ML20065S228

Proposed Tech Specs Identical to Corresponding LCO & Surveillance Requirements in NUREG-1433, Standard TS General Electric Plants,BWR/4

ML20065S228
Person / Time
Site:	Peach Bottom
Issue date:	05/10/1994
From:	PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC
To:
Shared Package
ML20065S226	List: ML20065S223 ML20065S228
References
RTR-NUREG-1433 NUDOCS 9405170221
Download: ML20065S228 (24)

Text

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Unit 2 l

PBAPS TABLE OF CONTENTS Pace No. l' 1.0 DEFINITIONS 1 LIMITING SAFETY SAFETY LIMITS SYSTEM SETTINGS 1.1 FUEL CLADDING INTEGRITY 2.1 9 1.2 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM INTEGRITY 2.2 29 SURVEILLANCE LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION REOUIREMENTS 3.0 APPLICABILITY -

34 l 3.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM 4.1 35 3.2 PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION 4.2 57 3.3 REACTIVITY CONTROL 4.3 99 A. Reactivity Limitations A 99 B. Control Rods B 101 C. Scram Insertion Times C 103 D. Reactivity Anomalies D -105 3.4 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM 4.4 115 A. Normal System Availability A 115 B. Normal System Requirements B 116 f C. Operation with Inoperable Components -

118 3.5 CORE AND CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEMS 4.5 114 A. Core Spray and LPCI Subsystems A 124 B. Containment Cooling System (HPSW, B 127 Torus cooling, Drywell Spray, and Torus Spray)

C. HPCI Subsystem C 128b D. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling D 130 (RCIC) Subsystem E. Automatic Depressurization System E 131 (ADS)

F. Minimum Low Pressure Cooling F 132 Availability G. Maintenance of Filled Discharge Pipe G 133 H. Engineered Safeguards Compartments H 133 Cooling and Ventilation I r I. Average Planar LHGR I 133a J. Local LHGR J 133a K. Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) K 133b l 9405170221 94o510 PDR ADOCF: 05000277 i' P PDR

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. Unit 2 PBAPS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.5.A Cgre Sorav & 4.5.A Core Sorav &

LPCI Subsystem (cont'd) LPCI SubsvStem (Cont'd)

Both CSS shall be operable Jter Freauency whenever irradiated fuel is in the vessel and prior (d) Pump low Rate Once/3 months to reactor startup from a Cold Shutdown condition Eact pump in each loop shall except as specified in deliver at least 3125 gpm l 3.5.A.2 and 3.5.F below: against a system bead corresponding to a reactor vessel pressure of 105 psig.

(e) Core Spray Header AP Instrumentation Check Once/ day Calibrate Once/3 months (f) DELETED

2. From and after the date 2. DELETED that one of the core spray subsystems is made or found to be inoperable for any reason, continued reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding seven days provided that during such seven days all active components of the other core spray subsystem and active components of the .

LPCI subsystem are operable.

3. LPCI Subsystem Testing shall be as follows:

Jtem Freauency (a) Simulated Automatic Once/ operating Actuation Ter.t Cycle (b) Pump operability Once/1 month i

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Unit 2 PBAPS LIMITING C0flDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.5.A Core Sorav and LPCI 4.5.A Core Sorav and LPC1 Subsystem (cont'd) Subsystem (cont'd)

3. Two independent Low Pressure Coolant Item Freouency Injection (LPCI) subsystems will be operable with each subsystem (c) tiotor Operated Once/ month comprised of: valve operability

a. (Two 33-I/3%) capacity pumps, (d) Pump Flow Rate Once/3 months

b. An operable flow path Each LPCI pump shall deliver 10,900-capable of taking suction from the gpm against a system head suppression pool and transferring corresponding to a vessel pressure the water to the reactor pressure of 20 psig based on individual pump vessel, and tests,

c. During power operation the LPCI system cross-tie valve closed and the associated valve motor (e) DELETED operator circuit breaker locked in the off position.

Both LPCI subsystems shall be operable whenever irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel, and prior to reactor startup from the Cold Shutdown Condition, except as l below.specified in 3.5. A.4, 3.5. A.5, and 3.5.F

4. From and after the date that one 4. DELETED l of the four LPCI pumps is made or found to be inoperable for any reason, continued reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding seven days provided that during such seven days the remaining active components of the LPCI subsystems, and all active components of both core spray subsystems are operable. t

5. From and after the date that one 5. DELETED LPCI subsystem is made or found to be inoperable for any reason, continued reactor operation'is permissible only during the succeeding 7 days unless it is sooner made operable, provided that during such  ;

7 days all active components of l both core spray subsystems and '

the remaining LPCI subsystem are operable.

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Unit 2 PBAPS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.5.A fore Soray and LPCI 4.5.A Core Soray and LPCI lubsystem (cont'd) Subsystem (cont'd)

6. All recirculation pump discharge 6. All recirculation pump discharge valves shall be operable prior to valves shall be tested for oper-reactor startup (or closed if ability during any period of permitted elsewhere in these reactor cold shutdown exceeding specifications). 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, if operability tests have not been performed during the preceding 31 days.

7. If the requirements of 3.5. A cannot be met, an orderly shutdown of the reactor shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in the Cold Shutdown Condition within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.

