ML20082M525

Gulf State Utils Co Annual Rept Per 10CFR50.59(b)(2), 900301-910301

ML20082M525
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	03/01/1991
From:	GULF STATES UTILITIES CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20082M518	List: ML20082M525 RBG-35475, Forwards Gulf States Utils Co Annual Rept Per 10CFR50.59(b)(2),900301-910301. Changes Included in Rev 4 to Updated SAR Submitted on 910823
References
NUDOCS 9109050238
Download: ML20082M525 (53)

Text

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t GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY AN!10AL-REPORT PURSUANT TO 10CFR50,59 (b) ( 2 )  :

1 MARCH 1, 1990 T!! ROUGH MARCH 1, 1991 i

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9109050238 910823 'j PDR ALOCK0500ggO ,

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Cha.rge Numh_er/USAR Section: LCN 1.8-21 /Page 10.3-1, Table 1.8-1 (36 of 238)

Q.escription..and Basis for Changg:

This change was made to eliminate the seismic support requirements of Category II main steam system piping during operational modes 4 and 5. During these modes of operation, when the subject piping is flooded, it is used only as an alternate means of removing decay heat from the reactor. No safety significance is impacted by this reclassification.

u Eummary of Safety Evaluation:

The accidents discussed in the USAR consider only when the piping is supplying steam. During modes 4 and 5, this piping is not functionicq as a steam pipe, so_the possibility for an accident as discussed, is not increased. All accidents as evaluated in the USAR pertain to when the steamlines are filled with high energy steam, therefore when these lines are filled with water no consequences are increased nor are any now accidents of a greater significance created by this change. The margin of safety for the basis of the technical specification for the reactor coolant system during cold shutdown has not been reduced. Therefore it was concluded that this change does not create an unreviewed safety question.

ClLapsq_J{umtgr/USAR Sectign: LCN 1.8-22 / Tables 1.8-1 (89 of 238),

1.8-1 (175 of 238),

1.8-1 (176 of 238)

DASSIintion _ and Dagis._(qt_g.hange:

This change relocated references concerning the qualification of personnel performing verification of procurement contract requirements at vendor facilities trom paragraph C.3 of the River Bend Station pocition on Regulatory Guide 1.58, Revision 1,

" Qualification of Nuclear Power Plant Inspection, Examination, and Testing Personnel," to the River Bend Station position on Regulatory Guide 1.123, " Quality Assurance Requirements f or Control of Procurement of Items and Services for Nuclear Power Plants."

This change also correctly identifies the appropriate ANSI standard f or the qualification of personnel perf orming source surveillances and audits.

Summary qf Safety Evaluation:

This change only relocates and clarifies the requirements for the qualification of personnel performing verification of procurement contract requirements at vendor facilities. No requirements have 1

. i been added or deleted. There are no technical specifications pertaining to these requirements. Therefore this change does not create an unreviewed safety question.

I glance NumberLUSAR Sectio _q: LCli 2.3-7 /Page 2.3-18 Description _ ag}d Basis for Chance:

This change revised the requirements for dew point sensors during the operational phase per the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.23. RBS has a low potential for cooling tower icing and fogging. ,

This section was made past tense to indicate pre-operation.

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Dunary of Qaf ety Evaluation:

I Dew point sensors are not required to prevent or mitigate the probability or consequences of an accident, only wind speed, wind direction and delta temperature are required to determine the occurrence and consequences of an accident or malfunction. The dew point is not used in calculation of offsite dose af ter a postulated accident therefore the possibility of creating a new accident is not created. The dew point sensors are not required by the technical specifications. Therefore this change does not create an unreviewed safety question.

- ghanoe liLughqIjJ1SAR seetioJ1: LCN 2.3-8 /Page 2.3-22 D.gperigtign ajLd Datis for Changa:

This change revised the USAR to reflect that the primary meteorological sensor for rainfall is located at the environmental services building. Previously, during pre-operation, the required raf,n gauge and other meteorological instruments were located together on the meteorological tower. This change revised the location of the rain gauge only.

glummary of safety Eyaluali9_D:

The nature of this change was to clarify that the official rain gauge was not located on the meteorological tower. No other procedural changes were made as a result of this change and no safety-related equipment was modified. Therefore the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident are not increased.

The emergeacy procedures do not use rainfall as a factor in predicting the consequences of an accident and the location of the rain gauge has no affect on any accident scenarios. Rain gauge location is not discussed in the basis for any technical specification t.nd therefore no margin of safety has been reduced.

Therefore this change has been determined not to constitute an unreviewed safety question.

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9, hance Number /USAR Section: LCN 3.2-0 / Table 3. 2-8 (1 of 2)

Description._amd Basis for Chance:

This change was made to revise the test pressure requirements for Quality Class 1 instrument tubing in cases where the test pressure (125 percent of design pressure) would be detrimental to unisolable 1 plant equipment. The normal tect pressure for Quality class 1 tubing is not revised. The revised test pressures still meet the ,

requirements of ASMC III Code. I I

p_umitgrv of Saf ety EvalugiA.qn t pressure testing of instrument tubing in accordance with the requirements of the ASME III Code will not increase the probability i or the consequences of any accident previously evaluated in the USAR. The possibility of a malfunction of a type different than that previously analyued is not created. This ASME Code allowed exemption will assure that damage to system components not designed to withstand pressuren up to 125 percent of system pressure will not occur. This will decrease the possibility of a new accident by preventing accidentally overpressarizing instrument systems. The technical specifications do not address pressure testing requircments. Therefore this change does not create an unreviewed safety question.

Q_tt. a nce Number /USAR Dection: LCN 4.6-17b / Figure 4.6-Sa j pescripti9.D and Basis for qbang.e:

This modification relocated the relief valve connection to the ,

reactor recirculation pump seal purge supply line so that it is i upstream, instead of downstream, of the seal purge flow indicator.

Also, the relief valve discharge piping was shortened so that any ,

leakage or flow through the relief valve is readily visible to the '

operator. These changes provide greater assurance that a lifted relief valve condition is discovered promptly and that indicated i seal injection flow is actually going to the reactor recirculation  ;

pump. {

gummary of safety EvalttaliSD l-The relocation of the relief valve connection does not increase the ,

probability or consequences of any' accident previously evaluated. l In addition, the modified discharge piping meets Seismic Category i 1 requirements and as such, the probability of a malfunction of a  !

- safety-related system or structure is not increased. Furthermore, j the reactor recirculation pump seal purge is not addressed in the j technical specifications.and does not adversely affect any margin j of safety. Therefore this modification does not create an ,

unreviewed safety question. i

. s Chance Numhter/USAR Jectiqn:

LCN 5.1-10 / Figure 5.1-3a pescription and Dasis for Change:

This change was made to revise the connection point of the steam dome pressure transmitter which provides an input into the cavitation logic for the reactor recirculation pumps high/ low speed interlock circuit. This instrument was moved from one condensing pot to another.

Summary of Safety Evaluation:

Since this modification of the recirculation pumps high/ low speed interlock input circuit does not affect the accident analysis provided in the USAR, this will not increase the probability of an accident as previously evaluated in the USAR. The consequences of an accident are unchanged by this modification as the system will function as previously evaluated. The operation of the transmitter is also not affected by this modification so no new accidents are postulated. There is no change to the probability of a malfunction of safety-related equipment as the transmitter will perform equally well.from either connection point. As such, the consequences of such a malfunction are Mso not increased by this change. No technical specification y af fected by this change. Therefore this change does not create an unreviewed safety question.

Change NutaberLtig]t Section: LCN 5.2-6 /Page 5.2-43 Description an[_Dasis (or chaqqa:

This change was made to clarify the basis and sensitivity of the leak detection system (LDS) monitor setpoints. The subject change reflects modifications to the manner in which LDS monitors detect a temperature rise as a result of reactor coolant leakage into the monitored areas. The new LDS trip setpoints remain consistent with the original basis of a temperature rise resulting from a 25 gpm '

steam leak in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

ELuNn_ary of Safety Eva_luatiqD:

, The changes in setpoints of the LSD monitors do not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of previously evaluated accidents or malfunctions. The changes to the normal

! maximum temperatures in the subject building zones have been

-evaluated for effect on environmental qualification of safety-related equipment in these areas and equipment qualified life has i

been revised, as necessary. This change adds no new equipment nor does it effect the function or operation of existing equipment, therefore the possibility for an accident or malfunction of 4

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I equipment important to safety is not increased or created. This !

change has been determined not to involve an unreviewed safety question.

Chance NtuQgr/USAR SectiED: LCN 5.4-61 /Fia"rn 5.4-15b DMSLiP11.9.A ADA _Hasis for Changs:

This modification removed the internals from a reactor water cleanup (RWCU) precoat pump discharge check valve and revised a USAR figure to show that a manual valve is normally closed. In addition, the associated design precoat flow rate was increased from 200 gpm to 260 gpm by changing the precoat pump impeller.

u p,23ary of Safety Evaluati9.Di 7t is concluded that the probability of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), which is the only previously analyzed accident potentially affected by the removal of the check valve ir9ernals and increasing the precoat flow, is not increased. Personnel safety is not adversely affected since removing the internals to the check valve in the precoat pump discharge piping does not increase the probability of reactor coolant overflowing the precoat tank.

Consequences of a oCCA are not increased as the check valve and precoat pump flow are not relied upon to mitigate the consequences of any accident, including a LOCA. Reliability of the RWCU isolation actuation instrumentation and containment isolation valves is not af fected. No new postulated accidents are created as a result of this change since the check valves aru located outside the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) and functions to prevent reverse flow during the precoat cycle when the f11ter domineralizers are at low pressure. Precoat flow is isolated from the reactor coolant pressure and only impacts performance of the RWCU filter domineralizers, which are not relevant to plant safety.

This nodification does not affect the probability of malfunction of any safety-related equipment or systems previously evaluated, since the ' only plant equipment potentially affected by removal of the check valve internals is the precoat tank and precoat pump, neither of which performs any safety-related functions. Consequences of

the malfunction of safety-related equipment or systems previously analyzed are not increased, since the check valve is not relied upon as a radiological barrier or to maintain the RCPD.

, Possibility of the malfunction of safety-related equipment or L systems not previously analyzed are not created since equipment potentially affected by this modification does not perform any l safety-related function, as previously noted. Furthermore, removing check valve internals and increasing precoat flow do not reduce any technical specification margins of safety since the only technical specification parameters pertaining to RWCU are reactor 5

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coolant chemistry limits and isolation actuation instrumentation.  !

Therefore it has been concluded that this modification does not t constitute an unreviewed safety question. [

f GhADue Number /VRAR_HA9112D: LcN 5.4-67a / Figures 5.4-12a, j 5.4-12b }

D_escription_and Dasis for cflangj!t:  !

This modification provided a pressure relief path for the bonnet f area of three residual heat removal (Rl!R) system safety-related valves (1E12*MOVF024A, 1E12*MOVF0248, and 1E12*MOVF042A). This  !

change was injtiated to eliminate the potential for  !

overpressurt:ation and locking of these containment isolation }

valves.  ;

i SygLaarv of Sainty_J,XAb1AtiqD3 This modification does not impact the operability of the above mentioned RMR system valves with respect to their safety function in the event of -a loss of coolant acciden' (LOCA) (i.e., -

IE12*MOVF024 A and 1E12*MOVF024D open to enable suppression ptol  ;

cooling to the reactor vessel; 1E12*MOVT042A opens to enable low  !

pressure core injection (LPCI) into the reactor vessel). The  !

modification has been evaluated against Technical Specification  !

3.6.1.3 for allowed leakage of containment isolation valves. The  !

evaluation has indicated that the probability and consequences of l previously evaluated accidents have not been increased. These l Interna'. valve changes have no adverse impact on the safety j function and the possibility of new postulated leakage occurring i from the containment'during an accident has not been created. The  !

overall safe function and operability of the RitR system has not i been adversely affected as a result of these valve modifications.  !

In addition, the probability and consequences of malfunctions t occurring as previously analyzed in the SAR have not been increased .

nor have new malfunction scenarios been created. Furthermore, '

Technical Specifications 3.6.4 and 3.6.1.3 were reviewed to verify ,

that the ' associated margins of safety have not been reduced.

Therefore it has been determined that this modification does not l constitute an unreviewed safety question.  !

I c h a nc e Nulgb_eJ / U S AR_ __ H.g_qt.i_qn : LCN 5.4-69 /Pages 3.1-39,  :

3.9A-9,  !

5.4-17,  ;

5.4-20,  !

