ML20114D056
| ML20114D056 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 01/28/1985 |
| From: | Blake E GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP., SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| CON-#185-302 SP, NUDOCS 8501300660 | |
| Download: ML20114D056 (124) | |
Text
h SOR January 2ggg985 q
nrme
'85 JyI30 pgg;;g J:
Ecesecrua$f.
h[jERV UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
~
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
)
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY
)
Docket No. 50-269 SP
)
(Restart Remand (Three Mile Island Nuclear
)
on Management)
Station, Unit No. 1)
)
LICENSEE'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN THE FORM OF A PARTIAL INITIAL DECISION ON THE DIECKAMP MAILGRAM Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge Ernest L.
Blake, Jr.,
P.C.
David R.
Lewis Counsel for Licensee 8501300660 850128 DRADOCK05000g
January 28,flhf8 JAS30 pio;y5
/
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
)
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY
)
Docket No. 50-289 SP
)
(Restart Remand (Three Mile Island Nuclear
)
on Management)
Station, Unit No. 1)
)
LICENSEE'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN THE FORM OF A PARTIAL INITIAL DECISION ON THE DIECKAMP MAILGRAM i
l l-Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge Ernest L. Blake, Jr.,
P.C.
l David R.
Lewis l
Counsel for Licensee l
l l
e
m i.
i e
TABLE OF CONTENTS
- INTRODUCTION.................................................
1 FINDINGS OF Ft.RT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW......................
6 I.
Whether Mr. Dieckamp,.in sending a mailgram on May 9, 1979,.with copies to NRC Commissioners, acted in careless disregard for its accuracy?...........
6' A.
What prompted the mailgram, what did'it state and what was its meaning?....................
6
.B.
On what:information did Mr. Dieckamp
-base his mailgram?.................................
8 C.
Did Mr. Dieckamp have sufficient knowledge
-of-accident events and perceptions to reasonably justify the contents of the mailgram, specifically his view that no one i
interpreted the pressure spike.or initiation.
of containment spray in terms of core ~ damage at the time the spike occurred on March 28, 1979, or-withheld any such information?........... 22 I
f II.
Whether there was evidence available as of May 9, 1979, that anyone at the time-the spike occurred-on March 28, 1979, interpreted the pressure spike or initiation of containment spray in terms of core damage or withheld such-information?.............. 24 A.
What evidence existed on May 9, 1979,'and:
L what conclusions should have been drawn from-
[.
that evidence, as to whether anyone inter.
preted the pressure spike or-initiationLof containment spray in terms of core damage at the time the spike occurred on March 28,
~1979,oor withheld any.such information?........... 24 B.
Was such evidence known to or' communicated-to Mr. Dieckamp,=during.the period March 28
'through May 9, 1979?..............................
37 i
I-
-i-i b
~
L 2
c.
C.
Did the.mailgram reasonably reflect any such evidence which was known to or communicated to Mr. Dieckamp, during the period March 28 through May 9, 19797..............................
38 III. Whether there was evidence available after May 9, 1979, that anyone at the time the spike occurred on March 28, 1979, interpreted the pressure spike or initiation of containment spray in terms of core damage or withheld any such information?.......... 39 A.
Whether subsequent statements by anyone, including interviews and testimony of Messrs. Chwastyk, Mehler and Illjes, constitute evidence that one or more individuals at the time the spike occurred on March 28, 1979, interpreted the pressure spike or initiation of containment spray in terms of core damage?........
39 B.
Whether subsequent statements by anyone, including interviews and testimony of Messrs. Chwastyk, Mehler and Illjes, justify the conclusion that one or more individuals at the time the spike occurred l.
on March 28, 1979, in fact interpreted the pressure spike or initiation of containment spray in terms of core damage?....................
40 C.
Was such evidence known to or communicated J
to Mr. Dieckamp after May 9, 19797................
83 l
IV.
Whether Mr.,Dieckamp subsequent to May 9, 1979, acted with~ careless disregard in not correcting or supplementing his mailgram in the light of subsequent evidence, including interviews of l
Messrs. Chwastyk, Mehler and I11jes?.................... 85 A.
Did Mr. Dieckamp have a reasonable basis to believe that any such subsequent evidence was available to the mailgram recipients?......... 85 B.
Whether Mr. Dieckamp had a reasonable basis to continue to believe that no one inter-preted the pressure spike or initiation of containment spray in terms of core damage?........
86 l
l i,
~
C.-
Whether'there is evidence that Mr. Dieckamp expected the NRC to rely on the mailgram for any regulatory purpose?.......................
92 z
D.
Whether it would have served any public or 7
regulatory purpose for Mr. Dieckamp to report
'the subsequent statements to the extent they constitute some evidence that such an inter-pretation had been made at the time the spike occurred on March 28, 1979, or that any such information was withheld?.........................
93 CONCLUSION..................................................J94 APPENDIX A:
List of Witnesses and Testimony, and Documentary
}
Material Bound into the Transcript i
j l
APPENDIX B:
List of Exhibits APPENDIX C:-
Principal Participants in Activity Related to the Dieckamp Mailgram Issue 4
i j
f i
-111-n
..i_ _
y.
-e m
,ljQEO January 28, l'd85 50.16 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR' REGULATORY COMMISSION
/
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
)
-METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY
)
Docket No. 50-289
)
(Restart Remand (Three Mile Island Nuclear
)
on Management)
Station, Unit No. 1)
)
LICENSEE'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN THE FORM OF A PARTIAL INITIAL DECISION ON THE DIECKAMP MAILGRAM j
INTRODUCTION 1.
This is the fourth partial initial decision in the Three Mile Island Unit No. 1 Restart Proceeding.
This decision addresses a mailgram sent by GPU Corporation president Mr.
Herman Dieckamp to Congressman Morris Udall on May 9, 1979.
l l
The mailgram provided Mr. Dieckamp's views on whether the sig-nificance of a pressure spike that occurred in the Three Mile Island Unit 2 containment on the first day of the accident at l
l that unit on March 28, 1979, and of, the coincident containment-l-
spray actuation, was-appreciated by Licensee personnel at the l
time.
The pressure spike referred to was a sudden increase t
I i
i
recorded in containment pressure from about 3 to 28 psig, fol-lowed by a rapid decrease'to 4 psig, at about 1:50 p.m.
It was caused by a rapid burning of hydrogen, which had been produced by a reaction of. steam with zircalloy components in the reactor
,. n core at temperatures greater than 2000* F.1/ The-pressure spike activated containment building' sprays, which actuate when approximately 30 psi containment building pressure is sensed by at least two of three independent sensors.
In addition, some individuals reported hearing a " thud."
The Dieckamp mailgram was addressed by the Licensing Board in its First Partial Ini-tial Decision in July, 1981.
LBP-81-32, 14 N.R.C.
381, 555-556 (1981).
2.
In an appeal ~from LBP-81-32, the Appeal Board re-manded the Dieckamp mailgram issue to the Licensing Board for further hearings.
ALAB-772, 19 N.R.C.
1193, 1268 (1984).
With respect to the Dieckamp mailgram, the Appeal Board defined the inquiry that the Licensing Board was to conduct as'follows:
(1) whether anyone interpreted the pressure spike and contain-ment spray, at the time, in terms of core damage, and (2) who or what was the source of the information that Mr. Dieckamp' l
conveyed in the mailgram.
Id.
The Appeal Board, elsewhere in.
its decision, defined the first issue as "was there evidence.
l l
1/
The reaction of zircalloy components with steam is often casually referred to as a " zirconium-water" or "zirc-water" re-action.
I
!^
.~
that'anyone interpreted the pressure spike in terms of core damage at the time of the spike, and was such information withheld."
ALAB-772, 19 N.R.C.
at 1267 n.103 (emphasis added).
The Licensing Board subsequently agreed with the Appeal Board's determination that only the withholding of information with re-spect to the pressure spike or spray initiation was addressed in the mailgram and is at issue in this proceeding.
Tr.
27,363.
The Appeal Board characterized the scope of this in-quiry as "relatively limited."
ALAB-772, 19 N.R.C.
at 1268.
3.
The Licensing Board, in a July 9, 1984 Prehearing Conference Order, elaborated on the scope of the inquiry and added a third facet:
whether, when, and how any interpretation was communicated to Mr. Dieckamp.
The Board also accepted as subissues:
(1) whether Mr. Dieckamp took steps to correct any misstatement upon learning the facts; (2) did Mr. Dieckamp ex-pect the mailgram to be relied upon and to be important to the regulatory process; and (3) should Mr. Dieckamp have known the facts and did he make any effort to discover them.
Memorandum l
and Order Following Prehearing Conference (July 9, 1984) at 8.
I 4.
Four parties participated in the remanded proceeding i
on the Dieckamp mailgram issue:
Licensee, the NRC Staff, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and Intervenor Three Mile Island l
Alert (TMIA).
5.
Discovery preceded the remanded hearings and was ex-E tensive.
Discovery lasted over three months.
Fifteen
! I r
L
- e, ud?
m.. _,
m sn di -
L.. ' * ~
1 t
,? discovery 1 requests were filed by the parties -- nine of=them by-F
-TMIA.- Over 4,000 documents were produced, including question-
- naires submitted by1 Licensee to over.400 present and'former GPU i r system and B&W employees in order to answer TMIA's' requests.
In addition, TMIA deposed thirty-two individuals.
During dis-
- covery,Jthe Board permitted TMIA to inquire.of Licensee con--
cerning knowledge by' Licensee. personnel on the day ofJth'e acci-ident of-high core-exit thermocouple (often casually referred to as incore thermocouple) temperatures.
Such inquiry met the
" general relevancy" standard for discovery in that such knowl-l edge might indicate that certain. individuals could have'related' p
such 1,nformation to the pressure spike.
The Board did not,
" ~
1 i-
.however, expand this proceeding to address the reportability.of i
incore thermocouple readings.
The proceeding. remained-limited i
to topics addressed by the Dieckamp mailgram -- the pressure i
i spike.and spray initiation.
In the same vein,'the Board ruled i
th,at corporate agency and imputed scienter were not issues in
[
this proceeding.
Rather, the key.subissue is whether anyone actually interpreted the pressure spike and sprayjinitiation in terms of core damage, not whether anyone should-have made that determination.
With respect to whether Mr. Di'eckamp should-have-known the facts,.the Board ruled the appropriate. standard:
to1be whether-he-acted with careless disregard for thel accuracy of the mailgram.
Memorandum and Order Ruling on First GPU-TMIA
'Disdovery Dispute (August 13, 1984).at 3-4.
o -
e f
[.
.~-..
.-.i P
6.
The. adjudicatory hearing commenced on November 14, 1984.
The hearing consumed 17 hearing days and over 3,000 transcript pages.
Twenty-four witnesses appeared and testified.2/
~The parties also stipulated into evidence 144 prior interviews, depositions, and reports; and portions of a number of the TMIA depositions were admitted in lieu of live testimony.3/'
1
(
2/
Appendix A hereto provides a list of witnesses and tran-script citations to their testimony, as well as a list of docu-mentary material bound into the transcripts.
3/
. appendix B hereto provides a list of exhibits offered or received in this proceeding.
The 144 prior interviews,-deposi-tions, and reports which were stipulated into evidence were marked as 144 items in part C of Joint Mailgram Exhibit 1.
These items are hereinafter cited in these proposed findings as JME 1(c) (item number).
(Part A of Joint Mailgram Exhibit ~l is the Stipulation and Part B is an index of the items.)
The TMIA depo'sitions that were admitted in lieu of. live testimony are marked as TMIALMailgram Exhibit 32(C)-(K).
i FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW I.
Whether Mr. Dieckamp, in sending a mailgram on May 9, 1979, with copies to NRC Commissioners, acted in careless disregard for its accuracy?
A.
What prompted the mailgram, what did it state and what was its meaning?
7.
On May 7, 1979, Congressman Udall, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment of the House Commit-.
tee on Interior and Insular Affairs, a number of subcommittee members, local congressmen, subcommittee staff, and NRC Commis-sioner Victor Gilinsky visited and toured Three Mile Island.
Mr. James Floyd, who was at that time TMI-2 supervisor of oper-ations,4/ conducted the tour of the TMI-2 control room.
During that tour, Mr. Floyd mentioned the pressure spike and initiation of containment building spray.
Mr. Floyd~ identified the containment building pressure recorder and discussed the conclusion that the pressure spike was not a spurious electri-cal signal because spray initiation required coincidence of at least-two pressure indicators.
Mr. Floyd also stated that the pressure spike was in full view of an NRC inspector.
- Note, however, that Mr. Floyd was not on the TMI site at the time of the pressure spike.
Dieckamp, ff. Tr. 28,316, at 3-4; Tr.
28,375-28,376 (Dieckamp).
- 4/
Appendix C hereto provides for reference a description of the principal participants in activity related to the Dieckamp mailgram issue.
- i i
h_-.
m
8.
This portion of the tour was reported with some de-tail in an article in the New York Times on the next day, May 8,
1979.
The article was entitled " Lag in Reporting Reactor
~
Damage Laid to Experts" and stated in its lead sentence:
A technician from Three Mile Island nucJear plant-told Congressmen today that control room personnel and Federal inspeccors knew the plant's fuel core was seriously damaged two days before the damage was formally re-ported and the seriousness of the accident made public.
The pressure spike was cited as the basis for this statement.
Dieckamp, ff. Tr. 28,316, at 4 and Attachment.
9.
Mr. Dieckamp was disturbed by the article because his own awareness indi.:ated that the nonreporting of the pressure spike reflected the actual delayed recognition of its signifi-cance and of the severity of core damage that had occurred dur-ing the accident.
As a result, he sent a mailgram to Congress-man Udall with a copy to Commissioner Gilinsky and other NRC Commissioners.
Dieckamp, ff. Tr. 28,316, at 4; Tr.
28,377-28,378 (Dieckamp); Tr. 28,963 (Dieckamp).
See also Tr.
29,079-29,082 (Blake).
10.
The mailgram stated in pertinent part:
There is no evidence that anyone inter-preted the " pressure spike" and the-spray initiation in terms of reactor core damage i
at the time of the spike nor that anyone withheld any information.
Dieckamp, ff. Tr. 28,316, at 4-5 and Attachment 2.
i.
I 11.
Mr. Dieckamp, in using the term " core damage" in the
- mailgram,'was referring to,the kind.of significant damage that would be consistent with a major fraction of.the zirconium
-having reacted with water or; steam.
Tr. 28,345 (Dieckamp). His frame of reference'was the1New York Times article ~, which he be-Llieved suggested that knowledge of'the meaning.of the pressure 1
spike ~in terms of core damage could have influenced.the deci-
[
sion to. evacuate the populace from around Three-MileLIsland.
For this reason,RMr. Dieckamp was: referring to the degree of core damage sufficient to have cast-doubt on the ability;to:
cool the. core with confidence.
Tr. 28,948 (Dieckamp).
]
12.
The mailgram phrase "nor that anyone withheld any
\\
j-information" refers to the pressure spike and;its interpreta-tion.
It was Mr. Dieckamp's belief at the time he sent the mailgram.that the pressure. spike and its meaning were.not un-derstood.on the. day of the accident, and consistent with that
).
belief, that no one made a conscious dedision to-withhold i
information about the spike.
Dieckamp, ff.:Tr.-28,316,;at 18.
B.
On what information did Mr. Dieckamp base -
-his mailgram?
t l-13.
The mailgram reflected Mr. Dieckamp's own understand-ing of the positive discovery and interpretation of the pres-l sure spiku -- of the'first' recognition of its meaning on the
~
i night.of March 29..Dieckamp, ff; Tr. 28,316, at 5, 9.
As' 4,
l i
l described below, this underst.anding was the result of informa-tion communicated to Mr. Dieckamp during the early days of the accident and of Mr. Dieckamp's substantial involvements in
_ post-accident investigative and recovery efforts.
14.
Mr.- Dieckamp first became aware of core damage beyond local failed fuel when he was informed of the pressure spike, the postulated mechanism of a hydrogen " explosion," and the re-action of zirconium and water as the source of the hydrogen.
This information came to Mr. Dieckamp sometime on Friday, March 4
30, 1979.
Prior to this time, Mr. Dieckamp's conversations with Commonwealth, NRC,- and company personnel and his atten-dance at a congressional visitors briefing conducted by John Herbein (at the time Met Ed's Vice President of Generation) on Thursday, March 29, 1979, hcd given him a sense of local and limited fuel damage.
On Wednesday, March 28, 1979, Mr.
Dieckamp had been in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, attending a Pennsylvania PUC_ meeting unrelated to TMI.
Mr. Dieckamp had spoken with Walter Creitz (then Met Ed's President, who was in Reading, Pennsylvania) and with Robert Arnold (GPU Service Corp.'s Vice President of Generation, who was in Parsippany, N.J.) on the morning of March 28, 1979.
In the early afternoon of March 28, he had a very brief conversation on the steps of the Pennsylvania State Capitol with John Herbein, Gary Miller
- (then TMI Station Manager), and George Kunder (then Supervisor _
of Technical Support - TMI-2), who were-on their way to brief i
-the Lieutenant-Governor.
Later on Wednesday evening after re-turning to his.home in New Jersey where GPU's corporate offices
-are located, Mr.'Dieckamp again spoke to Robert Arnold.
On 1 Thursday morning,. March 29, 1979, he met briefly with Mr.
Arnold in order to. review and sign a memorandum establishing a task force to investigate and analyze what was then thought to have been a severe plant transient.
On Thursday afternoon, he
~ ttended a briefing for a group of Congressmen at the TMI visi-a tor's _ center;. and at this time, he spoke with R. Vollmer of the NRC and with some members of the task force that Mr'. Dieckamp had' authorized earlier that morning.
On Thursday evening, Mr.
]
Dieckamp'again spoke to Mr. Arnold.
Mr. Dieckamp testified j
that at no time on March 28 or March 29 did anyone mention to him core temperatures in excess of 2000 F, the pressure spike, zirconium-water reaction, hydrogen, or core damage beyond i
i failed fuel.
Dieckamp, ff. Tr. 28,316, at 5-9.
No witness suggested otherwise.
15.
On Thursday, March 29, 1979, the task force.that Mr.
i Dieckamp had authorized--designated the Events' Analysis and Re-covery Planning Team--met at the TMI site.
The team members I
met at about 3:30 p.m.
in the TMI supervisors' conference room' and were assigned to either an Events Analysis = group or a Re-I-
William Lowe, of the-consulting firm of covery Planning group.
Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, was one of the team members and was-assignedito the Recovery Planning Group.
Lowe, ff Tr. 28,151,
! i
s e
at 3-4.
Other team members present were Richard Wilson (the Chairman),' Edward Wallace, Donald Reppert, T. Gary Broughton,
~
-George'Kunder, James Moore, Lee Rogers, Ron Williams, Thomas Crimmins,-and Robert Long; with the exception of Mr. Rogers, who was B&W's-repNesentative, all these individuals were engi-neers or managers-from GPU system companies.
TMIA Mailgram Exh. 18 at 3.
16.
Some discussion of the pressure spike may have oc-curred during or shortly after this Thursday afternoon meeting.
Mr. Lowe'has a recollection that at some time on the afternoon.
- of March 29th the containment pressure spike was mentioned in his presence and said to be a spurious indication--a. voltage anomaly in instrumentation.
Mr. Lowe remembers being skeptical of the explanation.
Mr. Lowe, however, did not see the strip chart ~during the afternoon meeting and does not recall anyone analyzing or exhibiting recognition of the signficance of the i
containment pressure spike.
Lowe, ff Tr. 28,1514-at 10; Tr.
28,177-28,178 (Lowe).
Mr. Thomas Crimmins (a GPU system engi-neer:who attended the meeting) has stated that he remembers seeing:the pressure trace during the meeting, but he too states
'it-das assessed to have been a spurious-instrument: problem.
[
Mr. Crimmins remembers no mention of hydrogen.
TMIA Mailgram Exh. 32F.
- 17.- George Kunder recalls a side discussion during'or l
after.the Thursday aftsenoon meeting in which he was shovn the
=
n
strip chart or a representation of the strip chart.
He thinks
-t Gary Broughton (a GPU Service Corp. manager) showed the chart to him.
Tr.l30,001, 30,005 (Kunder).
He believes that hydro-
_ gen, along with' instrument malfunction, were offered as possi-ble. explanations--possibilities that needed to be examined.5/
5/
Mr. Kunder exhibited a good deal of unceltainty in his recollection as to what was said about'the pressure spike, by whom, and when.
This same uncertainty is reflected in prior statements.
In his May 23, 1979 I&E interview (JME 1(c)(37)),
Mr. Kunder gave the following account:
Q.
.Were you.
. when did you become aware of a pressure spike occurring in the containment.
A.
It was about somewhere around Friday that j
would have been the 30th.
Q.
How did you become aware of that A.
-I'had been discussing some of the parameter
-curves from the incident with either Gary Broughtot.'s group, the GPU Investigative Team Group, or it was in a meeting that I had with some of the other GPU Engineers.
I can't remember specifically who it was but it was * *
- I was either questioning the group-on some of the things they had found or it was during the meeting that I had with a team ~of GPU'Engi-neers who were specifically charged under Dick Wilson by Herman Dieckamp to begin'the investiga--
tion of the incident.
- *
- But at any rate it was at either one of those encounters that the mention was made that "oh, gee, did you know that you.had a hydrogen explosion already" or'something to that effect and I said no I didn't and:they-showed me the spike.
They said it'd occurred that day.
.(Continued next page).
<p.
Tr. 30,004-30,005 (Kunder). Mr. Kunder, however, remembers no discussion of the pressure spike during the main meeting.
Tr.
30,005 (Kunder).
Nor does he remember any discussion or con-cern about a zirconium-water reaction.
Tr. 30,016-30,017; 30,074 (Kunder).