B. Containment Coolina System B. Containment Coolina System (HPSW. Torus Coolina. Drywell Sorav. (HPSW. Torus Coolina. Drywell Scrav2 and Torus Sorav) and Torus Soray)

1. Except as specified in 3.5.B.2, 1. Containment Cooling System components 3.5.B.3, 3.5.B.4, 3.5.B.5, and 3.5.B.6 shall be tested as follows:

below, the containment cooling system shall be operable whenever irradiated Item Freauency fuel is in the reactor vessel and reactor coolant temperature is greater (a) Each HPSW Pump Once/ month than 212 degrees F, and prior to Operability.

reactor startup from a Cold Shutdown Condition. (b) Each HPSW motor operated Once/ month valve operability.

(c) HPSW Pump Capacity After pump Test. Each HPSW maintenance pump shall and every deliver 4500 3 months.

gpm at 233 psig.

(d) Each Torus Cooling Once/ month motor operated valve operability.

(e) Each Drywell Spray Once/ month motor operated valve operability.

(f) Each Torus Spray Once/ month motor operated valve operability.

(g) Air test on Once/5 years drywell and torus headers and nozzles.

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Unit 2 l

PBAPS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.5.F Minimum Low Pressure Coolirig 4.5.F Minimum Low Pressure Availability .Coolino Availability

1. The following low pressure ECCS 1. At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, verify subsystems shall be OPERABLE when for each required Low Pressure irradiated fuel is in the reactor Coolant Injection (LPCI) subsystem.

vessel and the reactor is in the Cold that the suppression pool water Condition except when the reactor level is at least 11.0 feet, vessel head is removed, the spent fuel storage pool gates are removed, and 2. At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, verify.

water level is at least 458 inches for each required Core Spray (CS) above reactor pressure vessel subsystem:

instrument zero:

(a) Suppression pool water level

a. Two Core Spray (CS) subsystems with is at least 11.0 feet, or each subsystem comprised of:

(b) Condensate storage tank water (1) Two OPERABLE motor driven level is at least 17.3 feet.* 1 pumps, and

3. At least once per month, verify for (2) Piping and valves capable of each required CS and LPCI subsystem taking suction from the that the piping is filled with water required water source and from the pump discharge valve to the transferring the water through injection valve. l a spray sparger above the core to the reactor vessel. 4. At least once per month, verify for each required CS and LPCI subsystem OR manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path

b. One CS subsystem comprised of the that is not locked, sealed, or equipment specified in 3.5.F.1.a otherwise secured in position, is in above, and the correct position.**

one Low Pressure Coolant Injection subsystem comprised of:

(1) One OPERABLE motor driven pump, and (2) Piping and valves capable of taking suction from the required water source and transferring the water to the reactor vessel.

Only one required CS subsystem may take credit for this option during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

• • One LPCI subsystem may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal if capable of being manually realigned and not otherwise inoperable.

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Unit 2 PBAPS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.5.F Minimum low Pressure Coolina 4.5.F Minimum low Pressure Availability (Cont.) Coolina Availability (Cont.)

2. With one of the subsystems 5. At least once per 92 days, verify each required by 3.5.F.1 inoperable, required CS subsystem pump and LPCI restore the required subsystem subsystem pump develops the flow rate to OPERABLE status within 4 specified below against a system head hours or immediately initiate corresponding to the specified reactor action to suspend operations pressure.

with a potential for draining SYSTEM HEAD the reactor vessel. CORRESP0 MING NUMBER TO A REAC10R

3. With two of the subsystems SYSTEM fl0W RATE OF PUMPS PRESSURE OF required by 3.5.F.1 inoperable, immediately initiate action to CS 2 3,125 gpm 1 2 105 psig suspend operations with a LPCI 2 10,900 gpm 1 2 20 psig potential for draining the reactor vessel and restore at 6. At least once per operating cycle, verify least one subsystem to OPERABLE each required CS and LPCI subsystem status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or actuates on an actual or simulated immediately initiate action to automatic initiation signal.***

establish Secondary Containment Integrity. *** Vessel injection / spray may be excluded.

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Unit 2 PBAPS 3.5.A BASES Core Sorav and LPCI Subsystems Core Sorav Subsystem (CSS)

The CSS is provided to assure that the core is adequately cooled following a loss-of-coolant accident. Two redundant loops each provide adequate core cooling capacity for all break sizes from 0.2 ft' up to and including the double-ended reactor recirculation line break, and for smaller breaks following depressurization by the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS).

The CSS specifications are applicable whenever irradiated fuel is in the core because the CSS is a primary source of emergency core cooling after the reactor vessel is depressurized.

With one CSS inoperable, the verified operability (see 4.5 Bases) of the redundant full capacity CSS and the full capacity low Pressure Coolant Injection system provides assurance of adequate core cooling and justifies and specified 7 days out-of-service period.

The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that the CSS will be operable when required. Although all active components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation during reactor operation, a complete functional test requires reactor shutdown. The pump discharge piping is maintained full to prevent water hammer damage to piping and to start cooling at the earliest moment.

Low Pressure Coolant In.iection System (LPCIS)

The LPCIS is provided to assure that the core is adequately cooled following a loss-of-coolant accident. Two loops each with two pumps provide adequate core flooding for all break sizes from 0.2 ft' up to and including the double-ended reactor recirculation line break, and for small breaks following depressurization by the ADS.

