ML20197J287
| ML20197J287 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba, 05522234  |
| Issue date: | 12/11/1998 |
| From: | Bechhoefer C Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| To: | |
| References | |
| CON-#498-19789 98-745-01-SP, 98-745-1-SP, SP, NUDOCS 9812150032 | |
| Download: ML20197J287 (28) | |
Text
. _ _ . __ _ _ _ _ _ . ___ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _.___ _ -
{ O e
00CP.r c0 t
LBP-98-30 i.F.t.s,'
! UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
% DEC 11 Am:17 ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD PANEL Od
- Before Administrative Judges
- %- -
ADa,u, ;:p Charles Bechhoefer, Presiding Officer Dr. Richard F. Cole, Special Assistant l
l In the matter of: Docket No. 55-22234-SP RANDALL L. HERRING ASLBP No. 98-745-01-SP (Senior Reactor Operator December 11, 1998 License for Catawba Nuclear Station)
SERVED Ds i i ma INITIAL DECISION (Application for Senior Reactor Operator License)
Pending before me is the June 7, 1998 appeal of Randall L. Herring from the denial by the NRC Staff of his application for a Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) License for i the Catawba Nuclear Station. For the reasons that follow, I {
km affirming the Staff's denial, although on a different basis than put forth by the Staff. I am also setting forth certain criteria that may govern a future re-application by ,
)
Mr. Herring.
A. Introduction This appeal is governed by the informal hearing i-L procedures set-forth in 10 C.F.R. Part 2, Subpart L (10 C.F.R. SS 2.1201-2.1263). I have been designated Presiding Officer to consider this appeal, and have appointed r
0-9812150032 981211 PDR ADOCK 05000413 ,O O PDR ) i
I.
Administrative Judge Richard F. Cole to serve as my Special l
l Assistant. 63 Fed. Reg. 34197 (June 23, 1998). By i Memorandum and Order (Hearing File and Specification of l
Claims), dated June 30, 1998, I granted Mr. Herring's request for a hearing and set forth schedules to be followed. On the same day, I issued a Notice of Hearing.
! 63 Fed. Reg. 36720 (July 7, 1998).
Thereafter, on July 21, 1998, Mr. Herring filed a Specification of Claims, which outlined why he believed the NRC Staff had erred in denying his application for an SRO license. The Staff, in accordance with 10 C.F.R.
S 2.1231(a), filed the Hearing File on July 23, 1998 I
i (supplemented, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. S 1231 (c) , on September l i
i
( 11, 1998). Mr. Herring filed his written presentation of arguments on August 13, 1998 (hereinafter, " Presentation").
The Staff responded on September 11, 1998, backed by
! affidavits of three witnesses: Messrs. D. Charles Payne, Melvyn N. Leach and Everett Thomas Beadle. ('n O September 16, 1998, the Staff filed the notarized affidavit of Mr.
l l Payne.) l l I turn first to the background of the appeal items that
! are before me for review, then to a description of the grading guidelines applicable to the questions that Mr.
Herring failed to pass and finally to a review of the t
questions raised by Mr. Herring in his Presentation. l l
B. Backaround In December, 1997, Mr. Randall L. Herring, a Staff Engineer at the Catawba Nuclear Facility (see Personal Qualification Statement-Licensee (NRC Form 398), Hearing File, Item 1), took the examination for a senior reactor operator license. That examination was designated as a
" Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) Instant" examination, to be differentiated from an SRO Upgrade for current reactor operators (which Mr. Herring was not). See Form ES-303-1, Hearing File, Item 2. It included both a written test (which was administered on December 12, 1997) and an operating test (administered On December 2-5 and 16-18, 1997). Payne aff., 11 8, 11. Mr. Herring passed both the written test (with a grade of 87%, with 80% representing the passing grade) and several portions of the operating test.
But on January 27, 1998, he was advised by Region II of the )
NRC of the proposed denial of his SRO license based on failure to pass the operating test (Hearing File, Item 22).
He further was advised of a number of options that he could pursue, including an informal NRC Staff review of the examination grading.
