ML20050C332
| ML20050C332 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 03/31/1982 |
| From: | Guild R, Jeffrey Riley CAROLINA ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY GROUP, PALMETTO ALLIANCE |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8204080408 | |
| Download: ML20050C332 (30) | |
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UNITED' STATES OF AMERICA '
!!UCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY ~AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )
DUKE POWER COMPANY,'et al.,
) Docket Nos. 50-413-0L (Catawba Nuclear Station ) and Units 1 and 2)', 50-414-0L PALMETTO ALLIANCE, CAROLINA ) March 31, 1982 ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY GROUP and ) cc , Q 1".
/Q CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG ENVIRONMENTAL )
C0ALITION, ) / 0-Intervenors,
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PALMETTO ALLIANCE AND CAROLINA ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY GROUP RESPONSES AND OBJECTIONS TO ORDER FOLLOWING PREHEARING CONFERENCE Jesse-L. Riley Robert Guild, Esquire l Carolina Environmental Study Group 314 Pall Mall 854 Henley Place Columbia, South Carolina 29201 Charlotte, North Carolina 28207 Attorney for'Palmett Alliance l
8204000408 820331 DR ADOCK 05000 %@ t e
Pursuantto10CFR2.751a(d)andatthedirectionoftheBoard l
l Intervenors Palmetto Alliance and Carolina Environmental Study Group hereby file their objections to the Board's Memorandum and Order (Re-fbeting Decisions Made Following Prehearing Conference), dated March 5,1982; seek revision of the order in light these objections or the certification of such matters to the Commission or Appeal Board for determination as pemitted by 10 CFR 2.718(i); and further respond to the Board as directed.
Intervenors object to the Board's Memorandum and Order to the extent that it either rejects or accepts only conditionally contentions which these Intervenors have filed for litigation in this proceeding, and to the extent that it denies relief sought by them in their plead-ings or on the record before the Board. In support of this Response and these Objections Intervenors reiterate those matters set forth in their Petitions, Supplements and their statements of record at the prehearing conference held January 12 and 13,1982 at York, South Carolina, which are incorporated herein by reference.
Intervenors Palmetto Alliance and Carolina Environmental Study Group generally agree with the Board's view that its contentions can not properly be rejected for lack of specificity or basis where the subject matter of. a contention is to be addressed only later in Applicant or Staff filings or other documents not yet produced. Intervenors object, however, to the limited and conditional acceptance of their contentions at this time and the burden of further specifications 2
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required of them later. It is the prerogative of Duke Power Company, et al.,
to choose the time for filing its application for operating licenses for the facilities and the prerogative of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff to schedule the environmental and safety analyses which it performs as a basis for the agency action sought by Duke and opposed by ti.e In-tervenors. Intervenors control neither process, yet are required to assert their interest and plead their contentions for litigation years in advance of plant completion and long before agency environmental and safety reviews are perfomeo.
While the Board acknowledges the unreasonableness of the Applicants' and Staff's views that Intervenors must plead its contentions with full specificity now on pain of sumounting the barriers to late filing later; it imposes the burdens of this analysis on Intervenors in refusing the unconditional admission of contentions now which are otherwise fully litigable. Intervenors object to the requirements that they make further revisions of contentions because of the present unavailability of materials not within Intervenor's control. Such contentions should be admitted unconditionally now. Intervenors properly face the burden of withstanding discovery and sumary disposition in due course, but not the continued burden of establishing the threshold appropriateness of their contentions for litigation.
With respect to contentions for which the Board expressly requires revision after initial discovery Intervenors assert the adequacy of those contentions as plead and specifically object to the requirement 3
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l that they employ possibly limited discovery opportunities for their revision. In the event that the Comission adopts proposed limits on discovery, Intervenors request that this required round of discovery not be charged against these parties.
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' SERIOUS-ACCIDENTS, Palmetto 5, 9, 31~; CESG 2.
Intervenors object to the Board's rejection of ~ contentions which s question the~ assurance that Catawba can be operated without endangering' the public health and safety through the occurrence of serious accidents.
Intervenors believe that a variety of ~ plainly credible, Catawba specific, accident scenarios are implicit in their contentions as originally filed ,
but are herewith postulating explicitly several such scenarios ~in response to the Board's view that further consideration of these contentions requires such a showing at this time. We request that the Board either revise its Order accordingly or certify the question of the litigation of these issues for detemination by the Commission or Appeal Board.
