ML20106G543
| ML20106G543 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 02/08/1985 |
| From: | Bernabei L, Doroshow J CHRISTIC INSTITUTE, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20106G518 | List: |
| References | |
| SP, NUDOCS 8502140405 | |
| Download: ML20106G543 (4) | |
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gen burn and demonstrative of core damage. 32 G. Conclusion 310.
We find Dieckamp should have known that the statements j
in his mallgram were, and are today, f alse.
Moreover, wi th minimal investigation, he would have discovered that licensee
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personnel properly interpreted the pressure spike as a hydrogen burn and and in response changed to repressurize to stabilize the reactor.
The Board finds unconvincing licensee's arguments in support of the " thrust" of Dieckamp's mailgram.
311.
Licensee has continued to defend the accuracy of the f
mallgram.
The Board believes that Dieckamp and licensee's in-1 j
transigence on this point, given the extensive evidence presented t
of Met Ed and GPU Service Corporation awareness of the signifi-cance of the pressure spike on March 28, 1979, reflects poorl'y on management competence and character.
V.
DIECKAMP SHOULD HAVE CORRECTED THE MAILGRAM ONCE HE 4
DETERR1REFThlt 37KTEMRTT1R TRE M11TRUFm7EltYFAl,SE.
i 312.
Licensee argues in its Proposed Findings that "given f
the fact that the mailgram was accurate when sent, that its i
i thrust remains a reasonable conclusion today, and that all subse-(
quently adduced contrary evidence was fully known by all
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concerned, it was certainly unnecessary for Mr. Dieckamp to I
inform the mallgram recipients that the pref atory phrase 'there j
32 Dieckamp testified that even though Faust, in this interview, i
indicated he understood the spike was real and was a type of explosion, Dieckamp was "not able to go beyond that in terms of any significance he might have ascribed to it."
Tr. 28,674.
l However, Dieckamp could not come up with any other plausible explanation for an explosion other than the actual one -- a 4
I hydrogen burn.
Tr. 28,964-966.
See also JME l-C(ll4) at 2.
i*
l 113 8502140405 850212 4
i PDR ADOCK 05000289 i
G PDR
is not ovidsnso' ces no Icngor literal."
Licensoo's Proposed
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (January 28, 1985), at 94.
313.
None of the statements contained in the above conclu-sion is true.
As discussed in Part II, supra, the Board believes j
Dieckamp did possess evidence, and in fact positive knowledge, i
j that Met-Ed and GPU Service Corporation personnel properly
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interpreted the pressure spike as a hydrogen burn on the first day of the accident. Therefore Dieckamp knew at the time he sent i
1 it that he was making false and inaccurate statements in the mailgram.
314.
Even if he did not know on May 9, 1979 the statements were false, the reality is that on May 9, 1979, persons such as Chwastyk, Mehler and Illjes had properly interpreted and re-1 sponded to the pressure spike at the time it occurred.
If l
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Dieckamp had done any investigation he would have discovered.this l
substantial evidence at that time.
See Section IV, supra.
315.
Moreover, Dieckamp's statement that the " thrust" of j
the mallgram is correct although the words may be literally f alse l.
makes no sense to this Licensing Board.
Licensee and its top management are obliged to be meticulcas in fully disclosing all material information within their possession to the NRC in order for the NRC to carry out its mission to protect the public health and safety. That responsibility cannot be any more important than i
during an accident.
Thus licensee's f ailure to provide informa-l tion about the pressure spike and hydrogen burn to the Commission i
on March 28 seriously compromised the Commission's ef fectiveness in carrying out that mission.
This fact licensee does not appre-114 i
cloto, ovcn today, oftor multiplo invsstigations, inquirlos cnd
\\
hearings on this mat ter.
VI.
CONCLUSION.
316.
The Board concludes that Dieckamp's mailgram of May 9, 1979 contains false statements since licensee personnel did properly interpret the pressure spike and containment sprays to indicate a hydrogen burn and core damage. Moreover, the highest levels of licensee management, including Dieckamp, were aware of the pressure spike and its significance by early on March 29.
Yet licensee f ailed to disclose this information to the NRC or to Commonwealth of Pennsylvania authoritles unti1 March 30.
The Board therefore finds false Dieckamp's claim in the mailgram that I
there was no withholding of information.
317.
The Board has also found from the extensive record developed in this hearing, that Dieckamp knew that his mallgram was f alse at the time he sent it since he was informed during the afternoon of March 28 by Herbein, Miller and Kunder of their understanding of the pressure spike, and later on the morning of March 29 through Keaten of the GPUSC group's evaluation of the hydrogen burn.
318.
Even if Dieckamp did not know on May 9, 1979 that the statements in his mailgram were f alse at the time he sent it, he should have known given the extensive information available to the company that licensee employees understood the pressure spike to be a hydrogen burn and responded by changing to a repressuri-zation evolution.
A minimal investigation would have uncovered the simple fact that the mailgram contained false statements.
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e g
319.
We conclude licensee management has demonstrated ex-tremely poor character in continuing to defend false statements in Dieckamp's mailgram of May 9, 1979. Licensee's refusal to accept reporting responsibilities to the NRC demonstrates a basic lack of integrity which prevents this Board from finding licensee management has adequate integrity and competence to operate TMI-1 safely.
Respectfully submitted, 4
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oanne Doroshow The Christic Institute 1324 North Capitol Street Washington, D.C. 20036 I
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Ly e Bernabel Geo ge Shohet Go ernment Accountability Project 1655 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Suite 202 I
Washington, D. C. 20036 i
Attorneys for j
Three Mile Island Alert l
DATED: FEBRUARY 8, 1985 4
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116 i
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