ML20066B032
| ML20066B032 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 10/26/1982 |
| From: | James Smith LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO. |
| To: | Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| SNRC-776, NUDOCS 8211060350 | |
| Download: ML20066B032 (41) | |
Text
o g ^6 1 LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY Esp fama, SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION enwn : P.O. BOX 618 NORTH COUNTRY ROAD e WADING RIVER, N.Y.11792 Direct Dial Number October 26, 1981 SNRC-776 Mr. Ronald C. Haynes Office of Inspection & Enforcement, Region 1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION - UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-322
Dear Mr. Haynes:
Recent NRC inspection items have related to the location of containment isolation valves (CIVs) and their distance from the containment penetration. General Design Criteria (GDC) 55, 56 and 57 require that CIVs located outside containment be located "as close as practical" to containment. Selected valves have been previously discussed as part of NRC inspection items and resolved via letter SNRC-560, dated 4/23/81 (Mr. E. J. Brunner from Mr. M. S. Pollock).
The "as close as practical" criteria differs from the design ability to locate the CIV as close as possible to the containment wall in that the practical location must reflect consideration of the numerous compromises required in the layout of plant equipment, (i.e., accessibility for surveillance and maintenance, and location of suitable support locations) and the often conflicting requirements of other design codes.
To address the "as close as possible" alternative, LILCO has investigated the location of all CIVs with respect to the distance from the containment. This survey determined the actual valve distance from the containment and the justification for its locations. During the survey review, a distance of ten feet from containment was assumed as reasonable and requiring no further discussion.
At the request of the I&E onsite inspector, a discussion of the location of selected CIVs representing valves considered to be typical of the worst-case locations, has been generated. The list of selected penetrations and associated valves is enclosed as Attachment 1. In addition, Attachment 2 presents the details and justification for these locations; and Attachment 3 lists in tabular form the location criteria for all CIVs.
8211060350 G21026 I PDR ADOCK 05000322 A PDR
O SNRC-776 October 26, 1982 Page 2 In Attachment 3, since numerous considerations exist which affect the valves location, we have provided selected location " codes" to justify the location of the valves over the minimum distance of 10 ft. A distance of ten feet was assumed as reasonable and requiring no further discussion.
Some of the competing criteria which often necessitate compromise are as follows:
- 1. Design Codes - Relief valves should be located as close as practical to the component of concern in order to provide maximum overpressure protection. When system design requires the relicf valve to discharge into the primary containment, relatively long runs of tail pipe may be necessary due to basic equipment arrangements.
Piping codes preclude the option of adding any further isolation valves in the RV tail pipe.
- 2. Maintainability - Maintainability is a very important design criterion which in some cases requires locating CIVs away from the penetration to provide access.
Locating an important component like a CIV in an area which has poor access could compromise valve maintenance and actually degrade containment isolation capability.
- 3. Valve Support - Some CIVs have large actuators and must be well located to provide adequate seismic support.
Pipe flexibility between the rigid valve support and the rigid penetration is sometimes needed in order to keep design stress in the connecting pipe to acceptable levels. It is in the better interest of containment isolation to provide a suitable length of pipe with low stress levels than to provide a short section of pipe with high stress levels.
- 4. Piping Geometry - In several cases multiple pipe branches tee into a common manifold prior to penetrat-ing the containment. Because of system function, individual CIVs are required on the branches rather i than a single CIV on the manifold. This arrangement I minimizes both the parallel piping which would be i required, and the number of containment penetrations !
required, thereby improving overall containment integ- I rity. In this case, however, the basic geometry of the fittings combined with design provisions for weld )
inspections dictated by Section XI of the ASME Code '
make compliance with the distance criterion difficult
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K SNRC-776 October 26, 1982 Page 3 -
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if not' impossible. 'on'the whole,' containment integrity i
is better served by having fewer penetrations whose
'CIVs cannot meet the distance criterion rather than having-more penetrations whose CIVs can meet the dis-tance. criterion.
- 5. Minimizing Pipe Length - Good piping design practice calls for minimizing the length of piping. runs. .For high energy lines, a short run length decreases the likelihood of a Pipe Break Outside Containment (PBOC).
For-radioactive lines, a short run length minimizes exposure to personnel during operation and maintenance, and to equipment during and following an accident. In several manifold cases, extensive extra lengths of piping would be required to locate a CIV closer to the penetration, in conflict with this design practice.
To summarize, our evaluation of this matter indicates that the criteria of 10CFR50 have been adequately fulfilled. Although the distance from the containment in some cases may appear excessive, the location meets the intent of the "as close as practical" rule when considering all the valve location requirements based on maintenance, inservice inspection and testing accessibility and-the ability to provide adequate seismic support for.the valve and associated piping.
Very truly yours, -
[
. L.. Smith RCW/mp cc: H. R. Denton J. Higgins All Parties E . aJ . Weinkam i
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' ATTACHMENT-1 ,.
