ML20039E311

Proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law on Issues Raised in Reopened TMI-1 Restart Proceeding,Submitted to Special Master in Form of Recommended ASLB Initial Decision

ML20039E311
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	01/05/1982
From:	Blake E METROPOLITAN EDISON CO., SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE
To:
References
ISSUANCES-SP, NUDOCS 8201070142
Download: ML20039E311 (247)

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C i il 'sc UNITED STATES OFMAMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ECE/yED Sb --

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BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

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4 at to In the Matter of )

, ) Docket No. 50-289 SP METROPOLITAN LDISON COMPANY )

) (Restart)

(Three Mile Island Nuclear )

Station, Unit No. 1) ) (Reopened Proceeding) l LICENSEE'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON ISSUES' RAISED IN REOPENED TMI-l RESTART PROCEEDING (SUBMITTED TO THE SPECIAL MASTER IN THE FORM OF A RECOMMENDED INITIAL DECISION BY THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD) e g5S II I pi- r}

( Ca 8201070142 820105 PDR ADOCK 05000289 o PDR

l LIC 1/5/82 UNITED STATES OF. AMERICA ~

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

) Docket No. 50-289 SP METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY )

) (Restart)

(Three Mile Island Nuclear )

Station, Unit No. 1) ) (Reopened Proceeding)

LICENSEE'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON ISSUES RAISED IN REOPENED TMI-l RESTART PROCEEDING (SUBMITTED TO THE SPECIAL MASTER IN THE FORM OF A RECOMMENDED INITIAL DECISION BY THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD)

TABLE OF CONTENTS-PAGE I. INTRODUCTION AF- ., MKGROUND........................... 1 A. The Licensing Board's Prior Decision on Management Issues............................. 1 B. Reopening of TMI-l Restart Proceeding............ 2 C. The Matter of Confidentiality.................... 7 D. The Scope of the Reopened Proceeding. . . . . . . . . . . . . ll E. Miscellaneous Procedural Matters................ 17 II. THE QUALITY OF TMI-l OPERATING PERSONNEL. . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 A. Introduction.................................... 19 B. The Cheating Incident on the April, 1981 NRC Examinations................................ 22 1, Discovery of Cheating and Licensee Response................................... 22 1

'ii) Extent and Manner of Cheating by Messrs. O and W............................ 25 (iii) Reporting of the O and W Cheating Incident by Other Operating Personnel. . . . . . 29 C. Parallelisms Discovered on Make-Up Quizzes

and Mock NRC Exams of Other Candidates.......... 31 4

(i) Messrs. G and H............................ 31 (11) Messrs. GG, W and MM....................... 46 (iii) Messrs. S and Y............................ 50 (iv) Mr. Boltz and the ATTS Answer Key. . . . . . . . . . 51 D. Incidents of Cheating Reported b Licensee Personnel.......................y ................ 52 (i) Shipman Incident........................... 52 (ii) KK Telephone Call.......................... 57.

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(iii)WW Telephone Call.......................... 63 (iv) 00, P and Q Quiz Incident.................. 66 (v) Statement of Mr. I......................... 68 (vi) Possible Solicitation of Mr. P During NRC Exams.................................. 69 E. Rumors of Cheating.............................. 77 (i) Mr. Polon Rumors........................... 77 (ii) Rumors about Mr. U and Crib Sheets......... 80 (iii) Individual Stationed Outside the Exam Room to Provide Answers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2 (iv) Rumor Concerning Passing Papers............ 88 III. MANA GEM ENT INTE GRI TY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 0 A. Management Culpability With Regard to Cheating..................................... 91 B. Licensee's Investigation of and Response to Cheating........................... 113 (i) Licensee's Investigation of Cheating.................................. 113 (ii) Licensee's Response to Cheating........... 121 C. Management Constraints on NRC's Investigations................................. 132 D. Adequacy of Licensee's Management Response to July, 1979 Incident................ 141 E. Management Involvement In Cheating On RNP Exams........... ....................... 156 IV. LICENSEE'S VERIFICATION OF OPERATORS' QUALIFICATIONS...................................... 159 A. Past Training Administrative Practices......... 160 B. Coaching....................................... 167 C. Current Training Administrative Practices...................................... 176 D. Licensee's Operator Certification Process........................................ 180

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V. THE ADEQUACY OF THE NRC STAFF'S CHEATING INVESTIGATIONS AND EXAM ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES AT TMI-1.......... 186 I A. The NRC Staff's Investigations of Cheating at TMI-1....................................... 187 B. The NRC Staff's Operator License Exam Administrative Practices....................... 196 C. The NRC Staff's Review of the Category T Exams. 208 VI. SHIFT STAFFING AT TMI-1............................. 209 VII. FACTUAL

SUMMARY

..................................... 211 VIII. CONC LUS IONS OF LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of .)

) Docket No. 50-289 SP METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY )

) (Restart)

(Three Mile Island Nuclear )

Station, Unit No. 1) ) (Reopened Proceeding)

LICENSEE'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON ISSUES RAISED IN REOPENED TMI-l RESTART PROCEEDING I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND A. The Licensing Board's Prior Decision on Management Issues

1. On August 27, 1981, the Licensing Board issued a partial initial decision ("PID") in the Three Mile Island, Unit 1 ("TMI-1") restart proceedire. LBP-81 __, 14 N.R.C.

(1981).- Included in the PID were the Licensing Board's findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to both the procedural bac' ground of the TMI-l restart proceeding and the management issues raised by the Commission or the parties.

l 14 N.R.C. at  ; PID 1 41.

2. The TMI-l restart proceeding has as its genesis the Commission's July 2 and August 9, 1979 Orders, which directed the Licensee, Metropolitan Edison Company (" Licensee" or " Met Ed") to maintain TMI-l in a shutdown condition pending further order of the Commission.1 In its August 9, 1979 Order and Notice of Hearing, Metropolitan Edison Company (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1), CLI-79-8, 10 N.R.C. 141 (1979), the Commission specified the basis for its concerns about the operation of TMI-1. Included among its concerns were management-related issues, which were further delineated by the Commission in a March 6, 1980 Order. See CLI-80-5, 11 N.R.C.

408 (1980). These issues were litigated extensively, and were the subject of the PID.

B. Reopening of TMI-l Restart Proceeding

3. Just prior to the time the PID was issued in August, 1981, the Board received notifications from the NRC Staff, along with information from Licensee and Staff counsel, that the Staff was investigating allegations of cheating involving two of Licensee's TMI-l shif t supervisors who took j the NRC reactor operator ("RO") and senior reactor operator

("SRO") written examinations in April, 1981. See 14 N.R.C. at o

PID at 1 43.~ On the basis of the preliminary conclusions 1 On August 13, 1981, the Commission issued an Order granting Licensee's request to transfer to GPU Nuclear Corporation the authority to possess, use and operate TMI-1 and modifying its July 2, 1979, August 9, 1979, and March 6, 1980 Orders accordingly. See CLI-81-17, 14 N.R.C. _ (1981).

Consequently, for our purposes, any references herein to Licensee, Met Ed or GPU Nuclear Corporation are interchangeable. See PID 11 47-53.

2 The notifications and information consisted of (1) an initial Board notification (BN-81-17), dated July 28, 1981, (footnote continued on next page)

_ _ - - . _ . . _ . , _ _ _ , _ _ . - . , _ . . , _ . - . . ~ . - _ . , _ . _ . . _ ,

reached by the Staf f concerning the nature and extent of the cheating which occurred at TMI, the Board proceeded with the (continued) from Thomas M. Novak, Assistant Director for Operating Reactors, Division of Licensing; (2) a letter from Licensee's counsel, dated August 4, 1981; (3) an August 6, 1981 follow-up Board notification (BN-81-17A), enclosing a Memorandum from Mr.

Victor Stello, Jr., the Director of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement ("OIE"), to Mr. Harold R. Denton, the Director of NRR, summarily describing the results of OIE's July 1961 investigation; (4) a third Board notification (BN-81-17B),

dated August 7, 1981, enclosing the NRC Office of Inspector and Auditor ("OIA") investigative report and recommendations concerning the cheating incident; (5) a second letter from Licensee's counsel, dated August 10, 1981; (6) a letter from Staff counsel, dated August 13, 1981; (7) an August 14, 1981 Board notification (BN-81-17C) transmitting OIE's July, 1981 investigative report; and (8) an August 17, 1981 Board notification (BN-81-17D) transmitting correspondence between Mr. Herman Dieckamp, President of GPU Corporation, and Mr.

Harold R. Denton, the Director of NRR.

3 The preliminary Staff conclusions wera:

(1) two individuals acknowledged that they were involved in cheating on the examinations; (2) some sessions of the examinations were unproctored for extended periods of time; (3) there is no evidence of cheating by other Licensee employees who took the examinations; (4) there is no evidence that, except for the knowledge of the two individuals involved, the Licensee either knew of the cheating prior to the NRC Staff becoming aware of it (from a comparison of the answers) or attempted to facilitate cheating by its employees; (5) the Licensee has terminated the employment of the two employees; and (6) the Staff concludes there should be a reexamination of the other employees who passed the examination.

See Stello Memorandum, enclosed in August 6, 1981 Board Notification (BN-81-17A) from Thomas M. Novak; Denton letter, enclosed in August 17, 1981 Board notification (BN-81-17D).

(footnote continued on next page)

issuance of the PID. In the PID, however, we retained juris-diction to consider further the effect of the investigation of cheating on our management decision. 14 N.R.C. at  ; PID at 1 45.4 In particular, the PID expressly left open any conclu-sion with respect to operator testing and licensing. 14 N.R.C.

n.63; PID 1 584 n.63. We explained our decision to proceed with the issuance of the PID while retaining jurisdic-tion over issues which might be affected by the cheating incident as follows:

The issues of management integrity, the quality of its operating personnel, its ability to staf f the facility adequately, its training and testing program, and the NRC process by which the operators would be tested and licensed, are all important issues considered in this partial decision.

We will consider carefully the effect on such issues of the anticipated NRC Staff report, including whether there will be a reexamination of individuals who took the April examination, and the advice of the parties, to determine whether further actions by this Board appear warranted.

14 N.R.C. at  ; PID at t 45.

(continued)

Licensee unsuccessfully contested the re-examination requirement. See September 16, 1981 letter from NRC Chairman Palladino to Herman Dieckamp, President, General Public Utilities Corporation.

4 In doing so, the Board noted that its objective here was to give the Commission as much time as possible to review the PID before issuance of the subsequent decision on other issues.

By issuing our findings on training, staffing, and operator licensing in August, the Commission, if it so chose, could monitor the OIE investigation in the context of its relevance to the TMI-l restar t proceeding . See 14 N.R.C. at  ; PID at T 45.

4. In an Order dated August 20, 1981, we directed any party with an interest in management issues to advise us of its view as to whether further action, and if so, what action, should be taken in the restart proceeding with respect to the

, cheating incident. Parties seeking to take further investiga-tion, discovery, and/or move to reopen the proceeding to present evidence, were directed to identify what they would seek to prove, and to identify the bases for believing the further actions they sought would be useful. Parties who believed no further action was warranted similarly were asked to provide the bases for their conclusion.

5. In the event the proceeding was to be reopened to inquire into the operator cheating incident, the Board notified the parties that, pursuant t a 10 C.F.R. S 2.722, it would appoint Professor Gary L. Milhollin of the University of Wisconsin Law School, a part-time administrative judge with the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, to be a technical interrogator, an informal assistant and, subject to the consent of the parties, a Special Master. Board Memorandum and Order, dated August 24, 1981.

i 6. Two intervenors, the Aamodt family and Three l

Mile Island Alert, Inc. ("TMIA"), requested that the proceeding be reopened, and asserted their interest in participating

'therein. See Aamodt Responses to Board Orders [of] August 20 i

and 25, dated September 4, 1981; Petition of Three Mile Island Alert to Reopen the Record , September 8, 1981. Intervenor

-_______.-..__..-m._,______.m____.________.____.__-________u__

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l Anti-Nuclear Group Representing York (" ANGRY") requested that the Board direct the Staf f to further investigate the cheating matter, but did not ask the Board to reopen the record on its behalf. See Intervenor Anti Nuclear Group Representing York Submission of Views on the Investigation of Cheating at TMI, September 8, 1981. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ("the Commonwealth"), a 10 C.F.R. S2.715(c) interested state partici-pant, also expressed a keen interest in the cheating issue, although it did not move to reopen the record. See Letter from Adler, Attorney for the Commonwealth, to the Board , August 5, 1981. Licensee did not oppose reopening of the record. See Licensee's September 8, 1981 Response to Board Order Relative to the Submission of Views on the Investigation of Cheating dated August 20, 1981.

7. On September 14, 1981, the Board in a Memorandum and Order reopened the TMI-l restart proceeding record on matters related to cheating, scheduled a conference of the parties, and, as contemplated by our August 24, 1981, Order and without objection, appointed Judge Gary L. Milhollin to assist us as a Special Master, technical interrogator and informal assistant. The Board decided, sua sponte, to reopen the proceeding, based on our preliminary view that the information disclosed to date could have significant impact on the PID. A 5 On September 8, 1981, the Board issued a Memorandum and Order in which it granted a Staff request that its response date to the August 20, 1981 Order be. extended until September 15, 1981. In its September 15, 1981 Response, the Staff stated (footnote continued on next page) bifurcated prehearing conference was scheduled for October 2-3, 1981, in which the Board would determine the issues to be heard in the reopened proceeding under the general issue of the effect of the information on cheating on the issues considered or left open in the PID. Board Memorandum and Order, September 14, 1981, at 5. Judge Milhollin would then rule on the discovery and evidentiary matters and schedule. Finally, we asked the Staff to provide us with certain information respect-ing the NRC April examinations,0 and informed the parties of the procedure Judge Milhollin would utilize to rule on requests that such information remain confidential. Id. at 6-8.

C. The Matter of Confidentiality

8. The issue of confidentiality was pursued by a number of parties, including the Staff, Licensee, and attorneys who filed special appearances with the Board solely to (continued) that it considered further inquiry to be appropriate. See NRC Staff Response to the Board Relative to Views on the Investigation of Cheating, September 15, 1981.

6 Specifically, we requested: (1) unexpurgated copies of all previously filed Board notifications, including the OIA Report, the initial OIE Report, and the views of the OIE investigators; (2) Enclosure 1 to the initial OIE Report, which had been deleted when served; (3) information concerning seating diagrams, and the identification of proctors and relief proctors during the April, 1981 NRC examinations; and (4) the response of the Executive Director for Operations to the initial OIA Report. See Board Memorandum and Order, September 11, 1981, at 7, and NRC Staff counsel (Swartz) letter to Board, dated September 18, 1981.

_ _______ _a

l l

l

, represent the interests of three unnamed individuals, including the two individuals who cheated on the April,1981 NRC license examinations. See NRC Staff counsel (Swartz) letter to Board, dated September 18, 1981, and attached proposed Protective 2

Order; NRC Staff Brief on Need for Protective Order, Sdptember 24, 1981; Licensee's September 25, 1981 Response to Board Order Dated September 14, 1981 in the Matter of Confidentiality; Memorandum with Respect to Public Disclosure of Identities of Involved Individuals, September 28, 1981. In general, the Staff argued that the identities of the individuals who had admitted to cheating on the NRC's April,1981 examinations came within the discovery exemptions of 10 C.F.R. SS 2.790(a)(6) and (a)(7)(iii) and that, on balance, disclosure was unwarranted.

Thus, in the Staff's view, a protective order was necersary to protect the privacy rights of the individuals concerned.

Licensee initially expressed uncertainty as to whether it had a legal basis for resisting disclosure; nevertheless, it argued that disclosure was unnecessary as to these and other j individuals since the parties could effectively utilize a letter designation systen which had been used successfully by the parties earlier in the restart proceeding in lieu of identifying by name individuals whose traininC and testing 3 records were discussed on the record. Counsel for the three unnamed individuals asserted that nondisclosure was mandated, since it.would not inter fere with the pending adj udication.

Alternatively, a protective order wen requested.

1

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9. The requests for confidentiality were initially opposed by intervenors Aamodt and TMIA. The Aamodt family argued that a fair and thorough investigation required disclosure.

Aamodt Memorandum Opposing the Withholding of the Names of Operators Known to Have Cheated on Examinations, October 2, 1981.

TMIA maintained that a protective order was unwarranted and so burdensome on TMIA as to be unworkable. TMIA's Comments to Board Order Dated September 14, 1981 Concerning Confidentiality, October 1, 1981.

10. Oral argument on the matter of confidentiality was heard by the Special Master at the October 2, 1981, prehearing conference. See Tr. 23,190-222 (Milhollin, Trowbridge, Adler, McBride, Cole, Bradford, Clewett, Swartz). In an October 22, 1981 Memorandum and Order on Confidentiality, the Special Master ruled that there was no right on behalf of the individuals involved in cheating incidents, the Licensee, or the NRC Staff, to prevent the disclosure of the identities of these individuals during the hearing process. Counsel on behalf of three unnamed individuals, the NRC Staff and Licensee appealed to the Board the Special Master's confidentiality ruling on November 2, 3 and 4, respectively. See Board Memorandum and Order on October 2, 1981 Conference of the Parties Relative to Reopened Proceeding, October 14, 1981, at 7. On November 6, 1981, by Memorandum and Order, we affirmed the Special Master's Order on Confidentiality.

11. Although interlocutory appeals were taken from our Order by the Licensee and counsel on behalf of the three unnamed

i individuals and the Appeal Boar d stayed our Order pending appeal, the issue was made moot by the successful negotiation by the parties of a stipulation on confidentiality, which was approved and accompanied by an Order by the Special Master. See Metropolitan Edison Company (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-658, November 19, 1981. The key provisions of the confidentiality stipulation were:

(1) retention of the letter designation system in lieu of disclosure of the names of past and present TMI-l control room operators, shift foremen, shift supervisors, shift technical advisors, and one additional specified individual (except where an individual volunteers to disclose his or her identity);

(2) issuance of a protective Order requiring non-disclosure of letter-designated individuals; (3) provision to the Special Master and designa-ted counsel or representative (s) of the parties to the stipulation of the " key" which identified letter-designated individuals by name; (4) the use of in camera sessions for specified individualsT testimony, or when deemed appropriate by the Special Master; and (5) withdrawal of the appeal of the Licensing Board's Order affirming the Special Master's ruling on confidentiality (with the exception of the appeal by counsel for three unnamed individuals of those portions of the Board's opinion characterizing conduct of counsel).

In granting the unopposed requests to withdraw the appeals,7 the Appeal Board vacated the memoranda and orders of the 7 Counsel for the three unnamed individuals sought to withdraw their appeal except as to those portions of our decision which they considered to be characterizing the conduct of counsel. The Appeal Board considered this issue inappropriate for interlocutory review. See ALAB-658, at 2 n.l.

Special Master issued on October 22, 1981, and by us.on November 6, 1981, in order to avoid any residual inconsistency with the terms of the stipulation.

D. The Scope of the Reopened Proceeding

12. Prior to the established ~ October 2-3, 1981 prehearing conference, we directed the parties to arrive at a

. list of jointly agreed-upon issues and proposed but disagreed-upon issues which would be the focus of the reopened proceeding under the general subject of the effect of the information on cheating on the matters considered or left open in the PID. - See Board Memorandum and Order, September 14, 1981, at 5. On October 2, 1981, the Board received arguments on the issues suggested by the parties and modified for discussion purposes by the Board. Tr. 23,120-66 (Smith, Trowbridge, Aamodt, Clewett, Bradford, Adler, Swartz); see ff.

Tr. 23,122 for a discussion draft of the issues; see generally Board Memorandum and Order on October 2, 1981 Conference of the i

Parties Relative to Reopened Proceeding, October 14, 1981.

l 13. As a result' of the conference and the Board's deliberations, the following broad issue was adopted by the Board for the reopened proceeding:

l l The broad issue to be heard in the i

reopened proceeding is the effect of.the information on cheating in the NRC April examination on the management issues-considered or lef t open in the Partial Initial-Decision, recognizing that, depending on the f acts , the possible nexus of the cheating incident in the NRC-I L

v examination goes beyond the cheating by two particular individuals and may invol.ve the issues of Licensee's management integrity, the quality of its operating personnel, its ability to staff the facility adequately, its training and testing program, and the NRC process by which the operators would be tested and licensed.

Board Memorandum and Order on October 2,1981 Conference of the Parties Relative to Reopened Proceeding, October 14, 1981, at 2.

14. Also, the following particular issues were adopted as within the scope of the reopened proceeding:

1. The extent of cheating by TMI-l operator license candidates on the NRC license examinations in April 1981, and or any other Licensee- or NRC-administered examinations, including but not limited to the following: the Kelly examinations (including Category T) in April 1980; Category T make-up examinations subsequently administered by the company; the ATTS mock examinations in early April 1981; and such other examinations as the Special Master shall deem relevant. These latter shall include any other Licensee-administered qualification or mock exam or NRC-administered exam since the accident at TMI-2.

2. The adequacy of the Staff's investiga-tion of, and NRC response to, the cheating incident and rumors of cheating in the April 1981 NRC examinations.

3. The adequacy of Licensee's investiga-tion of, and Licensee's response to, cheating or possible cheating in the examinations listed in Issue 1 above.

4. [ Proposed Issue 4 was combined with Issue 3.]

5. The extent of Licensee management knowledge of, encouragement of, negligent failure to prevent, and/or involvement in cheating in the above mentioned NRC and Licensee examina-tions.

6. The existence and extent of Licensee management involvement in cheating as alleged by the Aamodts in paragraph 7 in response to the Board's Order of August 20, 1981.8

7. The existence and extent of Licensee management constraints on the NRC investigation of cheating and rumors of cheating in the NRC April 1981 examinations.

8. The adequacy of Licensee management response to the incident in July 1979 referred to in the OIE investigation report and involving one of the two operators terminated as a result of cheating on the NRC April 1981 examinations.

9. The adequacy of Licensee's plans for improving the administration of future 8 Paragraph 7 of the Aamodts' September 4, 1981 Responses to Board Orders (of] August 20 and 25 states:

7. NRC did not inveFtigate cheating on prior tests given to licer.see personnel, other than a partial review of ATT audits. The cheating incident puts prior testing, including that of non-licensed and contractor personnel, in question. The Board has expressed interest

in the propriety of other testing. Board Order

-- 8/20 at 3. The Aamodts have been aware (since the cheating incident) of other cheating in tests at TMI-l since the TMI-2 accident.

Action Required: The Aamodts are prepared to present a witness to testify to management's involvement in cheating of personnel on a test given at TMI-l since the accident. All tests given at TMI-1, particularly since the accident, should be reviewed by competent and independent consultants for evidence of cheating.

1 t

Licensee qualification examinations for licensed operators and candidates for operator licenses, including the need for independent administration and grading of such examinations.

10. The adequacy of the administration of NRC licensing exaninations for TMI-l personnel, including proctoring, grading, and safe-guarding the integrity of examination materials; the adequacy of the Staff's review of the administration of Licensee's Category T. examinations; and the adequacy of the Staff's plan for retesting operators and monitoring its NRC examinations to assure proper adherence to NRC testing requirements in order to assure that the purposes of the NRC examinations, because of the nature of the questions, cannot be defeated by cheating, _ the use of crib sheets, undue coaching or other evasive devices.

l' 11. The potential impact of NRC examina-tions, including retests, and operator terminations on the adequacy of staffing of-TMI-1 operations.

12. The sufficiency of management criteria and procedures for certification of operator license candidates to the NRC with respect to the integrity of such candidates and the sufficiency of the procedures with respect to the competence of such candidates.

Id. at 2-4.

15. In addition to the issues which were discussed I

with the Board on October 2, 1981, a number of issues were specified by the Special Master during the second half of the October 2-3 bifurcated conference as minimum evidentiary presentations which he would require of the NRC Staff or 4

Licensee, as appropriate, consistent with the role assigned to him as presiding officer during the reopened evidentiary presentations. See Board Memorandum and Order on October 2, 1981 Conference of the Parties Relative to the Reopened Proceeding, October 14, 1981, at 4; Tr. 23,238-49 (Milhollin, Swartz, Blake); Special Master's_ Memorandum and Order Following a Conference Among the Parties, November 8, 1981, at 6-9.

16. At the October 2-3 prehearing conference, the parties were also furnished with a list of approximately 50 witnesses whose appearance might be sought by the Licensing Board or the Special Master, comprised of Licensee employees and contractors, and NRC employees and consultants. Id. at 9.

Subsequently, upon agreement of the parties and the Special Master, 19 witnesses appeared who were not part of Licensee's-or the Staff's case-in-chief. See Tr. 25,683-26,980 (testimony of 19 witnesses).

17. Finally, the Special Master asked the NRC Staff 4

to present additional written testimony describing the adminis-tration and results of the O'ctober, 1981 NRC license reexamina-tions given at TMI-1, see Tr. 23,497-98, 23,508-10 (Milhollin),

and requested that Licensee sponsor similar testimony on the l November, 1981 CaJcegory ree'xaminations.

~

Tr.'23,490-91 .

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(Milhollin). j i ,

18. In summary,;out determination of s i'

the"appropria6e scope of the reopened proceeding was bised on our intention to

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assure consideration of th_e"effect on'all' previously litigated '

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management issues of the discovery of cheating by two SROs on the April, 1981 NRC license examinations, and all matters relevant to this or subsequently discovered incidents which the PID had not addressed. It expressly was not our intent to relitigate issues which already had been litigated at length, and which were not affected by this new development. In general, then, issues bearing on the efficacy of Licensee's and the Staff's methods for assuring that the TMI-l operators are properly qualified, e.g., past and present training and testing administrative procedures, the operatoc certification process, and all matters related to operators' cheating on NRC or other qualifying examinations, including Licensee management knowl-edge and the adequacy of the Licensee and NRC Staf f investiga-tions thereof, were deemed admissible subjects of inquiry.

9 For example, the Board did not permit a relitigation as to whether the substance of the NRC operator license examinations is technically adequate to assure that operators are qualified to operate the plant without endangering the health and safety of the public. We did, however, consider the substance of the examinations in the context of whether the tests, because of their content, are amenable to defeat by some artifice or evasive device which would enable the tested candidate to pass the test without mastering the subject matter, such as cheating, crib sheets, coaching or memorization of preidentified examination questions. See Board Memorandum and Order on October 2, 1981 Conference of the Parties Relative to Reopened Proceeding, October 14, 1981, at 5; Tr. 23,127-28 (Smith); Tr. 23,280 (Milhollin).

Similarly, over the Staff's objection, and finding inadequate basis to certify the question to the Board, Judge Milhollin required NRC Staf f testimony on the subject of Staf f attitude towards its own examination program. See Special Master Memorandum and Order Following a Conference Among the Parties, October 27, 1981.

1 l

l E. -Miscellaneous Procedural Matters  !

t s.

19. Extensive discovery, including numerous inter-rogatories, document requests,-and depositions, was' undertaken by'intervenors Aamodt and TMIA, along'with more limited I - discovery requests from the Commonwealth, the NRC Staff, and Licensee. The parties are to be commended for their diligence

{ and cooperation in facilitating compliance with their_ mutual requests.- See, e.g., Memorandum and Order Following a l Confer'ence,Among the Parties, October 8, 1981, at 3.

As a

-result c'f the_ parties ef forts, only on rather a limited number of items was- the Special Master called on to resolve discovery

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p,,; disputes. See, e.g., Special Master. Memorandum and Order

. _- a .

';~ Following a Conference Among the Parties, October 27, _1981,

20. At the October.2-3 prehearing conference the evid,entiary h' earing was scheduled for two weeks, beginning on

, November 10, 1981,~ Tuesdays through Saturdays. Two additional I

weeks of hearing subsequently were scheduled in order to accomm)o3 ate the numerous witnesses called, and the extensive 3

l- examination by the parties and the Special Master._ In total, 18 hearing days were utilized on the subjects of inquiry.

l Attached to this decision is a list of the. exhibits received into evidence. See Appendix B.

21. On the first day of the hearing, a motion to require the sequestration of Licensee's witnesses was sponsored by_ TMIA and the Aamodts. See Tr. 23,531-33 (Clewett); Joint Motion by TMIA and the Aamodts to Exclude and Separate I Witnesses, November 7,'1981. The parties subsequently entered into an agreement on sequestration which was made effective by

Order dated November 12, 1981. Tr. 23,911 (Milhollin).10 The

~

Order was distributed by Licensee's counsel to the affected individuals with an explanatory memorandum approved by the i

Special Master. Tr. 23,838-40 (Blake).

22. In the reopened proceeding the parties thor-oughly litigated the concerns which we, the Special Master , or they had as a result of the discovery of cheating on the April, 1981 NRC license examinations, or other facts which subse-quently came to light, as well as the implications of these particular issues. All of these matters roughly fall into the five categories specified in the broad issue identified as the 4

subject of this proceeding, namely, (i) the quality of 10 The key sequestration _ order provisions were:

1. Specified prospective witnesses were excluded from-the hearing room when other witnesses covered by the Order were testifying;

2. Specified prospective witnesses were forbidden to

. discuss among themselves or with other Licensee employees-(i) the nature of the administration of the NRC' April and October, 1981 exams, and Licensee's l Category T, April 1980 and 1981 mock exams, and -

I makeup exams from the April 1980 and Category T exams; and (ii) their oral testimony (including

questions asked); and

3. The limitations in (2), above, were inapplicable to a prospective witness' discussions which were necessary or incidental to the expeditious completion of l ordinary business affairs.

operating personnel at TMI-1; (ii) Licensee management's integrity; (iii) the administration of the TMI-l training and testing program;-(iv) the adequacy of the NRC's operator testing ' and licensing administrative process, as it has been conducted at TMI-1; and (v) shift staffing for operations at TMI-1. See 113, supra. Our findings are organized accord-ingly. For consistency throughout this decision, we refer to management personnel by name and to those covered by the i

approved confidentiality stipulation (i.e., control room operators, shift foremen, shift supervisors, shift technical advisors and Mr. VV) by letter. Attached to the decision as Appendix C is a table identifying by name those individuals to whom confidentiality was available but who appeared as wit-nesses and at that time voluntarily identified themselves.

Practically all of Licensee's personnel who were called as witnesses voluntarily appeared in public sessions. As a result, only two and one-half days of in camera hearings were necessary, and as to those, the transcripts were made available on the same schedule as the public sessions.

1 t

II. THE QUALITY OF TMI-l OPERATING PERSONNEL A. Introduction

23. One of the principal concerns we carried into I this reopened proceeding was the effect that evidence of cheating might have on the Board's prior findings concerning the quality of the operating personnel at TMI-1. See 1 13, supra. In this proceeding, we have assessed the quality of operating personnel by focusing on any evidence of cheating by TMI-l operator license cancidates on examinations and quizzes, including the Kelly examination administered in April, 1980, subsequent Category T and non-Category T make-up quizzes, the mock Associated Technical Training Services ("ATTS") examina-tion administered in early April, 1981, a mock examination administered in 1979, the NRC licensing examination in late i

April,1981, and on weekly training quizzes -given since the TMI-2 accident on March 28, 1979. See 1 14, supra.

24. To determine the extent of the cheating at TMI-1, we have reviewed the evidence of record with respect to:

(a) the cheating incident involving individuals o and W on the April, 1981 NRC examination; (b) parallel answers on other exams noted by Licensee's independent consultant Edward V.

Trunk; (c) potential incidents of cheating reported by Licensee personnel; and (d) rumors of cheating Il at TMI-1.1

25. For purposes of this proceeding, " operating personnel", as distinguished from management personnel, see 1 209, infra for definition of " management," includes control 11 Tnis Board recognizes that evidence of rumors is likely to be unreliable hearsay and therefore is itself of limited value for purposes of proving the truth of the matter asserted.

Nevertheless, rumors were vigorously pursued to identify the individual subjects of the rumors who then were themselves examined as to any substance in the rumors.

12 The Board notes that despite extensive discovery and cross-exmination, the Intervenors produced no evidence of significant instances of cheating beyond those already uncovered by Licensee and the Staff.

E room operators ("CROs"), shift foremen, shift supervisors, and shift technical advisors (" STAS").

26. The prefiled testimony of John F. Wilson, counsel for Licensee assigned to the TMI site, and Edward V.

Trunk, an independent consultant to Licensee, bear directly on the issue of the quality of the operating personnel -at TMI-1, as does the prefiled testimony of NRC Staff witness William J.

Ward. We have carefully considered the testimony and cross examination of these witnesses, and have relied as well on the testimony of other witnesses whenever applicable.

27. In addition to the testimony of these witnesses, the Board, the Special Master, the Commonwealth, the Aamodts and TMIA identified a number of operating personnel, both present and former employees of Licensee, who also should be called to testify at the proceeding with respect to the issue of the quality of the operating personnel. After a substantial amount of testimony during the proceeding and discussion among the parties, they agreed on a list of individuals who should appear as additional witnesses. Tr. 25,220-21 (Blake). This list included Messrs. O (former Licensee employee), W (former 1

Licensee employee), VV, G, H, Mr. Henry Shipman, KK, 00 , WW,

, V (former Licensee employee), I, HH (former Licensee employee),

A, U, T, P, 00 and Mr. Charles Husted, all of whom were 13 Mr. QQ's name subsequently was withdrawn by agreement of the parties and with Judge Milhollin's concurrence.

- - J

f notified by Licensee and all of whom appeared voluntarily, without subpoenas.14 Mr. YY (a former Licensee) also appeared voluntarily, at the request of the Special Master. Judge Milhollin accepted the list, later adding one other individual, Mr. GG, Tr. 25,570-72 (Milho11in), who also agreed to appear without a subpoena.

B. The Cheating Incident On The April, 1981 NRC Examinations

i. Discovery of Cheating and Licensee Response

28. During April, 1981, the NRC administered two sets of licensing exams to the operators at TMI-1. The "A" exams, comprised of one RO and one SRO -exam, were given on April 21 and 22, 1981, respectively, and the "B" exams, comprised of one RO and one SRO exam, were given on April 23 and 24, 1981, respectively. Staff Ex. 24, at unnumbered page entitled " Bruce A. Wilson". Messrs. O and W, both SROs, sat 14 The three former Licensee employees who testified at this proceeding were all asked why they lef t the Company's employ.

Mr. HH indicated that he lef t TMI because of dissatisfaction with the amount of testing. Tr. 25,844 (Mr. HH). Mr. V left TMI for personal reasons. Tr. 26,313-14 (Mr. V). Mr. YY left for family reasons. Tr. 26,014 (Mr. YY). Pursuant to Judge Milhollin's Order given orally during a November 2, 1981 conference call- with representatives of Licensee, the NRC Staff and the Aamodts , Licensee provided to the Aamodts the names and addresses of six other former employees who had left the Company since the TMI-2 accident. The Aamodts telephoned each of these individuals to determine the reasons for their departure. None of the-individuals who spoke to the Aamodts indicated they had left TMI because of cheating or any other issue related to this proceeding, and the Aamodts did not request tha t any of them testify. Tr. 25,331 (Clewett).

for the "B" exams in the room set aside for nonsmokers. Each remembered sitting next to the other during both exams at one of the eight foot tables in the exam room. Staff Ex. 26, at 9, 11; Tr. 26,178 (Mr. O); Tr. 26,078 (Mr. W).

29. An NRC consultant, Mr. Monte Davis, graded the SRO "B" exams, and when submitting his results on July 15, 1981, reported a large number of similar answers on Mr. O's and Mr. W's papers. Staff Ex. 26, at 3. An NRC investigation-commenced immediately. See generally 15 367-75, infra for a discussion of the adequacy of the NRC's investigation of the cheating incident.

30. During the course of the subsequent Office or Inspection and Enforcement investigation, Messrs. O and W were interviewed separately on July 27, July .30 and July 31, 1981.

In the first two interviews, they each denied ever having cheated on any exam administered by Licensee, the NRC or a contractor, but refused to sign a statement to that effect prior to ' consultation with their attorneys. Staff Ex. 26, at 9-11, 41-45.

31. On July 31, Mr. O, accompanied by his attorneys, was interviewed by NRC investigator Baci and Mr. Victor Stello, the Director of OIE, in Bethesda, Maryland. At this time, Mr. O admitted that although he himself had not cheated, he had allowed Mr. W to use his (Mr. O's) exam papers to copy or otherwise to ccmplete his (Mr. W's) own exams. Id. at 46.

Mr. O later signed a sworn statement to that effect, dated July 31, 1981. Id., Enclosure 4. ^

32. On the same day, July 31, 1981, Mr..W, accompanied by his attorney, was interviewed by NRC investiga-tor Gilbert together with Mr. William J. Ward, Chief of the Investigations Branch of OIE, and an attorney from the Office of the Executive Legal Director. At this time, Mr. W admitted to having copied answers from Mr. O's exam papers on the ATTS RO and SRO mock exams given in early April,1981, and on the NRC RO and SRO exams given in late April, 1981. Id. at 48-49.

Mr. W also signed a sworn statement to that effect. Id., .

33. When Robert C. Arnold, President of GPU Nuclear Corporation, was first advised of the NRC investigation on July 27, 1981, he had made arrangements to have Messrs. O and W immediately reassigned to nonlicensed activities. Arnold, ff.

Tr. 23,590, at 5; TMIA Ex. 51, at 1 and Attachment 1; TMIA Ex.

52, at 1 and Attachment 1; Tr. 23,652 (Arnold). When Mr.

Arnold was informed on July 31, 1981 that Messrs. O and W had signed statements admitting to cheating, he spent several days discussing Licensee's options with various members of TMI management before reaching the decision that discharge of O and W was the most appropriate course of action. Arnold, ff. Tr.

23,590, at 6-7; TMIA Ex. 51, at 2; TMIA Ex. 52, at 2; Tr.

23,676 (Arnold). Each individual was interviewed by Messrs.

Arnold and Hukill prior to his termination. Mr. W submitted his resignation on August 8, 1981; Mr. O, on August 9, 1981.15 15 Mr. O initially was terminated from Licensee's emoloy on August 3, 1981. Mr. W was on vacation at that time but (footnote continued on next page)

TMIA Ex. 51, at 3; TMIA Ex. 52, at 2. See generally 1 267, infra, for a discussien of the adequacy of Licensee's response to this cheating incident.

ii. Extent _and Manner of Cheating by Messrs. O and W

34. This record contains-much evidence on the extent of O's and W's cooperation and 'be manner in which it was accomplished. We will explore this matter briefly.

l 35. The OIE investigators thoroughly reviewed and 4

compared the examinations submitted by Messrs. O and W and

found act only many instances where their essay-type answers I were " markedly similar", but many instances where *. heir answers were virtually identical. Specifically, on the NRC RO exams,

. OIE found " blatant similarities" between 0 and W in at least 21.5 percent or 17 of approximately 79 questions requiring extensive essay responses. On the SRO exams, OIE found

" conspicuous commonality" in at least 55 percent or 29 of approximately 52 questions requiring lengthy answers. Staff Ex. 26, at 14. A witness presented by the Aamodts, Dr. Bruce Molholt, testified that "there was exact coincidence in 87 l

r (continued) immediately upon his return he learned of Licensee's termination decision. Prior to his interview with Mr. Arnold on August 8, Mr. W prepared a written resignation statement.

i'- Because Mr. W was allowed to resign, Mr. O as well was given

the opportunity to resign which he did on August 9. TMIA Ex.

51, at 3; TMIA Ex. 52, at 2.

i i

I percent" of Messrs. O's and W's answers on the NRC SRO exam given on April 24, 1981.

See Molholt, ff. Tr. 25,185, at page entitled " Summary Statement". Other testimony of record also reflects a recognition of the extent of the similarities between Messrs. O's and W's answers on both the NRC RO and SRO exams. See, e.g., Tr. 23,820 (Arnold).

The similarities between O's and W's earlier ATTS mock RO and SRO exams were less blatant; five percent or two of approximately 45 answers on the RO exam were similar; 27 percent or ten of approximately 37 answers on the SRO exam were distinctly similar. Staff Ex.

26, at 17.

