ML20211A749
| ML20211A749 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Three Mile Island  |
| Issue date: | 02/16/1987 |
| From: | Voigt H GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP., LEBOEUF, LAMB, LEIBY & MACRAE |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20211A553 | List: |
| References | |
| LRP, NUDOCS 8702190228 | |
| Download: ML20211A749 (41) | |
Text
,
/0 00LMETED
' UNITED STATES'OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
'87 FEB 17 P2 :09 BEFORE THE PRSbIDING BOARD
,s. . Nck$,. ,
In the Matter of i )
)
INQUIRY INTO THREE MILE -
.) Docket No. LRP ISLAND UNIT 2 LEAK RATE )
DATA FALSIFICATION .)
)
REPLY OF THE NUMEROUS EMPLOYEES TO THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF' FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW OF/GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION AND THE AAMODTS In accordance with the Board's order of January 21, 1987, the Numerous Employees hereby reply to the Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (" Proposed Findings")
filed by GPU Nuclear Corporation ("GPU Nuclear") and the Aamodts. We do not reply to the findings proposed by Messrs.
Gary Miller or Herbein.
I. Reply to GPU Nuclear Corporation's Proposed Findings Introduction We do not oppose many of the Proposed Findings of GPU Nuclear, although the Proposed Findings of the Numerous Employees are more comprehensive on most of the same subjects.
GPU Nuclear's Proposed Findings follow, to a great extent, the 8702190220 870216 0 PDR ADOCK 05000 G -
i conclusions of the Stier Report. While it is, perhaps, understandable that'GPU Nuclear.would adhere to the analysis of its investigator, the hearing record is more complete. The evidence includes much testimony that was not available to Mr. Stier, and because Mr. Stier personally did not recall interviewing any TMI-2 employee, the Board is in a far better position than Mr. Stier to evaluate the record and form its own judgment. (The only Board witness whom Mr. Stier could recall personally interviewing was Mr. Herbein. Tr. 2027-28.) For those reasons, the Board should rely on the Proposed Findings of the Numerous Employees, rather than those of GPU Nuclear, even where there is no difference in the result reached by either set of Findings.
The Numerous Employees do, however, reply to certain of GPU Nuclear's Proposed Findings, particularly those that involve Messrs. Floyd and Seelinger. Not only are those Proposed Findings a thinly-veiled effort to blame two ex-employees for almost all of the leak rate testing problems that occurred at TMI-2, but also much of what GPU Nuclear proposed concerning those two individuals is a distortion of the record.
Description of Management Responsibilities In 1 42 of its Proposed Findings, GPU Nuclear proposed that the Board find that Mr. Gary Miller " depended on ,
l
[Mr.] Seeliitger to supervise day-to-day operations" of TMI-2. j i
That simply was not Mr. Seelinger's responsibility; Mr. Seelinger did not, at any time, supervise the TMI-2 1
Operations department. See T 818 of the Numerous Employees' I l
Proposed Findings.
In T 47 of its Proposed Findings, GPU Nuclear proposes that the Board find that the TMI-2 Superintendent-Technical Support's position description made him responsible "for ensuring TMI-2 operation complied with the Tech Specs," citing Stier Report, Vol. V(A), Tab 6. To the contrary, any fair reading of the position descriptions for Unit Superintendent, Superintendent-Technical Support, and Supervisor of Operations would lead one to conclude that such responsibilities were those of the Unit Superintendent and Supervisor of Operations.
The Superintendent-Technical Support had such responsibilities directly only when the Unit Superintendent specifically delegated them to him. Id. See also GPU Nuclear Proposed Findings 1 50 (Supervisor of Operations " responsible ... for ensuring compliance with the Tech Specs.")
Surveillance Procedure 2301-3D1 GPU Nuclear incorrectly states, in T 67 of its Proposed Findings, that the TMI-2 Surveillance Procedure
" required the responsible CRO to enter the Action Statement under Tech Spec 3.4.6.2 if a leak rate test indicated that a limiting condition operation [ sic] had been exceeded." The
only bases cited for that Proposed Finding are Sections 6.4 and 7.2 of the Procedure itself and Mr. Kirkpatrick's testimony. l However, the Surveillance Procedure does not so indicate; Section 7.2 refers to " Data Sheet 1" or " Data Sheet 2" which i
Section 6.1 of the Procedure makes clear are Data Sheets for ]
I hand-calculated leak rate tests; there is nothing in the 1 Procedure that requires entry into the Action Statement if a computer-generated leak rate test depicted unidentified leakage in excess of 1 gpm. Mr. Kirkpatrick was not legally competent to offer the opinion cited. Finally, the Surveillance Procedure was not the law, because it was not part of the TMI-2 Technical Specifications. See TT 162-70 of the Numerous Employees' Proposed Findings.
The same assertion concerning the Surveillance Procedure appears in GPU Nuclear' Proposed Findings T 90; that paragraph should be rejected for the same reasons.
Training In T 101 of its Proposed Findings, GPU Nuclear appropriately proposes that the Board find that the record
" belies the apparent belief by the Training Department that on-the-job training on leak rate testing was adequate."
However, GPU Nuclear would have the Board adopt Mr. Stier's opinion that:
" Adequacy [ sic] of instruction alone, however, cannot excuse the individual operators for bearing personal responsibility for inappropriate l
_ - - - _ _ _ . - - ]
1 conduct "far removed' from the requirements of the surveillance procedures and Tech Specs and resulting in part from the operators' erroneous interpretations and applications of these requirements both before and after the events of October 18, 1978."
1 The Board should not adopt Mr. Stier's opinion. Mr. Stier admitted that he found it difficult to reconstruct the type of training that the operators had. Tr. 2024-25. His testimony preceded that of Mr. Boltz and that of the operators and supervisors before the Board concerning the almost non-existent training that the operators and supervisors received.
Accordingly, Mr. Stier's opinion of TMI-2 training is largely speculative, and entitled to no weight. That training was so lacking that the operators and supervisors had essentially no guidance as to what to do. See TT 315-26 of the Numerous Employees' Proposed Findings.
Further, as even GPU Nuclear's proposed Finding T 101 concedes, the operators' and supervisors' actions resulted from I their interpretations of the unclear and inconsistent Technical Specifications and Procedures which Met Ed and the NRC imposed on them. See 4H 133-61, 369-80 of the Numerous Employees' Proposed Findings. Their difficulties were with a test procedure that simply did not work, and that produced random results. See id., 1T 184-224.
In 1 102 of its Proposed Findings, GpU Nuclear proposes that the Board find that:
i
" Operators in effect were simply going through the motions of conducting leak rate tests to satisfy a procedural requirement-that they interpreted to allow repeated running of tests in a 72-hour period without immediate entry into the Action Statement after conducting the first valid test with a result greater than 1 gpm."