Intervenor::-have been of the opinion that the Staff has regarded serious accidents as credible in view of NRC funded studies on the subject currently in progress at Brookhaven on LOCA's, at Battelle -
Columbus on core melt / core slump and at Sandia National Labs on hydrogen release, combustion and detonation. We are providing scenarios with a variety of sequences. It is obvious that some elements in these sequences may be recombined to form _many other credible accident scenarios.
l Initiating events from outside'the' station in the fom af loss of' l offsite power, or from within the station in such events as feedwater loss as at TMI-2, steam generator ~ tube rupture as at Ginna or electrical l insulation combustion as at Brown's Ferry. These ac.f. dents have taught us that sequential events contribute to the development of ~ serious 5
j o o .', .
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\ accidents such as sticking PORV's and disabled' electrical systems. Sub-sequent event.s can lead to reactor pressure vessel breach, hydrogen release and containment breach,
- I '. OFFSITE POWER FAILURE
~
. Stations main transformer' burns out as it did recently at Duke's Marshall l
Steau Plant or the transmission line is brought down by a tornado or a t .hea'vy lightening strike in the switchyard disables the switch gear. Both L
[-= reactors are operating at full power. Half of the diesel electric generat-
[ ing capacity fails to start. There is an insufficiency of on site power for safe shut down. Decay heat removal is inadequate due to inoperable feed water and reactor ~ coolout pumps. This results in excessive reactor temperature and pressure. The reactor vents through the' pressurizer spring
. loaded relief valves. The ECCS accumulator water is soon exhausted. The reactor coolout system continues to vent steam with the result of core exposure and subsequent melt down and core slump. There is massive hydro-gen release, a metal-water reaction at least 80% complete. The air recir-culation fan is inoperative. The igniters do not reach ignition tempera-ture. Hydrogen accumulates in the containment. Diffusive mixing of ihydrogen and containment air results in a combustible mixture. The tem-
, "perature of the reactor surface is increased by~ the~ melted fuel to a t
temperature sufficient to cause ignition of the hydrogen-air mixture.
' Containment is breached, the estimated failure pressure of 67.5 psi being exceeded. The reactor vessel melts through and releases essentially
. 'the entire inventory of radioactive volatiles to the. atmosphere as the 6
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a - . _ . - . . _ _ .
t l
l molten fuel drops into the sump water vaporizing explosively on contact l and foming a substantial amount of particulates~ carried outside by the steam generated from the~ sump water. This scenario represents a PWR-1 as i 1
denominated in the Reactor Safety Study.
II. ATWS Catawba has been operating for 10-15 years. The nil ductility temperature of ~ the reactor pressure yessel has increased to greater than 200 degrees F as comonly occurs with reactors of this age. The turbine generator throws a blade, puncturing the turbine case and making the feed water system temporarily inoperative. The control system calls for reactor trip but the reactor does not SCRAM due to comon mode failure of SCRAM systems leaving control rod solenoids activated. Pressure builds in the reactor coolant system due to decay heat, load loss and cessation of feedwater flow. The PORV opens, the pressure rises to the set points of relief valves which operate. The ECCS actuates. The accumulators and high pressure injection pumps perform according to design. Large quantities of cold water enterirl
' the reactor pressure vessel chill parts of it to below the high nil ductility temperature. Temperature differentials in the pressure vessel induce higher levels of stress, the effluent from the core is still at a high temperature. 'The combination of high internal pressure-high pressure injection pumps still operating, spring loaded relief valves now bei.ng closed, and the PORY partially closed - cause brittle failure of the junction of the reactor vessel and cold 1eg nozzle, 7
the weld having developed cracks. With the reactor breaci ed ECCS flow no longer traverses'the core. The' core heats up, hydrogen evolves from the zirconium-steam reaction. Steam-hydrogen release rates are so great that the air return fan does not appreciably dilute the lower containment steam-hydrogen atmosphere with air and flowing through the ice condensor the steam condenses. Almost pure hydrogen emerges from the condensor.