1 1 Selected Penetrations and Valves'for Discussion i' ;
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Penetration Valve ( s) -
X24 (A through H) P42*MOV-232.through 240 ,
X43/XS-5 Ell *RV-152B; RV-157B '
Ell *MOV-055B; MOV-056B X10B Ell *RV-155 +
E41*MOV-036 X8B lEll*MOV-040B
! J-2 T48*SOV-134 Check Valve
-X36 C41*EV-010A&B l B-3 T48*SOV-128A&B i'
F-ll Two' check valves o
e B-7 P50*MOV-103A -
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I o SNRC-776 ATTACHMENT 2 Penetration- Valves Size Distance X-24 A, B, C & D lP42*MOV-232- '3" 41'10"
-233 3" 38'10"
-234 3" 39'4"
-235 .3" 37'2" The original design for these valves was for a 2" valve. As part of a major modification to improve drywell cooling, they were upgraded to 3" valves, and at that time consideration was given to moving the valves closer to the penetration. The present loca-tion was determined to be "as close as practical" based on giving priority to much larger diameter high pressure valves located in the vicinity of the penetration. These valves are physically approximately 25 feet from the containment penetration. The dis-tance indicated above reflects the actual " piping run" distance, which was arranged to accommodate larger valves of other. systems (16"lEll*MOV-040A and 24" 1 Ell *MOV-037A) which were already installed, and an existing aisle.
These valves could be physically moved a few feet closer, but this would not be practical, and the reduction in accessibility would hamper maintenance required by the valve testing program and would also restrict accessibility to other components in the area.
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l Penetration Valves Size Distance X-24 E, F, G&H IP42*MOV-237 3" 32'9"
-238 3" 31'2" '
-239 3" 24'11" ' *
-240 3" 23'7" These valves are identical to the 4 valves discussed with pene-tration X-24 A, B, C&D, except that these are located on the east side of the containment.s -
These valves are physically a, bout 15 feet from the containment.
penetrations. The distance.above reflects the actual " piping run" distance'which accommodates other high' pressure valves in-the immediate area. The locations allow for maintenance on the Motor Operators of these valves.
-At the time of the drywell cooling modification, these valves were moved slightly closer to the containment by. removing-a plat-form and by optimizing other piping configurations. ' Notice that the distances on the east side are approximately 10' closer than those on the west side. Maintainability in a congested area was' not compromised by this relocation.
PENETRA T/ON X-24E, F 6,H .
COOLING WATEM 70 DMWCt.L C00L, ERS West PRIMARY COMTAINMENT
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s Penetration Valves Size Distance X-43/XS-5 lEll*RV-152B 4" 227'-3"
- E11*RV-157B 1" 12'-6" 1 Ell *MOV-055B 2" 16'-3"
-056B 2" 11'-10" Refer to FSAR 6.2.4.3.3 under " General Evaluation" for general compliance againct Criterion 56. Specific compliance for pene-tration (XS-5) is given under " Influent Lines to Suppression Chamber", and for penetration (X-43) is given under " Effluent Lines from Suppression Chamber."
GDC 56 requires that lines penetrating containment and connecting to the primary containment atmosphere have two isolation valves, one inside containment and the other outside. This criterion does not reflect consideration of the BWR suppression pool which provides isolation from the suppression chamber air space by a water seal.
The HPCI steam supply to RHR heat exchanger relief valves and the RHR heat exchanger relief valves common discharge line (XS-5) penetrates the primary containment and discharges at a point located below the suppression pool water surface, thus providing a water seal and isolation from the suppression chamber air space. No valves are included in these lines, in accordance with ASME Section III - Division 1, Subsection NC-7153, which requires that no stop valve or other device be placed relative to a pressure relief device so that it could reduce overpressure pro-tection. GDC 56 is satisfied on the basis given above, and that the relief valves common discharge line including relief valves
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4 Penetration S-43/XS-5,'" Continued '
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is isolated from the suppressioni chamber air space by a water seal (suppression pool) in the primary containment Also, the relief valves are normally closed, and other pip: -1, equipment, and valves located outside of the relief salve f.. n a closed sys-tem (all branch lines are procedurally maintained closed) which is pressurized after'a LOCA such'that any leakage.past relief valves would be into primary containment. Subsidiary lines (RHR heat exchange vent lines) which use the common-discharge line as ic a header are provided with two normally closed, remote manually a
actuated, motor-operated isolation valves. Compliance with ASME :
Section III-Division 1, Subsection NC-7151 dictates that the re-lief valve be located as close as practicable to the major source of transient pressure. The original design for the piping for the RHR Heat Exchanger Relief valves had the discharge running'to the RHR pump test return line. This arrangement was changed so that the RHR Heat Exchanger Relief valves utilized a separate penetration which is XS-5. The long length of piping from 1E11*RV-152B to XS-5 is justified because it is considered more practical than utilizine a second set of vacuum breakers and a second penetra- tice "le competing criteria in this case were to minimize the c.It' .i penetrations or to have the isolation valve closer to the containment.
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.it Penetration X-43/XS-5, Continued ,
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Fewer penetrations provide a more conservative-design and this -
criteria was judged to- be governing. In fact there are no spare penetrations available'for this service.
