ML20056E321

Insp Repts 50-369/93-11 & 50-370/93-11 on Stated Date. Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations, Surveillance Testing,Maint Observations & LER Followup on Previous Insp Findings

ML20056E321
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire, Mcguire
Issue date:	08/06/1993
From:	Cooper T, Lesser M, Van Doorn P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20056E315	List: ML20056E314 ML20056E317 ML20056E321
References
50-369-93-11, 50-370-93-11, NUDOCS 9308230175
Download: ML20056E321 (7)

See also: IR 05000369/1993011

Text

UNITED STATES

/g mac\ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '

' E' S REGION 11

[ } P! S 101 MARIETTA STREET. N.W., SUITE 2900

E ATLANTA, GEORGIA 303234199

O

s...../

Report Nos. 50-369/93-11 and 50-370/93-11

Licensee: Duke Power Company

422 South Church Street -

Charlotte, NC 28242-1007

Facility Name: McGuire Nuclear Station 1 and 2

Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370 License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17

,

Inspection Conducted: June 13, 1993 - July 17, 1993

Inspector: / g. ($3

Gr- P. K.~ Van Doorn, Senior Resident Inspector Da% Signed

Inspector: [/ [m.6, /9/3

,

T. A. C60per, Resident Inspector Date Signed

/

Approved .

M. S. Lesser, Section Chief

/!6[f3

Date Signed

Division of Reactor Projects

i

SUMMARY  !

i

Scope: This routine, resident inspection was conducted in the areas of

plant operations, surveillance testing, maintenance observations,

Licensee Event Report followup and followup on previous inspection

findings.

Results: In the areas inspected, one violation was identified concerning a

failure to provide an adequate preventative maintenance procedure

to calibrate lake level instrumentation (paragraph 4.b.).

m

-

9308230175 930809 9 c;

DR ADOCK 0500 g

.

- . . . . - . _. . - - . _ . _ .

i

!

I

REPORT DETAILS

f

i 1. Persons Contacted

l

Licensee Employees

}

!

! D. Baxter, Support Operations Manager

A. Beaver, Operations Manager

J. Boyle, Work Control Superintendent

! D. Bumgardner, Unit 1 Operations Manager

1 *B. Caldwell, Training Manager

l *W. Cross, Compliance Specialist

*T. Curtis, System Engineering Manager

{ J. Foster, Station Health Physicist

l *F. Fowler, Human Resources Manager

*G. Gilbert, Safety Assurance Manager.

3

P. Guill, Compliance Engineer

• B. Hamilton, Superintendent of Operations

B. Hasty, Emergency Planner

• P. Herran, Engineering Manager

i L. Kunka, Confliance Engineer

j E. Geddie, Station Manager

• T. McMeekin, Site Vice President

R. Michael, Station Chemist ,

3

• T. Pederson, Safety Review Supervisor l

l *N. Pope, Instrument & Electrical Superintendent j

i *R. Sharpe, Regulatory Compliance Manager I

! B. Travis, Component Engineering Manager

l R. White, Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent

'

Other licensee employees contacted included craftsmen, technicians,

i operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.

t

,

NRC Resident Inspectors

1

i *P. Van Doorn, SRI

• T. Cooper, RI

l

] * Attended exit interview

i

2. Plant Operations (71707)

{

a. Observations

i The inspection staff reviewed plant operations during the report

, period to verify conformance with applicable regulatory

1- requirements. Control room logs, shift supervisors' logs, shift ,

.,

turnover records and equipment removal and restoration records 1

i were routinely reviewed. Interviews were conducted with plant

! operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics, and

! performance personnel.

4

i

!

____ .__ _

-_ -.. , - - --- - . - -

i

l

l

2 ,

Activities within the control room were monitored during shifts

and shift changes. Actions and/or activities observed were

conducted as prescribed in applicable station administrative

directives. The number of licensed personnel on each shift met or

surpassed the minimum number required by Technical Specifications 1

(TS). The inspectors also reviewed Problem Investigation Reports

(PIRs) to determine if the licensee was appropriately documenting

problems and implementing corrective actions.  ;

Plant tours taken during the reporting period included, but were

not limited to, the turbine buildings, the auxiliary building,

electrical equipment rooms, cable spreading rooms, and the station

,

yard zone inside the protected area.

!