It is bouyant, having only 1/14 the density of the upper containment atmosphere. The hydrogen rises to the dome. The dome igniters operate using up the oxygen in the ignition region. Hydrogen continues to accumulate in the upper containment. Hydrogen flow slows as zirconium is depleted. The hydrogen and oxygen in the upper containment inter-dif-fuse broadening the interface and increasing the volume of combustible gas mixture. When a portion of the combustible mixture reaches an igniter most of it will combust due to the turbulent mixing which will occur in the initially combustible region. Tne containment pressure exceeds the expected average rupture pressure of 67.5 psi. Radioactive violatiles will be released to outside atmosphere from the burst containment. Sub-sequent core slump will release additional steam and radioactive parti-culates resulting in a PWR-1 release.
III.FATIGUEFAILUREOF,G'REACTORPRESSUREVESSEL The steam generator tube problem encountered in Westinghouse's D Series Steam Generators is not satisfactorily fixed. The reactor requires shutdown and restart on a much greater rate than designed for - namely greater than a rate of 200 cycles in 30 years. The resultant fatigue C
carries an even more rapid increase in nil ductility temperature than encountered in nonnal operation. Cracks develop'in the pressure vessel welds: a common occurrence as in Oconee 1. The many problems with the aging Oconee reactors and the steam generator problems at McGuire result in low nuclear plant capacity factors for the Duke system. To meet Winter peak Catawba is operated, although a shutdown to deal with nil ductility temperature well in excess of 200 degree F would be prudent.
The turbine trip relieves an overload condition. The reactor SCRAMS and is directed toward a cold shutdown. After several hours the load problem is remedied. Parts of the reactor have fallen below the nil ductility temperature. Restart is too rapid in the effort to get the unit back on line. Tne excessively rapid pressure escalation and the excessive temperature gradients result in stresses in the vessel which are suffi-ciently large enough to cause a crack to propogate in brittle failure.
Reactor is breached. From this point the scenario is similar to the ATWS scenario - resulting in a PWR-1 release.
IV. STUD BOLT FAILURE An AEC licensed plant experienced corrosion induced stud bolt failures, "An Investigation of the Failures of LACBWR Pressure Vessel Closure Studs," SWI-2154-20, December 1971. The fix was a change in stud bolt alloy composition. Catawba bolts are sensitive to corrosion by borated water. The FSAR requires bolts to be moved to a dry area during refueling and bolt holes in the pressure vessel flange to be plugged while inmersed in borated water. In this refueling the~ plugs 9
l used are defective. 'Tha~ presence of borate-water in the bolt holes is undetected. On resumed operation corrosion of the bolts takes place. The intrinsic strength of the' bolting material vary appreciably. FSAR Table 5.3-12. About one year after refueling a turbine trip causes a pressure excursion in the' reactor. The reactor SCRAMS. 'Although the PORV set point is not reached the increased load on bolts is sufficient to cause the weakest bolt to fail. Almost-instantly the remainder of bolts fail due to load increase from decompression of the flange at a failed bolt and the initial load increase in the vicinal bolts. '(the compression of the flange under nomal loading is approximately 0.1 inches) As a result of the unzippering of the lid closure, the lid becomes a projectilev reaching a velocity of several hundred mph. As a result of steam thrust greater than one million pounds the lid is not daflected by the polar crane and strikes the containment dome, breaching it. Becuase the reactor lid thrusts asside the pie shaped cement blocks which close off the lower containment from the upper containment there is negligible steam suppression in the ice condensor. If not already breached by the reactor' lid, steam pressure breaches the cement outer containment which is not' designed to withstand appreciable internal pressure. The ECCS is defeated.
Water pumped in to the reactor vessel flows out over'the flange, kept-from entering the core by steam blocking. The core melts discharging The release qualifies as
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volitales and particulates to the atmosphere.
a PWR.1.
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O 8 OPERATOR QUALIFICATIONS, PALMETTO 8 At pp.17 and 18 of its Order the Board seeks the parties' views on whether present Comission rules or other regulatory developments bar consideration of this otherwise admissable contention which questions the sufficiency of hands on nuclear experience by Duke Shift Supervisors, Senior Reactor Operators and Reactor Operators. it is the view of these Intervenors that no such bar is applicable and that, therefore, this contention should be adnitted unconditionally.
10 CFR Sections 55.11 and 55.24, cited by the Board in its request for views, provide for operator license application requirements and Commission waiver of such requirements, respectively. Only the waiver section, 55.24(a), makes any reference whatever to actual operating experience and there such unspecified " extensive actual operating experience at a comparable facility within two years prior to the date of application," is made the basis, in part, for waiving "any and all" written examinations and operating test requirements.