The section of piping penetrating the containment wall, from the
-penetration to the Econtainment' Isolation Valve, represents an-extension of containment.1 This piping is the_ containment-pressure boundary and maintains containment integrity after'an' accident. . The "as close as practical" guideline is satisfied when a CIVsis' located near an-existing line, and the critical distance becomes the distance to the containment pressure boundary (i.e., existing line) not the distance to the actual containment penetration. Since the 8" dischargeLline from the RHR relief valve to XS-5 is considered part of the containment pressure boundary, the location of E11*RV157B and MOV056B and
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055B are considered as close as practical to the 8" line with respect to other design considerations'such as maintainability, ASME Code requirement location of relief. valves with respect-to the device they are relieving, and the fact that all of these valves are mounted on the same piece of equipment. It is therefore concluded that the referenced valves are located "as close as practical" in accordance with total system design requirements.
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Penetration Valves Size Distance X-10B IE41*MOV-036 4" 81'-5" lEll*RV-155 2" 62'-5" lEllMOV-040B 16" 84'-0" Refer to FSAR 6.2.4.3.3 under " General Evaluation" for general compliance against Criterion 56 and under " Influent Lines to Suppression Chamber" for penetration (X-10B) for additional specific compliance; CIV lEll*MOV-040B is discussed separately under. penetration (X-8B).
i Relief valve lEll*RV-155eis a thermal relief for the piping run from the RHR heat exchangers (in the steam condensing. mode) to the RCIC suction. , Relief valves are. located as close as practi-cal to the equipment being protected (refer to previous discus-sion). The valve is physically located at el. 33'2", which is dictated by the elevation of penetration X-10B (29'0").
J This arrangement allows the relief discharge line to slope continuous-ly down to the containment.to avoid-liquid " collection pockets" which are not permitted by the ASME Code.
When verifying the "as close as practical to the containment" location of this relief valve, it was assumed that the relief valve could be located anywhere along the piping run from the RHR exchanger condensate outlet and the RCIC suction, given that the elevation was required to be at least 33'. The present location was confirmed to be "as close a possible" to penetration X-10B
- due to overhead obstructions above closer locations and the 1
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Penetration X-10B, Continued, criteria that the relief valve be a close as practical to the equipment it is protecting.
Containment isolation valve lE41*MOV036. serves as a minimum flow valve for the HPCI system. This valve conforms to the require-ments of GDC 56'as discussed in FSAR Section 6.2.4.3.3. Since the piping ultimately discharges below water level, the post LOCA water seal minimizes the isolation valves function when consider-ed in conjunction with the closed Code Class 2 boundary beyond the valve. The normally closed position combined with the previous criteria minimizes the need for containment isolation.
For these reasons, the controlling criteria for locating the valve becomes system process requirements. This fact is evident.
by the valves location of only a few feet from the main HPCI piping run. HPCI is a high pressure system which could operate during plant accident or transient conditions. The valve opens when the system is initially started and recloses when flow is delivered to the vessel. Locating the valve close to the main system piping run minimizes the system boundary pressurized while operating, and reduces the total extent of high pressure piping in the secondary containment.
The valve is located "as close as practical" in accordance with total system design requirements.
PENETRATION X-/0B !
HPCI MIN / MUM FLOWLINE, RNR RELIEF VALV[ P/SCHAR6C UNE 4
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Penetration Valve Size Distance X-8B lEll*MOV-040B 16" 51-1" Refer to FSAR 6.2.4.3.3 under " General Evaluation" for general compliance against Criterion 56, and under " Influent Lines to Suppression Chamber" for penetration (X-8).
The outboard CIV MOV-040B is located outboard of MOV-042B from penetration (X-10B), and outboard of MOV-041B from penetration (X-8B). The distances are 84'0" and 51'1", respectively. The line through penetration (X-10B) discharges at a point below the suppression pool water surface. In this case both MOV-042B and the suppression pool water seal provide isolation.
In the case of the flow path through penetration X-8B and MOV-041B, and the flow path through penetration (X-10B) and MOV-042B, CIV MOV-040B represents the second isolation valve. The "as close as practical" criteria is satisfied by the first isolation valve from containment. Since both the first and second isolation valves are outside containment they are accessible for inservice inspection during plant operation.
CIV (MOV-040B) is used during the test mode and is normally closed. In addition, the piping, equipment, and valves ~1ocated outside CIV MOV-040B form a closed system (all branch lines are procedurally maintained closed) which is pressurized after a LOCA such that any potential leakage past the isolation valves would be into containment. The location of MOV-040B is dictated by its Penetration X-8B, Continued .
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safety function,_which is'to serve-as the' block valve which branches off.thelLPCI injection'line. As such, it is essential to be located as close to,the LPCI injection line as practical.
This valve also serves as outermost CIV-when in-;the suppression chamber spray,and. suppression pool cooling modes of operation.
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O Penetration Valves Size D1 stance
'J-2 OIV-0016A 3/4"- 27'3" (Simple Check Valve)
IT48*SOV-134 3/4" '31'5" Specific: compliance against Criterion 56 is given in FSAR ,
6.2.4.3.3-under " Influent Lines'to Drywell".
This penetration contains the redundant' PASS-primary 1 containment atmosphere sample return line. Each has two normally closed-valves, a solenoid operated _ isolation valve and check 1 valve, both located outside of the primary containment.