36. We find, based on the abundance of evidence produced since the start of the NRC investigation, that Messrs.

O and W cheated extensively on their April, 1981 NRC exams and that cheating occurred as well on the ATTS mock exam earlier in April, 1981. We make no further finding as to the precise 1

amount of the cheating, nor do we think such a finding is necessary.

37. The manner in which the two operators cheated has raised some concerns because the testimony and signed

[ statements of Messrs. O and W on this issue conflict in certain respects. For example, Mr. W stated both to the NRC in his signed statement dated July 31, 1981, see TMIA Ex. 52,

. Attachment 14, and in his sworn t'estimony before Judge Milhollin, see Tr. 26,087-89 (Mr. W), that he and Mr . O exchanged some answers orally; that Mr. O asked four or five i

l l

4

--m w,-~m,, , . . - . . ,m-,,_.:-r. -

m,- -,n... . . - - . y

questions during each of the NRC exatas; that he passed Mr. O a piece of paper with the answer in response to question M6 on the SRO exam, Tr. 26,111 (Mr. W); see TMIA Ex. 52, Attachment 14, at 3; Tr. 26,088, 26,107-08 (Mr. W); and that he copied from Mr. O's exam papers during the ATTS exams as well as the NRC exams. Tr. 26,085-86 (Mr. W); TMIA Ex. 52, Attachment 14, at 1. Mr. O, on the other hand, denied asking Mr. W for help on question M6 or any other question on the SRO exam, see Tr. 26,222-23 (Mr. O), denied-having obtained a slip of paper with an answer from Mr. W, see Tr. 26,224, 26,248 (Mr.

O), denied having aided Mr. W on the ATTS exams, and stated-generally that he did not remember ever receiving any help from Mr. W, either orally or in writing. See Tr. 26,285-88 (Mr. O).

38. We recognize that Mr. W's oral testimony was internally contradictory. He stated categorically at one point that "We [O and he] were not orally exchanging any answers."

Tr. 26,087 (Mr. W). Under closer questioning, Mr. W was shown his prior written statement to the NRC which indicated clearly that he and Mr. O orally exchanged questions and answers and that Mr. O had asked him at least one question tnd possibly four or five on both exams. See TMIA Ex. 52, Attachment 14; Tr. 26,088 (Doroshow, Milhollin). Mr. W then conceded that "Four or five questions on an exam is not much . . . . That is what I am trying to say. It was not that much oral communica-tion during the whole thing." Tr. 26,088 (Mr. W).

39. Mr. O, by contrast, did not contradict himself on the stand. We note, however, that Staff witness Ward believes that Mr. O in fact received help from Mr. W, although Mr. Ward has no clear evidence on which to base that belief.

Tr. 25,384-85 (Ward). It also strains our credulity to believe that in light of Mr. W's clear statement that Mr O asked him for an answer on at least one specific SRO exam question, Mr. O cannot recall ever asking for or receiving help from Mr. W.

Tr. 26,285-88 (Mr. O).

40. Professor Molholt attempted to clarify the '

situation by asserting in his prefiled testimony that in certain instances he could ascertain who was copying from whom by noting which individual misspelled words in his answer. See Molholt, ff. Tr. 25,185, at 2-3. For example, Dr. Molholt claimed that on several questions on Parts I, K and L of the SRO exam, Mr. W was giving Mr. O oral answers containing words Mr. O couldn't spell. However, under m .ws. examination, Dr.

Molholt admitted that an acceptable alternative explanation would be that Mr. W copied answers from Mr. O and corrected Mr.

O's spelling errors. Tr. 25,209 (Adler, Molholt). We reject Dr. Molholt's conclusions on this matter as nothing more than mere speculation which is equally susceptible to various and conflicting interpretations; either Mr. O copied from Mr. W, or Mr. W copied from Mr. O.

41. We do not have to resolve this conflict between Messrs. O's and W's testimony, because we find that regardless of whether O's or W's version of events is correct, both individuals clearly cheated on at least two NRC exams, and they

were appropriately terminated from Licensee's employ. See 5 267, infra. Moreover, once Messrs. O and W were terminated from Licensee's employ, they were no longer permitted to perform licensed duties at the TMI plant. Staff Ex. 26, at 60; Tr. 25,120-21 (Collins).

iii. Reporting of the O and W Cheating Incident By Other Operating Personnel

42. The manner in which the cheating occurred could bear on whether other operators taking the NRC exams with Messrs. O and W noticed the activities. Dr. Molholt, for instance, made the bald assertion that "It is hardly possible to imagine that these other operators (who took the NRC exam with O and W] were unaware of what O and W were doing".

Molholt, ff. Tr. 25,185, at 3. Under cross-examination, however, the only support Dr. Molholt could provide for his conclusion was the statement, "It is an assumption, but it is an inference that I think could be substantiated". Tr. 25,200 (Molholt). No substantiation was e7er provided.

( 43. NRC witness Ward also hypothesized that in his personal opinion, it was " highly likely" that other examinees noticed the activities of Messrs. O and W, although he conceded i

that he did not have "the benefit of knowing how intense the l

degree of concentration is during one of these examinations".

l Tr. 25,385-86 (Ward). Mr. Ward later softened his tone, l

l however, by noting that it was "possible" that an examinee saw l

l t

Messrs. O and W cheating. Tr. 25,386 (Ward). He also noted that proctors are more likely to have noticed cheating than the examinees. Tr. 25,451 (Ward). Yet, no NRC proctor observed the cheating.

44. By contrast, the NRC OIE investigators ques-tioned the majority of the operators who took the NRC exams in the same room with O and W, and all of them stated that they had not observed any suspicious activities during the April, 1981 NRC exams. See, e.g., Staff Ex. 26, at 23 (Mr. R), 25 (Mr. Q), 31 (Mr. S). In addition, other individuals who sat in the same room with 0 and W testified before Judge Milhollin.

Two of them specifically denied seeing Messrs. O and W pass papers or hearing them speak to each other. These two individuals, Messrs. A and I, sat directly behind Messrs. O and W and would have been in the best position to notice question-able activity had they not been giving their complete attention to their own work. See Tr. 26,043-44 (Mr. A); Tr. 26,536-37 (Mr. I); see also Tr. 25,966 (Mr. 00); Tr. 25,839-40 (Mr. HH).

45. Despite the conflicts between Messrs. O's and W's testimony, it appears that if they spoke at all during the exam, they spoke briefly. No NRC proctor observed it. This Board therefore accepts the oral and written testimony of the other operators who took the NRC exam with Messrs. O and W, that, concentrating on their own exams, they did not observe the cheating.

C. Parallelisms Discovered on Make-Up Quizzes and Mock NRC Exams'of Other Candidates _

n

46. After the discovery that Messrs. O'and W had cheated on the NRC exams, Licensee perceived a need to deter-mine 'if further cheating had occurred at TMI-1. Licensee therefore contracted on August _29, 1981 with Mr. Edward V._

Trunk, Assistant Professor of Engineering at the Pennsylvania State University, Capitol Campus, who was asked to analyze and compare several sets of exams for any visible evidence of potential cheating. During a period of approximately seven weeks, Mr. Trunk and a colleague, Mr._ Donald L. Miller, intermittently reviewed-numerous exams and documented several sets of parallel answers. These parallelisms were then investigated' further by Jchn~ F. Wilson and a colleague, Richard D. Lloyd, both-counsel to Licensee located at TMI. See Wilson, ff. Tr. 24,478, at 3-4; Trunk, ff. Tr. 24,831, at 5, 8, 11; see generally it 47-101, infra for a discussion of the adequacy of Licensee's investigation of cheating. The OIE investigators decided it was not necessary to follow up on Licensec's investigations. Tr. 25,337-38 (Ward). We shall discuss in turn the principal parallelisms for each pair or group of' operators identified by Mr. Trunk.

i. Messrs. G and H

47. Messrs. G and H were found to have eleven sets of-parallel answers appearing on three rounds of Category T make-up quizzes administered on November 26, 1980, March 27 and June 25, 1981, and on one non-Category T make-up exam admir is-tered on November 2, 1980. Trunk, ff. Tr. 24,831, at 5-6, 10-11. This fact in itself raised serious concerns in our minds, as it did in the minds of Mr. Trunk, Mr. Wilson, the parties and Judge Milhollin. For this reason, Messrs. G and H were subjected to a great deal of probing cross-examination.

We are satisfied, however, that the record contains sufficient evidence to exonerate these two individuals.

48. Messrs. Trunk and Miller believed early in their investigation that Messrs. G and H may well have cooperated on certain Category T make-up quizzes. As they noted in their first Report dated September 2, 1981, "The evidence supports a cooperative effort may have existed between G and H." Lic. Ex.

70A, App. B, at 1. In their third Report dated October 1, 1981, after having compared the exam answers to available training materials and answer keys for possible explanations for the similarities other than improper cooperation, they were still unable to dismiss two sets of G and H parallelisms as resulting from training materials or as being " random" or

" trivial". Lic. Ex. 70D, at 3. Finally, in their fourth Report dated October 14, 1981, they discovered two new sets of G and H parallelisms and concluded that "these two incidents appear to indicate that some cooperative effort did take place between these two examinees" . Lic. Ex. 70E, at 2.

49. Nevertheless, they were unable to conclude positively that cheating had occurred. Trunk, ff. Tr. 24,831, at 12. As

Mr. Trunk stated on the stand: "And so in the end we did not feel that we had a case."

~

Tr. 24,855 (Trunk).

50. Whereas Mr. Trunk's role was to evaluate the exams, see Tr. 24,629 (Wilson), Mr. Wilson's role was to evaluate i underlying facts, conduct interviews and determine the veracity of the interviewees, see Tr. 24,488 (Wilson) -- a role for which he was well suited as a lawyer. Mr. Wilson admitted that the large number of parallelisms between G and H were "very suspicious," and raised particular doubts in his mind. Tr.

24,566 (Wilson). He confronted G and H with these problems during his individual interviews with them. Id.

51. Mr. Wilson indicated that the interviews were exhaustive and that he covered every parallelism called out by Mr. Trunk. Messrs. G and H stood up to this dogged ques-tioning, and without an opportunity to reflect in advance or to talk with each other, both operators denied cheating and explained the basis for their answers in a way that convinced Mr. Wilson. Not only did he have no basis for disbelieving their denials, see Wilson, ff. Tr. 24,478, at 6-9, but he came away believing that they were telling the truth. Tr. 24,564 (Wilson).

52. Having been impressed with the forthright manner in which Messrs. Trunk and Wilson expressed their concerns and their ultimate resolution of those concerns, we have reviewed carefully the sworn testimony of Messrs. G and H.

53. First of all, Messrs. G and H each admitted that they studied frequently together when they were on shift, and that they often memorized materials in preparation for exams. See Tr. 25,940-41, 25,947-49, 25,953 (Mr. H); Tr. 25,728, 25,736 (Mr. G). Thus, the Board finds as a general matter that the exam answers of the two operators -- particularly short answers and definition -- were likely to be similar.

54. Second, G and H indicated that they did not like to sit next to each other during weekly training classes or during the exam which followed. Mr. G indicated that his clear preference was to sit by himself in the back of the classroom where he could use two chairs and spread out. See Tr. 24,509 (Wilson). Mr. E noted that during the training and quiz periods, he and G usually sat on opposite sides of the room so they could each spread out and relax. Tr. 25,957 (Mr. H).

55. Third, we take note of Judge Milhollin's description of the demeanor of the two witnesses. -Mr. G appeared nervous and often jumped to respond without adequate reflection, leading to confused testimony at times. He admitted that he does not study as much as most other operators, and does not take work home. Tr. 25,729, 25,784 (Mr. G). He answered all questions openly.

56. Mr. E, by contrast, was relaxed and easy-going even under intense questioning. He apparently studies quite a lot and appears genuinely to enjoy it, noting at one point that he began studying for an upcoming NRC exam immediately after he had just taken an exam because "It is a hobby". Tr. 25,932 (Mr. H). He was extremely forthcoming.

57. We shall now discuss several of the G and H parallelisms which appeared to be the most troublesome. We have not attempted, nor do we believe that it is necessary, to discuss in detail every parallelism noted by Mr. Trunk. Our overall conclusion that G and H did not copy from each other's exams applies equally to those instances not specifically discussed.

58. The first set of parallelisms we think troublesome was discovered on the Category T make-up quiz given on November 26, 1980. Question No. 3 in the Accident Mitigation section read: "What type of pressure instrument is used for the following? a. Narrow Range Pressure, b. Wide Range Pressure." Lic. Ex.'s SSG, 66H. The correct answers are:

a. Rosemont (capac.) U-1.

b. Bourdon tube (force balance).

Lic. Ex. 68B (Accident Mitigation). As explained by Mr. Nelson Brown, Supervisor of Licensed Operator Training at TMI:

"The Rosemont capacitance-transmitter is a particular series of pressure transmitter .

. . a capacitance type press..;q sensor and transmitter. It has plates with a material called a dielectric in between it, and as the pressure increases, the proximity of the plates changes, which changes the capac-itance, the ability to conduct between the two plates, and that is proportional to the presctre."

. - . ~ _-

. . . a e wide range transmitter is a t'

i bourdon tube which . . . is typically a C shaped tube. It can have other shapes but that is the typical shape for it, and as pressure is increased on it, it tends to try

. and straighten out. By force balance, the -

bourdon tube is going to move a linkage arm as it is trying to straighten out, and then it has a feedback circuit that will then re-position this bar that was trying to be moved back to a neutral position.

So that the amount of current that is used to neutralize it is then proportional to the pressure. So that it measures a wide range of pressure while giving a limited amount of movement on the mechanical bourdon tube."

Tr. 24,786-87 (Brown)  ; see also Lic. Exs. 82A and 82B.

59. Mr. G's response for part A of the question read

" Forced balance Rosemont," for which he lost 0.1 point and still does not know why his answer was marked wrong. Tr.

25,751-52 (Mr. G); TMIA Ex. 75, at 6-7; Lic. Ex. 66H. Mr. G explained his understanding that Rosemont is a trade name for force balance, and force balance describes the kind of 16 See Licensee's transcript corrections.

instrument used to measure the pressure. TMIA Ex. 75, at 7; Tr. 25,752, 25,799-802 (Mr. G); Tr. 24,522-23 (Wilson). He reviewed his exam prior to taking the second Category T make-up (a take-home exam) on March 27, 1981, and when the same question was asked again, he answered "Rosemont" and received i

full credit.. His answer to the wide Range Pressure question was "Bordon (sic) tube" which was marked correct on both erams.

60. Based on Mr. Brown's explanation of a Rosemont transmitter and a bourdon tube, it is clear that Mr. G was confused at the time he took the exam and at the time he testified; the concept of force balance is associated with the bourdon tube, not with the Rosemont transmitter. One possible explanation for Mr. G's confusion is that several years ago when he was first a licensed operator at TMI, both wide and narrow range pressure instruments were force balanced bourdon tube 3. Just a few years ago, however, the narrow range pressure insttuments were changed and a Rosemont transmitter was installed in the system. Mr. G apparently has been under the misconception that Rosemont was just a trade name change, but that the type of instrument remained the same. Tr.

24,791-92 (Brown).

61. Mr. H's response to part A of.the question (narrow range pressure) on the November 26, 1980 exam read:

" forced balance," for which he lost 0.5 points. Lic. Ex. 66G; Tr. 25,809 (Blake). When asked to explain the correct answer, Mr. H first stated "a Rosemont instrument," Tr. 25,888 (Mr. H).

Upon further questioning on the same point, however, Mr. H became confused, gave different answers, and admitted- his confusion both at the time of the exams and the time of the testimony. Tr. 25,899-901, 25,942-43 (Mr. H). This confusion was further illustrated by the fact that when the same question was asked on the March 27, 1981 make-up exam but parts A and B were reversed, Mr. H not onl.y gave an incorrect answer to one of the parts, but gave the answers in the wrong order. Tr.

25,942-43 (Mr. H), 25,811 (Mr. G); Tr. 24,523 (Wilson). Under cross-examination, H again reversed his answers. Tr.

25,899-900 (Mr. H). H did not, however, have difficulty explaining how a bourdon tube works. Tr. 25,901, 25,934 (Mr.

H).

62. Although Messrs..G's and H's answers were similar, particularly on the November 26, 1980 Category T quiz when Mr. H gave responses in the correct order, it appears evident to this Board that the two operators did not collabor-ate on these answers. They may have reviewed some training material together in preparation for the exam, and although Mr.

G was somewhat confused and Mr. H was totally confused, they both apparently learned what they believed to be correct information and reinforced each others misconceptions. See Tr.

25,810 (Mr. G).

63. As for the possibility that either Mr. G or H during the quiz copied their answers to this question from training material, we have seen absolutely no evidence to support such a hypothesis. Tr. 24,616 (Mr. Wilson).

64. Another set of troublesome parallel answers was given in response to a-question-which appeared on both the November 26, 1980 classroom quiz and the March 27, 1981 take-home quiz. The question read: " Discuss how hydrogen gas is generated in the reactor coolant system' and reactor building following a LOCA". Lic. Exs. 66G,-66H, 66E and 66F. The-correct answer includes two different chemical reactions:- one involving aluminum and sodium hydroxide, the other involving zirconium and water. All four of these elements and compounds must be listed for full credit. Tr. 24,529-39 (Wilson); Lic.

Ex. 68B (Accident Mitigation).

65. On the first make-up exam, both G and H gave ~ a partially correct answer: "From aluminum, Zirc (or Zr) water reaction". Lic. Exs'. 66G and-66H; TMIA Ex. 75, at 7-8; Wilson, ff. Tr. 24,478, at 6. .The instructor marked both Messrs. G's and H's answers partially wrong and wrote on each exam "NaOH" just above each of the partially incorrect answers._ On the March 27, 1981 take-home exam, Messrs. G and H both included the compound NaOH but failed to include aluminum. Lic. Exs.

66E and 66F; TMIA Ex. 75, at 8; Wilson, ff. Tr. 24,478, at 6.

66. In an attempt to explain his answers, Mr. G appeared to understand the fact that aluminum and sodium hydroxide must react together to form hydrogen, but he sugges-ted that he didn't think it necessary-to list both components; one or the other would be sufficient. This comment was believable in view of Mr. G's admitted tendency not to write 1

elaborate or detailed answers on exams, even when he had more information to add. Tr. 25,787-88 (Mr. G).

67. Mr. G also noted that when his answer was marked wrong on the first exam and "NaOH" was written over the answer, he assumed NAOH was all that was necessary and answered the second make-up exam nccordingly. Tr. 25,754 (Mr. G); TMIA Ex.

75, at 8; Wilson, ff. Tr. 24,478, at 7.

68. Mr. H, on the other hand, conceded that he must not have understood the concept when he took the exam. Cr.

25,902-04 (Mr. H). He also indicated that when the instructor marked "NaOH" over his first' answer, he assumed NaOH was the answer that was called for on the second make-up exam and answered the question accordingly. TMIA Ex. 75, at 8.

69. Although we-can readily accept Messrs. G's and H's_ testimony that their misunderstanding of the instructor's corrections led them to respond incorrectly on the second make-up exam, we are troubled by the first set of answers. We cannot clearly ascertain from the record why Mr. G, who apparently understood the aluminum-sodium hydroxide reaction, would have made the same mistake as Mr. H, who apparently didn't understand the subject matter. On the other hand, when we consider Mr. G's propensity towards writing short and often incomplete answers, see Tr. 25,787-88 (Mr. G), Messrs. G's and H's tendency to memorize material, see Tr. 25,736 (Mr. G); Tr.

25,940-41, 25,953 (Mr. H), their frequent study sessions together, see Tr. 25,728 (Mr. G); Tr. 25,947-48 (Mr. H), their desires not to sit near each other during training sessions and quizzes, and their repeated and emphatic denials of cooperation on these answers, see TMIA Ex. 75, at 18; Tr. 25,770 (Mr. G);

Tr. 25,958 (Mr. H); Tr. 24,531 (Wilson), we find their denials of cooperation believable.

70. The last set of parallel answers which raised serious concern was discovered on a non-Category T make-up quiz administered on November 2, 1980. Lic. Exs. 66A and 66B. The question read: " Explain Bernoulli's Equation and its use in solving flow problems," and the virtually identical definition given by both operators read as follows:

E E Bernellis (sic) equation Bernoullis equation is is the general energy equa- the general energy equa-tion, it states that the tion, it states that the total internal energy of a total internal energy of system is equal to the gra- a system is equal to the

. vitational potential energy gravitational potential plus total kinetic energy energy of the systems of the system plus the sys- plus the total kinetic tem internal energy. Lic. energy of the system Ex. 66A. plus the system internal energy. We can use it to calculate flow by referen61ng to points in system and determine energy. differences (work).

Lic.-Ex. 66B.

71. We recognize, of course, that Mr. H's answer included a sentence about the equation's use, whereas Mr. G.

omitted any discussion'of its use. Such an omission appears to

be.typicallof Mr. G's abbreviated style of. examination

^

responses. Tr. 25,787-88 (Mr. G).

72. Mr. Wilson indicated that although he searched a -

long while for training materials on this question, he was r

unable to find any. Wilson, ff. Tr. 24,478, at 7-8.

73.

~

We note that when Mr. Wilson interviewed Messrs.

G and H with respect to this last set of ~ parallelisms, he was absolutely convinced of the operators' veracity. As he stated-

-in response to Judge Milhollin, "I interviewed them very thoroughly. . . . And on the basis of that intensive i

interview, their recollections were unshakeable, they were clear, their denials emphatic, and their general demeanor was such that I could not determine that they were telling anything other than the truth. There was not a chink that I could start to dig in through to discredit what they were telling me; and I tried." Tr. 24,627 (Wilson).

74. We note also that while Mr. Trunk thought this parallelism was particularly suspicious, he admitted to Judge Milhollin with great candor: "To be honest, when we saw this

i

, - , . . . . - . , ,- , - . - , _ . ..y-..,#,,- r, .._~..,,,,,y-.r.-- -.3----,, ,-,_-- _ _ - r,- _ v.,, ,,ve,.- - , . - - , , - . , , , , , ~ ,

F<

i

~

we said, now we have them. That was our feeling,. and we really 4 went over this with a fine-tooth comb. . . ._And it was-not -

there, that was it. this whs an The lead went cold . . .

isolated item. It was the only one like that." Tr, 24,'887 _ .

,- (Trunk); see also Tr. 24,885 (Trunk). '

~

75. When questioned about his response, Mr. G 7 explained that Bernoulli's equation was a new item introduced- -

since the accident at TMI-2, and that he had discovered while' on the night shift that the equation was coming up as a 'subjec.t' matter in his next training cycle. Tr. 25,819, 25,822-24 (Mr.

G). He recalled that an entire training week had been spent covering Bernoulli's equation and that "it would be neat to .

have a good definition for what this Bernoulli equation was all, ,

about". Tr. 25,822 (Mr. G). Mr. G noted, however, that he would not need to use Bernoulli's equation to measure flow ra'te T-at the plant. Tr.'25,802-03 (Mr. G). '?-

76. Mr. G was sure that he had memorized " cold" the -

definition of this equation from some source, see Tr. 25,817-18 ,

(Mr. G) and assumed that H had memorized it as well. Tr.

[

25,815 (Mr. G). Mr. G surmised that perhaps he and Mr. H had gotten the definition from one of H's college textbooks which -

I the latter often had with him on shift. Tr. 25,816 (Mr. G).

Mr. G's recollection was unclear as to the actual source, y however, and he stated: "

...I do not know if it was from his ,

textbook, from some other material that he (Mr. H] had once had

or something we had gotten from somebody else, but something F

m f'

r

__,_m , , . _ . _ , . . _ . , -. _ _ _ _ -.,.# 1 ,

like this [Bernoulli's equation definition] was something I would have flat memorized from somewhere." Tr. 25,818 (Mr. G).

77. Mr. H's independent recollection of this matter was similar to G's in most respects. Mr. H stated that Bernoulli's equation was emphasized in training during the week in which the November 2, 1980 non-Category-T quiz was given.

Tr. 25,883 (Mr. H). He also noted that although the equation was important for an understanding of how parts of the plant work, knowledge of the equation was not necessary to operate

.the plant. Tr. 25,884-85 (Mr. H).

4

78. Mr. H did not recall studying the definition x with G, $or did he think he had reviewed this information prior-to the training week in which it was presented. Tr. 25,885 (Mr. ,H). ,However, he was sure he had memorized the definition, see Tr. 25,883'(Mr. H), and when asked about the source of the definition, he stated "I am not positively sure, but I think

...'it was written on the blackboard during training." Tr.

' 25f883'(Mr. H); see Tr. 25,944 (G had told Mr. John Wilson during their interview that the defintion "possibly was put on

-the blackboard"). He continued to maintain that the words he memorized had been written on the blackboard, and the more he said it, the more positive he became. Tr. 25,919-20, 25,938, 25,944-45 (Mr. H). He did admit that he had been taught Bernoulli's equation at Penn State in 1973 or 1974 and that he still used his textbook for references. Tr. 25,937-38. Yet, he did not mention the possibility that he could have obtained the definition from his college textbook.

. _ . . _ . _ ._ ~ . _ _ ,_ . - _ .. - . ._ _

l l

79. The Board recognizes that Messrs. G and H, who have taken quizzes every several weeks for years, are likely to forget exactly where they obtained one particular piece of training material out of the hundreds of pieces they receive every year, and are likely to forget specifically when they reviewed such material. Such forgetfulness is even more understandable when the events in question occurred one year ago. We find, therefore, that the variances in G's and H's recollections of the source of the definition of Bernoulli's equation, and the variances in their recollections of when they studied this information, are indicative of understandably imperfect memories.

80. What we do find clear in both of their minds is that they memorized the definition of Bernoulli's equation from some source and responded with virtually the same memorized an'swer on the November 2, 1980 quiz.

81.. As Mr. Trunk pointed out on the stand, if Messrs. G and H had collaborated on the definition of L ,

Bernoulli's equation, they most probably would have collabora-ted on the other answers appearing on the same written page.

l Ye t~, their answers preceding Bernoulli's equation were dramati-l cally dif ferent. Tr. 24,887 (Trunk); Lic. Exs. 66A and 66B.

82. If Mr. G had copied Mr. H's answer, he most probably would have copied the last sentence explaining how the equation is used, particularly since this was half of the question. Tr. 24,889 (Trunk). On the other hand, Mr. H had

studied Bernoulli's equation before the TMI training week and had found the concept easy to describe. Tr. 25,883 (Mr. H).

It appears very unlikely, therefore, that Mr. H would have felt a need to copy the answer from Mr. G's paper.

83. Based on the reasons stated above, we find no convincing evidence indicating collaboration between Messrs. G and H on these answers.

84. In conclusion, we find no evidentiary basis for concluding that Messrs. G and H collaborated on any exam or quiz, including the Category T and non-Category T quizzes where parallelisms were noted by Mr. Trunk.

ii. Messrs. GG, W and MM

85. Messrs. Trunk and Miller noted in their first Report dated September 2, 1981, see Licensee Ex. 70A, that Messrs. W and GG were found to have two sets of very similar answers on the first-round Category T make-up quiz administered on December 19, 1980. Mr. MM's answers to the two questions were also very close to those of W and GG but did not have exact wording. Messrs. Trunk and Miller thus noted possible cooperation between Mr. W and the other two individuals.

Trunk, ff. Tr. 24,831, at 6; Lic. Ex. 70A, at App. B.

86. Specifically, the first question at issue was Lessons Learned No. I which reads as follows:

"1. List two (2) major areas of weakness noted by the Lessons Learned taks (sic) force."

. -. . . - .__ . . .- ~ _

The answers read as follows.

i GG W MM Non safety related non safety related non safety re-systems affecting systems affecting lated systems safety related safety related affecting safety systems (challenges systems (challen- systems operator the system) and ges the systems) action compound-Operator action and operator ac- ing the challenge which compounded tion which com- to safety systems, the challenges to- pounded the chal- Lic. Ex. K.

the safety system. lenges to the Lic. Ex. M. safety system.

Lic. Ex. L.

i

87. The second question at issue was Lessons Learned 3

No. 2, which read: "The most important lesson learned fell

into the general area of operational s afety. What was the primary deficiency in this area?"

88. The answers read as follows:

i l

GG W MM Operator training operator training operator training allowing. actions allowing actions inacegoate. Lic.

which challenged which challenged Ex. R.

I the automatic the automatic actions of the actions of the safety related safety related systems. Lic, systems. Lic.

Ex. M. Ex. L.

J I

+ --=y.,y, . ---.--y.--- ,,,=-wi.- ,,....,t --.-,w,y -,-.v ,-,,c w.,. ,,y, - .e_ -y,-,

89. Messrs. T:unk and Miller had an opportunity to examine these answers prior to tie submittal of their third Report dated October 1, 1981, ard in that Report, they conceded that the parallelisms with respect to Mr. MM's two answers were in fact very weak. They therefore removed Mr. MM's answers from the list of those that remained in doubt. Lic. Ex. 70D, at 3; Trunk, ff. Tr. 24,831, at 10.

90. Mr. John Wilson and his colleague, Mr. Richard Lloyd, reached the same conclusion as that of Messrs. Trunk and Miller with respect to MM's two answers. However, because Mr.

MM's name was not removed from Mr. Trunk's list of parallelisms until October, 1981, Messrs. Wilson and Lloyd interviewed MM on September 15, 1981; he denied any cheating. Wilson, ff. Tr.

24,478, at 11.

91. We agree with Messrs. Wilson and Trunk that MM's answers are not sufficiently similar to those of Messrs. GG or W to cause any concern.

92. As for the two sets of answers by Messrs. GG and W, Licensee could locate neither training materials nor a lesson plan despite an exhaustive search. Tr. 24,570-71 (Wilson). Therefore, we are not able to determine whether the operators' answers resulted from memorization of these mate-rials.17 17 Of course, that leaves open the possibility that during the l training week the instructor used these words in his lecture or wrote them on the blackboard and the individuals' answers on the exam resulted from studying or memorizing notes. There is no evidence to confirm or deny this possibility, however.

t

93. Mr. Wilson exhaustively interviewed GG to discover whether he cheated or whether he was aware of Mr. W's copying from his exam paper. Mr. GG denied any cheating or facilitation of another's cheating, although he could not remember where he and Mr. W had sat during the quiz so he could not be sure that Mr. W didn't look at his (Mr. GG's) exam paper without his knowledge. Tr. 24,569-70 (Wilson); Wilson, ff. Tr.

24,478, at 12. Mr. Hukill also questioned Mr. GG about the similarities between his and Mr. W's answers, and Mr. GG again stated emphatically that he had not cheated. Tr. 24,083 (Hukill). Mr. Wilson was not able to interview Mr. W because he was no longer employed at TMI-I at the time of this investi-gation. Wilson, ff. Tr. 24,478 at 12.

94. According to Judg2 t'.ilhollin's assessment of Mr.

GG's demeanor on the stand, the witriess' oral testimony on this issue was direct, unequivocal and totally believable. As he had told Mr. Wilson in a previous interview, Mr. GG could not recollect the circumstances surrounding the administration of the quiz in question, but when asked directly whether he had copied his answers from W, he answered empnatically "No, I did not". Tr. 25,695 (Mr. GG).

95. When Mr. W was asked the same questions, he responded that he "may have" discussed the first answer with i

M r . GG , but he could not recall; Tr. 26,144 (Mr. W); and that he may have cooperated with GG on the second question, but again, he could nce recall. Tr. 26,148 (Mr. W).

-~

96. Without having spoken to Mr. W, Wilson conceded on the stand that although he could not conclude positively that Mr. W had cheated, he had a " strong leaning" in that direction. Tr. 24,568 (Wilson). Mr. Ward of the NRC Staff also concluded that Mr. W was more likely than Mr. GG to have copied in this case because Mr. W already had a record of cheating. Tr. 25,411-12 (Ward).

97. The Board agrees with the position of Messrs.

Ward and Wilson, particularly after noting Mr. GG's strong denial of cheating and Mr. W's equivocation. The question of

. Mr. W's involvement is moot, however, since Mr. W already has left his employment with Licensee, iii. Messrs. S and Y

98. Messrs. S and Y were found to have two sets of virtually identical answers en a Category T make-up quiz administered on December 19, 1980. However, when the training materials for both answers were reviewed, it was evident that these two operators had merely memorized the materials.

Wilson, ff. Tr. 24,478, at 9-10; TMIA Ex. 76, at 2-3.

Moreover, Mr. Wilson's review of the exams of other operators with respect to the one question at issue disclosed that i

several operators had used phrases similar to those in the training materials. Tr. 24,554 (Wilson).

99. Mr. Y was unavailable for an interview due to a leave of absence, but Mr. S was interviewed by Messrs. Wilson

and Lloyd and denied any cheating. Wilson, ff. Tr. 24,478, at 9; TMIA Ex. 76, at 3.

100. Messrs. Wilson and Lloyd were satisfied with Mr. S's denial of cheating and decided it was not necessary to interview Mr. Y because the parallel answers appeared almost curtainly to have been memorized from training handouts. Id.

Messrs. P unk and Miller also found it probable that Messrs. S and Y memorized the teaching materials and so removed these parallelisms from their list of questionable items. Trunk, ff.

Tr. 24,831, at 9; Lic. Ex. 70D, at 1-2. We agree with these assessments and find that no cheating occurred in this instance.

iv. Mr. Boltz and the ATTS Answer,,gev 101. A fourth incident of parallelisms noted by Mr.

Trunk concerned Mr. Dennis Boltz and his response to two questions on the ATTS SRO exam given on April 2, 1980. Mr.

Boltz's answ-cs, including a graph, were found by Mr. Trunk to be nearly identical to the answer key. Trank, ff. Tr. 24,831, at 8; Wilson, ff. Tr. 24,478, at 12; Lic. Ex. 70C. Mr. John Wilson's subsequent interviews with Mr. Boltz and with Nelson Brown revealed that Mr. Brown had graded the two luestions at irsue and had adopted Mr. Boltz's answers, with some modifica-tion, for the new answer key. Wilson, supra, at 13. It was obvious to Mr. Wilson that Mr. Boltz did not cheat on this exam, id., and we concur in this judgment.

D. Incidents of Cheating Reported by Licensee Personnel

i. Shipman Incident 102. In addition to the parallel answers discussed abe.e, incidents of a different nature were reported by certain Licensee personnel. One of the most noteworthy involves Mr. Shipman, who is Mr. Ross' (the TMI-l Manager of Plant Operations) operating engineer. While presumably taking either the NRC RO or SRO "A" exam in April, 1981, Mr. Shipman left the nonsmoking room to get some coffee, and while at the coffee stand, another individual asked him a brief question which Mr. Shipman answered. Mr. Shipman then returned to the exam room and completed the exam without further incident. Arnold, ff. Tr. 23,590, at 10; Hukill, ff. Tr. 23,913, at 14; Staff Ex.

28, at 5.

103. At the time of this encounter or shortly thereaf ter, Mr. Shipman realized that his conduct had been improper but he did not think the incident was significant enough to constitute cheating. Therefore, he did not immediatelv report the occurrence to any of his superiors.

Staff Ex. 28, at 5 and Enclosure 3, at 1; Tr. 26,383 (Shipman).

l 104. On October 7, 1981, in an intarview with

! Mr. Henry Hukill, Vice President of TMI-1, Mr. Shipman was asked whether he had f acilitated cheating .ind he voluntarily related the incident at the coffee stand, describing the encounter as a spontaneous and unpremeditated occurrence. He could not recall who the questioner was and could not recall the question asked. He was also uncertain as to whether the incident occurred during one of the April, 1981 NRC exams given earlier the same month or one of the ATTS mock exams. Hukill, f f. Tr . 23,913, at 14-15; Staff Ex. 28, Enclosure 3, at 2-3; Tr. 23,986-87 (Hukill).

105. Mr. Hukill made it clear to Mr. Shipman "in rather strong terms" how he viewed his actions, how Licensee would not t,)lerate such actions and how he considered Mr. Shipman to have cheated just as much as the person who asked him the question. By the end of the interview, Mr. Shipman clearly realized the significance of his actions.

Tr. 23,959-60, 24,091 (Hukill); Tr. 26,358 (Shipman).

106. Mr. Hukill found it inconceivable that Mr. Shipman could not remember the name of the questioner or the question. He asked Mr. Shipman numerous times whether he remembered who was in the area, who was in the other exam room, whether the question was on the exam, what the question was, 1

etc. Mr. Hukill was, by his own characterization, very tough on Mr. Shipman, and during a subsequent interview concernin?

I the incident he made it clear that-he considered it "absciutely essential to his (Mr. Shipman's] moral integrity" that he tell Mr. Hukill everything he knew about the incident. Tr. 24,074, 1

24,091-92 (Hukill). Mr. Shipman, throughout the questioning, i continued to maintain that he could not remember any specific details of the encounter other than that it was brief and 4

spontaneous. See Staff Ex. 28, Enclosure 3, at 4-5. We note that both NRC witness Baci and Judge .tilhollin agreed that Mr.

Hukill appeared to be a very persuasive man, and that if anyone could have gotten Mr. Shipman to speak out, it would have beer.

Mr. Hukill. Tr. 25,373-74 (Baci, Milhollin).

107. After the interviews with Mr. Hukill, Mr. Shipman was interviewed by Mr. Arnold, who wanted to see him before taking any final disciplinary action. Tr. 23,690-96 (Arnold). Mr. Arnold was convinced that Mr. Shipman not only understood and accepted the seriousness of the incident, but was never going to allow such an incident to happen again.

This confidence in Mr. Shipman's attitude, together with a weighing of all the circumstances, including the fact that he had given Licensee seven good years of service as a highly competent, honest employee, the incident was spontaneous and not planned, it was an isolated incident, and Mr. Shipman voluntarily had reported it, shaped the decision of Messrs.

Arnold and Hukill that the most appropriate response by management was to issue a letter of reprimand. Arnold, ff. Tr.

23,590, at 10; Hukill, ff. Tr. 23,913, at 14-15; Tr. 23,691-95, 23,884 (Arnold).

108. Messrs. Arnold and Hukill clearly struggled with the question of Mr. Shipman's veracity. Both were skeptical at first about his failure to recall so many details of the incident. However, after Mr. Shipman withstood several hours of questioning without waivering from his original scory, both men were convinced that he was telling the truth.

Moreover, they both reasoned, the f act that Mr. Shipman was honest enough to reveal the incident in the first place suggested that he was being totally forthright in his descrip-tion of the events. Tr. 23,696-97 (Arnold); Tr. 23,987-88, 24,091-92 (Hukill). Indeed, Mr. Hukill emphatically rejected the suggestion that Mr. Shipman was the type of person who may have come forward without revealing the identity of the questioner to dissuade the latter from revealing the details of the incident. Tr. 23,988-89 (Hukill).

109. Mr. Shipman was interviewed on October 19, 20 and 22, 1981 about the coffee stand incident by OIE investiga-tors Gilbec' and Baci. He presented the same facts to the investigators that he had presented to Messrs. Hukill and Arnold; i.e., he remembered the incident but could not remember the question asked, the name of the questioner, or any physical characteristics of the questioner. Staff Ex. 28, at 5. He was given a written statement to sign during the October 20, 1981 interview but declined to sign it because he believed it did not accurately reflect what had been said. Tr. 26,359-60 (Shipman). He therefore listened to his own tape recording of the interview and submitted a handwritten, signed statement to the NRC. Staff Ex. 28, at 6-7, Enclosure 3.

110. On the stand, Mr. Baci indicated that he did not believe Mr. Shipman was being truthful; that his memory was-too selective. Tr. 25,368-69, 25,455 (Baci). Mr. Ward agreed,-

noting that Mr. Shipman's inability to' rem' ember any physical characteristics of the questioner " stretched our credulity 4

somewhat". Tr. 25,370 (Ward). On cross-examination, Mr. Ward 4

. indicated that if an individual was involved in an incident of cheating, he (Mr. Ward) would expect that individual to be able

to recall at least some physical characteristics of the other 4 I

individual or to recall details of the incident itself. Tr.