Mr. Kunder does believe he mentioned long-term hydrogen generation at the meeting, but merely as t'opic for subsequent recovery planning and without discussion.
Tr. 30,007-30,008 (Kunder).
(Continued)
JME 1(c)(37) at 50-51.
In his deposition before the Special Inquiry Group on September 18, 1979, Mr. Kunder gave the fol-lowing account:
Q.
In any event, did you express concern to this group [the Task Force of GPU Engineers during a meeting on the afternoon of March 29th) about the possibility of either continuing hydrogen genera-tion or the existence of hydrogen from water zircalloy interaction?
A.
At that moment I was not aware of the zirc-water reaction.
It was sometime after that, and it might have been the same meeting, but I really can't remember honestly, one of the GPU engineers or some engineer showed me the graph of the reac-tor building pressure and they said, "Do you know you had a spike here?"
And I said, "That is news to me."
Q.
This was the first time that you learned about that?
A.
.Yes.
JME 1(c)(80) at'74-75.,..
18.
Gary Broughten remembers no discussion of the pres-7 sure' spike or a hydrogen explosion at the meeting and no obser-vation of the strip chart.
Tr. 31,159 (Broughton).
His recol-lection was corroborated by Richard Wilson.
Tr. 31,530-31,531 (Wilson).
Gary Brcughton also remembers no conversation con-cerning the pressure spike with Mr. Kunder during the meeting on the afternoon of March 29th.
He remembers with confidence that he first learned that there had been a hydrogen explosion on Friday morning, March 30, 1979.
Tr. 31,166, 31,198-31,201 (Broughton).
Moreover, Mr. Broughton: stated that when informed on Friday of the pressure spike, he at first did not understand that the pressure spike had not just occurred (Tr. 31,199); as l
Mr. Kunder remembered that the Events Analysis and Recovery Team engineer who first showed him the pressure spike had told him it had occurred that day (JME 1(c)(37) at 51), it is ex-tremely likely that Mr. Kunder is in fact remembering a conver-sation that occurred on Friday.
19.
In sum, it is unclear whether there was discussion of the spike or of hydrogen during this afternoon meeting at'TMIA on March 29.
Hydrogen may have been mentioned during the meet-ing; so, too, the pressure recording of the spike may have been available. -What is clear, however,Lis that even at this meet-ing, a full day after the spike occurred, any connection be--
tween the two was at most a speculative possibility that should be explored. - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
20.
The meeting ended between 5 p.m.
and 6 p.m.
At this point Mr. Kunder took Mr. Lowe aside for a short but intensive explanation of what'Mr. Kunder perceived to be the urgent need of the plant.
After about ten minutes of conversation with Mr.
j Kunder, Mr. Lowe and two GPU engineering managers decided to go to the Unit 2 control room and get first-hand information. In the control room, they talked to some operators and engineers and observed what was going on.
There seemed to be unresolved problems relating to plant stabilization and damage control.
The operators were having trouble holding the pressurizer level steady.
Lowe, ff Tr. 28,151, at 4.
21.
Later that evening after dinner, the Recovery Plan-ning group reassembled in the Supervisors' conference room.
Shortly after the group had reassembled, Mr. Lowe told Mr.
Herbein the basic problem was plant stanilization, r.ot recov-ery, and that several senior people should be immediately ae-signed to the control room to help with stabilization and dam-age control.
Mr. Herbein asked for volunteers.
Mr. Crimmins and Mr. Lowe volunteered and at about 10 p.m. went to the Unit 2 control room.
Their first priority was to connect the two waste gas decay tanks, which contained radioactive gas and were near relief pressure, back to the containment.
They then sought information about plant status.
They were told that the primary system was still " mushy," that is, it was hard to con-trol pressurizer level.
The operators were concerned about = _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ - _
this problem, but still had no explanation that made sense.
They thought there might still be a steam bubble outside the pressurizer, but none of the many temperature readings were high enough for that.
Lowe, ff Tr. 28,151, at 5-6.
22.
In the meantime in the evening of the 29th, Met Ed engineers Richard Bcnsel, Ivan Porter, and others had begun to pull together and photocopy strip charts of various plant parameters during the accident in order to begin the event analysis.
Mr. Bensel undertook to begin to review these charts to familiarize himself with them.
Upon reviewing the reactor building pressure chart, Mr. Bensel found the 28 psig pressure spike.
JME 1(c)(107) at-54.
23.
Mr. Bensel~showed the spike to a number of other individuals who were in the control room area and who were con-cerned with operations.
Mr. Bensel learned that the spray sys-tem had come on at the same time.
Looking at the alarm print-j i
er, he also discovered that all six pressure switches had activated.
This led Mr. Bensel to conclude that there had ac-tually been an increase in reactor building pressure.
JME 1(c)(107) at 54, 24.
Richard Bensel then showed the pressure spike to Mr.
Lowe.
The time was about 11 p.m.
To Mr. Lowe, the spike lookeu like ones he used to calculate for hypothetical hydrogen ignition in containment, except it came down faster.
Contain-ment pressure was subatmospheric which could have been due to 1 ?
[
..s..
the oxygen having been used up by hydrogen burning.
Mr. Lowe concluded that the spike was caused by hydrogen ignition in the containment, that therefore the mushiness in the primary system had to be due to the presence of hydrogen gas in the primary system, that the hydrogen was from a zircalloy-water reaction, and that they had to get the hydrogen out.
Mr. Lowe asked to see other pressure readings and temperature traces.
They were confirmatory.
Lowe, ff Tr. 28,151, at 6-7; Tr. 28,166-28,167 (Lowe).
25.
Mr. Lowe advised Mr. Crimmins and others that there had been a hydrogen ignition in containment and that there was a hydrogen bubble in the primary system. There was a great sense of urgency to measure the bubble, not only in order to confirn or refute its presence, but also in order to find out if it was growing, to find out whether it was then large enough to interfere with reactor coolant pump operation on which core cooling then depended, and to estimate whether the core could be uncovered by bubble growth if depressurization occurred by failure of pressurizer heaters or a critical seal or valve.
Lowe, ff Tr. 28,151, at 7-8.
26.
Mr. Lowe asked for assistance, ud at about 11:30 p.m.,
James Moore, a GPU engineer, arrived.
Mr. Moore and Mr.
Lowe then devised a method to measure the bubble size by changing the level in the pressurizer to obtain a 100 psi pres-sure differential and applying Boyle's law.
This activity -
a.
v 3.
e
/
extended"into.the,early morning hours of Friday, March 30.
LEventually,-Jthey; estimated a bubble volume of about 1100. cubic
,f feet at 875 psia. :In1 addition,lMr. Lowe. started to calculate the. amount of zirconium cladding-in the1 core that.must have
-burnedcto produce enough hydrogen for global ignition in con-tainmentiand for:a hydrogen bubble of the size measured.
lAlthough Mr.-Lowe stopped.the calculation before its completion because of other urgent-matters, the rough numbers suggested'
'thatca large part'or all of the zirconium had burned..Lowe, ff Tr. 28,151,,at 10-13.
- 27.
On. Friday,LMarch.30, and continuing for the next sev-eral' days, Mr,. Dieckamp gained 'an explicit understanding-of j
this first. recognition of the meaning of the pressure spike,J the confirmation of; hydrogen, and a rough quantification of'the degree of coro. damage suggested by analysis of the zirconium--
water reaction. Mr. Dieckamp recalls that his awareness of core damage ' increased abruptly on Friday, March 30, when he was in-formed of.the pressure spike.
In telephone conversations'with~
-personnel at;the site, most likely Robert Arnold l Mr.:Dieckamp was told of the pressure spike recording.being brought to'the attention of the'GPU task force during the night of March'29.
~
Dieckamp,.ff Tr. 28,316, at-9; Tr._28/348L(Dieckamp).
Mr.
Dieckamp.was also briefed on Friday by; Robert'Keaten;Lwho.had that morning obtained from Gary Broughton, a sequence = of events, '
.and update ~on,the current status of. the reactor.
The update-
~18-5
contained information on the explosion in containment and the bubble in the reactor.
JME 1(c)(45) at 7; Tr. 31,247-31,249
.(Keaten); TMIA Mailgram Exh. 10 at 10-12.
(Mr. Dieckamp no longer remembers this briefing.. Tr. 28,646 (Dieckamp)).
Mr.
Dieckamp also talked to'Mr. Lowe by telephone several times near midnight on Friday, March 30.
Lowe, ff. Tr. 28,151, at 15; JME 1(c~)(86) at 22-23.
28.
Mr. Dieckamp learned that the task force had postu-lated a zirconium-water reaction as'the source of the hydrogen and that the presence of hydrogen was recognized as being con-sistent with the abnormal pressure-volume behavior in the pri-mary system.
The postulate caused the plant staff to take steps to take a containment building gas sample and to take steps to permit operation of the hydrogen recombiner.
Dieckamp, ff Tr. 23,316, at 5, 9-10.
29.
Mr. Dieckamp moved to the site on the afternoon of Saturday, March 31.
Thereafter, he was in routine conversation at TMI with key members of the plant staff, the task force, the NRC, and an Industry Advisory Group comprised of experts in various disciplines from around the country whose immediate as-sistance Mr. Dieckamp had solicited in a series of telephone calls on Friday, March 30.
In these continuing interactions, he became aware of the confirmation of hydrogen through analy-sis of the containment building gas sample which revealed a de-pletion in the normal atmospheric oxygen concentration.
This I,.
fdepletion, along with the residual hydrogen,. afforded the first indicator of the amount:of reacted zirconium and thus the first-quantitative indicator of the degree of core damage.
The first containment building gas ~ sample ~was taken at about 4:00 a.m. on
' March'31. 'Dieckamp, ff Tr. 28,316, at 10.
'30.
During the first few~ weeks of April, Mr. Dieckamp re-mained at the site.
He was directly involved in the concern.
about the potential explosivity of the hydrogen bubble, the
. primary l cooling system vulnerability to high concentrations lof-noncondensible and/or dissolved gas,.and the strategies em-ployed to remove the hydrogen from the-reactor primary coolant isystem.
He availed himself of early GPU interviews of opera-tors, sat in on preliminary reviews of the sequence of events,.
participated in status reviews.with the_on-site NRC staff, co-ordinated the activities of the Industry Advisory Group,'and generally participated in managing the response-to the acci-dent.
Dieckamp, ff Tr. 28,316, at 10-11;~ Van Witbeck, ff Tr.
28,261, at 2-3; Zebroski, ff Tr. 28,441, at 11-12.
l 31, During the third week in April, Mr. Dieckamp drew l
upon his awareness and learning, developed in part from. opera-tor interviews including a group statement-written by Gary Miller (JME 1(c)(10)),.to assemble testimony for. presentation to.the Nuclear. Regulation Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works (Hart Committee).
Dieckamp, ff Tr. 28,316, at 11. u
$f p '
~
13:2. :Mr.LDieckamp did not conduct.or cause to be conducted
~
~
lany. additiona1 inquiry into the facts)beyond.his own knowledge
.before mending.the mailgram, nor does he remember' consulting with anyone.
However, he-h'ad'given the subject of.the pressure
= spike and its interpretation considerable attention-in the
~
course of preparing testimony for the Hart Committee.
From the
' considerable information available to him prior to May 9, 1979,-
.he had.a very clear understanding of the delayed recognition and interpretation of the pressure spike. - He had also neither heard nor seen any indication that on March ~28,the pressure spike'had been~ properly diagnosed as the product.of a zirconium-water reaction or-that the pressure spike caused the plant staff to change or adopt.a strategy for bringing the plant to cold shutdown that1 recognized the. presence of hydrogen'
$r'noncondensible' gas.
His examination of operator interviews and his involvement in development of the sequence of" events revealed nothing to indicate that anyone had on.the 28th iden.
t tifjed the-meaning of the spike and.taken actionsLin" response.
Dieckamp, ff Tr. 28,316, at 12.
Mr..Dieckamp believes that had operators and plant management correctly interpretedL he pres-t sure-spike,.they would have immediately. turned on the.high
. pressure injection pumps and left them on.
However,.this ac-tion was not taken until around:5:30 p.m.
- several: hours after the pressure spike at"the direction of management that was_ unaware of;the pressure spike and forfreasons unrelated to
_t-
_._--_-.a-__
the pressure spike.
Tr. 28,901 (Dieckamp); Tr. 28,542 - 28,544 (Zebroski).
See also Tr. 30,324 (Herbein) (referring to JME 1(c)(82) at 38-40); NSAC-1 (July 1979), JME 1(c)(63) at 7.
In addition, they should not have left the block valve open, as it was, for more than an hour after the pressure spike.
Tr.
28,842 (Dieckamp).
Finally, Mr. Dieckamp believes that had the pressure spike been understood, Gary Miller and Jack Herbein' would not have left the plant to brief the Lieutenant Governor.
3 Tr. 28,906 (Dieckamp).
This belief was confirmed by Mr. Miller in this proceeding.
Tr. 30,239 - 30,242 (Miller).
C.
Did Mr. Dieckamp have sufficient knowledge of accident events and perceptions to reasonably justify the contents of the mailgram, specif-ically his view that no one interpreted the pressure spike or initiation of containment spray in terms of core damage at the time the spike occurred on March 28, 1979, or withheld any such information?
33.
Mr. Dieckamp's overall awareness caused him to con-clude that no one recognized the significance of the spike as a direct indicator of or as a direct measure of core dame.ge on March 28.
Mr. Dieckamp had made a considerable and sustained effort to ascertain the facts surrounding the accident at Three Mile Island.
His examination of operator interviews and his involvement in development of the sequence of events had re-vealed nothing to indicate that anyone had identified the mean-l ing of the spike and taken actions in response.
In addition, - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ _ _ _.
Mr. Dieckamp was aware of the manner in which William Lowe had' specifically identified the pressure spike as a zirconium-water reaction, and he was keenly aware of the efforts that that dis-covery had triggered.
Finally, he believed that contrary.
information would have come to his attention had it existed.
Mr. Dieckamp characterized the pressure spike--once correctly interpreted--as the'Rosetta stone.of deducing the degree'of core damage.
He'was comfortable that had there been some indi-cation.that the pressure spike had been earlier recognized and that the plant staff had taken some action in response to that recognition, he would have known.
Tr. 28,363-364 (Dieckamp).
34.
In sum, Mr. Dieckamp's statement in the mailgram was reasonable and informed.
Mr. Dieckamp did not act with care-less disregard for its accuracy.
. 1 b
s ni
1 m-II.
Whether there was evidence available as of May 9, 1979, that anyone at the time the spike occurred on March 28, 1979, interpreted the pressure spike or initiation of containment spray in terms of core damage or withheld such information?
A.
What evidence existed on May 9, 1979,.and what con-clusions should have been drawn from that evidence, as to whether anyone interpreted the pressure spike or initiation of containment spray in terms of core damage at the time the spike occurred on March 28, 1979, or withheld any such information?
35.
The parties adduced no material evidence in existence on May 9, 1979, that anyone interpreted the pressure spike or initiation of containment spray in terms of core damage at the time the spike occurred, or that anyone withheld such informa-tion.
36.
During cross-examination, TMIA referred Mr. Dieckamp to the interviews of two control room operators which existed-prior to the mailgram being sent and which could have been seen by Mr. Dieckamp:
- 1) Met Ed Chronology dictated by H. McGovern (March 29, 1979), JME 1(c)(1); and Met Ed Interview of C. Faust (April 6, 1979), JME 1(c)(8).
Mr. Dieckamp did not believe that either of these statements indicated that anyone had in-terpreted the pressure spike in terms of core damage at the time.
Tr. 28,673-28,682 (Dieckamp).
The Board concurs.
37.
The chronology dicated by Hugh McGovern to an inter-viewer on the evening of March 28th stated:,
2 "1400 Had a [ loss].of 2-32A and 2-42A[,]
loss of radiation area monitors and an RX building pressure spike that went off scale on narrow range meter--definite spike straight up, straight back down.
. had full Rx building (spray pumps and
[BS-Vl's), DH-V8's). isolation and. cooling.
Someone secured spray pumps, shut BS-Vl's
.and DH-V8's (Hugh did) and unisolated
'quipment for building."'
JME 1(c) ht 2, 5.
This statement merely indicates awareness that the spike had occurred; it attributes no significance to the spike.
In fact, Mr. McGovern was questioned on this state-ment in a deposition conducted by TMIA during this proceeding, and explained:
Q.
Okay.
Now there's no statement -- again, I'm looking on the 2 p.m. entry, the 1400 entry on this page, no indication as to-believing the spike was due to an electrical malfunction, is that correct?
A.
That is incorrect.
Q.
The electrical malfunction?
A.
The loss of 2-32A and 2-42A are motor con-trol centers, electrical buses on the 328 level of the auxiliary building.
The loss of radia-tion area and (sic) monitors and the reactor building spike I attributed to either~the elec-trical malfunction of the equipment on the 328 level of the auxiliary building or some sort of a catastrophic event'on the 328 building (sic),
a fire of something else along'those lin'es.
Q.
I understand that, and I understand your.
hypothesis. But what I'm asking now is does it state in this paragraph other than by inference, by this hypothesis, that the spike was due to an electrical malfunction?
A.
No, it does not.
I ask you also to recall that this was taken about 3:00 in the.norning following a very long day before.
L 1
TMIA Deposition of H. McGovern (Sept. 26, 1984) at 32, quoted in Notification by Licensee of Intended Joint Mailgram Exhibit References and Deposition Stipulations (Nov. 27, 1984), ff. Tr.
30,105, at 2-3, accepted by the Board at Tr. 29,542.
38.
There is no need to rely on inference to understand Mr. McGovern's belief.
In a May 4, 1979, Met Ed interview, Mr.
McGovern clearly explained the appreciation that he and others had of the significance of the spike:
Q.
Did motor control centers 32A and 42A trip when you were there?
A.
Yes, and I can give you the exact time, it was exactly when we had the reactor building pressure spike.
At the time I don't think any-body thought it was an explosion.
We thought that we just lost a bus.
The buses that you mentioned are located on the 328 ft. level.
We lost the transfer pumps, the oil pumps for the reactor coolant pumps, and various other loads.
At the time we thought the spike on the recorder was an electrical spike and not an actual pres-sure spike.
JME 1(c)(21) at 7-8.
It is therefore clear from the evidence in existence and available to Mr. Dieckamp prior to May 9, 1979 not only that Mr. McGovern did not at the time of the pressure spike interpret the spike in terms of reactor core damage, but also that he believed others shared his belief that the spike was caused by an electrical malfunction.
39.
In the April 6, 1979 Met Ed Interview of Craig Faust, Mr. Faust was asked about the pressure spike and responded:
Q.
What about the reactor containment building spike?
A.
We probably had some sort of explocion be-cause that's what it looked like; shock waves.
Q.
Did you hear anything?
A.
No I.didn't.
Q.
Did it affect the pumps?
A.
There didn't seem to be any change in any-thing.
When the pressure dropped right off, we.
stopped building spray pumps, we didn't think we needed them.
Q.
The spray pumps came on automatically?
A.
Right.
Q.
Did they actually spray?
A.
I don't know, Ed Frederick could.tell you, vbe tell you what-kind of discharge pressures e on the pump.
He was the one standing we there.
I don't know how long we had them on be-fore they were turned off.
JME 1(c)(8) at 5-6.
40.
As with many of the early interviews, the questions in this interview did not seek to distinguish knowledge held on the 28th from knowledge subsequently acquired.
Faust's; state-ment that they probably had "some sort of explosion" is rea-sonably read as a retrospect've observation.
Nevertheless, i
while this statement by' Faust might suggest to some.that Faust believed the spike to represent a real pressure increase, it definitely provides no basis for a belief that Faust understood the spike to represent hydrogen generation or zircalloy-water reaction.
See Tr. 28,674-28,677 (Dieckamp). '
v 41.
In fact, in an NRC Interview of Mr. Faust on April 21, 1979, in which Mr. Faust was asked whether pressure in con-tainment.could keep flow from the reactor coolant drain tank going into the auxiliary building, Mr. Faust responded:
I don't think it'got.high enough at that
' time to do it.
It was only 4 pounds.
The only other= thing we had was this spike in
.the building, which-I believe we are now interpreting possibly to a hydrogen explo-sion.
JME 1(c)(12) at 82-83 (emphasis added).
This statement indi-cates quite clearly that Mr. Faust learned of the significance.
of the spike subsequent to its occurrence.
42.
Similarly, in his initial interview aftercthe tran-sient, on March 30, 19796/ Mr. Faust stated:
The plant started shifting and we thought we were going to get the bubble back in the pressurizer cause we had gotten the level in there and it looked like we were starting to get some heat out of the heit-era in pressurizer where it might get the bubble back over, but it was rather short-lived in that all we ended up doing was re-actuating the building the building isolation area because the temperature came down.
Of course we got flashing and went right out the drain tank and probably into the building and we saw a 27 psi spike building pressure and it came immediately back down.
O.K.,
we picked up everything, everything else seemed to be steady back out where it was again it seemed everything went where it was and we figured at this time we got our, we overrode the system
$/
Mr. Faust had, with Edward Frederick, dictated a statement in the early morning of March 29.
This statement, however, only described the initiation of the accident. ;
1 m -
i again, in other words, by passed it, by passed ES, and stabilized out whare we were again.
Building spray pumps of course picked up and we took them off.
My reason-
-ing behind that is we didn't have a high
. building pressure anymore and why start washing everything down in there with sodi-um hydroxide, so that's-about it.
JME 1(c)(2) at 11.
This statement again indicates Mr. Faust did not place.a high importance on the pressure spike, let alone interpret the pressure spike in terms of core damage.
His expressed sense that nothing had changed--almost nonchalant--cannot be reconciled with recognition of the occur-rence of a zircalloy-water reaction.
43.
Mr. Faust may not even have believed the pressure spike to indicate a real increase in pressure.