5.4-24, i l- 5.4-33, 5.4-34, '

E 5.4-35,  ;

( 5.4-36, 6 I l

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, , ~ _ . _ . _ , _ . . . . . - _ _ _ _ _ _ - , - - . ...__._,-.__-.m-__., - __ - - -_ , . - - -

5.4-38, 5.4-40, 5.4-41, 5.4-43, 5.4-44, 5.4-50, 6.3-30, 6A.16-5, 6A.16-6, 7.3-10, I 7.4-12,  ;

7.4-13, 9h.2-4, 14.2-32,  !

14.2-33,  !

14.2-34, '

14.2-35, 15.2-16, '

15.2-26,  !

15.2-29,  ;-

15.2-31,  ;

/ Tables 1A-1 (8 of 17), i 3.9A-11 (1 of 9),

3.9A-11 (8 )f 9), i 6.2-37 (1 c- 6), ,

/ Figures 5.4-12a, 5.4-12b, ,

5.4-13 (1 of 3), 3 5.4-13 (2 of 3),  ;

5.4-13 (3 of 3), i l

7.3-4 (2 of 4), -

9.3-7j, t 9.3-7k  !

Description and Dania lot qhance: i This modificatic . W. inently disables the steam condensing mode I (SCM) of the rMihl heat removal (RHR) system. The change removed two vcives (1E12*MOVS2A & 528), installed blind flanges, and electrically and pneumatically disabled va]ves 1E12*MOVF026A and B, 1E12*MOVF087A and B, .and 1E12*PVF051A and B. The 3CM of the RHR was originally designed to provide a means to cool the reactor '

when isolated from the main condenser. However, license condition  :

5(a) of the River Bend Station Unit 1 Facility Operating License  ;

NPl -4 7 precludes the use of the RHR system n the SCM mode. This  !

modification permanently disables the use of the SCM mode to i prevent inadvertent operation of components and reduce any required maintenance.

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l S_ _u m m a r y of Sat,ety Evaluatio_n:

The probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR are not increased. The only accidents involving the SCM of RHR is the high energy line break ( HE..B ) in the main steam tunnel and auxiliary building. The probability of this HELB accident has not been increased. The possibility of an accident which is different than any previously evaluated in the SAR is not created. The design, fabrication and installation of the blind flanges were performed per the applicable codes and standards. This design will ensure that steam service piping remains empty and no new accident possibilities have been created including radiological consequences. The probability or consequences of a malfunction of a safety-related structure, system or component previously evaluated in the SAR has not been increased. The only analysis which was potentially impacted by this change was the number of safety relief valve (SRV) cycles (15) following a main steam isolation valve (MSIV) isolation. An engineering evaluation indicated that the impact of this modification did not increase the probability or consequences of this scenario. An alternate means of depressurizing and cooling down the reactor is available through

-the a.e of the SRVs and the suppression pool, and no credit is tekaa for steam condensing in mitigating the consequences of any ifunctions evaluated in the SAR. The possibility of a t1 function of a safety-related structure, system or component a fferent than any previously evaluated in the SAR has not been i creased. The modification does not create any additional or fferent system interfaces. There are no technical specification n quirements for the steam condensing mode of the RHR to be perable. This mode of RHR is not required to be operable to support ny other system required to be operable by technical specificac 7ns. Furthermore, the margin of safety of the RHR system as defined in the basis to the applicable technical specification has not been reduced.

Change Number /USAR Secti_o_n: LCN 5.4-70 /Page 5.4-40 Description and Basis for Change:

This modification analyzed the channel section (tube side) of four residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchangers (1E12*B001A, 1B, 1C, and 1D). This evaluation justified derating the tube side pressure (service water system - SWp side) of the RHR heat exchangers from 500 psig to 150 psig. This change was initiated to mitigate the potential consequences that could result from excessive corrosion within the heat exchangers.

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Summary of Safety Evaluation:

This modification does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR. The RHR heat exchanger calculations provided by the GE Company support the derating modification and the applicable ASME requirements have l been met for a 150 psig pressure vessel. The possibility of the tube side becoming overpressurized is controlled by the SWP inlet valves of the RHR heat exchanger being locked open, thus using the entlre SWP system as a pressure relief path in case of an RHR tube l rupture. Therefore the possibility or an accident which is different than any previously evaluated in the SAR is not created.

The noted calculations also verified that the RHR heat exchanger channel sections are structurally sound and capable of SWP design pressure. The probability and consequences of a malfunction of a safety-related structure, system or component previously evaluated in the SAR has not been increased. The pressure retaining section of the RHR heat exchanger (SWP side) is derated to the same L pressure rating of the SWP system which is 150 psig. Locking open l tha inlet SWP valves will ensure that the channel section of the SWP piping will not exceed the design pressure (150 psig). This modification will not affect the temperature rating of either l side (shell or tube) of the heat exchangers. The possibility of a  !

malfunction of a safety-related structure, system or component l different than any previously evaluated in the SAR is not created. '

The RHR and SWP operational bases, conditions for operations, and l surveillance' requirements delineated in Technical Specifications  !

3/4.4.9'and 3/4.7.1, respectively, have not been affected by this modification and the margin of safety of each system has not been reduced. Therefore it has-ben concluded that this change does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.

Chance Number /USAR Section: LCN 5.4-90 / Figure 5.4-8 Description and Basis for Chance:

This change correctly identified the location of the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) pump suction pressure instrumentation, E51*PIR002, E51*PTN052, and E51*PTN053, as local in the RCIC room instead of as a remote installation on instrument rack H22*PNLP017.

Summary of Safety Evaluation:

This modification only correctly identifies- the location of instruments. It does not change the instruments or their function, nor does it add or remove any equipment. Local installation of these instruments decreases the distance and elevation between the process lines and ' the instrumentation. Therefore there is no increase in the probability or consequences of an accident j previously evaluated. -Location of these instruments on a local j panel in the RCIC room does not effect the instrument function or 9

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qualification or the physical configuration other than placing the instrumentation adjacent to the process line. There is no change in the manner in which the instruments operate, thus no different type of failure is created. Therefore there are no accidents created which are different than those previously evaluated in the SAR. The River Bend Station technical specifications require a 31-day functional test and an 18-month channel calibration of the high/ low pressure interface valve leakage pressure monitors. This surveillance test is perf ormed on E51*PTN052. The revised location of the instrument has no effect on the technical specification surveillance requirements and therefore has no ef fect en the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any technical specification.

This change does not create an unreviewed safety question.

Chance Number /USAR Section: LCN 6.2-37 /Pages 6.5-9, 9.4-38, Figures 6.2-58, 7.3-7 (4 of 7),

7. 3-2 0 (4 of 14 ) ,

7. 3-20 ( 5 of 14 ) ,

7. 3-20 (12 of 14) ,

9.3-le, 9.4-7e Description and Basis for Chance:

This modification replaced two air operated dampers in the standby gas treatment system (SGTS) on the discharge of the decay heat removal fans, 1GTS*FN2A & 28, and two dampers in the reactor building ventilation system (HVR) at the discharge of unit coolers 1HVR*UC11A & 11B, with backdraft dampers. This modification also deleted all electrical control logic, status indication and instrument air connections associated with the above air operated dampers. This modification also eliminated the dependency on safety-related instrument air in the auxiliary building and removed the air bottles currently installed in this system.

Summary of Safety Evaluation:

The SGTS is only used to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

The unit coolers, 1HVR*UC11A and 11B, are used to maintain temperature in equipment areas and the SGTS equipment rooms during normal operation and after a design basis accident (DBA). This modification increases the reliability of the HVR and SGT systems by eliminating dependency on the safety-related instrument air system. All safety-related components supplied by the safety-related instrument air system have been identified and it was determined that all air users except for the four dampers discussed above fail in the position required to perform their intended safety function post-DBA. This modification ensures that the SGTS decay heat fan, as well as, the unit coolers will retain operable 10

after a postulated failure of the safety-related instrument air system. Therefore there is no increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. This modification increases reliability without ef f ecting the functional capability of the SGT and HVR systems. Therefore the possibility of an accident which is different than any previously evaluated in the SAR will not be created. This modification eliminates the dependency of four vital dampers on the instrument air system and increases the availability of the safety related instrument air system to supply other vital safety systems. Therefore the margin of safety as defined in the basis to any technical specification is not reduced. This change does not create an unreviewed safety question.

Chance Numbjlr/USAR Section: LCN 6.2-41 /Page 6.2-89, Tables 6.2-40 (6 of 18),

6.2-40 (8 of 18),

6. 2-4 0 (10 of 18 ) ,

Figures 6.3-4, 9.3-Ba, 9.3-8b, 9.3-8c, 9.3-8d, 9.3-8e, 10.4-2, 10.4-7a Description and Basis for chance:

This modification was implemented to provide administrative controls to keep feedwater-recirculation and minimum flow water return line valves FWS-V75 and FWR-V4,5, & 6, respectively in a locked open position. This change will preclude the possibility of inadvertently overpressurizing the associated piping. Other changes are made to correct editorial and drafting errors, and to provide consistency among the licensing and design documents, summary of Safety Evaluation:

The probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR are not increased. The physical valve positions have not been changed. This modification only revised design documents for consistency. The possibility of an accident which is dif ferent than any previously evaluated in the SAR has not been created. All previously identified valves which are applicable to the USAR safety requirements are still in the locked position. The probability of a malfunction of a safety-related structurc, system or component previously evaluated in the SAR has not been increased. The weight of the lock and chain associated with the valves is negligible therefore the piping does not require any further analysis. The consequences of a malfunction of a safety-11

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related structure, system or component previously evaluated in the SAR'has not been increased. The position of the valves remain unchanged therefore the system function and operability is not affected. The possibility of a malfunction of a safety-related structure, system or component previously evaluated in the SAR has not been created. This modification imposes administrative controls on certain valves to preclude the possibility of an inadvertent overpressurization of the feedwater system beyond the design pressure. The margin of safety as defined in the basis to

'the any technical specification has not been reduced. Therefore it has been concluded that this change does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.

Chance number /USAR Section: LCN 7.1-6 / Tables 7.1-3 (4 of 5),

7.1-3 (5 of 5)

Descriotion and Basis for Chance:

This modification added a footnote to SAR Table 7.1-3 to document the removal of loss of power annunciation f rom valves 1B21*MOVF019 l and 1E12*MOVF009 to meet the requirements of the River Bend Station l Fire Hazards Analysis.

Summary of Safety Evaluation:

1 This-change lifted leads in the motor control center to prevent annunciation of loss of power / thermal overload to these valves.

Lack of annunciation does not result in a change nor does it affect the probability of any previously evaluated accident. Disabling the input from 1B21*MOVF019 to annunciator 2000 and status light DS-2A, and disabling the input from 1E12*MOVF009 to annunciator 2034 and status light DS-2B, does not increase the probability of any accidents previously evaluated in the SAR. Since disabling the annunciation does not affect the probability of a malfunction of

, these valves or the probability of a loss of power / thermal overload to-these valves, the consequences of previously evaluated accidents are not increased. During normal power operations these valves will be tagged closed with the power removed. Since these valves are normally closed and close to perform their isolation function, disabling the annunciation does not change the consequences of any previously evaluated accidents. This change does not affect the probability of failure of any components or system and does not create the possibility of a failure mode different than any previously evaluated. This change does-not affect the operation'or function of these valves, it only prevents annunciation of loss of power, which is the normal operating condition for these valves.

Therefore the possibility of an accident different than any previously analyzed in the SAR is not created. Loss of power annunciation does not form the basis for any technical specification. Removal of the annunciation does not affect the 12

operability of the valve nor does it affect ar.y other component related to the technical specifications. This change does not create an unreviewed safety question.

Chance Number /USAR Section: LCN 7.3-75 / Figure 7.3-14 (8 of 16)

Description and Basis for Chance:

This modification deleted existing amber lights in the main control

. room which provide inoperable status for the four control building chilled water chiller compressors. In addition, this change revised the circuitry for existing amber lights for the four control building chilled water pumps inoperable status.

Summary of Safety Evaluation:

Because the operability status of the HVK chiller compressors can be ascertained from other existing indication, removal of the amber status lights from the control room will not increase the probability of an accident. The indication circuitry being revised by this modification is not required to be operated after an accident and therefore, the loss of this indication has not increased the consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

The design of the circuitry changed in this modification is consistent-with that originally implemented in the plant, so the probability of a new accident is not createa by this change. This modification revises indication circuitry and does not change any control or protective systems and, as such, does not affect the l basis for any technical specification. Therefore this change does not create an unreviewed safety question.

Chance Number /USAR Section: LCN 7.3-83 / Figure 7.3-2 (7 of 7)

Description and Basis for Chance:

! This change de-terminated the alarm contact wiring associated with alarm unit 1B21-ESN648, so that the failed RPV head thermocouple 1B21-T/CN029A' signal will not jeopardize the alarm function of the other three thermocouple inputs to main control room alarm 2003, "RPV Temp Low". _

_ Thermocouple IB21-T/CN029A is located in the drywell and will require an outage to repair or replace. This is a nonsafety-related wiring change and all work is restricted to main control room pcnel H13-P619 where the alarm unit is located.

l Summary of Safety Evaluation:

1 The subject thermocouple is used during operational' condition 4 and during tensioning of the reactor vessel head bolting studs.