GPU Nuclear has not shown that there was any " valid" leak rate test "with a result greater than 1 gpm". Furthermore, when leak rate tests did appear to reflect the presence of the only confirmed instance of unidentified leakage over 1 gpm, the operators acted appropriately. See 1 230 of the Numerous Employees' Proposed Findings. The evidence of record is not that operators and supervisors were indifferent to leakage; they were indifferent to leak rate test results that bore no connection with reality. See TT 327-39 of the Numerous Employees' Proposed Findings.
Mr. Floyd's Interpretation of the Leak Rate Technical Specifications In TT 103-07 of its Proposed Findings, GPU Nuclear would have the Board find that Mr. Floyd's testimony concerning his understanding with Mr. Seelinger in early October 1978 about the Action Statement requirement is implausible. There is no basis for these Proposed Findings. GPU Nuclear's Proposed Finding T 107 begins with this sentence:
"Floyd, in other words, stated that he always held the interpretation of the Tech Specs that Haverkamp insisted on in October 1978. Tr.
4930-31 (Floyd)."
1 This sentence misstates Mr. Floyd's testimony; he explained that his Operations Memorandum.No. 2-78-19 was implicitly modified by the requirement that the plant had to be in " steady state" for the leak rate test to be valid. Tr. 4939. He explained that the language in the Surveillance Procedure controlled, rather than the Operations Memorandum language, in the event of a conflict. Tr. 4940. Therefore, Mr. Floyd did not state "that he always held the interpretation of the Tech Specs that Haverkamp insisted on in October 1978"; rather, he always held the interpretation that he and Mr. Seelinger agreed on in early October 1978, which is correctly quoted in GPU Nuclear's proposed Finding T 105.
Mr. Seelinger's Response to His First Awareness of the Problem GPU Nuclear's Proposed Finding T 107 states:
"What is clear in the record, however, is that at least one member of on-site management, Seelinger, became aware of an erroneous interpretation and implementation by operators of Tech Spec 3.4.6.2 and failed to respond effectively. Whether Seelinger's failure to respond was partly based on an understanding or a misunderstanding of Floyd's Tech Spec interpretation is irrelevant to this finding by the Board." l The conclusion that Mr. Seelinger " failed to respond effectively" in early October 1978 is inappropriate. During most of the first half of October 1978, following Mr. Seelinger's first awareness of the leak rate test problem l
at TMI-2, the plant was not in a mode'that required the performance of-leak. rate tests. Faegre & Benson Report, Vol. Two, Chapter I, pp. 27-28. The record is clear that.
-Mr. Seelinger eventually responded to the leak rate problem at
.TMI-2 more than anyone'else; his lack of such_ efforts for a:
brief period prior to his conversation with Mr. Haverkamp is of.
l little significance, and does not support the conclusion that Mr. Seelinger should be criticized. Ses 11 350-52 and I
11 818-29 of the Numerous Employees' Proposed Findings. The Commission appears to agree, having focused on the period "following" October 18, 1978 in CL1-85-18. See 22 N.R.C. at 880; see also Tr. 1887-88 (NRR focused on later period for same reason).
Mr. Haverkamp's Meeting With Mr. Seelinger In 11 112-13, GPU Nuclear proposes that the Board find that Mr. Floyd was present at the October 18 meeting between Mr. Haverkamp and Mr. Seelinger, despite Mr. Seelinger and Mr. Floyd's inability to recall that Mr. Floyd was there.
Tr. 4630-31 (Seelinger), 4897, 4926 (Floyd). GPU Nuclear-correctly proposes in 1 113 that the subject of rounding-off came up during that meeting, but fails to note that Mr. Haverkamp initiated the idea, which he finally admitted in the hearings before the Board. See 11 347-48 of the Numerous Employees' Proposed Findings. Mr. Haverkamp's evasiveness on
l that key point over the years and his refusal to admit to the Board that he told Mr. Seelinger that he would deny suggesting the concept of rounding off (Tr. 4770-72) cast serious doubt on Mr. Haverkamp's recollection of that meeting. 'Mr. Haverkamp's recollection of Mr. Floyd's presence at his meeting with.
Mr. Seelinger is also called into question by Mr. Floyd's testimony that he first learned of the fact that values for l unidentified leakage would be rounded off from Mr. Fels, not at the Haverkamp/Seelinger meeting. Floyd Prep. St., p. 4, ff.
Tr. 4894.
Information Conveyed to Mr. Haverkamp In T 116 of its Proposed Findings, GPU Nuclear proposes that the Board find that:
"At 12:21 p.m., a leak rate of 0.1081 gpm was obtained, later corrected by William Fels (footnote omitted] to indicate a leak rate of
.283 gpm. See NRR Test No. 14; Tr. 4520-31 (Fels). Probably in the early afternoon, j Haverkamp was shown this test, with an acceptable l leak rate of 0.1081 gpm, and was informed that some amount of leakage had been identified and a )
computer input error found and corrected, both reducing unidentified leakage. Board Exh. 20, Haverkamp Testimony at 6-7; Tr. 2054-57, 2131 (Haverkamp). These statements about an identification of leakage and a correction of a computer input error were repeated in the later l
LER and are addressed below. Suffice it to say l here, however, the accuracy of these statements !
are not supported by the record and the apparent reason for obtaining acceptable tests--rounding off--was not disclosed to Haverkamp the afternoon of October 18 (emphasis added)."
l l
l
-The underscored' language is not'only contrary to fact, but is also contradicted within the same Proposed Finding of GPU Nuclear. As the first portion of GPU Nuclear's Proposed Finding 1 116 accurately states, a correction was made to NRR Test No. 14 due to a " computer input error" (see Test printout, on which identified leakage was entered as a positive number and' corrected to a negative value so-that it would be subtracted from, not added to, gross leakage). Leakage had been identified as of the time of NRR Test No.14. See 11 340-41 of the Numerous Employees' Proposed Findings. The value for unidentified leakage on NRR Test No. 14 was below 1 gpm, and, therefore, "the apparent reason for obtaining acceptable tests" was not rounding off. Accordingly, the disclosure to Mr. Haverkamp on the afternoon of October 18 was correct. In any event, he knew of the decision to round off, because he originated the idea (see 11 347-48 of the Numerous Employees' Proposed Findings), agreed, during the Haverkamp/Seelinger meeting, to allow it (Stier Report, Vol.