As previously stated, a recurring problem in interpreting the early inter-views is to distinguish statements made in retrospect--
statements reflecting subsequently learned knowledge.
State-ments made after May 9, 1979, in response to questions seeking Mr. Faust's reaction upon seeing the spike suggest Mr. Faust believed at the time of the spike that the spike was caused by I'
an instrument malfunction.
In testimony on May 11, 1979, be-fore the Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment of the House Committee on Interior and Insular. Affairs,.Mr. Faust re-i sponded to questioning from Dr. Henry Myers and indicated that ht the time of the pressure spike both he and Edward Frederick said the spike could have been an instrument malfunction.
JME l- !
I
- l(c)(28) at 145.
Similarly, in a deposition conducted by the
-NRC on October 9, 1980, he gave the following. answers:
Q.
But you recall that there was some discussion about [the pressure spike] being caused from some electrical problem?
A.
Well, that is what we sort of were looking at.
That is what they were trying to verify, whether there was a problem with the instrumen-tation.
That is what came on the strongest, let's put it that way, that I can remember.
I know that' was one point they were-looking at.
JME 1(c)(133) at 6-7 (emphasis added).
44.
Statements made on or prior to May 9, 1979, by other Licensee and B&W employees also indicate that the spike was not understood and in some cases not even perceived.
Gary Miller, i
in an April 14, 1979 group statement, said:
It should be noted that at approximately 1400 I heard a loud deep noise and at that time the reactor building spray pumps started and subsequent to the events of this day I learned that this was a 30 lb pressure spike which occurred in the Reac-tor Building apparently due to hydrogen.
JME 1(c)(10) at 21-22 (emphasis added).
i 45.
On April 21, 1979, Donald Berry, an engineer who was maintaining-a log of events in the control room at the time of the pressure spike, was interviewed by the NRC:
Q.
So then what happened?
A.
I guess.the next thing-I can remember is starting to take the log and you know when ex-actly again I don't know.
At that point'I' i
became more, a little more involved with what's going on and I can'see on this that this value was off of a low range recorder and.
.. i b
Q.
You're speaking of the reactor building?
A.
The reactor building pressure spikes, I was trying to get data from behind people, you.know, looking and it just spiked up to the top and back which showed me a four plus spike and I and
.this was only later that I heard that it actual-ly went up to 28 pound spike.
But I do'know that on the chart it spiked up to the top and back and that was on the low range chart.
Q.
So what was the discussion?
A.
. People didn't really, I don't think, under-stood at that point what happened.
I didn't understand:at that point what happened.
Sprays came on.
We know that and then they, as I logged there,-they turned the sprays off, you know, the pressure had spiked up and came back down.
Q.
Why did they stop the sprays?
A.
The pressure was back down to normal or close to normal level and they turned.the spray off.
So at that point I don't think anyone re-ally realized and it.wasn't until we were reading about the spike in the paper that there was a possible hydrogen, and I am going back things through my mind, when it could happen, I was there from 7:00 in the morning until 6 o' clock the next morning and then it dawned on me that we had the building spike.
And that was the only way I could-see that people must have later realized and that is what they tied it to.
Q.
But, at that time you had no indications-that anybody had thought that there had been A.
No.
Q.
Any kind of event like that?
l A.
No.
t i
Q.
Ah, do you recollect that anybody evaluated that situation, I mean, they discussed it?
When I say evaluation I merely mean like Zewe or who-l ever?
l l
A.
No.
I think the major concern of eople's mind at that time was getting the bubt a that we had trapped in a candy cane to nove so we would get this flow.
People were working every way they_could to get that established.
I guess I have to be, you know, I was agreeable with them at that point it was a pretty critical thing was to get that flow reestablished right.
JME 1(c)(13) at 17-19 (emphasis added).
46.
John Flint, a B&W employee who was in the control room throughout the 28th, in an April 23, 1979 NRC interview, stated:
In this range of time, heard a double thump, and at the time we had been in and out of respirators.
I assumed that the sound I heard was just a ventilation cycling at this time.
There appears to be a correlation with this and the reported hydrogen detonation in the building at that time.
JME 1(c)(14) at 6 (emphasis added).
47.
In an April 23, 1979 NRC interview, William Zewe, a Shift Supervisor in the control room, explained his observation of and reaction to the pressure spike:
Q.
When you got the building in isolation was that when you got the pulse of pressure in the containment?
A.
No.
It wasn't.
The peak that your proba-bly referring to, was the time that we actually started the building's spray pumps automat-ically, on a high pressure signal which was right around 30 pounds.
I think the recorder showed about 28 or 29 pounds.
But that wasn't till a couple of hours later.
Somewhere around 2 o' clock, a quarter to 2, or something like that in the afternoon.
Because we were then at-tempting to depressurize the plant and try to get down to the pressure, so that we could get on to decay heat removal.
So we had the I
?
electromatic lock (sic) valve opened and we were opening up the electromatic valve manually with our switch in order to_ reduce pressure so that.
we could get down there.
And it, it was one of these times when we had cycled the RC RV2, the electromatic. valve, that I was right in front of the Reactor Building pressure recorders.
We have two recorders there.
And I.was right in front of them.
And I believe it was Fred Scheimann, my shift foreman, that was operating the valve.
And I said, "Alrignt Fred, vent now."
You see, we were trying not to get high enough in pressure to have another building isolation, but yet reduce the pressure to come-down.
So he hit it, and I was right on the re -
corders themselves and they just went (whistle) j up.and right down.
And I said, "What the heck was that."
And then the Control Room operators off
- .o my left, in the building. spray pumps,.are probably three and a half to four feet over from:
1 the RB pressure recorders at the very end of the panel there.
And he said, " Bill, we've started I
the' buildings spray pumps."
And I said, "What?"
And so I looked over, and they were running and i, -
I pondered that for about 30 seconds.
I guess, because I thought, there just must have been b
some electrical fault surge from the electromatic, that caused the building spray pumps to come on.
And I thought, that's some-l thing we'll have to look into, but then I had the operator secure the building'a' spray pumps t
and then we went on with trying to depressurize then.
And we didn't have any more problem.in r
that time period of the high pressure.
JME 1(c)(15) at 32-33.
Zewe left no doubt as to his lack of appreciation of the pressure spike.
1 I was convinced at that time it was just a false electrical signal.
It nev,er entered my mind that it was a hy-drogen explosion, at that time at all.
Id. at 38 (emphasis added)..
e
-~
g r
m-
+
nm
-n-
9
.48.
Brian Mehler, another Shift Supervisor in the Control Room, in an April 25, 1979 Met Ed interview, stated:
I know at 2:00 we got the-boom.
I seen that, I was sitting in the office when that happened, that when the spray pumps came on and that's how I-knew we went over 4 pounds and the spray pumps were running.
I said that can't be possible.
They can't'be run-ning.
You know, we secured them and we looked at-the chart and you could see a line straight up about 32, 33 pounds, and then straight down.
I said who's playing with the transmitter, you know, but the only other explanation I could say the water was forced out of the building, the valves were left open and just the pressure in the building forced it out, you know, just a level the amount of water in the building.
JME 1(c)(17) at 8.
49.
In a May 1, 1979 NRC interview of I&E Inspector James Higgins, Higgins described a conversation with Gary Miller soon after Higgins first learned,on Friday, March 30, of the pres-sure spike.
Higgins stated that Miller indicated he had heard and was aware of the spike on Wednesday, but had completely 4
forgotten about it in the rush of events.
Higgius concluded that it was at this point on Friday that plant ~ management real-ized that they had the pressure spike.
JME 1(c)(19) at 24-25.7/
7/
It was Higgins' impression that Miller had been momentari-ly aware of the pressure-spike on Wednesday, but had not under-stood its significance until Friday. 'JME 1(c)(79) at 50-51; JME 1(c)(129) at 23-28. 1 I
~
\\
50.
Gary' Miller _was interviewed by the NRC on May 7, 1979:
Q.
Okay.
Another area I want to touch base with you on is, during depressurization of the system, it becomes apparent that the pressure, the hydrogen concentration in the containment was increasing, would you.
was that dis-cussed at any time during the day time?
A.
That was r.ot discussed to my memory, could've been but I don't remember discussing
-it.
Q.
No discussion of the possible increase of the hydrogen concentration?
A.
Not to my knowledge.
Q.
Were you aware that you had the 28 pounds?
A.
I was aware'of a loud noise in the reactor building, I heard it'at the control panel, in fact,'I asked what that was.
To my knowledge the other people standing there didn't hear it.
One operator tells me or one engineer tells me-that when'I said that he looked over and the building spray pumps had turned on which means that we had over 28 pounds.
Q.
Let me give you some information and see if if it ties something together in some-you.
what of a form of a question.
Were_you aware that at the instant, or had it come to your at-tention that the instant within the computer printout time frame and the operators discussion that the ignition occurred at the same time the power operated relief valve was opened?
A.
No.
Q.
And the computer, the reason-I say the com-puter, because the computer showed pressurizer heaters tripping at that time, you couldn't con-strue that either one of those conditions might
-have although pressurizer heaters tripping basically is outside, it can't.
it would've been a hot'short or something to give a spark.
When or had you become aware that the Shift *
~
Supervisor.was aware that the spike occurred at that time?
A.
He could've known.
I did not at that time have that knowledge and also you've got to.think you have.to remember that right after thatLtime I was preparing to leave the site.
So, I was out on the' panel watching us going to core flood.
Following that noise and so forth, I went back in and prepared to go and he could've talked to Mike Ross and.I wouldn't have known that conversation occurred.
JME 1(c)(23)(Tapes 159 and 160) at 70-71.g/
51.
In a May 9, 1979 NRC interview, Lynn Wright stated:
There's only other major event that sticks l
out in my mind as far as time, which would be at 1400, when.we had I would say no less than our second or third containment isolation signal, and our. building spray pump started, which building.
At that time,.I know it was an instantaneous spike up to roughly 29 pounds on our reactor building pressure recorders.
But people were ze'roed in on the pressurizer, trying to get some type of bubble and at this point I'm not sure whether this was when we were trying to reduce pressures and try to get on decay heat removal, which is one thing we did.
Whether it fell into this time frame or not, but I know we were trying to jog our electromatic relief isolation valve hoping to draw a bubble, and again some control over pressurizer level and pressure.
g/
Earlier in the same interview, Mr. Miller stated ambigu-ously, "I'm aware we had a hydrogen-excursion, I was aware at 2 l
o' clock we had an excursion.
JME 1(c)(23) at 26.
The NRC asked Mr. Miller to explain this statement in an interview on September 5, 1980.
Mr.. Miller explained he meant that.he is now aware that they'had a hydrogen excursion on the 28th, not that he was on the 28th aware that they had a hydrogen excur-sion. JME 1(c)(122) at 121.
Mr. Miller was also confronted by TMIA with this statement during this proceeding.
Mr. Miller l
Andicated that the testimony has been corrected by him in a letter.
Tr. 30,201 (Miller).
j !
l l
j o
JME 1(c)(24) at 12-13.
52.
Finally, in'a May 9, 1979 NRC interview,' Joseph Logan, the TMI-2 Superintendent, stated that although'he was in th'e control room at the time, he did not receive a report that reactor building sprays had activated.,He did hear a noise and asked what it was, and someone reported it was the ventilation system.
JME 1(c)(25) at 72-73.9/,
B.
Was such' evidence known to or communicated to Mr.
Dieckamp, during th'e period March 28 through May 9, 1979?
53.
Mr. Dieckamp availed himself of the early Licensee interviews.
Dieckamp, ff Tr. 28,316, at 11.
54.
Mr. Dieckamp cannot today determine which of the Licensee interviews he had seen prior to May 9, 1979.
He be-lieves that in the first few weeks after the accident he saw essentially all of these interviews that became available, and that he probably read most of the Licensee interviews.
As time l
went on, his immediacy with those matters began to diminish.
Tr. 28,349, 28,672 (Dieckamp).
55.
None of the NRC interviews referred to above, were transcribed prior to May 9, 1979.
See cover pages of JME 1(c)(12), (13), (14), (15), (19), (23), (24), and (25).
1 I
9/
Both Lynn Wright and Joseph Logan were interviewed in the afternoon of May'9, aftar the mailgram had been sent.
See JME 1(c)(24) at 1; JME 1(c)(25) at 1.
Compare Dieckamp mailgram, ff. Tr. 28,316.
i
\\ l
\\
1 L.
[
L C.
Did the mailgram reasonably reflect any such evidence which was known to or communicated to Mr. Dieckamp, during the period March 28 through May 9, 197"?
56.
None of the interviews in. existence as of May 9, 1979, indicates that anyone interpreted;the pressure spike or spray initiation in terms Lof reactor core damage-at the time of the : spike, or that anyone' withheld such.information.
To the contrary, they overwhelmingly indicate.that the~ significance of the pressure spike was not appreciated.
For this reason, it was not reported.
57.
The Dieckamp mailgram was, therefore, literally.true when sent.
At the time the mailgram was sent, no evidence ex-isted that anyone had interpreted the pressure spike or spray initiation in terms of reactor core damage on the day of the'
~
accident or had withheld such information.10/
10/ NRC Staff's witness, Norman Moseley, testified that he be-lieved that the statements of James Floyd that were reported in the May 7, 1979 New York Times article and the article itself were "some evidence" -- and the only evidence in existence prior to the mailgram being sent -- that someone had inter-preted the pressure spike in terms of core damage on the day of the accident.
Tr. 29,933 (Moseley).
However, as remembered by Mr. Dieckamp, Floyd merely stated that the pressure spike and spray initiation were observed by control room personnel and NRC inspectors, and that spray initiation indicated the pres-sure spike was not a spurious electrical signal.
Dieckamp, ff.
Tr. 28,316, at 3-4.
These statements made by an individual who was not present at TMI on the day of the accident, do not dem-onstrate that the pressure spike was interpreted in terms of core damage on the day of the accident.
The contrary conclusion in the New York Times article, which was based on these statements, has no independent evidentiary value whatso-(Continued next page)
I i
e
-_g
III. Whether there was evidence available after May 9,-
- 1979, that anyone-at the time the spike occurred on March 28, 1979 interpreted the pressure spike or initiation of containment spray in terms of core damage or withheld any such information?
A.
Whether subsequent statements by anyone, including interviews and testimony of Messrs.
s.
Chwastyk, Mehler and Illjes, constitute evidence that one or more individuals at the time the spike occurred on March 28, 1979, interpreted the pressure spike or initiation of containment spray in terms of core damage?
58.
Ce'rtain subsequent statements by Messrs. Chwastyk, 4
Mehler, and Illjes do, in the legal sense, constitute some evi-dence that one or more individuals at the time the spike oc-curred on March 28, 1979, may have interpreted the pressure spike or initiation of containment spray in terms of core dam-age.
The statements, however, not only were made long after the event but also are not dispositive.
They are discussed below.
f (Continued) ever.
It would be sophistry at its worst to now advance as ev-idence of the mailgram's inaccuracy the very conclusion which Mr. Dieckamp denounced.
Mr. Dieckamp was clearly stating that no evidence supported the conclusion in the New York ~ Times ar-ticle.
, i.
l B.
Whether subsequent statements by anyone, including interviews and testimony of Messrs.
l Chwastyk, Mehler and Illjes, justify the conclusion that one or more individuals at the time the spike occurred on March 28, 1979, in fact interpreted the pressure spike or initiation of containment spray in terms of core damage?
59.
Joseph Chwastyk was a shift supervisor at TMI Units 1 and 2.
Tr. 29,108 (Chwastyk).
At the time of the pressure spike, Mr. Chwastyk was on duty in the Unit 2 control room.
Tr. 29,111, 29,114, 29,124 (Chwastyk).
In essence, Nr.
Chwastyk in testimony during this hearing stated that he inter-preted the pressure spike as a hydrogen explosion due to zirconium-water reaction, informed a number of people, and took certain actions in response.
Tr. 29,354-29,358 (Chwastyk).
However, Mr. Chwastyk's testimony when viewed together with his prior statements in this regard reflect a growing knowledge, contain many inconsistencies and contradictions, and are virtu-ally uncorroborated.
60.
In this proceeding, Mr. Chwastyk testified that he saw the actual pressure recorder going straight up.
Tr.
29,124.
He testified that initially he did not know what was
. happening.
Tr. 29,125.
The spray pumps came on.
Tr. 29,126.
Mr. Chwastyk testified that the. pressure came back down and looked like it was staying there, so he ordered the spray pumps-shut down.
Mr..Chwastyk further testified that he ordered an external check of the reactor building and also ordered the
[
s
, ^r
~
i control' room operators to-verify containment integrity.
Tr.
29,127.. He testified that eventually he came to'the conclusion th'at the pressure spike did in fact' indicate a real increase in i
L.
pressure, based on the need for the pressure to be sensed at o
two separate locations'in order for spray pumps to start.
Tr.
l_
29,130.
Mr. Chwastyk testified that after discussing the cause of the spike with Brian Mehler (Tr. 29,166-29,167), he went back and discussed-the pressure spike with Gary Miller.
He testified that as best he can-recall he impressed upon Miller P
l-that he thought there had been a real pressure increase and i
I gave Miller the information upon which that conclusion was based -- spray pump actuation.
Tr. 29,131.
He does not recall j
l mentioning hydrogen or core damage (Tr. 29,154), but to the-best of his recollection mentioned that there had been an ex-j.
plosion.11/ Tr. 29,357.
Mr. Chwastyk testified that at the
[
time of his conversation with Miller, Mr. Chwastyk's:under-standing of.the pressure spike was that it was caused.by a hy-drogen buildup due to a zirconium-water reaction.
Tr. 29,141.
[
i E
According to Mr. Chwastyk, he. asked and shortly.thereafter re-
,)
ceived permission to draw a bubble in the~ pressurizer.
Tr.
i i
11/
Chwastyk' explained, "I am not certain about the' explosion, because the reason'I.say that, I think I. discussed with Mr.
- Miller the. fact of putting-the simultaneous operation of the-valve and-the presaure spike together,.which indicates an ex-plosion of some, sort.
But I really-don't recall'it." Tr.
29,406 (Chwastyk).
b L
~ -
.4
-r 4
4
',~
2
4 L
~29,142-150; Tr. 29,288-29,289; JME 1(c)(88) at 7,18; JME t-
'1(c)(117) at 26.
Chwastyk also testified that he ordered that t
~
electrical equipment not be operated.
Tr. 29,152.
He testified that a similar order was given later in the evening.
Tr. 29,152, 29,154-29,155.
Mr. Chwastyk testified that he dis-cussed the pressure apike with an NRC representative, but can-a not: recall if he told him that there had been~a hydrogen explo-i-
i sion.
Tr. 29,166, 29,357.
Mr. Chwastyk also testified that he 3
.d'iscussed the pressure spike with operators who later came on-4 shift.
Tr. 29,167.
He~ believes he' told them the pressure spike indicated a real increase in pressure and may have dis-i i
c'ussed hydrogen and zirconium-water reaction.
Tr. 29,168, Tr.
29,356.
{
Mr. Chwastyk's testimony during the hearing is that.he.un-derstood the pressure spike on.the day of the accident.
He was i
an important witness in this case and the Board observed him carefully.
We accept Mr. Chwastyk's testimony to be what he
. believes today, That testimony, however, cannot be reconciled i
with the vast bulk of evidence on this' subject which.was ad--
duced during the hearing.
In addition, a review:of Mr.
.Chwastyk's statementa from his initial interviews to his l
~ pres'ent testimony-five years later reflect an evolution in his l
recollection of his understanding of the prescure spike at'the-i.' '
time it occurred and-in his confidence in that. understanding.
t I
i '
,r,-
l
-m
- r-l y
l 61.
Chwastyk was first interviewed on May 21, 1979, i-twelve days after the mailgram had been sent.
'In this first I'
i l
interview, which was conducted by the NRC, Mr. Chwastyk de-I scribed his initial reaction to th'e spike:
I~didn't know what caused it but the fact that the spray valves started indicated to me that.we actually had some kind of pres-sure spike, either on the sensors or in the building itself.
I was not sure.
The spike of-course started all of the building i
spray pumps, decay heat pumps, etc.
The 4'
pressure spiked up and'it was only up very briefly, as a matter of fact, a couple of j
heart beats.
I know because I missed thcse heart beats.
It came right back down again.
I'still did not know what caused it so I sort of hesitated on securing all the i
equipment that started until I' thought.I had a better feel for what was going on.
Of course, I never did because the pressure came down and stayed down, and then I.or-dered them, the building spray pumps-and the DHV8's and everything closed.
Stopped.
JME 1(c)(35) at 9 (emphasis added).
In this May 21, 1979 interview, Chwastyk also stated that',-
l' after. hearing someone mentioning hearing a noise, he assumed i
i there had been~"some kind of explosion."
Id. at 17-18.
He f
stated that he then suggested to Gary Miller that they no l
longer cycle the electromatic relief valve "becausefit had --
the explosion -- or rapid rising pressure in-the reactor build-t ing corresponded to opening _the'[electromatic]mrelief valve."
l Id. at 18 (emphasis added).124 -Mr. Chwastyk never mentioned' ljb/. The electromatic _ relief valve (EMOV) 'is; sometimes ' referred to as1the pilot operated relief. valve (PORV).
Tr.,.29,332 -
~
(Continued next.page)
I t
9 -
p
+
~w w Ie-e v
v w
c-hydrogen in his May 21, 1979 interview, nor did he indicate he I
had deduced the occurrence of a zirconium-water reaction or that'he.had initiated action in response to the spike.
In fact he quite clearly indicated he never did understand what was going'on.
Mr. Chwastyk merely indicated that he believed the pressure spike corresponded to a real increase in pressure.
That he may have held this belief is not disputed.
62.
Mr. Chwastyk was next deposed by the Special Inquiry Group on October 11, 1979.
In this deposition, Mr. Chwastyk first referred to the pressure spike as "the hydrogen detonation or combustion or whatever you would like to call it."
