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Category:DEFICIENCY REPORTS (PER 10CFR50.55E & PART 21)
MONTHYEARB17414, Part 21 Rept Re 980116 Failure of Tachometer Transducer,Id Number TG-25-5,during Surveillance Test.Caused by Bearing Failure Which Could Cause Shaft to Seize & Break.Removed from Svc & Replaced Failed Tachometer Transducer1998-09-0303 September 1998 Part 21 Rept Re 980116 Failure of Tachometer Transducer,Id Number TG-25-5,during Surveillance Test.Caused by Bearing Failure Which Could Cause Shaft to Seize & Break.Removed from Svc & Replaced Failed Tachometer Transducer ML18066A2771998-08-13013 August 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Deficiency in CE Current Screening Methodology for Determining Limiting Fuel Assembly for Detailed PWR thermal-hydraulic Sa.Evaluations Were Performed for Affected Plants to Determine Effect of Deficiency ML20236Y1231998-08-0707 August 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Gas & Turbine Generator for Dedicated Emergency Power to Vital AC Buses ML20247B6751998-05-0101 May 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Evaluation & Notification for RELAP4 Excessive Variability at Millstone Unit 2.Caused by Small Changes in Input to RELAP4 That Can Result in Large Changes in Calculated Peak Cladding Temp.Informed NRC of Deviation ML20198E0631998-01-0707 January 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Shipment by Dubose National Energy Svcs,Inc, of 40 Pieces of 4 inch,90 Degree Elbows Which Did Not Meet ASME Section II SA-234 Requirements ML20211M6491997-10-0808 October 1997 Addenda 1 to Part 21 Rept Re Weldments on Opposed Piston & Coltec-Pielstick Emergency stand-by Diesel gen-set lube-oil & Jacket Water Piping Sys.Revised List of Potentially Affected Utils to Include Asterisked Utils,Submitted ML20211H7911997-09-30030 September 1997 Part 21 Rept Re Failure of Weldment Associated w/lube-oil Piping Sys on 970804 at Millstone,Unit 2.Root Cause Is Not Yet Known.Quality of Weldment Is Being Considered.Listed Util Sites Affected B16531, Part 21 Rept Re GE Commercial Grade Dedication Program Being Determined to Be Inadequate in Ability to Demonstrate Seismic Capability of Specific Relay.Returned Relays to GE Facility for Repair1997-07-0303 July 1997 Part 21 Rept Re GE Commercial Grade Dedication Program Being Determined to Be Inadequate in Ability to Demonstrate Seismic Capability of Specific Relay.Returned Relays to GE Facility for Repair ML20140D6581997-06-0606 June 1997 Part 21 Rept Re GE Model Ifcs Relays Procured from GE Delivered W/Loose Hardware & Unsuitable for Use at Unit 1 ML20210E3591997-03-27027 March 1997 Part 21 Rept Re Sorrento Electronics Inc Has Determined Operation & Maint Manual May Not Adequately Define Requirements for Performing Periodic Surveillance of SR Applications.Caused by Hardware Failures.Revised RM-23A B16149, Part 21 Rept Re Cracked Fuse Ferrule Defects Due to Administrative Error in Ltr Detailing Commitments Re Issue. Corrected Copy of Commitments Associated W/Ltr Provided1997-01-14014 January 1997 Part 21 Rept Re Cracked Fuse Ferrule Defects Due to Administrative Error in Ltr Detailing Commitments Re Issue. Corrected Copy of Commitments Associated W/Ltr Provided B16030, Part 21 Rept Re Stocked safety-related Fuses Issued from Storeroom for Installation Which Had Cracked Ferrules in Longitudinal Direction on 960911.Procurement & Warehouse Groups Completed Inspecting Fuses in Warehouse1996-12-13013 December 1996 Part 21 Rept Re Stocked safety-related Fuses Issued from Storeroom for Installation Which Had Cracked Ferrules in Longitudinal Direction on 960911.Procurement & Warehouse Groups Completed Inspecting Fuses in Warehouse ML20134N4061996-11-22022 November 1996 Part 21 Rept Re Fifteen Different Fuse Types from Three Different Mfgs Found to Have Axial Cracks Due to Brass Being Susceptible to Defect.Functional Testing Should Be Performed on Sample of Fuses ML18065B0111996-10-18018 October 1996 Part 21 Rept Re Application of Certain Aspects of ABB-CE Safety Analysis Methodology LD-96-014, Part 21 Rept Re Response to NRC Notice on Nonconformance. Licensee Will Direct Cognizant Personnel Reviewing Deviation or Failure to Comply for Basic Components Delivered to Customers,To Document Whether/Not Facts Indicate Evaluation1996-04-26026 April 1996 Part 21 Rept Re Response to NRC Notice on Nonconformance. Licensee Will Direct Cognizant Personnel Reviewing Deviation or Failure to Comply for Basic Components Delivered to Customers,To Document Whether/Not Facts Indicate Evaluation ML20059H7721994-01-17017 January 1994 Part 21 Rept Re Virginia Power Notifying