During the plant tours ongoing activities, housekeeping, fire

protection, security, equipment status and radiation control

practices were observed,

b. Unit 1 Operations  !

The refueling outage ended on June 13, 1993. On June 14, 1993,

the unit came on-line. After reactor physics testing at various

l power levels, full power operation was reached on June 18, 1993. l

Power was reduced to 18 percent on June 19, 1993, to allow repairs

l to a mechanically binding main feedwater regulating valve. Full '

'

power operation resumed on June 22, 1993. l

l c. Unit 2 Operations

On June 14, the unit began a coastdown from full power in

preparation for the approaching refueling outage. By June 22, 89

percent power was reached. At that time, power was reduced to 70

percent and remained 70 percent until shutdown on July 1. Core ,

off-load began on July 15, and continued through the end of the j

inspection period. j

d. Shutdown Risk Review l

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's controls over shutdown

risk. This included observation of the pre-draindown management

briefing, daily defense in depth assessments, procedure controls

for draindown and mid-loop operations, controls for containment  :

closure, and controls for maintaining an adequate vent path. The  !

inspectors verified that abnormal and emergency procedures were in

l place for loss of vital power and that the licensee was

maintaining two offsite power busses and two diesel generators

operable during reduced inventory conditions. The inspectors also

verified that core exit thermocouples were alarmed and trended and

that multiple level indications were provided including a site

glass on camera, narrow range level, wide range level and two

ultrasonic level indications. Multiple paths for adding reactor

coolant inventory were maintained. The licensee has continued to

-

- . .

.

!

l )

.

. ,

1

3  !

!

show an excellent sensitivity to shutdown risk and maintained many

precautions to minimize shutdown risk.

No violations or deviations were identified. l

i

'

3. Surveillance Testing (61726)

a. Observed

Selected surveillance tests were analyzed and/or witnessed by the  ;

resident inspection staff to ascertain procedural and performance

'

adequacy and conformance with the applicable TS.

,

Selected tests were witnessed to verify that (1) approved '

procedures were available and in use, (2) test equipment in use

was calibrated, (3) test prerequisites were met, (4) system

restoration was completed, and (5) acceptance criteria were met. '

The following tests were reviewed or witnessed in detail: l

\

PROCEDURE E0VIPMENT/ TEST -l

l PT/2/A/4150/14 Pressurizer PORV Low

l Temperature Overpressure

l Protection Analog Operational

l Test

PT/1/A/4600/01 Rod Control Cluster Assembly

Movement Test

PT/2/A/4209/12B Chemical and Volume Control

(NV) Pump 2B Head Curve

PT/1/A/4207/02B NM Train B Valve Stroke Timing

- Quarterly.

The inspectors reviewed the procedures and verified that all

prerequisites had been completed. Communications (including

repetition of directions)'between the technician in the control

. room, the technician in the plant, and the operator were_ good. .

All of the results were properly logged and verified by the

technician to have been within the acceptance criteria. '

l For each of the above tests, personnelIfollowed procedures

meticulously and communications were good.

No violations or deviations 'e identified.

1

..

. . - . . - --- - - - - - .._. .

___

!

.

.

.

.

4

4. Maintenance Observations (62703)

a. Observation

Routine maintenance activities were reviewed and/or witnessed by

the resident inspection staff to ascertain procedural and

performance adequacy and conformance with the applicable TS.

The selected activities witnessed were examined to verify that,

where applicable, (1) approved procedures were available and in

use, (2) prerequisites were met, (3) equipment restoration was

completed, and (4) maintenance results were adequate.

The following maintenance activity was reviewed or witnessed in  ;

detail: ,

"

WORK ORDER ACTIVITY

93040422 PM/PT Functional Test on Unit 1

Reactor Protection System Channel 3.

The inspectors verified that the procedure was adhered to, no

problems developed, and communication between the technicians and

the operations staff was good.  !

b. Calibration of Lake Level Instrumentation ,

During an Emergency Planning inspection on June 20, 1993, the

inspectors were verifying Emergency Action Levels (EALs) in the '

main control room. EAL No. 2, Section 4.1.9, Natural l

Disasters /0ther Hazards, initiates an Unusual Event when Lake 1

Norman level is less than or equal to 745 feet. The EAL basis and

FSAR-Section 2.4.11.6 state that a low level alarm will alert ]

operators to begin a controlled shutdown /cooldown of the units and

to swap nuclear service water suction to the standby nuclear

service water pond. None of the control room operators

interviewed were aware that the EAL existed or that lake level l

indication was available to'the control room.

