ML20041B601
| ML20041B601 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 02/22/1982 |
| From: | Baxter T METROPOLITAN EDISON CO., SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20041B598 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8202240338 | |
| Download: ML20041B601 (16) | |
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1 LIC 2/22/82 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
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METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY
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Docket No. 50-289
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(Restart)
(-Three Mile Island Nuclear
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Station, Unit No. 1)
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LICENSEE'S REPLY TO THE NRC STAFF'S RESPONSE TO LICENSING BOARD'S DIRECTIVE TO REPORT DETAILS OF ITS ENFORCEMENT PLAN IN THE FORM OF A SUPPL 3 MENTAL INITIAL DECISION In its December 14, 1981 Partial Initial Decision, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board directed the NRC Staff to report to the Board the details of its enforcement plan for implementing the Licensee commitments, Staff requirements and Board conditions.
The Board provided that the Staff's report should be in the form of a supplemental initial decision, and that any responses should be organized in a similar manner.
The Licensee was directed to respond, and the Board provided i
that other parties may respond to the Staff's report within 15 days following its service.
The Board directed that the report and responses should be limited to plant design, modifications, procedures, and separation issues.
See PID 1 1217.
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8202240338 820222 PDR ADOCK 05000289 0
Licensee herein submits the following response to the
" Staff's Response to Licensing Board's Directive to Report Details of its Enforcement Plan in the Form of a Supplemental Initial Decision," dated February 1, 1982.
Licensee's response is set forth as a reply to additional proposed findings of fact by the Staff and in the form of a section of a supplemental decision in which the Board addresses its reasons for modifying the Staff's proposal in some respects.
The main headings below (i.e.,
I, II.A, II.C and III) are taken from the Staff's report in order to identify here the subject of the reply.
I.
INTRODUCTION 1.
Licensee advanced one general comment which applies to all of the Staff's proposed license conditions, technical specifications, and restart certification items.
Licensee proposes that the Board direct the Staff to retain the parenthetical references to the Partial Initial Decision and/or the evidentiary record, which now accompany each item listed in the Staff 's repor t, in whatever future documents preserve and implement these requirements.
The purpose would be to ensure that any future questions about the scope and meaning of a requirement could be resolved with the benefit of the Board's discussion and at least some of the underlying record.
The Board does not know whether the Staff intended to retain these references, but we believe Licensee's suggestion has merit and the Board directs that the references be retained..
II.A.
LICENSE CONDITIONS / TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TO BE IMPOSED AT RESTART Control Room Design Review 2.
The Staff proposes prior to restart to include in the body of the license for TMI-l the following specific license condition:
Prior to startup following Cycle 6 refueling, the Licensee shall correct the deficiencies in the TMI-l control room that are identified in Items 3b, 3e, 3g, 4c and 10b of NUREG-0752 and its Supplement 1.
1.1 (See PID, 11 913 & 919, n.109).
Staff PF 2031.6.
Licensee has proposed that this condition be modified to eliminate Items 3b, 3e, 3g and 10b, as well as the reference to PID 1 919, n.109.
Licensee's basic complaint is that its commitment to address these items in a subsequent submission to the Staff has been translated into a requirement for unidentified corrections, that Licensee is being treated dif2erently than other operating reactors, and that there is no, basis for the schedule imposed.
The Board adopts Licensee's proposal for the following reasons.
3.
Items 3b, 3e and 3g are each addressed in Supplement 1 to NUREG-0752, the Staff's Control Room Design Review Report for TMI-1.
Item 3b states that the "(slet point knobs on Bailey controllers do not lock, and can be acci-dentally rotated."
Staff Ex. 15 at 3.
Item 39 states that
" Bailey controllers indicated demand signal rather than valve position."
Id. at 4.
In Supplement No. 1 to NUREG-0752, the.
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Staff discussed Licensee's corrective actions for these items and concluded as follows:
We have no immediate or long range require-ments for licensee actions concerning items 3.b and 3.g.
However, we require that the licensee include these items in its agenda for conducting and report on its DCRDR.