Mr. Herring chose the latter option. By letter dated February 11, 1998 (Hearing File, Item 23) to the Director, Division of Reactor Controls and Human Factors, NRR, he I requested an informal review of the four topics of his operating test on which he had been graded " Unsatisfactory" r
l
. . . . ~ , - . . . - . _ - . . . - . - ~ _ - - . - - - _ . - - - .- - .-. - .- _
l i
--one with respect to " Control Room Systems and Facility Walk-Through" (Topic B.1.4) and three with respect to
" Administrative Items" (Topics A.1, A.2, and A.4).
The Appeal Panel determined that he had answered two of those Topics correctly (Topics B.1.4 and A.1) but that two had not been answered satisfactorily (Topics A.2 and ,
L A.4) (Hearing File, Item 25). Although the Appeal Panel recommended that the license denial be overturned, Region II disagreed (Hearing File, Item 27). Region II determined, in effect, that incorrect answers.to two out of four questions in a given examination area (Administrative) was sufficient to support failure of the operating test and hence of the SRO exam. By letter dated May 18, 1998 (Hearing File, Item ,
31), Mr. Herring was advised that the denial of his SRO was being upheld, together with options he could pursue at that time. One would have been to re-apply for an SRO license, ;
no earlier than two-months from the date of that letter (see 10 C.F.R. S 55.35(a)), with the written examination being
, waived if the new license were sought within one year of the :
I written examination date (December 12, 1997). Another was this appeal, which Mr. Herring elected.
l C. Gradina Standards l
Regulations pertaining to operator-license examinations (including'SRO examinations) are found in 10 C.F.R. Part 55.
Under 10 C.F.R. S 55.33, an applicant for a license must pass both a written examination and operating test. Because i:
,~- - , , . - . . , - - - .. ., ,
f 1
t f
Mr. Herring passed the written SRO examination, only the operating test is here at issue.
To set forth consistent standards for operator and SRO l
{ examinations at various facilities, the Commission has issued NUREG-1021 (Interim Revision 8), " Operator Licensing l Examination Standards for Power Reactors." Grading standards for SRO examinations are set forth in NUREG-1021, i
Appendix E, ES-303, " Documenting and Grading Initial Operating Tests" (Hearing File, Item 19). With respect to Category A (" Administrative Topics"), the standards state, in pertinent part:
After grading all of the topics in Category A, assess l the applicant's topic grades and deficiencies and l assign a single "S" or "U" grade for the category. If the applicant has a "U" in only one administrative topic, the examiner may fail the applicant in Category "A" deoendino on the importance of the identified deficiency. However, if the applicant has a "U" in two or more of the administrative topics, the examiner must assion a orade of "U" for Category "A" (emphasis supplied). ,
NUREG-1021, at p. 4 of 28 (Interim Rev. 8, January 1997). ,
l Under.these standards, it is clear why the recommendations i of the Appeal Panel could not be followed. Mr. Herring was l found by that Panel to be deficient in two separate topics of Category A. And while a deficiency in one such topic could have been evaluated as of insufficient importance to warrant a "U" grade, deficiencies in two such topics could l
not have been disregarded, irrespective of their significance.
In performing my review, I am accepting the ;
determination of the Appeal Panel that two of the topics it i had reviewed were answered satisfactorily. The question before me, then, is whether Mr. Herring was correctly
]
evaluated in the two topics as to which the Appeal Panel had ,
l found deficiencies; for if he was, the " Unsatisfactory" l 1
grade he received from Region II would have been mandatory under applicable rules. On the other hand, if not, and if one topic were to remain "U," whether the identified deficiency is of sufficient importance to warrant a "U" grade becomes significant. (of course, if both topical l areas were evaluated incorrectly, as the applicant claims, Mr. Herring must be deemed to have passed the SRO exam.) I turn now to each of those topics.
D. Topics Beine Accealed
- 1. Topic A.2 !
