REPLY 190. TMIA's final attack on Dieckamp's belief that no one interpreted the pressure spike in terms of reactor core damage is an attempt to somehow impeach that belief by refer-ence to an " untitled piece" written by three Licensee employees and addressing Licensee's knowledge of core damage. See TMIA PF 266-270. This untitled piece, however, is not as TMIA char-acterizes it, the findings of an internal company investiga-tion. It was an incomplete draft summarizing prior statements

-- the same statements available to the Board as evidence in this hearing. See TMIA Mailgram Exh. 15. See also Tr.

28,878-88 (Dieckamp).

-112-

m REPLY 191. TMIA does not assert that Dieckamp was aware of this draft prior to this hearing; he was not. Tr. 28,887 (Dieckamp). Rather, TMIA argues that Dieckamp should now defer to the conclusions of this draft. But TMIA gives no reason why Dieckamp should abandon his own reasoned analysis. This incom-pleted product is hardly a weighty or conclusive product and is in fact much less significant than the investigative reports of which Dieckamp was previously aware. Compare, for example, JME 1(c)(106) (SIG Report), JME 1(c)(107) (Rogovin/Frampton Memo-randum), and JME 1(c)(142) (NUREG-0760). See also LIC PF 100, 128, 130.

REPLY 192. TMIA also argues that the Board should assign particular weight to the conclusions of this draft. The Board rejects.this suggestion. TMIA Mailgram Exh. 15 was not admit-ted for the-truth of the matter asserted therein. Tr.

30,883-906. Moreover, even.had it been, the Board would find its incomplete analysis and lay opinion to be hearsay evidence of little probative value.

Dieckamp's Consideration of NUREG-0760 REPLY 193. TMIA's next point decribes Dieckamp's reliance on NUREG-0760. TMIA PF 271-283. TMIA argues that, on the basis of the testimony of David Gamble, the Board should give

~ no weight to the conclusions in NUREG-0760.

RE2LY 194. The Board does not believe, however, that Gam-ble's testimony discredited the findings or conclusions

-113-

contained in.NUREG-0760. For the reasons cogently set forth in the NRC Staff proposed finding 4 (proposing paragraphs 57A-57P be inserted in Licensee's proposed findings), the Board deter-mines that NUREG-0760 was not an inadequate investigation as alleged by. Gamble and, in turn, by TMIA.

REPLY 195. The Board also observes that TMIA misperceives Licensee's case and argument. Licensee has not advocated that the Board defer to the findings and conclusions in NUREG-0760.

Rather, Licensee points to NUREG-0760 for two purposes which are independent of the truth of the matter asserted therein.

First, NUREG-0760 evidences that a reasonable man, after review of the evidence and facts, could reach the same conclusion as did Dieckamp. See LIC PF 126, 130. Second, NUREG-0760, along with the other investigatory reports, demonstrates that all ev-idence subsequently adduced was widely and publicly known. See LIC PF 123. The Board's consideration of NUREG-0760 with re-spect to these points is perfectly appropriate.

IV.C. Whether There is Evidence That Mr. Dieckamp Expected the NRC to Rely on the Mailgram For Any Regulatory Purpose?66/

(Response to TMIA PF 174-178)

REPLY 196. TMIA asserts that the Dieckamp mailgram was

' intended to be a statement by Licensee to the Nuclear 66/ The Reply Findings in this section are intended to follow LIC PF 133 in Licensee's proposed findings of January 28, 1985.

-114-L

Regulatory Commission to convince agency officials that Licens-ee had not withheld information. See TMIA PF 174-178. How-ever, as discussed below, the Board finds TMIA's assertion to be conclusory and unsupported.

REPLY 197. TMIA states that "Dieckamp claimed that the mailgram was not intended to have any official regulatory pur-pose." TMIA PF 174. What Dieckamp stated at the transcript page cited by TMIA was that the mailgram was not intended to be a communication to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Tr.

28,752 (Dieckamp). Nevertheless, the gist of TMIA's statement is true. Congressman Udall was the primary addressee; and copies were sent to at least two NRC Commissioners for their information. The mailgram was written in the first person. It stated Dieckamp's personal views. It neither requested nor ad-vocated any agency action whatsoever. See Dieckamp, ff Tr.