The licensee has not as yet committed to addressing items 3.b and 3.g in its DCRDR.
Id. at 4, 5 (footnotes omitted,.
Licensee subsequently made these commitments on the record.
Tr. 21,431-32 (Baxter).
4.
Item 3e, which is also addressed in NUREG-0752 Supp. 1, states that "[1] egend indicators contain numerous burned out bulbs."
Staff Ex. 15 at 1.
Again, the Staff discussed Licensee's proposed corrective action and concluded as follows:
Based on our evaluation of the licensees proposal, we find the licensee's proposal for checking legend indicator lamps acceptable for restart.
However, we require that the licensee investigate systems and techniques for effective communication of indicator and display lamp status information to operators where
" push-to-test" lamp status information is not already available and report its findings and proposals in its one-year detailed control room design review report (DCRDR).
The licensee has not committed to meeting this revised requirement.
Id. at 2 (footnote omitted).
As with Items 3b and 3g, Licensee subsequently committed, on the record, to meet the Staf f's requirement to address the issue raised in Item 3e.
Tr.
21,431-32 (Baxter)..
5.
Item 10b, which is addressed in NUREG-0752, deals with weaknesses in the radio communications system when communicating with a technician outside the control room area.
Staff Ex. 2 at 19.
The record show3 that Licensee plans to address this issue in its in-plant communications study, which it expects to complete in 1982, and to report on its findings in the DCRDR.
Id.
The Board found this to be satisfactory.
See PID 1 919, n.109.
6.
In the license condition now proposed by the Staff, the Staff attempts to convert Licensee's commitment to address these deficiencies in the DCRDR, into a requirement to implement unspecified corrections prior to startup following the Cycle 6 refueling.
Licensee understandably objects to such a license condition as impermissibly vague and not based upon the record here.1/
It should not be assumed (especially for the purposes of conditioning a license) that when the Staff reviews Licensee's further submission on these items it will determine that corrective actions will be necessary.
The Board certainly cannot define what such actions may be, and the prospect that unnecessary steps will be fabricated to meet a license condition is disturbing.
1/
In contrast, the Staff requirement for Item 4.c, and Licensee's responsive commitment, is to implement a relatively defined modification by the end of the first refueling outage.
See Staff Ex. 15 at 5,
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7.
Further, there is no basis for linking the DCRDR 1
requirement to "startup following the Cycle 6 refueling."
The requirement for a DCRDR (Detailed Control Room Design Review Report) is set forth as Item I.D.1 in NUREG-0737.
The require-ment is to be implemented for operating reactors, according to NUREG-0737, on a schedule that will be determined upon issuance of the human engineering guidelines being developed by the Staff to assist in performing the control room reviews.
These guidelines (NUREG-0700) were issued in September, 1981,1! and neither the Board nor Licensee are aware of any schedule imposed by the Staff for the submission of DCRDRs.
The Staff's intent in this regard is further clouded by the more recent publication by the Staff, for comment, of a draft report (NUREG-0801) entitled " Evaluation Criteria for Detailed Control Room Design Review."
The Staff has stated that This draft report contains guidance to the user (licensee / applicant and NRC staff) in determining the acceptability of the Detailed Control Room Design Review and resulting control room design improvements.
These criteria were developed in response to Item I.D.1,
" Control Room Design Review" of NUREG-0660, "NRC Action Plan Developed as a Result of the TMI Accident."
46 Fed. Reg. 56087 (November 13, 1981).
Consequently, there is no basis for the imposition now of any firm schedule for the submission of additional information by Licensee.5/
2/
See Availability of Guidelines for Control Room Design Reviews, 46 Fed. Reg. 47687 (September 29, 1981).
3/
The Staff testimony to the effect that it is expected to take approximately one year to perform a DCRDR after the (continued next page].
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8.
While Licensee informed the Staff that the GPU control room design review report, dated December, 1980 (Licensee Ex. 23), is Licensee's DCRDR (see Staff Ex. 15 at 5),
the Board has already observed that the Staff apparently has not reviewed the GPU report for compliance with the NUREG-0737 requirement.
See PID 1 914, n.108.