The LPCIS specifications are applicable whenever there is irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel because LPCIS is a primary source of water for flooding the core after the reactor vessel is depressurized.

With one LPCIS pump inoperable, or one LPCIS loop inoperable, adequate  !

core flooding is assured by the verified operability (see 4.5 Bases) of l the redundant LPCIS pumps or loop, and both CSS loops. The reduced  ;

redundancy justifies the specified 7 day out-of-service period.

The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that the LPCI will be operable when required. Although all active components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation during reactor operation, a complete functional test requires reactor shutdown. The pump discharge piping is maintained full to prevent water hammer damage to piping and to start cooling at the earliest moment.

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Unit 2 PBAPS 3.5.E BASES (Cont'd.)

With one ADS valve known to be incapable of automatic operation, four valves remain operable to perform their ADS function. However, since the ECCS Loss-of-Coolant Accident analysis for small line breaks assumed that all five ADS valves were operable, reactor operation with one ADS valve inoperable is only allowed to continue for seven (7) days provided that the HPCI system is verified to be operable and that the actuation logic for the (remaining) four ADS valves is verified to be operable (see 4.5 Bases).

F. Minimum Low Pressure Coolina Availability The purpose of Specification F is to assure that adequate core cooling capability is available while the reactor is in the Cold Condition. The long term cooling analyses following a design basis LOCA demonstrates that only one low pressure ECCS subsystem is required, post-LOCA, to maintain adequate reactor vessel water level in the event of an inadvertent vessel draindown. It is therefore reasonable to assume, based on engineering judgment, that while the reactor is in the Cold Condition one low pressure ECCS subsystem can maintain adequate reactor vessel water level. To provide redundancy, a minimum of two low pressure ECCS subsystems are required to be OPERABLE while the reactor is in the Cold Condition. ECCS subsystems are not required to be OPERABLE with the reactor in the Cold Condition with the spent fuel storage pool gates removed and the water level maintained at least 458 inches above reactor pressure vessel instrument zero. This provides sufficient coolant inventory to allow operator action to terminate the inventory loss prior to fuel uncovery in case of an inadvertent draindown.

G. Maintenance of Filled Discharoe Pioe If the discharge piping of the core spray, LPCI subsystem, HPCI, and RCIC are not filled, a water hammer can develop in this piping when the pump and/or pumps are started. If a water hammer were to occur at the time at which the system were required, the system would still perform its design function. However, to minimize damage to the discharge l piping and to ensure added margin in the operation of these systems, this Technical Specification requires the discharge lines to be filled whEnever the system is in an operable condition.

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Unit 2 PBAPS 4.5 MSfji Core and Containment Coolina Systems Surveillance Freouencies The performance of individual emergency core cooling systems (HPCI, LPCI, Core Spray and ADS) and the integrated performance of the emergency core cooling systems are described in analyses referenced in Section 6.5 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. Periodic surveillance of pumps and valves is performed in accordance with ASME Code,Section XI, to the extent described in the Inservice Testing Plan, to verify that the systems will provide the flow rates required by the respective analyses. HPCI and RCIC flow tests are performed at two pressures so that the systems' capability to provide rated flow over their operating range is verified. To avoid damaging Core Spray system valves during Core Spray pump flow testing, throttling is not normally performed to obtain a system head corresponding to a reactor pressure of 2105 psig. Pump curves are used to determine

equivalent values for flow rate and test pressure for the Core Spray l

pumps in order to meet the Surveillance Requirements. HPSW flow tests verify that rated flow can be delivered to the RHR heat exchangers.

The testing interval for the core and containment cooling systems is based on industry practice, sound engineering judgment and practicality. The core cooling systems have not been designed to be fully testable during operation. For example, in the case of the HPCI, automatic initiation during power operation would result in pumping cold water into the reactor vessel which is not desirable.

Complete ADS testing during power operation causes an undesirable loss-of-coolant inventory. To increase the availability of the core and containment cooling systems, the components which make up the system; i.e., instrumentation, pumps, valves, etc., are tested frequently. The pumps and motor operated injection valves are also tested each month to assure their operability. A simulated automatic actuation test once each cycle combined with frequent tests of the l pumps and injection valves is deemed to be adequate testing of these systems.

The flow path piping of the emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) has the potential to develop volds and pockets of entrained air.

Maintaining the pump discharge lines of the HPCI system, Core Spray system, and LPCI subsystems full of water ensures that the ECCS will perform properly, injecting its full capacity into the reactor pressure vessel upon demand. This will also prevent a water hammer following an ECCS initiation signal. One acceptable method of ensuring that the lines are full is to vent at the high points. An acceptable method of ensuring the LPCI and Core Spray system discharge lines are full is to verify the absence of_ the associated

" keep fill" system accumulator alarms.

While the reactor is in the Cold Condition one low pressure ECCS subsystem can maintain adequate reactor vessel water level. To l provide redundancy, a minimum of two low pressure ECCS subsystems are required to be OPERABLE with the reactor in the Cold Condition.

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PBAPS 4.5 BASES (Cont'd.)