25,453-54 (Ward); accord, Tr. 25,455 (Baci).

111. Mr. Shipman's testimony on the stand was totally consistent with his statements to Messrs. Arnold and

! Hukill and to the NRC investigators. He did admit that the question asked of him may very well not have been on the exam 1

he was taking, but he continued to believe that it was. Tr.

I 26,363, 26,397 (Shipman). He also stated that if someone had i asked him for assistance on a weekly quiz, he would have been I

" shocked" and would not have provided any help. He distingui-shed such an occurrence from the coffee stand incident, explaining that the latter incident was so brief and spontane-i

ous that he didn't think of it in terms of someone asking for assistance. Tr. 26,376-77 (Shipman).

i 112. After reviewing all the evidench of record, we l

remain puzzled as to why Mr. Shipman has been unable to recall so many facts about the individual who asked him the question.

Nevertheless, we realize that Mr. Shipman thought the incident was relatively insignificant at the time it occurred, and that although we find such an attitude to have been inappropriate, L

this attitude may have caused him to forget much of what transpired, 113. After weighing what we consider to be the salient evidentiary facte -- Mr. Shipman's voluntary disclosure of t5e incident, his ability to convince his own management of his veracity despite several rounds of very tough questioning, and his exemplary employment history with Licensee -- we find that he nas been truthful. We also find that Licensee acted appropriately in this instance by issuing a letter of reprimand to Mr. Shipman, particularly because he clearly has come to understand the error of his ways.

ii. KK Telephone Call 114. The second incident of note involves Mr. KK, an STA at TMI-1, who was on duty on April 23 and 24, 1981 when the NRC examinations were being administered. While on duty in the TMI-1 shift supervisor's office, he received a telephone call from an individual who identified himself as Mr. U. Mr. KK had known Mr. U professionally since September 1979, but not well enough to identify U's voice on the telephone. Mr. QQ was in the room with Mr. KK during the incident but could not remember whether he heard the caller over the speaker phone or whether I

he remembered the call because of his discussions with Mr. WK immediately afterwards. In any event, Mr. QQ could not identify the voice either. Wilson, ff. Tr. 24,478, at 13-14; Staff Ex. 27, at 39, and Enclosure 8, at 1-4.

115. The caller asked Mr. KK for an answer to a technical question concerning what happens to fuel pin tempera-ture over core life if an oxidizing layer builds up on a cladding surface. Mr. KK had often been asked questions of this nature in person, but had never received a telephone cal' from an operator with a question. Tr. 26,479 (Mr. KK). Aware that the NRC examination was in progress and alert that this was the type of question that would be on the NRC exam, Mr. KK asked the caller whether he was taking the NRC exam. The caller said no, but iadicated that he wanted the information for another individual, Mr. O, who was taking the exam. Mr. KK stated that he could not provide an answer to the caller because it wouldn't be fair, ac which point the caller said okay and hung up. Wilson, supra at 14; Staff Ex. 27, at 29, and Enclosure 8, at 5. Mr. KK was certain that he did not provide an answer to the question. Tr. 26,506 (Mr. KK).

116. NRC witness Ward and assistanto compared the question reportedly asked of Mr. KK to both the NRC RO and SRO "B" examination questions. No correlation was found between the examination questions and the one asked of Mr. KK.

i Mr. Paul Collins, Chief of the NRC Operator Licensing Branch, also investigated the matter and stated that he was reasonably sure the question did not appear on the NRC RO or SRO "A" examination. Staff Ex. 2', at 31. Finding no contrary evidence, the Board concludes that the question asked of fir. KK did not appear on any of the NFC April, 1981 NRC examinations.

117. A few days later, Mr. KK discussed the incident with O and asked him whether it were true. This was several months before the NRC investigation that identified O as having collaborated with W on the April, 1981 NRC exam. O denied any knowledge of the matter and told KK that he had not asked for any help in taking his April, 1981 exam. O also indicated that the question asked was an easy one which he could answer without any assistance. Mr. KK believed him. Wilson, ff. Tr.

24,478, at 14; Tr. 26,474 (Mr. KK); Tr. 25,271-72 (Mr. O); see also Tr. 26,258 (Mr. O could not remember whether he spoke to Mr. KK about the incident just after the April exams or just after the commencement of the NRC investigation of cheating);

Staff Ex. 27, Enclosure 8, at 8-9.

118. On the stand, Mr. KK explained why he did not report the incident to anyone in management prior to late September, 1981 when the NRC was conducting its second investi-gation of cheating. Mr. KK stated that after speaking to Mr.

O, he (Mr. KK) believed the caller had lied about the purpose for his call, and possibly had lied about his identity. Thus, all that Mr. KK knew with certainty was that someone had called with a question which Mr. KK did not answer, and he did not i think this constituted enough information of substance to merit a report to management. Tr. 26,473-75 (Mr. KK). Mr. KK did not ask Mr. U about the incident because he assumed Mr. U would deny having made the call, and, not knowing U vell KK did not know whether or not he would believe the denial. On the other hand, if Mr. U denied having made the call and KK felt he could believe him, KK would have no better information than he i started with. Therefore, Mr. KK decided not to speak to U.

Tr. 26,518-20 (Mr. KK).

119. Prior to the NRC's investigation of rumors of cheating in late September, 1981, KK discussed the incident ~

with P, who cautioned him about trafficking in rumors. Tr.

26,471-73 (tir. KK); Staff Ex. 27, at 40. Subsequently, on the morning of September 22, 1981, the day Mr. KK was to be interviewed by OIE regarding a rumor, he discussed the incident with Mr. Toole, Operations and Maintenance Director at TMI-1, and with Messrs. John Wilson and Richard Lloyd. Wilson, ff. Tr.

t 24,478, at 13; Staff Ex. 27, at 32, and Enclosure 8, at 10.

Mr. KK suspected that the NRC might want to talk to him about-the telephone call and that he should inform his management first. He also stated on the stand that even if the NRC had not been at TMI conducting an investigation, he eventually would have told Licensee's management.

Tr. 26,502-03 (Mr. KK).

! On September 23, 1981, he recounted the incident once more for OIE Investigator Richard A. Matakas. Staff Ex. 27, Enclosure 8; see Tr. 25,377-78 (Vard). Mr. Matakas and the other OIE investigators believed KK's story. Tr. 25,405 (Ward).

l 120. The OIE investigators also interviewed U about l this matter on September 24 and 25, 1981. Mr. U stated that he had been assigned to training on April 23 and 24,-1981 and that he had been reviewing old examinations. He provided the

investigators with a copy of the ATTS RO examination and noted that Question 5 in Section H of the exam read: " Explain how the build-up of corrosion products (CRUD) on the fuel elements affects fuel temperature" . Staff Ex. 27, at 44 and Enclosure

11. Mr. U indicated, and we concur, that the question in the ATTS exam is very similar to the one asked of Mr. KK. Staff Ex. 27, at 44. We find it likely, therefore, that whoever called Mr. KK could indeed have been studying old examinations.

121. Mr. U admitted that in order to clarify some study materials, he might have called Mr. KK on April 23 or.24 j with a thermodynamics question similar to the one asked, but

, that he had no recollection of such a call. In any event, Mr.

U explained that (1) the specific question asked of Mr. KK was an easy one for which Mr. U he would not have needed clarifica-l tion; (2) he would not have called Mr. KK to help O because O-didn't need any help; and (3) he would not have calledEMr. KK to help anybody else answer an exam question because he (Mr. U) understood that the NRC exams were to be individual efforts.

f Wilson, ff. Tr. 24,478, at 15; Staff Ex. 27, at 36-30, 44; Tr.

l 26,844-47 (Mr. KK).

122. U noted on the stand that he did not speak to KK about the incident because he had heard about it for the first time during the NRC investigation and was told by the investigators not to discuss the matter. The sequestration order issued by Judge Milhollin was a further reason not to discuss the matter with KK. Tr. 26,864-65 (Mr. U).

123. Mr. Ward noted that the facts suggested a great t

likelihood that Mr. U had called Mr. KK, and Mr. U conceded that he might have called him. Yet, under admittedly intense questioning by Messrs. Ward, Baci and Smith, Mr. U fervently denied any recollection of having made the call. Mr. Ward was therefore convinced that Mr. U was not lying about this matter, for having admitted the possibility of a call, Mr. U had nothing to gain by holding back any further information. Tr.

25,381-82 (Ward).

124. Mr. O was questioned on the stand about this matter and his responses were consistent with what already had been revealed. Mr. O said that Mr. KK's disclosure to him of

the incident made him very angry, and that he had intended to speak to Mr. U about it but just had not found the opportunity.

Mr. O also stated that the question asked of Mr. KK was a very basic heat transfer question that was quite easy to answer.

Mr. O would not have needed to seek assistance on sucn a question. Staff Ex. 27, at 43; Tr. 26,272 (Mr. O).

I 125. Based on the above evidence of record, this Board finds that a telephone call was indeed made to Mr. KK and that his explanation of the incident was truthful. His l

l decision not to report the telephone call to his own management immediately after the incident occurred was regrettable, but was rational under the circumstances and certainly not worthy of any sanction. This Board also finds no reason to disbelieve Mr. O's denial of involvement in the incident.

126. Mr. U's denial of involvement is somewhat more troublesome because he did concede the possibility of calling Mr. KK on the dates in question. However, we agree with Mr.

Ward that having conceded the possibility, Mr. O could gain nothing by lying about his actual placement of the call.

Moreover, we are convinced of the veracity of his assertions that neither he nor Mr. O needed help on the question allegedly asked of Mr. KK. Therefore, we find that Mr. U did not make the call to Mr . KK. See Wilson, ff. Tr. 24,478, at 5 (Messrs. Wilson and Lloyd found no basis for disbelieving U's denial of cheating); Staff Ex. 27, at 47 (OIE investigators were unable to conclude that Mr. U was guilty of malfeasance in connection with the KK telephone call).

127. Because the question allegedly asked of Mr. KK was not on the NRC examinations given in April, 1981, it is not likely that the unidentified caller was in fact attempting to cheat or to facilitate cheating on those examinations.

( iii. WW Telephone,, Call 128. The third noteworthy incident involves Mr. WW, an STA at TMI-1. While Mr. WW was on duty in the Unit 1 shift sepervisor's office during the administration of the Kelly exams in April, 1980, he received a telephone call from an

, individual who did not identify himself. The caller asked the 1

type of question typically asked of STA's like Mr. WW; viz, what are the indices on the DNB (departure from nucleate l

L l t

boiling) curve. Because the question asked was routine, and because Mr. WW frequently was called with such questions, he answered unhesitatingly. Arnold, ff. Tr. 23,590, at 10-11; Tr.

26,442-43 (Mr. WW); Staff Ex. 28, at 4, and Enclosure 1.

129. Mr. WW later saw a copy of the Kelly exam and discovered that the question he had been asked would have been useful in answering a question on the Kelly examination. The exam question, which was No. 3 in Category A' (Principles of Heat Transfer and Fluid Flow) , see Kelly, ff. Tr. 12,409, at Appendix B, required a drawing of the DNB graph, for which it was necessary to know the indices on the graph. Thus, although the question asked of Mr. WW was not itself an examination question, it was directly related to an examination question, and Mr. WW suspected possible cheating. See Staff Ex. 28, at 4; Tr. 26,444-45 (Mr. WW). On the other hand, as Mr. WW testified, the question at issue would have been useful for general background knowledge of heat transfer and thermody-namics, so the question may have had no relation to the Kelly exam. Tr. 26,444-45 (Mr. WW).

130. Mr. WW was interviewed by OIE investigators on September 23, 1981 with respect to a rumor of cheating, but did not report the telephone call at that time. Staff Ex. 28, at

4. He explained that just prior to the NRC interview, he recalled the incident but decided that his suspicions of cheating were unsubstantiated and too vague to merit vol-unteering the information to the NRC. He did reason, however,

that if he were asked a direct question, he would answer truthfully and reveal the call. He was not asked a direct question, so he remained _ silent. Staff Ex. 28, Enclosure 1, at 2; Tr. 26,446-49, 26,457 (WW).

131. Mr. WW was interviewed by Mr. Richard Wilson, Vice President of the Technical Functions division of GPU Nuclear, on October 13, 1981, and during the conversation, he discussed the telephone call. Mr. Wilson reported WW's account to Mr. Arnold who promptly reported the information to Mr.

Victor Stello. The OIE investigators then returned to interview Mr. WW a second time. Arnold, ff. Tr. 23,590, at 10-11.

132. During Mr. WW's second OIE interview on October 19, 1981, he discussed the incident freely, noting that he could not name the caller at the time of the incident or at the time of the interview. Staff Ex. 28, at 4, and Enclosure 1, at

2. Mr. WW stated emphatically on the stand, however, that if he could remember the name of the caller, he would have no reservations reporting it. Tr. 26,464 (Mr. WW).

133. After reviewing the above evidence, this Board finds that a telephone call was made to Mr. WW and that his explanation of the incident was truthful. Mr. WW should have been more careful about providing answers over the telephone during the administration of an examination, but we find that his response to the question was reasonable in view of the frequency with which he was asked similar questions. Mr. WW should also have reported the incident more promptly, but the information he had was so vague that he reasonably assumed his suspicions were meritless.

iv. 00, P and Q Quiz Incident 134. One potential incident of cheating was revealed for the first time by Mr. 00 during his appearance at this

, proceeding. When asked whether he had observed cheating on weekly quizzes, he indicated that some time ago, he had talked with P and Q about a math question on one quiz while the quiz cas in progress. The discussion involved an exchange of information relevant to the exam, but Mr. 00 could not recall who initiated the discussica, who asked for the information or who provided it. Tr. 25,375-76, 25,982, 25,996 (Mr. CO).

135. Mr. 00 acknowledged that he had not revealed this information to Mr. Hukill during-his interview of October i

12, 1981 because Mr. Hukill had not asked about the weekly quizzes. Moreover, OO'did not believe that what he did on the weekly quizzes constituted cheating. Tr. 25,976-77 (Mr. 00).

I 136. Mr. P stated on the stand that although operators sometimes spoke to each other about questions on a quiz, they did not ask each other for answers but for clarifi-cation of questions. Mr. P himself had been asked, albeit infrequently, to clarify the meaning of or to explain how to answer a question, and he had provided an answer. He could not remember the name of any specific questioner, but he said it would have been one of the_ people cn1 his shift. Tr. 26,701-02

{Mr. P).

137. Mr. O did not testify, nor was he interviewed by the NRC about this matter, so he could not comment on Mr.

OO's accusation.

138. The Board finds no reason to disbelieve Mr. P's testimony on this issue, particularly in view of the fact that Mr. ' OO could recall neither the nature of the information exchanged, nor who instigated the discussion or provided information. Therefore, we find that, to the extent Mr. P may have spoken to Mr. OO on a weekly quiz, he (Mr. P) most likely clarified the question for Mr. 00 or at most explained how to answer it.

139. We are troubled by Mr. OO's attitudes about the weekly quizzes and by his refusal to view his past cooperation as cheating. Nevertheless, the incident took place some time ago when weekly quizzes apparently were not treated with sufficient respect by many of the operators. See it 327-33, infra, particularly 1 327, for a discussion of past quiz i

l administrative procedures. With the changes that have been instituted with respect to the administration of weekly quizzes i

(see 1 347, infra), we view it as highly unlikely that Mr. 00,

, or any other operator whose obligation to work alone on weekly quizzes was misunderstood due to the past looseness of Licensee's weekly quiz administration, would continue to cooperate with his pec s on such quizzes under Licensee's current testing policies or , indeed, in light of the I

sensitizing effect of this proceeding on the TMI-l operators.

v. Statement of Mr. I 140. An additional incident merits our brief attention. During the September 24, 1981 OIE interview of Mr.

Ronald J. Toole, Operations and Maintenance Director at TMI-1, Mr. Toole mentioned that Mr. I had been agitated and upset about the termination of Messrs. O and W and had stated to him that the people responsible for the cheating of O and W were still around. Mr. Toole did not perceive Mr. I's remarks to mean that Mr. I believed other cheaters were still at TMI-1, but rather, that TMI management was responsible for Messrs. O's and W's perceived need to cheat. Mr. Toole related these remarks to Mr. John Wilson on September 22, 1981 in response to the latter's questions on cheating rumors. Staff Ex. 27, at 32.

141. On September 24, 1981, the same day as Mr.

Toole's OIE interview, OIE interviewed Mr. I and asked him about the statement that Mr. Toole had attributed to him. Mr.

I did not specifically recall the conversation in question, but remembered that he had spoken to Mr. Toole when he was upset about the termination of Messrs. O and W. Mr. I's statement conveyed his belief that TMI management personnel had f ailed to uphold their duty to prepare O and W adequately for the NRC exams. This failure, in Mr. I's view, had resulted in the termination of two fine employees, whereas the management personnel were still at TMI. Mr. I did not mean to imply that he had any direct or indirect knowledge that others were

.~

involved in the O and W cheating incident. In fact, he specifically denied such knowledge. Staff Ex. 27, at 35 and Enclosure 9; see Tr. 26,576-77 (Mr. I).

142. We find both Messrs. Toole's and I's explana-tions credible and we agree with the OIE investigators that no further action on this matter is warranted. See Staff Ex. 27, at 47.

vi. Possible Solicitation of Mr. P During NRC Exam 143. The final incident we shall discuss concerns the testimony of NRC witness Ward, Mr. Husted, a licensed operator instructor at TMI-1, and Mr. P, a shift supervisor at TMI-1, the latter two of whom were the only individuals taking the NRC SRO "B" exam in the smokers room on April 24, 1981.

The record reveals a conflict between Mr. Ward's testimon/ and Mr. P's concerning P's interview by NRC investigation on September 25, 1981. Mr. Ward's recollection is that Mr. P during the interview stated that Mr. Husted solicited an answer from him, whereas Mr. P's recollection is that he never stated such a thing because Mr. Husted did not solicit an answer from l

him. Mr. Husted consistently has maintained that he did not cheat on the April NRC exam and specifically that he solicited no answer from Mr. P during that exam or any other. Staff Ex.

26, at 19; Staff Ex. 27, at 16; Tr. 26,937 (Husted).

144. Mr. P was interviewed on September 25, 1981 by l

Mr. Baci and Mr. Ward, although Mr. Baci was not present during the entire interview. Mr. Smith of OIE joined Messrs. Ward and Baci from time to time. Tr. 25,459-60 (Ward); Staff Ex. 27, at 40.

145. During the interview, Mr. P expressed anger at the NRC proctor, Bruce Wilson, for leaving the examination room unproctored, claiming that such an absence left Mr. P vul-nerable to allegations of cheating and left him open to possible solicitation by other examinees. Staff Ex. 27, at 4; see Tr. 26,691 (Mr. P). Mr. Ward thought P's vehemence was "rather strange" and was perhaps an indication that in fact he had been solicited during the examination. Tr. 25,462 (Ward).

146. Mr. Ward pursued the matter during the interview by stating: . . . [T]he reason why you (Mr. P] are so upset about this is it puts you in an awkward position when Husted asked you a question," at which point Mr. P apparently looked startled and hesitated. Mr. Ward continued using this investigative technique, saying something like "(W]e knew he (Husted] had asked the question", (even though it appears he had no basis for this assertion). Mr. P then responded, according to Mr. Ward, by admitting that Mr. Husted had asked him only one question and that Mr. P had refused to answer it.

Further, according to Mr. Ward, Mr. P concluded the discussion by stating that no further solicitation had been made. Tr.

25,462-63 (Ward). Mr. Ward believed Mr. P's assertions. Tr.

25,320 (Ward).

147. Mr. Ward testified that Mr. P could not remember the specific question asked of him, but suggested that it concerned the meaning of a concept; "well, what in the' hell does this mean or words to that effect". Tr. 25,462-64 (Ward).

148. OIE n ver directly confronted Mr. Husted with P's claim because on two prior occasions, Mr. Husted had denied cheating on the NRC exam. Tr. 25,317, 25,320, 25,414 (Ward).

Moreover, Mr. Ward reasoned that because P had not provided any information to Mr. Husted, there was no reason to pursue the matter furth6r. Tr. 25,320, 25,415 (Ward).

149. Despite Mr. P's alleged admission that Mr. Husted asked him for an answer during an NRC exam -- an admission that Mr. Husted attempted to cheat -- Mr. Ward's testimony was that he decided not to include the matter in the second OIE Report concerning cheating (Staff Ex. 27). He i

reasoned that Mr. Husted's act did not constitute cheating -

because Mr. Husted did not receive an answer to his question.

' Tr. 25,415 (Ward). Mr. Victor Stello agreed that the act did ,

not fit into OIE's definition of cheating. Tr. 25,418 (War'd)_.

~

According to Mr. Ward, the KK telephone call (similar in that a question was posed but no answer given) was distinguishable on the grounds that it related to a potential cheating conspiracy

-- an individual may have been stationed outside..of sn examina- 4 tion room providing answers to third parties. See Tr.

25,415-16 (Ward). ,-

150. Mr. Ward also reasoned-that the alleged cheating incident was not directly related'to the main thrust of the second OIE investigation which concerned management f J

~

• A A .

involvement in cheating. Thus, there was no need to include the matter in the OIE write-up which was intended to summarize facts related to the primary investigative issue. Mr. Ward could not recall whether Mr. Stello was specifically aware of his decision to exclude the incident from the OIE report. Tr.

25,417-18'(Ward).

151. P's version of the OIE interview was substan-tially the same as Mr. Ward's in many important respects.

First, although P was somewhat confused about which OIE

. investigators interviewed him, he remembered Mr. Baci and a second person [Mr. Ward] whom he mistakenly believed to be Ward Smith. He also believed that a third person [Mr. Smith]

may have joined the interview from time to time, hence his confusion with the name Ward' Smith. Tr. 26,725-26'(Mr. P).

152. P clearly revealed the depth of his anger at the'NRC proctor's absence from the examination room, indicating-numerous times that his concern arose only after the NRC l

investigation of 0 and W had begun. It was then that Mr. P realized he could be vulnerable to allegations of cheating-

,- because no proctor was in the examination room at 'all times to i

i attesttohis[ honesty. It was apparent that this had been grating on him from the time the O and W investigation began until he was inte'rviewed by OIE, when his fears were actually l realized by si. Ward's questions. Mr. P insisted, in the face l  !

of intense cross-oxamination, that he had not been thinking of or worrying about the possibility Mr. Husted's cheating during

[] -

s the April examindtion itself'. He maintained that he was totally preoccupied with' the exam and that the thought of cheaping had never occurrsd to him at that time.

See Tr.

'26,729-36, 26,747-48 '(Mr. P).

~

\

153. Mr. P candidly admitted that prior to the investigation of Messrs. O and W, he might have been unwilling to "make waves" or " blow the whistle" on one of his friends had

~

the -friend tried to copy P's answers or solicit an answer. Tr.

. \

l 26)729,'26,731 (Mr. P). Since the termination of Messrs. O and W,.however, Mr. P had given the matter a lot of thought, and felt that' he would " scream bloody murder" if anyone asked him for assistance. Tr. 26,741 (Mr. P).

s e

154. Mr. P then explained Mr. Ward's comments as he remembered.them. He stated that.Mr. Ward, who was sitting s

opposite Mr. Baci a,nd generally to the right and behind Mr. P, s s had interrupte'd Mr. Baci's questions on what Mr. P believed to be the lack of complete . proctoring on the NRC exam. Tr. 26,692 (Mr. P). When Mr. Dard suddenly spoke up, he said something

\ like: "I am sure that there were [ sic] chatter in the room.

In fact, I would suggest to you that . . . Mr. Husted asked 4

s .you a quest i on". Tr. 26,692 (Mr. P). Up to this point, P's recollection is virtually the same as Mr. Ward's. P then

' recalled an additional comment by Mr. Ward that he was not

. inte' rested' in Mr . Husted 's question. Tr. 26,692-93 (Mr. P).

t \

s 155. Mr. P found Mr. Ward's interjections " odd", but before Mr. P could decide whether a response was required, N

'I

( , l' '

Mr. Baci asked him a question totally unrelated to Mr. Ward's comment.- Mr. P answered Mr. Baci's question, and Mr. Ward apparently dropped the matter of Mr. Husted. Thus, according to Mr. P, he never responded affirmatively or negatively to Mr.

Ward's comments. Tr. 26,692-93, 26,761-62 (Mr. P).

156. Mr. P was as emphatic and unequivocal as Mr. Ward in asserting that he did not tell Mr. Ward that Mr. Husted had solicited an answer from him. Moreover, he repeated several times that Mr. Husted did not in fact solicit any answers from him. Tr. 26,691-93, 26,731, 26,733, 26,734, 26,735 (Mr. P).

157. Mr. Husted's oral testimony was consistent with his statements to the NRC investigators. When asked directly whether he had asked P a question during the April, 1981 NRC exam, he answered unhesitatingly: " Absolutely not". Tr.

26,937 (Husted); see also Tr. 26,936 (Mr. Husted and Mr. P did 4

not discuss anything during the NRC exam).

158. In resolving this conflict, we must weigh the evidence. On the one hand, we find troublesome Mr. Ward's failure to discuss Mr. Husted's alleged solicitation in the OIE Report. His explanation for this omission gives us pause', for we are troubled that OIE would fail to report an incident based on-a distinction between a successful and an unsuccessful solicitation of answers on an examination. Moreover, even if we totally accepted this explanation, we would not approve of it, for Mr. Husted's alleged solicitation, if it occurred, was

clearly cheating and should have been reported and vigorously

- pursued. Therefore, the accuracy of'Mr. Ward's recollection.is in doubt.

159. Mr. Ward's recollection that P forgot the question Mr. Husted asked him is also doubtful' in this 4

instance, because someone who is generally as concerned as P about being accused of cheating on an exam would not be likely to forget such a question. This is particularly true of an individual like Mr. P, whose attention to details was obvious.

See, e.g., Tr. 26,690 (P corrects misstatements in OIE' Report summarizing his interview).

160. . We must note, however, that Mr. Ward's answers.

appeared unambiguous and unequivocal. He seemed to have remembered P's interview very clearly, despite the paucity of notes he wrote on the subject. Tr. 25,464 (Ward).

161. Mr. P, on the other hand, appeared to be an exttamely cautious and careful individual who was indeed, as Mr. Ward observed, concerned about his honesty and his appear-j ance of honesty. We can understand why Mr. Ward might have been suspicious about the extent of Mr. P's concern in this regard, but after reviewing the record, we find that P's fears l

are merely a part of his character.

162. Mr. P's expressed hesitancy to " blow the t

whistle" on his peers does not indicate to us that he was protecting Mr. Husted by lying on the stand. On the contrary, if Mr. P had chosen to lie, he undoubtedly would have done so

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at the time of the NRC investigation when he was first asked about cheating on the NRC exam. To tell the OIE investigators that Mr. Husted asked him a question and then to deny such a disclosure on the stand is both illogical and incredible to this Board.

163. Finally, Mr. Husted consistently and belie! ably denied cheating on the NRC exam. This clearly supports P's position.

164. Weighing all of these facts and reviewing the entire record, we find no basis for disbelieving the testimony of Messrs. P and Husted. We also find it;. .t , despite his unambiguous statements on the stand, Mr. Ward must have been confused about P's response during the interview. Mr. P apparently answered an unrelated question of ifr. Baci's in a manner that led Mr. Ward to believe Mr. P had accused Mr. Husted of soliciting an answer. Such confusion is under-stancable, particularly when two investigators were questioning P at the same time on somewhat unrelated matters, and more particularly-in view of the suggestive investigative-type questions Mr. Ward was employing. OIE's failure to refer at all to this event in its investigation reports may be indica-tive of an-uncertainty on their part as to P's response to Mr.

l Ward's questioning about Mr. Husted.

165. In view of our finding on this matter, no further action need be taken by the NRC or by Licensee.

E. Rumors of Cheating 166. In addition to the specific instances of suspected cheating just discussed, several rumors of cheating were reported to the Licensee and to the OIE investigators.

These rumors were explored to determine whether they might point to individuals who could provide some concrete evidence of cheating at TMI-1.

i. Mr. Polon Rumors 167. Messrs. John Wilson and Richard Lloyd conducted interviews with Mr. Polon, Manager of Employee Communications at GPU Nuclear on August 24, 26, and 28, 1981, to learn more about certain rumors the latter had heard. During these interviews, Mr. Polon indicated that on July 27, 1981, the same day that the NRC informed Mr. Arnold of its original cheating investigation, he (Mr. Polon) was informed of the investigation so that he could respond to media inquiries. The next afternoon, Tuesday, July 28, Mr. Polon's wife related to him that she had had a telephone conversation with the wife of Mr.

f P in which they had discussed previous conversations about rumors of cheating during NRC exams. They also had discussed i similar rumors told to both of them by the wife of Mr. T, a l TMI-l CRO. Wilson, ff. Tr. 24,478, at 16; Commonwealth Ex. 8, at 1.

168. Later that day, Mr. Polon related his wife's statements to Mr. William L. Gifford, Vice President of Communications. Mr. Polon also mentioned that he had heard from Mr. U about rumors of cheating on the April, 1981 NRC exam. Mr. Gifford immediately told Mr. Arnold about the rumors, and a meeting was held in the latter's office within minutes. Mr. Gifford and Mr. Wilson were present as Mr. Polon repeated the rumors. Mr. Arnold chastized him for not having reported the information to him sooner, af ter which he (Mr.

Arnold) immediately reported the rumors to NRC investigator Baci. Wilson, ff. Tr. 24,478, at 16-17; Commonwealth-Ex. 8, at 1-2; Tr. 23,664 (Arnold).

169. Messrs. T and U were interviewed separately by OIE investigators on July 29, 1981 and were asked about their knowledge of these and other rumors. Mr. T indicated only that he had heard general rumors about cheating on the NRC exams but could not remember the names of anyone who was the subject of rumors, or who passed on rumors. Mr. T mentioned nothing about his wife. Staff Ex. 26, at 38. Mr. U noted that rumors of cheating often circulate after exams but that he had never taken them seriously. He did indicate that he may have voiced some concerns about cheating, but these were only casual remarks because he had neither heard nor observed any cheating.

Staff Ex. 26, at 33. Mr. P was not interviewed by the OIE at this time.

170. On August 31, 1981, Mr. T was interviewed by 4

Messrs. Arnold and Wilson. He (Mr. T) clarified his statements to the OIE investigators by noting that he had only heard those

rumors after the commencement of the NRC-investigation.

Wilson, ff. Tr. 24,478, at 17; Commonwealth Ex. 8, at 3. He also claimed that his wife was an unreliable source because he did not talk to her about his work and she did not work at TMI.

Tr. 26,612-13 (Mr. T).

171. Mr. U was interviewed by Messrs. Arnold and Wilson on the same day as Mr. T. Mr. U did not remember discussing any rumors of cheating with Mr. Polon and denied that he had cheated on any mock or NRC-administered exam.

Wilson, ff. Tr. 24,478, at 17; Tr. 26,823-24 (Mr. U).

172. Messrs. Wilson and Lloyd interviewed Mr. U a second time on September 3, 1981 to try to pin down his position. When confronted with the specific rumor alleging that he had cheated, Mr. U emphatically denied the claim. He indicated that he had been very nervous in front of Mr. Arnold during the previous interview. With the lawyers, however, Mr.

U appeared relaxed and totally credible. Wilson, ff. Tr.

24,478, at 18; Tr. 24,611 (Mr. John Wilson does not believe Mr.

U was more candid when Mr. Arnold was not present; just more relaxed).

173. Mr. P stated on the stand that he had ques-tioned his wife about these rumors after learning of them for the first time at his November 8, 1981 deposition. Mr. P's wife told him that she had been approached by the wife of Mr. T some time after the April, 1981 NRC exams, and had been ~.cid that Mr. T thought he had done badly on the exams and Mrs. T thought everyone else must have cheated. Tr. 26,697-98 (Mr.

P). Mr. P's wife did not believe this story and thus did not relate it to her husband at the time. Tr. 26,697-99 (Mr. P).

174. Mr. P's wife also related that Mrs. Polon had called her at about the time the NRC's O and W investigation came to light. She and Mrs. Polon had discussed the rumor related by Mrs. T, and Mrs. P had told Mrs. Polon she did not believe the rumor.- That was the extent of Mrs. P's knowledge of and conversation about the rumors. Tr. 26,698 (Mr. P).

175. Based on these interviews and on the oral testimony of Messrs. T, U and P, we find absolutely no evidence to support these rumors. We therefore cannot rely on them as proof of the matters asserted.

ii. Rumors About Mr. U and Crib Sheets 176. A second rumor was reported by Mr. Polon to Messrs. John Wilson and Richard Lloyd during his August 28, 1981 interview. Mr. Polon indicated that when talking to his wife in an attempt to refresh his recollection of the above rumor chronology, she had relayed a second rumor of cheating which she had heard from the wives of Messrs. P and T. Mr. U was alleged to have written on his hand and to have taken crib sheets into the April, 1981 NRC exam. Following this interview, Mr. Polon reported the rumor to Mr. Arnold. Wilson, ff. Tr. 24,478, at 17; Commonwealth Ex. 9, at 1; Tr. 23,664 (Arnold); Tr. 26,304 (Mr. V).

177. Messrs. Arnold and Wilson decided that interviews of Messrs. T and U on this matter would be appropri-ate, and they were scheduled for August 31, 1981. Wilson, ff.

Tr. 24,478, at 17. Mr. Victor Stello was also notified of this rumor on September 2, 1981. Id., at 18.

178. Mr. T's interview, which has been discussed at 5 174, supEg in connection with the other Polon rumors, did not shed any light on the truth or falsity of the U rumors.

Wilson, ff. Tr. 24,478, at 18; commonwealth Ex. 9, at 2; Tr.

26,598-99 (T heard no rumors concerning use of crib sheets on cne NRC April exam).

179. Mr. U's first and second interviews, which also have been discussed above at 15171-72, supra, ccnvinced Messrs.

Wilson and Lloyd that his denials of cheating were sincere and believable. Wilson, ff. Tr. 24,478, at 18; Commonwealth Ex. 9, at 2.

180. Mr.~U's testimony on the stand was totally consistent with his statements to his management. He denied discussing cheating with Mr. Polon and categorically denied his use of crib sheets on the NRC April exam. Tr. 26,822-23 (Mr.

U). He did admit that he had brought his briefcase into the exam room, but was sure that he did not remove any information that could have assisted him on the exam. Tr. 26,840-41 (Mr.

U).

181. Based on our review of the record, we find absolutely no evidence to support these rumors about Mr. U.

They constitute nothing more than unreliable hearsay which cannot be used as proof of the matters asserted.

182. The Board is aware of generalized rumors that crib-sheets were used several years ago on Licensee-administered or mock exams. Names were rarely-mentioned in conjunction with these rumors, and no operator actually saw another operator using a crib sheet. See, e.g., Tr. 26,440-41, 26,451 (Mr. WW: heard no names); Tr. 26,030 (Mr. YY: heard.no names); but see Tr. 26,000, 26,005 (Mr. 00: heard that Mr. RRR

, used crib sheets on an exam but unclear whether it was NRC exam; Mr. RRR left Licensee's employ about one year ago). We find these rumors, like those discussed above, to be unsubstan-tiated and totally unreliable as probative evidence.

iii. Individual Stationed Outside the Exam Room to Provide Answers 183. The most troublesome and potentially serious rumor we have noted concerns the allegation that some individual was stationed outside the exam room during the April, 1981 NRC exams to give assistance to examinees. The rumor generally was reported without a specific name mentioned, but some operators heard that Mr. U was the individual sta-tioned outside the exam. See Tr. 26,263 (Mr. O), 26,534 (Mr.

I). Some operators also heard that TMI management was aware of the-presence of this individual. See Tr. 26,488 (Mr. KK).

184. This rumor with all its variations was relatively widespread at TMI-l see, e.g., Tr. 26,599 (Mr. T);

Tr. 25,987-88 (Mr. 00); Tr. 26,133-34 (Mr. W); Tr. 26,263 (Mr.

O); Tr. 26,486-88 (Mr. KK); Tr. 26,534 (Mr. I), but we recog-nize that -the operators only heard it af ter the NRC began its cheating investigation when the likelihood of speculation about alleged cheating was great. See id; see also Tr. 23,940 (Hukill) (rumors were to be expected after the O and W cheating incident became known). But see Tr. 25,986-87 (Mr. 00 appar-ently thought this rumor existed before the examination) .

185. Mr. U was questioned at length by the OIE investigators and by Judge Milhollin and the parties to this proceeding. Mr. U testified, first of all, that during the period in April when the NRC exams were given he had been and was still assigned full time to training with a group of Category IV trainees. He took his exams on April 21 and 22.

On April 23 and 24 when the "B" exams were underway, he was studying for his upcoming NRC oral exams and was working primarily in Mr. Husted's office. Mr. T was also assigned to training at that time and was using Mr. Husted's office with Mr. U from time to time. Staff Ex. 27, at 37; Tr. 26,825, 26,834-36 (Mr. U).

186. Mr. U explained that he had not been assigned to use Mr. Husted's office on April 23 and 24, 1981, but had chosen to use it because of its close proximity to the coffee stand and soda machines and because of Mr. Husted's reference materials. Mr. U simply requested Mr. Husted's permission for the use of his office, which request was not uncommon. Tr.

26,875-77 (Mr. U).

187. Mr. Husted verified that he had indeed given Mr. U permission to study in his office on April 23 and 24, 1981 while he (Mr. Husted) took the NRC, RO and SRO "B" exams.

Tr. 26,916-17 (Husted).

188. Mr. T was questioned about his knowledge of Mr.

U's whereabouts and activities on April 23 and 24, 1981, but could recall very little other than that Mr. U was indeed in Mr. Husted's office from time to time and that he (Mr. U) apparently was studying. Staff Ex. 27, at 42; Tr. 26,615-20 (Mr. T).

189. On the stand, Mr. U conceded that while the NRC exams were in progress, he might have answered spontaneously a quick question asked of him in the hallway or elsewhere outside the exam rooms. However, he did nct recall having provided such an answer to anyone. Tr. 26,837-38 (Mr. U).

190. Because of the possibility that Mr. U might unintentionally have provided an answer to an examinee in the manner described above, he inserted the word " knowingly" into his handwritten, signed statement for the OIE investigators.

His statement thus read that he did not " knowingly" facilitate l or encourage anyone to cheat, nor did he " knowingly" provide information or answers to anyone in the process of taking an NRC exam. Staff Ex. 27, Enclosure 12, at 2-3; Tr. 26,882-83 (Mr. U).

l l 191. Mr. 00 indicated on the stand that he had heard rumors that someone -- no one specifically ---was going to be l

! L

stationed in Mr. Husted's office to provide answers to examinees. Tr. 25,988 (Mr. 00). During the NRC exam, Mr. 00 went to the coffee stand and happened to meet Mr. U, whom Mr.

00 reasoned was coming from the direction of Mr. Husted's office. Tr. 25,988-93 (Mr. 00). As they exchanged simple greetings, Mr. 00 " jumped to the conclusion" that Mr. U was waiting to be asked a question. However, no words were exchanged other than the greetings. Tr. 25,988-89 (Mr. 00).

192. Mr. P also recalled having seen Mr. U at the coffee stand at some time on April 23 or 24, 1981. He indi-cated that he and Mr. U may possibly have said " Hello" to each other, just as Mr. 00 indicated, but Mr. P drew no inferences from Mr. U's presence. Tr. 26,703-04 (Mr. P).

193. When Mr. U was confronted on the stand with Mr.

OO's allegation, Mr. U stated that he could not recall having spoken to Mr. 00 during the administration of the NRC exams.

Mr. U stated unequivocally, however, that he would not have offered Mr. 00 assistance. Tr. 26,877-78 (Mr. U).

l. 194. Having reviewed the record carefully on this matter and having considered the facts and allegations discus-I sed above, this Board finds, first, that Mr. OO's theorizing regarding the encounter with Mr. U is pure speculation.