As described, this line connects into an existing-line to the-hydrogen gas analyzer, IT48*PNL-068A, which is' required to be
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open at all times to perform its intended function. This-existing line forms an extension of the' containment boundary.
This arrangement ~ satisfies GDC 56 since~the isolation valves are located as close as practical to the containment. boundary.(i.e.,
instrument line)~. Thelcritical distancejfor: valves lOIV-0016A and-IT48*SOV-134, is its distance from the existing pipe, not its distance from penetrations. These distances are 7'-8" and 11'-10" respectively.
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Penetration Valves Size Distance X-36 1C41*EV-010A&B 1" 67'-10" Refer to FSAR 6.2.4.3.2 under " Influent Lines to Drywell" for specific compliance of these CIV's against Criterion 55.
The standby liquid control line penetrates the primary contain-ment through penetration X-36 and discharges directly into the RPV. This line is equipped with a simple check valve inside the primary containment and a simple check valve located outside as close as practical (less than 10 feet) to the primary contain-ment. Additionally, redundant remote manual normally closed explosive valves are provided outside the primary containment.
This alternate arrangement for containment. isolation from GDC 55 was taken on the basis that it is imperative that the line be capable of opening should injection of the liquid poison become necessary. An automatic valve has been omitted to preclude the possibility of failure of the valve to open. As a means of pro-viding assurance for reliable timely actuation, redundant explosive valves (normally closed) are used upstream of the outboard check valve. This arrangement ensures reliability of operation as well as isolation if required.
The piping between the primary containment and the explosive valves is constructed to ASME III, Code Class 1 requirements which is a higher level of assurance than the primary containment itself which is constructed to ASME III, Code Class 2.
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1 Penetration X-36, Continued .
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In addition, these valves are located in an accessible location for the maintenance required.
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B-3 eIT48*SOV-128A 3/4" 14'8" IT48*SOV-128B. 3/4" 31'11" Specific compliance against' Criterion 56 is given in FSAR 6.2.4.3.3:under " Effluent _ Lines from.Drywell".
The rationale for the location of'these valves'is-identical to I
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, Penetration Valves Size Distance F-ll 1Cll*OIV-1028B 3/4"- 12'11" Refer to FSAR 6.2.4.3.2 under " General Evaluation" for general compliance against Criterion 55, and under " Influent Lines to
-Drywell" for additional specific compliance.
The consequences of failing this line have been evaluated and are acceptable. The recirculation pump seal injection line is 3/4" ASME Section III'- Code Class 2'from the recirculation pump through the second check valve (located outside and as close~as practical to the primary containment). From this second check valve to the CRD connection, the line is ANSI B31.1.0. Should this line be postulated to fail and either one of'the check valves is assumed not to close (single active failure), the' flow rate through the broken line has been calculated to be substan-tially less than that permitted for a broken instrument line.
The two check valves in series, one located inside and the other outside the primary con- tainment, provide sufficient isolation capability for postulated failure of this line. On this basis, and the general evaluation referenced above, the intent of GDC 55 is satisfied.
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Penetration Valves- Size Distance B-7 1P50*MOV-103A 1" 33'2" ,
Refer to FSAR 6.2.4.3.3 under " General Evaluation".and under
" Influent Lines to Drywell" for specific compliance to GDC 56.
CIV MOV-103A was originally designed to be located 28 feet from containment. Although the valve diameter may be considered as small bore, the addition of a motor operator causes a significant increase in the clearance and support requirements.- As a result of the design requirements of the seismic support system and i
l necessity for proximity to.a' maintenance-inspection, and' testing platform, the CIV was relocated to its present location.
Based on maintenance, inservice inspection and testing accessi-bility and the ability to provide adequate seismic ~ support for the above valves and associated piping, the present location-is "as close as practical" to the containment.
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s ,- 'l Penetration- Valves Size Distance XS-16 1Dll*MOV-032B 1" 17'10" 1Dll*MOV-033B 1" 15'cl0"
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These valves are designed to isolate after 1 at which time the piping and primary containment will be subject-ed to elevated temperatures resulting in expansion stresses.
The' actual' piping . distance of these valves from the penetration is necessary to provide the required flexibility loops necessary to ensure integrity of the small piping during the postulated and.
coincident seismic event.
The physical distance of 1Dll*MOV-033B from the~ penetration is, 4'-8", MOV-032B is clightly farther.