1 Topic A.2 relates to Equipment Control and included two separate questions that were asked in the Catawba main control room. The first of these questions concerned operability of the Nuclear Service Water system (designated as the RN system at Catawba), given a specific set of initial conditions, one of which was that " Valve 1RN-2B in step 2.8 fails to operate, other valves in step 2.8 close" i
(Hearing File, Item 3). According to the examiner (:Mr. D.
Charles Payne), this question had to be asked prior to the second question, inasmuch as the second question (concerning
i l
RN system configuration control for the given condition) was leading and could assist the applicant in answering the first question correctly. Payne affidavit, i 24. In response to question 1, Mr. Herring verbally stated that the system was " operable because the other valve in series worked 'OK' [and that therefore one) can isolate the lake."
Id., at i 25. See also Presentation, at 5.
Mr. Payne states that this answer was incorrect, and that the RN system was " inoperable." He explained that the system was inoperable under the question conditions, as defined by Catawba Technical Specifications (CTS) (Hearing File, Item 9) and the RN system design basis document (DBD)
(Hearing File, Item 10). Payne aff., i 25. After confirming that Mr. Herring considered the RN system to be operable under the conditions stated in Question 1, Mr.
Payne gave Mr. Herring a copy of question 2 (Hearing File, ,
l Item 4). Id. Mr. Herring did not address operability in response to the latter question (nor did he attempt to change his response to Question 1), but he provided the correct answer to Question 2. Mr. Payne explains that he graded Mr. Herring's response to the second question as satisfactory "despite his incorrect understanding of the RN system's operability, because proper system configuration control was established." Id., j 26.
Simply stated, Mr. Herring failed to follow the applicable Technical Specifications and Design Basis
Document. The result of not declaring the RN system to be inoperable would be the likely circumventing of certain of the Catawba facility's administrative controls for dealing with Technical Specification issues--i.e., tracking of Limiting Conditions for Operation and performing operability evaluations, as described in Operations Management Procedure (OMP) 2-29, " Technical Specifications Action Log." The NRC assigns great importance to operator actions, particularly i
SROs, in determining TS system operability and correctly implementing appropriate administrative process controls.
Id., i 28.
In his written presentation, Mr. Herring defends his answer to Item A.2 on several bases. First, he states that the RN system was operable based on the fact that 1RN1B was closed previous to the failure of 1RN2B to close. He added that 1RNIA needed to be kept closed with power removed.
Presentation, at 5. In response, the Staff claims that the latter information was provided in response to Question 2 (where he had been graded satisfactory), and that Mr.
i Herring had not indicated that power should be removed from l valve 1RN-1-A to make the RN system operable (Payne aff., l 1
1 46). The Staff also disagrees with Mr. Herring that !
removing power from 1RN-1-A is not a condition of operability (id., 5 47). It explains:
The licensee (Catawba) expects licensed operators to make system operability determinations using OMP 2-29 i 1
(Presentation exhibit 13), Nuclear System Directive (NSD) 203, " Operability," (Presentation exhibit 9),
Catawba Technical Specification (CTS) (Hearing File, j
_ 9 _
Item 9), and the Design Basis ' Document (DBD) for the af fected system (s) . (Hearing File, Item 10; Beadle affidavit, paragraphs 5-9; Leach affidavit). OMP 2-29 and NSD 203 are guidance documents which provide generic insight and perspective concerning operability, whereas the CTS and DBD are system specific with detailed requirements and action statements. As such, the facility licensee has attested that given the situation presented in Question 1 and 2 of administrative topic A.2, the proper licensed operator action is to apply TS 3.7.4 and refer to RN System DBD for evaluation of valve 1RN-2B. (Beadle affidavit, paragraphs 7, 9). Consequently, the "A" loop of the RN System should be declared inoperable per TS 3.7.4 based on valve 1RN-2B not being capable to position the RN System to the Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond.
Payne aff., i 47. The Staff adds that a licensed operator is expected to know, and be able to properly apply, the TS definition of " operability," as well as know that the RN System is a TS system. Id.