JME 1(c)(88) at 6.
His generic use of these terms makes it difficult to determine in subsequent responses whether he in fact considered the spi,ke in such terms on the 28th.
Chwastyk stated:
When the nydrogen explosion occurred, it was -- it occurred simultaneously with an operation of the valve, and I'm not sure which one it is now, I think it was the block valve for the PORV-or the PORV itself, I'm not sure which.
That led me to believe that we had some-kind of a problem in the solenoid onerator on the valve. 'And that's when I essentially thought I knew enough about what was going on to suggest to Gary Miller to -- well, I asked (Continued) 29,334 (Chwastyk).
However, it may not have been the.EMOV that was cycled at the time of the pressure spike,'but rather the EMOV block valve-located immediately downstream of the EMOV.
See NUREG-0600,-JME 1(c)(62) at I-3-11; Tr. 29,331 (Chwastyk).
1 l l
l
permission to re-establish the bubble in l
the pressurizer and that's what we -eventu-ally did do.
Id. at 6-7.
The ambiguity created by using the term " hydrogen detonation" generically is demonstrated in a statement by Chwastyk elaborating on the conversation with Miller in which Chwastyk purportedly asked permission to draw a bubble in the pressur-izer.
Mr. Chwastyk stated:
It was right after the hydrogen explosion and I mentioned that I correlated the open-ing of the valve with the detonation peri-od, that I again went to Gary Miller and explained what I thought had happened as far as the hydrogen detonation and the si-multaneous opening of the valve.
Id. at 18.13/
That Mr. Chwastyk was indeed using the term hydrogen explosion or detonation generically and retrospectively is strongly sug-gested by his following statements in the same deposition.
At this time the pressure spiked -- at that time, I didn't know what it was.
But it was some time later when someone mentioned an explosion that they had heard that I put two and two together on the pressure spike and the noise that we had actually had some kind of explosion in the building.
Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
13/ Compare this statement with Mr. Chwastyk's May 21, 1979 interview, in which he stated.that he. suggested to Gary Miller that they no longer cycle the electromatic relief valve "be-cause it had -- the explosion -- or rapid rising pressure in the reactor building corresponded to opening the.electromatic-relief valve."
JME 1(c)(35) at 18 (emphasis added)..
^
I j
I related that to Gary that I thought that i
what we had seen out there was an explosion-of some kind in the building and it corre-lated with the opening -- one of the valves, and I'm still not sure which one it was, I told Gary that I didn't advise him operating that valve any longer.
'-Id.
(emphasis added).
63.
Mr.'Chwastyk was again deposed by the Spacial Inquiry Group on October 30, 1979.
Mr. Chwastyk stated that u'pon 4
seeing the spike his first reaction was that it was an instru-ment problem.
However, he then noticed that the spray pumps had started and concluded that it could not be an instrument problem.
JME 1(c)(99) at 6-7.
Mr. Chwastyk was asked whether he recalled discussing the spike with Mr. Mehler.
He did not.
Id. at 7-8.14/
furing this October 30, 1979 deposition, Mr. Chwastyk was again questioned about his reported conversation with Mr. Mill-er.
Mr. Chwastyk stated ".
I went to Gary and I related to Gary that I think we had some kind of, something happened in the reactor building and simultaneously with the changing'of the position of this valve.
And I suggested to him that we no 14/ Brian Mehler, another shift supervisor on duty in the con-trol room with Mr. Chwastyk, had been deposed by the.Speciel Inquiry Group on October 11, 1979.
Mr. Mehler remembered dis-cussing the cause of the spike with Mr. Chwastyk.
Mr. M(hler stated that hydrogen did not enter into their discussion.
He stated, "We thought maybe some kind of chemical reaction or something happened because it was up and down so quick."
JME 1(c)(89) at 14-15..
r
longer cycle that valve."
Id. at 10.
It was during this October 30, 1979 deposition that Mr. Chwastyk for the first time indicated that he had assumed that the explosion was caused by hydrogen.
Id. at 14-15.
When questioned about how substantial core damage must have been to generate that amount of hydrogen, Chwastyk replied:
I thought about it, and I think from the time that it dawned on me what happened in the reactor building, I knew we had sus-tained some core damage.
How severe it was, I tried to stay away from thinking about how severe or unsevere the accident was, simply because I don't know.
I don't want to make any conjecture.
At the time, remember, I had other things that I just did not have the time to waste thinking about what ifs essentially.
Id. at 26.
Chwasuyk was also asked in his October 30, 1979 interview whether he remembered an instruction not to operate electrical equipment.
He replied that such an instruction.was given just after the D.C. (11 pumps in the reactor coolant pumps were started, but that he did not think this instruction'was given on Wednesday, March 28th.
Id. at 15-16.
64.
Mr. Chwastyk was interviewed once more by the NRC in September, 1980.
Whereas most persons' memories were fading, Mr. Chwastyk's was expanding.
Mr. Chuastyk now remembered his discussion with Brian Mehler and thought he discussed'the spike "with quite a-few people."
JME 1(c)(117) at 6.
Chwastyk stat-ed that it was shortly after his conversation with Mehler that
, r 6
i he assumed there had been "some kind of explosion, a hydrogen explosion."
Id. at 15.
Mr. Chwastyk also remembered l
concluding that there had been a zirconium-water reaction -- a term he had never used in any of his prior interviews or depo-sitions.
It was only after the explosion that it dawned on me that we did in fact have some core damage'in there because the zirc-water reaction created the hydrogen.
Until that time, I did not really know what the-status of the plant was.
I only knew what I was_ told.
But when I put tc7 ether the explosion and the hydrogen, I knew then that we had suffered at least some core damage.
I did not know how to quantify-it simply because, you know, it could have been a localized explosion, like I men-tioned earlier, or it could have been a minimal amount of hydrogen.
In my mind, you know, when I put the explo-sion together and it was hydrogen, you know, it came from zirc-water, it was just.
an assumption I made.
I discussed the explosion, you know, and my thoughts at the time, which were that there j
had been a hydrogen explosion.
I don't think that I went into zirc-water reaction creating hydrogen or an explanation or dis-cussion of what happened.
l Id. at 24-25.
i With respect to Chwastyk's purported conversation with Mr.
I Miller, Mr. Chwastyk stated'during his 1980 NRC interview that he told Miller that there had been "some kind of explosion in l
l l
' the building."
Id. at 7.
But later in the interview he sug-gested, and again for the first time a year and a half after
~
- the accident,-that he had related to Mr. Miller that there had probably been;a hydrogen' explosion.
Id. at 27.
With respect to an instruction not to operate electrical equipment, Chwastyk now, in 1980, remembered such an instruc-tion being given on the 28th.15/ He stated that he did not-know-but-assumed the instruction'was given by Gary Miller, and he also assumed the instructi.on was given to avoid sparking.
Id. at 16-22.
In addition,.n irreconcilable conflict with Chwastyk's present testimony that it was he -- Chwastyk -- who first gave an order not to operate electrical equipment, Chwastyk stated in his September 4, 1980 interview that upon..
hearing of such an order, "I could have kicked myself for not thinking cbout that." Id. at 16.
Finally, in his September, 1980, interview, Mr. Chwastyk for the first time remembered that in response to.the pressure spike, he directed that a check of containment integrity be made.
Id. at 33-36.
. 15/ Chwastyk's September 4, 1980 account resembles quite closely the earlier deposition-testimony of Brian Mehler.
Compare JME 1(c)(89) at 15-16, 23-25~with JME'1(c)(117)-at i
16-18.
Mehler subsequently concluded that he was mistaken and an instruction not to operate: electrical equipment had not been given on the 28th.
Ironically, Mehler based this conclusion in part on a conversation with Chwastyk,-in which Chwastyk had
. told ~him the instruction was given on the 29th.
JME 1(c)(98) at 15-16; JME'1(c)(117) at-36-40.
See PF'86 infra.
' 49-
~
D
__-.__i.___._-
65.
This evolution in Mr. Chwastyk's recollection reveals L
that Mr. Chwastyk's present belief in his state of knowledge on March 28, 1979, has been considerably influenced and affected 1
by subsequent learning.
In this respect, his earliest inter-view must be viewed as the most reliable.
That May 21, 1979 interview does not indicate that Joseph Chwastyk interpreted-the pressure spike or initiation of contain:nent spray in terms of core damage at the time of the spike.
It is not until October, 1979, that he first speaks of hydrogen at all and not until September, 1980, that he connects the spike with a zirconium-water reaction.
66.
_Chwastyk's present recollection is also compromised by the testimony of all the persons to whom Chwastyk purported-ly related his thoughts.
67.
Brian Mehler, when asked whether-there was any con-cern expressed about hydrogen ignition during his discussion with Chwastyk of possible causes of the pressure spike replied that he did not ever recall hydrogen being mentioned on the 28th.
Tr. 29,487 (Mehler).
Mehler previously stated in a SIG deposition that hydrogen did not enter into this conversation.
JME 1(c)(89) at 14-15.
Chwastyk too does not remember men-tioning hydrogen to Mehler.
Tr. 29,166-29,167 (Chwastyk).
68.
Gary Miller has no memory of Chwastyk speaking to him on the 28th about the spike or correlation of the spike with-l the cycling of the electromatic relief valve.
Tr. 30,203-...
-30,204 (Miller).
In previous statements, Miller has consis-tently stated,that'he remembers no such conversation.
JME 1(c)(122) at 122-123; JME 1(c)(95) at 22.
Indeed, Chwastyk himself has indicated uncertainty as to what'he told Miller.
Chwastyk's May 21, 1979 interview suggests that Chwastyk merely told Miller there had been a rapid pressure rise when the EMOV was opened.
See JME 1(c)(35) at 18.
In his October 11, 1979 deposition, when asked whether he told Miller that he thought opening the valve caused an explosion, Chwastyk replied:
.That's what I thought.
Most definitely I did think that.
Now, whether_or not I re-lated that to Gary then, now that I think about it, I don't really remember.
I may have just gone back to Gary and asked per-mission again to redraw the bubble.
I just can't remember if I related to him my thoughts at the time of the correlation of pressure spike in the operation of the valve.
JME 1(c)(88) at 21-22 (emphasis added).
Mr. Chwastyk was equally uncertain in his October 30, 1979 deposition.
He stated that he told Mr. Miller that the't had-some type of explosion, but added:
Whether I said it wa's hydrogen or not, I'm not sure.
But I remember distinctly putting together the operation.of the valve.
and the spike, and I think I relayed those thoughts to Gary.
JME 1(c)(99) at 17 (emphasis added).
When informed that Mr.
Miller had no recollection of such a conversation, Mr. Chwastyk became even more equivocal:
i 1
9 Well,-that could very well be true.
- Again, I can't absolutely -- if Gary said -- I may
~
not have told him what I thought at the time,-because I really wasn't certain.
Id. at 19-20 (emphasis added).
Mr. Chwastyk ended this deposition as follows:
Q:
I just have one question to consolidate and clarify the record.
Could you give us your best recollection of what it is that you told Gary' Miller on Wednesday afternoon about your correlating the pressure spike with a possible explosion?
A:
My best recollection is that I related to him what I had put together at the time, and that was the simultaneous operation of the valve with the pressure spike and the noise heard in the building.
And I may have_just inferred.
I don't really remember that I said specifically that-it was a hydrogen explosion or explosion or whatever.
I just may have inferred that it may have caused a spike.
I don't ramember that specifically.
I do remember putting those three things togeth-er and relating those three things to Gary.
Whether I said I thought it-was a hydrogen explosion or if I just thought it was an explosion of some kind or even if-I just inferred that those things caused the spike, I don't remember.
Q:
I don't want to put words in your 7
mouth.
You recall making the-inference, but you don't recall whether you conveyed that inference to Gary Miller; is that cor-rect or incorrect?
A:
My best recollection-is that I did re-lated (sic] that information to Gary.
That's the best I can remember.
How much r
of that information though, what information I gave him, I definitely don't remember.
I do know that'I gave him the I
information of the bank.[ sic], the valve opening. simultaneously with the pressure spike..
.--s
y, Now,-if I.related that or if I put that together and told him-that I thought it was.
a hydrogen explosion, if I thought it was an explosion at all, I don't remember.
Id. at 28-29 (emphasis added).
-If Mr. Chwastyk had indeed interpreted the pressure spike in terms of core damage, as he today believes, it is hard to l
reconcile the fact that he.didinot communicate that important T
determination to his close co-worker, Brian Mehler, or to his plant manager, Gary Miller.
4 69.
Even Chwastyk's statement that he asked Miller's per-mission to draw the bubble is suspect.
Two control room opera-tors -- Craig Faust and Lynn Wright -- who were at the console 4
at the time of the spike and under the direction of Chwastyk have stated.that they were already trying to draw a bubble in the pressurizer when the spike occurred.
JME 1(c)(2) at 11; JME 1(c)(24) at 12-13.
See also NRC interview:of D. Berry-I-
(April 21,-1979), JME 1(c)(13) at 19.
70.
Mr. Chwastyk's testimony that'he informed Miller of n explosion is al.a extremely questionable insofar as the l
timing of this purported conversation-is concerned.
According to Mr. Chwastyk's testimony, the sequence of events after the
-1:50 pressure spike' included a period of. time in which he~ob-served containment pressure return to normal and' ordered the.
. containment spray pumps secured -- six minutes according -to -ob-
~
[
jective evidence (JME 1(c)(63) at 45), an instruction given by
- ?. -
l l
-e,
7 Chwastyk to check containment, a conversation with~Mehler, and a subsequent conversation in which he was informed of a thud or noise.
Tr. 29,124-29,133, 29,338-29,340 (Chwastyk); JME 1(c)(117) at 15.
Chwastyk has described this entire period as 15-30 minutes after the spike, perhaps less.
JME 1(c)(117) at 27.
Yet the best evidence indicates that Miller departed to brief.the Lieutenant Governor shortly before 2:00.
Tr.
30,245-30,247 (Miller); Tr. 30,343 (Herbein); JMF 1(c)(106) at 906.
71.
In his September 4, 1980' deposition, Chwastyk identi-fied Donald Neely as the NRC inspector whom he had told the spike was real.
JME 1(c)(117) at 13, 104-105.
Inspector Neely, however, has stated with considerable conviction that he was not informed of'the pressure spike.
JME 1(c)(130) at 8-13; JME 1(c)(90) at 16-17.
72.
The individuals on the shift whom Chwastyk briefed on the afternoon of March 28th were Theodore Illjes, Charles Mell, and John Kidwell.
Tr. 29,167 (Chwastyk). -These operators have l
also been interviewed.
l l
73.
Charles Mell, in an NRC interview on Jul,y 14, 1979, stated that during turnover they were shown the spike and tcid 1
that both building spray pumps had come on.
He stated,'how-l ever, "at that time they hadn't, you know, they know that both l
of them came on but they really hadn't rea'lly postulated why they had come on yet.
No one-really had the time to think '
about it. "
JME 1(c)(60) at 7.
Mell stated that it was not until the next day that someone postulated a hydrogen burn.
JME 1(c)(60) at 11-12.
See also JME 1(c)(69) at 17-18.
74.
In a May-23, 1979 NRC interview, Theodore Illjes
- stated,
. when it was turned over it was mentioned that we did have a pressure spike, when we turned over.
That was the only thing that was mentioned, and that they had recovered from a reactor building isolation." JME 1(c)(36) at 8.ls/
(Illjes had no present recollection of this briefing.
Tr.
29,646 (Illjes)).
75.
John Kidwell was interviewed by the Special Inquiry Group.
He recalled that there was discussion late one night about the pressure spike and what caused it, but did not know which day.
See JME 1(c)(107) at 61.
~
76.
In sum, not one of the people with whom Chwastyk be-lieves he discussed the significance of the spike corroborates Chwastyk's presently stated views.
Not one of these individ-uals -- Miller, Mehler, Illjes, Mell, Kidwell, or Neely -- re-members Chwastyk informing them on the 28th that there had been a hydrogen explosion or discussing its significance in-terms of core damage.
It is highly unlikely that all these persons --
including an NRC inspector -- could have forgotten such
.ls/
Illjes also stated in his May 23,.1979 interview that hy-drogen explosion was discussed later on in the evening.
This subject is addressed separately at PF 94-104 infra.
l !
l LJ
information.
It follows that Chwastyk is mistaken in his memo-ry of recognition of the significance of the pressure spike and of what he informed others.
77.
Chwastyk's testimony is also inconsistent with other actions and events.
~Chwastyk has stated that he resisted going to full high pressure injection.
JME 1(c)(88) at 43, 47.
Yet full'high pressure injection was the chief action that recogni--
~
tion of the spike would have prompted.
Tr. 28,901 (Dieckamp);
Tr. 28,542 - 28;544 (Zebroski).
Similarly,.Chwastyk stated in his May 21; 1979 interview that once the reactor coolant pump was restarted.in the evening, he felt that everything was "under control and it was essentially a matter of recovery after that."
JME 1(c)(35) at 34.
See also JME'1(c)(88) at 25.
Such sentiments are inconsistent with recognition of the occur-rence of a zirconium-water reaction and continued presence of hydrogen in the reactor coolant system.
78.
Chwastyk may well have realized that the pressure spike indicated a real increase in containment pressure, but it is unlikely that he interpreted the pressure spike in terms of core damage.
More likely, his present memory has fed off un-derstanding that developed after the accident and off the many statements he and others gave over the years.
It appears that Chwastyk's recognition that the spike corresponded to a-real e
pressure increase has metamorphosed into a recognition that the spike corresponded to a hydrogen explosion -- in large part
simply because the pressure spike was subsequently referred-to
,l-as the hydrogen' explosion.
His having-informed on-coming oper-ators of there having been a pressure spike has transformed 4
into a briefing on hydrogen produced by a zirconium-water reac-
+
. tion.
What may simply have been a comment ~to Gary Miller that the EMOV should no longer be cycled -- cn perhaps-simply a re-iteration.of earlier requests to draw a bubble ---now-includes a discussion informin'g Miller that there had been an explosion in containment.
If in the unlikely event Chwastyk indeed i
guessed that the pressure spike was caused by a hydrogen explo-sion due to a zirconium-water reaction -- an understanding in consistent with Chwastyk's actions and his earlier statements-
-- the information was certainly not passed on.
79.
Brian Mehler was another shift supervisor who re-j ported to Unit 2 on the day of the accident. Tr. 29,428-29,429
-(Mehler).
Mehler testified that at the time.of the pressure' spike, he was in the shift supervisor's office.
He testified that from there he noticed increased activity at-the' console and the actuation of a number of alarms.
Tr. 29,475-29,476-(Mehler). 1Re went to.the console.
Tr. 29,476 (Mehler).
Mehler testified that the' pressure recorder was brought to his.
f attention, and his first impression was that it^ looked like an electrical fault of some sort-or that someone wasfdoing some-4 thing torthe transmitter.
Tr. 29,479, 29,562-(Mehler).- A i
- 'short time after, he. noticed that both building spray pumps.
l.
. [-
1
?
d
-b t
l were running. 'Mehler testified that at-that~ point, based on
_the sensor logic for building spray' actuation, he came to the l
. conclusion that the pressure spike was real.
Tr. 29,479 (Mehler).
~
80.
Mehler also testified that he had a few words with
~Chwastyk about the spike. 'Mehler testified that they were con'-
cerned,: thought maybe it'was some kind of chemical reaction, but could.not come up with a feasible source.
He has main-tained consistently and continues to maintain that hydrogen was never mentioned on the 28th, much less zirconium-water reaction or.other cause of any hydrogen.
Tr. 29,487, 29,566 (Mehler).
4 See also Tr. 29,562-29,564 (Mehler).
j _
Mehler was also questioned at some length regarding 81.
i '
prior statements concerning an instruction not to operate elec-trical equipment.
Tr. 29,500-29,504; 29,507-29,534, 29,567-29, 579 (Mehler).
These statements are discussed below.
82.
As previously discussed Mehler was first interviewed by Met Ed on April 25, 1979.
Mehler mentioned.the pressure spike but indicated he had not understood.its cause.
See PF 48 supra.
83.
Mehler was next interviewed by the NRC on May-17, 1979.
In that' interview, Mehler was asked about the: pressure spike and answered:
Q: 'Okay.
There was a discussion about -- in l
the afternoon approximately.1:50 or so -- there was a spike in-the containment to a high pres-sure.
l _
L
)
~
'A:
The-spike in the containment occurred about 10 of 2.
Somewhere around 10 of 2 or 2:00.
Q:.Were you in-the area when that occurred?
A:
When that occurred I was in the-shift super-visor's office.
What alerted me to it is I no-L ticed the CROs moving over towards the makeup pumps and starting to secure them, and that.in-dicated that we had probably another ES.
And' there's two conditions that could have caused it.
Either low pressure, which we.were already at, or a'high reactor building pressure of four pounds.
Q:
Okay, Brian, did you notice that the con-tainment spray pumps were on at that time?
A:
Yes I did, I~ walked out and I went to the
.[
left side of the console where the building i
spray pumps are.
Previous to that I glanced over the RP pressure indication and it was
+
reading roughly in the neighborhood of one or two pounds.
At that particular point I looked at the spray pump and they were running and I didn't know why, because they should start at 30 pounds.
So we secured the spray pumps because there was no need to put the sodiuim hydroxide into the containment all over'the equipment.
t Q:
Okay, Brian.
Did you have the wide range pressure trench recorder available'to you for reactor pressure?
A:
Oh yes.
Q:
Did you look at that?
l A:
Yes, after we secured the spray pumps I went i
back and checked the recorders.
And definitely L
there was a spike aligned straight up..It went l..
up to approximately 32 to 33 pounds and it came down in the same line.
Q:.Mdat did this mean to you? 'Did'it mean any-thing at that time?