As the Board further notes, at p.18, the only other reference to operating experience requirements contemplated by Commission rule itself is contained in the pending proposal published at 46 FR 26494 (May 13, 1981):
An applicant for senior reactor operator license shall have had experience as an operator and shall participate in an NRC approved training program.
In sum, while existing and proposed Commission regulations refer to operating experience the extent and character of that experience is 11
unspecified, and, thus, subject to dispute. Further, the deficiencies of past practice are expressly acknowledged by the Commission in NUREG 0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements:
I.A.2.1 IMMEDIATE UPGRADING OF REACTOR OPERATOR AND SENIOR OPERATOR TRAINING AND QUALIFICATIONS In the past, many individuals who came through the operator ranks were administered SR0 examinations without first being an operator. This was clearly a poor practice. .. .
Id. I.A.2.1-1 Even in the face of this acknowledgement, however, the actual re-quirements for hands-on experience on large PWR's remains imprecise and arguably insufficient as written as well as in application by Duke to this specific facility to reasonably assure safe operation. The Commis-sion has expressly authorized parties to litigate "the sufficiency of such requirements" in individual licensing cases. Statement of Policy, 45 FR 85236 and 85238 (December 24,1980). Intervenors should be free to litigate this contention in this proceeding.
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COSTS V. BENEFITS Palmetto 11, 12, 13, 30, 33, 34, 39; CESG 1, 5, 6, 12.
The Board rejects each of the Intervenors' contentions which challenge the " economic" cost effectiveness of completion and operation of the Catawba units as weighed against the benefits properly credited to the facility. Intervenors object.
Palmetto Alliance and Carolina Environmental Study Group continue to maintain, as they did at the prehearing conference, that the favorable resolution of these cost-benefit contentions presently warrant the remedy of dismissal of the operating license application and immediate cessation of construction since completion and operation of the facility is not cost effective. The Intervenors continue to urge that these issues be taken up now before additional " sunk" costs are incurred, and so that the necessity for litigation of all remaining issues can be avoided.
The Board expressly relies on the Comission's recently adopted rule barring "need for power or alternative energy sources" contentions from operating license proceedings in rejecting Palmetto contentions 30, 33 and 39, CESG 1, 5 and 12. Although not expressly citing the new rule, the Board also rejects Palmetto contentions 11,12,13 and 34, CESG 6, as "not relevant to the narrow focus of the cost / benefit analysis at the operating license stage," Order at p. 34, or simply "too late," Order at p. 29. Intervenors object to the rejection of these contentions and respectfully request that the Board revise its Order to admit these issues or certify these questions for Comission or Appeal Board detennination.
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Without undertaking a pointless attack on the fallacious reasoning expressed in justification of this recent Commission rule, suffice it to l say that the NEPA policy of considering environmental costs "to the fullest extent possible" is ill-served by a total agency ban on consid- l eration of such costs. NRC rejection of construction cancellation as a NEPA choice is particularly ironic in the face of a growing industry movement to embrace such a choice on private cost effectiveness grounds.
Where a company such as Duke has either cancelled or will cancel multi-unit nuclear projects at Perkins and Cherokee on cost grounds, this Board has a duty to require such an analysis in this proceeding on behalf of the public under NEPA where unwarranted environmental costs can yet be avoided.
NEPA requires that an agency must - to the fullest extent possible under its other statutory obliga-tions - consider alternatives to its actions which would reduce environmental damage. That principle establishes that consideration of environmental matters must be more than a pro forms ritual.
Clearly, it is pointless to " consider" environ-mental costs without also considering action to avoid them.
Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Conin. v. AEC, 449 F2d 1109 at 1128 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
Here, particularly for Unit 2 which is less than 40% complete, the "no plant" alternative to granting the operating license sought in Docket No. 50-414-OL must receive full consideration under NEPA.
The cost-benefit contentions not barred by the Consnission's recent "need for power" rule offer an appropriate vehicle for the Board to 14
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r perfom the NEPA analysis of the "no plant" alternative to avoid further environmental costs.
The increased construction costs, known and likely in the future, are raised in Palmetto 11, 12 and 34 (CESG 6), as are the reduced benefits which are a b included in Palmetto 13.