Alternate temperature monitoring can be af forded by maintaining RPV coolant temperature greater than 100 degrees F or by using a hand 13

pyrometer to monitor temperature. Furthermore, the subject instrument loop is non-divisional and nonsafety-related, and neither provides or supports any safety related control function.

Additionally, RPV shell flange thermocouple 1821-T/CN050A and RPV bottom head thermocouple 1821-T/CNO30A are still operable and can be used to provide RPV temperature. Disabling the annunciator function of alarm unit 1821-ES648 does not affect the probability of an accident due to reactor vessel head bolting stud f ailure from excessive stress, which could lead to reactor coolant loss.

Therefore there is no increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR. Disabling of the subject annunciator function for RPV head flange low temperature will not create a different accident scenario since the only accident condition that can exist is a loss of reactor coolant, which has already been analyzed. Technical Specification 4.4. 6.1.4 requires that the-temperature of the RPV flange and head flange be verified to be greater than or equal to 70 degrees F in operational condition 4 and during tensioning of the reactor vessel head bolting studs. This surveillance requirement can be afforded by

r. maintaining the RPV coolant temperature above 100 degrees F or by using a hand-held temperature monitoring device, as applicable.

Therefore the margin of safety as defined in the basis to any technical specification is not reduced. This change does not create an unreviewed safety question.

Chance Number /USAR Section: LCN 7.3-84 /Page 7.3-39 Description and Basis for Chance:

This modification revised the level at which the control building j air conditioning system (HVC) trips due to reactor vessel low water l level from a Level 1 trip to a Level 2 trip. A low reactor water level trip is required to protect control room personnel from airborne radioactive contamination that may escape to the environment after a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) outside l containment. This change was implemented to be consitent with the l- original safety analysis provided in the main steam line break dose calculation-for control room personnel following a LOCA.

! Summarv of Safety Evaluation:

This modification does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR. The change from a Level 1 to a Level 2 trip will allow the plant to be operated in-compliance with the safety analysis provided in the main steam line break dose calculation for control room personnel following a LOCA.

i

-This modification does not introduce the possibility of any different accident than previously evaluated in the SAR since it restores the Level 2 trip required by the original analysis. The probability or consequences of a malfunction of a safety-related structure, system or component previously evaluated in the SAR are 14 l

. . . . ~ . . . . . . . ._.

. = . - - . - - - . - .. . . - - - -

not increased. This change provides the wiring revisions which are required to cause the initiation of the HVC filtration units on a reactor water Level 2 as originally analyzed. The modification will allow the plant to be operated as originally intended and does not alter the capacity or function of the filtration units, only the ' level at which they are started. As described in the associated USAR logic schematic (Figure 7.3-12) and applicable analysis documents, this modification does not introduce the possibility of a malfunction of a safety-related structure, system or component different than any previously evaluated in the SAR.

This change increases the margin of safety within the technical specifications by initiating the control room filtration at an earlier point in time following a LOCA, thereby reducing the  !

potential for exposure to control room personnel. Therefore it has l been concluded that this modification does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.

I chance Number /USAR Section: LCN 7.4-13 / Figures 7. 4-1 (4 of 5) , ,

7.4-1 (5 of 5) , j 7.6-9 pescription and Easis for Chance:

This modification changed the Division I and II isolation relays l

E51A-K66 and E51A-K86, steam supply pressure low; and turbine trip relay E51A-K72, pump suction pressure low, from Agastat GP series to time delay relays to provide circuits that are less susceptible to transients.

1 Summary of Safety Evaluation:

Replacement of the existing low pump suction pressure and low steam supply pressure "GP" relays with time delay relays does not affect any system other than the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system. The only accidents evaluated in the SAR involving RCIC are l those involving a high energy line break -in the steam tunnel or auxiliary building. -This modification does not af fect the -mechanical

( portion of the system and thus does not increase the probability of l a failure of the steam supply system. This modification enhances -the syst2m reliability by reducing the inadvertent transients within the pressure measurement or in the trip circuit of the low steam supply pressure. This modification does not affect the mechanical portion l of the system nor does it affect other trips associated with the mitigation of consequences of an accident. The high ambient and delta temperature isolation, and high steam flow RCIC isolation circuits are not affected and will continue to function as designed to terminate flow through the line in the event of a steam supply

! line failure. Therefore there is no increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR, nor does it create any new or different accident than those previously evaluated. The bases for Technical Specification 3 / 4. 3. 2 states, " . . .

15

i i

to enhance overall system reliability and to monitor instrument channel response time trends, the isolation actuation instrumentation '

response shall be measured and recorded as part of isolation system response time." Isolation system response time is detined as being the 10 second diesel generator start time and the isol& tion valve closure time of 9.9 seconds for valves 1E51*MOVFv63 & 64. These bases remain unchanged. Therefore the margin of safety as defineu in the basis to any technical specification is not reduced. This change does not create an unreviewed safety question.

Chance Number /USAR tiection: LCN 7.5-24 / Tables 7.S-1 (4 of 12) ,

7.5-2 (3 of IS) ,

7. 5-2 (6 of 18) 7.5-2 (12 of 18)

Description and Basis for Chance:

This modification revised the range category of the fcilowing parameters in the referenced USAR tables: Diesel Generator Voltage, Effluent Radioactivity, Reactor Building or Secondary Containment Area Radiation. These tables were revised to be consistent with the current plant design, related source documents, and system specifications.

Summary of Safety Evaluation:

The probability and concequences of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR has not been increased. The associated meters for these ranges provide the operator with the information to indicate. the operation of individual safety systems (i.e., standby buses 1 ENS *SWG1A and 1 ENS *SWG1B). They are used for monitoring purposes only and do not contribute to the operability of the systems. The possibility of an accident which is different than any previously evaluated in the SAR has tot been created.

Increasing the scale range does not create any new accident scenarios. The probability and consequences of a malfunction of a safety-related structure, system or component previously evaluated in the SAR has not been increased. A range change does not increase the probability of a malfunction of the meter nor any other aystem with which the device may interface. In addition, a range modification does not increase the possibility of a meter failure and hac no impact on any other system :omponent or structure. Furthermore, this modification has no affect on any design basis failure point nor any technical specification safety limit and therefore the margin of safety has not been reduced.

Therefore it has been concluded that this change does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.

16 l

Chance Number /USbR Section: LCN 7.5-25 / Tables 7. 5-1 (2 of 12) ,

7.5-2 (2 of 18)

Description and Basis for Chance:

.This change revises the USAR tables to indicate proper suppression pool level ranges as indicated in the control room. The previous ,

control room instrumentation was indicated to measure from -18 feet  !

to 4 feet on one instrument. This instrument is being revised to indicate -14.75 feet to 4 feet. Another instrument (narrow range) I was revised to indicate the correct range of between 18.5 feet and 21.0 feet above suppression pool.

Summary of Safety Evaluation:

The suppression pool level indicators provide information to the operators of the water level in the suppression pool.

Additionally, the narrow range instruments provide automatic transfer of HPCS suction from CST to the suppression pool if water level is high, As such, these instruments function during normal operation for monitoring and verifying pool level and during an accident provide monitoring and automatic HPCS transfer if needed.

These instruments themselves are not postulated to initiate any accidents. Therefore there is no increase in the probability of any accidents previously evaluated in the SAR. The ranges of the level instrumentation provided are such that critical level measurements are within the instrument ranges. The range is adequate to ensure that the operator can determine if adequate water is present to absorb the energy released from a full power blowdown, provide adequate ECCS NPSH and ensure SRV tailpipe limit is not exceeded. As such, there is no effect on the consequences of any previously postulated accidents and no new accidents are postulated. The qualification of the instrumentation is not reduced by this change, nor are operator actions to indicated level or automatic functions. This change has therefore been evaluated not to increase the -probability of failure of the suppression pool or any other safety-related component. The span of the wide range instrument with-the span of the narrow range instrument is adequate to satisfy the margin of safety as described in the technical specifications basis. The instrument input to the remote shutdown panel is unaffected by this change. Therefore this change has been evaluated not to create an unreviewed safety question.

Chance Number /USAR Section: LCN 7.5-26 / Tables 7.5-1 (6 of 12) ,

7. 5-2 (2 of 18) ,

7. 5-2 (8 of 18) 17

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i Description-and Basis for Chapqel  ;

i This modification revised the referenced USAR tables to reflect the use of 0 -

10 volume percent hydrogen range for the dryvell and containment hydrogen concontration parameter. Even though River Bend Station (RBS) does not use an inerted containment, RBS takes exception to the 0 -

30 volume percent range, of the hydrogen monitoring system as described in Regulatory Guide (R.G.) 1.97.

Utilization of the 0 - 10 volume percent range has been technically ,

justified as the aost useful range based on all operator actions i being initiated at hydrogen concentration values below 9 volume j percent.

Summary of Safety Evaluation:

The hydrogen analyzers provide information to the operators of the hydrogen content in the containment and drywell. These instruments .

function as monitoring devices during normal operations as well as i during and ef ter an accident. No automatic actions are initiated by L these instruments; however, manual operator actions are performed  ;

I based on the monitoring information provided. The 0 -

10 volume 1 I

percent range of the hydrogen analyzers is adequate to ensure that

the operator can observe minimum detectable levels of hydrogen in

, the containment and drywell. In addition, an emeraency operating 4 procedure (EOP) is currently in place which dictatcs the required l manual operator actions to be taken on hydrogen concentrations l

~

below 9.0 volume percent. Thus the modification does not increase f the_ possibilities or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR. The change does not affect the instrument I function, qualification or physical configuration. The range change does not impact operator response to indicated hydrogen 4 concentrations. There is no change to the manner in which the

. instruments operate, thus no different type of failure is created.

l Therefore there are no accidents created which are different than

those previously evaluated in the SAR. The 0 - 10 volume percent

range adequately exnibits minimum detectable levels of hydrogen in the containment and drywell. If the hydrogen analyzers are inoperable, operators =are directed to collect and _ analyze I atmospheric grab samples per an EOP. Since there are no physical 4

changes required due to the range change, nor any other equipment

affected, the probability of a malfunction previously evaluated in the SAR is unchanged. Because the hydrogen analyzers cause no automatic response of other equipment and since containment and drywell atmospheric grab samples are used when the hydrogen analyzers are inoperable, the consequences of their malfunction as i -previously evaluated in the SAR is unchanged. -The hydrogen range

modification does not create- a different malfunction since the i function, physical characteristics, operation of the instrument, and the manner in which they fail is unchanged. Technical

Specification 3/4.3.7.5 requires quarterly calibration of the hydrogen analyzers using two calibration gases; 1 volume percent and 4 volume percent, both of which are more accurately read on the l 18 l

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l 0- 10 volume percent range. All operator actions dictated by the EOP occur at values within the 0 - 10 volume percent range. The revised _ range of the hydrogen analyzers has no affect on the technical specification surveillance requirements and therefore has no affect on the margin of safety as defined in the technical specifications. Therefore it has been concluded that this ,

modification does not represent a:. unreviewed safety question. l l

pdtance Number /USAR Section: LCN ?.6-25 / Figures 7.6-1 (2 of S),

7.6-9 (1 of 4)

Description and Basis for chance:

This modification disabled the drywell high temperature input (which is one of four different inputs to the same annunciator) to annunciator 2404 from point 3 of recorder E31-TRSR608 (E31-R608).

This modification was implemented to provide greater assurance that ABS Operations will be aware of the gross occurrence of unidentified drywell leakage. Prior to this modification when one of the four inputs previously described gave an alarm signal, the annunciator would be continuously lit and the potential alarming signals of the 3 remaining inputs would be masked. Drywell ambient temperature via thermocouple E31*T/CN017B will continue to be monitored on point 3 of the recorder.

Summary of Safety Evaluation:

The probability of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR has not been created. The alarm function only is provided by this equipment, Disabling one of the four inputs for drywell ambient temperature will not have any effect upon the probability of an accident. The consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR have not been increased. The instrument provides an alarm function only. The USAR postulated accident analysis takes no credit for an alarm responso. Separate and redundant instruments provide the required isolation function and are not changed by this modification. The possibility of an accident which is different than any previously evaluated in the SAR has not been created. The

' alarm point from point 3 will be removed by lifting the lead from point 3. This was executed in accordance with specific plant procedures to ensure that no spurious signals are created and that the safety-related power supply-is not affected. The probability of a malfunction of a safety-related structure, system or component previously evaluated in the SAR nas not been increased. Disabling one of the four inputs to alarm window 2404 does not increase the probability of malfunction because the modification was completed in accordance with the previously mentioned procedures to preclude this occurrence. In addition, 3 of the 4 inputs are still enabled.

