ML20052E576

Interim Deficiency Rept Re Incorrectly Specified Design Temps for Containment Penetration Piping/Valves.Supply Sys Engineering Conducting Technical Evaluation of Ae Rept.Next Rept by 820707

ML20052E576
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	04/30/1982
From:	Matlock R WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To:	Engelken R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, GO2-82-0407, GO2-82-407, NUDOCS 8205110242
Download: ML20052E576 (4)

Text

Docket No. 50-397

& 50.55(e) Report JJ Washington Public Power Supply System P.O. Box 968 3000 GeorgeWashingtonWay Richland, Washington 99352 (509)372-5000 Docket No. 50-397 April 30,1982 Responds to: NA G02-82-0407 Response re by: NA 9 4

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Mr. R. H. Engelken RECERO C E NEF- 1' U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l ?

Region V 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 5

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Walnut Creek, California 94596 un y

Subject:

NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2 - -g[h 10CFR50.55(e) POTENTIALLY REPORTABLE COND CONTAINMENT PENETRATION PIPING / VALVES

Reference:

a) Telephone conversation between RT Johnson (Supply System) and J Elin (NRC) on 2-18-82, Telecon #QA2-82-048.

b) Letter #G02-82-0331, RG Matlock (Supply System) to RH Engelken (NRC), dated 3-19-82, same subject.

In the above referenced telecon the Supply System informed your office of a potentially reportable deficiency under 10CFR50.55(e) and reference (b) was an interim status report on the identified condition.

Attachment (A), to this letter, provides the Supply System's interim report on the above caption condition. The attachment includes a restatement of the problem and an expanded description of the safety implications associated with failure of a containment penetration. Attachment (B) depicts a typical containment configuration for reference.

If there are any questions on this item, please contact R. T. Johnson at (509) 377-2501 extension 2712.

R t c P!ogramDirector,WNP-2 RGM/LCF/ks Attachments: As stated.

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cc: WS Chin BPA RA Feil, NRC Resident Inspector A Forrest, B&R HAP 0 / gh ND Lewis, NRC s Y J Plunkett, NUS Corp. ._ O '

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ATTACHMENT A INTERIM REPORT SUPPLY SYSTEM NUCLEAR PROJECT N0. 2 10CFR50.55(e) #179 CONTAINMENT PENETRATION PIPING / VALVES Potential Problem The Architect Engineer may have incorrectly specified design temperatures for certain containment penetration piping and valves. Approximately 21 penetrations have been identified in which piping and/or valves, considered as part of the containment boundary, were specified with a system design temperature lower than the containment design temperature of 340 0 F. for the drywell or 2750 F. for the wetwell.

Because the process fluid temperature was used rather than the containment design temperature, the piping and valves serving as containment boundaries may not meet the post accident function requirements of ASME Section III, Subsection NE.

Safety Implications A failure of containment piping or isolation valving in the post-LOCA containment environment could result in the loss of certain ECCS functions, a release of radioactivity to the environs in excess of 10CFR100 limits, as well as other implications dependent upon the particular penetration involved.

Action Taken The AE has conducted an extensive evaluation to confirm that the piping attached to containment penetrations was designed to the applicable code requirements of ASME Section III. The evaluation indicates the following Subsections of ASME Section III as the code requirements utilized for the design of containment penetrations:

o The AE did utilize the applicable design rules of ASME Section III, Subsection NE-3620 for the design of containment piping penetrations, o ASME Section III, Subsection NB-3620 requires NB-3600 or NC-3600 to be applied to the design of piping systems in the containment system.

e The above Subsections of ASME Section III do require a stress evaluation for all various postulated combinations of normal and upset conditions; but, do not require a stress evaluation for faulted secondary stresses (as in a post-LOCA condition). Additionally, the application of post-LOCA environmental effects, as referenced in ASME Section III, Subsection NG-3213.9, is not expected to cause a failure.

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. . - s Interim Report 10CFR50.55(e) #179 Page 2 With respect to the affected containment penetration isolation valves, the AE evaluation of the seismic stress reports and/or valve code data reports for i each containment penetration isolation valves indicates the valves meet ASME.Section III, Subsection NB-3500 or NC-3500 requirements.

Current Status Supply System Engineering is conducting a technical evaluation of the report submitted by the AE. To date, we are not able to establish a completion schedule for the technical evaluation being performed. Therefore, we will continue to provide your office with quarterly status reports. The next report will be submitted on or by 7-7-82.

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Typical Of 21 Applicable Containment Penetrations o 4 y ,

PER ASME III NE 3620 X8 E M Mi I

Per System I Containment System [ ASME III Class 1 or i Per System Per NB 3600 or I2PerNB3600or Design lASMEIIIClass1or2

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g Per ASME NE l NC 3600 l Design I I i l i l 1

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l 7 x i Containment u Reactor Building I

Containment Post-LOCA l Drywell Wetwell i I

Temperature 3400F 2750 F I i

Accident Pressure 34.7 PSIG 34.7 PSIG Design Pressure 45 PSIG 45 PSIG

. ATTACHM7.NT B e