28,316, attachment. Dieckamp testified that he sent the mail-gram because he was disturbed by what he believed to be misin-formation and wished to inform Congressman Udall and others that he took exception to the implications of the New York )

Times article. See LIC PF 133.

REPLY 198. TMIA proposes that the Board reject the direct i

, testimony of Dieckamp on the subject of his intent, and states that Commissioner Kennedy "used" the mailgram "to answer cer-tain questions posed by the House oversight committee." TMIA PF 174. Commissioner-Kennedy's use of the mailgram, however, is irrelevant to Dieckamp's intent. It provides no basis for

-115-

tejecting Dieckamp's testimony -- testimony that is certainly

the.most probative indication of the purpose of the mailgram.

Furthermore, the Board notes that Commissioner Kennedy's use was no more than to inform the House Committee that he had re-ceived a copy of the mailgram. There is no indication that Commissioner Kennedy used it to " answer questions." JME 1(c)(29), at 190 (Udall Committee Task Force Hearings).

REPLY 199. TMIA attempts to discredit Dieckamp by stating that he " denied" sending the mailgram to any Commissioner other than Commissioner Gilinsky "until confronted" with a copy he sent to Commissioner Kennedy. TMIA PF 175. Dieckamp did not

" deny" sending the mailgram to any Commissioner other than Com-missioner Gilinsky. When asked whether he remembered sending a copy to other Commissioners, Dieckamp replied: "The only thing that I know today is what the mailgram itself says. I know of no action on my part to distribute it separate and apart from what is indicated on the mailgram itself." Tr. 28,962 (Dieckamp).

REPLY 200. The Board does not find it surprising that Dieckamp did not remember that a copy had been sent to Commis -

sioner Kennedy or whether copies had been sent to Commissioners other than Gilinsky. The mailgram was addressed to Congressman Udall. Dieckamp believed that Commissioner Gilinsky was sent a copy because he too had been present during the Congressional tour of TMI on May 7' '1979.

, Tr. 28,752 (Dieckamp). Appar-ently, Dieckamp decided that if he were to send a copy to one

-116-

Commissioner, other Commissioners should also receive a copy.

'That Dieckamp no longer remembers sending copies to other Com-missioners indicates the insignificance of this action to Dieckamp. They were true copy addressees.p7/

REPLY 201. TMIA also argues that the fact that Dieckamp was questioned in an October, 1981 Commission meeting on the mailgram indicates the mailgram was submitted to the Commission for regulatory purposes. TMIA PF 177. In so stating, TMIA re-fers to facts not in evidence and violates the Board's ruling striking.(at TMIA's request) reference to the subject matter of the very same Commission meeting. See Tr. 28,889-91. In addi-tion, the argument is illogical. Dieckamp's intent in sending the mailgram cannot reasonably be determined by the fact of his being subsequently questioned.38/

REPLY 202. Accordingly, the Board rejects TMIA's conclu- .

sion that the Dieckamp mailgram was intended to be an official regulatory submission by Licensee to the Commission. See TMIA PF 178. TMIA's conclusion is unsubstantiated by the evidence and testimony. The Board accepts Dieckamp's uncontradicted testimony regarding his intentions.

.-17/ The mailgram copies of the Udall mailgram necessarily show the Commissioners as addressees however, the first sentence states: "This is a copy of a mailgram sent to the Honorable Mor-ris K. Udall, Washington, D.C. 20L75." JME 1(c)(142), App. B at 117-1 (NUREG-0760). See also TMIA EAh. 14.

sg/ Had the Board accepted the transcript of the Commission's October.14, 1981 Commission meeting into evidence, we would note that no Commissioner mentioned having used or relied upon the mailgram in the course of this questioning.

-117-i

7.._

IV.D Whether it Would Have Served Any Public or Regulatory Purpose for Mr. Dieckamp to Report the Subsequent Statements to the Extent They Constitute Some Evidence That Such an Interpre-tation Had Been Made at the Time the Spike Occurred on March 28, 1979, or That Any Such Information Was Withheld?69/

(Response to TMIA PF 312-315)

REPLY 203. TMIA's proposed findings regarding the purpose to be served by correcting the mailgram (TMIA PF 312-315) are unsupported by a single citation. TMIA first asserts, in conclusory manner, that Dieckamp knew that Licensee properly interpreted the pressure spike on the first day of the acci-dent. TMIA PF 313. Since the Board has rejected this claim (see LIC REPLY 28-56, supra), it provides no basis for a duty

-to correct.