The experience at Catawba's ' sister' facility, McGuire, is instruc-tive. Intervenors are infomed that McGuire Unit 1 initial operation was put back some 14 different times from Winter 1975 to September 1982. The plant remains at reduced power levels, and there is no assurance that full power levels will be achieved in the forseeable future. Original ,
cost projections of $400 million now exceed $1.8 billion. Unit 2 remains incomplete.
The Comission's ' decision in Seabrook, 5 NRC 503 (1977), cited by the Board in rejecting Palmetto 11, amply supports a new NEPA cost-benefit review at this stage for Catawba:
Indeed, our conclusion substantially depends on the integrity of the NEPA process which leads up to the point of hearing. Where that integrity is absent -
where time and money have been misspent - it may be proper to restrike a NEPA analysis on the basis of a set of facts no longer existing, ie. as though those expenditures had not been made...
Jd.,5N.R.C.at533.
Intervenors urge the Board to take up these NEPA questions not barred by the new rule and to certify the remaining cost benefit questions for Appeal Board or-Comission determination.
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SPENT FUEL' TRANSPORTATION ~AND~ STORAGE Palmetto 14, 15, 16, 17 and 38; CESG 11.
By these contentions Intervenors challenge Duke's proposed use of the expanded Catawba spent fuel pools to effectuate its " cascade plan" whereby spent fuel from the Oconee and McGuire facilities would cascade in turn from pool to pool " involving the premature using up of storage space at Catawba and possibly the Perkins and Cherokee facilities as well."
Amendment to Materials License SNM-1773 LBP-80-28, 12 NRC 459 at 482-83 (1980). There the Licensing Board denied Duke's Oconee to McGuire tran-shipment request. The request was approved on appeal, ALAB-651, 14 NRC 307(1981), in a decision which did not disturb the factual findings regarding existance of the " cascade plat" 14 NRC at 312. ,
Intervenors object to the Board's rejection of Palmetto contentions 14,17and38(CESG11)andtheconditioningof15and16. The Board faults Palmetto for seeking to " avoid application of the Table S-4 values about transportation impacts solely on the ground that the spent fuel would be destined for the Catawba storage pool, instead of the hypothetical reprocessing plant," Order p. 19.
As the Commission made clear in its adoption of the scope of coverage pmvisions of 51.20(g)(1), it meant what it said when it added the present language "to make clear when and h, the rule is to be applied and what criteria are to be applied in detennining whether a given case is or is not within the scope of the rule;" 40 FR 1007 (January 6, 1975) and most important here the requirement that
...any assessment will be subject to seperate consideration l
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in individual licensing cases if it covers transporta-tion of a type which is outside the scope of the rule.
Id. The rule properly places the burden of a " detailed analysis of the environmental effects of such transportation," 10 CFR 51.20(g)(1), upon the Applicants,and not Intervenors, for transportation beyond this scope.
The Board rejects Palmetto 17 as a collateral attack on the Comis-sion's pending waste confidence rulemaking citing the Appeal Board decision in Salem, Order at p. 19. The Court of Appeals in Minnesota
- v. NRC, 602 F2d 412 (D.C. Cir.1979), instructed the Comission to determine the degree of assurance that radioactive waste can be safely disposed of and whether such wastes can be safely stored at reactor sites past facility license expiration if necessL y. The Court approved the generic resolution of these issues on the basis of a rulemaking record rather than in individual adjudications, but rejected prior Comission findings of such assurance not based on record evidence. See Denial of petition for Rulemaking, 40 FR 34391 (July 5, 1977). The Comission initiated its waste confidence proposed rulemaking in re-sponse to Minnesota v. NRC, supra, 44 FR 61372 (October 25,1979):
If the Commission finds... reasonable assurance... it will promulgate a rule providing that the safety and environmental implications of radioactive waste re-maining on site after the anticipated expiration of the facility licenses involved need not be considered l in individual facility licensing proceedings.
44 FR 61373. No such rule has yet been promulgated. As of October 29, 1981, the Regulatory Agenda reflects: "Comission action on the pro-posed rule is unscheduled," 46 FR 53609. Under the circumstances of this case, particularly where Duke seeks apparent authority to store 17 l
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waste from not only Catawba but all other Duke facilities, Palmetto contentions 17 should not be rejected on the basis of this " unscheduled" generic resolution. Board certification of this question is respectfully requested to determine the appropriateness of litigating this important issue here.