Fairbands Morse Via Failure Analysis Rept NESML-Q-058 of Defective Air Start Distributor cam,16104412 ML20059F2631994-01-0707 January 1994 Part 21 Rept Re Air Start Distributor Cam Mfg by Fairbanks Morse.Mfg Suggests That Site Referenced in Encl App I Inspect Air Start Distributor Cam as Soon as Practical B14680, Part 21 Rept Re Substantial Safety Hazard Evaluation of RCP Turning Vane Cap Screws.Util Increased head-to Shank Fillet Radius to Reduce Stress Concentration & Reduced Thread Engagement to Reduce Axial & Bending Stiffness1993-11-22022 November 1993 Part 21 Rept Re Substantial Safety Hazard Evaluation of RCP Turning Vane Cap Screws.Util Increased head-to Shank Fillet Radius to Reduce Stress Concentration & Reduced Thread Engagement to Reduce Axial & Bending Stiffness ML20058G5981993-11-17017 November 1993 Part 21 Rept Re Westronics Recorders,Model 2100C.Signal Input Transition Printed Circuit Board Assembly Redesigned to Improve Recorder Immunity to Electromagnetic Interference.List of Affected Recorders & Locations Encl ML20057G1511993-10-0707 October 1993 Part 21 Rept Re Westronics Model 2100C Series Recorders. Informs That Over Several Tests,Observed That Recorder Would Reset During Peak Acceleration & Door Being Forced Off Recorder.Small Retaining Clips Added to Bottom of Door B14544, Update to 900827 Rept of Substantial Safety Hazard Re GE Custom 8000 Horizontal Induction Motors,Reported Per 10CFR21 for Unit 3.Util Has Determined,As Part of Review of in 91-007 That Subj GE Motors Also Used at Units 1 & 21993-08-11011 August 1993 Update to 900827 Rept of Substantial Safety Hazard Re GE Custom 8000 Horizontal Induction Motors,Reported Per 10CFR21 for Unit 3.Util Has Determined,As Part of Review of in 91-007 That Subj GE Motors Also Used at Units 1 & 2 ML20126J5961992-12-31031 December 1992 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Loss of RHR Cooling During Nozzle Dam Removal.Nozzle Dams May Create Trapped Air Column Behind Cold Leg Nozzle Dam.Mod to Nozzle Dams Currently Underway. Ltrs to Affected Utils Encl ML20085N3251991-11-0101 November 1991 Part 21 Rept Re Hardness Levels,In 8 of 20 Bolts in Steam Generator,W/Approx Half of Expected Value for Matl Spec. Bolts Supplied by Process Products,Ltd & Cardinal Fastener & Specialty Co.All Bolts Will Be Replaced L-91-002, Supplemental Part 21 Rept Re GE Reactor Trip Breakers Used in safety-grade Equipment.Initially Reported on 901228.List of Plants Supplied w/C-E Breakers Encl1991-01-0404 January 1991 Supplemental Part 21 Rept Re GE Reactor Trip Breakers Used in safety-grade Equipment.Initially Reported on 901228.List of Plants Supplied w/C-E Breakers Encl B13620, Part 21 Rept Re Substantial Safety Hazard Involving GE Custom 8000 Horizontal Induction Motor.Pump Motor Failure Identified Due to Loud Noise During Operation.Caused by Loosening of Clamps of Air Deflector.Damaged Motor Removed1990-08-27027 August 1990 Part 21 Rept Re Substantial Safety Hazard Involving GE Custom 8000 Horizontal Induction Motor.Pump Motor Failure Identified Due to Loud Noise During Operation.Caused by Loosening of Clamps of Air Deflector.Damaged Motor Removed B13621, Part 21 Rept Re Substantial Safety Hazard Involving Westinghouse Veritrek Transmitters.Large Shift in Output Observed While Attempting to Calibr Two Transmitters. Internal Review Performed & Defective Transmitters Replaced1990-08-27027 August 1990 Part 21 Rept Re Substantial Safety Hazard Involving Westinghouse Veritrek Transmitters.Large Shift in Output Observed While Attempting to Calibr Two Transmitters. Internal Review Performed & Defective Transmitters Replaced ML20043A2491990-05-11011 May 1990 Part 21 Rept Re Tufline Plug Valves.Metallographic Exam of Cracked Bolting Revealed That Failures Due to Igscc.Cause Not Determined.Lubricant Used Not Tested or Certified for Low Halogen Content.Addl Metallographic Exam Underway ML17223A5941990-03-0909 March 1990 Errata to 900126 Part 21 Rept Re Anchor/Darling Actuators Incorporating Use of Teldyne-Republic four-way Valves.Lists Plants Inadvertently Left Out in Original Rept B13253, Part 21 Rept Re Failure of Several Motor Control Starters Mfg by Telemecanique Due to Mechanical Binding in Motor Starter.Initially Reported on 890512.Failed Starters W/Units Replaced & Two Failed Starters Returned for Vendor Tests1989-05-15015 May 1989 Part 21 Rept Re Failure of Several Motor Control Starters Mfg by Telemecanique Due to Mechanical Binding in Motor Starter.Initially Reported on 890512.Failed Starters W/Units Replaced & Two Failed Starters Returned for Vendor Tests ML20246K7401989-04-26026 April 1989 Part 21 Rept Re Incorrectly