REPLY 204.

TMIA next claims that irrespective of Dieckamp's knowledge, persons such as Mehler, Chwastyk, and Illjes properly interpreted the pressure spike at the time it occurred. TMIA PF 314. Mehler and Illjes, however, certainly never correctly interpreted the pressure spike on the day of the accident. See LIC REPLY 75, supra; LIC PF 94-104. With respect to Chwastyk, the Board concludes that the preponderance of the evidence indicates that Chwastyk also did not interpret the pressure spike in terms of core damage at the time of the spike. See LIC PF 119. See also LIC REPLY 75-106, supra.

.jyL/ The Reply Findings in this section are intended to follow LIC PF~134 in Licensee's proposed findings of January 28, 1985.

-118-I i

{-

i k

l REPLY 205. Even if the Board had reached a contrary con-l clusion with respect.to Mr. Chwastyk, however, the Board would not impose upon Mr. Dieckamp a duty to correct. In the Board's opinion that duty would only arise if Mr. Dieckamp knew his conclusion was inaccurate. The Board finds a reasonable man l

could evaluate the evidence and conclude -- as did Mr. Dieckamp

-- that the spike was not correctly interpreted. Since Mr.

l Dieckamp's conclusion is reasonable, he is entitled to it; his 1

defense of his belief casts no aspersion on his integrity and he is not required to disavow that belief.

Respectfully submitted, SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE W. YAs f Ernest L. Blake, Jr., P.C.

David R. Lewis Counsel for Licensee Dated: February 25, 1985

{'

-119-

APPENDIX A Index to Licensee, NRC Staff and TMIA Proposed Findings and Licensee Reply Findings

1. Licensee Proposed Findings (Dated January 28, 1985)

LIC PF Page LIC PF Page 1 1 63 46 2 2 64 47 3-5 3 65-68 50 6 5 69-70 53 7 6 71-73 54 8-10 7 74-76 55 11-13 8 77-78 56 14 9 79 57 15 10 80-83 58 16-17 11 84 60 18-19 14 85 62 20-21 15 86 64 22-24 16 87-89 67 25-26 17 90-92 68 27 18 93-94 69 28-29 -

19 95 70 30-31 20 96 71 32 21 97 73 33 22 98-99 74 34 23 100 75 35-37 24 101 77 38-39 26 102-103 78 40 27 104-105 79 41-42 28 106-111 80 43 29 112-116 81 44-45 30 117-119 82 46-47 32 121-122 83 48-49 34 122 (repeat no.) 84 50 35 123 85 51 36 124-125 86 52-55 37 126 87 56-57 38 127-128 88 58 39 129-130 90 59-60 40 131 91 61 43 132-133 92 62 44 134 93

2. NRC Staff Proposed Findings (Dated February 15, 1985)

STAFF PF Page STAFF PF Page 1-2 2 10 19 3-4 3 11-12 20 5-6 13 13-14 21 7-8 16 15 22 9 18

3. TMIA Proposed Findings (Dated February 8, 1985, as amended)

TMIA PF Page TMIA PF Page 1 1 158-159 59 2-4 2 160-163 60 5-6 3 164-165 61 7-9 4 166-168 62 10-12 5 169-170 63 13-14 6 171-173 64 15-17 7 174-177 65 18-19 8 178-180 66 20-21 9 181-182 67 22-25 10 183-187 68 26 11 188-191 69 27-29 12 192-193 70 30-32 13 194-195 71 33-36 14 196-198 72 37-39 15 199-200 73 40-42 16 201-202 74 43-46 17 203-206 75 47-49 18 207-209 76 50-52 19 210-212 77 53-54 20 213-215 78 55-57 21 216-219 79 58-59 -