The consequences of a malfunction of a safety-related system structure, system or component previously evaluated in the SAR have not been increased. The instrument being modified provides the 19

alarm function only to alert operators of gross unidentified leakage in the drywell. The possibility of a malfunction of a safety-related structure, system or component different than any previously evaluated in the SAR was not increased. The associated power supply to the annunciator is isolated by 2 fuses therefore the change cannot create a new failure possibility of the safety-related power supply. The margin of safety as defined in the basis to the applicable technical specifications has not been reduced.

The bases for dryvell average temperature places no reliance upon the alarm function. Lifting one of the four inputs 'does not disable alarm function in any case. Furthermore, the technical specifications are satisfied through the daily surveillance of drywell ambient temperature (STP-000-0001). Therefore it has been concluded that this modification does not represent an unreviewed safety quesiton.

l Chance Number /USAR Section: LCN 8.1-4 /Pages 8.1-2, i

8.1-3, 8.3-4, 8.3-5, 8.3-49, Figures 8.1-4, 8.1-6, 8.1-9, 8.2-2 Description and Basis for Chance:

This modification replaced the preferred station service transformer with a larger transformer. Associated relay changes required to allow plant operation with this new transformer were also made.

Summary of Safety Evaluation:

This transformer and its replacement are nonsafety-related equipn.ent used to supply power to a nonsafety-related bus. The

' installation of the new transformer will have no affect on the probability of an accident. Replacement of this transformer will not increase the consequences of an accident because the new transformer will provide power to the same loads as the original

transformer, which include no loads required post-accident. The i-location of the new transformer will be the same, only the size le

! changed. The transformer being replaced is not mentioned in the technical Mpecifications and as such no- basis is reduced.

Therefore this change has been determined not to create an unreviewed safety question.

l l 20

Chance Number /USAR Section: LCN 3.1-6 / Figures 8.1-4, 8.1-6 Description aAd Basis for Chance:

This change revised USAR drawings to add notes to show that temporary feeder cables are spared at the 13.8 KV construction loop at switch 12. The change was implemented to revise the drawings to be consistent with the current plant configuration.

Summary of Safety Evaluation:

The probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR has not been increased. Disconnecting the power fron switch 12 did not have any impact on any reviews of an accidents.

The auxiliary boiler is out of service, and serves only as a nonsafety-related -function. Also all the power sources to the auxiliary boiler are from nonsafety-related buses. The possibility of an accident which is different than any previously evaluated in the SAR has not been created. No credible scenarios exist for an accident of a different type due to this change. The auxiliary boiler and the associated power source are nonsafety related and are isolated from safety-related systems. The probability and consequences of a malfunction of a safety-related structure, system or component previously evaluated in the SAR have not been increased. The auxiliary boiler and the associated power feeds .are nonsafety-related and are located in nonsafety-related areas. The possibility of a malfunction of a safety-related structure, system of component previously evaluated in the SAR has not been created.

There are no new scenarios than those previously analyzed in the SAR. The auxiliary boiler is currently out of service and is not utilized for any function. The margin of safety as defined in the basis to any-technical specification has not been reduced. The auxiliary boiler and the-associated power feeds are not addressed in the technical specifications or the bases. Therefore it has been concluded that this modification does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.

Chance Number /USAR Section: LCN E.3-32 / Figure 8.3-6 Description and Basis for Change:

This - modification revised a USAR figure to reflect the as-built configuration of a portion of the Division I control power distribution circuitry. This change was-implemented to change the 125V DC source from 1ENB*PNLO2A and 1ENB*PNLO4A to 4.16KV and 480V ,

load centers, f

i 21 P

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summary of safety Evaluationi The probability and consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR have not been increased. This modification updates the applicable USAR figure to reflect the as-built configuration of 1ENB*PNLO2A and 1ENB*PNLO4A. This change retlects the previously analyzed and licensed condition of the plant. The possibility of an accident which is different than any previously evaluated in the SAR has not been created. Technical Specification 3/4.8.3.1.b.1 and 3/4.8.3.2.b.1 addresse the 125V DC distribution panels so no new accident can be created as a result of this change. The probability of a malfunction of a safety-related structure, system or component previously evaluated in the SAR has not been increased. No change in the system logic or design was made except the location of the power feed source. No new or additional loads were added to the circuit feeders. The consequences of a malfunction of a safety-related structure, system or component previously evaluated in the SAR has not been created.

The addition of 1ENB*PNLO4A and serving portions of 1ENB*PNLO2A loads - f rom 1ENB*PNLO4A has no impact on the overall operation of Division I safety-related breakers and switchgears. The possibility of a malfunction of a safety-related structure, system or component different than any previcasly evaluated in the SAR has not been created. No change in the overall system configuration was made therefore no new malfunctions have been created. The margin of safety as defined in the basis to any technical specification has been reduced. The intent of the change was to make revisions to be in compliance with applicable engineering drawings and related documents. Therefore it has been concluded that this change does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.

Chance Number /USAR Section: LCN 8.3-34 / Tables 8.3-2a (1 of 3),

8.3-2a (2 of 3),

8.3-2a (3 of 3),

8.3-2b (1 of 5),

8.3-2b (2 of 5),

8.3-2b (3 of 5),

8.3-2b (4 of 5)

Figures 8.3-14a, 8.3-14b, 8.3-15

-Description and Basis for Chance:

l The loading calculation for the diesel generator was revised to reflect clarifications in response to NRC concerns from the Electrical Distribution System Functional Inspection. These calculation revisions i are being reflected in the USAR loading tables and profiles.

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~ . _ - -. . . - -- - .- - . - - .. - - - . . - - --

M

{ Summary of Safety Evaluat(on:

The standby diesel generator.s provide power to emergency loads necessary

[ to safely chutdown the reactor after a loss of coolant accident (LOCA)

L concurrent with a loss of offsite power ( LOOP) , without exceeding the

! load limits of the diesel generators. The automatic loading of the emergency diesel generators do not exceed the qualified loading limit.

These changes do not exceed these limits nor is the probability of any accident previously evaluated in the USAR increased. No new accidents i are created by this change as the loading requirements of the generators are maintained. Therefore it has been concluded that this change does not represent an unreviewed safety question.

[ Chance Number /USAR Section: LCN 9.1-25 /Pages 9.1-52, 9.1-54 Description and Basis for chance:

This change revises USAR Sections 9.1. 4. ? . 5. 6 and 9.1. 4. 2. 5. 7 to include

, information on the examination interval for the dryer / separator strongback and the vessel head strongback carousel. Originally correspondence ctated that the lifting devices were examined on five year intervals. This change extends that examination cycle to eight years and clarifies the USAR to reflect this information.

summary of Safety Evaluation:

The relaxed non-destructive examination frequencies that have been established for the head strongback carousel and the dryer / separator strongback are equivalent to the requirements of ANSI N14. 6-1978 and the original examination interval identified in RBS correspondence to the NRC with regard to heavy loads. ANSI N14.6-1978 was primarily intended l for cask lifting rigs which are used on a relatively frequent basis (50 to 100 times per year) and are suojected to potential abuse in transportation between sites as well as harsh environments during transport. Originally, the five year examination frequency for the RBS lifting devices was based on a twelve month cycle. Currently RBS utilizes a twelve month fuel cycle with these devices typically used for only a limited number of lifts during refueling. Based on the original twelve month inspection cycle and the fact that these devices are used considerably less-than the lifting rigs-for which ANSI N14.6-1978 was intended, extending the examination cycle to eight years will not create the possibility of any new accidents, nor will this extension increase the possibility of any existing accident analyzed in the USAR. In addition, the subject lifting devices are stored, while not in use, in an-area where they are not subjected to any harsh environments. In addition, a visual inspection is performed per ANSI 14.6 prior to use each refueling outage. Therefore it has been concluded that extending the non-destructive examination from 5 years to eight years does not create an unreviewed safety question.

I 23

Chance } Lumber /USAR SectioD: LCN 9.1-27 /Pages 9.1-37, 9.1-76 Description and_D_ asis for Chance:

This modification provided a clarifying description to the fuel handling section of the USAR. The change provided a more defined description on the intended operation of limit switches and adjustable mechanical stop that jams the hoist cable against part of the platform structure, j Summary of Safety Evaluation:

The probability of an accident as described in the USAR is not l increased. Redundant electrical interlocks which are set in accordance with technical specification limits for proper operation and administrative restrictions via reactor engineering and fuel handling procedures will ensure that radioactive materials are not raised out of the water. The intended operation and reliability of the fuel platform per the design are not impacted by the change. The consequences of an accident as ev&luated previously in the USAR have not been increased.

The most severe accident scenario associated with fuel handling is dropping a spent fuel bundle onto unchanneled spent fuel in the spent fuel racks. This has been previously evaluated in USAR chapter 15.7.

The possibility of an accident which is dif ferent than any previously evaluated in the SAR has not been created. The fuel platforms are structurally rated at Safety Class 2 and Seismic Category 1. All parts of the associated hoist systems have a conservative built-in safety factor that has not been compromised by this modification. The probability of a malfunction of a safety-related structure, system or component previously evaluated in the USAR is not increased. The limit switches and their respective actuation setpoints are not affected by this change. These limit switches are not safety-related, nor do they impact any other safety-related components. No new components are introduced in the system which would affect safety-related functions.

The consequances of a malfunction of a safety-related structure, system or component previously evaluated in the SAR have not been increased.

The most significant accident scenario which has been previously noted has been addressed in the USAR. This analysis has not been impacted by this modification. The possibility of a malfunction of a safety-related structure, system or component different than any previously evaluated

, in the SAR has not been created. The only safety-related equipment associated with this change is the structural steel load bearing

- components of the platform which are classified as Safety Class 2 and Seismic Category 1. This change does not impact the seismic qualification of the fuel platform. The margin of safety as defined in the basis to any technical specification has not been reduced.- As previously described, the USAR revisions are intended to clarify current fuel handling . operations and do not have any adverse impact on the original design for operation. Therefore it has been concluded that this change does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.

24

gjlance Number /USAR Sq_ction: LCN 9.1-28 /Pages 7.7-34, 9.1-56, 9.1-66, 9.1-76, 9.1-79 Description and Rasis for Chance:

This change clarified refueling procedures ccncerning the operation of the refueling platform, the fuel handling platform, the fuel preparation machine, the movement of fuel, and the receipt and inspection and channeling of new fuel.

Summary of Safety Evaluation:

.The most limiting accident scenario concerning refueling operations is the dropping of a spent fuel bundle onto unchanneled spent fuel. This  !

modification enhances and clarifies the procedures for refueling j operations and does not affect any of the assumptions or inputs to the i fuel handling accident analysis. Therefore this change does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR. This modification has no affect on the design of any refueling equipment. The platforms are Safety Class 2 and Seismic Category 1 and all portions of the hoist are designed to have a_ safety factor of 5 based on the ultimate strength of the material. The lifting of fuel has previously been evaluated in the SAR, therefore no new or different accidents are created as a result of this modification. No !

physical modifications to plant equipment were performed as a result of this modification. All of the interlocks on the platforms that are 1 discussed in the technical specifications remain unchanged, therefore '

there is no decrease to the margin of safety as described in the basis l to any technical specification as a result of this change. This change does not create an unreviewed safety question.

Chance Ntunber/USAR Section: LCN 9.2-88 / Figure 9.2-24b Qescription and Basis for Chance:

This. change removed and replaced an existing 14-inch motor operated butterfly valve (1MWS-MOV138) with a 20-inch motor operated butterfly valve in the coo 2ing tower nakeup water system.

Summary of Safety _ Evaluation:

1MWS-MOV138 is a nonsafety-related motor operated valve in the cooling tower makeup water system and its operation has no affect on any accident previously evaluated in the SAR. This modification only changes the size of 1MWS-MOV138 and does not af fect the operation of any safety-related equipment. Therefore this change could not increase the posibility for an accident of a diffferent type than any previously evaluated. The cooling tower makeup water system is not contained in 25 l

the technical specifications. Therefore the margin of safety of any ,

technical ~ specification is not reduced. This change does not create an unreviewed safety question.

_ Chance Number /USAR Section: LCN 9.2-132 / Figure 9.2-3a Description _and Basis for Chanag:

This modification added a nonsafety-related valve and valve cap to the makeup water supply system (MWS). This valve will function as a raw water supply valve and will allow a temporary auxiliary boiler to be installed for use if necessary.