Stamped Name Plates on Certain Asco Nuclear Qualified Valves.Vendor Will Contact Each Affected Facility & Furnish Correctly Stamped Plates & in Near Future Discontinue Sale of Rebuild Kits for Valves ML20244D8161989-04-13013 April 1989 Part 21 Rept Re Failure of Rosemount Transmitters.All Failed Transmitters Replaced,Inservice Test Procedure Prepared & Monthly Test of All 12 Transmitters in RCS Throughout Cycle 2 Operation Will Be Performed.Review Continuing ML20153B2811988-02-22022 February 1988 Part 21 Rept Re Defect in Operation of Gas Monitors Using Fixed Filters.Initially Reported on 880212.Caused by Error in Software for Monitors.Vendor Testing Mod to Software & in Interim Recommends Changing Filters Every 48 H B12449, Part 21 Rept Re Noryl Plastic Insulation Deterioration on Bus Bars in Certain Metaclad Switchgear at Facility. Switchgears Used in safety-related Circuits Will Be Inspected & Repaired During Refueling Outage in Nov 19871987-03-0404 March 1987 Part 21 Rept Re Noryl Plastic Insulation Deterioration on Bus Bars in Certain Metaclad Switchgear at Facility. Switchgears Used in safety-related Circuits Will Be Inspected & Repaired During Refueling Outage in Nov 1987 ML20211P7211987-02-23023 February 1987 Part 21 Rept Re Rockbestos Coaxial Cable Used in Sorrento Electronics Digital & Analog high-range Radiation Monitor. Insulation Resistance at High Temp Not High Enough for Ion Chamber & Associated Electronics to Operate Properly ML20211C8371987-02-13013 February 1987 Part 21 Rept Re Insufficient Length of Upper Adjusting Ring Retaining Pins on Dresser Main Steam Safety Valves. Initially Reported on 870211.Defective Pins Replaced ML20210F4741986-09-16016 September 1986 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Sticking in Closed or Partially Open Position on Dresser 3050 Diaphragm Valves.Initially Reported on 850118.Disc Caps,Including Chamfers on Outside Diameter,Will Be Modified ML20203D0221986-07-14014 July 1986 Part 21 Rept Re Air Monitoring Sys Probes Exhibiting Blue Tip Rather than Normal White Tip & Insensitive to Chlorine. Caused by Improper Handling/Storage.Advisory Bulletin Encl. Item Not Reportable Per Part 21 ML20206S0841986-06-30030 June 1986 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Cut Wires in Wire Harness of Bbc Brown Boveri K600/K800 Circuit Breakers.Initially Reported on 860509.Safety Implications Listed.Gear Guard Designed to Prevent Cut Wires B12082, Part 21 Rept Re Substantial Safety Hazard Due to Generic Defect in Ite/Brown Boveri Type K600S Circuit Breakers. Initially Reported on 860501.Mod & Repair of Breakers Continuing1986-05-0909 May 1986 Part 21 Rept Re Substantial Safety Hazard Due to Generic Defect in Ite/Brown Boveri Type K600S Circuit Breakers. Initially Reported on 860501.Mod & Repair of Breakers Continuing ML20141D8051986-04-0101 April 1986 Part 21 Rept Re Model 402 Series Level Control Used for safety-related Application Shipped W/O Torque Check. Customers Will Be Notified by 860428 & Requested to Perform Torque Check.List of Plants Using Component Encl ML20137X3891986-02-27027 February 1986 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Defect in Model KMG-HRH Noble Gas Radiation Monitor W/Enhanced Detector Model KDGM-HR. Initially Reported on 860222.Vendor Will Request Utils for Listed Plants to Determine If Monitors Defective ML20151Y8141986-02-0404 February 1986 Part 21 Rept Re Colt-Pielstick Engine Tripping Out on High Speed When Started for Test Purposes at Seabrook.Caused by Source of Air Pressure Staying On.Engines Will Be Modified to Positively Vent Air from Rack Boost Cylinder ML20137N4831986-01-17017 January 1986 Final Potential Significant Deficiency Rept SD-57 Re High Energy Steam Line Breaks Outside Containment.Initially Reported on 840605.Info on Impact of Break on Environ Qualification of Equipment Outside Containment Submitted ML20138K8401985-12-0303 December 1985 Final Part 21 & Deficiency Rept SD-41 Re Gould Type He 4 100-amp Frame Size Breaker in 480-volt Motor Control Ctr Which Failed When Pole C Did Not Close When Breaker Operated.Initially Reported on 830608.Breakers Replaced ML20137R0291985-11-13013 November 1985 Final Potential Significant Deficiency Rept SD-56 Re Undocumented Linear Indications & Excessive Geometric Unsharpness of Tubeco Weld Radiographs.Initially Identified in Insp Rept 50-423/85-14 on 831122.Weldments Repaired ML20137N5611985-11-13013 November 1985 Final Part 21 & Significant Deficiency Rept SD-82 Re Errors in Westinghouse Core Exit Thermocouple Sys.Initially Reported on 850509.New Emergency Operating Procedure Setpoints Calculated.Item Not Reportable Per 