22 220-222 80 60-61 23 223-225 81 62-6.4 24 226-228 82 65-67 25 229-231 83 68-69 26 232-234 84 70-72 27 235-236 85 73-76 28 237 86 77-78 29 238-241 87 79-80 30 242-243 88 81-84 31 244-245 89 85-87 32 246-249 90 88-90 33 250-251 91 91-92 34 252-254 92 93-95 35 255-258 93 96-99 36 259-261 94 100-101 37 262-264 95 102-103 39 265-267 96 104-106 40 268-270 97 107-109 41 271-274 98 110-111 42 275-276 99 l 112-114 43 277-279 101 115-117 44 280-281 102 118-120 45 282-285 103 121-123 46 286-288 104

, 124-125 47 289-290 105

! 126-128 48 291-293 106 129-132 49 294-295 107 133-135 50 296-298 108 136 51 299-302 109 l

137-138 52 303-304 110 139-140 53 305-306 111 141-143 54 107-309 112 144-146 55 310-312 113 147-150 56 313-315 114 i 151-153 57 316-318 115 154-157 58 319 116 L_

l

4. Licensee Reply Findings (Dated February 25, 1985) j l

LIC REPLY Page LIC REPLY Page 1 5 86-88 57 2-3 6 89-90 58 4-6 7 91-93 59 7-9 8 94-96 60 10-11 9 97-98 61 12-13 10 99 62 14-15 11 100-101 63 16-17 12 102-103 64 18-19 13 104-105 65 20-21 14 106 66 22 15 107-108 67 23-24 16 109 68 25-26 17 110-112 69 27-28 18 113-114 70 29-30 19 115-116 71 31 20 117 72 32 21 118 73 33-34 22 119 74 35-36 23 120-121 75 37-38 24 122 76 39 25 123-124 77 40 26 125-126 78 41-44 27 127 79 45 28 128-130 80 46 29 131-132 81 47-48 30 133 82 49-50 31 134-136 83 51-52 34 137-138 84 53 35 139-140 85 54-55 37 (., 141-142 86 56-58 38 143-145 87 59-60 39 146-148 88 61 40 149-150 90 62 41 151-152 91 63-64 42 153-155 92 65 43 156-158 93 66 44 159 94 67 45 160-161 95

, 68-69 46 162-163 96 70-71 47 164 97 72 48 165-167 98 73 49 168 99 74-75 50 169-170 100 76-78 51 171-173 101 79-80 52 174 102 81-82 53 175-176 103 83 54 177-178 104 84 55 179 105 85 56 180-181 106

LIC REPLY Page 182-183 107 184-185 108 186 109 187 110 188 111 189-190 112 191-194 113 195-196 114 197-198 115 199-200 116 201-202 117 203-204 118 205 119

/

APPENDIX B INDEX Licensee Reply to TMIA Proposed Findings TMIA PF LIC REPLY TMIA PF LIC REPLY l 51 61, 75, 91, 94 2 52 61, 75, 95 3 53 61, 75, 96-98 4 54 61, 75, 99 5 5 55 61, 75, 99 6 56 61, 75, 99 7 57 61, 75, 99, 100 8 6 58 61, 75, 99, 101 9 7 59 61, 75, 99, 104 10 8 60 61, 75, 99, 104 11 61 61, 75, 99, 104 i 12 9 62 61, 75, 99, 102-103 13 63 61, 75, 99 14 64 61, 75, 99 15 62 65 61, 75, 105 16 62 66 61, 75, 105 17 62, 63 67 61, 75, 105 18 62, 66-67 68 61, 75, 106 19 62, 68 69 61, 75, 106 20 62, 70 n.32, 71 70 61, 75, 106 21 61,,62, 64-65 71 61, 107, 108, 126 22 61, 62, 65 72 61, 107, 109, 110, 115 23 61, 62, 65 73 61, 107, 111-114 24 61, 62, 65 n.28 74 61, 107 25 61, 62, 71 75 61, 107, 115 26 61, 62, 66 n.29, 69, 70 76 61, 107, 116-117 27 61, 75, 77 77 61, 107, 118 28 61, 75, 77 78 61, 107, 119 29 61, 75, 78 79 61, 107, 120-121 30 61, 75 80 61, 107, 122 31 61, 75, 79 81 61, 107, 123 l 32 61, 75, 79 82 61, 107 33 61, 75, 79, 116 83 61, 107, 124-126 34 61, 75, 79 84 61, 107, 125 l

35 61, 75, 80 85 61, 107 36 61, 75, 79 n.36, 115 86 61, 107,108 n.43, 126 37 61, 75, 81 .