A:
First thought'in my mindLthatLsomeone was-screwing with the transmitter.
j I i'
l r
Q:
Do-you know.-aat' activity the shift was in-i --
volved in at thextime that today ignition or ex-plosion occurred?
A:
I didn't know at that particular moment what
' activities were'-involved.
Later on I found out.
Q:
Okay. 'And what did you find out later?
i-A:
Well, later the only. activity that could
'have caused the explosion was some kind of spark because they opened _the bl'ock valve -- no, no it was not the block valve.
It w'asithe vent valve.
from the. pressurizer to. relieve some water.
And-that was-the only thing that could have given us 1
detonation of_the hydrogen.
JME 1(c)(32) at 29-32.
In this.nterview,.Mehler-did'not explain what day or-time he meant by "later."
However, in
. testimony in this proceeding, Mehler explained that he was re-i ferring to-sometime after the 28th.
Tr. 29,490-(Mehler).
i 84.
Mehler was next interviewed-on August 22, 1979 by the Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation of-the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works.
Mehler was asked if he heard anyone express any concern about energizint the_ block valve-just prior to the pressure spike.
He replied:
~
No.
After the pressure -- don't know ex-4 -
actly what the time element was after that.
L Since we did have an explosion, it needed a source of ignition. lWe assumed the igni.
[
tion source could have been the block valve.
If it was-that same day or two days I
-later I can't'tell.
I know it was dis-
- cussed at some-time-or another.
JME 1(c)(68) at 8.
Mehler-also-described his reaction-to'the l
' spray pumps running:
- l. ;
/
I P
.=
_. _ - - _, ~,.
To. start spray pumps you need 30 pounds of-pressure, two out of three, and they were l
running.
I-couldn't believe that, I looked at them.
I walked over and looked at the chart and that's when I saw the line straight up and straight down.
It looked like.somebody played with the transmitter.
It couldn't have been that or we wouldn't have gotten the spray pumps.
Id. at 9.
Mehler stated that an NRC representative asked him why he was concerned.
Mehler stated that he answered:
I told him that they would only start at 30 pounds. I said it is impossible to get 30 pounds.
I walked over to the chart and looked at it, we got up to 28, according to this chart; 31, it was straight up.
I looked at.it and said, "that's impossible".
I showed it to him.
Id. at 10.
Mehler also stated that he talked to Joseph Chwastyk about the spike.
When asked what was Chwastyk's reac-tion, Mehler stated:
He was concerned and he realized basically what we had.
We weren't really concerned
-- we were concerned bu* we'couldn't deter-mine if it was hydrogen er maybe we had some kind of chemical reaction that-time.
The spray system did come on and all that.
We didn't know.
At that point none of us realized we could have had that much hydrogen in the building of that percentage.
It was really roughly, we are talking about 3-R's (sic) [ hours] a buildup to roughly, I guess, 7 percent, somewhere around there.
i Id. at 12.12/
Finally, Mehler remembered a statement made 12/
In testimony in this proceeding,. Mehler explained that the word hydrogen was used in his interviews only because they knew I
(Continued next page) L
~.
t
" Don't start nothing,fdon't stop nothing."
Id. at 13.
He did
'not indicate.when this. statement was made.
However, when asked-Lif-this statement-was a factor in perhaps delaying starting the f
L reactor / coolant pump late that evening, Mehler replied "I don'>t u
o sknow if that was brought into discussion or not."
Id.
- 85. Lon. October-11s-1979, Mehler.was-deposed by the Spe-cial: Inquiry Group'.-
He was asked about"his May 17, 1979 NRC-t interview:
Q.
Okay, I'think in your I&E interview you said that you.tPought initially that-the pressure spike in the containment, when you saw it, was probably due to.somebody-fooling around with the transmitter.
i j
.A.
Yes, I said that.
But then I also said it couldn't have been possible because build-ing spray pumps started.
}
Q.
Which meant that there had been a pressdre signal that went through and started the j'
building spray pumps?
l A.
Right.
Q.
Then I think in your I & E interview you said later you told Gary Miller.--
A.
No, I don't believe I did say that.
.I did say that I told an NRC man standing right l
along side of me and I pointed out the pressure spike;to him and-told him that it-happened _and why the building spray pumps:
came on because he wanted to know.
I (Continued)
-after the accident that'the spikeLwas. caused by hydrogen.. Tr.
-29,564.
He~didinot intend to indicate that hydrogen was dis-
. cussed with Chwastyk on<the 28th; it was not.
Tr.
~
29,564-29,566'(Mehler).
r 4
f
?
r t
d
- ir 1 '---ea aw --
r --+
--,.e t
e
- -+r t
'-m--
l Now you're going to ask me his name.
Q.
.No, I'm not interested in that strangely enough.
A.
Well, I don't know it.
Q.
.Now, after.looking at it in that initial dismissal, did you later realize that there had been pressure in the containment that caused that spike on the instrument?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Do you'have any idea what could cause that kind of a rapid pressure spike?
A.
I know Joe and I talked about it later on that. day, about what could-have caused it and I don't think hydrogen entered into it.
We thought maybe some kind of chemical re-action or something happened because it was up and down so quick.
Q.
That is Joe Cnwastyk?
A.
Yes.
Q.
So you really didn't have a good diagnosis?
A.
I personally didn't think hydrogen could form that quick in the building to that concentration to cause it in that period of time.
Q.
Did you ccnnect the spike with the fact that it just happened after the vent valve had been opened?
A.
No, later on, yes.
Two days-later when everyone became concerned, yes.
Q.
But not on the 28th?
A.
We were told, someone.must have connected it, because.we were. told not to start any pumps, not to.do anything that could give
(
an ignition.,
.Q.
Were you told that on the 28th?
A.
Yes, in a supervisor's office.
I forget l
who told us that, so it was someone,who was L
honed in on something.
Q.
It sounded like somebody made a connection with. hydrogen?
A.
Who, I don't know.
I would have to make an assumption and I don't want to do that.
Q.
Did you make'any recommendations to Gary Miller -- with regard to that pressure spot (sic) either immediately after it happened or later on on the 28th?
A.
No.
It's very hard.
I would like to put the time together, but I can't.
I can't.
I do know sometime after the pressure spike happened we were told not to start equip-ment because they assumed that it could.
happen again and-they probably put it that there was hydrogen in there, but that was sometime after 1:50.
Now how-far past that, I don't know.
And I do not, I said
-- well, to Gary Miller I said -- he said don't start any more oil pumps and I said we don't have to, I already tested them all, because they were concerned -- but how far into the afternoon at that time, I don't know whether it was 4:00, 2:00 or what, but it was sometime after.
JME 1(c)(89) at 13-16.
Later in this deposition, Mehler was questioned concerning the instruction not to operate electrical equipment.
He maintained that the instruction was given on the
~28th, because it was prior to the reactor coolant pump being
(
started.
Id. at 23-25.
l 86.
Mehler was again deposed by the Special Inquiry Group on October 30, 1979.
He agreed that, based on the' fact that l
the spray' pumps'had come on, he did conclude on March 28th that l
l
_64_
l-1
there had been an actual pressure excursion in the reactor building.
JME 1(c)(98) at 6-7.
Mehler stated that he had l
explained to an NRC inspector the logic of the spray pumps, that there was no need to leave the spray pumps on since pres-sure was down, and that he (Mehler) did not know what caused the pressure spike.
Id. at 8.
Mehler stated that-the inspec-tor was not Don Neely, whom Mehler knew.
Id. at 9.
Mehler also described his subsequent conversation with Chwastyk:
Q.
Do you remember thereafter talking with a Mr. Chwastyk, Joe Chwastyk about the spike and what might have caused it?
A.
Sometime later Joe and I did discuss it.
Q.
When you say "later," you mean later in the day?
A.
I couldn't say if it was ten minutes to an hour later, but both of us were out at the panel, looking at it.
And we were both concerned about it, but we did not know what caused the spike.
And hydrogen wasn't mentioned at the time, we did mention to each other it could have been some kind of chemical reaction, but we didn't know.
Q.
When you say " chemical reaction," you as-sumed that it was some sort of explosion but you didn't talk about-the possibility of a hydrogen explosion?
L A.
That wasn't' mentioned in that discussion at l
the time.
r i
Q.
Was there any possible chemical explosion i
or detonation that you talked about that i
might have been a possibility?
A.
We really didn't know what could have L
caused it.-We were'just discussing possibilities.
- i I'
1
)
Q.
As far as you remember, the subject of hy-drogen didn't come up?
L A.
Not between us that day.
Q.
Do you remember thinking yourself about ethat as a possibility?
A.
Not that day.
Q.
Did you, in your.own mind or in-your con-i versation with Mr. Chwastyk, connect the possibility of.an explosion with the open-ing or closing of the PORV block valve?
l A.
That I don't know.
It was associated with that sometime later.
I don't know if it was that day or the next day _that that's what could have been the source.
Q.
What do you remember _about your conversa-tion with Joe Chwastyk?
Were you guys pretty upset about this, or were you puz-zled?.How would you characterize the con-versation?
A.
We were both highly concerned and really a i
little scared.
But it happened, it was over with, there was nothing we could do about it anymore; and we were more con-cerned with trying to get the core stabi-lized.
Id. at 10-11 (emphasis added).
Mehler was also questioned again_concerning the instruc-tion not to start electrical equipment.
He still believed the instruction had been given by Gafy Miller, but stated: "Now what day that was, I don't know."
Id. at 12.
He explained that he associated the instruction with the starting of the t
lift and backstop-pumps.
Id. at 13.
However, Mehler_added that'they also started 11.ft. pumps on the 29th, and that he was.
Y
on duty both days.
Id. at 14.
In. addition, since his October 11, 1979 deposition Mehler had talked to Gary Miller, Michael L
l Ross, Joseph Chwastyk, and Bill Zewe.
According to Mehler, none of these individuals remembered such an instruction being given on.the 28th; but Chwastyk recalled such an instruction being given-on the 29th.
Id. at 15-16.
87.
On November 1, 1979, Mehler provided to the Special Inquiry Group transcript corrections to his October 11, 1979 deposition (Mehler's first SIG deposition).
Included was a cover letter informing the SIG that Mehler was unable to state that-the instruction not'to operate electrical equipment oc-curred on March 28, 1979 or at some later date.
JME 1(c)(89)
(cover page).
88.
Mehler was interviewed one last time by the NRC on September 4, 1980.
Mehler stated that the change in his recol-lection concerning the instruction not to operate el~ectrical equipment was.the result of having talked to people, having had.
I
- the chance to review logs, and having had a chance to sit down and figure out where he was.
JME 1(c)(115) at 23.
He stated that, after six months, the 28th, 29th and 30th ran together.
Id. at 21.
89.
Mehler's present testimony and prior statements make' it very clear-that while Mehler-thought there had been a real pressure excursion, he simply did not understand the cause.
On March 28, 1979, Mehler did not think of hydrogen as a L
possibility.
JME 1(c)(98) at 11..
m
90.
The significance of Mehler's testimony therefore de-volves to the implication of his October 11, 1979 deposition j
testimony that an instruction not to operate-electrical equip-ment was given on the 28th.
But Mehler has retracted this a
statement.
91.
In addition, the evidence is overwhelming that the instruction was in. fact given on the 29th.
The instruction is reflected by entry in the control room log -- at 9:14 p.m. on Thursday, March 29, 1979.
The entry reads "Placed RCP Lift pumps in off (minialze sparking potential in RP)."
TMIA-Mailgram Exh. 16 at'4.
In this proceeding, Brian Mehler re-ferred to this entry and others on the 30th to indicate lift pumps were started on the 29th and 30th.
Tr. 29,530-29,532 (Mehler).
George Kunder testified that it was in fact he who
.gave the instruction -- on Thursday.
Tr. 30,028-30,033.
See also JME 1(c)(118) at 51-53.
Richard Bensel was assigned to determine which equipment could cause sparking, as reflected in James Seelinger's notes on Thursday at 9:30 p.m.
TMIA Mailgram Exh. 2 at 9.
92.
Moreover, Gary Miller testified that he does not re-member an instruction on the 28th not to operate electrical equipment and does not believe it was given on that day.
Tr.
30,208-30,209 (Miller).
See also JME 1(c)(95) at 21-30.
Mill-er's testimony is corroborated by that of thirteen other indi-f viduals,. including two NRC' inspectors who were present in the
! l
i control room.
None of these individuals remembers concern
~
about electrical-equipment and sparking on the 28th, while a number of them do recall such concern on the 29th.
JME 1(c)(70) at 19 (Porter); JME 1(c)(125) at 14 (Porter); JME Ll(c)(71) at 9-10 (Frederick); 'JME 1(c)(132) at 8 (Frederick);
.1E 1(c)(118) at 51-53-(Kunder); JME 1(c)(119) at 46 (Zewe);
JME 1(c)(124) at 66-67-(Ross); JME 1(c)(127) at'10-12 (Illjes);
JME 1(c)(129) at 30 (Higgins); JME 1(c)(130) at 9 (Neely); JME 1(c)(133) at 17-18 (Faust); JME 1(c)(134) at 7-8 (Scheimann);
JME 1(c)(135) at 4-5 (Conaway); JME 1(c)(136) at 47 (Logan);
and JME 1(c)(137) at 13 (A. Miller).
93.
In conclusion, it appears evident that Mehler was mistaken in his October 11, 1979 deposition in stating that an instruction not to operate electrical equipment was given on the 28th, and was correct in his subsequent retraction.
The remainder of his testimony and statements explicitly indicate that Mehler did not recognize the pressure spike as a hydrogen explosion on the 28th.
Consequently, Mehler's prior statements and present testimony do not demonstrate that anyone inter-preted the pressure spike or spray initiation in terms of reac-tor core damage at the time of the spike.
94.
Theodore Illjes was, at the time of the accident, a
. control room operator _at Unit 2.
On the day of the accident, he reported to the observation center somewhere:between two and three o' clock in the Efternoon and subsequently reported to the
Unit ~2 control room.
Tr. 29,587 - 29,588 (Illjes); JME 1(c)(36) at 2, 4.
95.
Mr. Illjes has very little recollection today of-con-versations on_the day of the accident.
To the best of his rec-
.ollection, he does not remember discussion of hydrogen on the evening of.the-28th.
Tr. 29,595 (Illjes).
He has no-recollec-tion of being told by Chwastyk that the pressure spike was real, that it represented an explosion, that the explosion was due to hydrogen, or-that the source of the hydrogen was a zirconium-water reaction in the reactor core.
Tr. 29,652 -
29,653 (Illjes).
Today, Illjes believes that realization that a hydrogen burn had actually occurred was later, probably Friday, March 30.
Tr. 29,651.
He believes that if the pressure spike had been attributed to a hydrogen burn or hydrogen explosion on Wednesday, March 28, there would have been corrective measures taken and perhaps a log. entry made.
Tr. 29,650 - 29,651
~ (Illjes).
Mr. Illjes also testified that he remembers Steve Pogi as one of the engineers who was present when the spike was attributed to hydrogen.
Illjes recalls that Mr. Pogi was not present on the day of the accident.
Tr. 29,657 - 29,659 (Illjes).
Mr. Pogi was a Penelec Former GPUSC startup engineer
?
l who arrived at-TMI on Friday, March 30, 1979. -TMIA Mailgram 1
Exh.- 11.
i I-
96.
'Illjes was first interviewed on May 23, 1979.
In l-
/dhis interview, which was conducted by-the NRC, Illjes' recalled
' being briefed upon-reporting to the control roem.
- DUE 1(c)(36) at 2 - 4.
-When asked if'he recalled being briefed on the wide range / narrow range reactor building pressure indications, Illjes replied:
"I was told that they had a spike on both indications of the reactor building pres-sure recorder.
There was some discussions as to what it was.
A hydrogen explosion was discussed.
This was later on in the evening."
JME.l(c)(36) at 6.
When asked when in the evening this discus-i
.sion took place, Illjes replied:
It was after we drew a. bubble.
O.K.
If I want to relate it, I would say it was after we drew the bubble in the. pressurizer which we did after that.
As far as what time that was mentioned, as far;as we dis-cussed it, I know it was discussed when we turned over, when we came in, but we'didn't make any bones about it because we were in-terested in getting flow through the reac-tor and the bubble in the pressurizer and so.
They had recovered from that situa-tion, and our concern was cooling the reac-tor and insuring it had flow.
Later on' when we had things stabilized,.we had a bubble in the pressurizer and_had a' reactor coolant pump running and that term area, we were discussing with, I can't remember if it was one of our engineers.
But we'did
~
i have a pressure spike. 'We pulled <it out.
and I don't know who wanted a copy-but.we made a couple copies of the chart."
Id. at 7.
When asked about any earlier discussions, Illjes
. stated:
s W
e.
W' 9
g
~+&a
l 1
"I was there and I wasn't involved in any discussion until it was brought up....
Ex-cept when.it was turned over it was men-I tioned'that we did have a pressure spike, when we turned over.
That was the only thing that was mentioned, and that they had recovered from reactor building isolation.
Q:-
So a pressure spike was discussed at the turn over, when you first came in, about 3:45. And then somewhere about 8:00 further discussion and also xerox copies?
A:
Right.
Id. at 8 - 9.
Finally, when asked what was discussed and with whom, Illjes replied:
"A:
We talked, I talked about it with the trainee on our shift, who was Chuck Mell.
And the person that asked for the informa-tion, and I don't remember who that was, whether it was an NRC inspector or a E&W representative.
Q:
Was any discussion related to this?
Was the hydrogen burn or was a real spike or was this discussed as an electrical spu-rious signal possibly?
A:
This was discussed that evening but we also talked about it several times after that and I cannot separate the two differ-ent discussions but as far as I remember we related it to a cycling of the electromatic relief isolation, which is a DC operated valve I believe and that has a contact'in there which will cause arcing which possibly could ignite'the hydrogen. That-was discussed, but I can't say we-discussed it that night.
We didn't really have that much time to do a lot of discussion, but we talked about it and when I walked away from the panel, the guy that wanted the copy, you know, he wanted it now, and I had to walk away from the panel to make sure that
~
the other guy, my shift supervisor, was there while I valked away so.....
I s
Q:
On the first evening, can you recall if on that first evening you were dis-cussing after 8:00 that it was possibly a hydrogen burn?
A:
As far as I know that possibility was discussed that evening.
Q:
With this engineer, you don't know whether he was GPU or NRC or_what?
Can you recall?
A:
No, I won't say.
I don't remember.
~
No. We...
It was also that night, you know, that we determined that we had a hard.
bubble and what that bubble was, you know, we had talked about that too, you:know...
What is the gas and is~it hydrogen or other and all that water that went through the -
reactor and out-into the RC drain tank and out into the reactor building.
-Q:
So at that time it appeared.to be still inconclusive within your own
...?
A:
I wasn't sure that's what it was, per-sonally, yes.
I'll say that.
4 Id. at 9 - 11.
97.
Charles Mell was also interviewed by the NRC.
Mell did believe that the pressure chart had been photocopied on Wednesday night.
However, he agreed that had they removed the chart, "it wouldn't ink.for awhile."
JME 1(c)(60).at 9 - 10, 12.
Furthermore, regardless of when the chart was first photocopied, Mell s'tated that it was not until Thursday that someone postulated a hydrogen burn.
Id. at 11.
There was no discussion of hydrogen on Wednesday night.
Id. at 12.
See also JME 1(c)(69) at 18.
l 98.
Richard Lentz, who'was the only GPUSC engineer per-mitted access to the Unit 2 control room to collect data on March 28, 1979, was also interviewed by the NRC.
Lentz told the NRC that he obtained no analog output (e.g. strip chart re-cordings) on the 28th and that such data was taken off on the 29th.
JME 2(c)(47).at 9.
Lentz also testified in this pro-ceeding and confirmed that the strip chart was not pulled or photocopied for him on the 28th.
Lentz, ff Tr. 32,972, at-2.
99.
The NRC subsequentT7 concluded that it was possible but unlikely that copies of the pressure trace were made on the 28th.
The NRC examined the reactor building pressure trace and observed no obvious pen disruption.
The chart itself had a-written notation " chart removed, March 29, 1979 at noon."
NRC personnel did not recall a photocopy in the control room on March 28, 1979.
The NRC had further discussions with Licensee and GPUSC technical staff who were identified as having knowl-edge of the copying of the pressure trace.
A GPU staff member stated in a discussion that he was not in-the control room on March 28, 1979, but did get copies of the reactor building pressure spike around the 29th or 30th of March.
He also stat-ed he made copies for NRC staff.
The NRC concluded that Illjes was mistaken and that the actual analysis and review took place on March 29, 1979.
NUREG-0600, JME.1(c)(62) at I-4 I-4-51.
l l
E
m h
e 100.
The Special Inquiry Group examined-the same evidence Land reached the same conclusion.
JmGC 1(c)(107) at 59 - 62.
The Special Inquiry Group based its conclusions on the -follow-ing facts:
1.
No other control room operator or
. supervisor had recalled any general discus-l sion in the control room about what' caused the pressure spikejor about.a hydrogen ex-plosion on Wednesday night (i.e.,~after.the main pumps were restarted about 8:30 p.m.),
whereas such discussions clearlyfdid take place Thursday night when engineers discov-ered the spike, cut up.the strip chart- 'and Xeroxed it in order to analyze it.
o.
2.
Illjes recalled that "we also talked about it several times after that and'I cannot separate the two different discussions,"
(Illjes, IE 261, at 9), sug-gesting that he, like others, may have had a-difficult time long after the fact dis-tinguishing between events that occurred on Wednesday and Thursday.
3.
In his testimony, Illjes-linked the discussion about the pressure. spike with the determination.that there.was a noncondensible gas bubble in the reactor system ("It was also that night, you'know,
~
that we determined that we had a hard bub-bleiand-what that bubble was, you know, we-l
'had talked about that.too, you know").