10CFR50.55(e) ML20137S0981985-11-12012 November 1985 Final Potential Significant Deficiency Rept SD-89 Re Binding of Telemecanique (Formerly Gould) Starter Contact Carrier Assemblies.Initially Reported on 851014.Size 1 & 2 Starters Being Inspected.Vendor Has Supplied Retrofit Kits ML20137N5101985-11-12012 November 1985 Final Potential Significant Deficiency Rept SD-75 Re Nonconforming Terminations in CVI Corp Equipment.Initially Reported on 850213.Insp of Lugs Completed.Deficient Terminations Repaired or Replaced ML20198F7041985-11-0101 November 1985 Deficiency Rept SD-56 Re Tubeco Weld Radiographs.Initially Reported on 840618.Review of Tubeco Radiographs for QA Category I,Asme III Code Class 1,2 & 3 Welds Complete.Final Rept Will Be Provided by 851113 ML20198F7421985-11-0101 November 1985 Final Part 21 & Deficiency Rept SD-25 Re Failure of Pinion Gear Shear Keys in Limitorque Model SBO Motor Operated Valves.Initially Reported on 820903.Westinghouse Determined Item Not Reportable Per 10CFR50.55(e) 1998-09-03
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217P5391999-10-25025 October 1999 Rev 0,Change 1 to Millstone Unit 1 Northeast Utils QA Program ML20217C8721999-10-0606 October 1999 Rev 21,change 3 to MP-02-OST-BAP01, Nuqap Topical Rept, App F & G Only B17896, Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With1999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With B17894, Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2.With1999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2.With B17898, Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3.With1999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3.With ML20216J4341999-09-24024 September 1999 Mnps Unit 3 ISI Summary Rept,Cycle 6 ML20211N8401999-09-0202 September 1999 Rev 21,change 1 to Northeast Utils QA TR, Including Changes Incorporated Into Rev 20,changes 9 & 10 B17878, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Mnps,Unit 1.With1999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Mnps,Unit 1.With B17874, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3.With1999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3.With ML20216F5141999-08-31031 August 1999 Rept on Status of Public Petitions Under 10CFR2.206 B17879, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2.With1999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2.With ML20211G9631999-08-30030 August 1999 SER Accepting Licensee Response to GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves ML20211A6561999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2 B17858, Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3.With1999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3.With B17856, Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With1999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With ML20210J0311999-07-21021 July 1999 Rev 20,Change 10 to QAP 1.0, Organization ML20210E5931999-07-19019 July 1999 Revised Page 16 of 21,to App F of Northeast Util QA Program Plan ML20210C5911999-07-15015 July 1999 Revised Rev 20,change 10 to Northeast Util QA Program TR, Replacing Summary of Changes ML20210A0411999-07-15015 July 1999 Rev 20,change 10 to Northeast Util QA Program Tr B17814, Special Rept:On 990612 B Train EDG Failed to Restart within 5 Minutes Following Completion of 18 Month 24 H Endurance Run Required by TS 4.8.1.1.2.g.7.Caused by Procedural inadequacy.Re-performed Hot Restart Via Manual Start1999-07-12012 July 1999 Special Rept:On 990612 B Train EDG Failed to Restart within 5 Minutes Following Completion of 18 Month 24 H Endurance Run Required by TS 4.8.1.1.2.g.7.Caused by Procedural inadequacy.Re-performed Hot Restart Via Manual Start ML20209D1881999-07-0101 July 1999 Rev 20,change 9 to Northeast Util QA Program Tr ML20196J2191999-06-30030 June 1999 SER Concluding That Licensee USI A-46 Implementation Program,In General,Met Purpose & Intent of Criteria in GIP-2 & Staff Sser 2 for Resolution of USI A-46 ML20211A6751999-06-30030 June 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2,providing Revised Average Daily Unit Power Level & Operating Data Rept ML20196A8451999-06-30030 June 1999 Post Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Rept ML20209J0541999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Millstone Unit 2 B17830, Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3.With1999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3.With ML20196K1791999-06-30030 June 1999 Addendum 6 to Millstone Unit 2 Annual Rept, ML20196J1821999-06-30030 June 1999 Rev 21,Change 0 to Northeast Utilities QAP (Nuqap) Tr B17833, Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Millstone