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Category:REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT (SEE ALSO AO LER)
MONTHYEARML20092G0111995-09-11011 September 1995 Ro:On 950801,loss of One Channel of Reactor Vessel Level Sys Occurred.Reactor Water Level Instrument LE-0101A & signal-&-power Cable Will Be Replaced During Next Refueling Outage ML20198H3691983-11-14014 November 1983 Ro:On 831003,results of as-found Tests Indicated Crosby Main Steam Relief Valves Had Lift Points Exceeding Tech Spec Limits.Valves Disassembled & Rebuilt by Mfg ML20081H3471983-10-25025 October 1983 Telecopy Ro:During Ae Analysis,Design Deficiency in Support Configuration for 1-inch Diameter Fill & Drain Piping to T-82D (Safety Injection Tank D) Discovered.Supports Will Be Redesigned & Installed During Current Outage ML20080R0971983-10-0707 October 1983 Telecopy Ro:On 831006,walkdown of Safety Injection Sys Pipe Hangers Revealed Overloaded Condition on Base Plate & Anchor Bolts of Hanger H214.Caused by Error in Design Analysis.Hanger Support to Be Redesigned ML20080P8341983-10-0303 October 1983 Supplemental RO 82-034:panel C-47 Will Be Modified & Fire Deluge Sys Reflash Capability Will Be Provided for Panel C-13 ML20076C5671983-08-12012 August 1983 Telecopy Ro:On 830811,safety Injection Tank Boron Found Below Tech Spec Limits for Tanks T-82D & T-82B.No Cause Stated.Both Tanks Inoperable at Same Time for 1 Minute ML20076A9031983-08-0808 August 1983 Telecopy Ro:On 830806,sample from T-82D Showed Boron Concentration to Be 1,712 Ppm Which Is Below Tech Spec Limit of 1,720 Ppm Boron.Safety Injection Tank Restored to Operability W/Boron Concentration of 1,753 Ppm ML20076A6241983-08-0505 August 1983 Telecopy Ro:On 830804,safety Injection (SI) Tank T-82B Became Inoperable Due to Low Level,While SI Tank T-82D Inoperable Due to Routine Sampling.Si Tank T-82B Restored to Operability within 5 Minutes ML20077G8201983-07-20020 July 1983 Telecopy Ro:On 830719,discovered Current from 125-volt Dc Sys Short Circuit Will Result in Temp of Associated Conductors,Exceeding FSAR Value.Sample Boron Concentration Could Not Be Restored within 1 H ML20090F2461983-06-23023 June 1983 Telecopy Ro:On 830531,auto & Manual Indication Lights for FIC-0737A & HIC-0737A (Controllers for CV-0737A-auxiliary Feedwater) Discovered Out.Caused by Blown Fuse in Control Circuitry ML20073T0831983-05-0202 May 1983 Telecopy Ro:On 830429,sample from T-82D (Safety Injection Tank D) Showed Boron Concentration Below Tech Spec Limit. While Attempting to Increase Boron Level,Addl Safety Injection of T-82B occurred.T-82D & T-82B Restored ML20079P6851983-04-28028 April 1983 Updated RO 83-06:evaluation of Discrepancies Between as- Built & Actual Design of Safety Injection Refueling Water Tank Support Structure Indicated Sufficient Capacity to Resist Loadings.Schedule for Mods & Design Review Submitted ML20073Q8501983-04-26026 April 1983 Telecopy Ro:On 830425,two Safety Injection Tanks Inoperable. Caused by Low Level & Routine Testing.Tank Level Restored ML20073R3501983-04-25025 April 1983 Telecopy Ro:On 830423,safety Injection Tank Inoperable Due to Routine Sampling.Additionally,Another Tank Became Inoperable Due to Low Level ML20069K4911983-04-18018 April 1983 Telecopy Ro:On 830415,safety Injection Tank T-82D Fell Below Tech Spec Level Requirements.No Cause Stated.Level Restored ML20072F3461983-03-14014 March 1983 Telecopy Ro:On 830312,w/safety Injection Tank T-82D Inoperable Due to Low Boron Concentration,Addl Safety Injection Tank T-82B Became Inoperable Due to Low Boron Level.Operability Restored ML20070W0541983-02-10010 February 1983 Telecopy Ro:On 830129,operators Discovered Thermal Overloads for One Room Cooler Fan in Each of Engineered Safeguards Rooms Tripped & Wired Incorrectly on 830131.Fan Wiring Corrected ML20071A0201983-02-0707 February 1983 Telecopy Ro:On 830204,number of Openings in Safety Injection Refueling Water Tank Support Structure Unaccounted for & Only One Fan Operating for Each Room Cooler.Caused by Loss of Offsite Power & Diesel Generator Failure ML20067C8451982-12-0303 December 1982 Ro:On 821203,safety Injection Tank T-828 Boron