The presence of noncondensible gas was not dis-l cus. sed, as far as all the' evidence avail-j-
able to us showed, until. late afternoon or.
early evening-on Thursday, not on Wednesday night.
j 4.
Illjes-made reference to requests for.information from GPU. engineers or NRC-
~
inspectors.
We knew such individuals'had
[
-bcen involved in looking at the' pressure-spike Thursday. night, but there was no evi-r
.dence that either GPU officials.or'NRC in-spectors knew of or were interested in it I
Wednesday night.
. i r
,u
.2,
p
~-
~-
~
~
-5.
The strip chart'incquestion bears
_a-notation that-it-was. removed from the
?
trotating drum in the. control room at about' Enoon on Thursday, and the two pen-recorder-lines run out.to approximately that time.
EIn order to xerox the. spike Wednesday night:
it would have.been necessary to remove the entire' drum-from the: instrument panel, in-terrupting both pen-lines. Jul IE inspector 4
.who examined the. original cha'rt reported'in the IEiinvestigation report thattit.showed:
.no discontinuities of'the type that would necessarily.be. caused.by taking.'the chart i:
off thecrecorder and putting it back on again."
p
-Ici. at 59 - 60.
.In addition, the Special Inquiry Group again interviewed Illjes.
Illjes recalled that the chart was photocopied because "a. number of engineers" requestedJthe strip 4
1 l
chart'and that he talked to one of these engineers,~ Walter f-(Bubba) Marshall, about whether the spike had been caused by an' l-electrical spike or a hydrogen explosion.
The Special Inquiry Group then interviewed Marshall.
Marshall stated that he was present Wednesday night and Thursday morning until about 7 a.m.
l in the vicinity of the' control room; that he had previously f
been present at 2 p.m. when the spike occurred, and that at 1.
that time it was gen vally agreed.to have been caused by a-faulty signal; that on Wednesday night, there was no discussion L
about the possibility of a hydrogen' explosion; andlthat.he was i
involved in discussions on Thursday night after 10 p.m. with;
~
-Richard Bensel,-James Floyd-and control room operators about the pressure spike and.a hydrogen explosion.
Id. at 61.
I s.
l Y
- -3, c
L_
101.
Illjes was next interviewed by the NRC on September 24, 1980.
Illjes was asked to explain the discrepancies be-tween his prior statement and the weight of the evidence.
Illjes: replied, " Bad memory."
JME 1(c)(127) at 6.
Illjes main-tained only that the pressure spike had been discussed.
Q.
Is it still your recollection that hydrogen was discussed on March 28th, 1979, as a pcssible cause of the pressure spike?
A.
To my recollection, we discussed the pres-sure spike.
Q.
Do you recall who you discussed it with?
l A.
The other two men in the control room at the time, and Joe Chwastyk was sitting behind us, or in the near vicinity.
I don't remember if he was in the conversation or not.
But the other two men on the shift --
Q.
That would be Mell and Kidwell?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Was hydrogen a part of those discussions, do you recall?
A.
I don't remember.
Q.
When you said " pressure spike," you.used that intentionally?
You were talking about the pressure spike?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And not necessarily hydrogen?
A.
It's hard for me to separate all the dis-cussion that was made on that night.
I can't really say, because it was discussed how many times thereafter, and that far apart I can't re-late the difference.
Id. at 6-7.
. 1;-
102.
At some point in time, the 2 a.m.
to 10:15-p.m. on March 28, 1979 portion of the strip chart was cut from the pre-ceeding and subsequent portions, leaving the chart in three pieces, a fact noted in NUREG-0600.
NUREG-0600, JME 1(c)(62) at I-4-50 to I-4-51.
It can be postulated that the middle sec-tion might have been cut from the strip chart.on the evening of the 28th and hence removed for copying without di'srupting the pen trace.
Consequently, testimony was heard in this proceed-ing on whether this portion of the strip chart could have been cut from the remainder without disrupting the pen trace on March 28.
The testimony revealed that while this is physically possible, it would have been necessary to tape the chart back together in order for the chart to move onto th~e take-up roll.
Examination of the chart, however, did not reveal evidence that such temporary taping had occurred.lg/ Brill, ff Tr. 31,610, at 2-3.
No tape mark was evident on the portion of the strip chart that would have remained under the pens.
Tr. 31,661 -
31,662 (Brill).
103.
Of more significance, however, is the testimony of Illjes and Mell, the individuals who believed the chart had been " pulled" on the 28th.
Neither of them stated that the chart was cut on the evening on the 28th, even when confronted Ig/ The strip chart was taped together subsequent to May 2, 1979.
See Brill, ff Tr. 31,610, at 4.
i l
i,
i
w with the fact that the pen trace showed no disruption.
JME l
1(c)(60) at 9-12; JME 1(c)(107) at 61.
Furthermore, Chwastyk, who was the shift supervisor on duty at the console on the evening of the 28th, stated that normally if a copy was wanted, the entire strip chart would be removed and a new one replaced.
If it had been removed and cut, the date, time, and an.explana-tion would have been noted.
Chwastyk could not envision some-one pulling the spool out, cutting it, taping it, putting it back, without making a notation on the chart.
Tr.
29,407-29,409-(Chwastyk).
104.
Illjes' statement in his initial NRC interview, in which he recalled a discussion of hydrogen on the evening of the 28th, is simply contradicted by the statements of too many other people, such as Mell, Marshall, and NRC personnel who Illjes remembered being present.
Illjes' statement'is also in-consistent with the physical evidence; and today, Illjes be-lieves the discussion did not occur on the 28th.
For these reasons, it is evident that Illjes was at.one point indeed mis-taken in his recollection of the timing of this event; he is hardly alone in his inability to consistently recall events during the initial days of the accident.
105.
Subsequent to the mailgram, many other individuals have been interviewed or deposed concerning their knowledge or appreciation of the pressure spike.
They have uniformly indi-cated lack of appreciation of the pressure spike on the 28th.
1 s
i 106.
Ivan Porter has previously stated he was not aware I
of the pressure spike'on March 28, 1979.
JME 1(c)(70) at 12-14;-JME 1(c)(97) at 24-28, 107.
George Kunder testified in this proceeding and has previously stated that he was not aware of the pressure spike on the 28th.
Tr. 29,993 (Kunder); JME 1(c)(72) at 25-27; JME 1(c)(118) at 53-54.
108.
Leland Rogers has stated that he was not aware of the pressure spike.
He did hear a noise, but was told it was ventilation dampers.
JME 1(c)(87) at 47-48; JME 1(c)(100) at 49-50.
109.
Joseph Logan has stated that he was not aware of the pressure spike on the 28th.
JME 1(c)(77) at 14-15; JME 1(c)(136) at 52-55.
t 110.
Gary Miller testified in this proceeding and has previously stated that he was not aware of the pressure spike, and while he did hear a thump, attributed it to ventilation dampers.
Tr. 30,186-30,187 (Miller); JME 1(c)(39) at 57-58, 59 and 63; JME 1(c)(83) at 31-32; JME 1(c)(93) at 28-29; JME 1(c)(95) at 18-2.2; JME 1(c)(122) at 111-123.
111.
Jack Herbein has testified in this proceeding.and previously stated that he was not aware of the pressure spike on March 28, 1979.
Tr. 30,417-30,418 (Herbein); JME 1(c)(27) at 26-27; JME 1(c)(67) at 19.
I -
L.
~~
112.
Robert Arnold did not learn of the pressure spike on the 28th.
JME 1(c)(26) at 36; JME 1(c)(73) at 12-16; JME 1(c)(84) at 34.
113.
.Two NRC inspectors who were in the control room --
James Higgins and Donald Neely -- were not aware of the pres-sure spike on the 28th.
JME 1(c)(79) at 49-51; JME 1(c)(90) at 16-17; JME 1(c)(129) at 22-24; JME 1(c)(130) at 8-9.
114.
Control room operators who were on duty in the con-trol room at the' time of the spike -- Edward Frederick, Craig Faust, Hugh McGovern and Lynn Wright -- were aware of the pres-
~
sure spike, but did not understand it.
They attributed it to an electrical or instrument problem.
JME 1(c)(28) at 143-147; JME 1(c)(71) at 11-13; JME 1(c)(75) at 264-265; JME 1(c)(111) at 3-7; JME 1(c)(116) at 7-13.
JME 1(c)(132) at 5-6; JME 1(c)(133) at 6-8.
115.
Adam Miller, a shift foreman in the control room, was also aware of the pressure spike but did not understand it.
t He believed it was due to a sudden escape of steam when the EMOV was opened.
JME 1(c)(137) at 4-5.
116.
Walter (Bubba) Marshall, ar. engineer in the control room at the time of the spike, was aware of the spike.
He stated that they could not come up with any reason for the pressure spike other than an electrical system or instrument fault.
JME 1(c)(31) at 23.
I' 1117.
William Zewe, a shift supervisor in the control 1.
-room, wasfaware.of the spike.
He. stated that he discussed the.
- spike-with Joseph Chwastyk and Michael Ross,.and they concluded-l, it was some sort of electrical transient.
JME 1(c)(75) at 257-259.
See id. at 11-12.
See also JME 1(c)(119) at-40-44.
118.
Michael Ross, the TMI-1~ Supervisor of Operations who was.in the Unit 2 control room providing assistance, was' also t
. aware of the pressure spike, but he attributed it to an-instru-ment problem.
JME 1(c)(33) at 3-5; JME 1(c)(81) at 42-44; JME' 1(c)(96) at 8-9; JME 1(c)(124) at 47-51.
119.
In response to the questionnaires which-Licensee j
sent to 456 individuals during the course of. discovery in this J
j proceeding, twenty-one individuals responded yes to a question asking: "On Wednesday, March 28, 1979, were you aware of~or in-formed that a hydrogen explosion or combustion had occurred in the TMI-2 containment building?".
Licensee contacted all these persons.
One individual did not respond; the remaining twenty informed Licensee that they had misunderstood the. question and answered incorrectly.
TMIA Mailgram Exh. 32A.
119. Based on review of the physical facts and evaluation of the present and prior testimony of key individuals, the Board finds that the weight of the evidence does not. support a I
conclusion that anyone on March-28, 1979, did 'in fact interpret the pressure spike and spray initiation in terms of reactor core damage.
82-V i
l o
.m-.
F
.,...y- - - -
4
,.--.yf._-
-m
- ~
w
The totality of the record is seriously contaminated by post accident learnings as evidenced by the numerous inconsistencies.in the sequential statements of individuals.
The inherent infirmity of memories after more than 5 years lim-its the ability to further isolate the facts.
While the record contains numerous bits and pieces of information that can form the ingredients of a contrary conclusion, selective-assembling of the record to support a conclusion contrary to the thrust of the Dieckamp mailgram does not withstand the tests of internal consistency and independent corroboration.
Accordingly, we cannot conclude that subsequent evidence demonstrates the mailgram to be inaccurate.
C.
Was such evidence known to or communicated to Mr. Dieckamp after May 9, 19797 121.
Mr. Dieckamp reviewed the additional information on the pressure spike produced by the several investigations sub-sequent to May 9, 1979, including specific interviews of indi-viduals.
Dieckamp, ff Tr. 28,316, at 12-13.
During this pro-ceeding, Mr. Dieckamp displayed considerable familiarity with such information.
122.
Mr. Dieckamp was asked when he first became aware of I
Chwastyk's May 21, 1979 interview.
Mr. Dieckamp did not know exactly, but did not think he was aware of Chwastyk's state-j ments prior to receiving a transcribed copy.
Tr. 28,745-28,746 m
~
i b?
(Dieckamp).
As evident from the cover sheets of the tran-l' scripts in the Joint Mailgram Exhibit, the early NRC interviews n
-- those conducted for NUREG-0600 ---were transcribed in late 4
June or early July,.1979.
At that time, Mr. Dieckamp was not fol' lowing all of the NRC interviews and had no particular rea-4 son to single out Chwastyk's interview for review.19/
Tr.
28,747-28,748 (Dieckamp).
122. Mr. Dieckanp, however, was familiar with the investigative reports at or near the time of their issuance.
Tr. 28,713-(Dieckamp).
He took advantage of-the testimony summaries in those. reports.
Tr. 28,760.
These reports reas-i i-sured Mr. Dieckamp in his conclusions and beliefs.
- Dieckamp,
'l ff. Tr. 28,316, at 17-18;'JME 1(c)(123) at 15.
i i
1 1
I i
f i
t F
19/ -E"en today, Mr. Dieckamp-does not find Chwastyk's May 21, 1979 interview inconsistent with the mailgram.
- Dieckamp, ff..
Tr. 28,316, at 14; Tr. 28,748-(Dieckamp).
The Board agrees. -
_ ~.
IV. 'Whether Mr. Dieckamp subsequent to'May 9, 1979, acted with careless disregard in not correcting or supplementing his mailgram in the light of subsequent evidence, including-l interviews of Messrs. Chwastyk, Mehler and Illies?
A.
Did Mr. Dieckamp have a reasonable basis to believe that any such subsequent evidence was available to the mailgram recipients?
123.
The information that was obtained in the months and years after the mailgram was sent consists primarily of inter-views and depositions conducted by the Nuclear Regulatory Com-mission'(through I&E or the Special Inquiry Group), by the President's Commission, by the Senate Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation, and indeed, the' testimony in this proceeding.
The
. interviews and depositions taken over the years were not only made publicly available, but also, as evidenced by the cita-tions in the various investigative reports, generally shared arong the investigative groups.
In particular, the Report of the Majority Staff of the House Committee on Interior and Insu-lar Affairs, JME 1(c)(143), which itself analyzed the pressure spike information, indicates that Representative Udall's staff not only conducted their own investigation, but also were inti-mately familiar with, the many investigative reports, inter-i views, and depositions compiled by other investigators and the-l conclusions reached by those investigators.
Moreover, the var-ious investigative reports themselves. summarize the pertinent
[
information in considerable detail.
See NUREG-0600, JME
! i s
e yv
- 1(c)(62) at I-4-47-to I-4-51; Report of the Special Inquiry Group, JME 1(c)(106) at 42-43, 902-911; Memorandum from Rogovin/Frampton to Chairman Ahearne (March 4, 1980), JME 1(c)(107) at 1-6, 43-62; Report to the U.S. Senate, JME 1(c)(108) at 138-141; NUREG-0760, JME 1(c)(142) at 22-31; and Report of the Maiority Staff of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affcirs, JME 1(c)(144) at 54-98.
Mr. Dieckamp cer-tainly had a reasonable basis to believe that subsequently ad-duced evidence was available to the mailgram recipients -- Rep-resentative Udall and the NRC Commissioners.
Indeed, not one wit of evidence was presented in this proceeding to suggest that any information available to Mr. Dieckamp was unavailable or unknown to the mailgram rec 3pients.
B.
Whether Mr. Dieckamp had a reasonable basis to continue to believe that no one interpreted the pressure spike or initiation of containment spray in terms of core damage?
124.
It is this Board's concl'usion upon consideration of the present testimony and the host of prior statements of the individuals involved, as discussed above, that in fact no one i
on March 28 interpreted the pressure spike or initiation of containment spray in terms of core damage.
125.
Even if this Board had determined that the only plausible candidate, Joseph Chwastyk, did on March 28 interpret the pressure spike in terms of core damage, the Board would I
f i l t
I
still' conclude that the Dieckamp mailgram was accurate when sent and could not have been sent as'an effort to mislead.
'Moreover, the Board would still have concluded that the thrust of the mailgram remains today a reasonable conclusion.
There isino. question that the evidence most adverse.to the assertion in the Dieckamp mailgram, including the testimony of Mr.
-~ hwastyk, contains serious inconsistencies and is contradicted C
by~a wealth of competing information.
A reasonable man could certainly conclude, based on all the evidence available today, that no one on March 28, 1979, interpreted the pressure spike or spray initiation in terms of reactor core damage.
126.
With respect to what a reasonable man could today conclude, the conclusions of the various investigative reports are significant irrespective of their correctness.
In NUREG-0600, upon consideration of more information than was available to Mr. Dieckamp, including the May 1979 interviews of Chwastyk and Illjes, the NRC Staff reached a conclusion I
~
stronger than that in the Dieckamp mailgram.
Whereas Mr.
Dieckamp stated "there is no evidence that anyone interpreted the pressure spike or spray initiation in terms of reactor core t
damage at the time of the spike," the NRC Staff concluded, "No statements that have-been obtained indicate that anyone present postulated that the pressure spike was due to the rapid burning of hydrogen."
JME 1(c)(62) at I-4-48.
For Mr. Dieckamp's statement to be wrong, not only would one need to have n i
3 pestulated a hydrogen burn, but as well recognize the source of the hydrogen to be a zirconium-water reaction and correlate that reaction.to the amount of core damage necessary to gener-ate the requisite quantities of hydrogen.
127.
The ~ Special Inquiry Group took Mr. Chwastyk's state-ments at face value, but nevertheless found:
The true nature of the pressure spike (that it was a-hydrogen burn) will not be gener-ally recognized until Thursday (March 29) evening.
d JME 1(c)(106) at 42. 'The report also concluded that the pres-sure spike was one of a number of important factors that were ignored, misinterpreted, or disbelieved; and the report found no evidence that information was wilfully withheld Id. at 911.
128.
In the Rogovin Supplemental' Report, the Special In-quiry Group again evaluated the evidence and elaborated in its conclusion:
There is' evidence from which one could infer that information was intentionally withheld from the NRC.
Such an inference could be drawn from the very fact that some critical information was not in fact re-ported; from a judgment that the explana-tions given as to why information was not believed or why it was discounted, albeit plausible, are not convincing; and from the existence, in a few instances, of conflict-ing testimony-.about who knew what at what time, which could be read.as an attempt I witnesses to deny falsely that they were aware of critical information that they knew should be reported.
l ;
The problem with the drawing of such an in-ference is four-fold.
First, it is merely.
an inference; there is no direct evidence to support it.
Second, although there is some sworn testi-mony that could support such an inference, in order to draw the inference it is neces-sary to disbelieve the sworn testimony of a number of individuals.
In the case of the pressure spike / hydrogen explosion, there is conflicting testimony about wheth-er the matter was explicitly pointed out to NRC inspectors -- who were unquestionably in the control room and in a position to i
observe it -- and in addition it is neces-1ry to. disbelieve the testimony of Gary Miller and-the corroborating testimony of a number of others who say theLspike was attributed to an instrument failure.
This is not to say that none of these indi-viduals may not have given false testimony under oath, or recalled events incorrectly.
However, in the absence of direct testimony tending to show that they have testified falsely, such a conclusion would necessari-i ly be based on surmise rather than on evi-dence.
Third, there are plausible explanations other than intentional concealment that have been advanced-for the discounting of the information in consistent sworn testi-mony by control room personnel, and there are plausible alternative explanations for the failure to report this information other than willful withholding, including confusion, fear, and a desire to focus on getting the plant stable.
These are dis-cussed in our Report.
In hindsight, the explanations given for disbelieving some of the information may not be very convincing to some, but from that one cannot necessar-ily conclude that the' testimony is false.
Finally, wc know that critical information was also not reported by NRC and B&W per-sonnel to their own managements during the day,cn by Met Ed control room personnel to
offsite Met Ed and GPU officials.
No one l
has: suggested that such-conduct involved intentional concealment. 'Indeed, as our.
Report points out, top NRC officials
'ncluding the acting: Chairman had informa-i tion on March 28 indicative of core uncovery,.yet this information was not com-municated to~ Congress the'next day in a
. formal briefing.
As we noted in-our Re-i port,-these facts tend to-lend.some weight to the notion that confusion and lack of i
competence by Met Ed employees, rather than i
a conspiracy to withhold information, was involved.
JME 1(c)(lO7) at,2-5; See id. at 43-62.
129.
The Hart Committee Report discussed the evidence
~
concerning the pressure spike in a section entitled "The Symp-toms are Not Understood."
JME 1(c)(108) at 140.
In the same I
vein, the report concludes:
t i
The weight of the evidence does not support-intentional concealment of information by i
the utility on the first day of the acci-j dent.
There are conflicting statements as-to whether the director of the utility's emergency command team was made aware of major evidence of uncovering of, and severe-i damage to, the core.
On balance, however, the evidence indicates that neither he nor 4
i other utility personnel deliberately j '
withheld this information.
In fact, the t
i actions-of these personnel during the first i
day of the accident indicate
- they did not know'or fully understood the informa-tion available to them.
They were i
i unprepared f6r, and unable to respond l
effectively to, the emergency.
i
{.
Id. at 15.
l 130.
In NUREG-0760, the NRC again evaluated the' evidence.'
l The report concluded generally:
l
- I i
f d
E
-yir---
ew
-6 y
.,,-+y--+3y e.
.-.m,.
(-,,-
w--
c.
- ~'
'It was not-until late the-next evening on L
Thursday, : March 29, 1979,.that-the signifi-L-
cance of.the, containment pressure spike was-generally known, andtit was not until early
-in_the morning of Friday, March'30, 1979, that the-Station Manager was aware that the pressure spike had been.real.
The investi-gators believe that, because the pressure spike:was;not generally recognized as being "real":on-March 28, 1979, it was generally l'
ignored.
u2GE 1(c)(142) at~23.
With respect to Mr. Chwastyk's. belief,
' NUREG-0760 concluded:
}
.The investigators conclude tv=.t Chwastyk j:
believed the pressure; spike to.be real (containment pressure reached.28 psig) and i--
discussed it with Mehler on March _28,.1979.
They conclude that Chwastyk's recollection
~of the cause of~the spike is in error.'
'The-investigators conclude that hydrogen was i
j not discussed as a cause.for the pressure spike on March 28, 1979; there was no i
acknowledged cause'for the spike on that j-date.
It is concluded that the order not j
to restart electrical equipment was given on some day subsequent to March 28, 1979.
(~
i-Id. at 28.20/
i i
131.