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TABLE 1.0 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES -
LOCATION CRITERIA POnetration Size Distance from Location Nu.aber Description Valve Numbers lin_1 Containment Criteria (note 1) Remarks X-1A. B. C.D Main Steam Lines 1821*AOVO82A 24 CODE *A* CODE "A*
182t'A0VOS2B 24 CODE "A" CODE 'A" 1821*A0VOB2C 24 CODE *A* CODE *A*
1821*ADVO82D 24 CODE *A" CODE "A" Main Steam Drain 1821*MOVO61 2 CODE "A".*H" CODE *A*
Lines (Before seat on 1821*MOVO62 2 CODE *A".*H" CODE 'A" outboard) 1821*MOVOG3 2 CODE *A" "H" CODE 'A*
IB21*MOVO64 2 CODE "A" *H" CODE "A" Main Steem Leakage 1E32*MOVO21A 1 1/2 CODE "A".*H" CODE *A*
Control 1E32*MOVO218 1 1/2 17'-7* *H" CODE '8" 1E32*MOVO21C 1 1/2 CODE *A"."H" CODE 'A" 1E32*MOVO21D 1 1/2 CODE 'A"."H' CODE "A" X-2A.8 Feedwater 1821*A0VO36A 18 CODE 'A' CODE "A" 1B21*AOv0368 18 CODE *A* CODE "A" y 8
Main Steam Drain 8
X-3 Line 1821*MOVO32 3 CODE "A* CODE "A" X-4 Reactor Water st1 cleanup System from 1G33*MOVO34 6 CODE *A* CODE 'A" the Reactor Vessel X-5 Residual Heat Removal bd System - Shutdown 1E11*MOVO48 20 CODE "A" CODE 'A' Cooling from Reactor IE11*RV163 1 CODE "A" CODE *A" Vessel Residual Heat Removal 1E11*MOVO37A 24 CODE *A" CODE "A" PREDICATED BY LOC.
X-6A.B CODE *A* OF L/8 CHK VALVE Injection Line to 1Ett*MOVO378 24 CODE "A" Recirc System PREDICATED BY LOC.
OF L/8 CHK VALVE Residual Heat Removat 1E11*MOVO39A 10 CODE "A" CODE *A*
.X-7A.B CODE CODE 'A' IEt1*MOVO39B 10 "A" System-Drywell Spray 1E11*MOVO38A 10 CODE *A* CODE "A" 1Ett*MOVO388 10 CODE "A" CODE "A" X-8A.8 Residual Heat Pomoval 1E11*MOVO41A 6 17'-1* CODE "D"
- Sys tem-Suppress ia 1Ett*MOVO41B 6 17'-t* CODE "D" Chamber Spray Residual Heat 1Ett*MOVO40A 16 41*-6* CODE *C" 1 of 10 REY. 3
=
TABLE 1.0 (CONT'D)
~
Penetration Size Distance from Location Number Descriotton Valve Numbers (in) Containment Criterta (note 1) Remarks Removal Return to 1E11*MOVO408 16 51'-1* CODE "B" Suppression Pool 1E11*MOVO42A 1G 24*-O" CODE "B" 1Et1*MOVO428 16 27*-9" CODE "B" X-CA.8.C.D Residual Heat Removal 1Ett*MOVO3tA 20 CODE "A" CODE "A" System-Pump Suction lE11*Mov031B 20 CODE "A", CODE "A" 1Ett*MOVO3tC 20 CODE "A" CODE "A" 1E11*Mov03tD 20 CODE "A" CODE "A" X-10A Residual Heat Removal 1Ett*MOVO42A 16 CODE "A" CODE "A*
4 Return to Suppression Pool Suppression Pool 1G41*MOVO33A 6 21*-6" CODE "D" Cleanup Return 1G4t*MOVO338 6 15'-3" CODE "D" Residual Heat Removal 1E11*MOVO44A 4 29'-5" CODE "B" Steam Condensing Discharge-Residual Heat Removal System- 1E11*MOVO45A 4 29'-S" CODE "B" Minimum Flow Core Spray Test Line 1E21*MOVO35A 10 43'-t" CODE "O" Core Spray Minimum 1E21*MOVO34A 3 24*-9" CODE "D" Flow Suppression Pool Pump 1Ett-OtV-OO47 3 14'-11*."H" CODE "O" (Simple Check Valve) i Back 1Gt1*MOVC639 3 26'-10"."H" CODE "D" Post-Accident Samp- Simple Check Valve 3/4 CODE "A" "H" CODE "A" ltng System Sample 1Et1*SOV-168 3/4 CODE "A"."H" CODE "A" Return X-lOS ' Residual Heat Removal 1Ett*MOVO42B 16 11*-1" CODE "B" Test Return to Suppression Pool Reactor Core Isolation 1E51*MOVO36 2 68'-10"."H" CODE "G" PREDICATED BY LDC.
Cooling-Minimum Flow OF L/B BRANCH-OFF
. High Pressure Coolant tE4t*MOVO36 4 St*-5*."H" CODE "E" Injection-Minimum Flow' Residual Heat Removal 1E11*MOVO44B 4 26*-1" "H" CODE "C&D" System-Steam Conden-i - sing Discharge -
l Residual Heat Removal 1Ett*MOVO458 4 23'-9"."H" CODE "C&D*
System-Minimum Flow l Core Spray Test 1E2t*MOVO358 10 42'-9"."H* CODE "D*
Line
(
l
' 2 cf 10 ,
REV. 3
TAILE 1.0 (CONT'D)
Pcnetratton Size Distance from Locatton Number Description Valve Numbers (in) Containment Criteria (note 1) Remarks Core Spray Minimum 1E21*MOVO348 3 26'-4"."H" CODE "D" Flow Reiter Valve Dis- 1E11*RV155 2 62'-5" "H" CODE "E" LOCATION AS CLOSE charge - AS POSSIBLE TO Residual Heat Re- PRES. VESSEL (RHR HX) moval Supply to Reactor Core In-jection Cooling Suctlon.