Second, although Mr. U's admission of possible provision of a spontaneous answer is troubling, we find no basis to believe that he actually provided any answers. Moreover, he would gain nothing by holding back additional information. See 1 123,

1 supra (having admitted the possibility of making a telephone call to Mr. KK, Mr. U gained nothing by holding back further information). Even if Mr. U had spontaneously provided an I

answer to an examinee, we would not view that as an indication that Mr. U was stationed outside the exam room to assist examinees. Finally, we have seen absolutely no evidence, other than one statement of a particularly vague rumor, that TMI management knew of, discussed, encouraged or proposed the idea of stationing an individual outside the exam rooms.

195. We therefore agree with the OIE investigators and find that the rumor alleging that someone, particularly Mr.

U, was stationed outside the exam rooms to provide answers is unsubstantiated. Similarly, any suggestion of TMI management's knowledge of, involvement in or encouragement of the presence of such an individual is totally unfoundcd. See Staff Ex. 27, at 47.

196. We take note at this point of a somewhat related matter involving Mr. U. He was cross-examined extensi-vely regarding the circumstances surrounding his presence in the training facility and particularly his use of Mr. Husted's office during the second set (Set B) of NRC exams on April 23 and 24. In attempting to recall when he had gained Mr.

Husted's permission to use the latter's office, Mr. U related that on the morning of April 23 (after he had taken " Set A" NRC exams on April 21 and 22), he had gone into the nonsmokers' examination room before the exam began. Mr. U remembered that

i Mr. O was.present at the time, as were Messrs. A, Z and possibly's. These individuals were waiting to take the "B" exams. See TMIA Ex. 88; Tr. 26,879-80 (Mr. U).

197. Mr. U described this get together'as generally laughing and joking around for about 20 to 25 minutes prior to the commencement of the exam. He was certain that the subject of the difficulty of his exam was discussed. He also stated he may have mentioned what subject matter categories were covered on the "A" exams, and may have discussed his specific exam questions and answers. When the exam began, Mr. O left the room and returned to Mr. Husted's office to study. Tr.

26,879-80 (Mr. U).

198. General discussions between examinees about the NRC examination could be expected; such discussions are common during any examination period--NRC or otherwise. Mr. U's banter with the other operators waiting to take an exam similar to the one he had just taken may have been, and ia all.likeli-hood was, innocently intentioned. It is hard to conceive that this brief session immediately before the exam could have led to any material effect on the exam in any event. It is, i

however, troublesome in that this sort of activity-provides an.

opportunity for compromising an examination which should be avoided. Accordingly, we believe the NRC should instruct examinees not to discuss their exams with prospective examinees during the same examination visit by the NRC. Restricting such conversation for such a limited period of time (1 to 4 days at most) will provide a level of assurance to the integrity of the NRC examination process which far outweighs, in our minds, any potentially offsetting detriments which one could envision.

iv. Rumor Concerning Passing Papers J

199. One other rumor was related by Mr. Husted who recalled that at some time within two weeks af ter the April, 1981 NRC examinations, he was walking inside the training center and between the coffee pot and the men's room he passed a group of two or more individuals. He overheard a brief portion of their conversation and remembered the words " passing papers". Mr. Husted did not hear which papers were being passed or whether they were being passed during a Licensee or NRC-administered exam. Staff Ex. 27, at 16; Tr. 26,924-28 (Husted).

200. When Mr. Husted first overheard this conversa-tion, it did not occur to him that the speakers might be referring to passing papers during an exam, but when the NRC

, began its first investigation of cheating, Mr. Husted made the connection. Tr. 26,925-26 (Husted).

201. Mr. Husted's recollection of the specific location of the overheard conversation was based more on an assumption as to the most probable place to congregate than on a precise memory. Tr. 26,926 (Husted). His inability to remember other salient facts such as the identity of the speakers or the day the conversation took place was

< - + - ""

" disconcerting" to Mr. Ward, but the latter conceded that the rumor was vague and that over time, Mr. Husted understandably could have forgotten many facts. Tr. 25,382-83 (Ward).

202. We note that when Mr. Husted was first interviewed by the OIE investigators on July 29, 1981, he acknowledged that he had heard rumors about possible cheating on exams but that these rumors were " unconfirmed hearsay".

Upon further questioning, he declared that he could not recall anything concerning what he had heard. Staff Ex. 26, at 39; Tr. 26,928-29 (Husted). By his second NRC interview on September 18, 1981, however, he had had time to think about the incident and freely recounted the overheard conversation.

Staff Ex. 27, at 16; Tr. 26,929-31 (Husted).

203. On the stand, Mr. Husted was uncertain as to why he had not provided any information on this rumor to the NRC in July, 1981. His final recollection, however, was consistent with his statements to OIE during his September 18 interview. See Tr. 26,928-31 (Husted).

204. Based on our review of the record on this matter, we must take notice of Mr. Husted's attitude on the stand. His answers were sometimes flippant (see, e.g., Tr.

26,928), and he appeared at times to consider the questions in a less than serious manner. This same attitude may have led to Mr. Husted's earlier problems with the O'E l investigators.

Nevertheless, he voluntarily reported the rumor in question to the OIE investigators and his report is believable.

205. We find that this rumor, like those already reviewed, lacks substantiation and cannot be relied upon as probative evidence.

206. Having carefully reviewed all relevant prefiled testimony, oral testimony' and exhibits of record, this Board has ' identified only a very few instances of cheating among the operating personnel at TMI-1:

(1) The cheating involving Messrs. O and W on the April, 1981 NRC, RO and SRO "B" examinations and on the ATTS examinations; (2) The oral response given by Mr. Shipman to an unidentified individual while they were getting coffee during what was presumably an April, 1981 NRC examination; and (3) The discussion by Mr. 00 and at least one other operator about the substance of a question on a weekly quiz while the quiz was in progress.

(4) An unidentified individual may have cheated by making a telephone call to Mr. WW in an attempt to obtain an answer to a question on the Kelly. examination.

III. Management Integrity 207. Within the scope of the broad-question-of the implications which can be drawn about Licensee management's integrity from the incidents of cheating at TMI are a number of specific issues addressed in the prepared testimony of Licensee and Staff witnesses, and which the parties and the Special Master exhaustively pursued with the witnesses. These issues are: (a) the extent of Licensee management knowledge of, encouragement of, negligent failure to prevent, and/or involvement in cheating in the April, 1981 NRC examinations, and in Licensee's primary qualification exams given since the TMI-2 accident; (b) the adequacy of Licensee's investigations of, and Licensee's response to, cheating or possible cheating in the examinations at issue; (c) the existence and extent of Licensee management constraints on the NRC investigation of cheating and rumors of cheating in the NRC April 1981 examina-tions; (d) the adequacy of Licensee management's response to the incident in July 1979 involving one of the two operators terminated as a result of cheating on the NRC April 1981 examinations; and (e) the existence and extent of Licensee management's involvement in cheating on radiation work permit

("RWP") examinations given after the TMI-2 accident, as alleged by the Aamodts . See 514, supra, issues 3, 5-8.

A. Management Culpability With Regard to Cheating 208. The testimony of Licensee witnesses Robert C.

Arnold, President of GPU Nuclear Corporation, Henry D. Hukill, Vice President of GPU Nuclear Corporation and senior on-site manager at TMI-1, and Michael J. Ross, TMI-l Manager of Plant Operations, bears directly on the question of management's knowledge of, encouragement of, negligent failure to prevent and/or involvement in cheating on the April, 1981 NRC examina-tions or Licensee's primary qualification exams since the TMI-2 accident (March 28, 1979). Staff witness Ward's prefiled testimony also directly addressed this question. To the extent i

i that other witnesses' testimony relates to'this question, we have relied upon it, as well.

l 209. In assessing whether, and to what extent, Licensee's management should be considered culpable for the incidents of cheating previously discussed, it is important

! . that we. define at the outset what we mean (and therefore, what we do not mean) by " management." In the Staff's view, a member

of management would be an individual who is in a position to '

control the actions of more than one shif t. Tr. 25,377 (2ard).

Thus, for purposes of their investigations, OIE's definition Of management " start [s]" with Michael Ross, and includes thesa individuals senior to him. Id. While the purely technical definition may be broader, including all non union (so call ed - -

" exempt") personnel in supervisory or senior professional!

positions, see Tr. 23,622-23 (Arnold), our statement of issues for the reopened proceeding intended to focus on complicity by management individuals as defined by the Staff. Thus, we have considered whether any senior member of Licensee's management responsible for TMI-l had knowledge of, involvement in or otherwise encouraged cheating. We have not considered the.

cheating by i'n dividuals O and W, for example, to constitute evidence of management's involvement per se, rather, we have evaluated whether these incidents, or the other incidents of cheating or cheating rumors, explicitly or implicitly impugn Licensee's organization because they cast doubt on the integ-rity of the people in charge of TMI-1.

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210. Mr. Arnold testified that his first knowledge of cheating or the potential that cheating might have occurred on the April, 1981 NRC written operator license examinations came from the NRC late in the day on July 27, 1981, when NRC investigators came to TMI to conduct interviews of Licensee employees. Arnold, ff. Tr. 23',590, at 5. Thus, Mr. Arnold became aware of the cheating at the time of the NRC Staff's first notification to Licensee tnat an investigation was underway. Mr. Hukill became aware of the issue when Mr. Arnold telephoned him shortly after Mr. Arnold had been notified by the Staff. Hukill, ff. Tr. 23,913, at 1-2. Prior to that time, Mr. Hukill had absolutely no knowledge or indication of any kind that cheating could have occurred or did occur on the NRC exams, or on any other TMI-l operator exam. Id. at 2.

211. In addition to presenting the testimony of its senior management personnel responsible for operations at TMI-1, the first level of management, the Manager of Plant Operations at TKI-1, Mr. Michael Ross, also testified on the subject of management's awareness of cheating on exams.

212. The April, 1981 NRC exams were administered over a four day period, April 21-24, 1981. " Set A" of the RO and SRO exams were given on the first two days, followed by

" Set B" of the RO and SRO exams on the next two days. Mr. Ross took " Set A" of the exams, RO and SRO. (Individuals "O" and "W" took the Set B examinations. See 128, supra.) During the time Mr . Ross took the " Set A" examinations, he was not aware of any cheating taking place in the nonsmokers room in which he

. sat; nor did he subsequently hear rumors of cheating, at.least not until after the NRC investigation began at the end of July,

[

1981. Ross, ff. Tr. 24,127, at 1, 4. Thus, Mr.-Ross had no-prior knowledge of the incidents of cheating and rumors described in the OIE August 11, October 13 and October 28, 1981 ,

a investigative reports, Staff Exs. 26, 27 and 28. Id. at 2; Tr.

24,177, 24,181, 24,185 (Ross).

213. Mr. Ross admitted that in his eleven years of experience at TMI-1 and in working with licensed operators, he-had heard rumors concerning - just about every subject af fecting the lives of his colleagues. Thus, he-was reluctant to state that he had never heard rumors about cheating. Ross, ff. Tr.

24,127,_at 5.

However, he is confident that these stories made i

so little sense to 'him that he rightfully ignored them.- Ross, ff. Tr.-24,127, at 5. On cross-examination, Mr. Ross could not t'

recollect any specific rumors that he 'had heard; nevertheless, it was clear in his mind that since "(y]ou hear things in a l

power plant," he had probably heard gossip related to individuals' conduct during exams. Id.; Tr. 24,195-96, 24,207 i

l (Ross). Mr. Ross was certain, however, that he never heard i

I rumors which-were of sufficient specificity or seriousness that-l L he felt he should take, or recommend that measures be taken to

. prevent cheating. Tr. 24,207 (Ross). He was alsc able to 1

i state', without equivocation, that he does not and has not in-l the-past condoned cheating, or ever suspected that cheating had actually taken place on any exam. Ross, ff. Tr. 24,127, at 5.

! I

1 l

214. Mr. Ross' recognition that he may.have heard cheating-related gossip which seemed at the time to be harmless is, in our-view, a positive reflection on his straight-forwardness on this subject -- a general characteristic of Mr.

Ross which we have gleened from his numerous appearances before us, and which the Special Master observed during the reopened proceeding. See PID, 1155. We have no reason to believe that Mr. Ross would not have in fact followed through and investi-gated rumors which suggested that there was a cheating problem.

Nor do we believe that Mr. Ross' ccknowledgement of gossip constitutes knowledge of, encouragement of, or involvement in cheating.

215. The Staff's investigations revealed no evidence that Licensee management was involved in any way in the cheating which took place on the April, 1981 operator license examinations, or on the other examinations-at issue in this proceeding. Ward, ff. Tr. 25,274, at 15; Staff Ex. 29, attached " Opinion of Reporting Investigators," at 2. Mr.

William J. Ward, Chief of the Investigations Branch, Enforcement and Investigations Staff, OIE, has had extensive

! experience in misconduct investigations. See Ward, f'. Tr.

25,274, at attached Qualification Brief. Also appearing with-L

, Mr. Ward were Messrs. Peter E. Baci and Edward C. Gilbert, two

[ experienced OIE investigators assigned to the cheating inci-dent.' Id. at attached Qualification Briefs. In Mr. Ward's

, opinion, the OIE investigations were conducted in such a way as i

to make it highly'likely that, had management been involved in any cheating incident, such involvement would have been detected by the Staff. Id., at 15. Clearly, the OIE investi-gators perceived the issue of management involvement to be one of primary importance. Id.; Tr. 25,303-04, 25,343, 25,418, 25,426 (Ward). Consequently, they were quite sensitive to this concern during all three of their investigations. Ward, ff.

Tr. 25,274, at 15. Specifically, the Licensee interviewees --

made up of current and former TMI-l control room personnel and licensed operator training instructors -- were questioned regarding possible management involvement, and all responses were negative. Management personnel were also interviewed by the OIE investigators. They denied any knowledge of cheating at TMI prior to initiation of the NRC investigations. Thus, after discussions with Licensee management personnel, the NRC investigators were convinced that these officials were sincer-ely concerned with the safe operation of the plant and would not condone cheating. Id.

216. One very specific allegation was raised concerning management complicity in exam cheating. The allegation related to Mr. Ross' involvement in reviewing the April, 1981 NRC license examination questions and answers during the time the exams were underway. This allegation was thoroughly pursued by OIE; however, before describing their findings, a brief recitation of the factual circumstances is appropriate.

217. As indicated in the Staff's license exam procedure, see Staff Exs. 29 and 30 at 3 and 18, respectively, it is standard NRC practice to have senior members of a licensee's operations staff who have intimate familiarity with the facility and who are tr ained as senior reactor operators review operator license examinations being given to other licensee personnel while the exam is being administered.

Wilson, ff. Tr. 25,481, at 3; Tr. 24,133-34 (Ross). There are two facets to this procedure: (1) to review the examination questions for clarity -- i.e. , so that they will be well understood by ihe applicants -- and to ensure that the ques-tions are germane to the particular facility, see Wilson, ff.

Tr. 25,481, at 3; Tr. 25,498-99 (Wilson); and (2) to ensure that all answers deemed correct by NRC Staff examiners are currently valid at the facility, see Wilson, ff. Tr. 25,481, at 3; Tr. 25,499 (Wilson). With respect to the review of the examination questions, the Staff cannot conduct this review with Licensee personnel prior to the exam's administration without potentially compromising the exam and violating Staf f procedures for safeguarding exam integrity. Boger, ff. Tr.

25,480, at 5. But it is not practical to wait until the exam l is over to substantively review the questions, because by that time it is too late to provide to examinees question correc-tions due to ambiquities or staff misinformation about the facility. Thus, normally, the Staff reviews the questions with a technically knowledgeable, SRO-licensed member of a licensee's staff as soon as the exam is underway; immediately thereafter, the examiner goes through the- answer key with the same individual. Tr. 25,499'(Wilson); Tr. 24,157 (Ross).

218. In April, 1981, every licensed individual at

. TMI-1 with a detailed technical familiarity of the materials covered by the NRC operator license examinations was taking the exams. Ross, ff. Tr. 24,127, at 2; Tr. 25,496 (Wilson). This is an unusual situation. Ordinarily, when an individual or group of individuals takes the NRC operator license exams, there are other individuals in the training or operations departments who already have an NRC license and can fulfill this review function. Ross, ff. Tr. 24,127, at'2; Tr.

1 24,132-33 (Ross). However, because everyone at TMI-l was required to be re-licensed, no " extra" personnel were available-upon whom the NRC examiners could legitimately rely to review the exam questions and answers. Ross, ff. Tr. 24,127, at 2.

219. In order to accommodate this rather unique situation, members of Licensee's staff who were not taking the examinations and were not SRO (or RO) licensed, specifically, Mr. Ronald J. Toole, Operations and Maintenance Director at TMI-1, and Mr. Samuel L. Newton, TMI Operator Training Manager, along with a Licensee training consultant, Mr. Charles Pardi of ATTS, reviewed the questions to the first two sessions of examinations, i.e., the " Set A" exam questions. Staff Ex. 27, at 14, 17, 18. In essence, this was a compromise measure, utilized to avoid having an individual who was taking the " Set

.'  ; ~ e, <

/

n.,

B" exams review the " Set A" exams and thereby gain some,inFight, into his forthcoming examinations. Tr. 24,21[il5 ( R o s s ) ; -T,r'.

25,146-47 (Collins). Subsequent'ly, during the " Set-B", sessions ,

and after he had completed his~ examinations, Mr. Ross, an individual-with the requisite detailed knowledge, reviewed the .-

questions to the " Set :B" exams, as .well as the answer keys to '".

?- ;

all of the exams. Tr. 24,157, 24,168-70 (Ross); Tr.'25,550-51 -- I!

(Wilson). Mr. Ross did not have the oppor u,nity to review the # <

" Set A" exam questions and recommend changes to them, since the

" Set A" exams had been completed at the ime his review 'took 7 -

}$-

~

place. Tr. 25,498, 25,547 (Wilson); Tr. 24,172 (Ross). c 220. Mr. Ross spent approximately three2to four ,

hours on the third and fourth day of thp April, .1,981 NRC exam ,

sessions reviewing the " Set A" answer keys _and the." Set B" questions and answer keys with Mr'.-Bruce Wilson, one of the NRC y

staff examiners from the Operator, Licensing Branch, Division of

- t Human Factors Safety, NRR. See' Wilson, ff. Tr. 25,481, at _.

attached Professional Qualifications; Ross,'ff. Tr. 24,127, at b

?

A 2-3. During the review, Mr. Wilson and Mr. Ross, along~with two operator training instructors, Messrs. Boltz and Brown, met i ,-

in Mr. Boltz's office,. located immediately next to.the smoker's i exam room. Ross, ff. Tr. 24,127,.at 3; Staff _Ex. 27, at 12 , .

19, 22; Tr. 24,153-57 (Ross). The Licensee -reviewers, includ-

ing Mr. Ross, told the examinerf if there was a question they .

did not understand, or an answer-they did not agree with and, E

for the most part, showed the examiner documentation in support 4

E i

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l 1

of- their view.

~

Tr. 24,157, 24,160, 24,243-44, 24,238 (Ross).

1 .

Thus, changes were requested by Licensee staff. Tr. 24,157-69 (Ross). -

3 221. Mr. Ross' participation in the exam review l

undertaken during the conduct of the " Set B" exams given in April, 1981 became,a matter of particular concern to the NRC Staff when an infoVmant, individual YY, who formerly had been 1 ,

~i

! ,' employed at TMI~, relayed to OIE that Mr. Ross had bragged in

, the-alleger's. presence of his success in keeping the NRC a'

proc' tor but ef;the examination room during the_ April, 1981 NRC

- r 0 ,

,/ ,

e'xams, when the procter'was supposed to have been in the room fod the entire day! Staff Ex. 27, at 1, 4, 7-8 and Attachment

1. M'i. YY also recalled that Mr. Ross had boasted he had

j -

. successfully expanded the answer keys to favor TMI examinees.

H' -

Id. at/4, 7,'and Attachment 1. Mr. YY's opinion of Mr. Ross c .

was illustrated,by his statement that Mr. Ross was the type of

- indivi~ dual wh'o would instruct his people in writing not to

[7 appropriate materials from other locations in the plant and l1 /

then verbally order them out en " midnight requisitions.' I_d .

i l at 7 and' Attachment 1.

i

' 222. When apprised of these allegations, Mr. Victor

' , S tello , Jr . , Director, OIE, ordered that an investigation be

' initiated immediately. M . at 4. As a result, Senior OIE f

- investigator Peter E. Baci took charge of what turned out to be the second of the three OIE cheating investigations conducted .,

- at TMI. -M. 4 i

/ l s /' ...

-100-P 4

,s

\ 42 l 223. Attherepu'estoftheSpecialMaster,Mr.YY testified,' concerning his dliegations that Mr. Ross expanded the j answer key and kept the proctor out of the exam room during the exam. Mr.YY'stesNimonyessentiallyrepeatedhisearlier statements to OIE Investigator Baci. S_ee Staff Ex. 27, 1

Enclosure 1; Tr. ,26,007-08, 26,011-14, 26,020-25 (Mr. YY). It was Mr. YY's opinion that Mr. Ross would keep a proctor out of the room to give exam candidates!an unfair advantage. Tr.

26,011 (Mr. YY). With respect to the " midnight requisition" allegation, it was Mr. YY's recollection that Mr. Ross once came in and talked to YY's shift supervisor, Mr. W, during a night shift, and told Mr. W that he (Mr. Ross) wanted a certain work-type bench put in place that evening. According to Mr.

YY, after Mr. Ross left, Mr - W discussed with Mr. inf. the contrast between Mr. Ross' written directive not to appropriate materials without authorization, and his oral directive to do so. Tr. 26,013-14 (Mr. YY). On the other hand, Mr. YY also testified that he thought Mr. Ross' expansion of the answer key was done under normal procedures, and that he was aware of no instances where Mr. Ross acted in a manner which violated any NRC regulations. Tr. 26,022, 26,034 (Mr. YY).

224. The OIE investigators interviewed a number of individuals over a three week period in arriving at their conclusions with respect to the allegations concerning Mr.

Ross. 'Specifically, OIE interviewed Mr. YY, Mr. Ross (on three occasions), Mr. Toole (twice), Mr. Newton, Mr. Boltz, Mr.

Brown, a number of TMI-l personnel who might have overheard the

-101-

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alleged state.nents of Mr. Ross, Mr. Pardi of ATTS, and Messrs.

Paul F. Collins, Ronald E. Maines, and Bruce A. Wilson, of NRR, the NRC Staff personnel involved in making the April exam administration arrangements. Based on their investigations, a

. detailed report was published by OIE on this and one other allegation, discussed in 11114-27, supra. See Staff Ex. 27.

225. Mr. Ross acknowledged that he may indeed have spoken to his staff about his review of the answer keys; however, he does not remember a specific conversation on this subject. Staff Ex. 27, at 12; Tr. 24,175-77, 24,302-03, 24,331 (Ross). During the OIE investigation and while on the stand, Mr. Ross stated that he may have commented on how long the reviews had taken, but there was no question in his mind that his description of the time involved would have been an observation and not a description of an attempt on his part to distract the proctor. Mr. Ross categorically denied that he had ever attempted or would ever attempt to keep an NRC proctor from doing his job. Staff Ex. 27, at 12-13; Ross, ff. Tr.

24,127, at 3.

226. It was NRC Staff examiner Bruce A. Wilson's opinion, based on his seven year association with Mr. Ross, that Mr. Ross would never countenance any plan to lure him (Mr.

Wilson) from his proctoring. Staff Ex. 27, at 9. Mr. Ronald E. Maines, the other NRC examiner involved in administering the

-April, 1981 NRC exams, had neither knowledge nor suspicion of any Licensee attempts to keep him from the room that he was

- 10 2=-

.+

assigned to proctor. Id. at 11. Mr. Baci, the OIE investigator who interviewed Messrs. Ross and YY, stated that he could understand Mr. Ross discussing the situation in a fashion which would be interpreted by Mr. YY in the way he described it. However, it was Mr. Saci's opinion that Mr.

Ross' version of the f acts was probably closer to the truth.

Tr. 25,437-38 (Baci).

227. Extensive cross-examination of Mr. Ross and Mr.

Bruce Wilson concerning the specific changes to the exams which j were suggested by Mr. Ross indicated that the substantial, but not extensive changes were prompted by TMI-l plant design modifications, NRC Staff misinformation about the' facility, and the fact that the exam was based in part on training material Licensee had sent to the Staf f which was outdated at the time L of the exams. See Tr. 24,268-301 (Ross); Tr. 25,591-632, 25,673, 25,676-82 (Wilson); Staff Exs. 33, 34, 35 and 36. Mr.

Wilson recalled no instances where one of the Licensee exam reviewers recommended a change to the answer key which, in Mr.

Wilson's view, would have made the answer key less accurate or complete. Tr. 25,678 (Wilson).

t 228. A number of individuals who would have been present in the control room at the time of the Ross conversa-tion recalled by YY were questioned. on this subject. It was the recollection of Messrs. KK and GG that Mr. Ross had discussed his review of the exams, but that they understood Mr.

1 Ross to be reassuring his staff about the fairness of the exam.

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, - , - , , . - . - , , - - . . - , , .. .., - ,,..,. ,-- -n.. ,- , , . . - - - . . , - .

Id. at 24, 26; see also Tr. 25,688-89 (Mr. GG). Mr. RR recalled Mr. Ross discussing this subject in an effort to cheer up individuals who were depressed about the exams. Staff Ex.

27 at 27. Messrs. Newton, Pardi, QQ, and WW were unaware of this rumor. Id. at 15, 17, 18, 25. Finally, on cross-examination, Mr. W -- the individual Mr. YY identified as having knowledge of the " midnight requisition" incident --

recalled an incident involving obtaining a desk. Contrary to Mr. YY's testimony, it was Mr. W's recollection that Mr. Ross had properly authorized appropriation of an unused desk from TMI-2 to be used at TMI-1; however, the operators who Mr. W sent to get the desk decided on their own not to go all the way over to Unit 2 to get the designated desk, but instead took an unoccupied desk from a TMI-l office. Tr. 26,161-63 (Mr. W). '

As Mr. W recalled it, this led to a fuss, but the problem centered on the operators who took the shortcut, not on Mr.

"oss. In Mr. W's opinion, Mr. Ross is not the type of individual who would instruct his people in writing not to appropriate materials from other locations in the plant and then verbally order them on a " midnight requisition." Tr.

26,161-62 (Mr. W).

229. In summary, the OIE investigators were unable to corroborate the allegations of the informant, Mr. YY, and discovered no evidence which would lead them to conclude that Mr. Ross was guilty of any misfeasance and/or malfeasance.

Staff Ex. 27, at 46. We are satisfied tnat OIE conducted a i

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thorough investigation of this allegation, and endorse the conclusions they reached.

230. While we are satisfied that Licensee management did not directly know of or encourage cheating, nor were they involved in any manner in the cheating incidents described in Section II, supra, the question of management's negligent failure to prevent this misconduct is a much more difficult question to resolve. As we discuss in detail, see Section IV, infra, there were serious shortcomings in Licensee's adminis-trative practices which we discuss in our findings on Licensee's verification of operators' qualifications. In addition to focusing on Licensee's procedures, however, we have carefully considered the attitude of Licensee management about the April, 1981 cheating incident, and the conduct Licensee's management appears to expect and demand from its employees, particularly its licensed operators. In so doing, we have made an effort to understand whether management held an attitude about integrity on the job, or about getting something done at whatever cost -- e.g., exams -- which could have played a part in the cheating which has occurred.

231. We consider the matter of management attitude and ethics perhaps to be of the most vital importance in our resolution of the facts of this case. As we stated in the PID, '

in considering whether Licensee's organization is qualified to operate TMI-1, the attitude of management towards the responsi-bility which would be entrusted to it was of major concern to

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us. PID, 15 116-128. With respect to exam cheating, we have no doubt that specific procedures can be written and instituted at TMI-l to minimize the likelihood of any such incidents in the future. See 14 337-38, infra. This is a fairly easy task to perform and to evaluate. More difficult to assess is whether management has a properly serious attitude about the subject, has inculcated its staff with a fundamental under-standing of its responsibilities in this regard, and has established adequate lines of communication with its staff members to " reach" them on this subject. Generally, then, we have considered whether Licensee's management has provided us with not only direct assurances, but with more subtle indica-tions of its ability to properly manage a nuclear power plant.

In making our evaluation, we take into consideration the Special Master's impressions of the witnesses, as well as Licensee management's written and oral testimony, the Staff's views on this subject, and the opinions of Licensee's employees, particularly its operators.

l 232. Licensee's management was shocked and l

demoralized by the discovery of cheating on the April, 1981 examinations. See Arnold, ff. Tr. 23,590, at 1, 4; Hukill, ff.

Tr. 23,913, at 2; Ross, ff. Tr. 24,127, at 4; Tr. 24,190 (Ross). At Three Mile Island, the last two-and-one-half years have yielded almost a continuum of unprecedented challenges to l Licensee's management and staff. These challenges have been technical, personnel, financial, labor and public relations l -106-

related. Nevertheless, in Mr. Arnold's opinion, and in full recognition of the importance and complexity of the host of prior problems and other current problems Licensee's management has faced, none has been as troublesome as the issue of cheating and its implications as to the integrity of Licensee's personnel and thus collectively of GPU Nuclear Corporation i itself. Arnold, ff. Tr. 23,590, at 1; Tr. 23,604-06 (Arnold).

233. In his testimony, Mr. Arnold described his responsibility and authority with respect to molding Licensee policies on conduct and integrity in the workplace, and his nuclear Navy background which provided to him an understanding _

of the extent to which the use of nuclear energy is critically dependent upon the integrity of the people involved with it.

Arnold, ff. Tr. 23,590, at 1-2; Tr. 23,612-13 (Arnold). As President of GPU Nuclear Corporation, Mr. Arnold establishes corporate policies and imposes disciplinary action on those who-deviate from those policies. Tr. 23,607-08 (Arnold). Mr.

Arnold stated repeatedly that cheating or other actions that violate the public trust will not be tolerated by Licensee, and that Licensee recognizes its clear responsibility to take appropriate steps to prevent it, and deal firmly with it if it i

does occur. Arnold, ff. Tr. 23,590, at 2-3; Tr. 23,616 (Arnold). In Mr. Arnold's view, no known wrongdoing should be permitted to go unaddressed by management, and further, the threshold of conduct which is "beyond the pale" is low.

Arnold, ff. Tr. 23,590, at 3.

-107-I .

234.- Recognizing that the responsibility for preventing, and responding to employee misconduct, such as cheating, rests with Licensee, and that the consequences to the public of such conduct can be severe, Mr. Arnold also articula-ted the difficulty, from a corporate management perspective, of creating an atmosphere where employees feel they have a responsibility to and do come forward with information which might reflect negatively on themselves or their co-workers, while at the same time instituting a policy which clearly states that individuals will.be held accountable for their performance. Id. at 3-4; Tr. 23,647-51 (Arnold). We concur in Mr. Arnold's view that it is extremely important for GPU Nuclear Corporation to conduct its affairs, including treating its employees, in a manner which minimizes the inherent conflict between disclosure and accountability. Arnold, ff.

Tr. 23,590, at 3-4; Tr. 23,651 (Arnold). Licensee's method for accomplishing this includes emphasizing to its employees that safety of nuclear plant operations depends on Licensee having l

all the facts relating to plant operations, and hence, on the character and integrity of everyone involved, demonstrating

?

l through example management's adherence to the highest princi-ples, and instilling in its employees confidence that they will be dealt with fairly. Arnold, ff. Tr. 23,590, at 4. We will discuss shortly Licensee's efforts to date in these areas. See Section III(b), infra.

235. Finally, in retrospect, Mr. Arnold recognizes that management's failure to explicitly enunciate its policy on

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i cheating or-to establish and enforce the necessary safeguards, see 11 325-33, infra, were important deficiencies, given the 4~ consequences of this failure. Tr. 23,d30-34 (Arnold). Mr.

Arnold. attributes these deficiencies to the trust management placed in the TMI-l operators and the consequent failure to adequately acknowledge.that when you take any group of individuals in the aggregate you have got to expect there are going to be some occasions of falling short. Thus, management failed to be sufficiently sensitive to the need to express the trust' that it placed in its operators, and to safeguard that j trust. Tr. 23,632-33 (Arnold). In addition, with the complete restructuring of the training program and department following 3

the TMI-2 accident, management's major focus was on the quality and scope of training. Instituting exam procedures was simply overlooked Tr. 23,633 (Arnold); see also Long, ff. Tr.

24,921, at ,.

i 236. In addition to considering the views of Mr.

Arnold on~the issue of cheating, we also heard.from Mr. Hukill, I an individual whose attitude is extremely important, since Mr.

Hukill, as the senior member of TMI-l management on site, sets l the tone for how individuals conduct themselves on a daily i

basis at TMI-1. In his prepared testimony, and his testimony upon cross-examination, Mr. Hukill was forthright in expressing

- his views on cheating, including the basis for them. In summary, based on his experiences in the nuclear Navy program,

. ingrained in Mr. Hukill is the view that total honesty and

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trustworthiness is absolutely necessary on the part of all individuals, from the top to the bottom, in an organization.

Hukill, ff. Tr. 23,913, at 3-6. Cheating, lying, falsification of records, or any other conduct which reflects a willingness to compromise the integrity of one's actions is totally unacceptable and cannot be tolerated. Id. at 3; Tr. 23,985 (Hukill).

237. Mr. Hukill's testimony reflected the degree of concern and responsibility he felt for the cheating which took place on the April, 1981 NRC operator license exams. While Mr.

Hukill did not assume his responsibilities as the Vice-President in charge of TMI-l until September of 1980, having arrived on-site in June of 1980, see Tr. 24,008 (Hukill), he nevertheless felt that he bore some responsibility for what had occurred since he did not clearly articulate his views on this question of ethics to the TMI-l staff when he arrived but, rather, assumed such a view to be commonplace.

Hukill, ff. Tr. 23,913, at 4-5; Tr. 23,981, 24,010-17 (Hukill). In this respect, he felt somewhat naive. Hukill, ff. Tr. 23,913, at 2. Mr. Hukill also was concerned about the degree to which Mr. O and Mr. W felt " driven" to cheat. Id. at

11. While he had reached no conclusion on this subject after having spent considerable time thinking about it, Mr. Hukill nevertheless faulted himself for not having sat down with each exam candidate prior to the April, 1981 NRC exam and ensured that they were ready (substantively au'. emotionally) to take

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. .. - - _- . _ =_ - _ _ _ .

the exams. Id.; Tr. 24,010-17 (Hukill). (On the other hand, based on what he knew at the time he testified, Mr. Hukill believed the exam candidates had been ready to take the April NRC exams, at least substantively. Tr. 24,017 (Hukill).)

238. Management can be faulted for not clearly enunciating its views on cheating, or safeguarding against such conduct because, as Mr. Arnold recognized, the'se omissions 1 resulted in very serious consequences. We do not believe, i

however, that it reflects a careless attitude by Licensee's management about the trust placed in them, or an inattention to their duties and responsibilities. Moreover, we find it j difficult to fault Licensee's management for their assumptions with regard to honesty, which we believe to be fairly common.

We do, however, have criticisms, as expressed in 51 315-20, 356-66, infra, with regard to the certification process Mr.

j Hukill utilized to verify that operators were qualified to sit for the April 1981 NRC exams, and the absence of a TMI exam administrative procedure. See 11 325-33, infra.

I 239. In general, however, we are confident that the

{.

i . standard of conduct by which Licensee's employees ~will be l judged by Mr. Arnold and Mr. Hukill is very high. See, e.g.,

l Tr. 23,616 (Arnold); Tr. 23,985 (Hukill). It was very clear, 1

for example, that while Mr. Hukill would be willing to accept some failings or shortcomings in his staff, he would not tolerate acts of misconduct which we consider unacceptable, e.g., another cheating incident by Mr. Shipman, discussed at 11 102-13 above. It was also clear that Mr. Hukill perceived his

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role as senior onsite member of management as requiring him to

.get to know the people working for him and that he would not depend on one source of information. Tr. 23,984-86, 24,006, 24,014-16 (Hukill). We have confidence that the matter of proper attitude is not an issue which Licensee's management will let slide at TMI-l once the subject is out of the adjudi-catory limelight. See, e.g., Tr. 23,984-86, 24,009-10 (Hukill).

240. Finally, Mr. Ross addressed in his testimony his recognition that, in addition to being attentive to operators' conduct in the control room, he now realized how-important it is for him to focus his attention on operators' conduct'in other aspects of their job, such as in training and testing. Ross, ff. Tr. 24,127, at 7. We agree.

241. Based on the evidence set forth above, the Board concludes that Licensce's management did not have any prior knowledge of or involvement in the incidents of cheating described in Section II, above, nor did ' they encourage this misconduct. While we may not always agree with each specific disciplinary. action taken by Licensee, we find the. bases for Licensee's actions in each instance to be carefully considered and reasonable. With respect to attitude, we do not find there to be a management attitude problem at TMI-l which can be considered .to have caused the exam cheating which has occurred.

Finally, we are confident that the cheating incident-in the April, 1981 exams and the ensuing. investigations and hearings

-112-

.. -_ - - _-- .- . - . = . - - . .. --

have so sensitized Licensee's management that any shortcomings 1

of the past are not-likely to be repeated. As we discuss in Section III.B(ii), infra, the steps Licensee.has already taken to avoid even the potential for cheating bear this out.

B. ' Licensee's Investigation of and Response to Cheating

, 242. Under the personal supervision of Mr. Arnold, Licensee embarked upon a variety of efforts to effectively i respend to the incidents of cheating at TMI. See Tr. 23,636 (Arnold). We discuss here Licensee's investigations by Mr.

John Wilson, one of GPU Nuclear Corporation's attorneys located on-site at TMI, and the exam analysis undertaken by an indepen-dent consultant, Mr. Edward V. Trunk, at the request of Licensee. In addition, Mr. Arnold, Mr. Hukill and other senior members of management conducted numerous meetings and took other actions, outlined below, which were responsive to the

' situation. Finally, in Section IV of these findings, we 4

discuss the changes instituted in TMI's exam administration and i operator certification. procedures to protect against abuses in the operator licensing process.

(i) Licensee's Investigation of Cheating 243. To determine if there was further cheating beyond that disclosed by the NRC's investigations, Licensee contracted on August 29, 1981 with Mr. Edward V. Trunk, Assistant Professor of Engineering at the Pennsylvania State

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University, Capitol Campus ("PSU"). Mr. John Wilson made contact with Mr. Trunk on behalf of Licensea. and requested, in three stages,'that he perform an independent comparison of several sets of exams to determine if incidents of cheating were evident. These exams included the Kelly exams (Category T and non-Category T) and Category T make-up quizzes, all of the ATTS exams which had not been reviewed by the NRC in their investigation of cheating by Messrs. O and W, Kelly non-Category T make-up quizzes and a 1979 mock NRC exam. Mr.

Trunk was also asked to report the results of his work in writing. Wilson, ff. Tr. 24,478, at 3-4; Trunk, ff. Tr.

24,831, at 5, 8, 10-11; Tr. 24,586-88 (Wilson); see Lic. Exs.

70A-70E, 244. Mr. Trunk was selected for this task because he had an engineering background, he was capable of making independent, unbiased judgments, he was available immediately, he had access to additional assistance from colleagues, and his professional and community standing would give his review credibility. Tr. 23,683, 23,878 (Arncid); Tr, 24,493 (Wilson);

see Trunk, ff. Tr. 24,831, at 3.

245. Mr. Trunk's review was performed with Donald L.

Miller, an Assistant Professor of Engineering at PSU. They arranged each set of exam papers in a row on a long table and examined one question at a time from all the exams. Messrs.

Trunk and Miller reviewed the exams slowly and called out peculiarities in the answers to each other. A second review

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was made by scanning the responses rapidly to help spot similarities otherwise missed. Trunk, ff. Tr. 24,831, at 4; Tr. 24,845-49, 24,866 (Trunk).