Concentration Fell Below Tech Specs & Could Not Be Restored within Required 1-h Limit ML20066A8651982-11-0101 November 1982 Telecopy Revised RO Initially Reported on 821025:on 821022, Boron Concentration in Safety Injection Tank T-82B Restored in 1-h.Initially Reported That Concentration Less than Tech Specs for Over 1-h ML20065T3841982-10-25025 October 1982 Telecopy Ro:On 821022,23, & 25,safety Injection Tank T-82B Boron Concentration Fell Below Tech Spec Limit & Could Not Be Restored within 1-h as Required ML20063E8211982-08-16016 August 1982 Telecopy Message of Ro:On 820814,containment Integrity Momentarily Lost.Caused by Failed Gasket on Escape Air Lock ML20084U6011977-12-0808 December 1977 Telecopy RO 77-056:on 771129,main Exhaust Fan Stopped During Gaseous Waste Release,Exceeding Tech Spec 3.9.15.Release Terminated.No Waste Gas Monitor Alarms Received or Discharge Limits Exceeded ML20084U6191977-11-28028 November 1977 Telecopy RO 77-055:on 771125,offsite Power Lost,Resulting in Loss of Main Condenser Cooling Water.Plant Stabilized in Hot Condition & Borated.Letdown Line Developed Leak.Leakage Exceeded Tech Spec 3.1.5 Limits.Leak Isolated & Repaired ML20084U6641977-09-26026 September 1977 Telecopy Ro:On 770924,station Power & Startup Power Lost. Caused by Lightning Storm ML20084U6831977-09-0909 September 1977 Telecopy Ro:On 770908,turbine Load Limiter Lower Switch Stuck Closed,Causing Turbine to Run Back to 43% Power.Caused by Control Rods Inserting Below pre-power & Power Dependent Insertion Limits to Maintain Primary Coolant Temp ML20084U7051977-07-19019 July 1977 Telecopy RO ER-76-036:on 770719,C SI Bottle Found Out of Specs & Level Transmitter Failed.Instrument Calibr,Repaired & Returned to Svc ML20084U2341977-02-0808 February 1977 Telecopy RO ER-77-014:on 770107,intake/discharge Water Temp Delta Temp Limit Exceeded Twice ML20084U2491977-02-0101 February 1977 Telecopy RO 77-009:on 770130,intake/discharge Water Delta Temp Limit Exceeded Twice,Violating Tech Specs 3.9 & 4.1 ML20084U7131977-02-0101 February 1977 Telecopy Ro:On 770131,transmission Towers & Conductors Between Plant & Switchyard Found Heavily Loaded W/Ice Deposited by Cooling Tower Plume.North Cooling Tower Placed on Bypass to Reduce Further Ice Formation ML20084U7281977-01-18018 January 1977 Telecopy Ro:On 770117,discharge/lake Delta Temp Exceeded Twice & Control Rod Misaligned During Withdrawal for Critical Approach ML20084U3031977-01-14014 January 1977 Telecopy RO 77-004:on 770111 & 12,intake/discharge Temp 5 F Limit Exceeded During Plant Trip Startup Conditions ML20085E6331977-01-0404 January 1977 Telecopy RO 77-001:control Rod Drive Mechanism 4 Declared Inoperable Due to Seal Leakage ML20085E4321976-12-10010 December 1976 Telecopy Ro:On 761209,one Sequencer in Left Channel Failed to Run Completely Through During Safeguards Sys Online Tests.Caused by Improper Sequencer Resetting ML20085E5881976-08-27027 August 1976 Telecopy Ro:On 760823,sequencer Improperly Operated.W/All Rods Withdrawn,Group 4 Select Light Energized When Group 3 Selected.Transmittal Sheet Encl ML20085E4801976-08-19019 August 1976 Telecopy RO ER-PAL-76-026:on 760817,cooling Tower Basin Level Exceeded Normal Elevation During Attempted Modified Mode of Circulating Water Sys Operation ML20085E5221976-05-17017 May 1976 Telecopy RO 76-016:on 760514,MSIV Integrity May Be Lost After Main Steam Line Break.Fsar Review Indicates That Steam Line Rupture Incident Assumed Complete Steam Generator Blowdown ML20085E5311976-05-11011 May 1976 Telecopy RO PAL-ER-014;on 760511,1-1 Diesel Generator Removed from Svc W/One High Pressure Safety Injection Pump Inoperable.Caused by Greater than Tech Spec Limiting Condition for Operation ML20085E5361976-05-11011 May 1976 Telecopy RO 76-013:during Plant Startup,Cooling Tower Drained to Repair Leaking Condenser Tube,Resulting in Temp Differential Above Tech Spec Limits ML20085E5561976-05-0303 May 1976 Telecopy Ro:On 760430,during Mods Re Boron Recrystallization,Vendor Reported That Case Code Allowable Stress May Be Exceeded at Valve body-to-bonnet Flange.Valves within Code Limits for Present Operating Pressure ML20085E5691976-04-23023 