The only report to reach a contraryfconclusion.was-1 the Report Prepared by the Majority Staff of the Committee on l-l Interior and Insular Affairs, " Reporting of'Information-2C/
In ALAB-772, the Appeal Board rejected!NUREG-0760 as'a:
bksis for the Licensing Board's prior decision not to explore 1
further the Dieckamp mailgram issues ALAB-772,'19 N.R.C. 1193, 1266-1267~(1984).
This determination,'however, does-not negate F
the existence of NUREG-0760 or the~effect it may have had:on L
-Mr. Dieckamp's' beliefs and actions subsequent to.the mailgram.
L-Irrespective of the correctness of the conclusions ~therein, NUREG-0760'was a major NRC report which strongly' supported the thrust of the Dieckamp mailgram.
$. t 1
q t
.+
e,~<-w-e,
-.ev-
.mi-.e-v
,-3-g
,i,,yr-
.-g.c
-*,-y
..-p,.e, g
m ww e
.o,
.-ey y~v
,e---,vvr, y
- =
s p:
+
r
-Concerning the Accident at Three Mile Island" (March 1981) JME-1( c ) (143'). : Curiously, although it quoted the Dieckamp
~mailgram, the Report made no explicit' finding as to its accura-h cy.21/
132.
In addition to the evidence adduced after the mailgram had been sent, Mr. Dieckamp found and still finds log-ical support for the thrust of his mailgram in his readings of i
the various investigative reports and their conclusions.
Dieckamp, ff. Tr. 28,316, at 16-17; JME 1(c)(123) at 15.
4-E C.
Whether there is evidence that Mr. Dieckamp 2
expected the NRC to rely on the mailgram-for I'
any regulatory purpose?
{
133.
Mr. Dieckamp sent the mailgram because he was dis-turbed by the May 8, 1979 New York Times' article, which was in-consistent with Mr. Dieckamp's own awareness.
Dieckamp,- ff Tr.
4 i
28,316, at 4.
The purpose of the mailgram was simply to inform 1
i i
Congressman Udall and others that he took exception to the.
I i'
21/
The lack of finding on the Dieckamp mailgram is curious in that the very issue of the Dieckamp mailgram has been perpetu-i ated at the considerable urging of Congressman Udall and Dr.
Henry Myers (the Committee's Science Advisor). Congressional i
' interest in this matter has been evident both to the Special Inquiry Group and to the NRC's I&E.
Tr. 30,661-30,662, 30,703 j
(Gamble); JME 1(c)(107) at 81.
In_ fact, even:in this proceed-ing TMIA at one point proposed Dr. Myers as a TMIA witness.
)
TMIA aubsequently withdrew the proposal in. return inter alia j
for Licensee's agreement'to' drop interrogatories inquiring into-information and support provided to'TMIA by;Dr. Myers.
See JME 1(a) at 9.
Nevertheless,- the Board observed-that Dr. Myers did attend.the hearings during the appearances of key witnesses in this! proceeding.
l _.
1-
- ~
~.
. n -..
.u., a
_, _.. _, I,, -
'1 implications of the New York Times article.
Tr. 28,751 (Dieckamp).
No evidence was adduced in this proceeding to sug-i gest that Mr. Dieckamp expected the NRC to rely on the mailgram 4
for any regulatory purpose.
D.
Whether it would have served any public or regulatory purpose for Mr. Dieckamp to report the subsequent statements to the extent they constitute some evidence that such an inter-pretation had been made at the time the spike occurred on March 28, 1979, or that any such information was withheld?
134.
Mr. Dieckamp recognized the introductory phrase in the mailgram, "there is no evidence" can be taken literally to indicate a measure of absolute knowledge that goes beyond the reasonable basis that he possessed for his judgment and belief.
Dieckamp, ff Tr. 28,316, at 17.
If he were to write the-mailgram today, he would delete that phrase.
Tr. 28,357 (Dieckamp).
Yet it is only this introductory phrase that, after the fact, has been made literally incorrect by some obfuscating evidence subsequently adduced.
The thrust of Mr.
Dieckamp's mailgram -- that no one interpreted the pressure spike or spray initiation in terms of core damage at the time of the spike -- remains Mr. Dieckamp's conclusion and a reason-able conclusion based on all th'e evidence.
Dieckamp, ff Tr.
28,316, at 19.
Given the fact that the mailgram was accurate when sent, that its thrust remains a reasonable conclusion today, and that all subsequently adduced contrary evidence was.
- fully known by all concerned, it was certainly unnecessary for
-Mr. Dieckamp'to inform the mailgram recipients that the prefa-tory-phrase "there is no evidence" was no longer literal.
The Board sees no purpose to have_been served by such correction.
Nobody could reasonably misunderstand the import of that mailgram.
To suggest that such a correction was necessary to avoid misunderstanding or to suggest not doing so as a basis for questioning Mr. Dieckamp's integrity is unjustified and would set an impossible standard.
CONCLUSION Based upon consideration of the entire record on this mat-ter, the Board concludes that the Dieckamp mailgram casts no dispersion whatsoever on the integrity of Mr. Dieckamp.
i Respectfully submitted, SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE I.
sh Ernest L. Blake, Jr.,
P.C.
i David R.
Lewis Counsel for Licensee l
Dated: January 28, 1985 l
t l
1 l
i l
(; lJ
APPENDIX A List of Witnesses and Testimony l
Witness Written Testimony Oral Testimony l
Boyer, Robert E.
31,544 to 31,567 Brill, Richard A.
-ff Tr. 31,610 31,593 to 31,665 Broughton, T.. Gary ff Tr. 31,235 31,070 to 30,234 Chwastyk, Joseph J.
29,107 to 29,426 Conrad, Curtis A.
'31,361 to 31,391 Deman, Joseph H.
31,343 to 31,358 Dieckamp, Herman M.
ff Tr. 28,316 28,302 to 28,970 j
Gamble, David H.
ff,Tr. 30,522 30,459 to 30,822 Henrie, James O.
31,007 to 31,044 i
Herbein, John G.
30,298 to 30,458-i Illjes, Theodore F.
29,585 to 29,782 Keaten, Robert W.
31,236 to 31,299 i
Kunder, George A.
29,989 to 30,103 Lentz, Richard ff Tr. 32,972 32,971 to 33,032 i
Lowe, William W.
ff Tr. 28,151 28,138~to 28,246 Mehler, Brian G.
29,427 to 29,584 Miller, Gary P.
30,123 to 30,294 Moseley, Norman C.
ff Tr. 29,816 29,784 to 29,977 Mulleavy, Thomas L.
31,318 to 31,343 Porter, Ivan D.,
Jr.
ff Tr. 31,462 31,461 to 31,496 Rochino, A. P.
31,417 to 31,458 r
Van Witbeck, Thomas L.
ff Tr. 28,261 28,259 to 28,295 i
1
.-,,-,,n.--,
g E
4 E
4 Wilson, Richard F.
ff Tr 31,504 31,503 to 31,544 Zebroski, Edwin L.
ff Tr. 28,441 28,439 to 28,571
]
Zeiter, David E.
31,392 to 31,413 5
2 N
Documentary Material Bound M
into the Transcript Description Following Transcript Fage i
Curriculum Vitae of William W. Lowe 28,151 5=
Mailgram from H. Dieckamp to Rep. Udall 5
(May 9, 1979) 28,316 4
d e
j' N.Y. Times " Lag in Reporting Reactor Damage Laid to Experts" (May 8, 1979) 28,316 6
f Memorandum from B.
Cherry to H. Dieckamp r
(March 29, 1979) (re TMI #2 Accident) 28,418 p
TMIA Deposition of Herman Dieckamp a
(Oct. 3, 1984) (page 121 to page 122 1
{
line 6) 28,632 q
-5 TMIA Deposition of Robert Arnold (Oct. 4, 1984) (page 24 line 23 to page 26 line 4) 28,635 j
TMIA Deposition of Richard Lentz
=
(Oct. 15, 1984) (page 105 line 7 to page 109 line 1) 29,708 y
[-
=se 5
TMIA Deposition of Walter Creitz j
=
(Oct. 29, 1984) (page 20 line 15 to e
page 30 line 5) 29,708 C
h Notification by Licensee of Intended g
Joint Mailgram Exhibit References and a
Deposition Stipulations (Nov. 27, 1984) 30,105
'E 3
's I-Notification by Licensee of Intended 2
Joint Mailgram Exhibit 1 References (Nov. 28, 1984) (re external check of
=
1L containment) 30,105 4=
-A @
~~~
EE
_=
=
3
Curriculum Vitae of David H. Gamble 30,522 Memorandum from Victor Stello to Norman Mosely (April 1, 1980) (re Completion of IE Investigation of Information Flow at TMI During March 1979 Accident) 30,522 Draft of NUREG-0760 Section Entitled "High Core Exit Temperatures" 30,522 Draft of NUREG-0760 Section Entitled "Reportability of a Predicted Offsite Exposure Rate" 30,522 Revised Draft of NUREG-0760 Section Entitled "Reportability of a Predicted Offsite Exposure Rate" 30,522 Notification by Licensee of Intended Joint Mailgram Exhibit 1 References (Nov. 28, 1984) (re knowledge of hydrogen burn) 30,823 Notification by Licensee of Intended Joint Mailgram Exhibit 1 References (Nov. 28, 1984) (re instruction not to operate electrical equipment) 30,823 Notification by Licensee of Intended
=
Joint Mailgram Exhibit 1 References (Nov. 29, 1984) (re Illjes' prior statements) 30,823 Notification by Licensee of Intended Joint Mailgram Exhibit 1 References (Nov. 29, 1984) (re Chwastyk's communi-cations) 30,823 Notification by Licensee of Intended Joint Mailgram Exhibit 1 References (Dec.
5, 1984) (re discussion of hydrogen during meeting on March 29, 1979) 30,823 l
Notification by Licensee'of Intended Joint Mailgram Exhibit 1 References (Dec. 5, 1984) (re incore thermocouples) 30,823 '
Notification by Licensee of Intended Joint Mailgram Exhibit 1 References (Dec. 5, 1984) (re investigative reports) 30,823 Open Lines of Inquiry into IE Inspectors' Alleged Failure to Report Information Re March 28, 1979, Hydrogen Explosion at
]
TMI-2 (Enclosure 2 to TMIA Mailgram Exh. 22) 30,862 Notification by Licensee of Intended References to Joint Mailgram Exhibit 1 (Dec. 7, 1984) (re repressurization) 31,303 Notification by Licensee of Intended References to Joint Mailgram Exhibit 1 (Dec. 7, 1984) (re Mr. Arnold's knowledge of the pressure spike and incore thermo-couple temperatures) 31,303 Notification by Licensee of Intended References to Joint Mailgram Exhibit 1 l
(Dec. 7, 1984) (re time at which Miller departed TMI to brief the Lt. Governor) 31,303 Notification by Licensee of Intended References to Joint Mailgram Exhibit 1 (Dec. 7, 1984) (re thud attributed to ventilation dampers) 31,303 Notification by Licensee of Intended References to Joint Mailgram Exhibit 1 (Dec. 11, 1984) (re NSAC Report) 31,303 Notification by Licensee of Intended References to Joint Mailgram Exhibit 1 (Dec. 11, 1984) (re Inspector Higgins' impression of G. Miller's awareness of the pressure spike) 31,303 Notification by Licensee of Intended References to Joint Mailgram Exhibit 1 (Dec. 12, 1984) (re information gathered by GPUSC engineers) 31,582 Instruction Manual for Reactor Building Pressure Recorder 31,610 -
6 8
6, e
.c 1
ta 3
aF t
dt a
eo 7
5 0
0 7
ti 3
1 7
7 d
2 tr 1
1 6,
6, e
9, ic t
ms 8
9 1
1 c
9 dn 2
2 3
3 e
2 Aa J
r o
T R
7 e
3 tc 1
aa F
8 d
2 et ip 1
0 6
7 0
6 s
fi 3
7 6
6 7
1 t
ir 1
0, 6,
6, 6,
9, B i tc b
ns 6
9 1
1 1
9 X i en 2
2 3
3 3
2 h
da I
x I r D E T
N E
f P
o P
A t
r s
g o
e r
i n
t t
su o
p L
n
)
i 2
e nd eo
,t
)
e, om4 l
n o -
n if 5
s n
R1 ia8 i
is t
l 55 g i af t
)
18 g
no 2
12 a
tr9 a am o M dp ol o it0 n n eos o ag1 M te h T
. en ts l
s2
.e h
itrii th nt PA ftnao I toir ftn ommi(tdr c ll r
ettie oci Jamw'aEe'er ui, t
oi e
oci
,t iM i
C rdh Ol pa8 n eeS UFs Ol) iuk)g tna y uet n( 52 wl s
(n n( 9 mlCc0intrM t
. o
,r or o
021 sihec o o 81 ol i8taea(
Snv J sa fef iz5 nMtii)p iz6 risB9stLe oo t
et tom tt eo A
rrl4s tt e fWe 1ei hl ~
t fie xhi ue ne)o i nenn' euob8e inen md vl :Al n
d N fi mn dt o
io es( ob lou s e gii) seotu9R s e gi moar,not a
ie m
alDR oLall7 rfaP1 oLal utJa1I pnnd
(
p p
'e h g
f p p d
n2 oehU p
itc ex Vc g
hl ed(80e eTsol,o ed(1 ne,o rrmo i
drn dE o nsgo Dr 56n s
ra7 Dr 7 ansehethJs r
oae n 4D ihur a) i n r't r r s
a) rrkLchec i) c MPd I m 1
wpot Ah4oel eoreete Ah4e oac rtMamr0 s
i
.a 4
aa rn I c8gg cnetncn I c8g merdar tor 8
. r 4
rrho Mi9aa3 i e
.f v el neOi Mi9a ehinMuftro9 D
AoE 8g C1 DgtC TR1 pp6 LvAIG(l 1R1 p MADa(FoAfM1 1
2 3
4 h
h h
h 1
x x
x x
1 E
E E
E h
h x
m m
m' m
x E
a a
a a
E r
r r
r r
m e
a lg lg g
g m
l l
a b
r i
i i
i r
m g
a a
a a
lg u
M M
M M
l H
i e
a l
a e
e e
i M
e e
e e
M t
s s
s' s
b t
n n
n' n
f i
n e
e e
e f
h i
c i
i i
t x
o i
c c
c a
E J
L L
L L
S Y
,l[1
!lllr
Il fJ 8
8 7,
ea 0
ta 3
aP t
dt, 0
1 8
6 3
a eo ti 3
1 d
6 8
7 tr 9,
8, 5,
9, e
1 c
t ims 9
0 c
8 8
8 dn 2
3 e
2 2
2 As j
r e
T r
e ta aaP d
et ip 8
0 4
2 7
1 fi 1
1 7
6 6
9 ir 9,
8, 6,
3, 1
1 tc ns 9
0 0
8 8
8 en 2
3 3
2 2
2 da I r T
g n
2 n
i i
e rr t
t leou s wn
,h D
s n oe t
ypn r
r ald 8i emo1 e
m e I
O gFi 2w rl oiM nl a n M
i c y
oeCtT ab o inod3 T)
.tnc bhn 9
n, cs a
mm t
l ain2 D t
LsoA-co s2 a8 woegtt r a n l msa Onr ei
)
dri e
m2 Mrian oGei l
irs y Eoo dvtl1 eat mh r
V (t
e l
r M
WiierrA p
n swd d(nwT amiae re l nam 8 tMa ac) ieh f
oimT9 a s Jr3 mhmruhdeR r r 1
tnr a1 t c ma)eoi mi nol e oCodrtnp r
om0vl c ov)i aeoe, icoe yM-ya rr8nFc ra1tFh r Cnbr aan Hhfh v
b 3 bM fo9I A fD8a t
fo eeu Po tnt 9 den) n n
N1 n
9gn tdHFfn i : i 1
woe nos nn m
Ii7 ut tin) usa mo1i og m
uo,Eo9 n,(
odt tn g
mocp e e eo o
eina noony uL r krg k i
t dt1 t9 d
,stit dk yd r t u g e tir d
eo aea ap p
n fa1 ny2eann ncekr(aoi mtnna nmrh tgP tm aol om vmre arnso mrt hriru aa(T n(
a ae.nred ir rli rh rirnf)rgs co er ri si sk rl c
ol rnoc oebioci oDaid1 oke apncb ol9k el9 ec9 s
mepofr mse fnc m el a8fcv teone ml7c te7 te7 e
etAina eoFEnoc e.hir9 nan tRioF ei9a oe9 oi9 D
MS(TIM MM(IiCA MJAGB1iBI A" tC( MW1J NS1 ND1 2
3 1
2-3 h
h x
x h
h h
E E
x x
x E
E E
r m
m 1
e a
a m
m^
m b
r r
hh a
a a
mu lg lg ltx r
r r
E
- N i
i a
lg lg g
a a
em l
i M
wa i
i i
t M
a a
a nr M
M M
b r
r og i
r r
ml A
I I
A A
h a
a mi I
M M
x t
t oa M
E S
S CM T
T T
ll t
.llfI
,j,l!l
Identified at Admitted a t -
Exhibit Number Desc ri Dt ion T ra nsc ri pt Pace T ra nsc ri pt Pace TMI A Ma llgram Exh 4 Letter f rom H.
Dieckamp 28,397 28,974 to the Pennsylvania PUC (May 21, 1979)
Attachment:
T ransc ript of Mr. Dicckamp's comments to the PUC on
-3/28/79 concerning I
the situation at TMI.
YMI A Ma i lg ram Exh 5,
Memorandum f rom B.
28,414 28,980 Cherry to H. Dieckamp (Ma rch 29, 1979) ( re l
TM1 2 Accident) l
- TMI A Ma i lg ram Exh 6 ilandwritten Minutes of 28,451 28,596 March 29, 1979 and l
Ma rch 30, 1979 Meetings of the EPRI Resea rch Advisory Committee TMI A Ma l lg ram Exh 7 First Page of Notes 28,462 28,597 Taken by Edwin Zebroski on Ma rch 30, 1979
. Concerning Conversation with Robert Keaten TMI A Mallgram Exh 8 Notes Taken by Richard 28,568 28,604 Lentz on March 28, 1979 TM1 A Mailgram Exh 9 "Ta sk-12" (Ma rch 28, 28,607 28,981 1979)
THI A Mailgram Exh 10 Notes Taken by Robert 28,641 28,983 Keaten f rom Feb. 15 1979 to Janua ry 24, 1980 TMI A Ma ilgram Exh 11 Pre l imina ry Summa ry:
28,653 28,986 Technical Manpower Buildup TMI 2 Accident Recove ry Team -- Ma rch 28 to Apri l 1,
1979 TMI A Mailgram Exh 12 Transcript of Conver-28,668 28,990 sa tion between R. Long and D. Dubiel, J. Scolinger, John Hilbish, and Cary Miller
.on April 12, 1979 Identified.st
' Admitted at
. Exhibit Number Description T ra nsc ri pt Pace T ransc ri pt Pace-TM I A Ma i l g ram Exh ' 13 Instructor Notes, TMI 28,710 28,994 11 Accident (Rev.
O, 1981) 6
(
TMI A Ma i lg ram Exh - 14 Memorandum to H.
28,752 28,995 Dieckamp (undated)
Attachments: Dra f t of Dieckamp Mailgram and May 8, 1979 New York Times Article 1 TM I A Ma i lg ram Exh 15 Memorandum from E.
28,879 28,997 Wallace to R. Arnold (Sept. 17, 1980) (re Internal Work Related to CPU's Knowledge of Core Damage following the TMI-2 Accident Attachments: Notes taken by J. Moore on 3/28/79; Untitled piece authored by B. Beh r t e, S. Cuibord, and D.' Reppert;. Interview Memorandum or Brian Mehler; and Dra f t TDR-TMl-I I5 TMI A Ma i lg ram Exh 16 '
THI-2 control Room Log 29,385
-29,385
' (Ma rch ' 28, 1979 to Ap ri l 1,
1979).
' TM1 A Mailgram Exh 17 '
New York Times, "3' Mile 29,514 29,978 Island Aides Said to Have Waited to Tell of Hazards" (Oct. 21, 1979)
' TMI A Ma i lg ram Exh 18 William Lowe's Activi-30,000 30,106 ties re TMl-2 Accident.--
0830 March 28 to 0730
' Apri l 8,1979 THI A Ma i lg ram Exh 19 Questionnaire Completed 30,035 30,107 by Thomas M. Crimmins, Jr.
(Aug. 29, 1984)
[TMI A Ma ilgram Exh 20 TMI A Deposition of Julien 30,119 Ab ramov i c i (Oct 15,
- 1984 ).( Page 42 line 19 to page 50 line 13) 4
l I
identified at Admitted at Exhibit Number Description T ra nsc ri p t Pace T ra nsc ri p t Paae TM I A Ma i lg ram Exh 21 Letter f rom D.
Lewis to 30,196 31,235 L.
Be rna be i (Oct. 18, 1984)
Attachments:
TMI-2 Control Room Ala rm Printout for Ma rch 28, 1979 ( Pages 71-74); and l
Licensee s fourth Supple-mental Response to Three l
Mile Island Alert's first Set of Interrogatories (Oct. 17, 1964)
THI A Ma ilgram Exh 22 Memorandum f rom Roger 30,709 A.
Fortuna to James Cummings (Nov. 6, 1980)
( re IE Inspectors' Alleged failure to Report i n fo rma t ion Re Ma rch 28, 1979, flydrogen Explosion at THi-2) (marked up)
THI A Ma ilgram Exh 23 D ra f t Letter f rom Roger 30,711 Rejected 30,823 Fortuna to NIS (Dec.
1, 1980) (marked up)
TM I A Ma i l g ram Exh 24 Memorandum f rom David 30,713 30,811 Camble to Norman Moseley (Jan. 26, 1981)
( re IE Investigation into information Flow Concerning the TMI Accident)
TMI A Mailgram Exh 25 OlA Report: IE Inspec-30,839 30,841 tors' Alleged fa ilure to Report Information Re Ma rch 28, 1979 Hydrogen Explosion at TMI-2 (Jan.