Next, Mr. Herring acknowledges that the answer key for the exam states that the RN system was inoperable, but claims it was based on Recommended Action Statements in the Nuclear Service Water System Design Basis Specification (Hearing File, Item 10). He asserts that Recommended Action Statements are not to be considered equivalent to Technical Specification action statements but are to be considered in conjunction with other documents, including Tech Specs and Bases. He then cites the definition of Operable from the Tech Specs and claims that the RN System was operable under that definition. Presentation, at 5-6. In response, the Staff acknowledges that Recommended Action Statements are not equivalent to TS action statements and as such should not be relied upon solely as the basis for restoring the RN
l system to operability. It agreed that after performing the l
DBD specified action to close and remove power from 1RN-1A, a complete operability evaluation should be performed and l
reviewed by Operations management prior to exiting the TS l
3.7.4 action statement and declaring the RN cperable again.
But it claims that that situation was not presented by these questions. It adds that the examination serves to assure that SRO applicants are familiar with and will operate the plant in accordance with the facility's license requirements (including Tech Specs), plant normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures, and management's administrative procedures. The Staff quotes Catawba management to the effect that " operations management expects the licensed operator to follow this guidance [RN Design Basis Specification, Section 20.4.2.1 Power Operated Valves) and declare the 'A' loop inoperable." (Beadle aff, 1 7.) The Staff concludes that Mr. Herring's answer does not meet these expectations (Payne aff., 1 48).
With respect to Mr. Herring's claim that the examination answer key was based solely on the Recommended Action Statement of the DBD and that it conflicts with the general guidance of the Design Basis Specification (DBS) and OMP 2-29, the Staff disagrees. It states that the answer to Question 2 was based on the DBD but that the answer to the operability question (Question 1) was based on the CTS l
definition of operability (also defined in NSD 203) and its
l l
applicability to. CTS 3.7.4. (Payne aff., 1 49). The Staff ;
notes that NSD 203 is'a corporate-level policy document, j applicable to three different nuclear plant sites, from which each facility may develop facility-specific
! compensatory actions that fall within the guidance (id., !
1 53). '
l_ Mr. Herring further asserts that, in making the l I
l operability decision for Question 1 during the exam, he :
1 l .
considered CTS 3.7.4, which requires a supply and discharge l
flow path capable of being aligned to the Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond (SNSWP) but does not require that the RN system be capable of automatically aligning to the pond, 4
just that it be capable of being manually aligned to the j pond. (He cites another CTS, 3.3.2, Item 14g, as requiring i
capability to automatically align or, if incapable, that )
l L there be manual alignment.) Presentation, at 6. l
.The Staff acknowledges that Mr. Herring correctly states'the definition of operable / operability but that his interpretation of how to apply the definition to the CTS is flawed. The Staff-cites NSD 203 to the effect that a system is operable or has operability when it is capable of
. performing its specified function (s) (Presentation, Exh. 9),
l l 'and asserts that one-of the safety functions of the RN system is the capability to. automatically swap from Lake
- Wylie to the SNSWP upon receipt of an emergency low pit level signal (Presentation, Exhs. 5, 6).
\
l l l
Io Next, Mr. Herring asserts that the first substep in I
! step 2.8 of OP/0/A/6400/06C, Enclosure 4.10 (Hearing File, l
l Item 9) closed 1RNIA and, as a result, RN Pit A was isolated l
from the lake. Subsequently, all other valves to align RN to the SNSWP were aligned to their proper position with the exception of 1RN2B. With RN in this alignment, Mr. Herring judged.the RN system as able to fulfill the requirement in CTS 3.7.4 and hence as operable since 1RNIA does not receive ;
any signals to open the valve. He further explained that he judged the RN system to be operable because-1RNIA was closed, not simply because it would operate. Mr. Herring also asserted that, before being asked Question 2 (and contrary to the recollection of the Examiner), as well as at the time he received Question 2, he had stated that 1RNIA needed to be tagged closed with power removed, to maintain configuration control to ensure that 1RNIA was not opened by
~
an operator which would make the RN system (loop A) inoperable. He cited a Summary Flow Diagram (Presentation, Item 13) as showing that with 1RNIA closed, the intake from f
the lake is isolated. He concludes this argument with the observation that, since 1RNIA was closed prior to the failure of 1RN2B, at no time was there a possibility of diverting Standby Nuclear Service Water inventory to Lake
'Wylie. Presentation, at 6-7.