VI(F), 9/14/83 NRC Report of Interview, p. 3), and; clearly was aware of it during his inspectinn at TMI-2 during October 16-20, 1978 (Tr. 2063; Haverkamp Prep. St., p. 9) (". . . I was indeed aware of the implementation of the round-off of test data because I reviewed the operations memo during the inspection, which is documented in Inspection Report 50-320/78-32 (See Exhibit A).").
The Decision to Report the Failure' to Invoke the Action Statement In 1 117 of its Proposed Findings, GPU Nuclear proposes that the Board find that, during a meeting between 4:30 and 5:00 p.m., the "PORC determined that a reportable occurrence had occurred. . . . That is misleading; Mr. Seelinger testified that the final PORC determination to report the violation of 1 gpm LCO for unidentified leakage was probably made at 10:00 a.m. on October 19, 1978 when he first discussed the problem with Mr. Floyd because Mr. Floyd was not at the PORC meeting on October 18, 1978 (Haverkamp Prep. St.,
Ex. G, p. 3 (PORC attendance list for October 18, 1978 meeting, showing Mr. Floyd not present)). Tr. 4780-81. Mr. Seelinger's recollection of his reason for the use of the time and date of "1000 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br /> on October 19, 1978" as the time and date of the decision to report the violation is consistent with the first portion of 1 118 of GPU Nuclear's Proposed Findings, which correctly states that Mr. Seelinger informed Mr. Haverkamp in the afternoon of October 19, 1978 that Met Ed would report the violation. See Tr. 4780-82.
Mr. Seelinger's Letter to the NRC In 1 120 of its Proposed Findings, GPU Nuclear proposes that the Board find that the time and date of the event referred to by the word " discovered" in Mr. Seelinger's 4
I
October 19, 1978 letter was incorrect, pointing out that the-
" discovery" occurred the day before. GPU Nuclear's Proposed Finding has the problem backwards -- the problem is with the word " discovered", not with the time and date of the event. A more precise word than " discovered" would have been
" determined", which would have better described the fact that Met Ed's final decision to report the failure to invoke the Action Statement was made in Mr. Seelinger's conversation with Mr. Floyd during the morning of October 19, 1978. In any event, the letter and its timing are not material (Tr. 4782 (Kelley, J.)), particularly because the NRC had known about the problem since the morning of October 18. There simply was no motive that Mr. Seelinger could have had to attempt to mislead the NRC about the time and date of an event of which the NRC itself was aware. Mr. Seelinger's forthright testimony before the Board should dispel any notion that he is the type of individual who would attempt to deceive the NRC.
In T 121, GPU Nuclear proposes that the Board find that Mr. Seelinger's letter to Mr. Grier was " misleading" because it's states that "[u]nidentified leakage was reduced to
[ Technical Specification] limits at 0735 on 10-18-78", but in its very next proposed Finding (T 122 n.27) GPU Nuclear contradicts its own T 121 by describing Mr. Floyd's reference to "2 gpm" in his Operations Memorandum as " appropriate". If rounding off was " appropriate" (which it was at that time 12 -
i
because Mr. Haverkamp had approved it), it follows that I
Mr. Seelinger's letter was not " misleading" because the Test {
run at "0735 on 10-18-78" (NRR Test No. 12D, Stier Test No. 146) was within those " appropriate" limits (i.e., it depicted less than 1.5000 gpm of unidentified leakage).
Mr. Seelinger was certainly justified in using the earliest time when unidentified leakage was below the applicable limit because Mr. Bezilla had given NRR Test No. 12D to Mr. Floyd to analyze for Mr. Seelinger and Mr. Floyd told Mr. Bezilla it showed that the plant was " legal". Tr. 4919-20; see Exhibit 24 (handwritten notation on NRR Test No. 12D "OK by roundoff JRF".); Stier Report, Vol. VI(A), Tab B, 2/22/85 Bezilla Interview, p. 19 (Mr. Seelinger inserted time and date of first leak rate test within allowable limits).
Mr. Seelinger's October 27, 1978 Conversation With Mr. Haverkamp In T 124, GpU Nuclear proposes that the Board find j that, in his conversation with Mr. Haverkamp on October 27, 1978 in which Mr. Haverkamp told Mr. Seelinger that rounding off was no longer acceptable, "Seelinger in this conversation with Haverkamp near the end of October had a clear opportunity to reveal the extent of the practice of rounding off". GpU Nuclear again contradicts itself within the same proposed Finding. GpU Nuclear correctly points out that Mr. Haverkamp told Mr. Seelinger that rounding off "was not an allowable
practice", thus confirming that Mr. Haverkamp knew it was being i
employed. . GPU Nuclear mischaracterizes Mr. Haverkamp's prepared testimony when it states that Mr. Seelinger~ told.
Mr. Haverkamp that "the rounding off practice would not.be employed"; in fact, Mr. Haverkamp testified that Mr. Seelinger told him "that the-round-off practice would be terminated (emphasis added)." Haverkamp Prep. St., p. 9.- By admitting that he knew it would be " terminated", Mr. Haverkamp knew it had been employed.
Mr. Seelinger's point about not being " terribly straightforward" with Mr. Haverkamp (Tr. 4772-74) concerned the l extent to which other Tests run between October 18-27, 1978 were within allowable limits solely ~because of rounding off, not whether rounding off had taken place; Mr. Haverkamp knew that the rounding off policy had been in effect. Tr. 2063 (reviewed Mr. Floyd's Operations Memorandum, including rounding off); Haverkamp Prep. St., p. 9. In any event, all of those Tests (NRR Test Nos. 15-26) which were rounded off would have depicted unidentified leakage below 1 spm without rounding off. By subtracting the value for identified leakage from the gross leakage on each such Test, the Board can see that each value for unidentified leakage would be below 1 gpm.
Thus, at this point in its proposed Findings, GPU Nuclear's effort to show that Mr. Seelinger misled the NRC collapses, because every significant " fact" on which it is
\
based is wrong or irrelevant,'and Mr. Haverkamp already knew what=actually occurred. These mistakes by GPU Nuclear are the springboard for its erroneous. Proposed Findings.about the LER,.
to which we now turn.
LER 78-62/lT GPU Nuclear proposes, in its 1 125 n.28, that the Board find that the inaccurate time and date in the first sentence of the Narrative to the LER " repeats the inaccurate time and date provided by Seelinger in the Grier letter." This statement illustrates the depth of GPU Nuclear's confusion on the subject. While the time and date are the same, they refer to entirely different things. The letter refers to the time and date of the decision to report (Tr. 4780-82); the Narrative refers to the time leak rate tests were being run. The Narrative should have referred to the morning of October 18, but the error was not material (Tr. 4782 (Kelley, J.)), was not made by Mr. Seelinger (Tr. 4664), and was evidently questioned by him (Tr. 4617-18). There was certainly no motive to insert the incorrect time and date in the Narrative; on October 30, 1978 (the time the Narrative was written, Tr. 4638-39), it was of no moment whether the events in question occurred on October 18 or 19.
