IR 05000373/1993020
| ML20059D109 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 10/22/1993 |
| From: | Hague R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059D079 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-373-93-20, 50-374-93-20, NUDOCS 9311020137 | |
| Download: ML20059D109 (14) | |
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t U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
F Report N /93020(DRP); 50-374/93020(DRP)
Docket No ; 50-374 License Nos. NPF-ll; NPF-18 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Executive Towers West III 1400 Opus Place Suite 300 Downers Grove, IL 60515 Facility Name: LaSalle County' Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: LaSalle Site, Marseilles, Illinois Inspection Conducted: August 23 through September 30, 1993 Inspectors: D. Hills P. Brochman J. Smith M. Leach H. Peterson S. DuPont J. Kennedy Approved By: N 2 AR.L.Hagge, Chief ~ -Da > y
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Reactor Projects Section 1C Inspection Summary Inspection from August 23 through September 30. 1993 (Reports No. 50-373/930 20(DRPl: 50-374/93020(DRPi Areas Inspected: A special, unannounced safety inspection was conducted by NRC senior resident inspectors and a project manager from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR). The inspection included followup on previously identified items, maintenance interface, radwaste material condition, and 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations, Results: Two violations were identified. One involved two examples of '
failures to perform required 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations and one example of providing inadequate justification why a change was not an unreviewed questio The other violation involved a failure to perform a required onsite 2 review. Two unresolved items were identified. One necessitated additional NRC review of a change to the control room ventilation radiation monitor ,
9311020137 931022 PDR- ADOCK 05000373 G PDR i
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! licensee's conclusion that the change was not an unreviewed safety question.
l The other was awaiting the licensee's completion of a safety evaluation for .
l- the removal of a feedwater heater emergency drain valve from servic l Maintenanc_g j Daily planning was effective, and additional controls were implemented to .
address previous outage planning problems. Communications between operations and maintenance varied, depending on department. Mechanical maintenance communicated least with operations. Although positive self-assesment changes were initiated, implementation deficiencies were noted. Management had not adequately addressed previous concerns regarding worker knowledge and use of the problem identification forms. Although radwaste material condition nad )
improved, further action was warranted. Adequacy of preventive maintenance.of radwaste equipment was questionable. Root cause analysis and resulting corrective actions were not comprehensive and management overview of this area -'
was lackin '
L Enaineerina j l
l The performance of safety evaluations and screenings was weak. A non-rigorous ,
approach to this area was frequently demonstrated with incomplete l documentation of the thought process or rationale for conclusions. Many -l conclusions were incorrect, indicating a lack of thoroughness and proper )
perspective on the licensing basis. The licensee demonstrated misconceptions -)
about'the safety evaluation process and when faced with a choice sometimes
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DETAILS Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company
- Murphy, Site Vice President
- J. Schmeltz, Acting Station Manager
- J. Gieseker, Site Engineering and Construction Manager
- Reed, Technical Services Superintendent
- J. Lockwood, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor
- Santic, Maintenance Superintendent .
- R. Crawford, Work. Planning Assistant Superintendent
- J. Miller, Plant Support-Engineering Supervisor
- J. Houston, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
- R. Francis, Radwaste Coordinator
- J. Atchley, Senior Operations Supervisor
- J. Bruciak, Maintenance Staff Supervisor
- T. Nauman, Master Mechanic
- M. Cray, Master Instrument Mechanic
- K. Kociuba, Master Electrical Mechanic
- J. Shetterly, Work Control Supervisor
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- W. Kirchoff, Site Support Engineering
- R. Vinter, Training Department
- R. Ragan, System Engineer Supervisor
- J. Tokarz, Training Department
- L. Oshier, Health Physics Supervisor .