Post Accident 1E11*SOV169 3/4 20'-9"."H" CODE "D" Sample Return 1E11-01V-OO48 later later later X-11 Residual Heat 1E11*MOVO53 4 CODE "A" CODE "A" Removal System 1E11*RV164 1 CODE "A" CODE "A" Head Spray Line to Reactor Vessel X-12 High Pressure 1E41*MOVO42 10 CODE "A"."H" CODE "A" Coolant 1E41*MOVO48 1 17*-11" CODE "B&C" Steam Inlet Line X-13 High Pressure IE41*MOVO44 18 CODE "A" CODE "A" Coolant Injection-Turbine 1E41*18V-OO21 18 12*-5" CODE *B" Exhaust 1E41*18V-OO22 18 CODE "A" CODE "A" (Simple Check Valves)
X-14 Spare X-15 High Pressure Coolant 1E41*MOVO32 16 CODE "A" CODE "A" Injection-Pump Suction X-16 Reactor Core Isola- 1E51*MOVO42 3 CODE "A" CODE "A" tion Cooling-Turbine 1E51*MOVO48 1 CODE "A" CODE "A" Steam Inlet X-17 Reactor Core IE51*MOVO45 8 CODE "A" CODE "A" Isolatton Cooling-Turbine 1E51'08V-OO2O 8 CODE "A" CODE "A" Exhaust 1E51*O8V-OO21 8 CODE "A" CODE "A" (Simple Check Valves)
X-18 Reactor Core 1E51*MOVO46 2 CODE "A" CODE "A" Isolatton Cooling-Vacuum 1E51*02V-OO25 3 of 10 REV. 3
TA%LE 1.0 (CONT *D)
Pcnetratton Size Distance from L.ocatton Number Description Valve Numbers (in) Centainment Criteria (note 1) Remarks Pump Discharge (Simple Check 2 14'-7" CODE "0" Valve)
X-19 Reactor Core IE51*MOVO32 6 CODE "A" CODE "A" Isolation Cool 1ng-Pump suction X-20A.B Cora Spray Pump 1E21*MOVO33A 10 CODE "A" CODE "A" 01:, charge to Reactor 1E21*MOVO338 10 CODE "A" CODE "A" Wessel X-2tA,8 Core Spray Pump 1E21*MOVO31A 14 CODE "A" CODE "A" ,
1E21*MOVO31B 14 CODE "A" CODE "A" Suction X-22A,8 Reactor Butiding 1P42*MOVO35 4 13'-10" CODE "B" Closed Loop Cooling Water to 1P42*MOVO47 4 CODE "A" CODE *B" Rectrc Pump and Motor Coolers X-23A,8 Reactor Butiding 1P42*MOVO36 4 13'-8" CODE "B" Closed Loop Cooling Water to IP42*MOVO48 4 11'-2" CODE "B" Rec 1rc Pump and ,
Ptotor Coolers X-24A to H Reactor Building 1P42*MOV232 3 41'-10" CODE *B" Closed Loop 1P42*MOV233 3 38*-10* CODE *B" 1P42*MOV234 3 39*-4" CODE *B" 1P42*MOV235 3 37'-2"" CODE *B*
1P42*MOV237 3 32*-9" CODE "B" 1P42*MOV238 3 31*-2" CODE "B" 1P42*MOV239 3 24*-11" CODE "B" Cooling Water to 1P42*MOV240 3 23'-7" CODE "B" Drywell coolers X-25A,8 Reactor Butiding 1P42*MOV231 4 14*-5" CODE "B" Closed Loop 1P42*MOV236 4 CODE "A" CODE "A" X-26 Purge Air to 1T46*A0VO38B 18 CODE "A" CODE "A" Drywell X-27 Purge Air from 1T46*AOVO398 18 CODE "A" CODE *A*
Drywell 4 of 10 REV. 3
TAILE 1.0 (CONT'D)
Ptnetration Stre Distance.from Location Description Valve Numbers (in) Containment Criteria (note 1) Remarks Number._
X-28 Purge Air to IT46*A0VO380 18 CODE "A" CODE "A" Suppression 1T46*A0VO38C 18 CODE "A" CODE "A" Chamber Suppression Chamber IT24*A0VOO4A 1 C'0DE "A* CODE "A*