87 61, 107 38 61, 75 88 61, 107 39 61, 75, 82 89 61, 107, 127 n.52 l

40 61, 75, 83 90 61, 107, 127, 128-129 l 41 61, 75, 84 91 61, 107, 130 42 61, 75, 85, 111-114 92 61, 107 43 61, 75, 85, 111-114 93 61, 107, 131 44 61, 75, 85 n.40, 111-114 94 61, 107, 132 45 61, 75, 86 95 61, 107, 133 46 61, 75, 87 96 61, 107, 134-136 47 61, 75, 88 97 61, 107, 136 48 61, 75, 89 98 61, 107, 137 49 61, 75, 90 99 61, 107, 137 50 61, 75,'91-94 100 61, 107, 137

TMIA PF LIC REPLY TMIA PF LIC REPLY 101 61, 107, 137 151 61, 164 102 61, 138-141 152 61, 165-166 103 61, 154 . 153 61, 166 104 61 154 61 105 61, 142 155 61, 167 n.59 106 61, 143 156 61, 167 n.59 107 61, 143-144 157 61, 167 n.59 108 61 158 61, 167 n.59 109 61, 146 159 61, 167 n.59 110 61, 146 160 61 111 61, 139, 145, 154 161 61, 168, 168 n.60 112 61 162 61, 168 n.60 113 61, 147 163 61, 169 114 61 164 61, 169 115 61, 147-148 165 61, 170 116 61, 139, 154 166 61, 171 117 61 167 61, 155 n.56, 172 118 61 168 72, 73-74 119 61 169 72, 72 n.34 120 61, 139, 149, 154 170 174 n.62 121 61 171 122 61 172 123 61 173 124 61 ' 174 196-198 125 61, 150 175 196, 199-200 126. 61 176 196 127 61, 139, 150, 154 177 196, 201 128 61 178 196, 202 129 61, 139, 154 179 130 61 180 131 61 181 132 61, 151 182 >

133 61 183 134 61, 139, 154 184 135 61, 152-153 185 136 61 186 137 61, 155, 155 n.56 187 138 61 188 139 61, 156-157 189 140 61, 158 190 -

141 61 191 40 n.19, 40 142 61, 159 192 30-35 143 61, 159-160 193 30, 32 n.15 144 61, 159, 161 194 30, 30 n.13 145 61, 159, 161 n.57 195 146 61, 159, 162 196 147 61, 163 197 28-29, 36 148 61, 164 198 37 149 61, 164 199 37 150 61 200 28-29, 38 TMIA PF LIC REPLY TMIA PF LIC REPLY 201 28, 29, 38-39 251 174, 180-183 202 28,;29, 37-39 252 174, 180-183

-203 36 n.17 253 174, 180-183 204 36 n.17 254 174, 180-183 205 32 n.15 255 174, 180-183 206 256 174, 180-183 207 41, 42 257 174, 184 208 44-45 258 174, 185 209 44-45 259 174, 186 210 44-45 260 174, 187 211 41, 43 261 174, 188 212 44-45 262 174, 188 213 46-48 263 174, 188 214 46-48 264 174, 188 215 46-48 265 174, 189 216 46-48 266 174, 190-192 217 46 267 174, 190-192 218 268 174, 190-192 219 269 174, 190-192 220 270 174, 190-192 221 47, 48 271 174, 193-195*

222 41 272 174, 193-195*

223 46 273 174, 193-195*

224 41 .

274 174, 193-195*

225 41 275 174, 193-195*

226 41 276 174, 193-195*

227 277 174, 193-195*

228 50, 51 278 174, 193-195*

229 51-54 279 174, 193-195*

230 16, 51-54 280 174, 193-195*

231 51-54 281 174, 193-195*

232 51, 55-56 282 174, 193-195*

233 51, 55-56 283 174, 193-195*

234 51, 55-56 284 11 235 51, 55-56 285 11 236 50 286 11 237 287 11, 14 238 288 11, 15 239 174-176 289 11, 15

! 240 174-176 290 11, 16 l 241 10, 174, 180 291 11, 16, 17 l 242' 174 292 11, 18-20 l 243 174 293 11, 18-20