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ECCS, Palmetto 19, 45, CESG 19 Intervenors object to the Board's rejection of these contentions regarding safety of the Catawba emergency core cooling system.
Reliance on assumptions and computer models is not an adequate basis for assuring public health and safety. According to such NRC safety analysis the TMI-2 acci&nt could not happen. Yet, it did. A reliance on the theoretical analysis of ECCS performance lacking an empirical demonstration of the event in which variables and interactions not considered in the model may operate, as shown in the Idaho LOFT test series, is reason sufficent not to rely on code " findings."
Intervenors object to the Board conclusion that their discussion of neutron shield dropping as a consequence of bolt failure was unclear.
Applicants' counsel bears responsibility for " muddying the waters" on the record: "there is no neutron shield at Catawba," Tr. 183. The Catawba FSAR reflects no such misapprehension at 5.3-5; p. 5.3.1.6:
....outside of the neutron shield pads." There is no question that the neutron shield is also referred to as the lower core barrel as denominated in the figure for Catawba's sister plant - McGuire -
described in the record. McGuire RESAR figure 3-2 shows three con-centric cylinders: the core barrel and thermal shield which reduce neutron flux into the reactor vessel, i.e. function as neutron shields.
McGuire RESAR figure 4-2-7 shows the bolted interface between the upper and lower core barrel assemblies.
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ALARA, Palmetto 20.
Intervenors object to and seek revision of the Board's order re-jecting this ALARA contention. Westinghouse plants such as Catawba can be expected to experience significant steam generator problems which will make for occupational deses violating ALARA principles, regardless of limits on maximum individual exposure. The more individuals exposed the higher the total dose. To accord with a reasonable interpretation of dosages "as low as reasonably achievable" the sum of doses should confonn to ALARA.
CONTROL ROOM DESIGN - HUMAN FACTORS, Palmetto 22, 42, CESG 16 Intervenors here contend that the Catawba control room design is inadequate particularly in light of the recent knowledge of human factors considerations as they impact operator error particularly in emergency circumstances. The Board misperceives the reference to inadequate core cooling instrumentation in Palmetto 22 which was intended as an example of failure to demonstrate compliance with post TMI control room design requirements such as " reactor - water-level indication" II, F. 2-2, and a human factors analysis of types and locations of displays and alanns indicating 3CC: II. F. 2-3.
l SECURITY PLAN, Palmetto 23.
l Intervenor Palmetto Alliance infonns the Board of its decision to pursue its contention that the Applicants security plan is inadequate reserving its right to comment on the appropriateness of further procedures. -
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DECOMMISSIONING, Palmetto 25.
Interyenor objects to the Board's deletion of the paragraph referring to circumstances which would necessitate decomissioning prior to expira-tion of the facility license which are sufficiently likely as to require their inclusion in reasonable contingency planning.
'ATWS, Palmetto 28.
Since the publication of the Technical Report on Anticipated Transients Without SCRAM for Water Cooled Power Reactors, WASH 1270, issued in Septem-ber 1973, a number of reactors have experienced one third or more of their total lifetime risk of exposure and the cumulative liklihood of occurrence has been greatly expanded. WASH 1270 called for specific mitigating design changes to be required comencing October 1,1976, which were not implemented. A final ATWS requirement may be another decade away.
Catawba should not be pemitted to operate absent an adequate remedy for an ATWS.
SYSTEMS INTERACTION, Palmetto 29.
While Intervenor lacks the' technical qualification to detail the precise application of the widely recognized problem of systems inter -
action as it is likely to impugn safe operation of Catawba, it is in-fomed that this subject is of safety significance and objects to Board disallowance of this issue.
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I RISK ~ EVALUATION, Palmetto 32, CE 563.
Intervenors object to Board rejection of this contention. There are i several entities at risk - people, property and environment. Special circumstances here place a large number of the same people at risk from the four McGuire and Catawba units. The same is true of some property and environment. This site specific risk arises from the fact that most of Charlotte's population is within a 20 mile radius from cither plant and about one half of the population is within a 15 mile radius. The EPZ language refers to a radius of about 10 miles. NUREG 0396, Figures I-17 and I-18, support estimates of casualties and early injuries out to 25 miles. Indeed more early fatalities and injuries are projected for the interval between 15-25 miles than from 10-15 miles.