April 1976 Telecopy RO 76-011:penetration 46 Containment Vent Header Exceeded Allowable Limits During Leak Testing ML20085E5821976-04-12012 April 1976 Telecopy RO 76-008:on 760409,waste Gas Tank T-101A Inadvertently Partially Released.No Limits Exceeded or Approached ML20085E6011976-02-11011 February 1976 Telecopy RO 76-004:on 760210,abnormal Degradation of Steam Generator Tubes/Reactor Pressure Boundary Suspected.Data Evaluation in Progress ML20085E6131976-02-10010 February 1976 Telecopy RO ER-76-003:on 760209,eddy Current Testing Revealed Greater than Expected Steam Generator Tube Degradation ML20085E6281976-01-12012 January 1976 Telecopy RO 76-001:investigation of Unusual Noise Revealed That Sirw Tank Slightly Dented & Vent Partially Plugged W/Ice & Snow.Lpsi Pump Stopped & Reactor Cavity Secured. Investigation Continues ML20085E7621975-12-22022 December 1975 Telecopy Message of Ro:On 751221,plant Discharge Water Temp Exceeded 5-degree Temp Differential During Plant Cooldown & Removal of a Cooling Tower from Svc ML20085E7701975-12-10010 December 1975 Telecopy Message Ro:On 751208,Tech Specs Apparently Violated Re Discharge Water Ph.Caused by Misinterpretation of Sample Data.Ro Negated & Problem Handled Through Plant Corrective Action Sys ML20085F9021975-12-10010 December 1975 Corrected AO 75-014 Re Previous Insp of 2,400-volt Breaker on Bus 1D ML20085E7731975-11-21021 November 1975 RO 75-026:on 751113,containment Purge Exhaust Valve Leaked Excessively During Local Leak Test.Caused by Improper Seat Alignment of Upstream Valve Due to Deformation by 46 Psig Pressure.Valves Tagged Closed ML20085E8641975-10-14014 October 1975 RO UE-75-010:on 751002,poison Rod Axial Growth Found in Facility Fuel.Possibly Caused by Radiation Induced Gowth. Power Level Limited to 80% & Primary Coolant Gross Gamma Radioactivity Monitored by Daily Samples 1995-09-11
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML18066A6901999-11-0101 November 1999 Rev 5 to Palisades Nuclear Plant Colr. ML18066A6761999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Palisades Nuclear Plant ML18066A6271999-09-0202 September 1999 LER 98-011-01:on 981217,inadequate Lube Oil Collection Sys for Primary Coolant Pumps Was Noted.Caused by Design Change Not Containing Appropriate Level of Rigor.Exemption from 10CFR50,App R Was Requested.With 990902 Ltr ML18066A6351999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Palisades Nuclear Plant ML18066A6771999-08-31031 August 1999 Operating Data Rept Page of MOR for Aug 1999 for Palisades Nuclear Plant ML18066A6221999-08-20020 August 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990722,TS Surveillance Was Not Completed within Specified Frequency.Caused by Failure to Incorporate Revised Frequency Into Surveillance Schedule in Timely Manner.Verified Implementation.With 990820 Ltr ML18066A6061999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Palisades Nuclear Plant.With 990803 Ltr ML18066A5201999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Palisades Nuclear Plant.With 990702 Ltr ML18066A4841999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Palisades Nuclear Plant.With 990603 Ltr ML18066A6371999-04-30030 April 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Palisades Nuclear Plant ML18068A5941999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Palisades Nuclear Plant.With 990503 Ltr ML18066A4161999-04-0101 April 1999 Rev 4 to COLR, for Palisades Nuclear Plant ML18066A4501999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Palisades Nuclear Plant.With 990402 Ltr ML18066A4671999-03-31031 March 1999 Rev 0 to SIR-99-032, Flaw Tolerance & Leakage Evaluation Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger E-53B Nozzle Palisades Nuclear Plant. ML18068A5351999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Palisades Nuclear Plant.With 990302 Ltr ML18066A3931999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Palisades Nuclear Plant.With 990202 Ltr ML18066A3781999-01-20020 January 1999 LER 98-013-00:on 981222,safeguards Transfer Tap Changer Failure Caused Inadvertant DG Start.Caused by Failed Motor Contactor.Contactor Was Replaced.With 