Inerting 1T24*A0VOO4B 1 CODE "A" CODE "A" X-29 Purge Air from 1T46*A0VO390 18 CODE "A" CODE "A" Suppression Chamber IT46*A0VO39C 18 CODE "A" CODE "A" Vacuum Breaker Test 1T46*A0VO79A 6 16'-1" CODE "B" Line - 1T46*A0VO798 6 18'-5" CODE "B" Suppression Chamber X-30 Sample Coolan* from 1831*ADVOS2 3/4 CODE "A" CODE "A" Reactor Vessel X-31 Equipment Drains from 1G11*MOV248 3 CODE "A" CODE "A" Drywell 1G11*MOV249 3 CODE "A" CODE "A" X-32 Floor Drains from 1G11*MOV246 3 CODE "A" CODE "A" Drywell 1G11*MOV247 3 CODE "A" CODE "A" X-33 Spare X-34 Spare X-35 Spare X-36 Standby L1 quid tC41*02V-OO10 1 1/2" CODE "A" CODE "A" Control System (Simple Check Valve) 1C41*EVO10A 1 1/2" 67*-10","H" CODE "B"&"D" 1C41*EVO108 1 1/2" 67'-10" "H" CODE "B"&"D" X-37A,0,C.D Transversing in-Core IC51*SOV801A 3/8" CODE "A" CODE *A" Probe 1C51*SOV801B 3/8" CODE "A" CODE "A" 1C51*SOV801C 3/8" CODE "A" CODE *A" 1C51*SOV801D 3/8" CODE "A" CODE "A" Ortve Guide Tubes 1C51*EV801A 3/8" CODE "A" CODE "A" '
1C51*EV801B 3/8" CODE "A" CODE "A" 1C51*EV801C 3/8" CODE "A" CODE "A" 1C51*EV801D 3/8" CODE "A" CODE "A"
.X-38 TIP Na Purge 1C51*SOV-028 later later later Simple Check Valve later later later X-39A,B Instrument Air to 1P50*01V-0811 1 CODE "A"' CODE "A" Suppression Chamber 1P50*01V-0821 1 CODE "A" CODE "A" 5 of 10 REV. 3
TABLE 1 O (CONT *0) e Panetration Size Otetancc from Location Number Description Valve Numbers (in) Containment Criteria (note 1) Remarks (Simple Check Valves) 1 1P50*MOV104 1 CODE *A" CODE "A" 1P50*MOV106 1 CODE "A","H" CODE "A" X-40 Spare X-41 High Pressure 1E41*MOVO49 2 CODE "A" CODE "A" Coolant Injection Vacuum Breaker X-42 Reactor Core Isolation 1E51*MOVO49 1 1/2 CODE "A" CODE *A" Cooling Vacuum Breaker X-43, XS-5 High Pressure Coolant 1Ett*0tV-3144 1 CODE *A",*H" CODE "A" Injection 1E11*01V-3145 1 CODE 'A*,"H" CODE "A*
-Steam Line Orain (Simple Check Valve)
-Steam Supply to 1E11*RV152A 4 5t*-3" CODE *E" RVs Preferably Lo-Residual 1E11*RV152B 4 227'-3" CODE "E" cated Near Source Heat Removal Heat Exchanger
- Residual Heat Removal System
-Heat Exchanger Relief 1E11*RV157A 1 CODE "A","H" CODE "A" 1E11*RV1578 1 12'-6","H" CODE "B","C"&"E"
-Heat Exchanger Vent 1Ett*MOVO55A 2 19'-4","H" CODE *B" 1E11*MOVOS6A 2 16*-11",*H" CODE "B" 1E11*MOVO55B 2 16'-3","H" CODE "C" 1E11*MOVO568 2 11*-10","H" CODE *B" X-44 Primary Containment 1T48*MOVO33A G CODE "A* CODE *A" Atmosphere Control-Suppression 1T48*MOVO38A 4 CODE *A" CODE "A" Chamber Supply Drywell Floor Seal 1T23*MOVO3tA 1/2 CODE "A" CODE "A" Pressurization
.X-45 Primary Containment IT48'MOVO338 6 CODE "A" CODE "A" Atmosphere Control-Suppression IT48'MOVO388 4 CODE "A" CODE *A*
Chamber Supply Drywell Floor Seal IT23*MOVO318 1/2 CODE "A* CODE "A" Pressur1zatton X-46 Primary Containment l Atmosphere
! 6 of 10 l -
REV. 3
TABLE 1.0 (CONT *D) .