This circumstance requires specific investigation.
The " totality of risk" concept is derivable from everyday experience:
there is some risk in a boy's crossing the street. Further risks can be added: playing football, driving a tractor, driving a car, drinking and driving. The liklihood of injury increases in relation to the sum of'the individual risks. The risk to an individual in Charlotte from four reactors is greater than from one. We further contend that risk is greater for an ice condensor containn.2nt designed for 15 psi than for a dry containment such as TMI designed for 65 psi. It is also greater with a hydrogen. igniter system than without. Welding deficiencies increase chances of a LOCA. With this partial list of the multiple causes for an accident, that which is important is the' sum - the total probability of 22
_= _ -. - _ . . ._. _- _ - - - __ - . . ..
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injury not ju:t the isolated' probability of one event. !
If another practical example of totality of risk is needed consider l the types of homeowners insurance policies which contain totality of a broad spectrum of specified (ie. H0-2) or unspecified (ie. H0-3) risks.
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EMERGENCY PLAN, Palmetto 35, CESG 8.
Because of site specific considerations detailed herein Intervenors request the Board certify this contention for determination by the Commis-sion or Appeal Board.
' COSTS OF SEVERE: ACCIDENTS, Palmetto 36, CESG 9.
Intervenors allege that a NEPA cost attaches to the inability of local officials and resources to assure protection of public health and safety in a serious accident.
CRISIS RELOCATION, Palmetto 37, CESG 10.
No atack on the Comoission rule is intended, but it should be recognized that the rule attempts to plan for unanticipated events. A substantial release of particulates would require relocation as the AEC and Department of Agriculture recognized in " Treatments for'Fannland Contaminated with Radioactive Material," Ag. Handbook 395. June, 1971.
The proximity of four units near Charlotte makes it prudent to plan crisis relocation in the event of such a release. Board certification of this question is requested in the event the Board still believes it can not be raised in this proceeding.
EMP, Palmetto 41, CESG 15.
There are a variety of circumstances in Which an atmospheric nuclear detonation could occur other than through an act of war. As an act'of defense SAC aircraft with nuclear weapons regularly fly in U.S. airspace.
An accidental detonation can occur. Some years ago a SAC aircraft crashed in North Carolina. 'Only one of several multiple barriers preventing 24
detonation renained intact. 'Recently U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig indicated the possibility of a nuclear warning shot to underscore the seriousness of U.S. intentions, short of' war. A similar threat on the part of our adversaries is sufficiently likely that Joint Chief of Staff Chaiman General Jones is making preparation to secure U.S.
command and control facilities against EMP at a cost estimated at $7 billion. , intentiorially aborted ICBM or ABM might also initiate an EMP.
This issue is sufficiently serious that the Board should certify the question for Appeal Board or Comission determination.
EMBRITTLEMENT, Palmetto 44, CESG 18.
The Board appears to have misread this contention. Reactor materials did indeed comply with 10 CFR Part 50; App. G requirements when tested.
Intervenors' concern is with the unanticipated " rapid increase in refer-ence temperature" which has been found in essentially all reactor vessels examined of which Oconee and Robinson are merely two nearby examples.
All of these reactor vessels were required to confom to essentially the same ASME codes. Perhaps it should be stated that the " reference tempera-ture" is the nil ductility reference temperature below which the applica-l tion of sufficient stress produces a glass-like brittle fracture rather than a chewing-gum-like ductile stretching. Taffy provides a comon example of ductile stretching. Above the nil ductility temperature it
" pulls" to an extraordinary degree without breaking. Below the' nil ductility temperature it breaks like peanut brittle in a fracture mode.
Premature reactor embrittlement increases hazard because ECCS water 25
during a LOCA can chill a reactor yessel below an elevated nil ductility temperature under conditions of appreciable stress. It is only prudent in light of what is clearly a common problem to anticipate and avoid these consequences at Catawba where no evidence exists that these reactors will behave any differently than other ASME Section III, Sub-section NA Components. The Board should note the langqage in ASME Code, Subsection NA 1130 p. 3, (1971 ed.):
The Rules.....do not cover deterioration which may occur in service as a result of radiation effects, corrosion, erosion or instability of the Inaterials, It is this now somewhat illuminated blindspot which Interyenors seek to address.