244 174, 177-178 294 11, 21 245 174, 177-178 295 11, 21 246 174, 179 296 11, 21 247 174, 179 297 11, 22-24 l 248 174, 180-183 298 11, 18, 26-27 l 249 174, 180-183 299 11, 18

!. 250 174, 180-183 300 11, 18, 20 n.10

• STAFF PF 4 (proposing i additional findings 57A-l 57P to Licensee proposed findings)

f

~

l l

TMIA PP LIC REPLY j

301 11-302 11 303 11 304 57

. 305 57-58 306 57-58 307 57,59-60 308 57-58 309 57-58 310 311 312 -203 313 203 314 203-205 315 203 316 317 318 1

4 5

4

- ~ . _ - . . -

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q l

. - !. w 00LKEirD ,

Februare d$, 1985 1 1

'*85 IE8 26 P352 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA yk.

l NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Tffgg

, u ;8 MEN -

BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSINd B'OARD7;? '

.. - .ww.

w;,n: A In the Matter of )

)

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY )' Docket No. 50-289

) (Restart Remand (Three Mile Island Nuclear ) on Management)

Station, Unit No. 1) )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 4

I hereby certify that copies of " Licensee's Proposed Find-ings in Reply to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Dieckamp Mailgram Issue Submitted by TMIA and NRC Staff," dated February 25, 1985, were served upon those persons on the attached Service List by deposit in the United States mail, postage prepaid, this 25th day of February, 1985.

N is

~~~.

1. pi

%_ M y N David R. Lewis f Dated: February 25, 1985

m ..e . _ _ _ . . _ - ,_ -. _ . -_ _ _ . _ _ _ _

8-UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

)

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-289 (Restart Remand

)

(Three Mile Island Nuclear ) on Management)

Station, Unit No. 1) )

SERVICE LIST b

Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman Administrative Judge U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Gustave A. Linenberger, Jr.

Washington, D.C. 20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

~

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Thomas M. Roberts, Commissioner Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Administrative Judge Gary J. Edles James K. Asselstine, Commissioner Chairman, Atomic Safety and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Licensing Appeal Board Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-Frederick Bernthal, Commissioner U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Administrative Judge Washington, D.C. 20555 John H. Buck Atomic Safety and Licensing Lando W. Zeck, Jr., Commissioner Appeal Board i

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

. Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Administrative, Judge Administrative Judge b i .Ivan.W. Smith Christine N. Kohl l Chairman, Atomic Safety and Atomic Safety and Licensing

Licensing Board Appeal Board l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 l

i Administrative Judge Docketing and Service Section (3)

Sheldon J. Wolfe Office of the Secretary

< Atomic Safety'and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Washington, D.C. 20555 l

F tb  :

'4 l

SERVICE LIST PAGE 2 l

l l

Atomic Safety and Licensing Mr. Henry D. Hukill j Board Panel Vice President U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission GPU Nuclear Corporation Washington, D.C. 20555 P. O. Box 480 Middletown, PA. 17057 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel Mr. and Mrs. Norman Aamodt U.S. Nuclear. Regulatory Commission R. D. 5 Washington, D.C. 20555 Coatesville, PA. 19320 Jack R. Goldberg, Esquire Mrs. Louise Bradford Office of Executive Legal Director .TMI ALERT U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1011 Green Street Washington, D.C. 20555 Harrisburg, PA. 17102 Thomas Y. Au, Esquire Joanne Doroshow, Esquire Office of Chief Counsel The Christic Institute Department of Environmental 1324 North Capitol Street Resources Washington, D.C. 20002 505 Executive House P. O. Box 2357- Lynne Bernabei, Esquire Harrisburg, PA. 17120 Government Accountability

Project Michael F. McBride, Esquire 1555 Connecticut Avenue LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae Washington, D.C. 20036 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036 Ellyn R. Weiss, Esquire Harmon, Weiss & Jordan Michael W. Maupin, Esquire 2001 S Street, N.W., #430 Hunton & Williams Washington, D.C. 20009 707 East Main Street P. O. Box 1535 William T. Russell Richmond, VA 23212 Deputy Director, Division of Human Factors Safety Office of NRR Mail Stop AR 5200 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission*

Washington, D.C. 20555 i

l l

L .- , , - - . _ _ - _ ._ .__