- M. Tyrrell, Radwaste
- R. Shields, Outage Manager
- T. Hammerich, System Engineering Monitor
- Swihart, Licensing
- Holden, Corporate EP,.0perators Programs Supervisor 1
- G. Plim1, Station Quality Verification (SQV) Director i
- C. Laskey, SQV
- J. Lyon, SQV
- C. Silich, Quality Control Supervisor ,
- J. Marshall, Safety Review
- T. Shaffer, Executive Assistant
- D. Carlson, NRC Coordinator i l '
Nuclear Reculatory Commission
- B. Clayton, Branch Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 1
- D. Hills, Senior Resident Inspector, LaSalle ;
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- J. Smith, Senior Resident Inspector, Zion
- M. Leach, Senior Resident Inspector, Dresden
- P. Brochman, Senior Resident Inspector, Clinton
- S. DuPont, Senior Resident Inspector, Braidwood
- H. Peterson, Senior Resident Inspector, Byron
- J. Kennedy, LaSalle Project Manager
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- C. Phillips, Resident Inspector, LaSalle
- H. Simmons, Region III. Inspector
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Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety
- J. Roman, Resident inspector, LaSalle
- Denotes those attending the pre-exit interview conducted on August 27, 199 ** Denotes those attending final exit interview conducted on October 1, 199 *** Denotes those attending both the pre-exit and final exit interview The inspectors also talked with and interviewed several other licensee employees during the course of the inspectio . Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items (92701)
(Closed) Unresolved Item (50-374/930ll-Ol(DRP)): Evaluate applicability of 10 CFR 50.59 to placing a feedwater heater emergency drain valve out-of-service. This item is discussed in Paragraph 5 and is considered close . Maintenance Department Interface (62700)
The inspectors, through interviews and the review of various documents and data, ascertained maintenance interface effectiveness with other plant department Plannino and Schedulina Daily planning was very effectiv Eighty per cent of work scheduled was completed on or before the scheduled completion date. The backlog of corrective work requests was moderate at approximately 75 In contrast, the outage planning and scheduling was much less effective than daily planning as reflected during the last two outages. Significant outage management controls were being implemented for the L2RG5 outage starting in Septembe The scheduling meetings and work request screening meetings appeared effective. Coordination between maintenance and operations departments was good and this was supported by the high percentage of scheduled work completed. System engineer support of maintenance appeared to be improving, but further progress was warrante The morning work request screening meeting reduced the number of duplicate work requests entering the system and improved coordination of work between operations and maintenance, and between maintenance departments. This
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coordination effort assisted in reducing the work request- '
backlog and in reducing the number of individual out-of-service requests, b. Operations Perspective The inspectors interviewed various operations personnel to !
obtain their view of maintenance. All persons rated the operations support by maintenance as good, with the instrument maintenance as most responsive, electrical maintenance second, and mechanical maintenance thir .
The communications with operations personnel was also perceived as good with the departments in the same order. Electrical maintenance was viewed as communicating with operations almost as well as instrument maintenance. Mechanical maintenance communications was viewed as weak, especially with respect to th ,
status of ongoing wor c. Outaae SCoDe Deferral The inspectors reviewed the deferred or cancelled work requests from the L2R05 outage. The reasons for the changes appeared appropriate and did not raise any safety questions. Some changes involved restoring margin to motor operated valves. This aspect will continue to be reviewed during future inspection ,
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d. Reorganizational Impactl Major changes this year have negatively impacted managemen ,
direction and the station focus. These changes included: major 1 station reorganizations, layoffs, and the assignment of a new 1 plant manager who was transferred in approximately six monthsJag :
Strong management direction needed during this transitional period
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I was disrupted, resulting in problems in direction and focu .l e. Self Assessment Programs The station implemented positive self assessment program changes i during the last year. These changes included daily events l screenings, integrated reporting program (IRP), and a problem identification form (PIF) to document low to high level events for the root cause progra Although positive improvements, these programs were in their infancy. The station had problems with the implementation of the PIF program at the worker level. The licensee had not taken action to sell the Plf program to the workers, who in many cases, were unaware of this program. The vast majority of PIFs were being generated by the events screening meeting from operator logs. This represented missed opportunities to capture identified problems and ensure appropriate corrective actions and trendin _ _ _ _ __ .