246. In addition to the actual review of the exams, Messrs. Trunk and Miller also reviewed available training materials and answer keys for guidance as to what was sought and what form of response was acceptable. Review of these documents provided explanations for otherwise unexplained parallelisms.- Trunk, ff. Tr. 24,831, at 4-5.

247. Having originally found several sets of parallelisms on.the Category T and non-Category T make-up quizzes, Messrs. Trunk and Miller reviewed the quizzes one more time with training materials and answer keys and were able

~

to explain to their complete satisfaction all but four sets of parallelisms; three sets between operators G and H and one set between operators GG and W, the latter of whom had'already been terminated from Licensee's employ.- Trunk, ff. Tr. 24,831, at 10, 11. These questionable items were noteo in Mr. Trunk's written reports as indicative of possible cooperation. See

{

Lic. Exs. 70D, 70E.

i

( 248. In the opinion of NRC Staff witness Ward, Mr.

I j Trunk thoroughly examined the referenced examinations using

, appropriate methodology and analysis. The OIE also agreed with I and accepted Mr. Trunk's conclusions. -Ward, ff. Tr. 25,274, at 3-4; see Tr. 24,603 (Mr. John Wilson thinks Mr. Trunk did thorough evaluation).

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l 249. Mr. Arnold instructed Mr. John Wilson to conduct follow-up interviews with all of the operators cited by Mr. Trunk as having at least one parallelism. Mr. Trunk was not asked to conduct these interviews, nor did he so request, because his expertise was geared toward spotting potential cheating. Tr. 24,488-89 (Wilson); Tr. 24,891 (Trunk). Mr.

Wilson, on the other hand, was particularly well suited to evaluate the facts and determine the veracity of the inter-viewees because of his legal background and his familiarity with Licensee's operations. Wilson, ff. Tr. 24,478, at 2-4; Tr. 24,488-89 (Wilson).

250. Mr. Wilson's association with Licensee may have had some effect on his independence, but not on his objectiv-ity. He understood clearly that Mr. Arnold's objective was to find out whatever was necessary for a thorough understanding of the basis for the parallelisms. In addition, Mr. Wilson knew and had a good relationship with the TMI-l plant staff, yet did not socialize with any of the subjects of his investigation.

Thus, he had no potential conflict of interest. Tr. 23,878-80 (Arnold).

251. Mr. Wilson, aided by his associate Mr. Lloyd, conducted rigorous interviews of six individuals named by Mr.

Trunk. Instructors were also interviewed when appropriate.

See Wilson ff., Tr. 24,478, at 7, 13; TMIA Ex. 75, at 11, 16-17. The only operators not questioned were Mr. W, who had already been terminated from Licensee's employ, and Mr. Y, who

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was on an extended leave of absence and whose parallel answer was easily explainable. Wilson, ff. Tr. 24,478, at 4-12; Tr.

24,555, 24,557 (Wilson).

252. Four of the interviewees, Messrs. Boltz, G, H and S, requested the presence of a supervisor, a TMI management representative or a union representative at these interviews, which requests were consistent with Licensee's policies. The presence of these additional individuals at the interviews did not hinder the ability of Messrs. Wilson and Lloyd to uncover the facts which they needed. Wilson, ff. Tr. 24,478, at 4-5, 7, 9, 13; Tr. 24,588-90 (Wilson); Tr. 25,409-11 (Mr. H); TMIA Ex. 75, at 1, 19.

253. Prior to these interviews, no individual was told of the nature of the interview, nor was anyone allowed to see a copy of the Trunk Reports, so the responses of the interviewees necessarily were spontaneous and unrehearsed.

Wilson, ff. Tr. 24,578, at 4; Tr. 24,616-19 (Wilson); Tr.

25,909 (Mr. H). Messrs. Wilson and Lloyd carefully questioned each individual about each and every parallelism cited by Mr.

Trunk. They also asked questions, when relevant, about seating arrangements, training materials and study habits. See TMIA Exs. 75, 76. As at least one operator testified, Messrs.

Wilson and Lloyd asked the same kinds of questions asked by the parties and by Judge Milhollin during cross-examination. Tr.

25,909-11 (Mr. H); see Tr. 25,693 (Mr. GG).

254. Messrs. Wilson and Lloyd were convinced of the veracity of all of the individuals they interviewed, and felt

-117-

confident that there was no basis for disbelieving their denials of cheating. Wilson, ff. Tr. 24,478, at 8-12; see, e.g., Tr. 21,566, 24,627 (Wilson).

255. Mr. Arnold was satisfied with Mr. Wilson's investigative efforts, see Tr. 23,685 (Arnold), and Mr. Ward, j on behalf of the NRC staff, believed that this investigation of cheating was reasonable and thorough. Ward, ff. Tr. 25,274, at 14.

256. In addition to the investigation of paral-1elisms, Mr. Wilson was directed by Mr. Arnold to conduct interviews of every person associated with a rumor reported to Mr. Arnold, which rumor had sufficient substance to merit an investigation. Tr. 24,586 (Wilson). The purpose of these interviews was to determine whether there was any basis in fact to these rumors. See Tr. 23,679 (Arnold). Mr.-Wilson was again chosen to conduct these investigations because he was located at TMI, he had an " intimate knowledge" of the various investigations that had been conducted at TMI since the TMI-2 I

accident, and had the kind of good working relationship wi th the personnel that encouraged open, candid discussion. Tr.

I 23,680-81 (Arnold).

257. Based on the information presented to Mr. Arnold by Mr. Polon, see 11 167-68, 176, supra, Mr. Wilson, assisted by Mr. Llovd, interviewed Messrs. T, Polon,.and U concerning general rumors of. cheating and specific rumors about Mr. U's cheating en an NRC examination. Wilson, ff. Tr. 24,478, at

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15-18; Tr. 24,586, 25,611 (Wilson); Commonwealth Exs. 8, 9.

Mr. Arnold himself took the lead during the interview with Mr.

T and the first interview with Mr. U. Wilson, ff. Tr. 24,478, at 16-18; Tr. 23,679-80 (Arnold). With the same thoroughness i

as that employed for the Trunk follow-up investigations, Messrs. Wilson and Lloyd questioned each individual until they f

were satisfied that all information had been disclosed. When a

J facts were unclear or conclusions too difficult to reach, individuals were interviewed a second time. Wilson, ff. Tr.

1 24,478, at 16-17; Tr. 24,611 (Wilson).

258. The wives of these individuals were not interviewed in conjunction with these rumors, which we find appropriate. These wives are not employed by Licensee and are not directly connected with Licensee activities, so they could not have had first-hand knowledge of the bases for any of these rumors.

259. Licensee also conducted several interviews with Mr. Shipman in an effort to determine as many facts as possible about his incident at the coffee stand. See 11 104-07, supra.

The OIE Was informed of the Shipman incident in a timely manner and conducted its own investigation of the incident. See 1 377, supra.

260. Licensee did not interview Messrs. WW and KK

+

about the telephone calls they received, but immediately after Licensee learned of the calls, the'information was reported to the OIE which followed up on its own. See 1 376, infra. We l

, -119- l l

l l

l

-1 o, . _ _ . _ ._ - _ _ _ . , _ _ _ _ . , . _ , _ . _ _ - , , . , .__, , , _ _ _ _ , , - - . . . , _ . ,

are satisfied that Licensee acted appropriately in these situations.

261. We note that in the cases of Messrs. Shipman and WW, one or more probable cheaters have not been identified.

(The KK incident is distinguishable because the question asked of Mr. KK was found not to be on the NRC April, 1981 examina-tions.) Licensee did not conduct investigations specifically to determine the identities of these unknown individuals.

However, we are well aware that Mr. Arnold met with the TMI-l operators twice to advise them, in part, of their responsi-bilities to inform management of any incidents of cheating, and that Mr. Hukill also interviewed all members of the operations staff at TMI-1 and asked them specifically if they knew of any cheating on the NRC, Kelly, ATTS er Category T examinations, or had cheated or facilitated cheating themselves. See 11 268-69, 272-74, infra. Messrs. John Herbein, Vice President, Nuclear Assurance, and Mr. Richard Wilson also conducted similar one-on-one interviews with individuals from their respective divisions to determine, in part, any knowledge of cheating.

1 See 1 277, infra. In view of these efforts, we find that Licensee need not have taken any further action to identify the unknown individuals. Further action would have been fruitless in view of the prior denials of cheating by all the personnel

who could have been involved in the Shipman or WW incidents.

l Cf. Tr. 25,'320 (Ward: after Mr. Husted had denied cheating on ,

two occasions, further interviews were deemed unproductive).

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262. In conclusion, we are satisfied that Licensee's investigations of potential cheating incidents either identified by independent consultant Edward Trunk, or reported by the operators themselves, were conducted promptly, thor-oughly and professionally. Matters were pursued until the investigators were confident that they had obtained all the information they needed for a full understanding of the situation, or until further efforts appeared fruitless. Even in the case s of Messrs. Shipman and WW where the identities of all relevant individuals have not been revealed, we find that Licensee made reasonable efforts to determine the identities of these unknown-persons.

263..We recognize that no new evidence of cheating was revealed during the evidentiary proceeding with respect to the exams, incidents and rumors investigated by Licensee. The absence of such additional information confirms our finding that Licensee's investigations were thorough and can be relied upon.

(ii) Licensee's Response to Cheating 264. With the completion of the NRC Staff's initial investigation into the O and W cheating incidents on July 31, 1981, and with the knowledge that these two individuals had admitted to cheating.on the April, 1981 NRC operator license exams, Mr. Arnold interviewed Messrs. O and W on August 3 and 8, respectively. Id. at 6; Tr. 23,667 (Arnold). During these

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interviews, Mr. Arnold determined that his basic understanding of the facts was correct. Tr. 23,666-67 (Arnold). Based on 0 and W's acknowledgement of their misconduct to him, Mr. Arnold informed these individuals that their conduct was such as to require termination of their employment with Licensee. Arnold, ff. Tr. 23,590, at 6-7; Tr. 23,667 (Arnold). Mr. Arnold's actions were recorded in two memoranda placed in the personnel files of O and W. See TMIA Exs. 51 and 52.

265. In his interviews with O and W, Mr. Arnold did not attempt to develop any more specifically than the NRC investigators had tried to do the motivation for O and W's decision to cheat. Tr. 23,783-84 (Arnold)- While in retro-spect, we demur from this decision, it is apparent from the facts themselves, and from Mr. Arnold's description of his meetings with these two individuals, that the situation was very traumatic for O and W and thus, not conducive to discus-sions of this sort. Tr. 23,784 (Arnold). It was Mr. Arnold's opinion that regardless of the reasons they may have given for cheating, Licensee's mrnagement had to proceed on the assump-tion that their misconduct was motivated by any (or all) of the potential reasons, e.g., inadequate training, unfairness of the exam, lack of confidence, etc. Tr. 23,784-85 (Arnold).

Moreover, regardless of their motive, Mr. Arnold was of the opinion that termination was Licensee's appropriate response.

Tr. 23,786-77 (Arnold). Thus, we do not perceive an effort by Licensee to avoid the reason (s) for the problem, but rather a

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reasoned judgment at the time that this information would not be particularly reliable or useful to Licensee.

266. We note that when they testified, Messrs. O and W were specifically asked about their motivation in cheating.

After describing his state of nervousness before the April, 1981 NRC exams and his feeling of pressure to do well, Mr. W explained the source of the pressure to be "[p]ersonal, more than anything." Tr. 26,115, 26,130 (Mr. W). He stated that he did not feel that he in any way owed it to the Company to pass the NRC examinations. Tr. 26,115 (Mr. W). Mr. O would not acknowledge that his actions constituted " willful" cheating, but rather consisted of his passively permitting Mr. W to copy from him. Tr. 26,229-31 (Mr. O). Mr. O did not think Mr. W felt driven to cheat but put a lot of pressure on himself and panicked. Tr. 26,278-88 (Mr. O). Other control room personnel and OIE investigator Ward echoed this internal pressure / panic theory about Mr. W. See Tr. 25,703 (Mr. GG); Tr. 25,917 (Mr.

H); Tr. 26,054 (Mr. A); Tr. 25,384-85 (Ward).

267. Mr. Arnold's decision to terminate 0 and W had been preceded by discussions with Mr. Herman Dieckamp, President of GPU Corporation, Mr. Philip Clark, Executive Vice President of-GPU Nuclear Corporation, Mr. Hukill, Mr. Toole and Mr. Ross -- in sum, the entire senior management responsible for TMI-l operations. Tr. 23,674-75 (Arnold). After exploring the appropriateness of the variety of responses that were available to them, a consensus was reached by senior management

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that discharge was the appropriate step to take. Tr. 23,676-77 (Arnold). We agree.

268. In early August, and subsequently, in a follow-up meeting, Mr. Arnold met with the TMI-1 operators to reaffirm management's support for them, but at the same time to emphasize to them management's expectations of high standards in their conduct, and to describe to them first-hand the reasons he was taking action on the two licensed operators.

Arnold, ff. Tr. 23,590, at 7-8; Hukill, ff. Tr. 23,913, at 20-12; see also Tr. 25,701 (Mr. GG: message he received from Arnold meeting was that "we live constantly in the public eye and that if you cannot stand being watched, then maybe you are in the wrong business, that he in no way would tolerate cheating."). During Mr. Arnold's initial meeting with the operators, he advised each operator of his responsibility and duty to advise management of any other instances of cheating of which he was aware. Arnold, ff. Tr. 23,590, at 8. At the second meeting, it became apparent that operator morale was low, and that the operators had a negative attitude about the re-exam requirements imposed on them. Hukill, ff. Tr. 23,913, at 12. In early October, Mr. Arnold sent a letter to all Licensee employees in which he reiterated GPU Nuclear Corporation's policies on fulfilling regulatory requirements, reporting nonconformances with requirements and cooperating with regulatory agencies. Arnold, ff. Tr. 23,590, at 8-9, Attachment 1.

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269. Mr. Hukill also met on a number of occasions with the TMI-l operations staff. Following Mr. Arnold's initial meeting, Mr. Hukill met with each of the licensed operators, by shift, in the plant, for approximately one to two

.ours. Hukill, ff. Tr. 23,913, at 10. At these meetings, Mr.

Hukill reviewed the following subjects: (1) the facts related to cheating, as he understood them at that time; (2) his standard of conduct, i.e., actions he would not tolerate, such as cheating and falsifying records; (3) the basis for Licensee's decision to rapidly resolve the O and W cheating incident; (4) his concerns about individuals feeling " driven" to cheat, and the management's responsibility to ensure that individuals were ready to take the operator license exams; and (5) reaffirmation of his intention to use six shifts, although five shifts would probably be necessary for a period of time.

Id. at 11. Mr. Hukill also requested feedback from these groups. Id. See also Tr. 25,701-02 (Mr. GG); Tr. 25,852 (Mr.

HH); Tr. 25,912 (Mr. H).

270. From his attendance at the meetings held by Mr.

Arnold, as well as his own meetings with groups of operators, Mr. Hukill determined that he, and others in management positions in GPU Nuclear Corporation, had to make it clear to the operators that the NRC licensed operator examinations, and Licensee's mock exams, were an objective measure of an operator's knowledge. While they were not the only gauge used by Licensee, or by the NRC, to determine whether an operator

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was qualified, they were necessary. Hukill, ff. Tr. 23,913, at

12. It was also important to Mr. Hukill that he stress to the operators that regardless of the operators' attitude about these exams, he placed significance on them, and would not tolerate misconduct in taking the exams, or in participating in the TMI operator training and testing program. Id.

271. Mr. Hukill began his effort to ensure that the operators understood his position on these issues by discussing his viewpoint at several bi-monthly managers meetings. Id.

Attending the managers meetings were the TMI-l Managers, as well as onsite managers from GPU Nuclear's support groups. Id.

at 12-13. Letters were then sent by Mr. Hukill to his Operations staff emphasizing the importance.of fulfilling regulatory requirements, and the need to adopt a proper attitude towards the operator training, testing and NRC license exam process. Id. at 13 and attached letter.

272. During the weeks of October 5 and 12, Mr.

Hukill met individually with every TMI-l licensed operator l candidate on the plant staff who took the NRC examinations in April, 1981. At these meetings, Mr. Hukill focused on a number of subjects. First, he discussed Mr. Arnold's lett(r regarding the importance of regulations and Licensee management's commitment to them, and the issues raised in his own letter to the operators. Id. at 13. Mr. Hukill informed each individual l that Licensee expected them to be straightforward and honest and relied upon their being truthful if the individual was

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interviewed by regulatory agency personnel, or if they were called to testify in the TMI-1 restart proceedings. He also emphasized his view that the NRC written exams provide a means by which the NRC and plant management can ensure and verify that operators have a certain minimum knowledge level.

Finally, he reviewed with each candidate his personal responsi-bility as a licensed operator for the health and safety of the public. Id. at 13-14.

273. During his individual interviews with opera-tors, which generally lasted from one to two hours, Mr. Hukill asked each individual whether he had cheated on the NRC, Kelly, ATTS or Category T exams, and whether he knew of anyone who had cheated on these exams. With the exception of Mr. Shipman's disclosure, discussed in 14 102-13, suora, the answer given b~y each individual to both of these questions was "no". Id. at 14.

274. During these meetings, Mr. Hukill took abbre-viated notes which primarily indicated whether, in his mind, l the individual understood and agreed with Licensee's policies on the subjects discussed and whether the individual had heard rumors. See TMIA Ex. 60; Tr. 23,934-42, 23,950-58 (Hukill).

It was not Mr. Hukill's purpose to identify nor did he pursue rumors which may have surfaced among the operators. Tr.

23,938-42, 23,952, 23,956, 23,958 (Hukill); Tr. 25,975-77 (Mr.

00). By interviewing all the operators individually, Mr.

Hukill pursued not merely what people had heard, but rather what each individual knew or had himself observed.

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' c, _

j e

i

275. The parties and the Special Master questioned v'irtually all of the control room personnel at length as to their attitudes about the subjects covered in the Hukill meetings,-viz., their views on cheating generally, their involvement in or knowledge of cheating, the O and W incident, management's expectations and standards of conduct, and the NRC re-exam process. There was a clear recognition by these witnesses of the wrongdoing of Messrs. O and W. See, e.g., Tr.

25,917 (Mr. H); Tr. 25,993 (Mr. 00); Tr. 26,317 (Mr. V); Tr.

-26,579, 26,581 (Mr. I). However, because of the perceived capabilities of O and W, and their many years in Licensee's 1

employ, many of the operators felt that O and W should have '

been removed from nuclear-related activities, but not fired.

See, e.g., Tr. 25,767-68 (Mr. G); Tr. 26,018 (Mr. YY); Tr.

26,310 (Mr. V); Tr. 26,532, 26,570-71 (Mr. I); but see Tr.

25,917 (Mr. H). While most of the operators had not thought cheating on a test would result in termination of employment, i it was evident that this was-not an issue which was given any I thought prior to July, 1981. Nor did we find that control room l

l s personnel perceived that management was in any way lax about its employees' conduct. See Tr. 25,686, 25,718 (Mr. GG); Tr.

W 25,841, 25,853 (Mr. HH); Tr. 26,093, 26,149-50 (Mr. W); Tr.

26,388-(Mr. Shipman); Tr. 26,463 (Mr. WW); Tr. 26,581 (Mr. I);

I Tr. 26,863-64 (Mr. U). (Interestingly, Mr. O stated that he

, recognized that his conduct might result in termination of his 1

employment. Tr. 26,250 (Mr. O). See also Tr. 26,719 (Mr. P).)

/

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.L

276. In general, the operators were quite bitter about_the re-examination requirement, perceiving it as discrim-inatory. Tr. 25,687 (Mr. GG); Tr. 25,843 (Mr. HH); Tr.

26,114-15 (Mr. W); Tr. 26,308 (Mr. V); Tr. 26,559, 26,588-89 (Mr. I). Nevertheless, they viewed their training as adequate, and the examination process as a serious undertaking to which they were personally committed as licensed operators. See, e.g., Tr. 25,719 (Mr. GG); Tr. 25,858-59, 25,862 (Mr. HH); Tr.

25,866-67, 25,946 (Mr. H); Tr. 26,031 (Mr. YY); Tr. 26,048-49 a

~

(Mr. A); Tr. 26,250, 26,277-78 (Mr. O); Tr. 26,309, 26,319-20

't; (Mr. V); Tr. 26,413 (Mr. Shipman); Tr. 26,522-24 (Mr. KK); Tr.

26,804 (Mr. U).

277. In addition to the meetings held and letter

, cest by Mr. Aukill to his staff, comparable one-on-one interviews were conducted with and letters were sent to individuals from their respective divisions who were candidates i for,NRC licenses at TMI-l by Mr. John Herbein, Vice President, i

s Nuclear Assurance, and Mr. Richard Wilson, Vice President, Technical Functions. Arnold, ff. Tr. 23,590, at 9. (Reporting to Mr. Herbein is the Training & Education Department of GPU Nuclear Corporation, of whom the TMI-l licensed operator instructors, i.e., Messrs. Brown, Boltz and Husted, are a part.

See organizational chart ff. PID 5 54. Tne TMI-l shift technical advisors report to the Syster 5 gineering Department of Mr. Richard Wilson's Technical m s Division of GPU

. Nuclear Corporation. See PID 5 513.) During the interviews

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=

- w

I conducted by Messrs. Herbein and Wilson, the subjects addressed in Mr. Arnold's letter and in their own division head letters were discussed, a further check was made on any awareness of cheating or possible cheating on exams by licensed operators, and individuals' attitudes were discussed. Arnold, ff. Tr.

23,590, at 9. Out of these meetings came- the information from Mr. WW concerning the telephone call he received during the Kelly exams in April, 1980, discussed in 11 128-33, supra. Id.

at 10-11.

278. It was the opinion of Mr. Ward, on behalf of the NRC Staff, that Licensee's group and individual meetings with operations personnel, along with Licensee's other actions, were adequate, reasonable and. thorough. Ward, ff. Tr. 25,274, at 13-14. The Staff also found reasonable Licensee's response to the cheating by 0, W and Mr. Shipman, Jiz., termination of O and W's employment, and a letter of reprimand in response to Mr. Shipman's misconduct. Id. at 14.

^79.

. We are satisfied that Mr. Arnold and Mr. Hukill have made every effort to personally discuss with TMI-l operations staff and management, from Mr. Toole down through th'e TMI-l organization, the standard 'of conduct which is ex'bected and will be demanded from them. See Hukill, ff. Tr.

23,913, at 15; Arnold, ff. Tr. 23,590, at 11. We consider it '

important that Licensee is formalizing its policies on matters of conduct. Hukill, ff. Tr. 23,913, at 15. We endorse and rely upon the course outlined by Mr. Hukill for preserving the

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integrity of his organization, including ensuring that procedures and regulatory requirements are followed, ensuring i that procedures necessary to safeguard the integrity of plant operations are established, discussing his views with members of his staff, pursuing any problem which potentially reflects on the integrity of TMI-l operations, and setting a good example, both in attitude and conduct, for his staff. Id. at

16. Management's determination to follow-through in these areas is particularly important where, as here, management in the past did not fully appreciate many operators' critical perspectives of management, of training, and of NRC and its exams. See Arnold, ff. Tr. 23,590, at 11-12.

280. Finally, we endorse Licensee's use of an ombudsman to function as a conduit by which Licensee's staff can come forward, in confidentiality, with criticisms or with needed information. See Tr. 23,637-41 (Arnold). We also believe the policies outlined by Dr. Long in his testimony defining cheating, fraud and misconduct, general sta:;dards of conduct, and adherence to policies are necessary. t ag, ff.

Tr. 24,921, at 27-28. While these policies are extremely formal and certainly provide no assurance that cheating and other misconduct will not occur and go unreported, they are important statements for Licensee's management to make in no uncertain terms to its employees.

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C. Management Constraints on NRC's Investigations 281. In order for us to have confidence in the NRC Staff's investigative findings and conclusions, it was impor-tant that we determine whether Licensee in any way hampered OIE's efforts to follow up on the discovered incidents or rumors of cheating. Moreover, the absence or presence of constraints by Licensee on the NRC investigations is a valuable indicator of GPU Nuclear Corporation management's attitude towards the NRC regulatory process, which places crucial reliance on a licensee management's willingness to disclose fully all information related to health and safety matters.

282. Shortly after Mr. Arnold was informed of the potential cheating by 0 and W on the April, 1981 NRC exams and notified Mr. Hukill of this development, he instructed Mr.

Hukill to make a member of management available to accompany O and W to their OIE interviews, if the employees desired.

Arnold, ff. Tr. 23,590, at 5; Tr. 23,553-54 (Arnold). Mr.

Arnold's directive to Mr. Hukill resulted in a conversation between Mr. Hukill and one of the OIE investigators, Mr. Baci, in which Mr. Hukill recollects that he was told that it was not NRC practice and the investigators would rather not have management sit in on the interviews. Tr. 23,995-96 (Hukill).

It was the recollection of investigator Baci that he also told Mr. Hukill the reasons for this policy, viz., that whenever you interview an individual and his boss is there, it is an

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inhibiting factor; a large group setting makes it a little more difficult to conduct an interview; and, management's presence removes the posibility of the employee divulging information to the Staff in confidence. Tr. 25,433 (Baci).

283. Mr. Hukill informed Mr. Arnold of the OIE investigator's reluctance to have management present during the interviews, or to advise the interviewees of their right to have a management representative present, at which time Mr.

Arnold telephoned the Director of OIE, Mr. Stello. Tr.

23,995-96 (Hukill); Ward, ff. Tr. 25,274, at 18; Tr. 25,429 (Ward). Mr. Arnold discussed with Mr. Stello his understanding that his employees had the right to have someone accompany them to the OIE interviews, if the individuals wanted to have such a person present, and that this did not seem to be the approach taken by the investigators on site. Tr. 23,655 (Arnold). Mr.

Arnold also recollects that he told Mr. Stello that this matter was important, and needed to be clarified before the interviews commenced. Id.

284. As a result of the Stello-Arnold conversation and subsequent conversations between the investigators and Mr.

Stello, the NRC did not make an effort to prevent a management representative from attending the O and W interviews or the subsequent initial OIE investigation interviews. Tr. 25,428-29 (Ward); Tr. 23,655 (Arnold). Against the preference voiced by the investigators, and because the investigators were not so telling the interviewees, Licensee undertook to tell its

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employees prior to their interviews that they had the right to request that they be accompanied by a member of management.

Ward, ff. Tr. 25,274, at 18; Tr. 25,429 (Ward); Tr. 23,656 (Arnold). On cross-examinaton, Mr. Arnold explained his rationale for volunteering this information as follows:

My own sense of fair play is people being interviewed in these types of circumstances ought to be aware of whatever flexibility they have in the way in which the interview is conducted. I just do not think that you can assume that the average person that may be subject to these interviews has the degree of familiarity with the procedures and that he ought to, in a sense, be completely on his own to look out for himself.

Tr. 23,656-67 (Arnold).

285. The practice of Licensee management -- gen-erally, Mr. Hukill -- informing individuals whom the NRC investigators sought to interview that a member of management could accompany them to the interview continued throughout the i

first OIE investigation. Tr. 25,429 (Ward). Only one interview, which took place offsite, was conducted without Licensee management present. Ward, ff. Tr. 25,274, at 18.

286. When the second investigation was initiated, involving allegations about Mr. Ross, a member of Licensee's senior management, Mr. Stello advised Mr. Arnold that manage-ment representatives would no longer be permitted to be present during the investigation interviews. Tr. 25,429-30 (Ward); Tr.

23,657 (Arnold); Hukill, ff. Tr. 23,913, at 9. Licensee management also were not present in the interviews conducted

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i during OIE's third investigation. Hukill, ff. Tr. 23,913, at l

9. It was NRC Investigator Ward's opinion that the reasons for the change in policy on this matter were that allegations which were the subject of the second investigation directly impli-cated Licensee's management, legal advice had been obtained by Mr. Stello confirming the investigators' belief (and contradi-cting Mr. Stello and Mr. Arnold's) that the interviewees did not have the right to have management present, and Mr. Ward perhaps was more persuasive in presenting his views to Mr.

Stello at the time of the second series of interviews. Tr.

25,429-30 (Ward).

287. Mr. Ward was present in the room with Mr.

Stello when Mr. Arnold was contacted and informed that manage-ment would be excluded from the subsequent interviews. During that conversation, Mr . Arnold stated that he had been advised by counsel that individuals did not have a right to have representatives other than their attorney present, tnat the investigators did have the authority to exclude management, and that Licensee would cooperate. Tr. 25,430-31 (Ward); Tr.

23,657 (Arnold).

288. All of the OIE investigators felt that the presence of management inhibited the free flow of information,-

although they were unable to quantify the extent of this.

Ward, ff. Tr. 25,274, at 18. This conclusion was based on the investigators' intuitive judgment that an individual is not going to be as candid or as forthcoming with management

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• "  : 6 &

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present. Tr. 25,424-25 (Ward). It was also the Staff's judgment, however, that by persistent questioning and making an individual aware of the fact that it is important to tell the truth, the investigators were able to obtain the necessary information from the interviewee. Tr. 25,425 (Ward). Thus, the ultimate conclusion reached by the investigators was that

-the information obtained during the first investigation was sufficient to conduct.a thorough and complete investigation, and to resolve the -issues under investigation, namely, cheating by Messrs. O and W, and a determination of the likelihood of additional cheating. Ward, ff. Tr. 25,274, at'19; Tr.

25,424-25 (Ward). . The investigators had no reason to believe that any of the information which potentially was not disclosed was of sufficient relevance to change the factual conclusions reached by OIE. Id.

289. In the investigators' view, Licensee management cooperated fully throughout the rest of the investigations.

Tr. 25,431, 25,470 (Ward). All constraints were removed from the investigators by Mr. Arnold. The only desire that Mr.-

Arnold expressed, which was something to which OIE gladly acceded, was that the investigators use Mr. John Wilson as a point of contact, and that they attempt not to interfere with plant operations to the extent of pulling . people of f of shif t who were needed. Tr. 25,470 (Ward). The investigators were subjected to no other pressures from Licensee. Id.

290. To the best of Mr. Hukill's recollection,

-neither he nor Mr. Christman discussed the issue of cheating

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with individuals identified by the NRC investigators as persons with whom they sought interviews prior to the conduct of the interviews. Hukill, ff. Tr. 23,913, at 6, 291. The evidence clearly establishes that the management representative in attendance at the various interviews conducted in July, 1981 -- generally, Mr. Hukill or Mr. Christman, Manager of Plant Administration at TMI-l -- did not participate in the interview process. See Hukill, ff. Tr.

23.913, at 6; TMIA Exs. 55-59; Tr. 26,166 (Mr. W); Tr. 26,265 (Mr. O); Tr. 26,975 (Husted).

292. Both Mr. Arnold and Mr. Hukill testified at some length about their motivations in offering management's attendance during the July, 1981 OIE investigation interviews.

Mr. Arnold expressed his concern that the investigators' record 4

of the interviews could contain errors. While he was aware of the potential of management inhibiting the interview process, Mr. Arnold felt the best way to resolve this issue was to simply make the offer, which the employees could refuse, to have a management representative accompany them. Tr. 23,659-60 1

(Arnold). Thus, Mr. Hukill took copious notes of the meetings, some of which reflect significant discrepancies with the OIE investigators' recollections. See TMIA Exs. 55-59; compare Staff Ex. 26 at 39 with Tr. 26,928-32 (Husted) and Newton and Brown, ff. Tr. 24,640, at 7-8. While Mr. Arnold acknowledged the fact that a supervisor's offer can be taken as a directive, it was his experience that at TMI, where numerous interviews,

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depositions and testimonies have been taken under a wide variety of circumstances, Licensee's employees understand that "in these types of situations the offer is just that, it is an offer." Tr. 23,661 (Arnold). (One interviewee did turn down Mr. Hukill's offer, and asked that Mr. Christman accompany him instead. Tr. 23,994 (Hukill).) In Mr. Arnold's opinion, many if not all of the interviewees were grateful for being able to have someone like Mr. Hukill present, in a supportive role.

Tr. 23,661-62 (Arnold).

293. Mr. Hukill considered the NRC's investigation to be an absolute necessity. Tr. 23,995 (Hukill). It was neither Mr. Hukill's intention nor his desire to interfere in the NRC's investigations or to in any way constrain the conversations which did take place between members of his staff and the NRC investigators. Hukill, ff. Tr. 23,913, at 6. To the contrary, Mr. Hukill thought management's attendance was beneficial insofar as it enhanced individual's cooperation and confidence. Id. at 6-7. He felt that knowing someone they knew was there, who was a member of Licensee's management, would show management's involvement in the problem, and thus facilitate communication to investigators who were total strangers. Tr. 23,998 (Hukill). Mr. Hukill's major motivation in attending the interviews was to ensure that his staff was being treated fairly. Tr. 23,996 (Hukill). Also, by attend-ing, Mr. Hukill would gain first-hand knowledge of the scope of the problem with which he was faced as Vice President of TMI-1.

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Id.; Hukill, ff. Tr. 23,913, at 7. Mr. Hukill did-not consider his presence a risk to NRC's obtaining complete or accurate information. Rather, he perceived that he would interfere only if the investigators took unfair advantage of the interviewee.

Tr. 23,997 (Hukill); Hukill, ff. Tr. 23,913, at o.

294. We note, however, that Mr. W. explained that he was asked by Mr. Stello, and declined the offer to have Mr.

Hukill present during the meeting where he first publicly admitted to cheating becaues of his feelings of guilt about his wrongdoing which made him uncomfortable speaking in front of Mr. Hukill. Tr. 26,164 (Mr. W). Mr. O stated, however, that Mr. Christ. nan's presence in the OIE interviews did not make him reluctant to talk. Tr. 26,265 (Mr. O).

295. Mr. Hukill never did assert himself because the investigations were conducted in a very focar.1, proper and reasonable way. Tr. 23,997 (Hukill). Given the extraordinary amount of his time the interviews were consumnig, Mr. Hukill considered not accompanying the interviewees after the first few interviews, once he gained confidence that his people would be treated fairly. Id. He decided to continue to offer his services, however, since he had made the offer to the initial interviewees and did not consider it fair to the subsequently interviewed employees to drop out and not continue to make the same offer. Id.

296. Wnile the investigators disagreed witn Licensee's position regarding management's presence during the

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OIE interviews, none of them felt that the purpose of this constraint was to hinder or interfere with the investigations.

Ward, ff. Tr. 25,274, at 18-19. Rather, the investigators felt that Mr. Arnold's position was a product of his understanding of his and his employees' rights during NRC interviews, and his concern that he properly protect his employees' interests during the interviews. Id. at 19. As Mr. Ward observed, this licensee had been the subject of numerous investigations over the several years since the TMI-2 accident and it had been consistent NRC practice throughout the prior investigations to allow interviewees to have a representative of his choice accompany him; NRC, in fact, advised interviewees of this practice in guidelines it provided to interviewees in its prior investigations at TMI. Tr. 25,449-50 (Ward). Mr. Ward testified that Mr. Arnold appeared particularly sensitive to the anxiety level of his staff stemming from the considerable public interest focused upon them for the past two years, and t '.e need for management to show that it was standing behind its employees. Ward, ff. Tr. 25,274, at 19; Tr. 25,432 (Ward).

297. From our review of the facts, we find that Licensee was doing no more than the Staff previously permitted in briefing its employees of the right to have a managenent representative present. While management's presence initially may have placed some constraint on the OIE investigations by attending the July, 1981 investigation interviews conducted oy OIE at TMI, this constraint did not result in the inability of

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OIE to discover, understand or follow-through on the facts at issue. More importantly, while we were initially concerned about Licensee's motivation in gaining from Mr. Stello, over the objections of the investigators, the Staff's agreement to allow management to be present during the interviews, we have concluded that Licensee's management did not intend in any away to_ impede NRC's investigations of cheating.

D. Adequacy of Licensee's Management Response to July, 1979 Incident 298. In July, 1979, individual VV, at the time Supervisor of Operations at TMI-2, handed in to Licensee's training department a take-home, makeup exam comprised of four sections. Miller, ff. Tr. 24,358, at 1. Grading of the examinations resulted in unsatisfactory marks on two of the four sections; moreover, review of the documents by Licensee l training personnel disclosed that one of the sections and.part of a second section were in the handwriting not of VV, but of another individual, O. Id. This incident was reported by Licensee to NRC investigators in July, 1981, when they were at TMI to investigate,,gheating involving individuals O and W on the April, 1981 NRC examinations. Arnold, ff. Tr. 23,590, at

6. Identified subsequently as an issue in the reopened proceeding, che 1979 incident was addressed in testimony and through cross-examination of a number of witnesses, principally Mr. Arnold who in July, 1979, was in overall charge at TMI, see

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Arnold, ff. Tr. 23,590, at 6; Mr. Gary P. Miller who in July, 1979, was Station Manager of TMI, see Miller, ff. Tr. 24,356; individual VV, see Tr. 26,639-86 (Mr. VV); individual O, see Tr. 26,181-94, 26,277-78; 26,270-71 (Mr. O); and an NRC witness, Mr. Lawrence P. Crocker, see Crocker, ff. Tr. 25,081.

299. The facts leading up to and surrounding this incident are not in dispute. Nor are the steps which manage-ment took with respect to the failed sections of the exam and with respect to investigation and resultant disciplinary action on the handwriting issue in dispute. The questions raised by the parties on this issue center on whether Mr . VV properly was allowed to retain licensed duties until July, 1979; whether management's response was appropriate based on its evaluation of the incident and VV's and O's respective involvements in it; and whether Licensee properly certified Mr. VV for renewal of his NRC license following the incident. Before addressing the questions raised concerning this issue, we will trace briefly the factual setting.

300. In August, 1977, Mr. VV, along with other individuals who already held NRC operator licenses on TMI-1, took an examination on the differences between TMI-l and TMI-2 in order to obtain an NRC license on TMI-2. TMIA Ex. 64; Tr.

24,366-68 (Miller). At the time this cross-license examination was given (and up until recently), the NRC criterion for passing was simply obtaining a grade of 70% overall on the exam; the pass-fail standard contained no minimum grade requirement in each n the individual sections of the exam.

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Tr. 24,367-68 (Miller); see also PID, 1268 and accompanying citations. Mr. VV passed the exam and obtained a license on TMI-2. Tr. 24,368 (Miller). Licensee's training standards set out in its administrative procedures required, however , that where an examinee displayed weaknesses in individual areas on an exam (by obtaining a grade of less than 80%), he was identified and required to participate during Licensee's next annual March through February requalification program in those lectures covering his particular weak areas. Miller, ff. Tr.

24,358, at 1-2; Tr. 24,368 (Miller); see also TMIA Ex. 65.

This requirement for those with identified weak areas is termed in Licensee's training program as a Fundamentals and System Review requirement (FSR requirement). See TMIA Ex. 65 (Licensee's Administrative Procedure 1006). Mr. VV received scores of less than 80( in two individual areas on his cross-license exam and therefore, under the Licensee's procedures, was subject to FSR requirements in these two areas. Id.

Lectures in these two areas apparently were not scheduled during the remainder of the March, 1977 to February, 1978 requal program, so VV had FSR requirements in two areas during the March, 1978 to February, 1979 annual program year. See TMIA Exs. 64 and 65.

301. In February, 1978, Mr. VV was required to take an annual requalification exam on TMI-1. He took it and passed, again under the then applicable 70% overall/no-minimum-in-individual-areas criterion. On this exam, measured under

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Licensee's more stringent requirements in individual areas, he was obligated to participate in FSR sessions in three subject areas, having obtained on the requal exam a grade of less than 80% in these areas. One of these three subject areas was the same as one of the two requiring VV's FSR participation from the earlier cross-license exam. Thus, with the onset of the March, 1978 to February, 1979 annual requal training program, Mr. VV was obligated to participate in four FSR sections. TMIA Ex. 64; Tr. 24,373 (Miller); see TMIA Ex. 65.