.i In 11~126-32, GPU Nuclear' proposes that the Board find that Mr. Seelinger was responsible for the errors in the LER w Narrative,-and that he made those errors to mislead.the NRC..
Those Proposed Findings are inconsistent with Mr.-Seelinger's testimony that he was not responsible for those errors.
Seelinger Prep. St., p. 7, ff. Tr. 4623. To show why GPU Nuclear's Proposed Findings are without basis, we first set forth the three-paragraph version of the Narrative as filed with the NRC (Stier Report, Vol. V(C), Tab 29), with the errors I underscored, and show that Mr. Seelinger was not responsible for them:
NARRATIVE TO LER 78-62/lT "At 1000 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br /> on October 19, 1978 (Tr. 4664; Mr. Stair not Mr. Seelinger), while performing Surveillance Procedure 2301-3Dl, it was determined that data obtained subsequent to the last recorded acceptable surveillance performance at 1935 on 10-16-78 (Tr. 4617, 4663; not Mr. Seelinger] showed that unidentified leakage during the interim period exceeded the j limits specified in the Technical Specifications (T.S. 3.4.6.2) and that the required action statement was not invoked. The largest unidentified leakage during this period was 2.6 9pm.
"This event was caused by misinterpretation of the requirements of the T.S. Since the actual frequency of performance of the surveillance procedure was greater than that required by the T.S., it was not clear to the personnel involved as to which set of data taken came within the T.S. requirements and when the time requirements of the action statement were applicable.
However, action was being taken to reduce the unidentified leakage to within' allowable limits and was accomplished at 0735 on 10-18-78 l (Tr. 4617, 4663; not Mr. Seelinger]',']ut_-
! determining a portion of this leakage to be identified leakaae from the Reactor Coolant
- System and to be well within the limits of T.S.
3.4.6.2.c [Tr. 4652-53; not Mr. Seelinger]. In
'- addition, it was discovered that errors in.
inputing (sic]-data to.the computer caused indicated unidentified leakage to be greater than I actually was occurring.
"The appropriate personnel will be instructed on the requirements of the applicable sections of the T.S. and the requirement to immediately invoke applicable action statements when the provisions of the-LCO's are not met.
Input data for-the computer program which calculates unidentified leakage has also been clarified."
As the above-quoted version of the Narrative to LER 78-62/1T demcnstrates, Mr. Seelinger was responsible for none of the errors in the Narrative. He questioned the erroneous times and dates, or left blanks for others'to fill in. He did not add the words ", by determining a portion of this leakage to be identified leakage from the Reactor Coolant System and to be well within the limits of T.S. 3.4.6.2.c."; those words were not in the one-paragraph version sent to Reading.- Seelinger Prep. St., pp. 7-8, ff. Tr. 4623; see also id., Attachment (handwritten version); Tr. 4652-53. Although Mr. Seelinger testified that it was unlikely that those words would have been added without checking with someone at Three Mile Island (Tr. 4659), he did not recall being that person. Tr. 4654-55.
In any event, all of the events described in the Narrative did occur as described in the Narrative; the errors are only as to the times and dates, not as to substance, as we now show.
{
t i
Point-by-point, the events described.in the Narrative are:
" . . while performing Surveillance (1)- .
Procedure 2301-3Dl, it was determined that data obtained subsequent to the last recorded acceptable surveillance performance
. . . showed that unidentified leakage during the interim period exceeded the limits specified in the Technical Specifications (T.S. 3.4.6.2) and that the.
required action statement was not invoked."
These words correctly describe the events of October 16-18, 1978, subsequent to NRR Test No. 12. See 11 340-44 of the Numerous Employees' Proposed Findings.
(2) "The largest unidentified leakage during this period was 2.6 gpm."
These words correctly describe NRR Test No. 12A, which depicted the largest unidentified leakage during the period October 15-19, 1978. See id., 1 340.
(3) "This event was caused by misinterpretation of the requirements of the T.S. Since-the actual frequency of performance of the surveillance procedure was greater than that required by the T.S., it was not clear to the personnel involved as to which set of data taken came within the T.S. requirements and when the time requirements of the action statement were applicable."
This statement was certainly correct; in TT 229-30 the Numerous Employees' Proposed Findings, .e set forth the evidence that unidentified leakage did exceed 1 gpm during that period, and there is certainly no dispute that the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.4.6.2 was not invoked at least before
noon on October 18. Tr. 4914-15; see 1 342 of the Numerous Employees' Proposed Findings. Operators were, of course, i
performing leak rate tests more frequently than required. See 1 174 of the Numerous Employees' Proposed Findings. Also, there is no dispute that most operators did not know that the Action Statement had to be invoked, under the Haverkamp/Seelinger interpretation, whenever the value for unidentified leakage exceeded 1 gpm. See 11 349, 365, 368 of the Numerous Employees' Proposed Findings.
(4) "However, action was being taken to reduce the unidentified leakage to within allowable limits and was accomplished . . . by determining a portion of this leakage to be identified leakage from the Reactor Coolant System and to be well within the limits of T.S. 3.4.6.2.c (sic: 3.4.6.2.b; Tr. 4653]."
Except for the typographical error in the reference to "T.S.
3.4.6.2.c", this statement was true, even though the last several words ("by determining . . . ") were not in the version that was edited by Mr. Seelinger. See 11 340-41 of the Numerous Employees' Proposed Findings; compare Seelinger Prep.
St., Attachment, ff. Tr. 4623 (last several words of above-quoted sentence not in handwritten Narrative);
Tr. 4652-53. Leakage was identified between October 16-18, 1978 and repaired during October 18-19, 1978. See 11 340-41 of Numerous Employees' Proposed Findings. NRR Test No. 14, commenced at 1221 on October 18, depicted unidentified leakage 19 -
l below 1 gpm and thus unidentified leakage was "within allowable limits" at 0735 (by virtue of rounding off, see Exhibit 24), or 1221 (without rounding off).
(5) "In addition, it was discovered that errors in inputing [ sic] data to the computer caused indicated unidentified leakage to be greater than actually was occurring."
This statement was true, because on two of the Tests in question, the operators had entered the wrong algebraic sign for identified leakage. See NRR Test Nos. 12 and 14; T 340 of ,
the Numerous Employees' Proposed Findings.