Summary of gafety Evaluation:

This modification has a nonsafety-related function and will not be in use until a temporary boiler is needed. Due to the location of the steam piping and the valve away from Category I equipment the probability and consequences of an accident previously evaluated are not increased. It has no adverse impact on the types or consequences of an accident or malfunction. Therefore it does not constitute an unreviewed safety question, ghange Number /USAR Seg_ tion: LCN 9.2-139 / Figure 9.2-8a Description and Basis for Change:

This modification corrected the mark number for a temperature element utilized in the ventilation turbine building chilled water system. The change was made to reflect current plant configuration.

Summarv of Safety Eva_Juation:

This modification was a drawing revision only and does not affect the '

l as-built configuration of the plant. The probability or consequences of r l an accident previously evaluated does not increase nor will the margin of safety, as defined in the basis to the technical specifications, be  !

reduced. Therefore it has been determined that this modification does not 'onstitute an unreviewed safety question.

9 l

Chance Number /USAR Section: LCN 9.2-142 /Page 9.2-3, ,

1 Figure 9.2-lb Description and Basis for Chance:

This modification to the normal service water system in the nonsafety-related "C" tunnel added a test coupon rack containing piping, pumps, valves, flow indicators, pressure indicators, temperature indicators, a '

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t .

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test heat exchanger, a low and normal flow coupon rack with corraters, a 2.5-inch diameter section of used service water piping to monitor and trend pitting, and a deposition monitor.

Summary of Safety Evaluation:

• The installation of the service water test cerrosion coupon rack will allow continued corrosion monitoring of various materials used throughout the service water system. Tne normal service water system is a nonsafety-related system, which automatically isolates during an accident via the supply and return header isolation valves serving the ,

auxiliary, control, and diesel generator buildings allowing the standby service water system to cool essential components within these buildings. Since the test coupon rack has no effect on the safety .

related standby service water system, there is no increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Installation of this test coupon rack is in compliance with all  ;

applicable design specifications, and line break and component failure i analyses-previously addressed in the SAR envelope postulated accident associated with this modification. Therefore no new or different accidents are created as a result of this modification. The technical i specification bases only address operation of the standby service water  ;

system. All service water corrosion coupon rack equipment is connected .

to the normal service water system. During any accident condition, the '

normal service water system will isolate from the standby service water -

system. Since all piping and equipment being added is nonsafety- ,

related, this nodification does not reduce the margin of safety of any I technical specification. This change does not create an um ' viewed safety question.

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Chance Number /USAR Secti_o_q: LCN 9.2-147 / Figure 9.2-24b

{

p_escrintion and Basis fer chance:

This change removed the " locked opon" designation from cooling tower makeup water systen valves 1MWS-V103, 104, V107, V108, V297, and V298.

! Summary of Safety Evaluation:

The referenced valves are not required to perform any safety function.

There are no regulatory requirements for locking these valves in position. Therefore there is no increase in the probability or consequences of accident previously evaluated. Removing the locked-open designation from these valves does not change their function -or i

operation, therefore no new or dif ferent accidents are created as a result- of this modification. There are no technical specifications related to the cooling tower makeup water system, therefore the margin I of safety of any technical specification is not reduced. This change does not create an unreviewed safety question.

27

4 4 CAance Number /USAR Section: LCN 9.2-150 / Figure 9.2-7d 1

Description and Basis for Cha_nge:  !

1 This modification added three 3/4-inch valves that were installed downstream of 1CCS-V391, V393, and V395. These valves are used for outlet test connections for the turbine plant component cooling water system, which is connected to the instrurent air compressor coolers.

Symmafv of Safety Evaluation:

The turbine plant component cooling water system is a nonsafety-related system located in the turbine building. The valves serve as test ,

connections or drains for the turbine plant component cooling water l system and will be opened and closed only when samples are taken.

Therefore this modification does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The turbine plant l component cooling water system is designed to remove heat loads from j nonsaf ety-relat ed equipment in the turbine building. Therefore the I addition of th me sample valves does not create a new or dif ferent type l of accident than those previously evaluated. The turbine plant compcnent cooling water system is not included or discused in the technical specifications. Therefore this change does not reduce the  ;

margin of safety of any technical specification. This change does not l create an unreviewed safety question.

l Chance Number /USAR Section: LCN 9.2-152 / Figures 9 ?-2b, '

9. 2 -Ic Description and Dasis for Chance:

This modification revised piping configurations and corrected errors in valve numbering in the normal service water system.

Summary of Safety Evaluation:

i The revisions to the piping configurations are minor in nature. The changes to the normal service water system are limited to piping branches and do not add or remove any equipment. Therefore the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated cannot be increased. Since no new equipment was added or removed, nor was the function- of the existing equipment changed, no new or different accidents'are created. The normal service water system is a nonsafety-related system and is not contained in the technical specifications, therefore the margin of safety of any technical specification is not reduced. This change does not create an unreviewed safety question.

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Change Number /USAR Section: LCN 9.2-153 / Figure 9.2-10 Descrip_ tion and Basis for Change:

This modification added a temporary cooling system which included a vendor supplied chiller package, and permanently designed and installed piping and electrical connections to the standby service water cooling tower. This modification is needed to cool the standby cooling tower water during the summer months of plant operation to compensate for the additional heat gain in the suppression pool.

Summary of Safety Evaluation:

This equipment is located outside of safety-related buildings or structures. Those portions of the modification that have the potential to fall into the standby cooling tower are seismically supported so as not to have an adverse effect on other safety-related equipment.

Therefore there is no increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. This system is designed so that in the case of a break in both the suction and discharge piping with siphoning through both lines, the maximum discharge rate would be approximately 1440 gpm. This water would be directed by the existing drainage ditch to catch basin 543. This catch basin is connected to a twelve-inch discharge line which is capable of removing over 1500 gp.n of drainage at full flow. Thus, the water discharged through the two four-inch lines will be removed by this catch basin and no flooding of the area would occur. Additionally, siphoning through both suction and discharge lines will not drain the standby cooling tower water level below the minimum water level, because the bottom of the lines are six inches above the minimum water level. Therefore the probability of a new or different accident is not created. This modification ensures that the temperature of the standby cooling tower water is less than the assumed maximum initial water temperature in the technical specifications. Therefore there is no reduction to the margin of safety of the basis for any technical specification. This change does not create an unreviewed safety question.

Chance Number /USAR Section: LCN 9.2-158 / Figure 9.2-7c Descrip_ tion and Basis for Change:

This modification disconnected turbine plant component cooling water lines to reactor feedvater pumps 1A, 1B, and 1C. These cooling lines were redundant and were disconnected to avoid leakage of reactor coolant into the component cooling water from the feedwater pumps stuffing box.

Summap of Sc(ety Evaluation:

The feeJwrir and turbine plant component cooling systems are nonsaf ety-relateu syetems and have no required function during an accident.

Therefore Oere is no increase in the probability or consequences of an 29

l l

I accident previously evaluated nor the probability of a new or different type of accident than any previously evaluated. These systems are not subject to any technical specification requirements. Therefore there is no reduction in the margin of safety in the basis to any technical specification. This change does not create an unreviewed safety question.

QJance Number /USAR Section: LCN 9.2-160a / Figures 9.2-la, 9.2-1b Descri':)tioy_and Dasis for Chance:

This change reflected modifications needed to implement a chemical cleaning process to the service water system. This modification added valved and flanged branch connections, and in-line valves to the normal service water system.

I Summary of Safety EvaluatioJ:

This modification provides new ties to.the normal service water cystem to allow for chemically cleaning dead leg piping during the fourth refueling outage, while bypassing components susceptible to the chemical and maintaining flow during-the cleaning c.peration. The normal service water system is a nonsafety-related system and serves no function in order to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The complete loss of normal service water has been analyzed in the SAR and this change could not have any greater effect than that event which was previously analyzed. Therefore this change does not incraase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. This modification only adds branch connections and in-line valves and does not have any effect on the operation or function of the normal service water system.

Therefore this modification does not create the possibility of a new or different accident. This change adds only passive mechanical equipment to the nonsafety-related normal service water system and does not impact any margin of safety to any technical specification. This modification does not create an unreviewed safety question.

Chapae Number /USAR Section: LCN 9.2-161 / Figure 9.2-la p_escription and Basis for Chance:

I This modification added three small bore valves to the normal service water system return lines from the ventilation chilled water system to j allo's for isolation of portions of the system. Chemical cleaning of the l normal service water system will be performed in the fourth refueling outage and qill utilize this modification.

30

__. ~_ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ ._ _ _ _ _ _ ___ _. .

l Summary of Safety Evaluation: i l

The normal service water system is a nonsafety-related system. The '

valves that are being added, as well as the existing piping to which they are being added, have no safety function. The most relevant accident discussed in the SAR concerns the postulated break of the main feedwater line outside of the containment. This is the bounding analysis for pipe breaks outside of containment. These modifications will be made in the nonsafety-related turbine building. Therefore there is no increase in the probability or consequences of an accident. The valves being added are passive piping components and the failure of these valves has no safety implication because they perform no safety function and cannot affect any system which has a safety function. '

Based on this, the possibility of a new or different accident is not I created. This change does not affect the ability of any safety-related i component or system to perform its intended function, nor does it af fect l any safety-related system design or operating condition. Therefore there is no reduction in the margin of safety to the basis for any technical specification. This change does not create an unreviewed safety question.

l i

Chance liumber/USAR-Sectio _D: LCN 9.2-162 /Page 9.2-14, l Figures 9.2-3a, I 9.2-5 i

Description and Das{s for Chance:

This modification added piping and valves to the makeup water treatment '

system to provide connections for a contractor supplied demineralizer train.

Summary of Safety Evaluation:

The makeup water treatment system is 1.creafety-relat: has no ef fect on any safety related system and is not requitet ;o mitigate the consequences of any postulated accident. Therefore . ore is no increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed.

This modification does not add any safety-related equipment or change the function of any equipment required for safe shutdown of thc plant.

Therefore no new or different accidents are created due to- this modification. There are no technical specification requirements for the makeup water treatment system and no new technical specification requirements are created as a result of this modification. This change does not create an unreviewed safety question.

t i

t 31 t

i g.

l

Chance Number /USMt Section: LCN 9.2-165 / Figure 9.2-Id d

pescrio.tio_n_ AIL-Dagis for Chalga:

This modification installed four six ..ich valved branch connections to be used as isolation valves during testing of the spent fuel pool cooling heat exchanger piping. Additionally, four four-inch flanged branch connections were added for future uso during chemical cleaning of the service water systam.

Sum _mgv of Safety EvaluJtion:

These modifications will not change the functions of the service water and spent fuel pool cooling systems. A ra"' m of the SAR has determined that the bounding accident for these systems is a break in the main 4

feedwater line outside of containment resulting in a flooding event.

The addition of these valves and branch connections has been designed ard installed in accordance with the original-QA Category 1, safety-related requirements of the existing piping systen. Therefore there is no increase in the amount of flooding that could be postulated nor an increase in the likelihood of a similar flooding accident. This modification adds no active components or electrical systems. The valves and branch connections are passive pieces of equipment. Failure of any of these components could at most result in a breach of the pressure boundary of the service water _ piping system. The loss of one division - of the standby service water system has been previously evaluated in the SAR. These changes do not effect the ability of the standby service water system to perform its intended safety function since only passive components are being added to the system. Therefore

there is no reduction in the margin of safety to any technical l

! specification. This change does not create an unroviewed safety question.

Chance Number /USAR 8ection: LCN 9.2-167 /Page 9.4-45, '

Figures 9.2-la, l 9.2-8b Descrintion and Basis for Chance:

This change modified a portion of the service water system serving the

turbine building sample room cooler 1HVT-CUR 1 to provide a closed cooling water test loop to try demineralized water and various corrosion inhibiting chemicals prior to chemically cleaning .the entire service l water system during the fourth refueling outage. This will ensure that proper water treatment is available when the service water system is chemically cleaned and converted into a closed loop system.

l i-I l-

! 32

.- , .. -- - -- - .. - ~ - - - - ---

Aummary of Sa_fety EvaJyuatig3:

This closed loop system is located on the roof of the turbine building sample room. The system and its function are nonsafety-related. The demineralized water system, being used for makeup water, and the piping to the turbine building unit cooler ID for the temporary heat exchanger are nonsafety-related and are not required for the safe shutdown of the plant. The flooding accident consequences are not considered to increase since all of the piping has a 2-inch diameter or smaller.

Additionally, all piping is installed in accordance with ANSI B31.1, Power Piping. - Leaks in this system would be identified by operations >

personnel on r'autine turbine building inspections. Therefore there is no increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The leakage of the chemical inhibitors into plant systems was also considered.- This is not considered to be a problem since chemicals used inside the closea loop system wil have an approved chemical permit for use inside of plant systems and the power block.