In the absence of Staff guidelines, it was not possible at the time of the hearing to make such an assessment.
Licensee intends, however, that to the extent the Staff guidelines require documentation and review beyond that provided by the December, 1980 GPU report, Licensee will document such additional reviews (which will include its commitment to address the issues raised in Items 3b, 3e, 3g and 10b) on the schedule set for completion of DCRDRs by other operating reactors.
Whether or not Licensee's submission should be in the form of a DCRDR depends, of course, upon the extent to which Licensee's earlier report already satisfies the Staff's requirements.
The Board finds that Licensee's proposal is consistent with the record and accept-able.
(continued]
issuance of NRC guidelines apparently was a best estimate at the time, which has not been implemented as a schedule for operating reactors.
See Ramirez and Price, ff. Tr. 10,452, at
- 5..
Fuel Handling 9.
The Board has required as a condition of Licensee that "[dluring any Unit 2 fuel movements Licensee will suspend work in the Unit 1 area of the fue? handling building * * *."
PID 1 1326(a).
Accordingly, the NRC Staff has proposed to include in the body of the TMI-1 license the following condition:
During any Unit 2 fuel movements Licensee shall suspend work in the Unit 1 area of the fuel handling building.
(See PID, 1 1326).
Staff PF 2031.7.
10.
In its response Licensee took issue with the license condition proposed by the NRC Staff as constituting too literal an interpretation of the Board's order.
In particular, Licensee urged that the license condition not impose an absolute bar to work in the Unit 1 area of the fuel handling building during Unit 2 fuel movements, but rather that NRC Staff review of Unit 2 fuel movement procedures consider on an ad hoc basis whether safety considerations require halting work in the Unit 1 area of the fuel handling building.
In order to l
resolve this issue we have gone back to review the relevant hearing record, as well as the proposed findings filed by the parties.
For the reasons we explain below, the Board agreer with the position urge'd by Licensee and we have modified the NRC Staff proposed license condition accordingly.
I.
11.
At paragraph 1254 of our PID we began a discus-sion of the potential impacts on Unit 1 operations from disposition of the Unit 2 reactor core.
We there found that fission gas activity in the Unit 2 reactor core is at less than detectable concentrations since the short-lived radionuclides such as xenon and iodine have decayed away.
See PID 1 1254.
We also found that the fuel handling building ventilation and filtration systems will be in service during defueling opera-tions in order to mitigate the consequences of a postulated fuel handling accident.
See PID 1 1255.
12.
In order to minimize the potential spread of contamination from the Unit 2 fuel handling area to Unit 1, Licensee will have installed prior to restart an environmental barrier.
With this barrier in place, we found that the only Unit 1 area that potentially could be affected by a Unit 2 fuel handling accident is the Unit 1 fuel handling area.
See PID 1 1256.
If a fuel handling accident at Unit 2 were to contami-nate the Unit 1 fuel handling area, we found that work in the Unit 1 area could be brought to a safe conclusion, the radio-logical problem could be addressed, and the Unit 1 fuel handling area would be available within a matter of days.
Id.
Since fuel handling evolutions generally need not be performed immediately, we concluded that any delay in gaining access to the Unit 1 fuel handling area would not adversely affect safe l l
operation of Unit 1 (id.);1! we also found that if a true safety need required quick entry to the Unit 1 fuel handling area, such entry could be made.
Id. at n.157.
13.
On reflection, it is now apparent to the Board that this analysis explicitly assumed that activities in the Unit 1 fuel handling area might be conducted concurrently eith
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l Unit 2 fuel movements.
In particular, we relied upon testimony that, if a Unit 2 fuel handling accident were to contaminate the Unit 1 fuel handling area, ongoing work in that area could be' brought to a safe conclusion and the radiological problem then would be addressed.
14.
Despite this testimony, at the end of our section addressing this issue, we stated that potential Unit 2 fuel handling accidents "will not adversely affect safe operation of Unit 1, in that during any Unit 2 fuel movements, Licensee will suspend work in the Unit 1 area of the fuel handling building * * *."
See PID 1 1256.