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This problem had been identified in a licensee independent commitment management review (report dated July 1, 1993), but ,
still'had not been addressed by plant managemen No violations'or deviations were identified'in this are . Radwaste Material Condition (84722. 84723. and 84724) '
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The inspectors evaluated the material condition of radwaste equipment i and the licensee's approach to related problems. This involved ;
interviews with radwaste staff personnel, including control room operators, radwaste shift foremen, and management; Personnel in other 7 departments were also interviewed, including Site Quality Verification, 3 Quality Control, Regulatory Assurance, and Technical Support. An '
assessment of material and. equipment condition was also performed by ,
making plant tours, and reviewing the backlog of responsible system work )
requests. Finally, a review of recent events and incidents related to ;
the radwaste department was conducte Eouipment Conditiom ;
Although radwaste equipment condition had significantly improved '
over the past two years, further improvement was warrante Through interviews and review of records, the inspectors concluded that conditions in the radwaste department in the past :
(two to four years ago) were considered lowest of priorities, i unless they threatened the reactor (power generation) performanc ;
Therefore, identified equipment-problems were ignored unless the -
equipment degraded enough to require immediate attention, i.e. the .
equipment fails and results in significant consequences. _ Plant ,
management had recognized the problem and taken. actions to' address i the situation. For example, the. licensee initiated several upgrade programs to improve the radwaste performance, including revising the sump preventive maintenance procedures, and initiating radwaste tank periodic inspection However, weaknesses still existed and the' licensee was experiencing the consequences of past neglect. There remained ;
many outstanding work requests associated with degraded instrumentation, annunciators, and pumps. Although the non-outage corrective work request backlog at the plant was considerably low, radwaste items constituted a substantial percentage. . These outstanding work requests ranged as far back as 1982. Some could ,
potentially hinder radwaste activitie ,
Of particular concern were sump high level annunciator failures l during recent events. These failures contributed to overflow and
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contamination incident ;
. 6/19/93 IWF03TA OVERFLOW - HI LVL ALARM FOR ITF09 DID NOT ALARM ON HIGH LEVEL
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. 6/28/93 OVERFLOW 0F lWZ02T - HI HI LVL ALARM FOR ITF08 DID NOT ALARM .
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. 7/21/93 HRSS WASTE TANK OVERFLOW - HI LVL ALARM DID NOT-ANNUNCIATE These and other annunciator problems in the radwaste control room could hinder operators from satisfactorily performing their '
duties. Furthermore, with the number of recent problems, the l adequacy of preventive maintenance and. calibration of instruments ;
in radwaste systems was questionabl ;
b. Root Cause and Corrective Action Proaram !
The inspectors evaluated PIFs and corrective action records regarding the. numerous recent radwaste spills. A need to improve the screening of PIFS to ensure adequate root cause analysis, and "
to ensure adequacy and timeliness of corrective actions was apparen These radwaste events involved tank overflows, hose ruptures, pipe '
failures, and tank failures. Causal factors ranged from equipment degradation or failure (backlog of identified equipment problem work request, and failures of unidentified equipment or instrument problems), use of incorrect equipment (low pressure and .;
temperature hose used on a high pressure and; temperature system), ,
lack of communications (inadequately informing supervisors, not following through by the supervisors to the concerns,.not logging ',
and turning _over identified problems to other operators) . and-personnel performance errors (lack of attention, forgetting
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responsibilities during chemical waste collector tank water transfer and continuing to transfer water until overfilling the .;
tank).
Heightened plant management ' overview of root cause analysis of -
events and corresponding corrective actions was clearly neede For example, the recent June 19, 1993 spill of 400 gallons of radwaste resulted from a mispositioned level indication bubbler flow valve. The completed event investigation did not fully
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address all underlying root causes such as to why the-valve was closed, and if other instruments had similar problems. This event indicated a lack of operator and supervisor communications and concern followup. A General Information Notice (GIN) to inform operators of the importance of heightened' awareness to their duties was not issued until July 26,.1993._ This notice was. narrow t in scope and did not address the cause of the problems associated i with operator and supervisor errors such as attitude problems, program difficulties, lack'of training, or attention to detai t
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Even more disturbing, plant management._was unaware of previous operator _ knowledge' of level indication problems. The inspectors
concluded that management overview of level 4 PIFs, some clearly warranting close scrutiny'due to a recurring nature, was lackin l No violations or deviations were identified in this are i
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5. 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation Proaram (37001)
The inspectors reviewed 37. safety screenings and safety evaluation l These were reviewed for modifications, temporary system changes,-
engineering work requests, tests or experiments, and procedure revisions to verify conformance to the requirements contained in 10 CFR 50.59 and ;
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the licensee's corporate and site procedures for performing safety-evaluations. The inspectors reviewed training and qualification records '
and course material for performing and reviewing safety screenings.and evaluations. The inspectors also reviewed audits and assessments of this function performed by the licensee's quality verification departmen ,
LaSalle administrative procedure LAP _-1200-13 and its attachments
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provided the licensee's guidance on performing safety evaluations required by 10 CFR 50.59. This procedure consisted of two principal .
parts, a " screening evaluation" form (Attachments A and B) and 'a "50.59 safety evaluation" form (Attachment C). ,.