990120 Ltr ML20206F6131998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 Consumers Energy Co Annual Rept. with ML18066A3651998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Palisades Nuclear Plant.With 990105 Ltr ML18066A3421998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Palisades Nuclear Plant.With 981202 Ltr ML18066A3301998-11-11011 November 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Safety Hazard Associated with Wrist Pin Assemblies for FM-Alco 251 Engines at Palisades Nuclear Power Plant.Caused by Insufficient Friction Fit Between Pin & Sleeve.Supplier of Pin Will No Longer Be Used ML18068A4921998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Palisades Nuclear Plant.With 981103 Ltr ML18068A4851998-10-29029 October 1998 LER 97-011-01:on 971012,starting of Primary Coolant Pump with SG Temps Greater than Cold Leg Temps Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Procedures & Operator Decision.Sop Used for Starting Primary Coolant Pump Enhanced ML18066A3181998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Palisades Nuclear Plant ML18066A2901998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for Palisades Nuclear Power Plant.With 980903 Ltr ML18066A3191998-08-31031 August 1998 Revised Monthly Operating Rept Data for Aug 1998 for Palisades Nuclear Plant ML18066A2831998-08-18018 August 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 980721,reactor Manually Tripped.Caused by Failure of Coupling Which Drives Feedwater Pump Main Lube Oil Pump.Main Lube Oil Pump Coupling & Associated Components Replaced & Satisfactorily Tested ML18066A2771998-08-13013 August 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Deficiency in CE Current Screening Methodology for Determining Limiting Fuel Assembly for Detailed PWR thermal-hydraulic Sa.Evaluations Were Performed for Affected Plants to Determine Effect of Deficiency ML20237E0301998-07-31031 July 1998 ISI Rept 3-3 ML18066A2701998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1998 for Palisades Nuclear Plant.W/980803 Ltr ML18066A2311998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1998 for Palisades Nuclear Plant ML18066A2261998-06-30030 June 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980531,small Pinhole Leak Found on One of Welds,During Leak Test Following Replacement of Pcs Sample Isolation Valves.Caused by Welder Error.Leaking Welds Repaired ML18066A3061998-06-18018 June 1998 SG Tube Inservice Insp. ML20249C4951998-06-17017 June 1998 Rev 1 to EA-GEJ-98-01, Palisades Cycle 14 Disposition of Events Review ML18066A1781998-06-0909 June 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980511,noted That Procedure Did Not Fully Satisfy Requirement to Test High Startup Rate Trip Function. Caused by Misunderstanding of Testing Requirements.Revised TS Surveillance Test Procedure & Reviewed Other Procedures ML18066A1711998-06-0101 June 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Impact of RELAP4 Excessive Variability on Palisades Large Break LOCA ECCS Results.Change in PCT Between Cycle 13 & Cycle 14 Does Not Constitute Significant Change Per 10CFR50.46 ML18066A1741998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1998 for Palisades Nuclear Plant.W/980601 Ltr ML18066A2321998-05-31031 May 1998 Revised MOR for May 1998 for Palisades Nuclear Plant ML18068A4701998-05-31031 May 1998 Annual Rept of Changes in ECCS Models Per 10CFR50.46. ML18065B2451998-05-13013 May 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980413,HPIS Sys Was Noted Inoperable During TS Surveillance Test.Caused by Performance of Flawed Procedure.Operators & Engineers Will Be Trained to Improve Operational Decision Making Through Resources & Knowledge ML18066A2331998-04-30030 April 1998 Revised MOR for Apr 1998 for Palisades Nuclear Plant ML18068A3461998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1998 for Palisades Nuclear Plant.W/980501 Ltr ML18066A3411998-04-22022 April 1998 Rev 0 to EMF-98-013, Palisades Cycle 14:Disposition & Analysis of SRP Chapter 15 Events. ML18065B2071998-03-31031 March 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1998 for Palisades Nuclear Plant.W/980403 