(6) "The appropriate personnel will be instructed on the requirements of the applicable sections of the T.S. and the c requirement to immediately invoke applicable '
action statements when the provisions of the LCO's are not met." ;
This statement was true; the operators and supervisors were sent the version of the LER set out in the Stier Report, Vol. V(C), Tab 30, and Mr. Floyd's October 20, 1978 Operations Memorandum No. 2-78-19. See 4W 353, 365-66 of the Numerous Employees' Proposed Findings. The standard mechanism at the time for " instructing" the operators and supervisors of such a change was by sending it, via a pORC " action item", to the Control Room for review and signoff. Tr. 4668.
(7) " Input data for the computer program which calculates unidentified leakage has also been clarified."
This statement was also true. See 5 356 of the Numerous Employees' Proposed Findings; see also Tr. 4494-96 (Mr. Fels
i reprogrammed computer to read a small number greater than O'so that the program would correctly subtract one number from another).
Therefore, every material statement in the LER Narrative was true. The errors, which are not material, are in the times and dates, and the typographical error in the reference to "T.S. 3.4.6.2.c." The times and dates were not material because they contribute nothing to the substance of the Narrative. There was no motive to provide incorrect times and dates; the NRC knew what the times and dates of the events were because Mr. Haverkamp brought the matter to Mr. Seelinger's attention (see TT 345-49 of the Numerous Employees' Proposed Findings) and because he was shown what evidently is NRR Test No. 14 on October 18, 1978. See T 116 of GPU Nuclear's Proposed Findings; Haverkamp Prep. St., pp. 6-7.
As a review of the handwritten version of the Narrative proves, the writing left unquestioned by Mr. Seelinger, and the writing added in his own hano, all state the facts accurately.
Mr. Haverkamp admitted that the Commission was not misled by the errotoneous times and dates in the Narrative. He testified that,he was concerned with, and focused on, the descriptions of the corrective actions described in the Narrative, not on the times and dates. Tr. 2053-55.
Accordingly, the NRC was not, and could not have been, misled by the Narrative.
Surveillance Requirement In T 142 of its Proposed Findings, GPU Nuclear concludes that Surveillance Requirement 4.4.6.2.d " required that RCS leakages be demonstrated to be within prescribed limits by" performance of a leak rate test "at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> during steady state operation." GPU Nuclear is incorrect. See Memorandum of Law of the Numerous Employees, Point VI; TT 135, 150 of the Numerous Employees' Proposed Findings.
Defects in the Test Procedure In 11 146-47, GPU Nuclear proposes that-the Board find that, although there were errors in the leak rate test j procedure, they were not always present. GPU's Proposed Findings imply that the errors in the procedure are insignificant because they tend to cancel each other out. In fact, that is true of the failure to correct for the difference in densities of the water in the MUT, the reactor, and the RCDT; it was oftentimes not true of the other errors in the procedure. Rather than adopt 11 146-47, and the brief listing of the errors in the test procedure set forth in iT 148-53 of GPU Nuclear's Proposed Findings, the Board should adopt 11 184-224 of the Numerous Employees' Proposed Findings on the defects in the leak rate test procedure. Those Findings are far more comprehensive and descriptive, and make clear that I
)
i I
certain errors in the procedure did not necessarily cancel each l
other out. See, e.g., T 185 of the Numerous Employees' l Proposed Findings.
Mr. Floyd's Knowledge of Problems With Leak Rate Tests In 1 157 of its Proposed Findings, GPU Nuclear I
proposes that the Board find that Mr. Floyd knew of the 1 i
problems with TMI-2 leak rate tests, notwithstanding his sworn denial of such knowledge, accurately reflected in the preceeding T 156. The evidence of record is that the period of time du' ring which there were the most significant problems with leak rate test results was from mid-February 1979 until March 28, 1979. Stier Report, Vol. I, p. 82. During most of that time, Mr. Floyd was not at work either because of a broken ankle or because he was attending his annual simulator training in Lynchburg, Virginia. Floyd Prep. St., p. 7, ff. Tr. 4894; Tr. 5012-13.
Mr. Seelinger's Knowledge of Difficulties In 1 158, GPU Nuclear proposes that the Board find that:
"Seelinger's knowledge of the difficulties was substantially increased as a result of the LER 78-62 event, in particular, the need to 'round off' to obtain a result less than 1 gpm unidentified leakage."
There is no evidence that Mr. Seelinger knew, after October 18, 1978, that operators "needed" to round off "to obtain a result less than 1 gym unidentified leakage." All leak rate tests that were retained between October 18-27, 1978 would have been below 1 gym, even without rounding off. Mr. Seelinger and Mr.
Haverkamp both knew that rounding off occurred during October 18-27, 1978, and then was cancelled. See 11 347-48 of the Numerous Employees' Proposed Findings; Tr. 2063; Haverkamp Prep. St., p. 9. Mr. Seelinger and Mr. Haverkamp could reasonably have assumed thereafter that the identification of leakage, and the correct entry of data into the computer, would solve the problems the operators had previously experienced.
GPU Nuclear's Proposed Finding 1 158 proves too much, for it logically would lead to the conclusion that Mr. Haverkamp also knew of the difficulties operators were having after October 18, 1978, yet the evidence is that he did not. See 1 367-68, 381-89 of the Numerous Employees' Proposed Findings.
Also, Mr. Seelinger became Unit 1 Superintendent on or about December 1, 1978 and had no involvement with leak rate testing at TMI-2 thereafter. See T 828 of the Numerous Employees' Proposed Findings.
Discarding Leak Rate Tests In 11 180-88, GPU Nuclear discusses the practice of discarding unsatisfactory test results. In T 191, it proposes that the Board find Messrs. Floyd and Seelinger guilty of
" dereliction or culpable neglect" for permitting that w
. 1 practice. Such a finding would have to be preceded by a finding that the TMI-2 Technical Specifications required the retention of the discarded tests. l
. 1 In fact, Icak rate tests " required by Technical Specification 4.4.6.2.d" were not discarded, because that Technical Specification required only that a leak rate test be performed "at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> during steady state I operation" and records satisfying that requirement were j retained. Therefore, the answer to the Commission's question is that no tests required by Technical Specification 4.4.6.2.d were discarded. See Memorandum of Law of the Numerous Employees, point VI.
Accordingly, there is no basis for GPU Nuclear's j Proposed Finding 1 191 that Messrs. Floyd and Seelinger were guilty of " dereliction or culpable neglect" with respect to the practice of discarding leak rate tests. In any event, f
Mr. Seelinger reasonably believed that the discarding practice-would be discontinued on October 18, 1978, once he was made aware of Mr. Haverkamp's interpretation and he attempted to convey that interpretation to the operators and supervisors.
See 1 826 of the Numerous Employees' proposed Findings.