, Therefore the possibility of a new or different accident than any previously evaluated is not created. No new .perating setpoints or limits will be changed. None of the temperatures of safety-related areas or environmental qualification temperatures will be changed.

Therefore there is no reduction in the margin of safety as defined in the basis to any technical specification. This change does not create an unreviewed safety question.

Chance Number /USAR Section: LCN 9.3-22 / Figures 9.3-la, 9.3-lb Descriot_fon and Basis for chajaga:

This modification added a sequencing panel and associated piping and instrument val"es to the instrument air system. The sequencing panel will enhance air compressor operation and control by enabling the air cor.. pressors to achieve their original functional design requirements, summary of safety Evaluation:

This modification will enable the instrument air compressors to achieve their original functional design requirements. This equipment is nonsafety-related and has no safety function. Therefore the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated are not increased.

This modification does not change the design of the- instrument air system, as it allows the system to operate at its intended capacity.

Failure of the the load sequencer will not render the instrument air system inoperable. Consequently, the possibility of a new or different accident than any previously evaluated is not created. The instrument air system is not discussed in the technical specifications. Therefore there is no reduction in the margin of safety as discussed-in the basis for any techncial specification. This change does not create ' an unreviewed safety. question.

33 i

t -

Glutnce Number /USAR Section: LCN 9.3-115 / Figure 9.3-7f DJscription and Basis for Chance:

This modification replaced the turbine flow meter with a magnetic flow .

meter in the drywell unit coolers condensate drain line. A strainer upstream of the flow meter was also removed because the magnetic flow meter does not require a strainer.

Summary __of Safety Evaluation:

Replacement of the existing flow meter with a magnetic flow meter does not change the design or function of the drywell unit coolers condensate drain lir.e. The instrument still meets the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.45 for seismic qualification. This drain line is not required to be operable to mitigate the consequences of any accident previously evaluated in the SAR. Since this instrument and this system is not required for safe shutdown of the plant, there is no possibility of the creation of a new or different accident :han any previously evaluated in ,

the SAR. This new magnetic flow meter meets all of the existing technical specification requirements, as well as, the requirements of .

Regulatory Guide 1.45 for seismic qualification. Therefore the margin  !

of safety as defined in the basis to any technical specification is not reduced. This change does not create an unreviewed safety question.

Chance Number /USAR Section: LCN 9.3-116 / Figure 9.3-71 -

Descriotion and Basis for Chance:

This modification added a flow indicator on the drip pan discharge on '

reactor bulding unit cooler 1HVR*UC8B to allow for indication of coil damage to this unit cooler, i pummary of Safety Evaluation:

l This modification adds a passive piece of equipment on a Qutlity Class ~

l 2 open-ended pipe that is not required to mitigate the consequences of I

an accident. Therefore the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR is not increased. Addition of the flow indicator only provides additional information used to determine coil l damage on the unit cooler. The function of the system and piping has l l not changed. Therefore no new or different accident is created as a result of this change.

This piping and instrumentation are not addressed in any technical specification basis and do not have a safety I function. This change does not create an unreviewed safety question.

l 34 4

chm 19._Eund2.gIRQ.AB,lggli2D : LCN 9.3-148 /F" 3 9.3-6, Figures 7.5-3 (4 of 6),

9.3-la 3

DigAtiption 4Rd DAsis for chalnie:

l

+his modification replaced instrument air dryor, IIAS-DRY 1B, with A hoatless air dryer. Additionally, the mark numbers of the instrument air filters wore changed from 11AS-FLT1A,B to IIAS-FLT11A,B.

1. 3mmarv.. oLAALetv EvalualigR:

The nonsafety-related instrument air system has no saf ety function for the prevention of an accident. Therefore tnere is no increase i in the probability or consequences of an accident previously [

evaluated. None of the design requirements of the instrument air i system have been changed. This modification ensures that the f instrument air system performs at or above the requirements  ;

contained in the Standard Review plan Section 9.3.1 and applicable i ANSI standards. Thus, there is no possibility of a new or "

different accident than any previously evaluated. The air dryers and instrument air system is not described in any cochnical i specification. Therefore there is no reduction in the margin of ,

cafoty au defined in the basis to any technical specification.  !

This chango does not creato an unreviewed safety question.

t Change Number /USAR Section: LCN 9.3-149 / Figure 9.3-la r

D_escription and Basis for Ch uqq: [

This modification added two temporary diesel driven air compresssrs  !

and two aftercoolers to the instrument air system upstream of air  ;

receiver tank IIAS-TK1C as alternete sources of air supply during l plant shutdown.

[

!Lymmary of Sgfety Evaluations i Tno instrument air system is a nonsafety-related system and has no i safety function in order to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Therefore the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated is not increased and the possibility of a now ,

or different accident than any previously evaluated is not created. ,

The instrument air system. is not addressed by any technical f specification. Thus, there is no reduction in the margin of safety  !

as defined in the basis of any technical specification. This  !

change does not create an unreviewed safety question. '

l  !

i 35 e i

I

Chang 1LEpnhatfMhh DentigD: LCl1 9.3-150 /pages 1.2-40, 9.3-4, 9.3-5, 9.3-6, Figure 9.3-la DeBRI1p.iigILAnd_Rallis for Changgi This change modifles the instrument air system IIAS) by adding a backup diesel-driven air compressor and associated components to be used for plant afr users in the event of loss of offsite power.

This will help to prevent a loss of instrument air associated with a less of the normal ac-driven air compressors.

apMnry of_ Safety Evajia_tigjl The IAS is made more reliable by this change with the addition of a backup source of compressed air. this backup can tv initiated whenever a loss of normal instrument air occurs. The probabilities or consequences of accidents previously evaluated in the SAR are not increased and no new accidents can be postulated by this addition because this new subsystem is isolated f rom the IAS during normal operation. The possibility of a malfunction of saf9ty-related equipment is not increased by this changn as the backup system will supply the same quality air as the normal system. No technical specification basis is affected by this modification because the IAS compressors are not required for safe shutdown and are not included in the technical specifications. Therefore this change does not represent an unreviewed safety question.

glancte Number /US AILRect.igj): LCll 9.3-152 /Finures 9.2-7d, 9.3-la, 9.3-lb, 9.3-ic, 9.3-1d passriotion add _Aasis for changa:

This change revised valve numbers on the instrument air compressor second stage water jacket to elimine.te duplication. 'chis portion of the system is nonsafety-related and no modification was made to the system. Only nomenclature changes were required.

ilumnary of SaLety Evaluation:

The implementation of this modification will not af f ect the ability of any equipment to perform its intended function. There is no increase in the probability of any postulated malfunctions or accidents as a result of this change, This portion of the 36

instrument air system is not included in the basis for any technica: specification, therefore no margin of safety is reduced.

This chanae does not create an unreviewed safety question.

QAAnce Number /UDAR 4ection: LCN 9.3-154 / Figure 9.3-7e Descripti2R_UL4_RAAis for- ChMig3:

This change removed a nonsafety-related hose and capped a line with a blind flange. The USAR was revised to reflect this modification.

This change does not affect any safety-related equipment.

E91gmary of safetv_RyAluation:

This change does not affect the use of the equipment and floor drain system. 1,eakage from this line which was capped will now be classified as unidentified leakage. There is no increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated in the SAR created by this change. Because this change does not change the function of the equipment drain system, no new accident possibilities are created. Capping of this line will not affeet the unidentified or identified leakage limita designated in the 1 USAR or the technical specifications. Therefore this change does  :

not create an unreviewed safety question. '

Chance Num!Lgr/USAR Section: LCN 9.3-156 / Figure 9.3-1b Description and Basis for Chance:

This change was made to add information to the instrument air system drawings by reflecting an air line and s valve. This line and valve supply air to the acid injection control valve and acid tank level instruments. This change only enhances the information of the system drawings and did not require hardware modifications.

HAmmary of Safety Evaluation:

The probability of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR is not increased because the added line is controlling the acid injection to the circulating water flume which is not a safety system. No new failures to safety-related equipment or new accidents are postulated as a result of this change. The consequences of any previously evaluated accident are not increased because control of the acid injection system affects no safety system. No technicaA specification basis is affected by this addition of a line off of instrument air. Therefore this change has been determined not to create an unreviewed safety question.

37

gbaDge Number /USAll Sqction: LCN 9.4-87 / Figure 9.4-4c ReAcdntio.n_a_rLd_Dapis f or Qbansle This change was made to add two temporary coolers to the turbine building generator area. This was required to reduce area temperatures near a leak detection system (LDS) monitor to clear a high temperature signal in the LCS monitor which initiated a half MSIV isolation. A walkdown of the area was performed to assure that this higher than normal temperature was not due to a steam leak in the monitor zone. A calculation was done to ensure that a leak of the sizc designed to be detected by this monitor wot.1d continue to be detected as devised. This modification is intended to reduce the temperature to less than the isolation setpoint while still allowing the monitor to perform its function.

SummaJy of Sqfety Evalualign:

Implementation of this modification does not impact the ability of the leak detection system to detect a steam leak in the turbine building nor does it affect the design basis of the leak detection system. Addition of additional cooling in the turbine area does not affect the 7robability of any accident previously analyzed in the SAR. The as litional coolers are powered from a non-lE bus and thus will not affect those accidents previously evaluated. The design basis for the leak detection system is not affected by W in change.

The LDS system is designed to detect a 25 GPM leak over a period of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> in the vicinity of the steam lines. Since the cause of the increased temperature in the turbine area is knnwn and the capacity of the added coolers is small, there is no potential to mask a steam leak of the size required to cause a release greater than those analyzed in the SAR. By limiting the temperature reduction in the area to less than 5 degrees Fahrenheit below the previously measured temperature prior to energizing the coolers, precautions have been taken to ensure that leak detection will perform its design function. The only safety-related equipment affected by this modification is the leak detection system and containment isolation valves. By limiting the temperature decrease as illustrated above, the probability of a malfunction of safety-related equipment is not increased. The basis for the actuation instrumentation setpoints is to ensure that the MSIVs and LDS perf orm their function quickly enough to prevent of f site doses f rom exceeding f ederal limit.s. By ensuring that the additional cooling capacity will not mask a steam leak, there is no decrease in the margin of safety associated with any technical specification basis.

Therefore this change does not create an unreviewed safety question.

38

Chnna.t_ltumber/UsAR sectism: LcN 9.4-90 /Page 9.4-54, Figures 9.4-5, 7.3-18 (1 of 7)

Dep_q11Dtion and Basis for Change:

This change added high capacity normal exhaust fans and associated controls to diesel generator (D/G) control rooms and plenums for both Divisions I and 2. This modification will help maintain the 104 degrees r technical specification temperature requirements by increasing the capacity of the exhaust fans.

gungary o(_ Safety Eva)_ygiioA :

The purpose of the exhaust fans is to maintain the D/G control rcoms temperature within technical specification requirements. The modification does not change the original design concept of this system. These fans are not required for safe shutdown of the plant. They are seismically supported as to not interfere with safety-related equipment. The installation does not increase the probability of an accident previously evaluated, nor does it create the possibility of any new accident. The design basis for maintaining the D/G control room temperature is not affected by this change and as such the consequences of any previously evaluated accident is not created. All new equipment installed was purchased to maintain to specifications required to maintain the integrity of the system in which it was installed. Therefore there is no possibility of creating a malfunction of any safety-related equipnent. This modification has been evaluated to not decrease the basis for any technical specification and as such no margin of safety has been reduced.

Chance Number /UDAR Sectiont LCN 9.4-92 /Pages 9.4-12, 9.4-16, 9.4-19, Table 9. 4-1 (1 of 4 )

Description and Dapis for Change:

This change revised the USAR to clarify that the fuel building internal pressure is to be maintained at less than or equal to 0.0 inches water gauge-(WG) during normal operations and less than or equal to -0.25 inches WG during accident conditions.

Ettamary of Sa fety Evaluation:

The RBS Safety Evaluation approved the fuel building HVAC system on the basis of its design capability to draw the - fuel building internal pressure down from 0.00 to -

0.25 inches WG during an accident within a specif jed time. The design of the system ensures 39 l

l that this requirement will be met so long as the fuel building Since theis '

maintained at less than or equal to 0.00 inches WG.

pressure of the fuel building during normalthe pressure operations will be possibility or maintained below this maximum consequences of an accident previously evaluated are not increased by this change. No new accidents are postulated by this change as during normal operattors, has no effect on the the HVAC system, draw-down time post accident as long as the maximum pressure is not exceeded. This change does not increase the consequences of a malfunction of safety-related equipment because Therefore this no modification change does not of any system has been performed.

create an unreviewed safety qvostion.