Overall, the inspectors concluded that the licensee's performance in this area was weak. Answers.to questions were simplistic at best. .The-worst cases repeated the question or used the description of the change ;
rather than analyzing the impact on the updated final safety analysis ' ,
report (UFSAR). The training materials were weak in some areas and did i not appear' to challenge the individual to critically examine the impact ,
of the proposed change to the facility. Poor screening evaluations with ;
incorrect conclusions were note i Safety Evaluation Performance .
The review of safety screenings and safety evaluations identified i numerous deficiencies with respect to completeness of the !
explanations including the correctness of final conclusions. The following are examples in which safety evaluations were not ;
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' performed either due to inadequate screenings or_ failure to perform a screening:
(1) Engineering Work Request E92-237, involved a change to an electronic circuit card for'the control room ventilation ~ u system (VC) inlet radiation monitors. These radiation ;
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monitors had been spuriously actuating and placing the_ VC system in the emergency mode. The proposed change was to j increase the time delay in the monitors' response circui i
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This was physically accomplished by replacing four capacitors and resistors on the circuit boards and was completed on April 20, 199 This change was accomplished through a parts evaluation. A safety evaluation screening with engineering evaluation L-93-007-0041 was completed on March 4, 1993. One enclosure to this safety screening stated that'if the VC system was in the purge mode, the 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria 19 limit of 30 Rem to the thyroid of the control room operators would be exceeded in a design basis accident. The licensee implemented a procedure change to
- ensure both VC subsystems were declared inoperable and
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technical specification 3.0.3 entered when the VC system was placed in the purge mode of operation. The licensee answered all questions on the screening in the negative- and, therefore, did not conduct a safety evaluatio Attachment B, step F.5.a of the screening inquired if the change altered the design or function of any system, structure, or component as described in the safety analysis report (SAR). UFSAR Section 6.4.4 stated that the emergency l make-up filter train was designed to limit occupational dose below levels required by Criterion 19 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix j i
l- Step F.5.e of the screening inquired if the change aligned j l or reconfigured any required equipment important to safety !
l beyond provisions of technical specifications. As the i licensee indicated, operation in the purge mode would render ,
both VC subsystems inoperable and dictated TS 3.0.3 entr !
The inspectors regarded this as voluntary and planned operation beyond the provisions of technical specification Although the licensee had prescribed additional'
administrative approvals prior to entering T.S. 3.0.3, these i did not preclude use of the purge mode. Therefore, both
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steps of the screening were answered incorrectl l Failure to perform a safety evaluation in this case was. an '
! example of a violation (50-373/93020-Ola(DRP)) of 10 CFR 50.59(b)(1) which requires records be maintained for changes to the facility as described in the safety analysis report including written safety evaluations which. provide the bases- .l
why the change does not constitute an unreviewed safety i
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l l i Following identification of this violation, the licensee H reperformed the screening and concluded a safety evaluation was necessar The resulting safety. evaluation concluded an
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l unreviewed safety question did not exis This is .l considered an unresolved item (50-373/93020-02(DRP)) pending !