Dereliction or Culpable Neglect In 4 194, GpU Nuclear proposes that the Board find that Messrs. Floyd and Seelinger, "by their dereliction or culpable neglect", allowed " falsification, manipulation, or
other improper actions (to occur] during leak rate testing".
This Proposed Finding is without basis, is premised on an incorrect view of the law, and must be rejected.
In T 195 of its Proposed Findings, GPU Nuclear proposes that the Commission apply a standard of negligence for its determination of " dereliction or culpable neglect", but not "a standard of vicarious or imputed responsibility". We agree the "a standard of vicarious or imputed responsibility" is inappropriate, but disagree that mere negligence satisfies the Commission's standard of " dereliction or culpable neglect".
Memorandum of Law of the Numerous Employees, Point III.
The Commission could easily have asked whether TMI-2 personnel, "by their negligence", were involved in, aware of, or condoned leak rate test manipulation or other improper actions. It did not. Rather, it used the different, and more stringent, standard of " dereliction or culpable neglect" (emphasis added) to require a showing of wanton and willful or intentional behavior far more inappropriate than mere negligence. Also, the Commission indicated that it was particularly interested in the period after Mr. Haverkamp's interpretation was conveyed to Met Ed personnel, not before.
See CLI-85-18, 22 N.R.C. at 880 ("Following the discovery by an NRC inspector in October 1978 . . .(emphasis added).").
J
^
Mr. Floyd's Responsibility In 1T 205-10, GPU Nuclear proposes that the Boarc~ find that Mr. Floyd was guilty of " dereliction or culpable J
neglect". GPU Nuclear does note that Mr. Floyd "[blasically~ .
. . . was ignorant of what was going on." 1 206, quoting -
Tr. 4976. Although Mr. Floyd candidly admitted that he could ,
have required adherence to procedures in a better fashion than he did, he was not " derelict" or " culpable" because he was not aware of improper leak rate testing practices. GPU. Nuclear argues, in its Proposed Findings TH 208-10, that Mr. Floyd was
" negligent"; the Company's findings should not be adopted because they are premised on a lesser standard than the Commission itself prescribed.
Mr. Seelinger's Responsibility In TV 211-13 of its Proposed Findings, GPU Nuclear argues that Mr. Seelinger was guilty of " dereliction or .
culpable neglect" for his actions in early October 1978. Those Proposed Findings should not be adopted, because Mr.
Seelinger's conduct during that brief period of uncertainty over the correct interpretation of the Technical Specifications should be compared to his efforts on and after October 18, 1978 to correct the situation. Seelinger Prep. St., p. 8, ff.
Tr. 4623; Tr. 4670-74.
- f mf_f
.,g y .
n +.y at r ,;
)h:
- l e' ~
f GPU Nuclear's Proposed Finding 1 214 should'not be
- adopted because the alleged misstatement in Mr._Seelinger's s n October.19, 1978 reportable occurrence letter to the NRC was r true (Tr. 4680-82) and, even without rounding off (which was in
'%. effect on the date of the letter).would have been true had the l'
time been "1221" instead of "0735". See NRR Test No. 14.
y Again, therefore, GPU Nuclear has attempted to create an issue
'] i' over a reference to a precise time which is not material (Tr.
'! ~
4685-86, 4782) and could not have confused the NRC because Mr.
, Haverkamp had seen the leak rate test (NRR Test No. 14) .run at a-1221 on October 18, 1978. Haverkamp Prep. St., pp. 6-7.
The Company's Proposed Finding 1 216 should not be !
1 adopted because the errors in the Narrative were not caused'by- l Mr. Seelinger, see pp. 16-21, supra, and Mr. Seelinger made efforts to see to it that the LER Narrative was truthful.
Seelinger Prep. St., pp. 7-8; see Tr. 4775-76.
GPU Nuclear even proposes, in its Proposed Finding 1 217, that Mr. Seelinger should be criticized for " lacking in the reasonable level of initiative and drive to be expected in a Superintendent of Technical Support" because, when he went
.for a second time to the TMI-2 Control Room to make sure that the operators and supervisors understood and would apply the j Haverkamp interpretation of the Action Statement requirement, he encountered the same shift supervisor he had before. That Finding should not adopted. Mr. Seelinger's efforts in going
to the TMI-2 control room to ensure that appropriate actions were being taken was above and beyond the call of duty because he did not supervise the Operations Department. Tr. 4628 (Seelinger), 5004-05.(Floyd). The Board should not criticize Mr. Seelinger for not doing even more than he did, given the number of corrective actions he attempted (Tr. 4670-74) and given that he "never tried harder on any other LER." Tr. 4680.
The remainder of GPU Nuclear's Proposed Findings concerning Messrs. Floyd and Seelinger should not be adopted because they are mere conclusions based on the same erroneous premises previously discussed.
II. Reply To The Aamodts' Proposed Findings Introduction
- The findings proposed by the Aamodts must be disregarded by the Board. The Aamodts' Proposed Findings mischaracterize testimony and miscite documentary evidence. In most instances, their Proposed Findings are supported by nothing more than incomplete, incorrect, or non-existent record references. More significantly, the Aamodts' Proposed Findings contribute nothing at all to the Board's task of making findings regarding the alleged involvement of individual TMI-2 employees in leak rate test falsification. We discuss the most egregious portions of those Proposed Findings below. The Numerous Employees urge the Board to reject the Aamodts' Proposed Findings in their entirety.
l I
Identified vs. Unidentified Leakage True to form, the Aamodts have largely ignored the massive record in this proceeding and have manufactured their own " evidence" in a desperate effort to convict "the company and corporate management." Aamodt's Proposed Findings 1 27.
Their thesis is based on a false premise. They have focused their attention on identified, rather than unidentified, t
leakage. Because the distinction between the two was patiently explained to Mrs. Aamodt during the hearings, Tr. 3954-55, 3957-58, the Aamodts' Proposed Findings beginning at 1 23 can only be viewed as deliberate obfuscation.
No one disputes the fact that there was increasingly high identified leakage at TMI-2 from February 15 through March 28, 1979. See 1T 293, 300 of the Numerous Employees' Proposed Findings. But Faegre & Benson and MPR each concluded that unidentifed leakage never exceeded 1 gpm during that time period. See id., 11 227, 234. The Aamodts' Attachments 2 and 3 do not prove the contrary; they simply confirm what the record already shows.
The Aamodts' Attachment 1 is apparently offered as
" evidence" that there was a steam generator leak at TMI-2 before the accident. This is totally improper. The document is rank hearsay, the author is not even identified, there is no way to verify the accuracy of the report, and there is no witness for the Board to question about it.
In any event, Attachment 1 does not show that the alleged steam generator leakage existed prior'to the TMI-2 accident, nor does it show that the leakage, assuming it existed, exeeded the 1 gpm limit on steam generator leakage.