As indicated in the PID, the source of this observation was the prepared, written direct testimony of NRC Staff witness Stoddart, ff. Tr. 10,159, at 22-23.
Aside from this reference, our conclusion is otherwise unexplained in the PID and is contrary to the 4/
At page 343 of our slip opinion there is a typographical error concerning placement of the footnote.
Lines 15 and 16 should be changed from "Tr. 10,063 and 10,069 (Fuhrer), any delay in gaining access to the Unit 157/ fuel handling area would not adversely affect safe operation of Unit 1.10/" to "Tr. 10,063 and 10,069 (Fuhrer), any delay in gaining access to the Unit 1 fuel handling area would not adversely affect safe operation of Unit 1.157/".
explicit assumption of other testimony, see, e.g.,
Tr. 10,062-63 (Fuhrer), that operations may be taking place in the Unit 1 fuel handling area during Unit 2 fuel mo'rements.
15.
It now appears to us that we may have misunderstood the thrust of Mr. Stoddart's written testimony.
His testimony states that "[s]uspension of work in the TMI-l area during TMI-2 fuel movements will be a procedural require-t' ment."
Stoddart, ff. Tr. 10,159, at 22-23 (emphasis added).
Two sentences later Mr. Stoddart refers to both hardware modifications and to "the described administrative controls",
which apparently refers back to the procedural requirement to suspend work.
In its response to the NRC Staff report, Licensee urged us to construe tilis testimony as relating to ad hoc procedural controls that might be imposed on work in the Unit 1 fuel handling area depending upon the nature of fuel movements taking place in the Unit 2 fuel handling area, and not as an absolute requirement that work always be precluded in the Unit 1 fuel handling area during Unit 2 fuel movement.
16.
While we believe Licensee's reading of Mr. Stoddart's testimony may be more accurate than our initial understanding of the testimony, in the absence of other confirming information we are not sure that Licensee's reading of the testimony is totally free from doubt.
- However, Dr. Ronald R. Bellamy, chief of technical support for the NRC's onsite Three Mile Island Program Office ("TMIPO"), provided testimony which resolves all doubt about the matter.
At page 10,206 of the transcript the following colloquy took place:.
Q (MR. ROBERT ADLER):
Has the NRC considered the possibility of imposing limiting conditions on Unit 1 operation during certain phases of Unit 2 cleanup?
A (WITNESS BELLAMY):
I would have to say that I do not believe there are any specific cases where I have already decided there will be a definite impact or constraint on the Unit 1 operation, but we will consider that before any activities in Unit 2 are approved; and if it appears in our judgment that there should be any additional limiting condition of operation put on the operation of Unit 1, then we would pursue such a path.
CHAIRMAN SMITH:
What do you mean by additional limiting condition of operation?
WITNESS BELLAMY:
I am specifically referring to an instance wherein if we were moving fuel from the Unit 2 spent fuel pool out of the building, there may be a situation where there could not be movement of Unit 1 fuel at the same time.
17.
It is now clear to us that the NRC Staff was not of the view that work in the Unit 1 area of the fuel handling building must necessarily cease during all movements of Unit 2 fuel.
Thus, there is no factual basis for the absolute ban on such work proposed by the NRC Staff as a condition of the TMI-l license.
18.
Licensee suggests that we ensure proper eval-uation of the potential hazards posed from Unit 2 fuel movements by requiring as a condition of the Unit 1 license that the onsite TMIPO review all procedures relating to movement of Unit 2 fuel to determine the possible impact, if.
any, of such Unit 2 fuel movements on the Unit 1 area of the fuel handling building.
If the onsite TMIPO finds undue risk to personnel working in the Unit 1 area of the fuel handling building, the NRC Staff should ensure that the fuel movement procedure includes adequate provisions to protect such person-nel, including (where appropriate) the requirement that work in the Unit 1 area of the fuel handling building be halted.
19.
The Licensing Board has decided to adopt Licensee's proposal.
Testimony presented in connection with the separation issue generally described the high degree of NRC Staff involvement in, and oversight of, the recovery operations at TMI-2.