Core and Containment Coolina Systems Surveillance Frecuencies However, one LPCI subsystem may be aligned for decay heat removal and considered OPERABLE for the ECCS function, if it can be manually realigned (remote or local) to the LPCI mode and is not otherwise inoperable. RHR valves that are required for LPCI subsystem operation may be aligned for decay heat removal. A note allows one LPCI subsystem of the RHR system to be considered OPERABLE for the ECCS function if all the required valves in the LPCI flow path can be manually realigned (remote or local) to allow injection into the reactor vessel, and the system is not otherwise inoperable. Manual realignment to allow injection into the reactor vessel in the LPCI mode may also include opening the drag valve to establish the required LPCI subsystem flow rate. This will ensure adequate core cooling if an inadvertent reactor vessel draindown should occur.

Sufficient time will be available to manually align and initiate LPCI subsystem operation to provide core cooling prior to postulated fuel uncovery. Only one required Core Spray subsystem may take credit for the condensate storage tank supply option during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel as stated in the note to Surveillance Requirement 4.5.F.2(b). During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel, the volume in the condensate storage tank may not provide adequate makeup if the reactor vessel were completely drained. Therefore, only one Core Spray subsystem is allowed to use the condensate storage tank as a source of water. This ensures the other required ECCS subsystem has adequate makeup volume.

When components and subsystems are out-of-service, overall core and containment cooling reliability is maintained by verifying the operability of the remaining redundant cooling systems that the Limiting Conditions for Operation require to be operable during the allowable out-of-service time period. Verifying operability in this context means to administratively ensure that the remaining required systems or subsystems are not known to be inoperable (for example:

confirming that equipment necessary for the systems or subsystems to perform their safety functions are not blocked out of service for maintenance, checking the status of selected surveillances on the remaining required systems or subsystems and checking that selected valves are in the correct position as indicated on the control room panels). Performance of operability tests is not required.

4.5 I&J Surveillance Reouirements Bases Averaoe and Local LHGR The LHGR shall be checked daily to determine if fuel burnup or control rod movement has caused changes in power distribution. Since changes due to burnup are slow and only a few control rods are moved daily, a daily check of power distribution is adequate.

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Unit 2 PBAPS 4.5.K Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) - Surveillance Reouirement At core thermal power levels less than or equal to 25%, the reactor will be operating at minimum recirculation pump speed and the moderator void content will be very small. For all designated control rod patterns which may be employed at this point, operating plant experience indicated that the resulting MCPR value is in excess of requirements by a considerable margin. With this low void content, any inadvertent core flow increase would only place operation in a more conservative mode relative to MCPR. During initial start-up testing of the plant, a MCPR evaluation will be made at 25% thermal power level with minimum recirculation pump speed.

The MCPR margin will thus be demonstrated such that future MCPR evaluation below this power level will be shown to be unnecessary.

The daily requirement for calculating MCPR above 25% rated thermal power is sufficient since power distribution shifts are very slow when there have not been significant power or control rod changes.

The requirement for calculating MCPR when a limiting control rod pattern is approached ensures that MCPR will be known following a change in power or power shape (regardless of magnitude) that could place operation at a thermal limit.

4.5.L MCPR Limits for Core Flows Other Than Rated The purpose of the K, factor is to define operating limits at other than rated flow conditions. At less than 100% flow the required MCPR is the product of the operating limit MCPR and the K, factor.

Specifically, the K, factor provides the required thermal margin to protect against a flow increase transient. The most limiting transient initiated from less than rated flow conditions is the recirculation pump speed up caused by a motor-generator speed control failure.

For operation in the automatic flow control mode, the K, factors assure that the operating limit MCPR will not be violated should the most limiting transient occur at less than rated flow. In the manual flow control mode, the K, factors assure that the Safety Limit MCPR will not be violated for the same postulated transient event.

The K, factor curves in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT were developed generically and are applicable to all BWR/2, BWR/3, and BWR/4 reactors. The X, factors were derived using the flow control line corresponding to rated thermal power at rated core flow.

For the manual flow control mode, the K, factors were calculated such that at the maximum flow rate (as limited by the pump scoop tube set point) and the corresponding core power (along the rated flow control line), the limiting bundle's relative power was adjusted until the  ;

MCPR was slightly above the Safety Limit. Using this relative bundle l power, the MCPR's were calculated at different points along the rated  :

flow control line corresponding to different core flows. The ratio l of the MCPR calculated at a given point of the core flow, divided by l the operating limit MCPR determines the X,. '

For operation in the automatic flow control mode, the same procedure was employed except the initial power distribution was established ,

such that the MCPR was equal to the operating limit MCPR at rated I power and flow.

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Unit 2 PBAPS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS Anolicability: Aeolicability:

Apples to the operating Applies to the primary and status of the primary and secondary containment secondary containment integrity.

systems.

Obiective:

Obiective:

To verify the integrity of To assure the integrity of the primary and secondary the primary and secondary containment.

containment system.

Specification:

Specification:

1. The suppression chamber A. Primary Containment water level and temperature shall be checked once per

1. Whenever the nuclear day.

syetem is pressurized above atmospheric pressure 2. Whenever there is in-or work is being done dication of relief valve which has the potential operation (except when to drain the vessel, the reactor is being the pressure suppression shutdown and torus pool water volume and cooling is being es-temperature shall be tablished) or testing maintained within the which adds heat to the following limits except suppression pool, the as spreified by 3.7.A.2, pool temperature shall or when inoperability be continually monitored of the core spray systems, and also observed and the LPCI and containment logged every 5 minutes cooling subsystems is until the heat addition permissible as provided is terminated.

l for in 3.5.F:

3. Whenever there is indication

a. Minimum water volume- of relief valve operation 122,900 ft 3 with the local suppression pool temperature reaching 200'F

b. Maximum water volume- or more, an external visual 127,300 ft 3 examination of the suppression chamber shall be conducted be-fore resuming power operation.