Technical Specification 3.4.6.2 required that steam generator tube leakage be limited to 1 gpm. The computer program for the leak rate test required the operators to enter a value for such leakage, which could be derived from a gross activity analysis of secondary coolant. See Stier Report, Vol.
V(C), Tab 19, para. 6.1.1. Leak rate tests for February 15-March 28, 1979 (Stier Tests Nos. 1-38) consistently show no steam generator tube leakage. See, id., Vols. IV(C) and IV(D). The last Test before the accident was completed at 0234 on March 28. Stier Test No. 1. It shows 0.0 gpm for steam generator tube leakage.
Finally, it appears that even the Aamodts' claim that there was post-accident steam generator leakage is not correct. The Rogovin Special Inquiry Group Report on the Three Mile Island Accident (Vol. II, part II, p. 725) indicates that there was a suspected steam generator leak that developed during the accident, for which a sample was taken at 5:42 a.m.
on March 28, 1979. Evidently the operators postulated that a steam leak was responsible for increasing reactor building pressure around 5 a.m. Subsequent analysis, however, disproved the supposition of steam generator leakage. See id., p. 663.
Therefore, it would appear that the unverified, unevaluated assumption in Aamodt Attachment 1 of a "known" leak in the B 4
steam generator is simply wrong. All references to it should be stricken.
We now turn to a review of certain of the Aamodts' other Proposed Findings.
Mr. Hartman's Allegations In T 7 of the Aamodts' Proposed Findings, an unsuccensful effort is made to resurrect the now thoroughly discredited allegations by Mr. Hartman of widespread leak rate test falsification at TMI-2. See, e.g., 1T 29-34 of the Numerous Employees' Proposed Findings.
Reliance On Prior Investigations In T 9 of the Aamodts' Proposed Findings, it is alleged that a variety of facts regarding many of the central issues before this Board have previously been established in investigations by the Commission, the Justice Department, Mr.
Stier and Faegre & Benson. The hodgepodge of facts allegedly established, in clear violation of the Board's emphatic directive that proposed " findings shall contain exact citations to the transcript of record and exhibits in support of each proposed finding", Tr. 5326-27, is supported only by a general 1
reference to four Exhibits. Ignoring the Board's further instructions that citations to voluminous Exhibits, such as the Stier Report, must be as specific as is necessary to allow the Board to find the supporting reference, Tr. 5327-28, this paragraph merely cites "Ex. 1-A, Vol. 1 [which contains 169 pages], Ex. 2, Vol. 1 [66 pages], Ex. 5-A [approximately 323 pages], Ex. 6 (approximately 1,900 pages]." That the Aamodts understood this directive is apparent from a few citations elsewhere in their Proposed Findings which comply with it.
Standing alone, this failure to adhere to the Board's explicit citation requirements is sufficent to warrant the total disregard of the findings proposed in this paragraph, and elsewhere. Seo Tr. 5327.
Furthermore, and even more significantly, the Commission's mandate to the Board was for the Board to find the facts at issue. See 1T 90-94 of the Numerous Employees' Proposed Findings. Accordingly, the Board has already determined that it would base its conclusions about alleged leak rate falsification on direct evidence. See id., T 94.
For this reason, the Board cannot rely merely on vague references to the investigative reports of others as the sole basis for its findings. See id. Rather, the Board must ;
independently weigh all the evidence of record, especially the l
testimony of the employees, whose credibility and demeanor the Board has had the opportunity to evaluate firsthand. See id.
l l
l l
l i
Finally, the Board cannot adopt the facts alleged in T 9 of the Aamodts' Proposed Findings because they are wrong.
For example, the allegation that the addition of hydrogen to the MUT during a leak rate test was forbidden is contrary to the record. See 1T 152, 256 of the Numerous Employees' Proposed Findings. The allegation that disparities between the MUT level transmitters were used by CROs to falsify test results is also contradicted by the evidence. See, e.g., id.,
T 291. Nor is there any evidence that in mid-October 1978 NRC Inspector Haverkamp advised TMI-2 personnel that discarding invalid leak rate tests was improper. See id., 11 381-88; see, e.g., Tr. 2100.
Aamodts' Proposed Findings Summary The Aamodts summarize, in T 10, their Proposed Findings set forth in the eight succeeding paragraphs, viz.:
TT 11-17 (there are two paragraphs numbered "16" and no paragraph "18"). We address them below. We note, however, that the Aamodts incorrectly assert in T 10 that Mr. Boltz filed a prepared statement, was a party to this proceeding, and was represented by counsel at the hearing.
Employee Perception Of The Leak Rate Test In 1 11 of the Aamodts' proposed Findings, it is contended, in effect, that the Board should not find that TMI-2 control room personnel perceived the leak rate test to be an
unreliable measure of unidentified leakage because leakage detection was important to the safe operation of the plant.
The most significant flaws in this argument are, first, that the 1 gpm LCO on unidentified leakage was arbitra'rily chosen and that amount of leakage had no safety significance, see T 171 of the Numerous Employees' Proposed Findings; and, second, that the supervisors and operators deemed the leak rate test to be relatively unimportant because it was unreliable.
Id., 11 327-39. Contrary to the implications of the Aamodts' Proposed Finding 1 11, the record amply demonstrates that .
supervisors and operators appreciated the importance of operating the plant within the LCO for unidentified leakage.
See 1 230'of the Numerous Employees' Proposed Findings. In sum, they did not disregard the safety significance of unidentified leakage; rather, they disregarded results of a demonstrably defective test. See id., 11 184-224.
Computer Program Defects The Aamodts' Proposed Finding T 12 contends that the TMI-2 operators were not justified in losing faith in the reliability of leak rate test results based on their l observation of inaccuracies in the computer program used to conduct leak rate tests. This Proposed Finding is meritless.
Many operators testified to the deficiencies that they had observed in the leak rate computer program. See T 329 of
Numerous Employees' Proposed Findings; see generally, id.,
11 184-224. Mr. Fels confirmed that defects in the leak rate test procedure were " mimicked" in the computer program, Tr. 4497, thereby causing erratic leak rate test results. See Tr. 4531. The Aamodts characterize Mr. Fels as "the computer expert" at TMI-2, yet disregard his testimony that the hand-calculated leak rate was "much less accurate" than that performed by the computer. Tr. 4531-32; see 1 761 of the Numerous Employees' Proposed Findings. In sum, the Aamodts' Proposed Finding in T 12 is contradicted by the record.