Ltr ML20217C2741998-03-31031 March 1998 Independent Review - Is Consumers Energy Method (W Method) of Determining Palisades Nuclear Plant Best Estimate Fluence by Combining Transport Calculation & Dosimetry Measurements Technically Sound & Does It Meet Intent of Pts ML18066A2341998-03-31031 March 1998 Revised MOR for Mar 1998 for Palisades Nuclear Plant ML18068A3041998-02-28028 February 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1998 for Palisades Nuclear Plant.W/980302 Ltr ML18066A2351998-02-28028 February 1998 Revised MOR for Feb 1998 for Palisades Nuclear Plant ML18065B1641998-02-0505 February 1998 Rev 0 to Regression Analysis for Containment Prestressing Sys at 25th Year Surveillance. ML18067A8211998-01-31031 January 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1998 for Palisades Nuclear Plant.W/980203 Ltr 1999-09-30
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omce.: m we., u.chegan Avenue, Jadson, Mac h6gan 49201. Area Code S17 7fut-OSSO January 14,1CJ72 Dr. Peter A. Morris, Director Re: Docket 50-255 Division of Reactor Licensing License No DPR-20 United States Atomic Energy Commission Washington, DC 20545
Dear Dr. Morris:
This letter is written to apprise you of a failure of a two-inch, motor-operated valve on the high-pressure safety injection (HPSI) system at the Palisades Plant.
On January 5, 1972, the time the difficulty was detected, the plant was in a cold shutdown condition. Maintenance activities were being completed so that plant heatup could begin later the same day. These maintenance activities included the repair of a flow transmitter for a flow indicator (FI-0313) that is common to the discharge of HPSI valve CV-3013 and its redundant HPSI valve CV-3062. After completien of this
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repair to the flow transmitter, tests were performed on this portion of the HPSI system, following an approved test procedure. When CV-3013 was opened, no flow indication was received. The redundant injection valve (CV-3062) was opened and the flow indicator worked properly. To verify proper valve lineup to the HPSI header, another valve was opened and its flow indicator indicated flow. It was concluded that HPSI valve CV-3013 was inoperable and plans for heatup of the primary system postponed until the cause of the problem with the valve could be determined and the valve repaired.
Preliminary investigations revealed that the motor operator for
,the valve was operating normally. In addition, the valve stem travel in-dicated that the valve was opening and closing normally. Radiographs were taken of the valve in the open position. These radiographs revealed that
, @* g , /[/TT the valve plug (disc) had broken. It appeared that the lower portion of
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the plug was in the valve body seat and the upper portion was attached to the stem.
- 91) ' / The valve was disassembled. Removal of the stem confirmed that the upper portion of the plug was attached to the stem while the lower
{tg portion of the plug remained in the seat in the valve body. A small hole g y a li ph sll
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- January 14, 1972 was drilled in the valve body below the valve seat. A small rod wuc inserted through the hole such that the remaining portion of the plug could be pushed out the top of the valve body. The plug came out easily.
The valve is a two-inch, motor-operated, bonnetless globe valve.
The valve body material is stainless steel, Grade F-316. The valve plug is made from a Stellite 6B casting. The plug has a "T"-shaped slot at the top which slips over the end of the valve stem so that it can be with-drawn by the stem when opening the valve. There are two cylindrical guiding surfaces, cne at the top of the plug and the second near the middle of the valve just above the seating surface. The middle guide tapers at about 45 degrees to a analler diameter above the seating sur-face. Below the seating surface, the plug is hollow. The outer surface of the hollowed portion of the plug is tapered slightly and has four narrow axial slots for flow throttling purposes.