detailed NRC review of the licensee's rationale and detailed '
supporting calculation The change was accomplished by a replacement part evaluation l under LAP-400-1 This change did not meet the criteria specified in the Commonwealth Edison Quality Assurance l Manual, Quality Procedure 3-51, Attachment A, Paragraph for a parts replacement in that the replaced electronic I parts were not identical-they had different capacitive and l resistive values. Nor was the form, fit, and function for the circuit boards identical-they had a different i function, a longer time dela In addition, this change ;
clearly affected nuclear safety, necessitating the higher ,
level review inherent in the onsite review proces l The failure to recognize that this change to the facility was a modification, as defined in Quality Procedure 3-51, resulted in the licensee failing to perform an onsite review l of this change, thus missing the opportunity to identify I this problem before the facility was changed. The failure to perfcrm an onsite review is a violation (373/93020-03(DRP)) of Technical Specification 6.1.G.2.a(4) which l required the onsite review for changes or modifications to '
plant equipment that affect nuclear safet I (2) The inspectors completed the evaluation of the previous unresolved item 50-374/920ll-01(DRP) and concluded a safety i evaluation was inappropriately not performed for isolation
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of a Unit 2 feedwater emergency drain valve (EDV). A 1990 deviation report indicated the EDV for feedwater heater 26B was leaking past the seat. A. hole in the valve body was repaired but further erosion and seat leakage caused the licensee to take the valve out-of-service on March 12, 199 The valve was not scheduled for repair until the next refuel outage in September 199 UFSAR, Section 10.4.7.5, stated that an automatic dump to condenser action on high level was provided. Shutting the EDV and operating in that condition for an extended period constituted a change to the facility as described in the UFSA Therefore, performance of a safety evaluation was required. Instead, the licensee designated this action as a maintenance activity and failed to perform even a screening evaluation. Delaying the required repair for a year and a half, extending over a refuel outage, placed this action well outside classification of a maintenance activit Failure to perform a safety evaluation in this case was an example of a violation (50-374/93020-Olb(DRP)) of 10 CFR 50.59(b)(1) which requires records be maintained for changes to the facility as described in the safety analysis report
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i including written safety evaluations which provide the bases ,
why the change does not constitute an unreviewed safety {
question. At the time of the inspection, the licensee still !
had not performed a safety evaluation regarding the ;
modification. This is considered an unresolved item (50-374/93020-04(DRP)) pending completion of a licensee safety evaluation and independent NRC review to ascertain whether the change constituted an unreviewed safety question. The licensee planned completion of the safety evaluation by -
October 15, 199 '
Several statements made by licensee representatives during I review of this issue indicated licensee misunderstandings of 10 CFR 50.59. For example, the licensee reasoning that "the
. . . loss of a feedwater heater is a transient, not an accident and therefore of no special concern . . " is ;
incorrect. The specific languaga in 10 CFR 50.59 dw not -
require an event to be an accident in order to iequire an evaluation. Increasing the probability of occurrence of malfunctions of equipment important to safety must also be considered since removing the subject EDV from service-increases the probability of a loss of feedwater heater i transient. Furthermore, in stating that removing the ;
subject EDV from service does not increase the probability ,
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that a-level increasing transient will occur, the licensee is ignoring its own conclusion in its deviation report on the loss of feedwater transient which occurred in December :
1990. Finally, the licensee's reference to a statement on Page 10.4-22 of the LaSalle UFSAR that continued operation of the feedwater system is possible in the event that a !
component is removed from service, is correct but not applicable in this instance since there is no redundancy in the EDV for a high pressure feedwater heater. Taking only the subject EDV out-of-service rather than taking the affected high pressure feedwater string out-of-service had !
the net effect of degrading the reliability of the entire )
feedwater heater system as demonstrated by the December'1990 :
transien ;
(3) Two screening questions for Temporary . System Change (TSC) 1- ,
0027-93, "Failing open recirculation damper IVX084, .
ventilation for Division II Essential Switchgear 9ESS) ;
Room," were answered incorrectly. However, as other screening questions did reach the correct final conclusion, [
a safety evaluation was performed. Automatic modulation of the ventilation systems was defeated by the TSC and manual modulation was initiated to maintain room temperatures !
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within the UFSAR design limits of 104 degrees F maximum and 65 degrees F minimum.
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Attachment B, step F.5.b, (LAP-1200-13) inquired if any '
procedural methods or administrative limits for performance of actions described in the UFSAR have been altere i Although neither automatic or manual modulation of damper IVX08Y was described in the UFSAR, manual modulation of the outside damper IVX06Y was described. Since only manual modulation of the outside damper was described in the UFSAR, manual modulation of inside damper IVX08Y was a change to a l procedure method described in the UFSA Step F.5.e asked if the change, test or experiment aligns or reconfigures any required equipment important to safet The screening stated that the equipment was not reconfigured. The preparer reasoned that recirculation was ,
maintained with the damper in its normal open p, itio However, removal of the automatic modulation aw and use of manual modulation was a reconfiguration of the syste I
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The following are examples in which the completeness of some ;
answers was lacking, indicati.y less than thorough work or an !