Power Station,Unit 1.With1999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Millstone Power Station,Unit 1.With ML20195H1011999-06-11011 June 1999 Rev 20,change 8 to Northeast Utilities QAP (Nuqap) TR ML20207G6411999-06-0303 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 105,235 & 171 to Licenses DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-49,respectively ML20211A6631999-05-31031 May 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2,providing Revised Average Daily Unit Power Level,Operating Data Rept & Unit Shutdowns & Power Reductions B17808, Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3.With1999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 3.With ML20211B7351999-05-31031 May 1999 Cycle 7 Colr B17804, Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Mnps,Unit 2.With1999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Mnps,Unit 2.With B17807, Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Mnps,Unit 1.With1999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Mnps,Unit 1.With ML20209J0661999-05-31031 May 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Millstone Unit 2 ML20206M4631999-05-11011 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Alternative Proposed by Licensee to Perform Ultrasonic Exam on Inner Surface of Nozzle to safe-end Weld ML20206J8351999-05-0707 May 1999 Rev 20,Change 7 to QAP-1.0, Northeast Utls QA Program (Nuqap) Tr ML20206G6221999-05-0404 May 1999 SER Accepting Util Request to Apply leak-before-break Status to Pressurizer Surge Line Piping for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2 B17782, Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With1999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With ML20205R3531999-04-30030 April 1999 Addendum 4 to Annual Rept, B17775, Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3.With1999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3.With ML20205K6141999-04-30030 April 1999 Non-proprietary Version of Rev 2 to Holtec Rept HI-971843, Licensing Rept for Reclassification of Discharge in Millstone Unit 3 Spent Fuel Pool ML20206E2971999-04-30030 April 1999 Rev 1 to Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2 COLR - Cycle 13 B17777, Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Millstone Unit 2. with1999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Millstone Unit 2. with ML20205Q5891999-04-0909 April 1999 Rev 20,change 6 to QAP-1.0,Northeast Utils QA Program TR ML20205R8751999-04-0909 April 1999 Provides Commission with Staff Assessment of Issues Related to Restart of Millstone Unit 2 & Staff Recommendations Re Restart Authorization for Millstone Unit 2 ML20206T3991999-03-31031 March 1999 First Quarter 1999 Performance Rept, Dtd May 1999 B17747, Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With1999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Millstone Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With 1999-09-30
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General Offices
cec P.O. BOX 270 HARTFORD. CONNECT l cut 06141-0270 L L J ((,C$%7,,, (203) 665-S000 October 12,1984 Docket No. 50-423 F0443A Dr. Thomas E. Murley Regional Administrator Region I U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19006 Refet ences: (1) W. G. Counsil to T. E. Murley, B10964, dated December 1, 1983.
(2) W. G. Counsil to T. E. Murley, B10815, dated June 17,1983.
(3) Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation, NERM-59, Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3. "Evahmtlen c,I Anchor Stud Spacing Containtment Structure Steel Liner,"
dated May 23,1984.
Dear Dr. Murley:
Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3 Reporting of Potential Significant Deficiencies in Design and Construction: Containment Liner Stud Spacing (SD-38)
In a May 19, 1983, telephone conversation between your Mr. T. Elsasser and our Mr. R. R. Viviano, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) reported a potential significant deficiency in the construction of Millstone Unit No. 3 as required by Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Paragraph 55(e). The potential significant deficiency involves containment liner stud (anchor) spacing in excess of specification requirements. (See References 1 and 2).
We have completed our evaluatien of the stud spacing in the Millstone Unit No. 3 containment liner to determine its potential impact on containment liner intedrity. The results of this evaluation are documented in a report by our architect-engineer (Reference 3) and a copy of this was given to your Mr. K. A. Manoly during his site visit on August 14,1984.