RELEASES TO LAKE WYLIE, Palmetto 46, CESG 20 The 1977 accident at Duke's Oconee plant referred to by the Intervenors resulted from Duke's disregard of AEC rules and FSAR specifications re-sulting in a substantial fine. It is not possible to anticipate rule violations at Catawba, but it is appropriate to inquire into potential Catawba equipment design to deal with a similar non-planned release, The release at Oconee occurred because Duke pressurized the turbine side fluid to identify steam generator tube leaks'without discharging radioactive water which the turbine side contained and replacing it with l
non-radioactive water before pressurizing. A gasket on the turbine room vessel blew out, resulting in spraying the turbine room with radioactive water. The volume used to wash down the contaminated turbine room exceeded Duke's facilities for storing and treating the radioactive water and-res sulted in a discharge exceeding technical specifications into Lake Hartwell -
26
r 4
a potable water source. The' Board should admit this contention by revision of its order.
LIABILITY OF NEW OWNERS, Palmetto 48, CESG 22.
This contention concerns the liability of the new owners in the event of a nuclear accident. Whether an accident occurs at Catawba or some other facility, if liability exceeds the level detemined under the Price-Anderson Act, as amended, 42 USC Section 2210, Pub. L. 94.197, 89 Stat.
Ill, an assessment of up to $5 million may be imposed for each reactor owned. This burden is one which it is unlikely and undemonstrated that the new owners - municipals and cooperatives - could meet and would therefore likely lead to default.
SERVICE'0F DOCUMENTS Intervenors request that the Board revise its Order at pp. 39 and 40 to clarify that Applicants'be required to serve upon them a complete copy of the Application, Environmental Report, Final Safety Analysis Report and Technical Specifications, Counsel for Palmetto Alliance and the representative of CESG have each requested of the Applicants that such service be made. Each request was refused.
Amendments and additions received are meaningless without the original documents to amend or add to. The partial loaned copy previously ;
made available by the State Emergency Preparedness Office to counsel for Palmetto Alliance was returned to the State of South Carolina upon request.
The nearest complete copy of these documents to the business office of Palmetto Alliance and the office of its counsel is at a distance of over 27 I t
one and one-half hours in P,ock Hill where the only public copy in South ;
Carolina of the transcript and other filings are to be located.
As a matter of basic fairness these materials should be served on
- all parties. Section 556(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act provides
The transcript of testimony and exhibits together with all papers and requests filed in the proceeding, constitutes the record for de-cision in accordance with section 557 of this title and, upon payment of lawfully prescribed costs, shall be made available to the parties,...
5 USC 556(e). As record matters - cited by the Board in this Order, passim - these documents should be served on the parties, now including these Intervenors.
CONCLUSION Intervenors Palmetto Alliance and Carolina Environmental Study Group respectfully request that the Board revise its Memorandum and Order dated March 5, IL32, certify such questions as herein provided and grant such further relief sought and as is just and reasonable.
I' March 31, 1982 bb-JeQe L. Riley U M~
Carolina Environmental Study Group 854 Henley Place Charlotte, North Carolina 28207 Robert GuilcY Esquire 314 Pall Mall Columbia, South Carolina 29201 Attorney for~ Palmetto Alliance 28
. o UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )
)
DUKE POWER COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-413 (CatawbaNuclearStation )
Units 1 and 2) )
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of PALMETTO ALLIANCE AND CAROLINA ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY GROUP RESPONSES AND OBJECTIONS TO ORDER F0LLOWING PREHEARING CONFERENCE in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class this 31st day of March, 1981:
James L. Kelley, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. A. Dixon Callihan Union Carbide Corporation Post Office Box Y Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 Dr. Richard F. Foster Post Office Box 4263 Sunriver, Oregon 97701 Richard P. Wilson, Esquire Assistant Attorney General 2600 Bull Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201 Atomic Safcty & Licensins 4 peal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 J. Michael McGarry, III, Esquire Debevoise and Libeman 1200 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
r e >
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington; D.C. 20555 Docket and Service Section U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington; D.C. 20555 Henry Presler, Chaiman Charlotte-Mecklenburg Environmental Coalition 942 Henley Place Charlotte, North Carolina 28207 Jesse L. Riley Carolina Environmental Study Group 854 Henley Place Charlotte, North Carolina 28207 3- g
~R+bert Gurl 4 4 squire Attorney for the' Palmetto Alliance i