Discarding Invalid Leak Rate Test Results The Aamodts propose in 1 13 that the Board find that the practice at TMI-2 of discarding invalid leak rate test results was not a continuation of a practice begun at TMI-1, because the operators received training and instructions to retain all test results and the Technical Specifications required it. If there is anything that is beyond dispute in this proceeding, it is that the practice at TMI-2 of discarding invalid leak rate test results had it genesis at TMI-1. See, l
e.g., 1 62 of the Numerous Employees Proposed Findings.
Equally noncontroversial is the fact that TMI-2 operators l
received virtually no training or instruction regarding performance of leak rate tests. See, e.g., id., SH 315-26.
Moreover, it is not correct that the Technical Specifications l
l 1
i l
l
required the retention of all . leak rate test results.: See id.,
, T 150; Memorandum of Law of the Numerous Employees, Point VI.B. This paragraph of the Aamodts' Proposed Findings must also be rejected as contrary to the evidence.
Reliance on Plant Parameters to Assess Leakage TMI-2 operators did not always disregard the leak rate test as a tool.for measuring unidentified leakage, as the Aamodts suggest in 1 14. Rather, they placed greater reliance on various plant parameters to assess unidentified leakage as a consequence of having observed leak rate test results that were both inaccurate and erratic. See 14 327-33 of the Numerous Employees' Proposed Findings. Consistent with the operators' observations, the technical analysis'in the record has confirmed that the leak rate test was fraught with inaccuracies during 1978-79. See id., 1T 184-224.
Neither Judge Carpenter nor Messrs. Kidwell, Guthrie, or Kunder " discredited" the operators' justification for looking at various plant parameters to help assess leakage.
For example, at Tr. 4833-36 cited by the Aamodts, Mr. Kunder ,
acknowledged the " concern" on the part of the TMI-2 opeators that arose from their observation that leak rate test results did not comport with long-term changes in inventory balance.
Judge Carpenter's questions in this exchange suggest that following such changes is a viable approach, provided shifts I
f i
. . . ~ , . ~ __ _ .__ ._.
i i
kept each other' informed of those changes. There has been ample testimony illustrating that shifts did apprise each other of leak rate test results and other relevant data. See, e.g.,
Hitz Prep. St., p. 4, ff. Tr. 3664 (use of shift turnover notes for that purpose).
Water Additions In T 15 of the Aamodts' Proposed Findings, undifferentiated allegations are made that water was added to the MUT solely to influence leak rate test results. Their Proposed Finding is offered without adequate or, in some instances, any record references. Moreover, the Aamodts apparently would have the Board assign individual responsibility for specific water additions to all operators on a shift, merely because they were on the shift when a water addition was alleged to have occurred. We submit that such an approach is fundamentally flawed and must be rejected. See, l e.g., TT 238-54, 390-93 of the Numerous Employees' Proposed Findings.
MUT Level Transmitters The Aamodts' Proposed Finding in their first T 16 (pp.
9-10) states that TMI-2 operators took advantage "of the known disparity between the [MUT level] instrumentation." This finding is flatly contradicted by the record; it has been established that MUT level transmitters were not used to
falsify leak rate tests at TMI-2. See 11.270-71, 287-91 of the Numerous Employees' Proposed Findings.
Hydrogen Additions In their second T 16 (pp. 10-11), the Aamodts' begin, again, with the totally false premise that the leak rate test procedure prohibited hydrogen additions to the MUT during the test. See, e.g., Stier Report, Vol. I, p. 88. Moreover,-they persist in taking prior statements ,f Mr. "Chastwyk" out of context and mi.scharacterizing them. See Tr. 3555 (Kelley, J.). For example, they allege that Mr. Chwastyk "who ran the demonstration of the hydrogen test told e[v]eryone he could contact. Ex. 6 (Ex. 21 [ sic] pp. 26-28)." As the material cited has nothing whatever to do with hydrogen additions, the apparently intended reference is to Exhibit 6, Exhibit 22, pp.
26-28. However, those statements of Mr. Chwastyk are more accurately summarized as merely that, after he ran his hydrogen experiment, he told the CROs on his shift to avoid adding hydrogen to the MUT during a test, and he reported the phenomenon to I&C personnel. See 11 262-63, 433-34, 437 of the Numerous Employees' Proposed Findings.
The Aamodts similarly mischaracterize the testimony of Mr. Kidwell and Mr. Olson. As to Mr. Kidwell, they propose that he "' faintly' knew about the hydrogen effect because he observed operators discussing it 'out of the corner of (his) i
eye,' Tr. 3293 [ sic). . . . But the page they cite does not contain the words quoted by the Aamodts nor does it involve a discussion of hydrogen additions. Rather, Mr. Kidwell's testimony on this subject appears at Tr. 3386-95, and may be more accurately characterized as showing Mr. Kidwell's lack of knowledge or understanding of hydogen's potential impact on leak rate test results. See T 786 of the Numerous Employees' Proposed Findings.
With respect to Mr. Olson, the Aamodts claim that his testimony was that he avoided an attempt by Mr. Coleman to discuss hydrogen additions with him. But the transcript pages they cite are from the testimony of Mr. Coleman. Mr. Olson testified that he could not recall the incident with Mr.
Coleman; that if it did occur, it had to have happened after the accident because Mr. Olson did not know of the hydrogen effect before then; and, he would not have reacted to Mr.
Coleman in the manner described. Tr. 4029-30; see T 800 of the Numerous Employees' Proposed Findings.
TMI-2 Supervisors Because the Aamodts did not attend even a single day of the hearing, their Proposed Finding at T 22 reflects their ignorance of the fact that all witnesses before the presiding Board were sworn to tell the truth. The Aamodts' allegation that GPU Nuclear's lawyers controlled the witnesses is not
{
l i
l i
supported by the record, and is contrary to fact. In any event, the Aamodts' statement to that effect violates the Board's repeated admonitions to them against making groundless and intemperate attacks upon counsel in this proceeding.
Memorandum and Order, Docket No. LRP, p. 13 (July 16, 1986).
The Board should reject this defamatory paragraph, and not adopt any of the Aamodts' other slighting references to counsel.
Respectfully submitted, Of Counsel: LeBOEUF, LAMB, LEIBY & MacRAE MICHAEL F. McBRIDE By N #c ROBERT ST. JOHN ROPER d Partner g~
MOLLY S. BOAST 1333 New Mmpshire Avenue, N.W.
JAMES W. MOELLER Suite 1100 MARLENE L. STEIN Washington, DC 20036 C. CHRISTOPHER SPRAGUE (202) 457-7500 SMITH B. GEPHART KILLIAN & GEPHART JANE G. PENNY 216-18 Pine Street TERRENCE G. McGOWAN Harrisburg, PA 17108 (717) 232-1851 Attorneys for the Numerous i
Employees February 16, 1987 l
. _ _ ,