4. A visual inspection of the sup-pression chamber interior, in-cluding water line regions shall be made at each major refueling outage.

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Unit 3 PBAPS TABLE OF CONTENTS Pace No.

1.0 DEFINITIONS 1 LIMITING SAFETY SAFETY LIMITS SYSTEM SETTINGS 1.1 FUEL CLADDING INTEGRITY 2.1 9 1.? REAOTOR COOLANT SYSTEM INTEGRITY 2.2 29 SURVEILLANCE LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION REOUIREMENTS 3.0 APPLICABILITY -

34 l 3.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM 4.1 35 3.2 PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION 4.2 57 3.3 REACTIVITY CONTROL 4.3 99-A. Reactivity Limitations A 99 B. Control Rods B 101 C. Scram Insertion Times C 103 D. Reactivity Anomalies D 105 3.4 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM 4.4 115 A. Normal System Availability A 115 B. Normal System Requirements B 116 C. Operation with Inoperable Components -

118 3.5 CORE AND CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEMS 4.5 114 A. . Core Spray and LPCI Subsystems A 124 B. Containment Cooling System (HPSW, B 127 Torus Cooling, Drywell Spray, and Torus Spray)

C. HPCI Subsystem C 128b D. Reac*.or Core Isolation Cooling D 130 (RCIC) Subsystem E. Automatic Depressurization System E 131-(ADS)

F. Minimum Low Pressure Cooling F 132-Availability G. Maintenance of Filled Discharge Pipe G 133 H. Engineered Safeguards Compartments H 133 Cooling and Ventilation l I. Average Planar LHGR I 133a J. Local LHGR J 133a K. Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) K 133b l'

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Unit 3 PBAPS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.5.A Core Sprav 4 4.5.A Core Sorav &

LPCI Subsystem (cont'd) LPCI Subsystem (cont'd)

Both CSS shall be operable Item Freauency whenever irradiated fuel is in the vessel and prior (d) Pump Flow Rate Once/3 months to reactor startup from a Cold Shutdown condition Each pump in each loop shall except as specified in deliver at least 3125 gpm l 3.5.A.2 and 3.5.F below: against a system head corresponding to a reactor vessel pressure of 105 psig.

(e) Core Spray Header AP Instrumentation Check Once/ day Calibrate Once/3 months (f) DELETED i

2. From and after the date 2. DELETED i that one of the core spray subsystems is 1 made or found to be inoperable for any reason, continued reactor operation is permissible only during l the succeeding seven days l provided that during such seven days all active  ;)

components of the other core spray subsystem and active components of the LPCI subsystem are operable. 4

3. LPCI Subsystem Testing shall be as follows:

Item Freauency (a) Simulated Automatic Once/ operating Actuation Test Cycle (b) Pump operability Once/1 month

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Unit 3 PBAPS LIMIT'ING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.5.A Core Sorav and LPCI 4.5.A Core Spray and LPCI Subsystem (cont'd) Subsystem (cont'd)

3. Two independent Low Pressure Coolant Item Freauency Injection (LPCI) subsystems will be operable with each subsystem (c) Motor Operated Once/ month comprised of: valve operability

a. (Two.33-1/3%) capacity pumps, (d) Pump Flow Rate Once/3 months

b. An operable flow path Each LPCI pump shall deliver 10,900 capable of taking suction from the gpm against a system head suppression pool and transferring corresponding to a vessel pressure the water to the reactor pressure of 20 psig based on individual pump vessel, and tests.

c. During power operation the LPCI system cross-tie valve closed and the associated valve motor (e) DELETED operatcr circuit breaker locked in the off position.

Both LPCI subsystems shall be operable whenever irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel, and prior to reactor startup from the Cold Shutdown Condition, except as l specified in 3.5.A.4, 3.5.A.5, and 3.5.F below.

4. From and after the date that one 4. DELETED of the four LPCI pumps is made or found to be inoperable for any reason, continued reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding seven days provided that during such seven days the -

remaining active components of the LPCI subsystems, and all active components of both core spray subsystems are operable.

5. From and after the date that one 5. DELETED LPCI subsystem is made or found to be inoperable for any reason, continued reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding 7 days unless it is sooner made operable, provided that during such 7 days all active components of both core spray subsystems and the remaining LPCI subsystem are operable.

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Unit 3 PBAPS

' LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.5.A Cpre Sorav and LPCI 4.5.A Core Sorav and LPCI Subsystem (cont'd) Subsystem (cont'd)

6. All recirculation pump discharge 6. All recirculation pump discharge valves shall be operable prior to valves shall be tested for oper-reactor startup (or closed if ability during any period of permitted elsewhere in these reactor cold shutdown exceeding specifications). 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, if operability tests have not been performed during the preceding 31 days.

7. If the requirements of 3.5.A cannot be met, an orderly shutdown of the reactor shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in the Cold Shutdown

- Condition within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.