We have concluded that the present containment liner stud spacing for Millstone Unit No. 3 is adequate and that it would .have had no adverse effect on safety had the condition gone undetected. Hence, this is not a significant deficiency for Millstone Unit No. 3.
8411030720 841012 DR ADOCK 05000 S af
-; e - ... .>
9 l
Changes to die Millstone Unit No. 3 FSAR,'Section 3.8 (Design of Category 1.
Structures) have been initiated to make the FSAR consistent with our findings and are attached for your information.
This constitutes our final report closing out SD-38. We trust that the above
- - information satisfactorily responds to your concerns.
Very.truly yours, NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY i
W. G. Counsil Senior Vice President
- N By: W. F. Fee Executive Vice President cc: Mr. R. C. Young, Director Division of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Phillips Building 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, MD 20014 Mr. K. A. Manoly Office of the Executive Director for Operations Region i U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406
MNPS-3 FSAR The liner plate is a continuously welded steel membrane supported
{ by and anchored to the inside of the containment at sufficiently F close k _
intervals with anchor studs arid deformed bars cn alamonM l natter 7) so that the overall deformation of the liner under the J 7 parameters derived from the design basis accident (DBA) and
- normal operation will be essentially the same as that of the concrete containment structure.
The function of the liner is to act as a gas-tight membrane under conditions that can be encountered throughout the operating life of the plant. The liner is designed to resist all direct leads and accommodate deformation of the concrete containment structure p without ieonardizino N k-ticht iteority,pance stress levelsl w1A1 be kept within allowable stress levels specified in ASME III I Division 1 Class MC.J Under DBA conditions, the liner is under a state or oraxial compressive strain due to thermal effects and during the test condition, the liner plate is under a state of biaxial tensile strain. The anchor studs prevent buckling of the liner and act as nodal points. Tests conducted at Northeastern University, Boston, Massachusetts, using 5/8-inch diameter studs and 3/8-inch thick plate, show that shear failure occurs in the stud adjacent to the weld connecting the stud to the plate; in no instance was the plate damaged. Tests conducted for the stud manufacturer under the direction of Dr. I.M. Viest (TRW, Inc. 1975) indicate that, with the manufacturer's reccmmended depth of embedment of the stud in concrete, the ultimate strength
[ of the stud material can be developed in direct tension. The reinforcement ring and liner adjacent to the hatches are anchored to the concrete containment with a denser stud pattern.
The liner pressure boundary includes embedments, insert plates, and penetrations. Liner dimensions are given in Sections 3.8.1.1.1 to .3 and shown in Figure 3.8-14. Leak chase channels are installed over penetration to liner' seams and over knuckle plate to liner seams.
B. Embedments Three types of embedments are used to maintain the leaktightness I of the steel membrane while transferring loads across the mat liner plate to the concrete mat. One is a 3 x 6 rectangular forged bar also called a bridging 'ar, another is a 1 1/4-inch thick plate, and the other is a 5-inch thick forged plate to which the neutron shield tank is mounted. Leak test channels are welded all around the embedments to ensure the leaktightness of the steel membrane. Vertical reinforcing steel is Cadwelded to the top and bottom of the embedments providing reinforcing bar continuity without creating n.ultiple penetrations.
C. Insert Plates
/ Loads from supports for piping such as the spray headers and other miscellaneous eclipment are transferred to the containment
-( concrete wall through insert plates and their anchors. Each 3.8-4
- - _ - = -- - - - - __ _ _ - = - - _ _ ,
I l
- o. .
l
!$?S-3 FSAR
(
- 25. ASTM C 26C-69 Air-entraintng A3 mixtures for Concrete
- 29. ASTM C 259-71 Test for Potential Reactivity of Aggregates (Chemical Method) 3C. ASTM C 295- Recommended Practice for Petrographic .
1965 Examination of Aggregates for Concrete (1973)
- 31. ASTM C SE6-69 Test for Potential Alkali Reactivity of Carbonate Rocks for Cencrete y Aggrega r.a s $
- 32. AWS D1.1-72 Rev.1-73 Structur u nelding Code k
t-9 t
- 33. AWS D12.1 Recommended Practices for Welding Rein-- 0 forcing Steel, Metal Inserts and Connect- c ions in Reinforced Concrete Construction j
^
- 34. NRC Regulatory Guides as qualified in Section 1.8 on the N following topics:
>; g Cadweld Splices 1.8.1.10 0
- ! 4. 4
- b. Reinforcing Bar Testing 1.8.1.15
?!,j { c. Structural Acceptance Testing 1.8.1.18 -
- d. Placement of Concrete 1.8.1.55 c
- i e. Design Response Spectra 1.8.1.60 2
' 1.8.1.61 0
- f. Seismic Damping values c ,
- 35. BOCA Basic Building Code of the Building officials and Code Administrators International, Inc., O 1970 g A
lj;e 36. State of Connecticut Basic Building. Code, 1971 q 9
'h 3.8.1.2.3 Steel Liner and Penetrations -
g ul
- I O if There was no applicable code for the design of concrete containment structure liners at the beginning of the construction of the Millstone liner. However, ASME gec ucns .II and VIII, 1971 edition, were used as a guide.