incomplete thought process. However, none led to incorrect final conclusions. Except those noted as violation examples, other answers in the safety evaluations addressed the pertinent aspects or in the case of inadequate screenings, the changes still recei"ad safety evaluation (1) UFSAR Sections 9.4.1.2 and 9.4.1.2.1.2 - Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room Ventilation System - This change deleted references to humidity control and isolation damFers for the computer room. These devices had never been installe Attachment B, step 3.a, was answered as follows: "the change returns the UFSAR to a previously evaluated condition." The answers to questions 3.b and.3.c were simply, "See answer to 3.a." The answer to step 3.a did not'
address the question in step (2) UFSAR Appendix H, Section H.3.5.1 - This change removed fireproofing material. from the ceiling'of a turbine driven reactor feed pump (TDRFP) room. The purpose of the change '
was stated as keeping the fireproofing material from falling off the ceiling and onto the TDRFP. The safety evaluation that was performed only addressed the possibility of this :
material falling and affecting the availability of the i feedwater system. The safety evaluation should have also !'
addressed the fire protection concerns associated with removal of the barrier, such as increased temperatures i the room overhead and impact on the strength of the structural steel during a fir Failure to provide adequat !
l justification in this case was an example of a violation - 1 (50-373/93020-Olc(DRP)) of 10 CFR 50.59 (b)-(1) which requires records be. maintained for changes to the facility as described in the safety analysis report including written 12 i
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safety evaluations which provide the bases why the change does not constitute an unreviewed safety question. The -
licensee intended to re-perform this safety evaluation by October 15, 1993 to address the fire protection concern J (3) LaSalle Operating Procedure (LOP)-WR-02 - Startup and ;
Operation of the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water _
System - This change added steps to address venting the instrument room air conditioning condenser. The safety evaluation screening form simply repeated the questions in step F.5 without providing a basis for the conclusion (4) LOP-RP-04 - Reactor Protection System (RPS) Bus B Transfer -
This procedure was revised to reflect the effects of the I
unblocked group X relay. The safety evaluation screening simply referred back to Section F.2.d. Section F.2.d only provided a_ description of the change without the necessary justificatio (5) Attachment B, step F.5.d, of the screening inquired if the change, test or experiment affects failure modes or introduces new failure modes of any equipment important to safety. Many of the safety screenings answered by stating that the component or system was not safety related. This l did not fully answer the question since the answers did not '
I address the difference between safety related equipment and equipment important to safety.
l (6) The answer to Attachment C, step F.8.g. in safety evaluation l TSC 1-0027-93 does not address the question.
l l b. Trainina and Qualification to Perform Safety Evaluations Through review of training material, the inspectors concluded that licensee safety evaluation training did not clearly provide guidance for determining that the change, test or experiment:
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- will reduce the margin of safet _
l l The licensee had just completed development of a new lesson plan l for performing safety evaluations. The following weaknesses were noted with the new lesson plan: i
- The principal constituent was a copy of LAP-1200-1 * There was minimal discussion of the CECO corporate philosophy or policy on performing safety evaluation l
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a There were no examples of either good or bad safety evaluations or screening * There was minimal use of industry and NRC information on performing safety evaluation The training and qualification records were also disorganized and difficult to revie Quality Assurance Audits The inspector reviewed the latest quality verification assessment of 10 CFR 50.59 screenings and safety evalua,Tions. OSQV-93-OllS was performed during the week of August _2 thyough 5, 1993, and evaluated 13 completed safety evaluation packages. This assessment identified concerns similar to those identified by the inspectors. These included:
- The lack of detail in activity descriptions and purposes to allow for determination of potential safety significanc * The evaluation frequently stated only the conclusions with no bases for the conclusions nor what specific issues were addresse The inspector noted that the weaknesses identified by station quality verification were not being tracked by the corrective action program, as this was only an assessment and not an audi The issues identified in the assessment have been reviewed by licensee management and corrective actions initiated. This assessment was too recent for the inspectors to develop any conclusions on the adequacy of the licensee's corrective action processe Two violations and no deviations were identified in this are . Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraph . Exit Interview The inspectors met'with licensee representatives'(denoted in Paragraph 1) during the inspection period on August 27, 1993, and at th conclusion of the inspection period on October 1, 1993. The inspectors summarized the scope and results of.the inspection and discussed the likely content of this inspection report. The licensee acknowledged the information and did not indicate that any of the information disclosed during the inspection could be considered proprietary in natur