( In response to this latter argument, the Staff notes I
that.NSD 203 states that the compensatory measure is to i
place the valve (emphasis provided by Staff) in its ESF position, and that the valve in this situation is 1RN-2B, not 1RN-1A as claimed by Mr. Herring. The Staff concludes that, since it is known that valve 1RN-2B will not close (per initial conditions of the question), and its ESF position is closed, the compensatory action in the applicant's cited reference cannot be accomplished. The Staff does agree that having 1RN-1A in the closed position has the equivalent effect on that portion of the RN suction piping, but NSD 203 does not specifically address this condition. As permitted by the policy statement of NSD 203, however, this situation is specifically addressed in the RN system DBD (Hearing File, Item 10). Consequently, the required compensatory action, as set forth by the Staff, is to close 1RN-1A and remove power from the valve. The Staff asserts that this conclusion is supported by the facility licensee. Payne aff., i 53, citing Beadle aff., 11 7-9.
The Staff adds that Mr. Herring's statement in his Presentation that he had advised the examiner that it would be permissible to place an operations information sticker on the valve control to prevent changes in valve position is irrelevant since, according to Mr. Payne, the applicant made no such statement. Even if he had, however, the statement would have little if anything to do with the correctness of Mr. Herring's response to whether or not a particular valve
(
(rather than the system as a whole) were operable.
l
l I conclude with respect to Question 1 of Topic A.2 that the answer given by Mr. Herring--that the RN system was operable--was manifestly incorrect, given the mandatory initial conditions with which the question was freighted.
The RN system was functional--i.e., it could be made to work by manual operation. But the system as a whole was inoperable, inasmuch as the automatic actuation built into the system would not work. Moreover, each of the scenarios posed by Mr. Herring in his Presentation that would lead to the answer he provided are fraught with fatal flaws, as outlined by Mr. Payne and reiterated here in summary form.
Collectively, they do not undercut the Staff's finding that Mr. Herring did not answer Questien 1 of Administrative Topic A.2 correctly.
Every reviewer of the question and answer provided by Mr. Herring of which I have been made aware (except, of course, Mr. Herring) agreed that the RN system was properly described as inoperable given the conditions underlying the question. These include Mr. Payne, the NRC examiner; Mr.
Melvyn N. Leach, Chief, Operator Licensing Branch of NRC's Region III Office and Chairman of the Appeal Panel that conducted an informal review of Mr. Herring's answer to the examination question; Everett Thomas Beadle, employed by the licensee, Duke Power Co., as a Nuclear Instructor, Operator l
Training, at the Catawba Plant; Donald W. Bradley, employed l
i by Duke Power Co. as a Shift Operations Manager, Catawba l
o l
Station; Mr. Michael Ernstes, another NRC Chief Examiner at Catawba, who concurred in operating test failure by signing Form ES-303-1 on January 20, 1998 (although not observing Mr. Herring's performance); Mr. Thomas Peebles, Chief of the Operator Licensing and Performance Branch, Region II; and Mr. John Munro, an examiner from the Operator Licensing and Human Performance Branch (HOHB) , Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (.N RR). See Payne aff., $ 40.
In short, based on the considered opinions of these individuals, I am holding that Mr. Herring's answer to Question 1 of Administrative Topic A.2 was not correct and that the Staff's "U" grade was justified.
- 2. Topic A.4 Knowledge of the emergency plan for a facility is one of the items upon which a SRO candidate may be tested. See, in particular, 10 C.F.R. S55.4 5 (a) (11) . Item A.4 was an emergency plan question that required the applicant to make a Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) based on a specified set of conditions during a general emergency and then to reevaluate the PAR based on changed meteorological conditions. Mr. Herring was asked three questions with respect to administrative topic A.4. The questions were asked in the reactor's main control room. Mr. Herring t
answered Questions 1 and 3 correctly. His failing grade was based on his response to Question 2. Payne aff., $$ 29-36.