302. According to Mr. Miller and memoranda prepared by Mr. Miller and others in the July, 1979 time frame, Mr. VV did not attend the scheduled FSR sessions and having missed them, was assigned make-up work by the training department in January, 1979. See TMIA Ex. 66. These make-up assignments were take-home exams covering the four sections in which Mr. VV had FSR obligations and were to be returned to the training department. Id. See also TMIA Exs. 67-70 (FSR Sections). Mr.

VV apparently ignored the training department's make-up assignment deadlines, and had not completed the assignments by March, 1979 when the annual requalification program year nominally ended. See TMIA Ex. 66. Had it not been for the flexibility NRC allows licensees in their Technical Specifications for purposes of meeting such yearly require-ments, i.e., + 25% (or an additional three months), Mr. VV would have been in arrears on his requalification requirements at the beginning of March, 1979. With the three months' leeway

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and one additional month allowed this licensee in its administrative deadlines due to the TMI-2 accident, Mr. VV's deadline ran out at the beginning of July, 1979. See TMIA Ex.

64; Tr. 24,375, 24,379 (Miller).

303. Literally at the eleventh hour, Mr. VV turned in completed work on the four sections. Miller, ff. 24,358, at 1; TMIA Ex. 66. By his own admission, he did so at the last moment and only when he knew that failure to do so would result in his being suspended from licensed duties for failure to complete his training requirements for certification of his license. Tr. 26,663, 26,679-80 (Mr. VV).

304. The training department's review of the exams which disclosed the failing grades on three sections and the handwriting differences on two sections precipitated several actions by Licensee. Due to the failures on the FSR require-ments, it was determined that in accordance with Licensee's procedures, Mr. VV should be removed from licensed duties and placed in a full-time accelerated training program pending successful reexamination in his deficient areas. The training department at Mr. Miller 's direction promptly carried through on these steps, which involved training assignments for VV, study of identified questions, meetings with training instructors to discuss apparent weak areas of knowledge and completion of reexaminations. Mr. Miller personally took charge of investigating the handwriting question. His investi-gation included meeting with training department personnel to

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review Mr. VV's training performance and individual interviews with Mr. O and Mr. VV. Miller, ff. Tr. 24,350, at 1-2; see also TMIA Ex. 65.

305. In his interview with Mr. Miller, Mr. O confirmed handwriting on two of the sections was his. Id ., at 2-3. Mr. O remembered answering the questions, stating he was not aware that he was providing answers for VV's exam. Ici , at

3. He further stated that he did not recognize the questions u

as FSR exam questions, that he had not been dishonest on any examinations and that he had never been nor would he consider i being less than honest. Id. Nor did Mr. VV, in his interview

with Mr. Miller, deny individual O's participation. Mr. VV confirmed that the four sections of make-upfexams were handed in by him and that Mr. O had completed answers on two of the sections. Id. His explanation was given without hesitancy, according to Mr. Miller. Id. He stated that he was pressed for time and was trying to complete his work in order to take

+ some time off; that he told O he needed to complete a nuuber of questions and asked O to provide some information to him; that he made no attempt to disguise O's work and felt by conpleting the responses to the questions and studying them he had completed the training requirements. Id.

306. Licensee's response, in addition to requiring 4

j Mr. VV to drop all licensed duties and to enter and complete an i

i accelerated training program including reexamination, was to take no further action with respect to 0, but to remove Mr. vv f

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from his position in charge of Unit 2'c operations and to place

! him in a non-supervisory position where his technical expertise could continue to be utilized. Id . , at 6.

307. With this background, we turn now to discuss and resolve the three areas questioned by the parties by-in-large through cross-examination of the witnesses who testified on this subject. The first area questioned was whether VV properly was allowed to retain licensed duties until July of 1979, despite having shown weak areas in prior examina-tions, one of which was almost two years prior to July, 1979.

The testimony was uncontroverted that Mr. VV had passed the exams and that his continuing in licensed duties was proper.

Tr. 24,368 (Miller). Possible confusion stems from the distinction between passing the examinations and Licensee's more stringent requirements for identifying weak areas and requiring FSR work in those areas. Compare PID, 1268 (NRC pass-fail criteria) with TMIA Ex. 65 (Licensee FSR require-ments). Had NRC's recer. tly revised standards for licensing operators on a plant beei. in effect in July, 1979, this may not have occurred since the current pass criteria require not only a minimum average grade overall, but as well a minimum accept-able grade on individual sections. See PID, 1268. Even though individual VV appears to have complied with all requirements in this regard, the timeliness of Mr. VV's compliance is hardly exemplary. His apparent absence from the FSR sessions and his tardy response to the make-up assignments set a poor example

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for the operators under him, see TMIA Ex. 66; Miller, ff. Tr.

24,358; Tr. 24,369-70 (Miller); Tr. 26,648 (Mr. VV), and as we point out below, were appropriately factored into Licensee's management response to his actions.

308. The second question, and the central area of interest on this issue, is whether Licensee correctly evaluated and responded to the incident and VV's and O's involvement in it.

309. The timing of this incident is not unimportant.

In July, 1979, in the wake of the TMI-2 accident, Licensee was engulfed in a host of technical problems never before faced by any organization. Its personnel were working long hours as they had been for several months, there were investigations underway with questions of every stripe being raised about TMI, and the organizational structure was evolving from its pre-accident form into the current GPU Nuclear organization.

Tr. 23,762-63 (Arnold); Tr. 26,670 (Mr. VV); Tr. 24,362, 24,421 (Miller). As Mr. Crocker, NRC's witness, characterized the circumstances: "I do not think there is any less responsi-bility to deal with it [ the VV-O incident] . " Tr. 25,097 (Crocker). But as he further observed: "If I had a plant that was a smooth-running operation at that point and something like this came up, I think you would have an opportunity at least for considerable more management attention to the problem. The decisions may not have differed, but at least it would have received a good deal more attention than I am sure this incident got at that point." Id.

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310. Despite the pressures of the time, the Station Manager Mr. Miller personally took charge of the investigation.

Miller, ff. Tr. 24,358, at 2. In his testimony he described the thought process he went through in determining.what action should be taken. Id. at 2-6. With respect to Mr. O, Mr.

Miller was convinced that Mr. O did not recognize that he was completing Mr. VV's training make-up exam. Id. at 4. Mr.

Miller explained that several factors were important to him in making this determination. First, he had known Mr. O for years and shared the view of everyone else that he was aware of who knew O, that 'ie was an upstanding individual of unquestioned integrity, and further that his record with Licensee was exemplary. Id. Second, there was not on the question sheets Mr._ VV provided to Mr. O anything to alert him that it was Mr.

VV's make-up exam; caver sheets provided to Mr. VV from the training department which enclosed the exam questions did indicate that it was a Mr. VV FSR assignment, but Mr. O never saw the cover sheets. Id. Exam-type questions like those which Mr. VV asked Mr. O to complete for him were a common format familiar to Mr. O. Tr. 26,181-82, 26,192-94 (Mr. O).

In Mr. O's view, Mr. VV could have been seeking O's answers to use the questions and answers as a quiz for other operators, or to prepare study materials for operators. Tr. 26,191, 26,270 (Mr. O). It did not strike Mr. Miller as unusual that when VV, who was Mr. O's boss, asked him to answer some questions, Mr. O answered them unhesitatingly. Miller, ff. Tr. 24,350, at 4.

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311. Mr. O's involvement in the April, 1981 NRC exam cheating incident makes it difficult objectively now to judge Mr. Miller's views of O in July, 1979. By all accounts, however, Mr. O was held in the highest regard both by manage-ment and his peers. Miller, ff. Tr. 24,358, at 4; Tr.

23,756-57 (Arnold). This extraordinary respect for Mr. O, together with Mr. Miller's other cited bases and the fact that nothing like this had ever occurred at TMI according to bot h Mr. Miller and the training department personnel, leads the Board to accept Mr. Miller 's decision not to take further action with respect to O as reasonable.

312. As for VV, the Licensee took disciplinary action. Mr. Miller explained the basis for his recom-mendations. Miller, ff. Tr. 24,350, at 5-6. As Mr. Miller viewed it, even though the training department's written instructions to Mr. VV in the cover sheet did not explicitly dictate that he himself perform the make-up work, the training department's policy was clearly that these exams were to be done individually and Mr. VV's decision to perform otherwise was very poor judgment. Id. at 5. Furthermore, while Mr.

Miller accepted VV's representation that he was not attempting to deceive the training department (or he would have recopied the answers provided by 0 into his own hand), Mr. Miller's position was that VV's having involved Mr. O represented an unacceptable lack of regard for the importance that Mr. VV should have attached to his completion of the test. Id.

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Finally, Mr. Miller thought that VV's lack of regard was further demonstrated by his past poor record of attendance at training sessions and his tardiness in completing make-up assignments. Id.

313. Mr. Miller's initial recommendation was that Mr. VV should be suspended for a week without pay and a letter describing the situation should be placed in Mr. VV's file.

Id. After discussions with his boss Mr. Herbein, Mr.-Miller agreed to recommend a two-week suspension rather than a one-week suspension. Id. The recommendation was'then reviewed by Mr. Arnold. Mr. Arnold was not aware that the make-up assignment involved was an FSR requirement that needed to be fulfilled for continued licensing of Mr. VV. Tr. 23,707-08 (Arnold). Nevertheless, based on his understanding that it was merely a typical make-up assignment for missed training, and his awareness of the involvement of Mr. O as well as Mr. vv's past performance in training and as a supervisor, Mr. Arnold decided that VV should be relieved of his supervisory operating i line position, a decision concurred in by Mr. Miller and Mr.

I Herbein. Miller, ff. Tr. 24,356, at 6; Tr. 24,451-52 (Miller);

Tr. 23,732 (Arnold). Mr. VV was relieved of his position, initially was assigned to a team investigating the TMI ,

accident where his detailed technical knowledge of the TMI-2 unit could be utilized, see Tr. 23,773-75 (Arnold), and finally was placed in a Unit 2 non-supervisory technical interface position with outside consultants, again where his knowledge of

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that unit could be put to advantage. Tr. 23,771-72 (Arnold).

i No witness criticized the appropriateness of Licensee's disciplinary actions of Mr. VV. We concur that such stern action was appropriate. To the extent there is doubt over the impact on Mr. VV of this move, salary comparisons of Mr. VV's progress with that of his counterparts in 1979 at Unit 1 and the individual who replaced VV.at Unit 2 provide a benchmark.

These comparisons, which Special Master Milhollin asked Licensee to provide for the record, show that both Mr. VV's counterpart at Unit 1 and his replacement at Unit 2 have had salary increases since the July, 1979 incident twice that of Mr. VV, and whereas Mr. VV's salary in July,1979, was the highest of the three, he now is the lowest. See Lic. Exs. 81a and 81b.

314. One final aspect of the Mr. VV disciplinary action that received considerable attention during cross-examination is the degree of, or lack of, public notice to its other employees of the action Licensee took on Mr. VV. Mr.

Crocker of the NRC expressed his opinion that the Licensee's organization could have profitted by management's officially noticing this action. Crocker, ff. Tr. 25,081, at 5; Tr.084-85 (Crocker). At first blush, it appears that is the case.

Making a public example of Mr. VV in this instance may have provided a clear signal to other employees of management's disapproval of VV's behavior. On the other hand, this incident was viewed as unique by training and by management. Miller,

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1 i

ff. Tr. 24,358, at 6; TMIA Ex. 66; Tr. 24,457-58 (Miller).

Furthermore, as Mr. Arnold pointed out, management's actions could have been misinterpreted and, in Mr. VV's case, there were unique reasons why management was hesitant to make an

. example of him. Tr. 23,732-34 (Arnold). According to Mr.

Arnold, the Licensee does not make it a practice to disseminate individual employee personnel ratters between an employee and the Company. Tr. 23,730, 23,896 (Arnold). In any event, with the vibrant communications channels among employees at TMI, as evidenced by the closeness particularly among operators and the active rumor mill (see Section II.E, supra), it is not reasona-ble to expect that replacing the head of the operators at Unit 2 would not be well known among all the operators and the reasons for the action as well, with or without bulletin-board publicity by management. See Tr. 23,737-38 (Arnold).

315. The third question which grew out of this issue was whether Licensee appropriately certified Mr. VV for renewal of his license in August, 1979, after the incident. The certification was sent to NRC in August, after Mr. VV had completed the accelerated training program, including retesting in the sections he had failed on the FSR make-up assignment and the sections in which Mr. O had provided answers. Miller, ff.

Tr. 24,358, at 6; TMIA Ex. 74. The certification letter to NRC, however, did not discuss the involvement of Mr. O in Mr.

VV's FSR make-up exams. See TMIA Ex. 74.

316. NRC's witness, Mr. Crocker, faulted Licensee on

, two grounds for certifying Mr. VV. The first ground was that

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if Licensee intended to remove Mr. VV from licensed duties, then Mr. VV would not need an NRC license and Licensee's certification of him would be counter to 10 CFR 55.10(a)(6) which requires that a license application include evidence that the individual has need for the license in the performance of his duties. Crocker, ff. Tr. 25,081, at 4. As a second ground, Mr. Crocker testified that certification for license renewal includes a requirement that the applicant for license renewal has discharged his license responsibilities competently and safely and that the incident with Mr. O certainly would cast doubt upon how competently VV had discharged his duties and should have cast some doubt on the suitability of Mr. VV to continue in licensed duties. Id. Mr. Crocker explained further during cross-examination that even though Licensee was not obligated or required to address the 0-VV incident in Mr.

VV's certification, it was his opinion that Licensee should have provided the information for NRC's weighing in its determination whether to renew vv's license. Tr. 25,102 (Crocker).

317. On the first basis for NRC's criticism, Mr.

Miller pointed out that no licensee maintains exactly the number of licensed individuals minimally required to operate the plant. In order to account for absences, illnesses and attrition, prudence dictates that every licensee maintain more licensed operators than are required at any point in time. Tr.

24,445, 24,447 (Miller). Finally, Licensee did not decide to

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1

a

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~ '

remove W's license, but rather.to remove him from his supervisory line function. See, e.g., Tr.=23,741-43 (Arnold).

318. On the second ground','Mr. Miller's posi. tion was '

that because .W did not attempt to disguise O's work to deceive the training department, he did not regard the incident as cheating or a reflection -on W's morals, but rat'her as very poor judgment and inadequate respect. for training's admirtistr/1-tive policies.18 Miller, ff. Tr. 24,358, at 5. Mr. Miller testified that he would not have certified W had he regarded -,

the incident as cheating. Tr. 24,457 (Miller). -

319. We do not fault Licensee on the first ground cited by Mr. Crocker -- namely seeking renewal of W's license .

even though he was not going to be used routinely as a licensed t operator. Licensee is correct that more than the nominal complement of licensed operators is prudent. Moreover, we noce' the regulation cited by Mr. Crocker as a basis for this1 ground - -

governs new applications, not renewals. Compare 10 CFR 55.10 (a)(6) with 10 CFR 55.33. We do, however, endorse-Mr. T Crocker's view that Licensee should have advised NRC of th'e~

0-W incident. Whether or not it is required by the regula-tions, we-believe that NRC should have been apprised of this event. As Mr. Crocker viewed it -- and'we agree - it is not clear whether NRC's decision to renew W's license would have 18 Mr. Arnold was not aware at the time that Mr . W's .

recertification was involved. See 1 313, supra. '

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m. ,

s ._

y been different, .but the information should have been available s

th .NRC to allow them to- factor it into their determination.

320. It appears that Mr. VV never has stood a licensed. watch since he was-removed from his supervisory duties in 1979, even though his license was renewed. Tr. 26,642 (Mr.

VV). We also. learned that Licensee was not planning to recortify Mr. VV again when his license is up for renewal.19 is 'Tr. 25,094 (Crocker). In view of these circumstances, the

_ timing of the event relative to the time of restart, and the uncontroverted evidence that this circumstance was unique, the Board does not view Licensee's failure to have apprised NRC of this incident in 1979, as an impediment to the restart of Unit 1.by the exis ting GPU Nuclear organization.

t

, E. Management Involvement In Cheating On RWP Exams 321. In their response to the Board's August 20, 1981 Order soliciting views of the parties on what actions

!should be undertaken on the' cheating question, the Aamodts in a September 4th pleading requested the record should be reopened, stating interi alia that they were " prepared to present a witness to testify to management's involvement in cheating of personnel on a test given at TMI-l since the (TMI-2] accident."

Af ter the r.ecord was reopened, the parties met to confer i

19 The NRC license for Mr. VVlis only on Unit 2; his Unit 1 licensed wa's vcided some time ago. Tr. 23,769-70 (Arnold).

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regarding the issues to be considered in the reopened proceeding. Although nothing more was known at the time about

'the Aamodt's witness or the test referred to, one of the issues agreed upon by the parties for the reopened hearing was: "6.

The existence and extent of Licensee management involvement in cheating as alleged by the Aamodts in Paragraph 7 in response to the Board's Order of August 20, 1981." This issue subse-quently was accepted by the Board in its Memorandum and Order of October 14, 1931. See 1 14 supra, issue 6.

l 322. At the hearing, the Aamodts did present one l

witness un this issue, Mr. Harry D. Williams. Mr. Williams had been a security guard, employed by a contractor to Licensee, Gregg Security, at TMI from about January or February, 1979 to May. 1979. Tr. 25,002 (Williams). Mr. Williams, in prefiled testimony, alleged as he had ir previously published newspaper excerpts from a book he was about to publish, that he had observed cheating in a Radiation Work Permit (RWP) test which he took'at TMI in late April, 1979. Tr. 25,009-19 (Williams).

l See also Long, ff. Tr. 24,925, at 19-24, and Ward, ff. Tr.

1 24,274, at 16-17. Prior to his filed testimony being accepted into evidence, Licensee conducted voir dire of this witness.

I Tr. 24,985-25,019 (Williams). On the basis of the voir dire, Licensee objected to the admission into evidence of Mr.

-Williams' prefiled testimony. Tr. 25,019-21 (Blake).

Following additional questioning of the witness by the Aamodts' counsel and by Judge Milhollin, see Tr. 25,021-28 (Williams),

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~ - ~ _ _ _

the Aamodts opposed Licensee's position, and the Commonwealth and the NRC Staff joined Licensee in objecting; TMIA took no position. Tr. 25,029-31 (Clewett, Adler, Goldberg). The Specia' c. aster sustained Licensee's objection, based on his observation of the demeanor of the witness, the slight proba-tive value of the testimony, the fact that the credibility of the witness had been undermined, and that in the view of both the Licensee and the NRC Staff, allowing the testimony could prompt the need for additional witnesses to rebut the allega-tions with a concommitant expenditure of hearing time. Tr.

25,031-32 (Milhollin).

323. With the rejection of Mr. Williams' testimony, there was no evidence of management involvement in cheating on the RNP exam and the Board so finds. We note in arriving at this finding that Mr. Williams knew of no one who could substantiate his assertions see Tr. 25,018-19 (Williams), that the Commonwealth received a negative response to its question whether the Aamodts had any other evidence in hand to support the assertions, see Tr. 25,030-31 (Clewett), and that the NRC's investigators had decided not to investigate this matter on the strength of Mr. Williams' assertions alone, owing partly to Mr.

Williams' prior attempts to provide information to the NRC which turned out to be of little value or significance. See Ward, ff. Tr. 25,274, at 16-17.

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IV. LICENSEE'S VERIFICATION OF OPERATORS' QUALIFICATIONS 324. The organization and program developed by Licensee to train, test, and certify to the NRC its operators' readiness to sit for the RO and SRO license examinations has been the subject of extensive findings in the PID. See FID 11 163-276. In this reopened proceeding, we were not concerned, generally, with the substantive quality of the TMI Training program, see Tr. 23;127-29 (Smith); rather, our focus has been on Licensee's past and present training administrative practices, particularly the administration of exams at TMI-1, as well as the efficacy of Licensee's certification process by which TMI-l management determinec that individuals are quali-fled to take and pass the NRC exam (t) and to serve as control room personnel. See, e.g., Tr. 23,151 (Smith). Thus, limited l

inquiry into the substance of the IMI operator training program was permitted when such information related to the administra-tion of the program, e.g., in order to determine whether i

1 particular method of training or testing could defeat the purpose of a test. See, e.g., Tr. 26,246-48 (Milhollin). In this way, we have reconsidered in this decision the impact of

( these findings on training, testing and certification on our

previous findings and, in particular, our conclusion that Licensee's training program, coupled with the NRC license exam process, should ensure enhanced operator performance and the safe and effective operation of TMI-1. See PID 1 204 and n.18.

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A. Past Training Administrative Practices 325. Licensee's past training administrative practices, particularly the administration of quizzes during the regular, cyclical training program for licensed operators, were very loose. Evidence on this question was adduced from numerous sources, including Licensee's management and training personnel, and the 19 licensed personnel -- an instructor, operators, shift foremen, shift supervisors, and STAS -- who were called to testify during the reopened proceeding. As we discuss in Section V, infra, because the Staff has found and continues to find satisfactory the performance level of Licensee's operator license candidates on the NRC operator license exams, it did not present evidence on this subject.

See Boger, ff. Tr. 25,480, at 2-4; Tr. 25,532-33 (Boger).

326. Licensee's management readily admitted to serious shortcomings in its training administrative practices.

See, e.g., Tr. 24,022-26 (Hukill); Long, ff. Tr. 24,921, at 3.

The need for Licensee to completely reorganize and revise its training programs was clear after the accident. However, in its efforts in this regard, Licensee focused on instituting major organizational and staf fing changes, and the development of completely new programs for new and requalifying ROs and SROs. Newton and Brown, ff. Tr. 24,640, at 4-5. A review of the programs which Licensee has instituted in the past year clearly reflects this substantial effort. See Lic. Ex. 60-62.

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(We discussed in our earlier findings Licensee's efforts in writing and implementing the 1979-1980 Operator Accelerated Retraining Program ("OARP"). PID 45196 - 207.) Included in the new programs are a number of administrative requirements which are appropriate and beneficial, e.g., record retention requirements, evaluation procedures, attendance requirements, and the specification of closed-book weekly quizzes in requali-fication training. Lic. Ex. 60-62; Newton and Brown, ff. Tr.

24,640, at 5-6.

327. Significantly absent, however, from Licensee's restructured training organi.zation and programs were exam and quiz administrative procedu2es. Thus, no specific oral or written instructions were given to operators prior to quali-fication or annual requalification exams or during weekly quizzes; proctoring varied widely, with emphasis on the availability of an instructor to answer questions; and, no procedure existed concerning safeguarding exam materials.

Newton and Brown, ff. Tr. 24,640, at 8-9, 11.

320. Dr. Long, the Direc tor of GPU Nuclear's Training & Educatior Department, testified that he believed every member of his teaching staff implicitly understood that cheating is totally unacceptable behavior and not only is not condoned, but is essentially incomprehensible in the context of training in preparation for seeking an NRC license to operate a nuclear power plant. Long, ff. Tr. 24,921, at 3. Thus, in his view, the unspoken proposition that one was to do one's own

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work, unless the assignment was intended by its nature to involve working through problems with others, was not articula-ted because it was a second nature proposition. Id. This view was shared by Mr. Newton, the TMI Operator Training Manager.

Tr. 24,818 (Newton). Nevertheless, as Mr. Newton acknowledged, because of the absence of requirements, such as 100% proc-toring, the opportunity for collusion on quizzes was present; in addition, operators could have harbored a misunderstanding as to whether they were required to do their own work, at leact on weekly quizzes. Tr. 24,818-21 (Newton). In Mr. Newton's view, this situation changed when he assumed his current position in August of 1980, at which time he directed that quiz rooms be proctored. However, even in this time frame, because the emphasis was on having someone available to answer ques-tions of the operators, not on monitoring operators' conduct during the exams,100% practoring was still not necessarily utilized. Id.; Newton and Brown, ff. Tr. 24,640, at 9.

329. Virtually all of the control room personnel called to testify by the intervenors, the Special Master or the Board, testified as to their recollections of the TMI Training Department's past exam administrative practices. It quickly became apparent, from their testimony, that a distinction existed in at least some of the operators' minds, and in practice, between cooperation on training department quizzes, usually given at the end of each week of training, and on major qualifying exams. See Tr. 25,695-98 and 25,719 (Mr. GG:

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. 7- . . _, 3 - - ~ , ,, -%-- -

seriousness of weekly quizzes, including Category T, not felt, whereas operators had serious attitude towards requalification exams); Tr. 25,967-74 (Mr. 00: cooperation occurred on weekly quizzes but not on requalifying exams); Tr. 26,231-34 (Mr. 0:

cooperation occurred on quizzes in time frame prior to but not during OARP; possible to construe unproctored take-home quizzes as condoning cooperation); Tr. 26,305-07, 26,317-18 (Mr. V:

because instructions unclear as to whether quizzes open or closed book, cooperation on quizzes occurred occasionally; however, cooperation did not occur on exams); Tr. 26,452-56 (Mr. WW: individuals occasionally cooperated in understanding quiz questions); Tr. 26,492-93 (Mr. KK: heard of but does not recall seeing group efforts on quizzes); Tr. 26,607-09 (Mr. T:

some quizzes were group efforts, condoned by instructor; not true with regard to mock exams); Tr. 26,807-14 (Mr. U:

consistent with crew concept, cooperation on take-home and classroom quizzes, particularly, discussion of question so answer understood); but compare Tr. 25,685, 25,698 (Mr. GG:

group efforts on quizzes not permitted and did not occur); Tr.

25,735-38, 25,826 (Mr. G: no talking or use of reference materials in quizzes); Tr. 25,852-56, 25,861 (Mr. H3:

reference materials, handouts not used during quizzes); Tr.

25,895-96 (Mr. H: handouts not used during t3Me-home quizzes);

Tr. 26 099, 26,116, 26,12-28, 26,156-57, 26,137-23 'Mr. W: no discussion of answers permitted or accepted during quizzer; recalls only one such instance); Tr. 26,371-76 (Mr. Shipman:

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s,e quizzes much more informal than NRC exams; during requalification training, people worked together to requalify themselves; however, during quizzes assistance not received or given); Tr. 26,537-38, 26,563 (Mr. I: no recollection of cooperation on quizzes); Tr. 26,671 (Mr. VV: recalls no cooperation on quizzes); Tr. 26,700-03, 26,714-15 (Mr. P: has seen no cooperatie:a on quizzes). Thus, the evidence suggests that cooperation on quizze,s certainly occurred at times, although the frequency or propriety of this conduct is unclear, given the fact that instructors permitted cooperation on quizzes on occasions. Tr. 26,923 (Husted). While some quizzes were intended to be taken on an individual basis only, id., no a records exist to verify whether cooperation was or was not authorized on weekly quizzes where operators recall coopera-ting.

4 330. The distinction between the formality of exams and quizzes is borne out by Licensee's testimony of Messrs.

Newton and Brown, who testified that on annual qualification exams students were instructed to do their own work, in contrast to regular training quizzes, where they very well may not have been so instructed. Newton and Brown, Tr. 24,640, at 6.

331. Similarly, Mr. Frank L. Kelly, an independent consultant who administered the .1980 comprehensive mock exams which followed the OARP, see PID 11 226-232, testified to.the procedures he utilized for the Kelly mock exam, given in April

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of 1980. While this exam initially was intended to serve as a preparatory device for the expected Spring, 1980 NRC esam, when the NRC license exams were delayed, the Kelly exam instead served as an annual requalification test. Kelly, ff. Tr.

24,894, at 1-2. In his testimony, Mr. Kelly described the administrative procedures he utilized for this exam. Id. at 3-5, and attachment. Essentially, Mr. Kelly took precautions to safeguard the exam's integrity prior to, during and after the administration of the exam. Id. However, no instructions or admonitions with regard to cheating were stated. Id. at 3.

Nor has Mr. Kelly revised his directions to his clients' operators since the discovery of cheating at TMI to include this' directive, since this proposition is "such a basic thing."

Tr. 24,897 (Kelly). Like the TMI Training managers, Mr. Kelly viewed the proctoring function as primarily providing to examinees an available person to answer questions. The deterrent function was secondary. Kelly, ff. Tr. 24,894, at 4.

Based on his extensive experience as an NRC examiner, he felt the Staff examiners in the past shared this perspective on proctoring. Tr. 24,898-99 (Kelly). See also Tr. 26,194 (Mr.

O: 100% proctoring on ATTS exam).

332. Not surprisingly, given training's past attitude towards proctoring, the evidence on the degree of proctoring of quizzes ranged from poor, e.g. , 20% of the time, see Tr. 25,696 (Mr. GG); Tr. 25,980 (Mr. 00); Tr. 26,806 (Mr.

V); to fair, e.g., 50-80% of the time, see Tr. 25,852 (Mr. HH);

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l Tr. 26,137-38 (Mr. W); Tr. 26,239 (Mr. O); Tr. 23,492-93 (Mr.

KK); Tr. 26,608 (Mr. T); Tr. 26,700-01 (Mr. P); Tr. 26,922 (Husted); to quite satisfactory, e.g., 90-100% of the time, see Tr. 25,736-37 (Mr. G); Tr. 25,872-73 (Mr. H); Tr. 26,374 (Shipman); Tr. 26,452-53 (Mr. WW); Tr. 26,537-38 (Mr. 1).

Given the cyclic nature of the training program at TMI, the broad scope of time encompassed by this question, which included individuals experiences in the recent past as well as many years aco, e.g., twelve years in the case of Mr. O, see Tr. 26,273 (Mr. O), and the inevitable variations in individuals' recollections, we can only conclude that geiz proctoring was neither a requirement nor a consistent practice at TMI. Certainly, as a result, an important test safeguard was inappropriately absent from the TMI training program.

Moreover, this laxness in administration was compounded by the prior use of take-home quizzes, which virtually by definition were unproctored, and may not even have been explicitly designated as required to be taken in the open or closed book format. See, e.g., Tr. 25,685 (Mr. GG); Tr. 26,582-85 (Mr. I).

333. While we therefore cannot and do not consider the evidence of quiz cooperation to signify rampant " cheating",

the testimony reflects significant confusion among the opera-tors, prior to the use of Licensee's new procedure, discussed at 15 347-50, infra, as to what constituted proper quiz conduct. Moreover, while permitting cooperation on quizzes may be beneficial because it serves as a useful teaching device,

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~ . - _. _

see, e.g., Tr. 25,735 (Mr. G), such a practice is improper as a means of verifying operators' understanding of the subject matter. Overall, it is clear that Licensee did not give I sufficient attention to preserving the integrity of its training and testing program.

i B. Coaching 334. Coaching was an issue in this proceeding to the i

extent that we were concerned whether the content and nature of the training at TMI-l so paralleled the testing of operators that test results could not be considered reliable evidence of i an operator's technical competence. The evidence on this subject roughly fell into two categories: (i) whether Licensee's own exams and quizzes were " coached" in the teaching, or were so narrow or were repeated so many times that test results were unreliable; and (ii) whether Licensee's training methods, e.g., the use of prior NRC exams or mock comprehensive examinations, enabled individuals to' pass the NRC -

]

examinations by memorizing answers to previously specified

-questions.

335. In Dr. Long's opinion, coaching, which he understands to be teaching an examination rather than teaching the subject matter, is not the teaching method employed at TMI.

Long, ff. Tr. 24,921, at 14. Licensee's Training & Education Department is committed to the well established educational method of criterion-referenced instruction, an approach which 1

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relies on developing behavioral learning objectives which serve to focus both student and instructor attention on the perform-ances sought ad a result of the instruction. This has the distinct advantage of avoiding what Dr. Long described as the

" hide and seek" game which he believes frequently exists between a teacher and students for determining what subject matter will be on an exam and, generally, what information the teacher really wants the students to understand. Id. Dr. Long did not state that coaching is avoided entirely, since sometimes the learning objectives of the instructor call for memorization, e.g., learning NRC's radiation exposure limits, a formula, or a definition. Id. Dr. Long does not believe that this teaching philosophy and method results in students ignoring 7ther materials taught; rather, it forces teachers to organize their lectures and materials around basic concepts and necessary information, and allows students to more easily determine the significance of the information communicated to them. Id. Moreover, the development and use of behavioral learning objectives is an important part of the TMI Instructcr Development Program, which has been completed by all licensed-operator instructors. Thus, Licensee clearly endorses this teaching philosophy -- criterion-referenced instruction --

as a beneficial method for its instructors to adopt. Id. at 15.

336. Dr. Long also endorsed the re-examination process by which a particular weak subject area is reviewed,

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and the individual is again tested to determine his level of proficiency. Id. at 11-13. He also noted that Licensee's procedures provide for discussions between the Operator Training Manager and the TMI-l Manager of Operations in the event an individual repeatedly fails examinations to determine whether the person lacks the ability or motivation necessary for the job, whether additional training is appropriate, or whether there is a personal, attitude or other problem which is resulting in deficient exam performance. Id. at 12-13.

337. The views of Dr. Long on coaching were essentially echoed by Messrs. Newton and Brown, the Operator Training Manager and the Supervisor of Licensed Operator Training at TMI, respectively. In their view, operator training, like any other educational process, does involve a significant amount of memorization, as well as conceptual understanding of materials. Newton and Brown, ff. Tr. 24,640, at 15. Neither of these gentlemen believe that an individual can pass an NRC exam, however, by memorizing materials. Id.

Nor do they believe that the quizzes and exams given by Licensee permit short-circuiting of the training process through complete memorization of materials. Id. at 15-16.

338. Mr. Boger of the NRC Staff, testified that license candidatas are indeed " coached" on how to best take exams, e.g., read questions carefully, and on what questions to expect on NRC exams. Boger, ff. Tr. 25,480, at 6. The degree to which candidates are coached is facility dependent. In Mr.

Boger's view, the previous examination questions available to

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candidates, and the bank of NRC questions encompass a wide body of knowledge which in all likelihood could not be memorized.

Id. at 6-7. In addition, Mr. Boger considers the chances of a mock exam ccntaining the same questions as the actual NRC exam to be very small. Id. at 7. In his comparison of the Kelly and the April, 1981 NRC exams, only three responses out of approximately one hundred necessary answers on each of the two RO exams administered at TMI-l were predicted exactly by the Kelly mock exam. Id. Similarly, out of the 65 questions contained on each of the two SRO exams, only one response contained on the two NRC SRO exams was predicted by the Kelly mock exam. Id. See also Tr. 25,585-89 (Wilson) and 11 397-98, infra.

339. In general, it was the view of Licensee's control room staff that the NRC examinations and training to become a licensed operator, in general, require both the-ability to memorize materials and to understand concepts. See, e.g., Tr. 25,708 (Mr. GG); Tr. 25,858-59 (Mr. HH); Tr.

25,868, 25,953 (Mr. H). While individuals expressed criticisms of training as it existed prior to the TMI-2 accident, most of these individuals were complementary of, or at least, satisfied with, the training they received in preparation for the April and October, 1981 examinations, and felt the exams were an indicator of their ability to operate TMI-1. See, e.g.,.Tr.

25,726 (Mr. G); Tr. 25,858-59 (Mr. HH); Tr. 25,866 (Mr. H); Tr.

26,049 (Mr. A); Tr. 26,276-78 (Mr. O); Tr. 26,413 (Shipman);

i

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-- m. . ---.w--w.,. - , , , , - - - . , - . - , , . . . , . . . . - .-y - - , - - , - - . , - - - - . . , - -

i l

Tr. 26,464B-65 (Mr. WW); Tr. 26,522-24 (Mr. KK); Tr. 26,674-75 (Mr. VV). But see Tr. 25,703, 25,716-18 (Mr. GG) and Tr.

26,543 (Mr. I).

340. While the evidence was somewhat conflicting on the degree to which prior NRC exams were available for opera-tors to use in preparatica for taking NRC examinations, compare Tr. 24,199 (Ross) with Tr. 24,972-73 (Long), clearly, operators have access to their own prior exams through the Freedom of Information Act, and most used at least their own prior exams to prepare themselves for the April and November, 1981 NRC examinations. See, e.g., Tr. 25,701 (Mr. GG); Staff Ex. 26, at 33 (U interview). (But at least one operator stated he did not use prior exams when he studied. See Tr. 25,869 (Mr. H).)

341. The extensive testimony earlier in this proceeding on the substance of the TMI training program, and the substantial volume of documentary evidence introduced in the reopened hearings of quizzes and examinations administered at TMI, see Lic. Exs. 66A-M, 67A-g, 68A-C and 69A-D; TMIA Exs.

67-70; Staff Exs. 33-36, 37A-R, reflects the fact that an enormous amount of material is encompassed in an NRC license examination, which is then broken down into subject matter subparts during the training cycle at TMI. See e.g., PID 51183-86. We do not believe that this topical approach, which seems necessary and logical, given the scope of the training required, constitutes " coaching"; nor does the evidence suggest that, in general, operators were coached, rather than taught

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~ . - _ _ . ._

the necessary subject-matter. As Mr. Newton and several of the operators noted, the written examinations require an ability to write answers to specific questions which conceivably could be memorized; however, at the very least, during the oral examina-tions, an NRC examiner can probe the knowledge level of the examinees.- Newton and Brown, ff. Tr. 24,640, at 16; Tr.

25,708-13 (Mr. GG); Tr. 25,953 (Mr. H); Tr. 26,322-23 (Mr. v);  ;

Tr. 26,411-13 (Shipman);.Tr. 26,804 (Mr. U). In general, then, we have no reason to believe that- individuals at TMI understand the materials covered by the NRC exam any less than other l examinees or, more importantly, that passing the comprehensive

] examination is possible if the individual fails to genuinely grasp a large body of knowledge, including concepts of reactor theory, as well as the nitty-gritty of procedures, and-techni-cal specifications.20 On the other hand, however, we were singularly dissatisfied with the coaching effect of two of ~ the quizzes given by TMI on the Category T subject matter.

342. Category T of the operators' training program stemmed from the Commission's August 9, 1979 Order, CLI-79-8, 20 If anything, the TMI-l control rooms staff were not sufficiently " coached" for the April, 1981 NRC exam which appear to have focused unusually heavily on details of plant design and the specific wording of technical specifications,

~

about which'the operators generally were unprepared and, quite critical. Tr. 26,045-47 (Mr. A); Tr. 26,320-22 (Mr. V); Tr.  ;

26,411,-26,414-16 (Shipman); Tr. 24,129-32, 24,343-45 (Ross);

Tr. 25,652 (Boger). The October, 1981 RO exams apparently did not so emphasize this non-operational aspect of the subject-matter, although the 530 exam did, and was deemed, as a result, very difficult, See, e.g. Tr. 26,053-54, 26056-59 (Mr.

A); Tr. 25,683 (Mr. GG); Tr. 26,322 (Mr. V); Tr. 24,141 (Ross); '

see also Tr. 25,545 (Wilson). <

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I Order Item II.l(e), and consisted essentially of understanding 1

the lessons learned from the TMI-2 accident. See PID 11 196, 204-05. During the 1979-1980 OARP, these " lessons", which included transient effects, operator response, and related procedure / design changes, were taught. Id. Operators were tested on this material in the Kelly exam. Kelly, ff. Tr.

24,894, at 2. Individuals who failed the Category T section of the Kelly exam were required to make up this portion of the test, which required passing at the 90 percent level -- the initially required passing grade on Category T. See PID 1 205.

In reviewing the actual quizzes given as makeup tests, as well as the testimony of several control roon personnel and of Mr.

Brown, an instructor and Supervisor of Licensed Operator Training, we have several serious criticisms of Licensee's administration of the Category T tests.

343. The first two rounds of Category T makeup tests included questions which are both identical and substantially similar. See Lic. Ex. 66G (Nov. 1980 Category T makeup, sections entitled "ESAS," " Accident Mitigation" and " Lessons Learned"), and Lic. Ex. 65 (April, 1981 Category T makeup); Tr.

24,801-09 (Brown); but see Lic. Ex. 66D (June, 1981 Category T makeup). In addition, the control room staff apparently were not aware of the significance of the Category T section, which was, during the first round of the make-up quizzes, adminis-tered simply as a portion of a weekly quiz. See, e.g., Lic.

Ex. 66G. Thus, four operators failed Category T three times.