9.', 93 /pages 9.4-42, 1'N GhADgg Number /USAB_,6ectiom 9.4-45, Table 9.4-7 (11 of 11),

Figure 9. 4-4b pescription and Busis for C) n gg:

This modification added additional cooling to the souththe end of the control steam tunnel between the auxiliary building and building. This was in performed to overcome unexpected high heat order co help maintain the environmental loads in the tunnel design criteria maximum normal temperature.

Summary of Safctv Evaluation:

components installed were not The mechanical and electrical These installed over or near any safety-related equipment.

components were not connected mechanically Therefore to any safety-related the probability of any new equipment pressure boundry. probability of any Nor the accident is not increased.

is previously evaluated accident increased because the additional cooling capacity being The installedofisthis addition within the design cooling capacity capacity has been of the steam-tunnel.

evaluated to not af fect the ability of the leak detection system to main steam tunnel. Technical detect steam leaks in the This change Specification-3/4.8 is not affected by this change.

has been determined to not create an unreviewed safety question. .

LCN 9.4-96 /Figuro 9.4-5 C. hanc_ e Number /UDAR 8ectio.n: ,

Description and Basis for_Chainge:

This modification added volume con.rol dampers to the diesel generator control cabinets includedtoincontrol air flow the original into the design, butcabinets.

were not l These dampers were available and could not be installed. f l

40 ,

.f i

that this requirement will be met so long as the fuel building is l maintained at less than or equal to 0.00 inches WG. Since the pressure of the fuel building during normal operations will be maintained below this maximum pressure the possibility or consequences of an accident previously evaluated are not increased by this change. No new accidents are postulated by this change as the IWAC system, during normal operations, has no effect on the draw-down time post accident as long as the maximum pressure is not exceeded. This change does not increase the consequences of a malfunction of safety-related equipment because no modification of any system has been performed. Therefore this change does not create a.1 unreviewed safety question.

l QAgitgs* jntmber/U8AR Section:

_ LCN 9.4-93 /Pages 9.4-42, 9.4-45, Table 9.4-7 (11 of 11),

Figure 9.4-4b Description qDd__Dasis far Change:

This modification added additional cooling to the south end of the ,

steam tunnel between the auxiliary building and the control building. This was performed to overcome unexpected high heat loads in the tunnel in order to help maintain the environmental a design criteria maximum normal temperature.

Summary--of Safety Evaluation The mechanical and electrical components installed were not installed over or near any safety-related equipment. These components were not connected mechanically to any safety-related equipment pressure boundry. Therefore the probability of any new accident is not increased. Nor is the probtbility of any previously evaluated accident increased because the additional cooling capacity being installed is within the design capacity of ,

the steam tunnel. The addition of this cooling capacity has been -

evaluated to not affect the ability of the Joak detection system to detect steam leaks in the main steam tunnel. Technical Specification 3/4.8 is not affected by this change. This change has been determined to not create an unreviewed safety question, t

Chance Number /USAR SectioD: LCN 9.4-96 / Figure 9.4-5 i

DeJerietion and Basis Lqr..ChaDSA:

This modification added volume control dampers to the diesel generator control cabinets to control air flow into the cabinets.

These dampers were included in the original design, but were not available and could not be installed.

40

+ .e,e-_,m.,,--mw.,,. , . ~ . , . + --peren np -----.,s

__ _ _ __ . ... _ -._ _ .. _. _ _ __.___ _ _______.___ _ ._. ._. .__ . _ m gymmary of safety Evaluation:

The addition of these dampers to the diesel generator control -

cabinets will aid in balancing air flow into the cabinets to more effectively control temperatures. This modification has been determined not to create an increase in the probability of accident previously evaluated. Adding these dampers per the original design will not create any new accidents. The technical specifications are not affected by this modification. Therefore this change has been determined not to create an unreviewed safety question.

9 hance Number /UChd Seq 11oJ: LCN 9.4-97 / Figure 9.4-4c D.escrintion and Basis for Changs:

This modification removed two existing sections of ductwork and relocated three existing supply air registera in the turbine building ventilation and cooling system.

Summary of safety EvalualiRD:

This system is designed to remove heat dissipated from equipment, ,

piping, and lighting in the turbine building. This system has no safety-related function and is not required for safe shutdown of the plant. The air registers were relocated from the side of the duct to the bottom as a result of this modification. The total airflow in the area remains the same as originally supplied.

Therefore the modification to the nyonsafety-related duct does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR, nor does it increase the possibility of a new or different accident than any previously analyzed in the SAR. The ductwork in question is not considered in the bases for any technical specifications and, as a result, margins of safety are not reduced by this modification. Therefore there is no unroviewed safety question created by this change.

Chance Number /OSAR Section: LCN 9.5-63b / Figures 9.5-10, 9A.2-9 e

Dep_ct.iotion and Basis for Chanag:

This change was made to add valve numbers and a pressure indicator to the subject fire protection system figures. In addition, an existing sprinkler system is included in the listing of fire suppression systems. This change added new information for clarity and no physical plant modification was performed.

I 41 w- er - o *'vw-e n-wrw-+w-w e- -+wwwr rr-

- -g wB- a*'---tv-w-+%e- we ' " * * " " 8" mT"W-' '8-"" '*W4 "N' ' - * " " ' " '

1. "' '*P~"*""NW ""# Y * "I ~C'

• I

$_ggnary of Saf atv Eva_LualloD:

Since this change only added supplementary information to the  ;

syctem drawings and no modifications were performed, the l possibility or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the USAR are not affected by this change. The addition of 1 information to the fire protection system drawings will not and cannot affect the system performance which will continue to accomplish its function. This change will not affect other equipment required for safe shutdown of the plant because no modifications of plant systems were performed. The addition of the warehouse sprinkler system to the listing of fire suppression systems will not alter the ability of fire protection system to perform its designed function. This change does not impact any technical specification. This change does not involve an unroviewed safety question.

i Chance Number /UShR Section: LCN 9.5-69 / Figure 9.5-le Description and Qasis for Chance: '

This change-capped fire suppression system feed lines which were installed to supply water systems and sprinklers located in an area where various temporary buildings were located. Also the normal position of the supply valve to this temporary feeder has been revised because the valve is now normally closed.

Summary of Safety Evaluation:

The change deleted a temporary system which was added to supply fire suppression systems to non-permanent buildings. The portion of the fire protection system modified provides no protection to any safety-related systems or cemponents and hence there is no increase in the consequences or the probability of an accident previously evaluated in the USAR. The system which was modified

- was capped to allow future use if needed and the valve normal

• positicn was changed to isolate the remainder of the system. There are no new accidents or malfunctions postulated as a result of this change. The technical specifications concerning fire protection are not affected by this change.

Chance Number /USAR Section: LCN 9A 3-4 /Page 9A.3-55 Description and Upsis for Chance:

This modification revised a River Bend Station position within the USAR regarding the fire protection requirements of the emergency diesel generator fuel oil storage tanks. This enange was 42 1

- - - , , m -e,, a--t.. .v. ,,.m-.,----_..r r, -.,---.-,,,m-

-,-y,,.,.-_a. , , , . . . , -

,, ,wn, e m. r,w_y-++'% r _vt.r.--- --murr,..v.m-m--,-,-._ .-w,v,

implemented to clarify and describe a deviation from Appendix A to Branch Technical Position (BTP) APCSB 9.5-1 with respect to the location and orientation of the diesel fuel storage areas.

Rummary _oLSaRLty_ESAh!aMon:

The probability of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR has not been increased. The accident previously evaluated in the SAR is a fire involving equipment and systems within any single fire area. The change does not increase the probability of a fire occurring in any fire area. The consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the SAR has not been increased. The fire accident scenario previously evaluated in the SAR credits barriers and suppressions systems as being adequate to contain a fire within the area. The possibility of an accident which is different than any previously evaluated in the SAR has not been created. Previous analysis in the SAR discount the fire loading in the applicable fire areas as being academic because the tanks are buried. This specific configuration isolates the fuel storage tanks from ignition and combustion sources, and heat exposure from a fire originating in an accident area. The probability of a malfunction of a safety-related structure, system or component previously evaluated in the SAR have not been increased. Previous analysis within the SAR assumes malfunction of systems, equipment and structures within any single fire area. The change does not increase the probability of this occurrence. The consequencer of a malfunction of a safety-related structure, system or component nreviously evaluated in the SAR have not been increased. A recent engineering evaluation associated with this deviation has indicated that the existing configuration of the suppression systems and physical separation barriers is adequate for containing the potential consequences of a single fire accident scenario. The possibility of a malfunction of a safety-related structure, system or component dif ferent than any previously evaluated in the SAR has not been created. Previous analysis in the SAR assumes that the diesel fuel loading in the applicable fire areas would not present postulated accident events. The previously mentioned engineering evaluation indicates that the existing configuration does not create a contributing factor in a fire or any new accident scenarios. The margin of safety as defined in the basis to any technical specification has not been reduced. Technical Specification 3/4.7.6 and 3/4.7.7 provide the bases to ensure that adequate fire detection and suppression capability and fire barriers are available to detect, mitigate, and extinguish an applicable fire accident where safety-related equipment is located.

The recent engineering evaluation indicates that the existing combination of separation, physical barriers, and suppression systems are adequate to prevent a fire erposure between the diesel generators and their respective fuel storage tanks. Therefore it has been concluded that this modification does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.

43

.- - ..-- - . __--- - . - _ _ _ . - ~ . _ . - - - - - - - . ..

i l

Ga.nge_.Rumb_gr/J1RAR Senti.on : LCN 10.3-200 / Figure 10.3-lb Rescript,1gILAn4_Itapjp for Gange: )

1 This modification installed two temporary air compressors to the l SRV accumulator charging system (SVV). The permanent (SVV) air  ;

compressors are being evaluated for replacement due to ditficulty 1 in obtaining spare parts.

Eummary of 841 qty _EyAluation:

The installation of these temporary air compressors will ensure that adequate pressure is maintained in the ADS S/RV accumulators to satisfy design requirements (2 actuations with drrywell pressure at 70 percent of drywell design pressure). The reliability of the main steam SRVs is not reduced by this change. this modification only changes the source of the air to the safety-related air accumulators. The probability of an accident as described in the SAR is not increased. The consequences of an accident previoucly evaluated in the USAR are not increased because this modification will not affect the severity of any accident and does not affect any postulated release paths described in the SAR. The possibility of a new accident is not created because the temporary compressors are located a safe distance from any safety-related equipment and are adequately anchored to the floor to prevent movement during a seismic event. The probability of a malfunction of a safety-related structure, system, or component is not eveated by this change as there is no essential change to the system design or operation. A nonsafety-related compressor is being used as a backup to another nonsafety-related air source. The margin of safety as defined in the basis of the technical specification is not decreased by this change. The basis of Technical Specification 3/4.4.2 is maintained by this change. Therefore this modification does not create an unreviewed safety question.

Chance Numb _erjUSAR flectio_D: LCN 10.4-67 / Figure 10.4-3b D_e_REr_i.p_t_i.9A_ add Basi.p for CAamgg:

t This change added a pipe to the circulating water system to tie the i

existing unit 2 blowdown line into the unit 1 circulating water discharge line and into the main blowdown line at its intended location in the blowdown pit. This change added a nonsafety-related pipe to the circulating water system blowdown function which has no affect on any safety-related system or component.

This nodification provided a minimum flow path for the makeup water pumps and clarifiers, and will aid in overall flume level control by increasing blowdown capacity.

44

.n . I I

l i

l l

@ mmaty_.o_f_saleLy_EYaluatlon: l l

A malfunction of the circulating water system (CWS) will not af feet l the ability to safely shut down the plant. The USAR states that i the CWS serves no safety function and its failure has no )

deleterious effect on any plant safety systems. Therefore this !

modification cannot increase the probability of any postulated i accident nor can it create any new accidents. Since the f ailure of this system will have no affect on any safety-related equipment,  !

this modification will not increase the prcbability of a malfunction of any component or system required for safety. The l CWS is not the basis for any technical specification and as such, i this change does not reduce any technical specification basis.

This change does not create an unreviewed safety question.

Ellang_e Number /USAB_@c_tjoJ: 1.CN 10.4-74a /rigure 10.4-3a D_qAqdotion and Dasis_foI_ Change: _

This change was made to relocate dincharge pressure indicators for the four circulating water pumps. The previously installed pressure indicators were ditficult to maintain because of the location of the pressure taps.

E mmaJy of Satetv_Ev_aluaM gn:

This modification has no affect on any analysis of any event postulated in the USAR. The relocation of these gages will not increase the probability of any accident or malfunction previously evaluated. They were moved to allow the perf ormance of maintenance during pump operation. No new types of accidents can be postulated by this change as there is no impact to any safety-related system.