B. Containment Coolina~ System B. Containment Coolina System (HPSW. Torus Coolina. Drywell Sorav. (HPSW. Torus Coolina. Drywell Soray.

and Torus Soray) and Torus Soray)

1. Except as specified in 3.5.8.2, 1. Containment Cooling System components 3.5.B.3, 3.5.B.4, 3.5.B.5, and 3.5.B.6 shall be tested as follows:

below, the containment cooling system shall be operable whenever irradiated Item Frecuency fuel is in the reactor vessel and reactor coolant temperature is greater (a) Each HPSW Pump Once/ month than 212 degrees F, and prior to Operability.

reactor startup from a Cold Shutdown Condition. (b) Each HPSW motor operated Once/ month valve operability. ,

(c) IIPSW Pump Capacity After pump Test. Each HPSW maintenance pump shall and every deliver 4500 3 months.

gpm at 233 psig. y (d) Each Torus Cooling Once/ month motor operated valve operability.

(e) Each Drywell Spray Once/ month motor operated valve operability, t

(f) Each Torus Spray Once/ month motor operated valve operability.

(g) Air test on Once/5 years drywell and torus headers and nozzles.

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., < , Unit 3 PBAPS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.5.F Minimum Low Pressure Coolina 4.5.F Minimum low Pressure Availability Coolina Availability

1. The following low pressure ECCS 1. At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, verify subsystems shall be OPERABLE when for each required Low Pressure irradiated fuel is in the reactor Coolant Injection (LPCI) subsystem vessel and the reactor is in the Cold that the suppression pool water Condition except when the reactor level is at least 11.0 feet.

vessel head is removed, the spent fuel storage pool gates are removed, and 2. At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, verify water level is at least 458 inches for each required Core Spray (CS) above. reactor pressure vessel subsystem:

instrument zero:

(a) Suppression pool water level

a. Two Core Spray (CS) subsystems with is at least 11.0 feet, or each subsystem comprised of:

(b) Condensate storage tank water (1) Two OPERABLE motor driven level is at least 17.3 feet.*

pumps, and

3. At least once per month, verify for (2) Piping and valves capable of each required CS and LPCI subsystem taking suction from the that the piping is filled with water required water source and from the pump discharge valve to the transferring the water through injection valve.

a spray sparger above the core to the reactor vessel. 4. At least once per month, verify for each required CS and LPCI subsystem OR manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path

b. One CS subsystem comprised of the that is not locked, sealed, or equipment specified in 3.5.F.1.a otherwise' secured in position, is in above, and the correct position.**

one low Pressure Coolant Injection subsystem comprised of:

(1) One OPERABLE motor driven pun p, and (2) Piping and valves capable of taking suction from the required water source and transferring the water to the reactor vessel.

Only one required CS subsystem may take credit for this option during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

• • One LPCI subsystem may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal if capable of being manually realigned and not otherwise i inoperable. j

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Unit 3 l

PBAPS l LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.5.F Minimum Low Pressure Coolina 4.5.F Minimum Low Pressure Availability (Cont.) Coolina Availability (Cont.) '

2. With one of the subsystems 5. At least once per 92 days, verify each ,

required by 3.5.F.1 inoperable, required CS subsystem pump and LPCI restore the required subsystem subsystem pump develops the flow rate to OPERABLE status within 4 specified below against a system hesd hours or immediately initiate corresponding to the specified reactor action to suspend operations pressure, with a potential for draining SYSTEM HEAD the reactor vessel. CORRESPONDING NUMBER TO A REACTOR

3. With two of the subsystems SYSTEM ELOW RATE OF PUMPS PRESSURE OF required by 3.5.F.1 inoperable, immediately initiate action to CS 2 3,125 gpm 1 2 105 psig 2 10,900 gpm suspend operations with a LPCI 1 2 20 psig potential for draining the reactor vessel and restore at 6. At least once per operating cycle, verify least one subsystem to OPERABLE each required CS and LPCI subsystem status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or actuates on an actual or simulated immediately initiate action to automatic initiation signal .*** l establish Secondary Containment Integrity. *** Vessel injection / spray may be excluded.

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Unit 3

. PBAPS 3.5.A BASES Core Sorav and LPCI Subsystems Core Sotav Subsystem (CSS)

The CSS is provided to assure that the core is adequately cooled following a loss-of-coolant accident. Two redundant loops each provide adequate core cooling capacity for all break sizes from 0.2 ft' up to and including the double-ended reactor recirculation line break, and for smaller breaks following depressurization by the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS).

The CSS specifications are applicable whenever irradiated fuel is in the core because the CSS is a primary source of emergency core cooling after the reactor vessel is depressurized. l With one CSS inoperable, the verified operability (see 4.5 Bases) of the redundant full capacity CSS and the full capacity Low Pressure

'~

Coolant Injection system provides assurance of adequate core cooling and justifies and specified 7 days out-of-service period.

The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that the CSS will be operable when required. Although all active components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation during reactor operation, a complete functional test requires reactor shutdown. The pump discharge piping is maintained full to prevent water hammer damage to piping and to start cooling at the earliest moment.

Low Pressure Coolant in.iection System (LPCIS)

The IPCIS is provided to assure that the core is adequately cooled following a loss-of-coolant accident. Two loops 'each with two ,

provide adequate core flooding for all break sizes from 0.2 ft' pumps up to and including the double-ended reactor recirculation line break, and for small breaks following depressurization by the ADS.