lN Design, materials, fabrication, testing, and inspection, where
. applicable, conform to the following codes, standards, and
$ specifications:
- a. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Eections II, III and V, 3
1971issueincludingaddendafuptoandincluding the 1973 Summer addends'.Awo sec riod E. Dty' f,'OM 2. 506 5E c.TioM CC 19S0 lj ( 1% > E tur.:.scidt- ADDEuoA uP c Ayo N(.L9DNc- 59succ.1967..
- b. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Welding Qualifications, 5ection IX, issue in effect at the time of qualificatten.
{
.i 3.6*10
_ _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ _ _ ~ . _ _ _ . . - _ . . _ . . _ _ _ . . _ .
- e. ,
MNP5-3 FSAR
~
(
is added to areas of marked
- deviation from the normal
( 3.5.1.4.2 pattern.
Steel I.iner and Penetrations Stres'ses due te strain compatability of the liner with the reinforced cencrete shell % ue to various combinatien6of pressure, thermal. IT self-weight an seismic load were determined using Stone & Webster's g f t- {
"KAI.NIUS" program. This is a direct integration program for static (;
dge analysis of multilayered thin shells of revolution. The stress tQ analysis of a shell subjected to mechanical and thermal surface loads gQgiyO and edge loads, is reduced to a boundary value problem governed by a u system of nenhomogeneous, linear, partial differential equat: ens. Mhahk The equations are separable with respect to the meridional and E o<; y y ej eircu=fercntial coordinates of the shell. The solution for each -
N}I$g separable component of the, loads is obtained by solving a typical 'two poine, boundary value problem governed by eight first order linea-F Analytic h =O t! yy U .)
ordinarydifferentialequationsusingdirectintegration.Ied evaluation of the penetration discontinuities were mode on the QO[$
ASAAS program (Asymmetric Stress Analysis of Axisymmetric Solids). $~i 3 The method of analysis employed is based on a finite element +
idealization of an axisy= metric solid. Each element is an Egg $n} e axisy= metric ring of a constant cross section. Since such a solid $ @p may be loaded and may deform in nonaxisymmetric modes and since the ')-
properties of the material may vary in all directions (e.g., due to ~[ $ e i
- ( 8f o(0 temperature variations), all the dependent variables including the -8 0@@5 4 j material preperties are expressed as truncated Fourier series with
'f the circumferential coordinate being the independent variable.
(
1 Influence coefficients of penetrations due to applied temperature, pressure, movement. axial shear and torsional loads were determined
- .' using TAC-2D analysis. TAC-2D is a co=puter program for calculating g steady-state and transient temperatures in two dimensional problems i by the finite difference method. The configuration of the body to be
! analyzed is described in the rectangular, cylindrical, or circular I (polar) coordinate system by orthogonal liries of constant coordinate
./ called grid lines. The grid lines specify an array of nodal
! elements. Nodal points are defined as lying midway between the
] bounding grid lines of these elements. A finite difference equation is formulated for each nodal point in terms of its capacitance, heat j[ generation and heat flow. paths to neighboring nodal points.
3.8.A.5 Structural Acceptance Criteria l
[ 3.8.1.5.1 Containment Structure The containment structure is designed for the loads and load h
combinations presented in Section 3.8.1.3.1. Allowable stresses, unless otherwise defined, are in accordance with ACI 318-71. For the y
' factored load combinations, design of the containment structure meets the broad intent of Article CC-3400 of ASME III Division 2. Details
' h' ( -
of the design conform to AC: 318-71 and the additional requirements
' discussed in Section 3.8.1.4, rather than the parallel requirenents A
t 3.B-20
MNPS-3 FSAR
( ultrasenically tested prict te instal}ation for the purpose of detecting pcssible laminations.
Toughness tests (Charpy V-notch) were performed on all materials -
which form part of the containment structure boundary. Nil-ductility Transition Temperature Tests were .so performed on all ferritic steel that fermed part of the pressure boundary but were not required of back:.ng plates, test channels, hatch bolts, and hatch nuts. .
Penetratien sleeves are made of SA537 Grade B Q&T. SA516 Grade 60 fine grain, ncrmalized and SA333 Grade 6 fine grain normalized, all with a ND T of -10'F.