The system-components described above are not mentioned in the technical specifications, nor are they the basis for any specification and therefore no technical specification basis is l reduced.

t j Change _ ltuAbe.lLQSAE_sec tion: LCN 10.4-85 / Figure 10.4-5d Desqdption alRL._RaMg_1qr i Chang _e:

This modification was made to correct a nomenclature error on a sump in the condensate demineralizer system from SMPT1B to SMPT21B.

This was to correct a drafting error only and no actual modification to-the plant was made. This sump serves the same-function as before with the same basis.

I 45

_ _ _ . ~ - _ _ , _ _ . _ . _ , _ _ - _ . _ , . _ . , _ . _..-.. _ ._ _ . _ .. _ ,,_

. ei .

EummarLof Bafety_!1valuatio.n:

This change was made to retlect the correct mark number on the equipment in the condensate system and in no way increases the probability of an accident previously evaluated in the U3Al<. '1 h e renaming of this component has no affect on any safety-related equipment or system and therefore does not increane the consequences of any accident previously postulated. This in a document change only which in no way creates any new accidents, nor does it have any affect on the basis of any technical specification. Theref ore this change does not create an unreviewed safety question.

Change _tiumber100AR_Section: LCN 10.4-90 / Figure 10.4 7b DescripAioA_and Basis _fmor_ Change:

This change was made to reflect the addition of a temperature control flow path for the feedwater pump and motor lube oil system to assist in assuring that adequate oil temperature was maintained during pump startup without affecting oil cooling during extended operation.

EmmarroLaa f3ttLnvaluAtlon:

This modification helps ensure that the reactor feedpumps oil temperature is maintained within an acceptable range during emergency starts independent of other plant parameters. This equipment serves nonsafety-related equipment and has no impact on any safety-related equipment and is not evaluated in the USAR. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the USAR is not increased by this change.

A failure of this new equipment will result in a configuration which will minimize the potential to overheat oil supplied to the reactor feedpumps. Theref ore this modification will not create any new accident scenarios. The feedwater pump lube oil system ,

parameters are not addressed nor or they the basis of any technical #

cpocification. This change has been evaluated not to constitute an unreviewed safety question.

Change _smk_erLUSAILRection: LCN 10.4-103 / Figure 10.4-7b Desc1;atlo_DJAd Basis f<or_ Chad 90:

This change only revised the direction of a continuation flag on a piping and instrumentation diagram (P&ID). The system flow direction was not modified but only changed by the flag to agree with other system drawings found in the USAR. This is a correction of a drafting error and the design basis of the feedwater system was not modified.

46

I AMmmar.Y_of BAfely_JyalualiQn The revision of the arrow only clarifles the system and makes this drawing consistent with other system drawings contained in the USAR. There was no impact to system operation, nor was any safety-related equipment affected. There was no increase in the probability or the consequences of an accident as a result of this change. Since this was only a correction to a draf ting error there is no decrease in the margin of safety as defined in the banis of j any technical specification. This change has been evaluated not to create an unreviewed safety question.

i t

ChaAgeJ1mbgr]JLSAB_De.qtioD : LCl1 11.2-40a / Figures 11.2-Ic, l 11.2-lk i i

DeACTIRtion_and_Daalp_[qr_ Change:

This modification was performed in order to replace the liquid l radwaste system turbidity analyzers with new models. The !

modification was not completed but the pre-existing turbidity  !

monitors have been removed. Removal of these monitors has not  !

affected overall system performance as the normal process  !

monitoring has been replaced by grab samples on an as-needed basis.  !

Eummary of_Dafely_Eyalua11on:

Removal of these turbidity analyzers does not have a significant l impact on system operation, polyelectrolyte addition is set based ,

on grab sample analysis results. The removal of these monitors has L been determined to not increase the probability of an accident or i malfunction nor will it create any new accident possibilities. "he pressure boundarien previously maintained by these monitors has been ensured by examination of welds in the affected area and by  ;

leak testing. The system, as currently modified, satisfies all  !

applicable requirements and has no adverse impact on safety or  !

operation. Therefore this modification does not reflect an  !

unreviewed safety question. [

t i

ghangJmber]JMAR_ Sac _tdgn: LCt1 11.3-4a / Figure 11.3-2c j Description and_pagip_(gr_ Change:

This modification installed bypass lines with manual valves (It164- l VF130A & 130B) around offgas hydrogen analyzers (1!164-CAB 11012A & l 12B) to allow blowing moisture out of the sample lines without j wetting the panel equ i pmer.t . During plant start-up conditions,  !

water accumulated in the sample lines to the offgas hydrogen }

, analyzers and had the potential for damaging the associated  ;

I instrumentation. l f

i 47  !

i I

___ ,._ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ ____ _ __.____ ~,._._.__,_

p_ummary_of_ Safety _ Evaluation:

The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or an equipment malfunction previously evaluated in the SAR have not been created. The probability and conucquences of an offqas release or combustion is not increased since the bypass linea will discharge to the condenser and all moving parts (valves) are spark free. The possibility of an accident or equipment malfunction different than those previously evaluated in the SAR has not been created, lio new accidents can be postulated as the only affect of this modification in to improve the operation and reliability of the offgas hydrogen analyzers. The margin of safety as detined in the basis to any technical specification has not been reduced. The reliability of the offgas system is improved by this change due to the increased officiency, reliability, and performance of the hydrogen analyzers. Therefore it has been concluded that thin modification does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.

Qhange__J1 umber /_US AR Section: LC11 11.3-7 /Pigure 11.3-2c D e s c r i p t i o rta n d._Ji a n i s_f o r c h a ng e :

This modification added an offgas (OFG) condensate collection chamber upstream of each isolation valve ( 1!164 -V F13 0 A & 1300) on the bypass ljne which was incorporated per LC11 11.3-4a of this submittal. This change eliminated the need for an operator to open the valves for draining frequently.

gummary of Saf ety_lvaluation:

The modification adds collection chambers (1!164-TKD082 A f- 82B) to f acilitate operation and improve the hydrogen analyzer operability.

The offgas system is not safety-related and is not required for safe shutdown. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or an equipment malf unction previously evaluated in the SAR have not been created. The probability and consequences of an offgas release or combustion is not increased since the bypass lines will discharge to the condenser and all moving parts (valves) are siark free. The possibility of an accident or equipment malfunction different than those previously evaluated in the SAR has not been created. 11o new accidents can be postulated as the only affcct of this modification is to improve the operation and reliability of the of fgas hydrogen analyzers. The margin of saf ety as defined in the basis to any technical specification has not been reduced. The reliability of the offgas system is improved by this change due to the increased efficiency, reliability, and performance of the hydrogen analyzers. T8herefore it has been concluded that this modification does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.

48

e 4. .

.CAgngeJubell.UERJLecli_en: LCN 11.3-18 /rigure 11.3-2a DeAcr._intig_n_and Da_ sis f or Change:

This change was made to revise the USAR piping and instrumentation drawing to reflect the pressure switch in the offgas pretreat monitor subsystem as D17-PDS117 instead of -PDIS117. The PDIS notation indicated that the pressure switch had an indicator built into the switch, which was incorrect. This change did not revise the original configuration of the system, nor did it change the system design basis.

Rummary of saf_ely__Evahalion:

The pressure switch described above is not required for the safe shutdown of the plant, nor is it required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The protreat radiation monitor (PTRM) is the only equipment which could be impacted by failure cf this pressure switch. Failure of the PTRM has no affect on the performance of the offgas system or the inlet radioisotope cc,mposition . There is no increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously postulated in the USAR. No sar ety-related equipment is impacted by this change to the PTRM and as such the probability of a malfunction of safety-related equipment is not increased. The alarm capability of the PTRM is not affected by this change. Local indicators at the differential pressure switch are present and therefore an additional indicator on the switch would provide no additional margin of safety. The margin of safety as defined in the basis of any technical specification is not increased by this change. Therefore this change has been determined not to create an unreviewed safety question.

Cjlatnge NumberfUBR _ SecJion: LCN 12.5-6 /Pages 12.5-6, 12.5-17 e

De_sc_tiption and Dagjs for Change:

This change revised the normal processing of thermolumimescent dosimeters (TLD) from monthly basis to quarterly.

l Summary of safety Eval _uation:

l ~ Changing of the normal reading of TLD exposure from monthly to quarterly can not af fect the probability of an accident nor can the consequences of an accident be increased. Other procedures have

, been revised to include more frequent processing of TLDs for

individuals receiving significant exposure. This change has no l affect on any safety-related equipment or system. The processing 1

49

o D. , . j i

I period for TLDs is not in the basis for any technical '

f specification. This change doen not create an unreviewed safety  !

question.  !

Chapqe .Eumb_eJ/USAR Sectio _D: LCN 13.1-24 /Pages 13-1,  !

13-11, I 13.1-8, I 13.1-9, l 13.1-10,  !

13.1-12, j 13.1-24,  ;

13.4-11, l 13.5-18, I L

13.5-21, 13.5-21a, l 13A-1, l 13A-9, l 13A-10, 13A-49,

{

13A-50,  !

13A-51,  !

13A-52,  ;

13A-53, j 13A-54,  !

13A-55, i 17-1,  !

17-11,  !

17-iv, i 17-v,  ;

17,2-1, {

17.2-2, ,

17 . 2 - 4 ., ,

17.2-5, i 17.2-6, 17.2-7, 17,2-8, i 17.2-9, +

17.2-10, i 17.2-11, I 17.2-12, 17.2-12a, .!

17.2-12b,

-17.2-14, I 17.2-20,  !

17.2-21b, j 17.2-24,-  ;

17.2-27,  ;

17.2-52, j 17.2-57,  !

17.2-68, 8 17.2-74, [

l 50 f

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.~ _ _ - , _ , _ . , _ . . - . . . . _ . _ , . . . . , _ _ _ . - . _ _ _ . _ , , _ _ _ - - - , _ _ - - - . - - _ - - _ , - . _ . _ , , . . . _ -

.E.o 17.2-75, 17.2-77,

/ Tables 17.2-2 (1 of 5),

17.2-2 (2 of 5),

37.2-2 (5 of 5),

/1igures 13.1-1, 13.1-7, 17.2-1 pescripli_oA_and Dasis for Change:

This change revised USAR chapters 13 and 17 to reficct current Quality Isssurance responsibilites and key personnel resumes. This change was implemented to refacet recent reorganizations at River Bend Station.

BRmmary of__qafe_ty Evaluali_on:

This change reflects changes in personnel and qualificaitons from the River Bend Station Quality Assurance group. This modificaiton reflects the enhancement of individual qualifications by documenting significant improvements in qualifications of existing resumes. Since all personnel changes involve individuals who meet or exceed position requirements and qualificaitons outlined in the applicable industry standard no increase in the probability or the consequences of an accident is created. Therefore this change does not create an unreviewed safety question.

CJange, NumberESAR SectioA: LCN 13.1-25 /Pages 13A-2, 13A-45, 13A-46, 13A-55, 13A-67, 13A-68, 13A-71, 13A-72, 13A-78, 13A-79,

/ Figures 13.2-1 (1 of 2),

13.2-1 (2 of 2) pescripiion and_Basip tor Change:

This change revised USAR Appendix 13A to reflect current resumes of key personnel associated with River Bend Station. This change was implemented to be consistent with recent reorganization changes.

51

?Q p_urtm.a ry_o Lfla te ty_Ey a lu at i on :

This change reflects changes in personnel and qualificaitons from River Bend Station. This modificaiton retlects the enhancement of individual qualifications by documenting significant improvements in qualifications of ex1r> ting resumes. Since all per sonnel changes involve individuals who meet or exceed ponition requirements and qualificaitons outlined in the applicable industry standards no increase in the probability or the consequences c f an accident is created. Therefore this change does not create an unroviewed safety question.

Chamo_,.RumbM]XSAR_S e c t i o n : I Cl1 13.L-7 /Page 13.5-14 Regeripilon and Dasis_for_o Change:

This change was made to revise the description of the f ormat of the emergency operating procedures (EOP) in the USAR. The EOPs were modified to include flowcharts for specific actions during scenarios for which the EOPs are used. The modification to the USAR section which describes the EOP format previously included only text for purpose, entry conditions and symptoms. This change is made to more accurately describe the format of the current E0Ps in use at RBS which follow NUREG-0899 and 11UREG/CR-5?28.

Symmary_oLpalety_RyaluatioD:

This change does not affect the technical content of the procedures, only the format in which they are presented to the operator and as such cannot increase the probability of an accident previously evaluated nor can it create a new accident. This revision of the description of the EOPs has no affect on the _

actions taken by the operator and therefore the occurrence of an accident is not increased. The margin of safety as defined in the basis of any technical specification is not decreased because the actions prescribed by the EOPs is not modified by this change.

Therefore this change does not create an unreviewed safety question.

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