The LPCIS specifications are applicable whenever there is irradiated ,

fuel in the reactor vessel because LPCIS is a primary source of water for flooding the core after the reactor vessel is depressurized.

With one LPCIS pump inoperable, or one LPCIS loop inoperable, adequate  !

core flooding is assured by the verified operability (see 4.5 Bases) of the redundant LPCIS pumps or loop, and both CSS loops. The reduced  ;

redundancy = justifies the specified 7 day out-of-service period.

The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that the LPCI l will be operable when required. Although all active components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation during reactor operation, a complete functional test requires reactor shutdown. The_ pump discharge piping is maintained full to prevent water hammer damage to piping and to start cooling at the earliest moment.

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Unit 3 PBAPS 3.5.E BASES (Cont'd.)

With one ADS valve known to be incapable of automatic operation, four valves remain operable to perform their ADS function. However, since the ECCS Loss-of-Coolant Accident analysis for small line breaks i assumed that all five ADS valves were operable, reactor operation with one ADS valve inoperable is only allowed to continue for seven (7) days provided that the HPCI system is verified to be operable and that the actuation logic for the (remaining) four ADS valves is verified to be i operable (see 4.5 Bases), i F. Minimum Low Pressure Coolina Availability l The purpose of Specification F is to assure that adequate core cooling capability is available while the reactor is in the Cold Condition. The long term cooling analyses following a design basis LOCA demonstrates

~

that only one low pressure ECCS subsystem is required, post-LOCA, to maintain adequate reactor vessel water level in the event of an inadvertent vessel draindown. It is therefore reasonable to assume, based on engineering judgment, that while the reactor is in the Cold Condition one low pressure ECCS subsystem can maintain adequate reactor vessel water level. To provide redundancy, a minimum of two low pressure ECCS subsystems are required to be OPERABLE while the reactor is in the Cold Condition. ECCS subsystems are not required to be OPERABLE with the reactor in the Cold Condition with the spent fuel storage pool gates removed and the water level maintained at least 458 inches above reactor pressure vessel instrument zero. This provides sufficient coolant inventory to allow operator action to terminate the inventory loss prior to fuel uncovery in case of an inadvertent draindown.

G. Maintenance of Filled Discharae pipe If the discharge piping of the core spray, LPCI subsystem, HPCI, and RCIC are not filled, a water hammer can develop in this piping when the pump and/or pumps are started. If a water hammer were to occur at the time at which the system were required, the system would still perform its design function. However, to minimize damage to the discharge piping and to ensure added margin in the operation of these systems, this Technical Specification requires the discharge lines to be filled whenever the system is in an operable condition.

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Unit 3 PBAPS 4.5 BASES Core and Containment Coolina Systems Surveillance Freauencies The performance of individual emergency core cooling systems (HPCI, LPCI, Core Spray and ADS) and the integrated performance of the emergency core cooling systems are described in analyses referenced in Section 6.5 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. Periodic surveillance of pumps and valves is performed in accordance with ASME Code,Section XI, to the extent described in the Inservice Testing Plan, to verify that the systen,s will provide the flow rates required by the respective analyses. HPCI and RCIC flow tests are performed at two pressures so that the systems' capability to provide rated flow over their operating range is verified. To avoid damaging Core Spray system valves during Core Spray pump flow testing, throttling is not normally performed to obtain a system head corresponding to a reactor pressure of 2 105 psig. Pump curves are used to determine equivalent values for flow rate and test pressure for the Core Spray pumps in order to meet the Surveillance Requirements. HPSW flow tests verify that rated flow can be delivered to the RHR heat exchangers.

The testing interval for the core and containment cooling systems is based on industry practice, sound engineering judgment and practicality. The core cooling systems have not been designed to be fully testable during operation. For example, in the case of the HPCI, automatic initiation during power operation would result in pumping cold water into the reactor vessel which is not desirable.

Complete ADS testing during power operation causes an undesirable loss-of-coolant inventory. To increase the availability of the core and containment cooling systems, the components which make up the system; i.e., instrumentation, pumps, valves,,etc., are tested frequently. The pumps and motor operated injection valves are also tested each month to assure their operability. A simulated automatic actuation test once each cycle combined with frequent tests of the pumps and injection valves is deemed to be adequate testing of these systems.

The flow path piping of the emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) has the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained air.

Maintaining the pump discharge lines of the HPCI system, Core Spray system, and LPCI subsystems full of water ensures that the ECCS will perform properly, injecting its full capacity into the reactor pressure vessel upon demand. This will also prevent a water hammer following an ECCS initiation signal. One acceptable method of ensuring that the lines are full is to vent at the high points. An acceptable method of ensuring the LPCI and Core Spray system discharge lines are full is to verify the absence of the associated

" keep fill" system accumulator alarms.

While the reactor is in the Cold Condition one low pressure ECCS subsystem can maintain adequate reactor vessel water level. To provide redundancy, a minimum of two low pressure ECCS subsystems are

required to be OPERABLE with the reactor in the Cold Condition.

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Unit 3 PBAPS 4.5 BASES (Cont'd.)