Investigations revealed that level indications were available in

the Control Room via the plant computer, but no level alarm

function was present. Additionally, the lake level indication on

the computer was falsely reading 745 feet, which is the EAL

setpoint. The operators contacted the system load dispatchor,

.whose instrumentation indicated that the lake was at greater than

757 feet. Although lake level was not actually at the alarm

setpoint,.the alarm should have alerted the operators and directed

them to declare an Unusual Event. As immediate corrective

actions, the level instrumentation was calibrated and an alarm was

installed to alert the operator when the lake level drops to 748

feet.

i

,

-

1 - . . , , ., . , , _ ,.._e ,- ,- ,_ . , ..~w - ~~

._ _ __ . _ _ _ _

,

. .  :

1

.

.

.

. 5

The following week, after corrective actions had been implemented, i

the inspectors interviewed the control room personnel on shift.

None of the operators were aware of the EAL, the lake level

indication on the computer, the alarm, or actions to take when the

alarm is received. Actions related to the installation of the

alarm and the calibration of the instrumentation were inadequate

because the operators were not aware of its significance or the

proper corrective actions to take.

While technicians were calibrating the loop, the pump bay "A"

differential pressure switch was found to be valved out.of

service. It was not clear how long.the switch had been valved

out. The valves are typically controlled by calibration

,

!

procedures. A Problem Investigation Process (PIP) was issued on I

the valved ou+ * essure switch. The pressure switch was valved i

back into P . and the calibration was completed. j

!

A review of the preventative maintenance program revealed that the

lake level transmitter loop, IMRCLT6480, was not included in the l

program. The lack of routine maintenance and calibration l

activities on this instrumentation loop resulted in the false j

indication of lake level in that the instrument was not in ,

calibration and the differential pressure switch was isolated.

The lack of a preventative maintenance procedure for the  ;

calibration of this instrument loop is identified as Violation  !

369,370/93-11-01: Inadequate Preventative Maintenance Procedure

for Calibrating Lake Level Instrumentation.

A review of the PIP log revealed that no PIP was issued for the

incorrect lake level indication, the missing alarm, or the

operators' unawareness of the EAL or indication. After the

inspectors inquired about the missing PIPS, a PIP was issued on

July 14, 1993.

c. FNQ Fuse Replacements

In 1991 the licensee completed a programmatic replacement of 4

Bussman type FNA fuses with Bussman type FNQ fuses. This was done

because the FNA fuses are susceptible to a mechanical failure

mechanism.

'

Since June 1992 there have been seven occurrences of mechanical

failure of Bussman type FNQ fuses. One of these failures resulted

in a Unit 2 reactor trip. As a result, the licensee has conducted

a review to identify all FNQ fuses.whose failure would not be

immediately obvious to control room personnel. These fuses are

all being inspected for failure.

The licensee has designated a task force to review the issue and

identify alternate fuse types to replace the Bussman FNQ type

fuses.

__ _. _ - - _ _ . _

i

.

.

l .

. 6

l

One violation was identified for an inadequate preventative maintenance

! procedure for lake level instrumentation.

5. Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup (90712,92700)

l

The following LERs were reviewed and closed:

! a. (Closed) LER 369/93-04, Both Trains of Control Room Ventilation

j Temporarily Inoperable due to an Equipment Failure.

! This LER was closed based on a review of the LER Report only.

l b. (Closed) LER 369/93-05, Unit 1 Experienced a Manual Reactor Trip

l as a Result of and Equipment Failure Due to an Unknown Cause.

The inspectors reviewed the work order for the equipment

replacement and observed the post maintenance test of the system.

No problems were identified.

l 6. Exit Interview (30703)

The inspection scope and findings identified below were summarized on

July 16, 1993, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 of this

I report. The following item was discussed in detail:

Violation 369,370/93-11-01: Inadequate Preventative Maintenance

Procedure for Calibrating Lake Level Instrumentation (paragraph 4.b.)

The licensee representatives present offered no dissenting comments, nor

did they identify as proprietary any of the information reviewed by the

inspectors during the course of their inspection.

l

. _ _ _ ._