Examination of the removed valve plug revealed that the valve failed after closing on an object which had become trapped between the taper of the valve plug's lower guide (above the plug seating surface) and the valve body. This object was wedged under the plug's guiding sur-face at the end of the "T"-shaped slot. The valve closing force was thus concentrated in a small area of the brittle Stellite material which was unsupported from above because it was beneath the open end of the "T" slot. The result was the cracking of the plug at the junction of the 45-degree bevel of the lower guide and the plug surface above the seating surface. Eventually there was some spalling of plug material from the lower guide at the bottom surface of the slot above. It was concluded from the icpression on the plug that the object that caused the initial cracking was small, probably about 1/8-inch in diameter. As about three quarters of the fracture surface area of the cracked plug had accumulated a red oxide deposition, it was concluded that the initial damage had been present for some time, probably since pre-core loading hot-functional testing or flushing operations. The valve appeared to have operated a number of times in this condition. Ultimately, same object (probably pieces spalled from the plug) became trapped between the seating surfaces of the valve, causing tension and bending forces again to be applied to the valve plug. At this closing cycle or the next opening cycle, the remainder of the material cre.cked. About one fourth of the surface area of the crack appeared very fresh (no red oxide deposition) .
Several small pieces of spalled material fram the valve plug were found in the valve body. Marks were found on both the valve plug seating surface and the valve body seating surface. These pieces of material were removed.
The hole that had been drilled through the bottom of the valve body was repaired by tupping the valve body and inserting a threaded plug of stainless steel 316 material in the hole. This threaded plug was seal-welded and the seal weld was dye-penetrant tested. This repair was approved by the valve manufacturer's design engineer. (Check valves
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Docket 50-255 January 14, 1972 l
l l used at the Palisades Plant in a similar service have a seal-welded threaded plug inserted in the lower portion of the valve body in an identical manner. The lower portien of the check valve bodies are identical to the lower body of this two-inch HPSI valve.)
The new valve plug (disc) was radiographed prior to its in-stallation. No defects were present in this plug. The remaining three l identical two-inch HPSI valves and the four identical redundant HPSI l valves were radiographed as assembled. No defects were detected. In addition, all eight HPSI valves were test-operated and it was verified that flow was established through each of these eight valves.
It was concluded from the differences in deposition of red oxide material on the fracture surface of the plug that the initial failure had occurred sometime ago, most likely during the pre-core loading hot-functional testing or flushing operations. The foreign object was probably either removed from the system during the reactor vessel cleanout prior to core loading or has settled into area piping where flow is very low. From the impression on the lower guide of the valve plug, we have concluded that this object must have been very small, probably about 1/8-inch diameter. In addition, the valve configuration precludes any object of greater si::e than about 1/4-inch diameter and 1-1/2 inches long from passing through the valve.
The valve plug was reconstructed to insure that all of the spalled material was accounted for. This reconstruction revealed that several very small chips of the valve plug were missing. These pieces were sufficiently small and light so that there are no concerns about cladding wear if they did reach the reactor vessel.
There is no danger of this foreign material reaching the con-trol rod drive mechanisms. The control rod drive mechanisms are mounted vertically on top of the reactor vessel head; therefore, this material vill not settle into them. A moderately strong flow would be required to move this material; no such flow exists thro'1gh the control rod drive mechanisms. In addition, these chips are sufficiently small such that they probably would not cause a malfunction of a control rod drive mecha-nism even if they were to get into this mechanism.
The effects of plant operation with a similar valve failure l have been considered. Sufficient flow indication is available to detect a failure of this nature in the HPSI system. Plant procedures require the operators to verify flow conditions if the HPSI system is actuated.
In the event of failure to attain flow through one of these valves, the operator can initiate flow through the redundant HPSI system.
To insure that the plant is not operated with an unknown fai2nre existing in one of these valves, a testing program has been established.
This testing program consists of:
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o Dr. Peter A. Morris o 4 Docket 50-255 January 14, 1972 (1) Prior to plant start-up from a cold shutdown condition, HPSI system valves CV-3007, -3009, -3011 and -3013 and redundant HPSI system valves CV-3062, -3064, -3066 and
-3068 win be test-operated. Flow through these valves will be established and verified.
(2) The same testing as in (1) above will be conducted on a monthly bssis during plant operation.
If these te.sts reveal a failure of an HPSI valve, the appro-priate technical specification limits will be followed..
From our review of this valve failure, we have concluded that this incident does not involve an unreviewed item with regard to reactor plant safety considerations. The cause of the failure of this valve has been determined and the valve has been repaired. In the unlikely event that a similar failure were to recur, a testing program has been estab-lished that will insure prompt detection of a valve failure.
Yours very truly, Ralph B. Sewell (Signed)
RBS/ map Ralph B. Sewell Nuclear Licensing Administrator CC: Boyce H. Grier USAEC bm_ .