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See Lic. Ex. 64, results on Category T exams for Messrs. G, H, FF and 00; Tr. 25,699 (Mr. GG); Tr. 25,756-59 (Mr. G); Tr.

26,003-04 (Mr. 00); Tr. 26,404-05 (Shipman). Moreover, round 2 of the Category T was given as a nonproctored, closed book, take-home test. See Tr. 24,808 (Brown); Tr. 26,CO3 (Mr. 00).

344. We were somewhat relieved to hear from Mr.

Newton that when he realized that some operators were not grasping the Category T subject matter or placing sufficient importance on it, he required in July, 1981, that the test be formally administered and that the content of the test be substantially changed. Tr. 24,813-16 (Newton); Tr. 26,003 (Mr.

00). In addition, a fourth Category T makeup quiz was adminis-tered in November, 1981, after the discovery of cheating on the April, 1981 NRC examinations and the concerns about collusion on the Category T makeup tests were raised through Mr. Trunk's investigations. Arnold, ff. Tr. 23,590, at 8.

345. The' fourth Category T quiz was taken by all operators who did not pass the Category T portion of the Kelly exam, or who did r.ot take the Kelly exam. Brown, ff. Tr.

24,695, at 1. The fourth makeup was preceded by a fairly short, but comprehensive review session. Id. at 2; Lic. Exs.

69C and 690; Tr. 25,745-46 (Mr. G). From our review of the examination (along with the fif th makeup tset administered to

.the one individual who failed to achieve 90 percent on the fourth makeup), as well as our understanding that Licensee's new exam administrative procedures were utilized and that the

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Staff approved of the exam, we are satisfied that the operators were sufficiently tested on this subject matter, given the thorough and conceptual nature of the test. See Lic. Exs. 69A and 69B; Brown, ff. Tr. 24,695, at 3-4; Tr. 26,407-09 (Shipman). Nevertheless, we find it highly inappropriate that Licensee waited until such a late juncture -- at least until July, 1981, and not until November, 1981 for many of the operators -- to properly test operators on this material.

Moreover, the repetition on the first two ma<eup tests of what appear to be less important Category T-related issues (see, e.g., Tr. 26,406-09 (Shipman), Tr. 25,745 (Mr. G)), most assuredly encourages memorization, rather than understanding, of the subject matter. It also results in individuals focusing on passing the exam, rather than increasing their grasp of the subject matter, i.e., coaching.

346. In conclusion, while we are generally confident that Licensee's training program does not rely upon coaching its students to pass NRC examinations, rather than genuinely educating them, we fault Licensee for not having focused earlier on the importance of the Category T examinations, and for not treating that test accordingly. We are satisfied, j however, that the TMI-l control room staff have now been adequately tested on these materials, based on the earlier Kelly results and the November, 1981 Category T exam results.

See Brown, ff. Tr. 24,695, attached grades.

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C. Current Training Administrative Practices 347. In responsa to the discovery of cheating on the NRC examinations in April, 1981, and to ensure that all exams administered by Licensee test the ability of the individual and prevent misconduct which would defeat this purpose, LicensoJ has drafted and instituted a training procedure, effective October 20, 1981, and applicable to the administration of all exams administered by the Training & Education Department or under its direction, viz., by contractors. See Lic. Ex. 63.

Included in this procedure are the following major require-ments:

(1) exams must-be secured by compliance with delineated procedures, e.g., typists must return all draft exam sheets to the individual requesting the typing:

(2) all exams must be accompanied by a " Written Examination Certification Cover Sheet" which, among other things, specifies whether the exam is open or closed book, specifies rules of conduct, identifies authorized reference materials, and provides a space for students to sign a statement that their work is their own; (3) instructor / examiner procedures are specified for ensuring that the physical environment in which the exams are taken does not compromise the exam process, e.g., no unauthorized materials are present, students are not sitting close together, and seating charts are made for

" major" exams, such as the requalification exams;

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(4) all tests are required to be'100% proctored; (5) rules on students leaving the exam room during the exam are provided; and (6) student misconduct is required to be immediately reported to Training supervisory personnel orally and in writing; the written report is given to the Manager of Training, who reports it in writing to the Human Resources Department (GPU Nuclear's personnel department), and notifies an individual in the student's supervisory chain, as well as the Director of Training & Education, Dr. Long.

Lic. Ex. 63; Long, ff. Tr. 24,921, at 25-26.

348. Dr. Long discussed the new exam administration procedures with the Training. Department at TMI in a meeting convened for the training manager, supervisors, instructors and administrative personnel the week of October 19, 1981. In this meeting, Dr. Long emphasized that it was incumbent upon them as teachers to ensure the integrity of Licensee's examination process. Long, ff. Tr. 24,921, e.t 26. While his department is j not the disciplinary function in the organization, Dr. Long believes that it is clearly his department's responsibility to approach examinations with the appropriate attitude, and to t

l take measures to protect the efficacy of the exams his i

i instructors administer. Id. We agree.

349. With respect to ensuring-that the training staff has the proper attitude towards the examination process, Licensee's Vice President of Nuclear Assurance, Mr. Herbein,

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1 has also conducted individual meetings with and sent individual letters to the operator training staff. Id.; see 1277, supra.

We cannot emphasize enough, however, that Licensee's past loose testing practices were sorely evident in this proceeding. We trust that, with the lesson now learned, the procedures which have been instituted will be fully complied with by the training staff.

350. In conclusion, we find the new training procedure on the administration of tests at TMI to satis-factorily guard against the kind of exam misconduct which the April, 1981 NRC exam cheating incident brought to light.

351. In connection with Licensee's current exam procedures, we have also considered whether it is necessary for Licensee to utilize independent consultants to conduct quali-fication exams at TMI-1. See 5 14, supra, issue 9. There are two facets to this question: (i) using independent examiners as a substantive check on the adequacy of Licensee's operator training program; and (ii) using independent examiners as an administrative check on the adequacy of Licensee's testing procedures, e.g., as exam proctors.

352. It is Licensee's view that the use of indepen-dent examiners is not responsive to the issue of cheating, and is not a necessary or even a desirable step to take. Long, ff.

Tr. 24,921, at 16. Licensee cites the occurrence of cheating on the examinations administered at TMI by ATTS as proof positive of the fact that cheating can occur on any exam,

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regardless of who writes, administers or grades it. Id. at 16-17. Dr .- Long believes that as educators and examiners, his staff must preserve the integrity of its training program and examination process, and cannot delegate this responsibility elsewhere, e.g., by using outside contractors to administer exams. Id. at 17. Thus, he advocates reliance on Licensee's own improved administrative process to protect against abuses such as cheating. Id.

2 353. With respect to the use of independent exa-miners as a substantive check on the adequacy of Licensee's 1

j.

operator training program, Dr. Long believes that an instructor i

who has worked with students over an extended period of time,

who has developed the teaching materials, who knows the a

facility and its procedures very well, and who understands

.first-hand the pott:tial weaknesses of his students, is in by 4

f ar the best position to write and grade an exam. Id. at 17-18. Now that Licensee has. restructured its organization, increased its training staff, and revised its training pro-I grams, Dr. Long believes it would be a disservice to these

! programs to utilize outside consultants in lieu of TMI instructors. Id. at 18.

354. As Dr. Long notes, the NRC exam process serves as the "outside consultant" verification of the qualifications of TMI-l operators. Id. Moreover, it is the Staff's intention to have periodic NRC requalifying exams when the staffing resources of the Operator Licensing Branch of NRR so allows.

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Tr. 25,633 (Wilson); see 1 406, infra, with regard to the issue of Operator Licensing Branch staffing.

355. We find Dr. Long's reasoning persuasive, particularly with regard to the need for independent consult-ants to verify the substantive adequacy of operator training at TMI. We do not consider it advantageous to supplant the i

instructor as the primary examiner and grader. Nor do we consider independent proctors to serve a particularly useful function in view of Licensee's new exam administrative proce-dure. Finally, we encourage the Staff to move forward with its own plans to administer requalifying examinations to individuals holding operator licenses.

L. Licensee's Operatar Certification Process i

356. One of the issues which we raised as a result of the O and W cheating incident was the efficacy of Licensee's operator certification procedures whereby Licensee vouches for the technical capability of every operator requesting to sit for the NRC exams, as well as for the ability of each license candidate to serve in the control room and, thus, each individual's personal integrity. See 1 14, supra, issue 12.

Licensee's certification procedures were an obvious area of inquiry, given the fact that Messrs. O and W were not only certified by Licensee to take the April, 1981 NRC exams, but were serving as shift supervisors -- the senior member of the shift crew who, in all circumstances, must exercise considerable judgment and integrity.

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357. Before describing the certification process at TMI-1, however, we note that with respect to Mr. O and Mr. W, both individuals were very highly regarded by TMI-l management and control room personnel for their technical capabilities and for their personal qualities. See, e.g., Hukill, ff. Tr.

23,913, at 2; Tr. 25,767 (Mr. G); Tr. 25,917 (Mr. H); Tr.

26,018 (Mr. YY); Tr. 26,045-55 (Mr. A). Moreover, Mr. O and Mr. W each had a sound training record. See Lic. Ex. 64.

Thus, we find no evidence that the flaw in these two individuals which led to the April,1981 exam cheating should have or even could have been detected by Licensee through its certification (or some other) procedure.

358. Since Mr. Hukill assumed the job of Vice President (formerly titled the Director) cf TMI-l in September of 1980, there have been two sets of NRC examinations which required his certification, namely, the April and the October, 1981 exams. Hukill, ff. Tr. 23,913, at 18. The method employed by Mr. Hukill to certify candidates to take the NRC exams in April involved a lengthy meeting with Mr. Herbein, the Vice President of Nuclear Assurance and former Director of TMI-1, Mr. Ronald Toole, the Operations and Maintenance Director at TMI-1, Mr. Ross, the TMI-l Manager of Plant Operations, Dr. Knief, the Manager of Training at TMI, Mr.

Newton, the Operator Training Manger at TMI, and Mr. Brown, the Supervisor of Licensed Operator Training at TMI. Id. at 19-20.

As a group, these individuals reviewed the results of each

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I operator candidate on the April ATTS examinations, the

, performance of individuals during the past year's training program, and the perfetmence of individuals on the job. Id. at 20; Tr. 24,702-05 (Newten). Each candidate was reviewed separately. Weaknesses of particular individuals, whether in training or on-the-job, were discussed. Hukill, ff. Tr.

23,913, at 20.

359. According to Mr. Hukill, his perception at the time of his April certification was that there were no attitude or performance problems in the group of operator candidates.

Id. Since that time, with the discovery of cheating by two senior reactor operators, and the realization that the operators' morale was low at the time of the April, 1981 exams, Mr. Hukill has been self-critical about his arriving at this conclusion without individually interviewing each candidate.

See 1 237, supra. Several operator candidates had required special training during the year. Hukill, ff. Tr. 23,913, at

20. Mr. Hukill and the group of supervisors attending the certification meeting reviewed the competency of these individuals. In addition, Mr. Hukill discussed these personnel with Messrs. Arnold and Clark, who agreed with Mr. Hukill that the individuals appeared to be sufficiently capable to take and pass the NRC examinations. Id. Mr. Hukill testified that if he had thought that any individual would most likely not succeed on the NRC exams, he would not have certified him. Id.

360. In certifying individuals for the October, 1981 NRC examinations, Mr. Hukill utilized the method he had

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used previously -- conducting a lengthy meeting at which individual candidates' training and on-the-job performance was discussed -- in addition, in this instance, meeting with each operator candidate prior to the exams. Tr. 24,054 (Hukill).

As a result of the certification review session, one candidate was not certified because the group reached a consensus that he simply was not ready to take the NRC examinations. Hukill, ff.

Tr. 23,913, at 20. A second individual's negative. attitude about Licensee was discussed; however, because of his conscien-tiousness and high level of competency on the job, and based on Mr. Hukill's interview with him and his full understanding of his responsibilities as a licensed operator, Mr. Hukill certified him for the examination. Id. Questions were not raised with respect to the other operator license candidates.

361. In addition to relying upon training data and input in evaluating the technical competency of the TMI-1 operators, Mr. Hukill also focused on the inherently subjective evaluation of Mr. Ross concerning the attitude, demeanor, honesty and, in general, the integrity of the operator license candidates. Id. at 21; Ross, ff. Tr. 24,127, at 7-9.

362. In Mr. Ross's view, a candidate's technical competency can be determined fairly objectively. Ross, ff. Tr.

24,127, at 8. In addition to evaluating an individual's performance on exams and in training, however, Mr. Ross and his shift supervisors can observe each individual's performance on-shift, including an operator's willingness to seek

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e-.

I %

I assistance when needed, his ability-to do more than one thing atJa time -t.an absolutely necessary capability for an operator td h' ave -- his ability to deal with stress (e.g. , multiple demagds), to sort out priorities and to work with the auxiliary operators and individuals senior to him. Id. Before recom-mending to Mr. Hukill that an individual be cer tified, Mr. Ross discusses the performance and attitude'of each operator license candidate with the individual's shift supervisor. Tr. .14,229 s

(Ross). If either the shift supervisor or Mr. Ross believes that the individual is not ready to take the NRC exam, Mr. Ross

.will not. recommend certification. Tr. 24,230 (Ross).

363.'The Staff relies upon the licensee to determine that operator candidates have demonstrated the requisite level of honesti to apply for a operator license. Since license c.andidates are required to have at least two years of power plant experience, or its equivalent, with at least six months of this experience at the facility for which the candidate seeks a license, the Staff believes that the licensee has been sufficiently exposed to the operator candidate that it can, and is in the best position to, evaluate the individual's integ-rity. Boger, ff. Tr. 25,480, at l'2; Tr. 25,574 (Boger).

364. The only problem which we have with Licensee's past certification process is that it was not formalized in a procedure, a problem for which Mr. Huk!11 recognizes Licensee can be legitimately criticized. Hukill, ff. Tr. 23,913, at 18.

Mr. Hukill intends, however, and in fact has committed to

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% we ~

l instituto such a proceduro prior to cartifying the naxt group of operator candidates. Id.

365. Both Mr.. Hukill and Mr. Ross argue that the 9

actual certification process that has been utilized is a valid

, means of determining the readiness of an individual to sit for the NRC exams. Id. at 18-19; Ross, ff. Tr. 24, 127, at 9. In general, we agree. The problem that we have with the certifi-cation procedure is not in the process which Licensee has used.

Like Mr. Ross, we agree that reducing the inherently subjective evaluation of an individual's personal integrity to a rote procedure probably is not possible, much less beneficial. See Ross, ff. Tr. 24,127, at 9. But we are concerned about the seriousness and thoroughness with which the certification process is undertaken, given the error in co.aputation of one individual's performance in the ATTS mock exam, which formed a basis for certifying an individual for the Ap;;1, 1981 NRC exams. See Tr. 24,306 (Ross); Tr. 24,780-81 (Brown).

However, based on the testimony of Mr. Hukill on cross-examination that in the future, training records will have to be signed by training personnel verifying completion of

/'

the program, we are satisfied that Mr. Hukill recognizes the importance of the certification process, and will ensure 5, himself that the data upon which he relies in the future to

~

certify operator candidates is accurate. See Tr. 24,052-55, 24,104-09 (Hukill).

366. Finally, while the Special Master was quite concerned about Licensee's willingness to certify one

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particular individual, Mr. H, who repeatedly failed various exams including quizzes, Category T tests, mock exams and NRC exams, see Tr. 24,105-09 (Milhollin, Hukill); Tr. 24,335-36 (Ross), we do understand that this confidence was based on the individual's successful performance on an NRC examination and his holding an associate's degree in nuclear engineering, see Tr. 24,760-61 (Newton), and that, in fact, this individual passed the October, 1981 NRC exams. See Staff Ex. 32, to November 30, 1981 Memorandum from J. J. Kramer to H. R. Denton (TMI-l RO Exam Results).

V. THE ADEQUACY OF THE NRC STAFF'S CHEATING INVESTIGATIONS AND EXAM ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES AT TMI-l 367. Among the issues designated for the reopened hearing were the adequacy of the Staff's investigations of and response to the cheating incident and rumors of cheating in the April, 1981 NRC examinations, the adequacy of the Staff's license exam administrative practices in the past, e.g., during the April, 1981 NRC exam, and now, e.g., during the October, 1981 NRC exam, and the adequacy of the Staff's review of the administration of Licensee's Category T tests. See 1 14, suora, issues 2 and 10. Consistent with our limited inquiry into Licensee's exam practices, we were interested only in determining whether the Staff's administrative procedures for safeguarding the exam process have been and currently are adequate, or whether the NRC license exam could be or now can

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be defeated by chea ting, undue coaching, or other evasive devices. See 1 14, suora, issue 10.

A. The NRC Staff's Investigations of Cheating at TMI-l 368. The NRC's investigations into cheating at TMI-l began on July 22, 1981, when Mr. Mark E. Resner and Mr. Ronald Smith, investigators with the NRC's Office of Inspector and Auditor, were directed by the Acting Assistant Director of I Investigations, OIA, to investigate allegations of cheating on the April, 1981 NRC exams at TMI-1. Resner, ff. Tr. 25,035, at

2. OIA became aware of the need for sucn an investigation when contacted by attorneys from the Office of the Executive Legal Direc':or on July 22. Resner, ff. Tr. 25,035, at 2; Staff Ex.

24, details of investigative report, at 1. The possibility of cheating by two TMI-l operators, O and W, had been discovered by an NRC consultant grading the SRO exams, who contacted the Operator Licensing Branch of NRR. See Staff Ex. 24, details of investigative report, at 1. As members of the NRC's internal investigative group responsible for ensurirg the integrity of the NRC and its employees and investigative matters cor.cerning the NRC which deal with potential criminal violations of the Atomic Energy Act, Mr. Resner and Mr. Smith were concerned with the implications of the cheating issue with respect to the NRC Staff. Id. at 1; Tr. 25,052 (Resner).

369. On July 22, OIA investigators Smith and Resner interviewed Mr. Collins, the Chief of the Operator Licensing

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Branch of NRR, see Collins, ff. Tr. 25,109, at 1, concerning his knowledge of the cheating issue. They also requested, obtained and reviewed the April,1981 NRC exams administered at TMI-1. On July 23, Messrs. Wilson and Maines, the principal NRC proctors during the April exam, were interviewed by the OIA investigators. Id. On July 24, 1981 Chairman Palladino determined that OIE, rather than OIA, should conduct a full investigation of the cheating matter. Id.; Staff Ex. 26, at 3; Tr. 25,279-81 (Baci). OIA therefore terminated its investiga-tive efforts, and reduced to writing the results of its interviews, which are contained in a July 31, 1981 Report of Investigation. See Staff Ex. 24.

370. OIA did not conduct a complete investigatior.

because of the reallocation of responsibility for this effort within the NRC. Nevertheless, an investigation of the princi-pal NRC staff members involved in the incident was conducted, with statements taken from these individuals, as reflected in OIA's Report of Investigation. Id. at 4-10. The statements of the Operator Licensing Branch personnel to OIA essentially reiterate the testimony of Messrs. Col' ins and Wilson, described in Section V(B), infra.

371. The OIE Investigations Branch bore the primary responsibility for the investigations of cheating at TMI-1.

Ward, ff. Tr. 25,274, at 1. At the time OIE started its field effort, the OIE investigators had been briefed on the results of the truncated OIA investigation. Id. at 6. OIE's

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understanding of the results of the OIA's efforts were that the operator license examinations.given at TMI-l in-April of 1981 were not well monitored or proctored, but that' the proctoring fell within NRC guidelines. Id. at 6-7; see also Staff.Ex. 29.

Based on these initial findings, OIE primarily focused on the two persons, O and W, about whom the Staff possessed evidence of cheating. Although OIE planned to inquire into the extent of c'neating by others, it had-no greater reason to suspect cheating on the part of the rest of the TMI-l operator can-didates than by candidates who' had taken RO and SRO exams at other facilities. Id. With that in mind, OIE's investigators, under the supervision of Mr. William J. Ward, the Chief of 'the .

Investigations Branch of OIE, concentrated on establishing the facts concerning the two suspected ~ individuals. Id. Also, the possibility of either conspirational cheating or management's involvement in any of the allegations was' vigorously pursued.

Tr. 25,305, 25,416-19 (Ward).

372. Using its standard investigatory procedures, OIE investigators were sent out to the field -- i.e., Three Mile Island -- to interview personnel who could have been cognizant of the matter under investigation. Ward, ff. Tr.

25,274, at 5-6. The only deviation from typical OIE procedures in the instant case was the use of headquarters Investigations Branch personnel in addition to regional-office investigators, due to the visibility of the cheating issue. Id.

373. OIE's initial investigative report, issued on August 11, 1981, essentially closed out the o and W cheating

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issue. See Staff Ex. 26. Four OIE investigators, Messrs.

Gilbert, Baci, Smith and Christopher, participated in the investigation, in addition to Mr. Ward. Id. The investigation began with Mr. Baci and Mr. Gilbert, along with OIE Resident Inspector Francis Young, visiting the TMI training facility at which the April, 1981 exams were administered. Id. at 6. Mr.

Baci and Mr. Gilbert then met with Mr. Arnold and Mr. Hukill in order to facilitate the scheduling of interviews. Id. at 7.

Two subsequent interviews with Mr. Arnold were conducted by OIE as the investigation proceeded. Id.

374. In conducting its initial investigation into cheating at TMI-1, OIE interviewed Messrs. O and W three times, and i.ndividually interviewed TMI-l OIE Resident Inspectors Young and Donald R. Haverkamp, Mr. Nelson Brown, the supervisor of Licensee's TMI licensed operator training program, Mr.

Michael Ross, Manager of Plant Operations at TMI-1, eight TMI-l control room personnel, a TMI-1 licensed operator instructor, and an individual, Mr . VV, who was involved in the 1979 incident of misconduct involving Mr. O discussed in Section III.D, supra. See Staff Ex. 26, at 9-49. To understand the extent of cheating on the April NRC exams, OIE interviewed individuals who might have been more likely to have either cheated (- to have provided information regarding cheating.

Ward, ff. Tr. 25,274, at 7. The persons seated closest to O and W fell into the former category, while the three persons who failed the exam fell into the latter. Id.; Tr. 25,292

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(Baci). None of these efforts developed credible evidence of other cheating. Ward, ff. Tr. 25,274, at 7.

375. The information contained in OIE's August 11 investigative report was provided on a continuing basis to Mr.

Dudley Thompson, Director, Enforcement and Investigations Staff of OIE, throughout the course of the investigation. Staff Ex.

26, at 50. Mr. Thompson was responsible for initiating any NRC enforcement actions stemming from the investigation. Id. On August 10, 1981, after O and W had admitted to cheating and the interviews of other examinees revealed no further evidence of cheating, Mr. Thompson advised the investigators that the information gathered to date was sufficient to allow an enforcement decision to be made and to sustain such enforcement action as might be necessary. Id.; Ward, ff. Tr. 25,274, at 8.

He also reported that O and W had been terminated by Licensee, and that the NRC had sent a confirming letter to each of these individuals which would have the effect of ensuring that they no longer could perform licensed duties at TMI-1. In view of the foregoing, Mr. Thompson considered further investigative effort unwarranted, and the investigation was closed. Staff Ex. 26, at 50. Mr. Thompson's view that further investigative efforts were unnecessary was shared by all of the investigators and Mr. Ward. Ward, ff. Tr. 25,274, at 8.

376. On September 15, 1981, the OIE Investigations Branch received information from a confidential informant, Mr.

YY, which raised the spectre of further improprieties

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a concerning the April, 1981 operator license exams. Staff Ex. .

1 27, at 1. Mr. YY's allegation concerned the conduct of Mr.

Michael Ross, a senior member of Licensee's management. A thorough investigation of the Ross allegation was conducted by three OIE investigators, Messrs. Baci, Smith and Matakas, under the direction of Mr. Ward. See Staff Ex. 27 and 11 216-29, 7

suprr. While the second investigation failed to corroborate the informant's allegations, see 1 229, supra, it did result in new infornation concerning the possibility of cheating on the April, 1981 NRC exams. Specifically, the following rumors were identified and pursued: (1) Mr. U's alleged call to Mr. KK in the shift supervisor's office, see 11 114- 27, supra; (ii) an individual (possibly Mr. U) was stationed in the vicinity of the exam room to provide assistance to the examinees during the NRC exams see 11 183-98, supra; (iii) and Mr. I, an SRO, had stated that while 0 and W had been terminated for cheating, the persons responsible were still at TMI, see it 140-42, supra.

Ward, ff. Tr. 25,275, at 9. The OIE investigators were unable to corroborate or find any evidence of the two assertions involving Mr. U, after interviewing all of the personnel who they believed had any information concerning the issues. Id.

at 9-10. Based on their interview of Mr. I, the investigators were satisfied that Mr. I's statement related to Mr. I's belief that the shortcomings of management in failing to adequately prepare the candidates for the license exams were responsible for O and W cheating on the exams, and not that Mr. I had other

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i information or knowledge concerning cheating on the April,1981 NRC exams. Id. at 9; see also Tr. 26,576-82 (Mr. I); Staff Ex.

27, at 35, 11 140-42, supra. At the conclusion of these interviews, the second OIE investigation was terminated. Ward, ff. Tr. 25,274, at 10.

377. Finally, OIE conducted a third series of interviews, reported in a third investigative report,- see Staff Ex. 28, based on information which Licenses management learned during the conduct of its own inyt ..tigation to determine the extent of cheating and had passed on promptly to the NRC. Id,.

at 10. Investigators Baci and Gilbert, under the direction of Mr. Ward, conducted interviews at TMI-l on October 19, 20 and 22 on the two new matters identified by Licensee, viz. , Mr.

Shipman's participation in an exchange of an answer while on a break from an exam which he thought was the NRC's April, 1981 exams, see 11 102-13, supra, and the incident involving the solicitation of an answer from Mr. WW to a question on the Kelly exam in April of 1980, while the exam was ongoing. Staff Ex. 28 at 1; Ward, ff. Tr. 25,2/4, at 10. The investigators interviewed Messrs. Shipman and WW; however, because of the inability of these two individuals to recall who had solicited answers from them in each specific instance, no other leads were followed. Ward, ff. Tr. 25,274, at 11.

378. In conducting all three of its investigations, the investigators generally did not refer to specific allega-tions raised by or about specific individuals. See, e.g., Tr.

25,294 (Baci). Rather, the investigators described to each

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interviewee a laundry list of possible examples of cheating and asked the individual whether he had any knowledge whatsoever of such conduct, or any other cheating incident. Tr. 25,298 (Ward); Tr. 25,365 (Baci). While this standard investigative technique creates the potential for not prompting all informa-tica relevant to a particular matter under investigation, we understand that it also provokes open-ended answers, potentially ferrets out information which would not be prompted by a narrow question.and protects the innocent in investiga-tions such as those which took place at TMI involving unsub-stantiated rumors and thus, the potential to wrongly malign individuals' characters and reputations.

379. Based in.each instance on the judgment of the investigators, their supervisor and senior management that .

further fact finding interviews would be-nonproductive, every lead was not followed by the Staff during their three investi-gations. See, e.g., Tr. 25,230 (Ward re P/Husted incident);

Tr. 25,332-33 (Ward re follow-up on KK and WW telephone calls);

Tr. 25,337-38, 25,376 (Ward re Trunk report follow-up); Tr.

25,371 (Ward re follow-up of Shipman incident). These judg-ments were initially made by the highly experienced investiga-tors utilized by OIE for this investigation, three of whom collectively have some 45 years of experience as criminal investigators. See Ward, Baci and Gilbert, ff. Tr. 25,274, at attached Qualifications Briefs. Essentially, the decision on each instance whether to continue to pursue a lead or a rumor

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is a management cost-benefit decision, involving the Staff's priorities, the importance or remoteness of the matter, and any existing time constraints involved. Tr. 25,343, 25,371 (Ward).

Although ideally an investigator would like to track down every detail of every allegation, the inherent limitations of resources generally do not permit such a practice. Tr. 25,343 (Ward). In any investigation, including serious criminal investigations, a practical compromise must be reached. Tr.

25,469 (Ward). While during the initial OIE investigation, the investigators appear to have been operating under some time pressure due to the impact of the issue on the activities of the Licensing Board, see Tr. 25,388 (Ward), no time constraints were placed on OIE's second and-third investigators, see Tr.

25,471 (Ward); moreover, the investigators did not feel the initial investigation suffered from its expeditious conduct.

See Tr. 25,471 (Ward); Tr. 25,292-93 (Baci). Based on their-very substantial investigative experience, we defer to their judgment as to the fruitfulness of further interviews.

380. In conclusion, we are satisfied that OIE pursued allegations and rumors to the extent believed to be productive, and that as a result OIE conducted a thorough investigation of the serious matters brought to their atten-tion.

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B. The NRC Staff's Operator License Exam Administrative Practices 381. Before discuusing the Staff's operator license exam procedure it is important to recognize that in evaluating a licensee's operator qualification program, the Staff pri-marily relies upon the performance level of a licensee's operators on the NRC license examinations. Boger, ff. Tr.-

25,480, at 3. If the performance level is unsatisfactory, the NRC essentially suspends its acceptance of facility certifi-cation of candidates, until the training program is upgraded.

Id.; Tr. 25,523-24 (Boger); Tr. 25,526-29 (Boger, Wilson). In determining whether a licensee's performance level on NRC operator license exams is satisfactory, the Staff compares the performance of a licensee's candidates with the perceived industry norm, and with the licensee's previous record to determine'if the certification process effectiveness has changed. Boger, ff. Tr. 25,480, at 3. While the Staff regularly evaluates operators' responses during facility transients and routine OIE inspection results, and conducts bi-annual requalification exam audit reviews, for the most part, a licensee's training program is not subject to regular Staff scrutiny unless an abnormal number of operators fail the NRC exams. Id. at 4; Tr. 25,491-93 (Boger); Tr. 25,530-32 (Boger, Wilson). Thus, a licensee's testing program is not monitored unless the candidate performance level on NRC exams proves unsatisfactory. Id. at 4. Since this has not been (and

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is-not, with respect to the October, 1981 exam) true at TMI-1, the Staff.has not evaluated (and does not now plan to evaluate) the TMI operator testing program. Id. at 2-4; Tr. 25,532 (Boger). The Staff does, however, audit Licensee's requalifi-cation exam, on the average about once every two years. Tr.

25,491-92 (Boger).

382. The Staf f presented testimony by Mr. Paul F.

Collins, Chief of the Operator Licensing Branch, NRR, Mr. Bruce A. Wilson, Section Leader of the Power and Research Reactor Group of the Operator Licensing Branch of NRR, and Mr. Bruce A.

Boger, a reactor engineer in the Operator Licensing Branch of NF1, on the subject of the adequacy of the Staff's operator

~

license exam process. See Collins,-ff. Tr. 25,109 and ff. Tr.

25,113; Wilson, ff. Tr. 25,481; Boger, ff. Tr. 25,480, 383. In his testimony, Mr. Collins generally described the approach of the Operator Licensing Branch to detecting cheating, both in the past, and currently as a result of the cheating which occurred at TMI in April of 1981. In summary, at the time of the TMI-l operator license examina-tions, there were no formal procedures that required a compari-son of exam papers for the specific purpose of detecting cheating. Collins, ff. Tr. 25,109, at 2. Nevertheless, it was Mr. Collins' view that the grading technique used by his staff was. adequate to detect cheating in most instances. Id. at 3.

Specifically, each question for all candidates was graded before proceeding to the next question. Id. This technique

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)

l l

facilitated both consistency in grades, and detection of '

iderstical answers when a small number of papers was involved.

Since many of the sets of exams administered by the Operator Licensing Branch involved ten or fewer candidates, reasonable assurance was provided that identical answers would be detec-ted. Id. Mr. Collins readily admitted, however, that for larger groups of candidates, such as the number of individuals who took the TMI-l operator license exams in April, 1981, the probability of detection decreases. Id.

384. As a result of the cheating which took place at TMI-1, the Staff's grading procedures have been revised to include a more formal check for cheating. The new grading criteria, set forth in Examiners' Standard ES-109, see Staff Sx. 25, requires, inter alia, that examiners review in detail the answers and the grades assigned for one question in 50% of the exam categories for 50% of the candidates, inspecting for indications of cheating or collusion. Collins, ff. Tr. 25,109, at 4; Staff Ex. 25. This quality assurance check is designed to increase the probability of detecting (but not eliminate the possibility of) cheating on exams. Tr. 25,122-26 (Collins).

In Mr. Collins' view, the ES-109 audit procedure, which takes one day per exam to satisfy, combined with the Staff's new 100%

proctoring requirement and procedure for ensuring that exa-minees are not sitting in close proximity to each other, as described below, constitute sufficient safeguards against cheating on NRC operator license exams. Tr. 25,124, 25,165-67 (Collins).

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385. In commenting on the Staff's failure to detect the cheating by O and W which took place in April, Mr. Collins attributed this fact to the large number of exams which were involved, the large number (56 out of 118 responses, or 47.5%)

of questions requiring short answers which do not facilitate detection of copying, and the short time-frame in which the exams were graded. Collins, ff. Tr. 25,109, at 5. Also, prior to the establishment of ES-109, essentially only borderline exams -- i.e., individuals who almost passed or almost failed

-- were reviewed for grading consistency. Tr. 25,142-45 (Collins). Thus, rampant cheating resulting in clear passing or failing grades could go undetected. Id.

386. It was Mr. Collins' view that the absence of a more formal cheating-detection procedure in no way demonstrated a lax attitude on the part of his staff. Id. at 6; Tr. 25,132, 25,149, 25,153-55 (Collins). Rather, the Staff believes that the attitude of the individuals who administer operator license exams is such that a sincere effort is made to ensure that the examinations will provide reasonable assurance that safe and competent individuals operate nuclear power plants. Collins, ff. Tr. 25,109, at 6. The procedures in effect at the time of the cheating incident were believed to have been adequate to obtain such assurance. As soon as the Staff realized that the procedures did not so provide, they were changed. Id.

387. A detailed description of the specific proce-dures utilized during the April examination was provided by

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Messrs. Wilson and Boger. During the April exams, the Staff followed the procedure in effect at the time, Operator Licensing Branch Standard ES-201 (Rev. 2), concerning the-administration of reactor operator written exams. See Staff Ex. 29. This procedure did not require 100% proctoring; in fact, it specified that "[ alt some time during the course of the written examination, the examiner should have a cognizant member of the facility staff review the examinations so that any possible inappropriate questions may be discussed, and to ensure that all answers deemed correct are currently valid",

thus encouraging the examiner / proctor's absence from the room.

Wilson, ff. Tr. 25,481, at 2-3.

388. Chief Examiner' Wilson, along with another NRC.

headquarters examiner / proctor, Mr. Maines, served as the.

primary proctors for the April exams. While-it is. typical to have only one examiner / proctor present at a facility, two examiner / proctors were provided for the exams because of the use of two rooms -- smoking and non-smoking -- for examinees.

Id. at 2; Tr. 25,145 (Collins). The only other proctoring assistance was provided by Resident Inspector Young, who proctored for one to two hours over lunch on the first three days of the exam. Tr. 25,501 (Wilson).

389. The exams were administered over.a four day period, with the RO exams given on Tuesday, April.21 and Thursday, April 23, 1981 and requiring nine hottrs to complete, and the SRO exams given on Wednesday, April 22 and Friday,

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r-April 24, 1981, and requiring coven hours. Wilson, ff. Tr.

25,481, at 2; Tr. 25,501 (Wilson). Mr. Wilson estimates that the exams were proctored for about 48 out of the 64 hours7.407407e-4 days <br />0.0178 hours <br />1.058201e-4 weeks <br />2.4352e-5 months <br /> total, or 75% of the time. Wilson, ff. Tr. 25,481, at 2-3.

However , when this time is broken down into the four exam days and the two rooms in which the examinees sat, it is likely that while the smokers room was proctored very close to 100% of the time on Tuesday and Wednesday (Set "A" of the RO and SRO exams), the nonsmokers room was not proctored for one and a half hours each of those two mornings, because Mr. Wilson, the examiner / proctor assigned to that room, was reviewing the exam questions with Licensee staff, as discussed in 11 217-19, supra. Tr. 25,508-09, 25,558-59 (Wilson). Similarly, while the nonsmokers room was proctored by Messrs. Maines and Young for 7 to 8 out of the 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> on Thursday and by Messrs. Maines-and Wilson 4 to 5 1/2 hours out of the 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> on Friday (Set "B" of the RO and SRO exams), the smokers room was proctored by Mr. Wilson for only 2 out of the 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> on Thursday, and 1 out of the 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> on Friday, while the detailed exam reviews were ongoing, as discussed at i 220, supra. Tr. 25,558-59, 25,579, 25,501-02, 25,579-85 (Wilson). In sum, not only were the examinations not fully proctored because proctors left to take short breaks, but the rooms were unproctored for significant periods of time, particularly with respect to the smoker's room during the Set "B" exams.

390. The exam question and answer review process which detracted Mr. Wilson from his proctoring duties on

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Thursday and Friday morning was conducted in cn inctructor's office immediately adjacent to the room Mr. Wilson was proc-toring. Tr. 25,502 (Wilson). While doors to both rooms were open and Mr. Wilson could get up at an}- time, and did so a number of times during the Thursday and Friday exams, Mr.

Wilson acknowledged that it would-have been unlikely that he would have heard whispering, seen papers exchanged or crib notes used from his location in the adjacent room. Tr.

25,502-04, 25,512-13 (Wilson). In addition to the subordina-tion of Mr. Wilson's proctoring duties to his exam review responsibilities, Mr. Maines did not proctor for periods of time on Thursday and Friday because he was receiving a health physics indoctrination in order to tour the facility -- part of his orientation, as he was new to Three Mile Island. Wilson, ff. Tr. 25,481, at 3; Tr. 25,502, 25,504-08 (Wilson).

391. Mr. Wilson testified that in the eight years that he had administered operator license exams at licensee facilities, it is probable that he has been absent from the examination room on at least one occasion for virtually a whole day. Tr. 25,511 (Wilson). In other words, the proctoring situation at TMI in April of 1981 does not appear to have been atypical, other than the large number of candidates taking the exams.- Consistent with Mr. Wilson's views, Mr. Kelly, Licensee's consultant who worked for many years as an NRC examiner, stated that the Staff viewed proctoring.primarily as a means by which examinees could have questions answered, rather than a safeguarding function. Tr. 24,898-99 (Kelly).

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392. Certainly the cheating which took place on the April, 1981 exams at TMI enunciated what should have been-apparent to the Staff before;-namely, that the risk associated with partial proctoring of examinations upon which the Staff places-such significance is too great to ignore. As a result of this realization, the Staff changed its procedure, as reflected in ES-201, Rev. 3. See Staff Ex. 30. Among other things, ES-201, Rev. 3 requires that 100% proctoring be maintained throughout the conduct of NRC operator license examinations. In addition, candidates are advised that (i) cheating on the examinations means an automatic denial of their application, and could result in more severe penalties; (ii) candidate signatures are required verifying that the work has been done by the candidate, and that he has received no assistance in completing the examination; (iii) all scrap paper must be turned in with the examination; and (iv) upon complet-ing the exams, he must leave the general area, as defined by the examiner, and if he is found in this area while the exam is still in progress, his application may be denied. See Staff Ex. 30, at 15-16.

393. While the previous proctoring procedures used by the Staf f were inadequate, we find that the new exam administration procedures, outlined above, will ensure that during the examination process, the integrity of the exams are not. compromised. We are also satisfied that the procedures utilized by the Staff-to secure the exam prior to its

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l administration, which include writing, typing and reproducing the exams in NRC controlled office spaces which require i

appropriate identification or keycard for entry, and review of

, the exam by facility personnel only after candidates have begun j taking the exam, are sufficient. Boger, ff. Tr. 25,480, at 5; Tr. 25,536-37 (Boger).

394. The operator license examinations given at TMI in-October, 1981 utilized the Staff's new exam procedures on grading and exam administration, Examiner's Standards ES-109 and ES-201, Rev. 3, Staff Exs. 25 and 30. Collins, ff. Tr.