See generally Fuhrer and McGoey, ff. Tr. 10,020, at 31-38.
Licensee's proposed condition will ensure that, during NRC Staff reviews of proposed Unit 2 fuel movement procedures, appropriate consideration will be given to potential impacts on personnel working in the Unit 1 area of the fuel handling building.
This process is consistent with the testimony offered by Dr. Bellamy and we believe it is more appropriate than an absolute ban on such work.
20.
Accordingly, in place of the condition proposed by the NRC Staff at paragraph 2031.7, we direct the NRC Staff prior to restart to include in the body of the license for TMI-l the following condition:
All procedures relating to the movement of Unit 2 fuel shall be reviewed by NRC's onsite Three Mile Island Program Office
("TMIPO") to determine the impact, if any, of such fuel movements on personnel working in the Unit 1 area of the fuel handling.
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building, and the TMIPO shall ensure that appropriate measures are taken to protect such personnel, including (where appropri-ate) the requirement that work in the Unit 1 area of the fuel handling building be halted.
1 ESF Filtration System 21.
The Staff proposed the following condition for the body of the THI-l license:
Prior to any Unit 1 fuel movements, Licensee shall install, and have opera-i tional, an engineered safety features-(ESP) filtration system for the Unit 1 fuel i
^
handling building. The ESF filtration system for Unit 1 shall be in operation whenever Unit 1 fuel movements are in progress.
(See PID 11 1265 & 1326).
Staff PF 2031.9.
Licensee has advised us that it will seek clarification and/or reconsideration by the Board of this requirement in order to accommodate the previously unforeseen need to partially defuel TMI-l prior to restart in order to investigate potential corrosion in the primary system.
consequently, we will defer our consideration of this Staff proposed condition until our ruling on Licensee's petition.
II.C.
COMMITMENTS / REQUIREMENTS TO BE COMPLETED l
PRIOR TO RESTART 22.
Staff proposed finding 2034.8 should be modified to add "and its Supplement 1" to the reference to "NUREG-0752."
23.
The citation to "PID 1 1174" in Staff PF 2034.10 should be to "PID 1 1064".
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i 24.
The Staff proposed that the following item be j
included among those to be certified by the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to the Commission as having been completed to the Staff's satisfaction prior to restart:
Licensee must environmentally qualify a single path to cold shutdown or bring the matter to the attention of the Commission.
(See PID, 1 1180).
Staff PF 2034.13 (footnote omitted).
Placement of this requirement on the restart certification list does not accu-rately implement the Board's decision.
We presumed that a single path to cold shutdown would be environmentally qualified pursuant to Supplement 3 of IE Bulletin 79-OlB, and directed Licensee to bring the matter to the Commission's attention if we were wrong in that presumption.
See PID V 1180.
We are aware that both Licensee and the Staff have addressed this subject in their January 28, 1982, comments to the Commission on immediate effectiveness.
However, the Bulletin does not require an environmentally qualified path to cold shutdown prior to restart, and we expressly declined to make such a finding.
See PID 1 1175.
Consequently, the Staff has improperly listed this as a restart certification item.
It more properly falls under II.D in the Staff report, "OTHER COMMITMENTS / REQUIREMENTS."
III.
CONCLUSION 25.
Licensee has proposed that in this Supplemental Initial Decision the Board should explicitly provide for the.
I filing of exceptions to the Supplemental Initial Decision.
We agree and have added to Staff PF 2037 the following statements implementing 10 C.F.R.S 2.762:
Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 52.762, any exceptions to this Supplemental Initial Decision or designated portions thereof must be filed within ten (10) days after service of the decision.
A brief in suprart of the excep-tions must be filed within thirty (30) days thereafter (forty (40) days in the case of the NRC Staff).
Within thirty (30) days of the filing and service of the brief of the appellant (forty (40) days in the case of the NRC Staff), any other party may file a brief in support of, or in opposition to, the exceptions.
Respectfully submitted, SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE h
George F. Trowbridge Thomas A. Baxter Robert E.
Zahler Counsel for Licensee 1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20036 (202) 822-1000 l
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