Penetratton St2e Distance from Location Number Descriotton Valve Numbers M Containment Criteria (note 1) Remarks Control-Drywell 1T48+MOVO35A
- CDDE *A* CDDE *A*
Supply
. 1T24*A0VOO18 4 17*-4" CDOE *D" <
] Drywell Inerting 1T24*A0VOOtA 4 15*-O* CDDE *D" 4
X-47 Primary Containment ,
Atmosphere Control Drywell Supply 1T48+MOVO358 4 CDCE *A* CDOE *A* j XS-1 Spare XS-2 Spare XS-3 Spare XS-4 Spare XS-5 See X-43 '
t XS-6 Suppression Pool 1G41*MOVO34A 10 CDDE *A" CDOE *A*
Cleanup /Pumpdown 1G41*MOVO348 10 28*-4* CDDE *D*
MS-7 Primary containment 1T48+MOVO348 6 C5DE *A" CDOE 'A" Atmosphere Control- 1T48+MOVO408 6 CDDE *A* CODE *A*
Suppression Cnamber i Room XS-8 Primary Containment IT46*MOVO34A 6 CDOE *3* CDDE *A" Atmosphere Control-Suporession 1T48'MOVO40A 4 CDDE 'A" CODE *A*
Chamber Return -
1 XS-9 Sparu XS-10 Spare XS-11 Spare MS-12 Spare _
XS-13 Spare XS-14 Spare XS-15 Spare XS-16A.8,&C Drywell Service 1P50*02V-0603 1 1/2 CDOE *A* CDDE *A* "
A i r- (Simple Check Volve) 1P50*02V-0601 1 t/2 CDOE *A*
CDOE *A*
(Manual Valve)
Drywall Rad. Montt.- 1D11*MOVO328 1 17*-10" CDDE *H" Distance >10* ts Supply required for reduced pipe stress s
7 of 10 REV. 3, e
l J
TABLE 1.0 (CONT *D) e Ptnetratton Size Distance from Location Number Description Valve Numbers (in) Containment Criteria (note 1) Remarks stress Drywell Rad. Montt.- 1Dt1*MOVO338 1 1S'-10" CODE *H" Distant > 10' is Return required for reduced pipe stress XS-17 Spare XS-18 Spare XS-19 Spare XS-20 Primary Containment 1T48'idOVO37 A 6 CODE *A* CODE *A*
Atmosphere Control-Drywell Return XS-21 Primary Containment 1T48+MOVO378 6 CODE *A* CODE *A*
Atmosphere Control-Drywell Return XS-22 Vacuum Breaker Test 1T48*A0VO788 6 11*-9" CODE '8' Line-Drywell XS-23 Spare (Reserved for Reactor Vessel Inspection)
XS-24 Spare XS-25 Spare (Moved to XS-16)
XS-26 Spare XS-27 Spare (Moved to XS-16)
XS-28 Spare XS-29 Spare XS-30 Post-Accident Sampling (Simple Check Valve 3/4 later - location System - No, later) incomplete at Primary Containment 1T48*SOV131 3/4 time of survey Atmosphere Sample Return 8 of 10 REV. 3
TA*LE 1.0 (CONT'0)
Penetration Size Distance from Location Number Description Valve Numbers M Containment Celteria (note 1) Remarks B-3 Post-Accident Samp1tng 1T48+SOVt28A 3/4 14'-8" CODE "G" S/8 VALVE ONLY System 1T48*SOV1288 3/4 31'-11* CODE "G* ISOLATES AFTER Orywell Atmosphere BRANCH Sample B-7 Instrument Air to 1P50*MOV103A 1 1/2 33*-2" CODE "B&O" Orywell C-2 Post-Accident samp1tng 1831*SOV313A 3/4 CODE "A" CODE *A*
System 1831*SOV3138 3/4 16'-10" CODE *E" Reactor Sample 0-5 Instrument Air to 1P50*MOV1038 1 1/2 25'-8* CODE "O" Orywell F-10 Rectrc. Pump Seal 1C11*0tV-1028A 3/4" CODE "A" CODE "A" Injection (Simple Check Valves)
F-11 Recirc. Pump Seal 1 Cit *OlV-1028B 3/4" 12'-it" CODE "B" Injection (Simple Check Valves)
J-2 Post-Accident Sample $1mple Check Valve 3/4 27*-3" CODE *G* S/8 VALVE ONLY System - ISOLATES AFTER BRANCH
, Atmosphere Sample 1T48+SOV134 3/4 31'-5" CODE "G" S/B VALVE ONLY Return ISOLATES AFTER BRANCH J-10 Post-Accident Sampling IT48+Sov126A 3/4 23'-11" CODE "G" S/B VALVE ONLY 150-System - (NOT LATES AFTER Orywell Atmosphere 1T48*SOV126B IN- 28'-7* CODE *G" BRANCH Sample STALLED) 1/2 CODE "G" Suppression Post-Accident Sampling 1T48+SOV129A 3/4 10'-9" CODE "C" Chamber System - 1T48+SOV1298 3/4 30'-2* CODE "G" Hstch Suppression Chamber (Azimuth Atmosphere Sample 137 7) i Suppression Post-Accident Samp1tng 1T48*SOV127A 3/4 15'-O" CODE "G" Chamber System - 1T48+SOV1278 3/4 22'-4" CODE "G" Hatch Suppression Chamber
.(Azimuth Atmosphere Sample 317 17)
Lines 9 of 10 REV. 3
= .
~~
NOTES: ,
(1) Valve location from the containment penetratton shall be Acceptable beoed upon the following criterlag distance free the ,
containment to measured from the run piping weld at the penetration to the first weld at the isolatten valve or to the s
~
valve flange face.
Locatton code JusttfIcatton A Distance is 10' or less-no further action needed.
8 Distance greater th w 10' required to eattilze practical valve or pipe support locations.
C Distance greater than 10' required due to ptptog geometry, e.g.
may be fitting bound due to interconnecting lines or radundant parallel piping runs would be required.
O Distance greater than 10' required for valve maintainablitty or acceselbility or access or maintainability of other piping and/or equipment.
E Distance greater than 10' Location from containment penetration conflicts with
- other code or system requirements.
F
' Valve serves as isolation valve for more than one penetration; location le a compromlee .
G -
Location acceptable on other bases - see remarks. ,
H Location distance from containment pressure boundary.
s l
l c
t 10 of 10 RfW. , 3
-