Neutron shield tank embedment base and the carbon steel penetration ferg:.ngs are SA505 Class 1 with a NDT! of +10'F. ,
W Penetration coolers equipment hatch, personnel airlock. shear lugs.
$p and backing plates are SA516 Grades 60 and 70 fine grain ncrmali:ed 3<
<I with NDT of -10*F. O u Bridging bars are made of SA350 Grade LF1 and SA516 Grade 70 ul $
M normalized with NOT of 0*F. Sump liners and bellows are made of Type 304 stainless steel SA240. The stainless steel penetratica 'h a forgings are made of types 304 and 316. SA182. g <,
Wo
( - Quality Control 3<
JU 1 tJ
\ Quality centrol procedures are described in the QA plan. Chapter 17. <
Special Construction Technicues bd I
Erection of the cylindrical portion of the liner plate followed a comoletien of the concrete mat. The liner plates served as the internal form for the concrete containment durinc constructicn. All liner seams are double butt welded. except for the lower 31 fe t of j the cylindrical shell liner p here th @ plates are welded using backing plates. The liner plate is continuously anchored to the concrete shell with steel anchor studs and deformed bars.
The maximum difference in cross-sectional diameters of the liner is in accordance with the rules shown in paragraph NB-4221.1 of Section III, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vess,el Code. Nuclear Power Plant Cemponents,1971 Edition. The maximim misalignment between liner plates is in accordance with paragraph NB-4232 of the ASME Boiler and Prersure Vessel Code. Nuclear Power Plant Components, 1971 Editlen.
All measurements were taken on parent metal and not at welds. Flat spots or sharp angles were not allowed.
l The allevable deviation frem true circular ferm does not affect the elastic stability of the containment liner because of the restraint g
provided by the ancher studs and deformed bars tying it to the reinforced concrete shell.
L
' 2.5-29
I 7 ,.
MNPS-3 FSAR
( TABLE 3.8-l LOADINO CONDITIONS - '
LINER PLATE AND ACCESS OPENINGS Design
. Allowables Lead (per ASME !!!
Catecory Cenditiens Ncmenclature)
D+P3 +T P +Pb+Q<25,,
Emergency g +SSE Test D+1. lSP. Pm<0.95 y P +P <1.355 y m b .
+" CAT" curve cen-siderations Normal 100 cycles of AP NE-3222.4 (d) or (e) 400 cycles of AT 100 cycles of 1/2-SSE Severe P (S Without D+P"i" +T"i" 1/2-SSE <1.55 temper-Operational P"+P"b m m ature
{
. (~.'
- P +P +Q<25 m m b ANCHORS Emergency D+P +T + SSE Max. shear < .425 S u D D Severe D+P g+T gg+ 1/2-SSE Max. tensile <0.45 5 Operational , ,
) g NOTES
- l .
The normal and test load ecmbinations are producing negligible
! effects.
?
Where:
. ,t
! D = Dead load effect of reinforced concrete structure acting on the 1:ner plus dead load of the liner
} i i = Design pressure (pressure resulting from design basis l
.; P ;
D accident and safety margin)
T = Load due to thermal expansion, resulting when the liner
/ D is exposed te the design temperature l ( ,
SSE = Stresses in the liner derived from applying the effect of
[(
! 's, the safe shutdoen earthquake 1 of 2
a.
MNFS-3 FSAR
( TAELE 2.5-1 .tCont) 4? = Dif ferential pressure between operating pressure and '
atmospheric pressure (100 cycles are assumed en the basis of 2.5 ar refueling cycles per year on a 40 year span)
AT = Lead due to thermal expansion resulting when the liner is exposed to the differential temperature between operating and seasonal refueling temperatures (400 cycles are assumed on the basis of 10 such variations per year. on a 40 year span (100 cycles of 1/2-SSE is an assumed nu:r.ber of cycles
'for this type of earthquake.)
Pr in= Minimum pressure resulting during operation of the containment .
i = Load due to thermal expansien resulting when the liner dn is exmosed to the minimum pressure S = Yield strength of the material y
5, .= The smaller of 1/3-ultimate strength or 2/3-yield strength i S u
= Ultimate strength of the stud material.
1
( b = ALLcWASLC DISPLAEUT F0f. LidEC A u c.M c E S , 1 4 .
[u OLTil.4 ATE Dl6PLAf.EMCOT 4MMi.lii Fbr. L10cc. Acc. Hots,10.
(~ =
= ALL.OWASLE unsf. Pt. ATE c0MPEE%PJ8 67 ear 4 3 lu/M
't i
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EMEEJEOM D+P g, ;,, * *p . 93 f g . c,c[4 1
lI)h$b~ h 4
EMcCSE CY O*ps To - 5.is suzAt L = c.5 h Tse:cra 6m = o.5 f.
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