7, 1981)
TMI A Ma i lg ram Exh 26 TM1 A Deposition of John 30,991 30,991 G.
Herbein ( Sept. 28, 1984) ( Page 28 through page 34 line 14) 1MI A Mailgram Exh 27 Notes Taken by 11.
31,020 31,300 Dieckamp on Ma rch 30, 1979 Identified at Admitted at Exhibit Number Desc ri r tion T ra nsc ri p t Paqo T ra n sc ri o,t Pace TMl A Ma i lg ram Exh 28 Notes Taken by T. Gary 31,112 31,213 Broughton on Ma rch 28 and 29, 1979 THI A Mailgram Exh 29 Transcript or Sen. lia r t 31,264 31,309 Briefing at TMi Obse rsa t i on Center on Ma rch 29, 1979 TM I A Ma i l g ram Exh 30 NUREG/CR - 1250 31,309 Wi thd rawn 31,313 (Rogovin), Volume 18, Pa rt 3, Pages 641-842 TH I A Ma i lg ram Exh 31 TMIA Deposition of T.
31,312 31,416 Ca ry Broughton (Oct 5, 1984) ( Page 70, line 11 to page 78 line 13, and page 93 line 22 to page 94 line 7)
TMI A Ma ilgram Exh 32A Stipulation on Mailgram 31,315 31,571 Evidence (Dec. 11, 1984) 31,697 31,697 (with attachments noted the rein -- questionna i res and followup letters)
TMI A Ma i l g ram Exh 328 Page from a Log of 31,337 31,571 Radiation Measurements 31,697 31,697 Taken at about 2 pm on Ma rch 28, 1979 Licensee's Response to TMIA'S first Set of Interrogatories and first Request for Production (Sept. 4, 1984)(answer to interrogatory 43(e))
Letter f rom E. Blake to L. Bernabei (Oct. 12, 1984)
( fourth paragraph) l l
)l
)fi1il 1IIjj l'
6 e
.c ta aP dt ep 7
7 7
7 7
ti 9
9 9
9 9
tr 6,
6, 6,
6, 6,
ic 17 ms 79 1
1 1
1 1
dn 5,6, 3
3 3
3 3
Aar 11 T
33 e
ta aaP d
et ip 7
7 7
7 7
fi 9
9 9
9 9
ir 6,
6, 6,
6, 6,
tc 77 ns 69 1
1 1
1 1
en 4,6, 3
3 3
3 3
da I r 11 T
33 7
4)
K e
7
)
5 e
e g
1 4e2 g1 h
e n a 2
n8n n.
i y
i op7e e
s e
4 t
p a9io r - -
l t 7n g
in, g
v1l t e - xtvI nr T
e o i a8
- a e
I tt Ese ee g60tel p2 m1 e1 p ig-Rstt r
a32 g
(
734 ung im.
l a o fi p0 g1 ca) i r23 pi n r L (etf o
r 'r (p 8a2 f
e o.ee oPtxrsa r e gee ea Co oa(g
.o.
s moie gi a f
o es p8 ol g rv fl pet ov(2 ntgn C seosPwd e
ng)annde nsp N
h a6 nm)e iopai mil te(de) lbs itY9oll aa ieo T
or4 ir8i o a 4 pii n g on
.(
ns)p1 oa4n e pl eL pc r nrn e8 tS
- t i ed)aem ae p
tBt e
ia8oe tb9l s
n i(o5 ssntnd8htu Tl i
1t55; i
mp tM9tn iA1 o
s t5 tyol nA7 nl p s.
475o s 6 or s
1 i
s 0
i or nSiuo 9heo eu oA
,2 1t oW1 ro
- o.,2 l o.
,5 t
pe6e e t M C y1iwrh eo Da naan1 Drn2 r Dr n11 t
c co p 0 ee p
)
fh pJ
.)
pD5 p
et2g ml a a
s nc em1 egge6 ede5 T
e 2e51 e 1 e i
Dr a homoll,
Dn.a g
r oep crrtae3 et rm i.i p pi ai e
.)
e.i e
c APg atoonR 3br er Altl l e Ahl e tJ4 ll c gn IAitp Attl ee s
I
.ad tnfmr n mu fe I
l c ;;
n) l c n t
8 l
c e
M pn t o n e e ya o u o eh MiO8446i7 Mi4i eo9 mao 0ai MuOo D
TD(a ACiRtBJtnf RT TW(1227l1 TR2l Lt1 TW(1 pl TJ(t C
D E
F C
H 2
2 2
2 2
2 3
3 3
3 3
3 h
h h
h h
h x
x x
x x
x E
E E
E E
E
're m
m m
m m
m b
a a
a a
a a
m r
r" r
r r
r u
N lg g
g lg lg g
l l
l i
i i
i i
i t
a a
a a
a a
i M
M M
M-M M
b i
A AI I
l -
I AI h
I A
A A
x M
M M
i M
M r
E T
T T
T T
T lllIlIi
c
's identified at Admitted at Exhib!t Number Desc ri pt ion T ra n sc ri o t Pace Transcript Paae TMI A Mailgram Exh 328 TMIA Deposition of 31,697 31,697 Richard Lentz (Oct. 15, 1984) (page 118 line 21 to page 126 line 8; page 128 line 15 to page 129 line 23)
TM 1 A Ma l lg ram Exh 32J TMIA Deposition of 31,697 31,697 Michael Ross (pages 17 to 28)
TM l A Ma i lg ram Exh 32K TMIA Deposition of 31,697 31,697 James P. Moore, J r.
(Sept. 26, 1984)
TMI A Mailgram Exh 33A Questionnaire Completed 31,330 31,569 l
by Thomas A. Mulleavy l
(Aug. 20, 1984)
H TMI A Mailgram Exh 338 Questionnaire Completed 31,349 31,569 by Joseph H. DeMan (Auo. 20, 1984)
TMI A Mailgram Exh 33C Questionnaire completed 31,368 31,569 by Curtis A. Con rad (Sept. 7, 1984)
TMI A Ma i lg ram Exh 33D -
Questionnaire Completed 31,400 31,569 by David Zeiter ( Aug.17, 1984)
TM l A Ma i lg ram Exh 33 E Questionnaire Completed 31,430 31,569 by A.
P. Rochino (Aug. 27, l
1984) l TMIA Mailgram Exh 33F Qtustionnaire Completed 31,545 31,569 by Robert Boyer ( Aug. 18, l
1984) l
~
31,415-1 TMI A Mailgram Exh 34 Testimony of David H.
(
Gamble (Sept.
1, 1984) i TM I A Ma l lg ram Exh 35 Memorandum from W.
31,420 31,570 C randa l l to D.
l.
Croneberger (July 6, p
1979) ( re TMI Project -
I Containment Shock Wave L
Study Reactor Building Ambient Temperature -
Recorder Charts) 1 l-j -
l
~.
b J
Identified at Admitted at Exhibit Number Description T ra nsc ri pt Pace
-T ra n sc ri p t Pace i'e TM I A Ma i l g ram Exh 36 TMI Project - Contain-31,421 31,570
}
ment Shock Wave Study -
Summa ry of Key Data TMI A Ma
- 1 gram Exh 37 Reactor Building Sprsy 31,423 31,570 Actuation SFAS (Oct. 17, 1979)
TMI A Ma i l g ra m Exu 38 Notes Taken by Julien 31,512 31,695 Ab ramov ic i on Ma rch 29, 1979 TMI A Ma i lg ram Exh 39 Notes Taken by T. ca ry 31,573 31,574, Broughton on Ma rch 29, 31,695-1979 TMI A Ma ilgram Exh 40 TMIA Depostion or Ivan 31,575' 31,576 D.
Po rte r, J r.
(Sept. 27, 1984) (page 49 last line to page 51 line 11) t TM I A Ma i lg ram Exh 41 Reactor Building Pres-31,606
.sure Strip Cha rt A (Ma rch 28, 1979)
THI A Ma ilgram Exh 42 Reactor Building Pres-31,612 sure Strip Cha rt B (Ma rch 28, 1979)
TMI A Ma i lg ram Exh 43 Notes Taken by Julien 33,014 rejected at Abramovici on March 28, 30,048
'1979 l
1 l
~
G
APPENDIX C Principal Participants in Activity Related to the Dieckamp Mailgram Issue ABRAMOVICI, JULIEN D.
Engineer II, Mechanical Engineering, GPUSC.
Located in Parsippany, N.J.
Reported to Gary Capodanno.
Arrived at TMI on 3/28/79.
ARNOLD, ROBERT Vice President for Generation of the GPU Service Corporation.
Located in Parsippany, N.J.
Reported to Herman Dieckamp.
Arrived at TMI on 3/30/79 and directed recovery effort under Herman Dieckamp.
BENNETT, SKIP Instrumentation Foreman at TMI.
Present on the morning of 3/28/79.
BENSEL, RICHARD W.
Lead Electrical Engineer at TMI-2.
Arrived at TMI-2 after 6:00 a.m.
on 3/28/79.
BENSON, MICHAEL L.
Lead Nuclear Engineer at TMI-2.
Arrived at Unit 2 control room at about 7:00 a.m. on 3/28/79.
BERRY, DONALD Operations Engineer at TMI-2.
Arrived at TMI-2 at about 7:00 a.m.
on 3/28/79.
Was maintaining a log in the Unit 2 control room at the time of the pressure spike.
BROUGHTON, T.
GARY Control & Safety Analysis Manager, GPUSC.
Located.i n Parsippany, N.J.
Reported to Robert Keaten.
Arrived at TMI on 3/28/79.
CAPODANNO, GARY Mechanical Design Manager, GPUSC.
Located in Parsippany, N.J.
Reported to' Donald Croneberger.
CHWASTYK, JOSEPH Shift Supervisor at TMI.
Relieved Zewe between 11:00 and 12:00 a.m.
on 3/28/79.
CO'.4AWAY, WILLIAM Shift Foreman at TMI.
Came on duty after 11:00 p.m. on 3/28/79.
CREITZ, WALTER President, Met Ed.
Located in Reading, PA.
CRIMMINS, THOMAS Manager of Engineering, JCP&L.
Arrived at TMI on 3/29/79.
CRONEBERGER, DONALD Manager, Engineering and Design, GPUSC.
Located in.Parsippany, N.J.
Reported to Richard Wilson.
DIECKAMP, HERMAN President and Chief Executive Officer of GPU and GPUSC.
DUBIEL, RICHARD W.
Supervisor of Radiation Protection and Chemistry at TMI.
Arrived at TMI at about 5:45 a.m. on 3/28/79.
FAUST, CRAIG Control Room Operator at TMI-2.
-Present in control room when acci-dent began and throughout the day.
FLINT, JOHN Babcock & Wilcox's Engineer and Start-up Representative at TMI-2.
Arrived at TMI-2 about 9:00 a.m.
on 3/28/79.
FLOYD, JAMES Operations Supervisor at TMI-2.
Out of town on 3/28/79. Conducted Congressional tour of control room on 5/7/79.
FREDERICK, EDWARD TMI-2 Control Room Operator.
Present in the control room when accident began and throughout the day.
GILBERT, BOB Instrumentation Technician at TMI-2.
Present on the morning of 3/28/79.
GINGRICH, JUANITA Auxiliary Operator at TMI.
On duty when accident began.
HERBEIN, JOHN G.
Vice President for Nuclear Generation, Met Ed.
Located in Reading, Pa.
Reported to Walter Creitz.
Arrived at TMI at about 11:40 a.m. on 3/28/79.
-HIGGINS,~ JAMES NRC Region I I&E Inspector.
Arrived at TMI at about 10:00 a.m. on 3/28/79.
HILBISH, JOHN Supervisor of Licensing, Met Ed.
Located in Reading, Pa.
Reported to George Troffer.
HITZ, GREGORY Shift Supervisor at TMI.
Arrived at TMI at about 6:00 a.m. on 3/28/79.
Served as intermediary in telephone communications between NRC Response Center and the TMI-2 operators.
ILLJES, THEODORE Control Room Operator at TMI-2.
Came on-shift in the afternoon of 3/26/79.
l KEATEN, ROBERT W.
Manager of Systems Engineering GPUSC.
Located in Parsippany, N.J.
Reported to Richard Wilson.
Arrived at TMI on 3/31/79.
KIDWELL,' JOHN Control Room Operator at TMI-2.
Came on shif t in the af ternoon of 3/28/79.
KLINGAMAN, RICHARD Manager, Generation Engineering, Met Ed.
Located in Reading, PA.
Reported to John Herbein.
KUNDER, GEORGE Superintendent of Technical Support at TMI-2 and the on-call Duty Officer at TMI-2 during morning of first day of the accident.
LEHMANN, GEORGE L.
Sr. Engineer, Generation, GPUSC.
Located in Parsippany, N.J.
Reported to Gary Capodanno.
Arrived at TMI on 3/28/79.
LENTZ, RICHARD Control Systems Engineer, GPUSC.
Located in Parsippany, N.J.
Reported to T.
Gary Broughtor..
Arrived at TMI on 3/28/79.
LOGAN, JOSEPH B.
Superintendent at TMI-2.
Arrived at TMI-2 about 5:45 a.m. on 3/28/79..
LONG, ROBERT Manager of Generation Productivity, GPUSC.
Located in Parsippany, N.J.
Reported to the Director of Generation Operations, who in turn reported to Robert Arnold.
Arrived at TMI on 3/29/79.
Conducted some operator interviews beginning 3/29/79.
LOWE, WILLIAM Consultant, Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, Washington, D.C.
Arrived at TMI on 3/29/79.
MARSHALL, WALTER J.
Operations Engineer at TMI.
Arrived at TMI-2 at about 5:35 a.m on 3/28/79.
McGOVERN, HUGH Control Room Operator at TMI-2.
Arrived at Unit 2 control room at about 6:55 a.m. on 3/28/79.
MEHLER, BRIAN Shift Supervisor at TMI.
Arrived in TMI-2 control room about 6:00 a.m.
on 3/28/79.
MELL, CHARLES Control Room Operator Trainee at TMI-2.
Came on shift in afternoon of 3/28/79.
MILLER, ADAM Shift Foreman.
Arrived in TMI-2 control room at about 6:30 a.m. on 3/28/79.
MILLER, DONALD Auxiliary Operator at TMI.
On duty when accident began.
MILLER, GARY Station Superintendent at TMI.
Arrived in TMI-2 control room shortly after 7:00 a.m.
Became Director of Met Ed's Emergency Command Team.
MOORE, JAMES P.
Mechanical Components Engineering Manager, GPUSC.
Located in Parsippany, N.J.
Reported to Donald Croneberger.
Arrived at TMI on 3/28/79.
MULLEAVY, THOMAS Supervisor, Radiation Protection at TMI.
NEELY, DONALD NRC Region I I&E Inspector.
Arrived at TMI about 10:00 a.m. on 3/28/79.
_4_
POGI,~ STEVEN Former GPUSC Startup Engineer.
Arrived at TMI on 3/30/79.
PORTER, IVAN Met Ed's-Lead Instrumentation Engineer.
Arrived at the Unit-2 control room at about 6:30 a.m. on 3/28/79.
RAYMOND, WILLIAM NRC Region I IEE Inspector.
Arrived at TMI in afternoon of 3/28/79.
REPPERT, DONALD Safety & Licensing Engineer, GPUSC.
Located in Parsippany, N.J.
Reported to Edward Wallace.
Arrived at TMI on 3/29/79.
Conducted some operator interviews beginning 3/29/79.
ROGERS, LELAND Babcock & Wilcox's Site Operations Manager at TMI.
Arrived onsite at about 7:00 a.m. on 3/28/79.
ROSS, MIKE Supervisor of Operations at TMI-1.
On duty at TMI-l when Zewe called him about two hours after the accident started and asked him to go to the TMI-2 control room.
SCHEIMANN, FRED Shift Foreman at TMI-2.
On duty when accident began.
SEELINGER, JAMES Superintendent at TMI-1.
Arrived onsite at about 6:45 a.m. on 3/28/79.
Given responsibility for Met Ed's Emergency Control Station in Unit 1 control room.
THORPE, JOHN Manager of Environmental Affairs, GPUSC.
Located in Parsippany, N.J.
Reported to Robert Arnold.
TOOLE, RON Former GPUSC Startup Engineer (TMI-2 Test Superintendent).
Present at TMI on 3/29/79.
TROFFER, GEORGE Manager, Generation Quality Assurance, Met Ed.
Located in Reading, PA.
Reported to John Herbein.
l i
VAN WITBECK, THOMAS Consultant, Energy Inc, Idaho Falls, Idaho.
Arrived at TMI on 3/31/79.
Leader of the Accident Assessment Group.
Conducted operator interviews.
WALLACE, EDWARD Licensing Manager, GPUSC.
Located in Parsippany, N.J.
Reported to John Thorpe.
Arrived at TMI on 3/29/79.
WEAVER, DOUGLAS Instrumentation Foreman at TMI.
Present on the morning of the ac.cident.
WILLIAMS, RON Senior Consultant, Generation Divison, GPUSC.
Located in Parsippany, N.J.
Reported to Robert Arnold.
Arrived at TMI on 3/29/79.
WILSON, RICHARD F.
Director of Technical Functions, GPUSC.
Located in Parsippany, N.J.
Reported to Robert Arnold.
Arrived at TMI on 3/29/79.
WRIGHT, LYNN Control Room Operator at TMI-2.
Arrived at Unit 2 control room at about 6:45 a.m. on 3/28/79.
WRIGHT, THOMAS Instrumentation Technician at.TMI-2.
Present on the morning of the accident.
YEAGER, BILL Instrumentation Technician at TMI-2.
Present on the morning of the accident.
ZEBROSKI, EDWIN Director, Nuclear Safety Analysis Center, EPRI.
Located in Palo Alto, CA.
Arrived at TMI on 3/31/79 and assumed role of co-leader of Ad Hoc Industry Advisory Group.
ZEWE, WILLIAM Shift Supervisor at TMI.
On duty when accident began.
- ?
e
References:
NUREG/CR-1250, "Three Mile Island: A Report to the Commissioners and to the Public," Vol. II, Part 3 (Jan. 1980) at 811-816, 914-916.
Report to the United States Senate, " Nuclear. Accident and Recovery at Three Mile Island" (June 1980) at 89-91.
JME 1(c) items 9, 12-16, 18-27, 30-38, 40-50, 52-54, and 56-60.
TMIA Mailgram Exh. 11.
.g-c.
Janggyy 28, 1985 g
cr.nac
'85 JM(30 N0:16 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEARREGULATOFYCOMMISSIO4
. XKOING & SERVici.
BRANCH BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
)
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY
)
Docket No. 50-289
)
(Restart Remand (Three Mile Island Nuclear
)
on Management)
Station, Unit No. 1)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of " Licensee's Proposed Find-ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the Form of a Partial Initial Decision on the Dieckamp Mailgram," dated January 28, 1985, were served upon those persons on the attached Service List by deposit in the United States mail, postage prepaid, this 28th day of January, 1985.
David R.
Lewis l
l l
Dated: January 28, 1985 1
l l
l t
J
a l'
t UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSIMG 2'JARD i
In the Matter of
)
l
)
METROFOLITAN EDISON COMPANY
)
Docket No. 50-289
)
(Restart kemand (Three Mile Island Nuclear
)
on Management)
Station, Unit No. 1)
)
SERVICE LIST Nunzio J._Palladino, Chairman Administrative Judge U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Gustave A. Linenberger, Jr.
Washington, D.C.
20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board i
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Thomas M. Roberts, Commissioner Washington, D.C.
20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Administrative Judge Gary J. Edles James K. Asselstine, Commissioner Chairman, Atomic Safety and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Licensing Appeal Board Washington, D.C.
20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Frederick Bernthal, Commissioner U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Administrative Judge Washington, D.C.
20555 John H. Buck Atomic Safety and Licensing Lando F. Zeck, Jr., Commissioner-Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission j
Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 Administrative Judge Administrative Judge Ivan W. Smith Christine N. Kohl Chairman, Atomic Safety and Atomic Safety and Licensing Licensing Board Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 Administrative Judge Docketing and Service Section (3)
Sheldon J. Wolfe Office of the Secretary Atomic _ Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D;C.
20555 t
+ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _, _ _. _ _.
4
.l t
SERVICE LIST PAGE 2 Atomic Safety and Licensing Mr. Henry D.
Hukill Board Panel Vice President U.E. Nuclear Regulatory Commission GPU Nuclear Corporation Wa'hington, D.C.
20555 P. O. Box 480 Middletown, PA.
17057 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel Mr. and Mrs. Norman Aamodt U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission R. D.
5 Washington, D.C.
20555 Coatesville, PA.
19320
-Jack R. Goldberg, Esquire Mrs. Louise Bradford Office of Executive Legal Director TMI ALERT U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1011 Green Street.
Washington, D.C.
20555 Harrisburg, PA.
17102 Thomas Y. Au, Esquire Joanne Doroshow, Esquire Office of Chief Counsel The Christic Institute Department of Environmental 1324 North Capitol Street Resources Washington, D.C.
20002 505 Executive House P. O. Box 2357 Lynne Bernabei, Esquire Harrisburg, PA.
17120 Government Accountability Project Michael F. McBride, Esquire 1555 Connecticut Avenue LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae Washington, D.C.
20036 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20036 Ellyn R. Weiss, Esquire' Harmon, Weiss & Jordan Michael W. Maupin, Esquire 2001 S Street, N.W.,
- 430 Hunton & Williams Washington, D.C.
20009 707 East Main Street P. O. Box 1535 William T. Russell Richmond, VA 23212 Deputy Director, Division of Human Factors. Safety Office of NRR-Mail Stop AR 5200 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 j