ML20084D881

AO 50-237/75-27:on 750421,control Rod Withdrawn for Friction Testing While Both GE & Util Employees within Direct Line of Sight of Core.Caused by Disregard of Master Procedure & Failure of Testing Procedure to Include Precaution

ML20084D881
Person / Time
Site:	Dresden
Issue date:	05/27/1975
From:	Stephenson B COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
References
329-75, 5889, AO-50-237-75-27, NUDOCS 8304120638
Download: ML20084D881 (2)

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BBS Ltr. //329-75 Dresden Nuclear Power Station

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Morris, Illinois 60450 May 27, 1975 t

N-Mr. J6mes G. Keppler, Regional Director ij Directorate of Regulatory C>peration-Region III l

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U. S. Nuclear Ret;ulatory Comission i

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Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 l

t SUEJECT: REPORT OF AFMCICG.L CCCURilR:CE P51 SECTIO:7 6.6.A 0F THE TmE:lIC/J.,

SPECIFICkTIC::S j

CONTROL ROD 'e.I'ED3A'.UJ, UITII PE?tSOUIn1 UIT11D! CORE LE!E-OF-SIGHT j

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References:

1) Rei;ulatory Guide 1.16 Rev.1 Appendix A f

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2) Notification of Region III of U. S. Nuclear Reculatory i

Comission

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Telephone:

Mr. Johnsen, 1050 hours0.0122 days <br />0.292 hours <br />0.00174 weeks <br />3.99525e-4 months <br /> on l'ay 16, 1975 Telegram: Mr. Keppler, 1445 hours0.0167 days <br />0.401 hours <br />0.00239 weeks <br />5.498225e-4 months <br /> on May 16, 1975 1

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t Report Date: May 27, 1975 x.

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Occurrence Date: -April 21, 1975

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As Pacility: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Morris, Illinois 60450 f: - -

- IDWTI 'ICAT[0N OF OCCURRH:CE A violntich.of section D.3 of the Dresden Manter Refueling Procedure (DFP'lj00-1 Rev.- 1) occurred during the lact refuelinc cutage of Unit-2 (1974-75). The violation occurred whcn a control rod was withdraun for friction tectint; uhile both GE and CECO employees were within direct line-of-nicht of the coro.

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OI!DIMCN3 PRIOR TO CCCURRFl!CE Unit-[was in a refueling outage with the reactor modo switch in the RE1EL positicn.

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At 2130 hours0.0247 days <br />0.592 hours <br />0.00352 weeks <br />8.10465e-4 months <br /> on April 21, 1975, Technical Staff perconnel and the Operating Dops.rtrent bacnn control rod driro fricticn tectin;.

During thic time, GE cmployeco were on the service platfom near the top of the veccol coarching for the loct roll of tape. Appro.xitately 755 of the friction tccting had been cor.pleted when a f.wl handlinc forcran noticed that both jobs were being donc cicultancouuly. The foren.n notified the Operating Engineer and friction tecting was temporarily terminated at 1345 hourc on April 23, 1975 DESIG:?ATIC:: OF APPAR;D CAUSE OP OCCURRIC:CM (Operator Error)

The I?.acter Refueling Procedure for Unita 2 & 3 cpecifies that all porconnel must leave the crea within line-of-cicht of the core whenever a control rod is to be withdraun. The CIO friction tecting procedure does not specify or refer to thic precaution. h'iction testing was " critical path" for the unit outage work. The Operating Engineer inadvertently dicrecarded the macter procedure in the effort to complete the tccting en schedule.

AM!LLYSIS OF OCCURR"::CE Dttring friction testing, only one CRD can be withdrawn at a time duo to an interlock in the reactor mode cuitch in the REFUEL pocition. Ac demonstrated by chutdown tarcin tecto perforced after the core vac loaded, the withdraual of any one rod could not produce criticality.

In addition, because there was twenty feet of water over the core for chielding, the perconnel on the cervice platform could not have experienced any noticeable increace in radiation.

Therefore, the health and cafety of the plant perconnel and the public ucre not enPmcercd in any way.

s CORRECTIVE ACTICI To complete thic cerics of friction tests, a verification procedure vac initiated to incu*e that there nero no perconnel on the cervice platform.

To prevent a recurrence of thic nature, a todification is being initiated to provide an inter 1cek on the cervice platform for Unita 2 & 3

% cn the plat-forno are in place and operable, a CRD rod block cicnal will be initiated.

Before friction tecting is bectm on Unit-3 during the procent outage, the friction tecting procedure will be upgraded to include the precautions specified in the canter refueling procedure.

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W. D. Stephencon Superintendent BBS:GARic p File /JRC f.

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