25,113, at 1-5; Tr. 25,129 (Collins). Specifically, x

arrangements were made with four professors from Pennsylvania State University, Capitol Campus, to proctor examinations.

l Collins, ff. Tr. 25,113, at 1-2. Only one' exam room'was utilized. Wilson, ff. Tr. 25,481, at-4. The proctors were in-1 the room when the examiner passed out the examination to the

.j -

j. candidates and listened to the instructions given, including-1 admonitions regarding cheating. Collins, ff. Tr. 25,113, at .

2. The exams were 100% proctored, and proctors had no concur-i i

rent duties. Only one candidate was allowed out of the exam room at a time, and proctors made a log of absences. Id. At I

the conclusion of the examination, the proctors assured all paper was turned in. Id.

i 395. The October RO exams were graded by NRC consultants who wrote the exams from Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory, using the one question or section at a time

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technique. Id. at 3. The October. SRO exams were graded by NRC examiners in the Operator Licensing Branch's headquarters office. Id. at 3. All examinations were reviewed by-Operator Licensing Branch supervision, per Examiners' Standard ES-109, that-includes a review for cheating. Id.

396. The October exams were safeguarded prior to their administration in accordance with regular Staff proce-dures. Id..at 4.

397. The issue of the degree to which examination questions repeat themselves from license exam to exam was discussed at length by all of the Operator Licensing Branch staff witnesses. See Collins, ff. Tr. 25,113, at 5; Boger, ff.

Tr. 25,480, at 5; Tr. 25,138 (Collins); Tr. 25,537 (Boger); Tr.

25,585-90 (Wilson). Again, our interest in this subject focused on whether TMI-l candidates who took the exam in April or, more importantly, in October, could have memorized.the answers to prior exams and through this technique, passed the exams.

398. There is a conscious effort not to repeat exam questions from exam to exam at a given facility. Tr. 25,537 (Boger). Nevertheless, some questions will reappear, particu-larly with regard to concepts and systems that are important enough to be covered on every exam. Boger, ff. Tr. 25,480, at

5. While the witnesses had difficulty assigning a percentage to the number of questions which could have been available to TMI-l candidates prior to the April exams, Mr. Wilson thought

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the percentage would be quite small because of the site specific nature of the exam. Tr. 25,585 (Wilson). In compar-ing the October examinations with all examinations administered since April of 1981 at B&W-designed facilities, Mr. Collins determined that less than 4% of the questions on the two RO and SRO exams given at TMI-l in October were similar to questions given at these other f acilities. Collins, ff. Tr. 25,113, at 5.

399. Finally, the Staff presented testimony on the nature of the oral examination process, describing its purpose, how oral exams typically are conducted, the ef fore 's to minimiz-ing " coaching" by one oral examinee of the next examinee, and the grading method used by the Staff. Boget, ff. Tr. 25,480, at 7-12.

400. The four to six hour oral exam focuses on the candidate's ability to read and interpret the control instru-mentation of the facility and to manipulate the control equipment in a safe and competent manner, along with his knowledge of how to operate the facility, including under emergency conditions, and his knowledge of radiological safety practices and the purpose and function of radiation monitoring equipment. Id. at 7-8. Each candidate is evaluated by an examiner in a one-on-one situation. Id. at 8. The candidates responses are evaluated and recorded on an Operator Examination Report, See Staff Ex. 31, which indicates whether each answer is satisfactory, marginal or unsatisfactory. Id. at 8, 11-12.

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401. The examiner spends time with the candidate exploring the candidate's knowledge of reactivity effects.

theory of operation, and radiation protection practices and procedures. Id. The major portion of the exam is conducted in the control room, where the candidate's ability to read, interpret and operate equipment under normal and abnormal conditions is demonstrated. Id. at 8-9. From two to eight transients are. postulated, to which the candidate must respond, along with four or five equipment malfunction incidents. Tr.

25,541, 25,642 (Boger). Effort is made to vary exams given on consecutive days in order to minimize coaching. Tr. 25,541-43 (Boger).

402. In sum, while a candidate can anticipate questions in a given area, the specific questions are unknown to him, and the oral exam will vary between candidates, with different subject areas probed during the exam. Boger, ff. Tr.

25,480, at 10-11.

403. In the Staff's view, the October written and oral examination results constitute a valid test of TMI-l operator license candidates knowledge. Tr. 25,676 (Wilson).

We concur in this opinion. There was absolutely no evidence of cheating on the October examinations. As one operator obser-ved, "I do not think Houdini could have cheated on that exam."

Tr. 25,995 (Mr. 00).

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C. The NRC Staff's Review of the Category T Exams 404. The Staff decision that individual licensees, and not the Staff, would administer the Category T requirement was made by Mr. Denton or Mr. Case of NRR. Tr. 25,152 (Collins). The Operating License Branch reviewed and found satisfactory the Kelly Category T test, but the Category T makeup tests had not been approved when the cheating investiga-tions began in July and August of 1981. Tr. 25,635-36 (Boger).

At that time, Licensee unilaterally had decided to nullify the results of the makeup Category T exams, thus requiring all individuals who did not pass the original Category T section of the Kelly exam or who did not take that exam to be re-examined on Category T. Arnold, ff. Tr. 23,590, at 8; Tr. 25,172-73 (Blake).

405. In assessing the validity of Licensee's most recent Category T examinations given in November, 1981, the Staff determined whether these tests are equivalent in subject matter and difficulty to exams given at other facilities, and ensured that the subjects outlined by the Commission in CLI-79-8, Order Item le, were adequately covered. Boger, ff.

Tr. 25,480, at 4; Tr. 25,533 (Boger). This review essentially has been completed; as Mr. Boger testified, the exams were found satisfactory, but the Staff had not yet formally so advised Licensee. Brown, ff. Tr. 24,695, at 1-2; Tr. 25,534, 25,635 (Boger).

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406. Clearly, the Staff has decided that its already overly stretched manpower in the Operator Licensing Branch, see Tr. 25,575-79 (Wilson), should not be used to focus in detail on the Category T examinations. Thus, for example, the Staff did not review the makeup Category T examinations given between 1980 and November of 1981. Tr. 25,636 (Boger). Obviously, then, the Staff was unaware of the redundant questions asked on two of these makeup quizzes. Tr. 25,533 (Boger). Recognizing the resource problem, we cannot help but note that this management decision appears to be inconsistent with the significance placed on the Category T exams by the Commission.

As a general matter, we note the consistent testimony of NRC Operator License Branch personnel that they are undermanned.

See Tr. 25,575-79 (Wilson); Tr.25,637 (Boger). We, ourselves, and the Special- Master experienced 'some frustrations with delays in responding to our requests which are attributable to heavy workloads in this branch of the Staff. In view of the importance of this area, we specifically recommend that the Staff take stock of its resources, and reassess the potential for increased manning of the Operator Licensing Branch of NRR.

VI. SHIFT STAFFING AT TMI-l 407. The standard for shif t manning at TMI-l was reviewed at length earlier in these proceedings. See PID 11556-578. The result of this review was a detailed, specific commitment on staffing by Licensee. See PID 1583(9). The

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question at issue in the reopened hearing was whether those commitments could be met.

408. Mr. Hukill reiterated Licensee's commitment to meet the shif t staf fing requirements to which it agreed and which are incorporated in the PID as license Condition 9.

Hukill, ff. Tr. 23,913, at 17; Tr. 24,075 (Hukill). This may not be easy for Licensee, in light of the October examina tion results, which resulted in only 11 reactor operator licenses, and 10 senior reactor operator licenses, the latter category including six individuals who do not regularly serve as members of the operating crew. See Staff Ex. 32.

409. We are aware of the fact that a number of candidates failed only one category of the written exam, or passed the written but failed the oral exam, and thus have the opportunity to make up the " dropped" section in a fairly short time-frame, without having to retake the entire exam. Tr.

25,516-23 (Wilson). Nevertheless, in view of the Staff's reluctance to allow licensees to use management personnel to fill out the shifts, see Crocker, ff. Tr. 25,062-63, at 5, it certainly is possible that Licensee will be unable to meet its shift staffing commitment in the near future.

410. Licensee's ability to meet its shift staffing commitment is an evolving situation, even in the short term, dependent upon termination or re-examinations, for example.

The Staff has stated that it-will evaluate the acceptability of Licensee's shift manning on a case-by-case basis, and will

-210-

reach a determination at a. specific time on the adequacy of Licensee's shift staffing capability. Crocker, ff. Tr.

25,062-63, at 5; Tr. 25,077 (Crocker). In the longer term, Licensee is making efforts to increase the number of licensed operators at TMI-1, witn five additional control room operators currently in training, and efforts underway to increase its manning levels. Hukill, ff. Tr. 23,913, at 17. We conclude simply that compliance with Condition 9 of the PID is suffi-cient to ensure requisite minimum staffing of TMI-l upon restart. We look to the Staff, as that Condition contemplates, to demand strict compliance with the specific commitments by Licensee for shift staffing. _ . .

VII. FACTUAL

SUMMARY

411. We reopened the record in this proceeding in - ,

order to determine what impact the discovery of cheating on the April, 1981 NRC operator license exams given at TMI-l would have on our previous management findings of fact and conclu- ,

sions of law. Although the evidence brought to light during this fairly lengthy reopened proceeding indicates failings in the administration of tests on the part of Licensee and of the_

Staff of which we were not previously aware, we see no cause to disturb our previous findings and conclusions regarding Licensee's overall management capability. We do not find, -

based on the record in this reopened proceeding, evidence of a any inherent disregard or lack of respect by this Licensee for

-211-w +

7

-m - -

4 the responsibilities every licensee in this technology must exercise. To the extent we are aware of past shortcomings in Licensee's and the Staff's approach to the administration of tests,'we address those failings in these findings and conclu-sions.

412. The ' evidence supports the view that cheating was not an accepted practice at TMI-l nor promoted, encouraged or condoned.by Licensee. management. We conclude management was not involved in cheating.

413. We do have a number of rather serious criti-cisms of Licensee, and of the Staff:

a. We conclude Licensee's failure to have adequately proctored its examinations, particularly weekly quizzes, was a serious oversight, although one which is not incomprehensible in view of the overall organization upheaval at TMI-l in the past two years, the focus of the training department'on restructuring the programs they administered, and the general assumption that honesty was demanded and required, based on management's (e.g.,

Messrs. Arnold and Hukill) past experience. We fault the

_S,ta f f , too, for this shortcoming, which in our view requires minor attention in contrast to the trouble which the absence of proctoring can cause, as we now well know.

"w b. While we doubt that the TMI training s s department understood the confusion among operators that existed as to the method by which exams and quizzes should

- s / ,e i

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be taken at TMI, nevertheless, this confusion existed, and for this we again fault Licensee.

c. Licensee's failure to formalize its certification procedures for NRC license exam candidates was inappropriate.

d. We fault Licensee particularly for its re-certification of an individual in 1979 without simulta-neously informing the Staf f of the individual's misconduct in handing in an examination taken in part by another licensed operator. In this regard we find instructive of the current management attitude, the forthcoming dis-closure of this incident by Licensee to the Staff at the beginning of the 1981 cheating incident investigation.

414. While some of the rumors concerning individuals which surf aced during OIE's and Licensee's investi-gations have not been fully resolved, we do not believe they can be. Rumors by their nature are elusive. We conclude that further pursuit of these matters would not be. a fruitful use of

/ Staff or Licensee resources. We are satisfied that the Staff's and Licensee's investigations vere thorough. Most importantly, we are satisfied that the evidence establishes not only that Licensee's management was not involved in any way in the discovered incidences of cheating at TMI, but that it vigor-ously pursue'd all/ instances of cheating or possible cheating it unco ered and promptly alerted NRC of them. Licensee also has ftaken appropria'te individ'al-disciplinary u action where

- ' circumstances warranted.

b

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l

415. We find that Licensee did not intend to constrain the NRC's investigations into cheating at TMI-1, and that the OIE investigations did not suffer from Licensee management's attendance at interviews during the initial investigation.

416. With respect to Licensee management capabil-ity, while we find there to have been several past failures, we conclude that management was not negligent. In reaching this conclusion we take into account the circumstances existent at TMI in the past two years, the significant effort by Licensee on all fronts to correct management-related shortcomings, and management's acknowledgement of its mistakes, including its willingness and ability to rapidly correct problems with which it has been confronted.

417. Given the new training and certification administrative procedures in effect at-TMI, and the Staff's new exam administration procedures, we conclude that the training and testing program for Licensee's operators is adequate. In this' regard, we direct the Staff periodically to conduct reviews of Licensee's implementation of its procedures to assure they are implemented in accordance with Licensee's documented commitments.

418. We are satisfied with Licensee's staffing commitment, set forth-in the PID at 1 583(9).

I

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VIII. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 419. In accordance with the Commission Orders CLI-79-8, CLI-80-5, and CLI-81-3, the Licensing Board's PID and our September 14, 1981 Memorandum and Order reopening the TMI-1 restart proceeding on matters related to cheating, and based on the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence of record in this reopened proceeding and the foregoing findings of fact, the Board concludes:

a. That the conclusions of law included in the PID remain in full force and effect;

b. That Licensee's operator training and testing program, in combination with the Staff's operator licensing procedures provide reasonable ,

assurance that TMI-l will be operated safely.

Respectfully submitted, SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE N d Ndf.

George F. Trowbridge Ernest L. Blake, Jr.

Bonnie S. Gottlieb Deborah B. Bauser Counsel for Licensee 1800 M Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 822-1000

-215-

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

)

METROPOLITAN FDISON COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-289 SP

) (Restart)

(Three Mile Island Nuclear ) (Reopened Proceeding)

Station, Unit No. 1) )

APPENDICES TO LICENSEE'S PROPOSED FINDINGS APPENDIX A: INDEX OF WRITTEN TESTIMONY AND DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE APPENDIX B: INDEX OF EXHIBITS APPENDIX C: KEY TO LETTER DESIGNATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS r

l

, - - 1

APPENDIX A WRITTEN TESTIMONY RECEIVED INTO EVIDENCE Following Witness Transcript Page Arnold, Robert C.

" Licensee's Testimony of Robert C. Arnold" 23,590 l (dated Movember 3, 1981)

Boger, Bruce A.

"NRC Staff Testimony of Bruce A. Boger 25,480 Regarding the Adequacy of Staff's Ad-ministration of its Examinations (Issues 9, 10, and 12)" (dated November 3, 1981)

Brown, Nelson D.

" Licensee's Testimony of Samuel L. Newton, 24,640 l

and Nelson D. Brown" (dated November 3, 1981)

" Licensee's Additional Direct Testimony of 24,695 Nelson D. Brown Concerning the November 1981 Category T Exam" (dated November 18, 1981)

Collins, Paul F.

"NRC Staff Testimony of Paul F. Collins 25,109 Regarding the Adequacy of Staf f's Administra-tion of its Examinations (Issues 2 and 10)"

. (dated November 3, 1981) 1 "NRC Staff Testimony of Paul F. Collins 25,113 Regarding the Adequacy of Staff's Administra-tion of its Examinations" (dated November 16, 1981)

Crocker, Lawrence P.

" Testimony of Lawrence P. Crocker Relating 25,062-to the Adequacy of Staf fing at TMI-1 25,063 (Issue No. 11)" (dated November 3, 1981)

A-1

" Testimony of Lawrence P. Crocker Relating 25,081 to Adequacy of Licensee Response to Cheating Incident (Issue No. 8)" (dated November 3, 1981)

Hukill, Henry D.

" Licensee's Testimony of Henry D. Hukill" 23,913 (dated November 3, 1981)

Kelly, Frank L.

" Licensee's Testimony of Frank L. Kelly" 24,894 (dated November 3, 1981)

Long, Robert L.

" Licensee's Testimony of Robert L. Long" 24,925 (dated November 3, 1981)

Miller, Gary P.

" Licensee's Testimony of Gary P. Miller" 24,358 (dated November 3, 1981)

Molholt, Bruce

" Aamod t Testimony of Dr. Bruce Molholt" 25,185 r ' ,. ;.

Newton, Samuel L. [y ?

" Licensee's Testimony of Samuel L. Newton, 24,640 3 ;c and Nelson D. Brown" (dated November 3, 1981) S Resner, Mark E.

" Testimony of Mark E. Resner Relative to 25,035 the OIA Investigation (Issue 2)"

(dated November 3, 1981)

Ross, Michael J.

" Licensee's Testimony of Michael J. Ross" 24,127 (dated November 3, 1981)

Trunk, Edward V.

" Licensee's Testimony of Edward V. Trunk" 24,831 (dated November 3, 1981)

A-2

Ward , William J.

" Testimony of William J. Ward Relating to OIE 25,274 Investigations (Issues 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7)"

(dated November 3, 1981)

Wilson, Bruce A.

"NRC Staff Testimony of Bruce A. 25,481 Wilson Regarding the Adequacy of Staff's Administration of its Examinations (Issue 10)" (dated November 3, 1981 Wilson, John F.

" Licensee's Testimony of John F. Wilson" 24,478 (dated November 3, 1981)

I):

se h$

kI) e I

A-3

DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE INCORPORATED INTO RECORD Following Description Transcript Page Letter dated October ,1981, from R. C. Arnold 23,590 regarding GPU Nuclear policy on the relation-ship with regulatory agencies and. providing guidelines on same Letter dated October 5, 1981, from H. D. Hukill 23,913 regarding the role of regulatory requirements in the conduct of (GPU Nuclear] activities Diagram of training facility as in April,1981 24,152 Resume, Gary P. Miller 24,358 Nelson B. Brown, Statement of Qualifications 24,640 Written Examination Certification Cover Sheet 24,695 Grades for November, 1981 Category T Exam 24,695 Do's and Don'ts For Exams 24,894 Qualifications Statement, Mark Eric Resner 25,035

Lawrence P. Crocker, Professional Qualifications 25,062-25,063 Lawrence P. Crocker, Professional Qualifications 25,081 Paul F. Collins, Chief Operator Licensing Branch, 25,109 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (Resume)

Resume, Dr. Bruce Molholt 25,185 Qualifications Brief, William Joseph Ward 25,274 Qualifications Brief, Peter Edward Baci 25,274 Qualifications Brief, Edward C. Gilbert 25,274 Professional Qualifications List, Bruce A. Boger 25,480 Bruce A. Wilson, Professional Qualifications 25,481 A-4

APPENDIX B EXHIBITS EXHIBIT IDENTIFIED AT ADMITTED AT NUMBER DESCRIDTLt TRANSCRIPT PAGE TRANSCRIPT PAGE Licensee Ex. 60 Replacement Operator Train- 24,641 24,642 ing Program Description, TMI-l Licensee Ex. 61 Senior Reactor Operator Re- 24,641 24,642 l

placement Training Program l Description, TMI-l Licensee Ex. 62 Licensed Operator Requalifi- 24,641 24,642 cation Training Program Description, TMI-l ,

l Licensee Ex. 63 Summary of Primary TMI-1 24,644 24,645 l

Operator Exams given since March 28, 1979, Rev. 1 Licensee Ex. 64 Summary of Grades of 24,645 24,646 l Primary TMI-l Operators Exams given since March 28, 1979 l

B-1 i l

I

EXHIBIT IDENTIFIED AT ADMITTED AT NUMBER DESCRIPTION TRANSCRIPT PAGE TRANSCRIPT PAGE Licensee Ex. 65 Training Assignment 24,659 24,660

[ Administrative Form (Section T Makeup Exam),

(Individual EE)

I Licensee Ex. 66A Unit 1 Requal Training, 24,682 24,686 Week No. 2, Cycle 7-5, Test, dated Nov. 2, 1980 (Individual G)

Licensee Ex. 66B Unit 1 Requal Training, 24,682 24,686 Week No. 2, Circle 7-5 ,

Test, dated Nov. 2, 1980 (

(Individual H)

Licensee Ex. 66C Test entitled TMI-2 24,682 24,686 Lessons Learned, dated June 25, 1981 l (Individual G)

Licensee Ex. 66D Test entitled TMI-2 24,683 24,686 l

Lessons Learned, dated June 25, 1981 (Individual II) l Licensee Ex. 66E Training Assignment 24,683 24,686 Administrative Form (Section T Makeup Exam),

(Individual G)

Licensee Ex. 66F Training Assignment 24,683 24,686 Administrative Form B-2

EXHIBIT IDENTIFIED AT- ADMITTED AT NUMBER DESCRIPTION TRANSCRIPT PAGE TRANSCRIPT PAGE (Section T Makeup Exam), .'

(Individual H)

Licensee Ex. 66G Unit 1 Requal Training, 24,684 24,686 Week No. 2, Cycle 7-6 Test, dated Nov. 26, 1980 (Individual H)

Licensee Ex. 66H Unit 1 Requal Training, 24,684 24,686  !

Week No. 2, Cycle 7-6 Test, dated Nov. 26, 1980 (Individual G) 4 Licensee Ex. 66I Unit 1 Requal Training, 24,685 24,686 Week No. 5, Cycle 7-6 Test, dated Dec. 19, 1980 (Individual S)

Licensee Ex. 66 Unit 1 Requal Training, 24,685 24,686 l Week No. 5, Cycle 7-6 i Test, dated Dec. 19, l 1980 (Individual Y) l l l Licensee Ex. 66K Unit 1 Requal Training, 24,685 24,686  !

Week No. 5, Cycle 7-6 Tust, dated Dec. 19, 1980 (Individual MM) l B-3 l

EXHIBIT IDENTIFIED AT ADMITTED AT NUMBER DESCRIPTION TRANSCRIPT PAGE TRANSCRIPT PAGE Licensee Ex. 66L Unit 1 Requal Training, 24,686 24,686 Week No. 5, Cycle 7-6 Test, dated Dec. 19, 1980 (Individual W)

Licensee Ex. 66M Unit 1 Requal Training, 24,686 24,686 Week No. 5, Cycle 7-6 Test, dated Dec. 19, 1980 (Individual GG)

Licensee Ex. 67A POS Corporation, RO 24,690 24,692 License Examination (Section T)

Licensee Ex. 67B Unit 1 Requal Training, 24,690 24,692 Week No. 1, Cycle 7-6 Test Licensee Ex. 67C- Unit 1 Requal Training, 24,690 24,692 Week No. 2, Cycle 7-6

[ Test Licensee Ex. 67D Unit 1 Requal Training, 24,691 24,692 l Week No. 3, Cycle 7-6 l I

l Test Licensee Ex. 67E Unit 1 Requal Training, 24,691 24,692 l Week No. 4, Cycle 7-6 Test Licensee Ex. 67F Unit 1 Requal Training, 24,691 24,692 Week No. 5, Cycle 7-6 Test B-4

EXHIBIT IDENTIFIED AT ADMITTED AT NUMBER DESCRIPTION TRANSCRIPT PAGE TRANSCRIPT PAGE Licensee Ex. 67G Unit 1 Requal Training, 24,692 24,692 Week No. 3, Cycle 7-6 Test, Round Two, Cat T Makeup Licensee Ex. 68A Cycle 7-5 Answer Key 24,693 24,693 Exam No. 2 Licensee Ex. 68B Answer Key, Cat T 24,693 24,693 Makeup, Rounds 1 and 2 Licensee Ex. 68C Answer Key, Cat T 24,693 24,693 Makeup, Round 3 Licensee Ex. 69A Written Exam Certification 24,794 24,796 Cover Sheet, attaching Cat T test answer key (administered on November 2, 1981)-

Licensee Ex. 69B Written Exam Certification 24,795 24,796 l Cover Sheet, attaching.

handwritten Category T Makeup Test and answer key -

(administered on November 6, 1981)

Licensee Ex. 69C Handout entitled TMI 24,795 24,796 Lessons Learned as l Applied to a Pressurized -

Water Reactor Plant; l Lesson Objectives 1

B-5

EXHIBIT IDENTIFIED AT ADMITTED AT NUMBER DESCRIPTION TRANSCRIPT PAGE TRANSCRIPT PAGE Licensee Ex. 69D Instructor's notes used 24,796 14,796 during preparation for November, 1981 Category T l exam j Licensee Ex. 70A Letter dated Sept. 2, 24,832- 24,835 1981 from Trunk and Miller 24,833 to J. Wilson (first Trunk Report)

Lic0nsee Ex. 70B Letter dated Sept. 7, 24,834 24,835 1981 from Trunk to Wilson Licensee Ex. 70C Letter dated Sept. 21, 24,834 24,835 1981 from Trunk and Miller to J. Wilson (second Trunk Report) l Licensee Ex. 70D Letter dated Oct. 1, 1981 24,835 24,835 l from Trunk and Miller to l J. Wilson (third l Trunk Report) l Licensee Ex. 70E Letter dated Oct. 14, 1981 24,835 24,835 l

from Trunk and Miller to J. Wilson (fourth Trunk Report)

Licensee Ex. 71 Radiation Protection 24,926 24,928 ,

Examination Answer Sheet l for H. Williams dated l April 28, 1979 l

B-6 ,

EXHIBIT IDENTIFIED AT ADMITTED AT NUMBER DESCRIPTION TRANSCRIPT PAGE TRANSCRIPT PAGE f

Licensee Ex. 72 Licensee's Testimony of 24,927 24,928 R. Long attaching Radia-l tion Protection Exam answer sheets Licensee Ex. 73 Administration of Exam- 24,927 24,928

inations - No. 6200-ADM 2600.1 dated Oct. 20, 1981

, Licensee Ex. 74 Application for Employ- 24,992 ment dated January 16, 1979 - H. Williams 1 Licensee Ex. 75 Application for Employ- 24,994 ment dated April 3, 1978 H. Williams 1

Licensee Ex. 76 Guard Orientation Infor- 25,009 mation from Gregg Security i Services Licensee Ex. 77 Excerpt from H. Williams 25,010 manuscript reprinted in Paxton Herald Newspaper-

"TMI Guard Talks about

Cheating" 1 '

Licensee Ex. 78 Excerpt from H. Williams 25,014 manuscript reprinted in 2 Paxton Herald Newspaper-

" Harry Williams Tells it All" B-7 4

EXHIBIT IDENTIFIED AT ADMITTED AT DESCRIPTION TRANSCRIPT PAGE TRANSCRIPT PAGE NUMBER Licensee Ex. 79 Excerpt from H. Williams 25,015 manuscript reprinted in Paxton Herald newspaper-

"The Truth about TMI" Affidavit of S. Newton 25,262 25,262 Licensee Ex. 80 dated Nov. 30, 1981, and attached requalification training hours for operators Graph showing comparison of 25,568 25,570 Licensee Ex. 81A l base monthly salary percent-I age increases of VV, MMM and EE from July, 1979 to Nov.,

l 1981 1

Chart showing comparison of 25,568 25,570 l

Licensee Ex. 81B base monthly salary percent-age increases of VV, MMM and EE from July, 1979 to Nov.,

1981 26,334 26,335 Licensee Ex. 82A Description of the Rosemont Pressure Transmitter Description of Bourdon tube 26,334 26,335 Licensee Ex. 82B pressure sensor and Trans-mitter Seating arrangement for 26,894 26,895 Licensee Ex. 83 April NRC RO and SRO exams B-8

EXHIBIT IDENTIFIED AT ADMITTED AT NUMBER DESCRIPTION TRANSCRIPT PAGE TRANSCRIPT PAGE Licensee Ex. 84 Shift watch on April 21, 22, 26,895 26,895 23, and 24.

Licensee Ex. 85 Chart showing employment 26,896 26,896 history and education for individuals at TMI-l who sat for NRC exams in 1981 l

B-9 L_

EXHIBIT IDENTIFIED AT ADMITTED AT NUMBER DESCRIPTION TRANSCRIPT PAGE TRANSCRIPT PAGE TMIA Ex. 51 Interoffice memo dated 23,670 23,673 Aug. 11, 1981 from R. Arnold to A. Brinkman concerning Mr. O's ter-mination TMIA Ex. 52 Interoffice memo dated 23,670 23,673 Aug. 11, 1981 from R. Arnold to A. Brinkman concerning Mr. W's ter-mination TMIA Ex. 53 Memorandum dated 23,735 Aug. 8, 19",9 from G. Miller to R. Arnold re:

VV discipline TMIA Ex. 54 Memorandum dated Aug. 23,773 23,778 20, 1979 from G. Miller to distribution list re:

VV assignment to GPU Accident Investigation Documentation Group TMIA Ex. 55 Interoffice memo dated 23,917 23,921 July 29, 1981 from H. Hukill to J. Wilson (Hukill notes of July 27, 1981 I&E interview of in-dividual W)

B-10

EXHIBIT IDENTIFIED AT ADMITTED AT NUMBER DESCRIPTION TRANSCRIPT PAGE TRANSCRIPT PAGE I

TMIA Ex. 56 Interoffice memo dated July 23,917 23,921 29, 1981 from H. Hukill to J. Wilson (Hukill notes of July 29, 1981 I&E interview of individual S) i TMIA Ex. 57 Interoffice memo dated July 23,918 23,921 30, 1981 from H. Hukill to J. Wilson (Hukill notes of July 28, 1981 I&E interview of individual EE)

TMIA Ex. 58 Interoffice memo dated July. 23,918 23,921 30, 1981 from H. Hukill to J. Wilson (Hukill notes of July 29, 1981 I&E interview of individual 00)

TMIA Ex. 59 Interoffice memo dated July 23,919 23,921 30, 1981 from H. Hukill to J. Wilson (Hukill notes of July 29, 1981 I&E interview of individual Q)

TMIA Ex. 60 Form letter dated Oct. 5, 23,933 23,934 1981 from H. Hukill attach-

, ing handwritten notes entitled Operator Interviews TMIA Ex. 61 Handdrawn diagram of 24,151 24,152 training facility as it existed at time of April, 1981 NRC exams B-ll

EXHIBIT IDENTIFIED AT ADMITTED AT NUMBER DESCRIPTION TRANSCRIPT PAGE TRANSCRIPT PAGE TMIA Ex. 62 Handwritten note dated 24,361 24,361 July 3, from G. Miller to J. Herbein concerning indivdual VV incident TMIA Ex. 63 Handwritten document dated 24,364 24,364 July 5, initialed by G.

(G. Miller notes on in-dividual VV's training status)

TMIA Ex. 64 Handwritten document dated 24,366 24,366 I

July 23 (G. Miller notes l on individual VV's train-ing from August 1977 to July 1979)

TMIA Ex. 65 Memorandum dated May 14, 24,376 24,.377 1979 from M. Ross to Licensed Personnel attaching AP 1006 TMIA Ex. 66 Memorandum dated July 10, 24,380 24,380 1979 from R. Zechman to G.

l Miller re: individual VV's participation in the 1977-78 requalificat_an program TMIA Ex. 67 FSR makeup exam for in- 24,391 24,392 dividual VV (Category H l (K))

B-12 l

l 1 -- -

m _ _ _ . . _ _ . , . . . .

EXHIBIT IDENTIFIED AT ADMITTED AT NUMBER DESCRIPTION TRANSCRIPT PAGE TRANSCRIPT PAGE TMIA Ex. 68 FSR makeup exam for in- 24,391 24,392 dividual VV (Category G (G&I))

t TMIA Ex. 69 FSR makeup exam for in- 24,392 24,392 dividual VV (Category E)

TMIA Ex. 70 FSR makeup exam for in- 24,392 24,392 dividual VV (Category A (A,H))

TMIA Ex. 71 Memorandum dated July 27, 24,405 24,405 1979 from G. Miller to J. Herbein concerning i July, 1979 incident in- i volving individual VV l TMIA Ex. 72 Memorandum dated July 6, 24,409 24,409  ;

1979 from R. Zechman to individual VV describing accelerated training pro-gram and enclosing in-structor's answer key and individual VV's exam from l training TMIA Ex. 73 Draft of letter from 24,413 24,413 G. Miller to P. Collins (NRC) re: individual VV's recertification B-13

EXHIBIT IDENTIFIED AT ADMITTED AT NUMBER DESCRIPTION TRANSCRIPT PAGE TRANSCRIPT PAGE TMIA Ex. 74 Letter from G. Miller 24,417 24,418 to P. Collins (NRC) re:  ;

individual VV's recer-tification TMIA Ex. 75 Attorney Work Product, 24,498 24,498 Privileged and Confidential, re: individual G and in-dividual H Category T quizzes (J.F. Wilson and R.D. Lloyd report) l l

TMIA Ex. 76 Attorney Work Product, 24,499 24,500 l Privileged and Confidential, re: S and Y Category T quizzes (J.F. Wilson and R.D.

Lloyd report) s TMIA Ex. 77 ' Training Assignment Admin- 24,500 24,500 istrative Form (excerpt from Section T Makeup Exam), individual G TMIA Ex. 78 Training Assignment Admin- 24,500 24,503 istrative Form (excerpt from Section T Makeup Exam), individual H TMIA Ex. 79 Unit 1 Requalification 24,500 24,503 Training, Week No. 2, Cycle 7-6, individual H TMIA Ex. 80 Unit 1 Requalification 24,501 24,503 l Training, Week No. 2, l Cycle 7-6, individual G B-14 l

l . . . . . _ .

EXHIBIT IDENTIFIED AT ADMITTED AT NUMBER DESCRIPTION TRANSCRIPT PAGE TRANSCRIPT PAGE TMIA Ex. 81 Unit 1 Requalification 24,501 24,503 Training, Week No. 5, Cycle 7-6, individual S TMIA Ex. 82 Unit 1 Requalification 24,501 24,503 Training, Week No. 5, Cycle 7-6, individual Y TMIA Ex. 83 Unit 1 Requalification 24,501 24,503 Training, Week No. 5, Lycle 7-6, individual W l l

TMIA E 84 Unit 1 Requalification 24,502 24,503 l Training, Week No. 5, l

Cycle 7-6, individual MM TMIA Ex. 85 Unit 1 Requalification 24,502 24,503 Training, Week No. 5, Cycle 7-6, individual GG TMIA Ex. 86 Test entitled TMI-2 24,502 24,503 Lessons Learned, indivi-dual H TMIA Ex. 87 Test entitled TMI-2 24,503 24,503 Lessons Learned, indivi-dual G TMIA Ex. 88 Listing of seating of 25,t64 candidates for the April 23, 1981 NRC RO "B" exam B-15 l

EXHIBIT IDENTIFIED AT ADMITTED AT NUMBER DESCRIPTION TRANSCRIPT PAGE TRANSCRIPT PAGE Aamodt Ex. 7 Transcription of notes 24,572 24,573 dated Aug. 28, 1981 by J. Wilson re: rumors involving individual NNN Aamodt Ex. 8 Transcription of notes 24,576 24,576 by J. Wilson re: rumors Aamodt Ex. 9 Grade Summary - Reactor 24,710 24,712 ,

Operator and Senior Reactor l Operator ATTS Audit Written  !

Examination (from Schile report) l Aamodt Ex. 10 Pgs. 4, 7, 8, 9, 12 and 24,725 24,726 13 from Schile report re:

weaknesses and strengths of examinees Aamodt Ex. 11 Aamodt Testimony of 25,034 rejected Mr. Harry E. Williams, Jr.

Aamodt Ex. 12 Memorandum dated Sept. 3, 25,396 25,396 1981 from T. Novak (NRC) to ASLB, Board Notification Aamodt Ex. 13 Excerpts from Licensee's 25,923 rejected Response to Aamodts' Follow-on Interrogatories of Licensee and from Licensee's Response to Aamodts' First Set of Discovery Requests of Licensee In Reopened Hearing

, of Cheating Incident B-16 w

EXHIBIT IDENTIFIED AT ADMITTED AT NUMBER DESCRIPTION TRANSCRIPT PAGE TRANSCRIPT PAGE Commonwealth Memorandum dated Sept. 1, 24,605 24,610 Ex. 8 1981 by J. Wilson re:

rumor chronology Commonwealth Memorandum to file dated 24,605 24,510 Ex. 9 Sept. 9, 1981 by J. Wilson re: U rumor l l

B-17

EXHIBIT IDENTIFIED AT ADMITTED AT NUMBER DESCRIPTION TRANSCRIPT PAGE TRANSCRIPT PAGE Staff Ex. 24 OIA Investigation Report 25,036- 25,036-dated July 31, 1981 25,037 25,037 Staff Ex. 25 ES-109, Rev. O (Draft) - 25,114 25,115 Operator Licensing Standard, Quality Assurance Program for Review of Graded Exams Staff Ex. 26 Aug. 11, 1981 " Report of 25,275 25,276 Investigation" by NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement Staff Ex. 27 Oct. 12, 1981 " Report of 25,276 25,277 Investigation" by NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement Staff Ex. 28 Oct. 28, 1981 " Report of 25,277 25,278 Investigation" by NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement Staff Ex. 29 Form ES-201, Rev. 2, 25,393 25,394 dated Feb. 15, 1969 re:

Administration of RO written exams Staff Ex. 30 Administration of Operator 25,482 25,484 Licensing Standard Written Exam, Reactor Operator -

ES-201, Rev. 3 (Draft) ^

Staff Ex. 31 NRC Form 157 - Operator 25,484 25,484 Examination Report B-18

EXHIBIT IDENTIFIED AT ADMITTED AT NUMBER DESCRIPTION TRANSCRIPT PAGE TRANSCRIPT PAGE Staff Ex. 32 Letter dated Nov. 30, 1981 25,489 25,490 from J. Goldberg (NRC) to I. Smith (ASLB) enclosing November 30, 1981 memo of TMI-l exam results Staff Ex. 33 Master A, NRC RO License 25,593 25,595 )

Exam dated April, 1981 Staff Ex. 34 Master A, NRC SRO License 25,593 25,595 I Exam dated April 22, 1981 Staff Ex. 35 April NRC RO License 25,6d0 25,601 Exam for individual EE, Categories A through H Staff Ex. 36 April NRC SRO License 25,600 25,601 Exam for individual EE, Categories I through N Staff Ex. 37A April, 1981 NRC RO exam of 25,832 25,836 individual X Staff Ex. 37B April, 1981 NRC RO exam of 25,833 25,836 individual U Staff Ex. 37C April, 1981 NRC RO exam of 25,833 25,836 individual GG Staff Ex. 37D April, 1981 NRC RO exam of 25,833 25,836 e individual BB l

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Staff Ex. 37E April, 1981 NRC RO exam of individual E 25,833 25,836 i

I B-19 l

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- EXHIBIT IDENTIFIED AT ADMITTED AT

- NUMBER DESCRIPTION TRANSCRIPT PAGE TRANSCRIPT PAGE 's Staff.Ex. 370' April, 1981 NRC RO exam of .25,836 . 25,836- s ,

individual B i Staff Ex. 37R april, 1981 NRC.RO exam.of 25,836 ~ 25,836.

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B-21 O

. . - . . - - - - . . . . . . . . . . ..i

APPENDIX C

-KEY TO LETTER DESIGNATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS Letter Position Name A Shift Supervisor B Shift Foreman C Control Room Operator D Control Room Operator E Shift Supervisor F Shift Supervisor G Control Room Operator ........ J. Banks H Control Room Operator ........ D. Mayhue I Shift Supervisor ............. B. Mehler L Control Room Operator O Shift Supervisor-(terminated)

P Shift Supervisor Q Control Room Operator R Control Room Operator S Shift Supervisor T Control Room Operator ........ R. Heilman U Shift Foreman V Control Rcom Operator (terminated)

W Shift Supervisor (terminated)

S Shift Foreman (terminated)

Y Control Room Operator Z Shift Foreman C-1

AA Control Room Operator GG Shift Foreman ............... D. A. Smith HH Control Room Operator (terminated) ............... V. Ruppert JJ Shift Technical Advisor KK Shift Technical Advisor ..... R. Lengel MM Shift Technical Advisor NN Control Room Operator (terminated) 00 Control Room Operator PP Shift Technical Advisor QQ Shift Technical Advi.sor RR Shift Technical Advisor SS Control Room Operator (terminated)

UU Control Room Operator VV Employee at TMI-2 WW Shift Technical Advisor ..... H. Crawford YY Employee at TMI-l TMI Project (terminated)

C-2

.