Core and Containment Coolina Systems Surveillance Freauencies However, one LPCI subsystem may be aligned for decay heat removal and considered OPERABLE for the ECCS function, if it can be manually realigned (remote or local) to the LPCI mode and is not otherwise inoperable. RHR valves that are required for LPCI subsystem operation may be aligned for decay heat removal. A ..Je allows one LPCI subsystem of the RHR system to be considered OPERABLE for the ECCS function if all the required valves in the LPCI flow path can be manually realigned (remote or local) to allow injection into the reactor vessel, and the system is not otherwise inoperable. Manual realignment to allow injection into the reactor vessel in the LPCI mode may also include opening the drag valve to establish the required LPCI subsystem flow rate. This will ensure adequate core cooling if an inadvertent reactor vessel draindown should occur.

Sufficient time will be available to manually align and initiate LPCI subsystem operation to provide core cooling prior to postulated fuel uncovery. Only one required Core Spray subsystem may take credit for the condensate storage tank supply option during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel as stated in the note to Surveillance Requirement 4.5.F.2(b). During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel, the volume in the condensate storage tank may not provide adequate makeup if the reactor vessel were completely drained. Therefore, only one Core Spray subsystem is allowed to use the condensate storage tank as a source of water. This ensures the other required ECCS subsystem has adequate makeup volume.

When components and subsystems are out-of-service, overall core and containment cooling reliability is maintained by verifying the t operability of the remaining redundant cooling systems that the limiting Conditions for Operation require to be operable during the allowable out-of-service time period. Verifying operability in this context means to administratively ensure that the remaining required systems or subsystems are not known to be inoperable (for example: -

confirming that equipment necessary for the systems or subsystems to perform their safety functions are not blocked out of service for maintenance, checking the status of selected surveillances on the remaining required systems or subsystems and checking that selected valves are in the correct position as indicated on the control room panels). Performance of operability tests is not required.

4.5 I&J Surveillance Reouirements Bases Averace and local LHGR The LHGR shall be checked daily to determine if fuel burnup or control rod movement has caused changes in power distribution. Since changes due to burnup are slow and only a few control rods are moved daily, a daily check of power distribution is adequate.

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'* " ' PBAPS 4.5.K ' Mini [num Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) - Surveillance Reauirement At core thermal power levels less than or equal to 25%, the reactor will be operating at minimum recirculation pump speed and the moderator void content will be very small. For all designated control rod patterns which may be employed at this point, operating plant experience indicated that the resulting MCPR value is in excess of requirements by a considerable margin. With this low void content, any inadvertent core flow increase would only place operation in a more conservative mode relative to MCPR. During initial start-up testing of the plant, a MCPR evaluation will be made at 25% thermal power level with minimum recirculation pump speed.

The MCPR margin will thus be demonstrated such that future.MCPR evaluation below this power level will be shown to be unnecessary.

The daily requirement for calculating MCPR above 25% rated thermal power is sufficient since power distribution shifts are very slow when there have not been significant power or control rod changes.

The requirement for calculating MCPR when a limiting control rod

. pattern is approached ensures that MCPR will be known following a change in power or power shape (regardless of magnitude) that could place operation at a thermal limit.

4.5.L MCPR Limits for Core Flows Other Than Rated A flow dependent MCPR limit, MCPR(F), is necessary to assure that the safety limit MCPR is not violated during recirculation flow increase events. The design basis flow increase event is a slow-power increase event which is not terminated by scram, but which stabilizes at a new core power corresponding to the maximum possible core flow.

Flow runout events are analyzed along a constant xenon flow control line assuming a quasi steady state heat balance.

The flow dependent MCPR limit, MCPR(F), is provided in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT. The MCPR(F) is independent of.the rated flow limit provided in Specification 3.5.K.2 and 3.5.K.3. To verify applicability of this curve to PBAPS, recirculation' flow runout events were analyzed with a PBAPS specific model at a typical mid cycle exposure condition. These flow runout events were simulated '

along the Maximum Extended Load Line Limit rod line to the maximum core flow runout value of 105%. The results of the analyses indicated that application of the MCPR(F) curve will preclude a violation of the MCPR safety limit in the event of a recirculation flow runout. The MCPR(F) curve is cycle independent.

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Unit 3 PBAPS LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 4.7 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS Applicability: Applicability:

Apples to the-operating Applies to the primary and status of the primary and secondary containment secondary containment integrity.

systems.

Obiective:

Obiective:

To verify the integrity of To assure the integrity of the primary and secondary the primary and secondary containment.

. containment system.

Specification:

Specification:

1. The suppression chamber A. Primary Containment water level and temperature shall be checked once per

1. Whenever the nuclear day, system is pressurized above atmospheric pressure 2. Whenever there is in-or work is being done dication of relief valve which has the potential operation (except when to drain the vessel, the reactor is being the pressure suppression shutdown and torus pool water volume and cooling is being es-temperature shall be tablished) or testing maintained within the which adds heat to the following limits except suppression pool, the as specified by 3.7.A.2, pool temperature shall ,

or when inoperability be continually monitored of the core spray systems, and also observed and the LPCI and containment logged every 5 minutes cooling subsystems is until the heat addition permissible as provided is terminated.

l for in 3.5.F:

3. Whenever there is indication

a. Minimum water volume- of relief valve operation 122,900 ft3 with the local suppression pool temperature reaching 200*F

b. Maximum water volume- or more, an external visual 127,300 ft 3 examination of the' suppression chamber shall be conducted be-fore resuming power operation.

4. A visual inspection of the sup-pression chamber interior, in-cluding water line regions shall be made at each major refueling outage.

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