Enclosure 4.2 of the Emergency Plan sets forth l
1 Protective Action Zones (PAZs) to be evacuated under 1 4
specified circumstances. Hearing File, Item 15. Page 1 cf 3 of that Enclosure is an Emergency Plaiir4ird Zone (EPZ) map delineating the 10-mile EPZ. Pages 2 and 3 of Enclosure !
l 4.2, each labeled " Protective Action Zones Determination Table," rat forth recommended zones for evacuation under specified circumstances. The examiner states that he observed Mr. Herring, in answering Question 2, to use ;
Enclosure 4.2, page 3 of 3, rather than page 2 of 3, as expected and as appropriate for the given site conditions.
Id., at i 30. In his response to Question 2, Mr. Herring listed 12 PAZs requiring evacuation and three requiring in- l l
place sheltering. This response exactly matched the PAZs of i Enclosure 4.2, page 3 of 3, for the given site conditions. I 1
Id., i 32. The expected answer would have required l
evacuation of seven PAZs (rather than 12), as set forth in Enclosure 4.2, page 2 of 3. Id., i 33.
As the reason for the mistaken reference, the examiner noted that both pages had similar appearances and required care in assuring the proper table was being used. In l addition, he noted that, according to S 3.0, " Subsequent i
! Actions," of *he Emergency Procedure (RP/0/A/5000/005, p. 2 l
of 4), the flowchart on Enclosure 4.3, page 1 of 3, should be used in answering Question 2. That flowchart provided that Enclosure 4.2, page 3 of 3, should be used only if plant conditions exist where "large fission product
1 inventory greater than gap activity [is) in containment."
l The examiner opined that Mr. Herring either improperly used l the flowchart (i.e., believed that the containment had a large fission product inventor") or, alternatively, was !
careless in his use of Enclosure 4.2; but that, either way, Mr. Herring exhibited poor understanding and improper use of the emergency response procedure. Id., 1 32.
In his Presentation, Mr. Herring sets forth several ;
reasons either why his answer was correct or why the j question was ambiguous and should not be counted. First, 1 Mr. Herring claims that, in answering Question 1 (on which .
he received a satisfactory grade), he used Section 2.0, l
Immediate Actions, of the Emergency Plan. Then, to answer l Question 2 (the only one on which he was graded as j unsatisfactory), he turned to Section 3.0, subsequent Actions, of the plan, which describes several actions that j an operator must take, including:
Evaluace specific plant conditions, off-site dose projections, field monitoring team data, and assess i need to update Protective Action Recommendations made i to states and counties in previous notification. (See i Enclosure 4.3, page 1 of 3, Guidance for Protective Actions, Protective Action Recommendation Flowchart, .
and see Enclosure 4.4, Evacuation Time Estimates for i
l
! Catawba Plume Exposure EPZ) . [ Hearing File, Item 15, RP/0/A/5000/005, at p. 3 of 4, emphasis supplied.]
Mr. Herring observes that the flowchart referenced in l Section 3.0 is taken from the Emergency Plan. See Hearing i File, Item 15, RP/0/A/5000/005, Enclosure 4.3, page 1 of 3.
He characterizes two diamond figures appearing at the start of the flowchart. The first (" General Emergency Declared?")
- . . _ . . -. - _ - - - . - - - ._ = -. .
t is always answered affirmatively, according to Mr. Herring, since the procedure containing the flowchart is the General l Emergency Procedure. The second diamond looks at whether windspeed is less than or equal to 5 mph. It directs the operator to one of two blocks, both of which are designated
" urgent" and, according to Mr. Herring, correspond to the Immediate Action Step of Section 2.0. If yes, the action required is evacuation of seven zones and in-place shelter for eight zones. If no, the action required is to
" recommend evacuation of 2 mile radius & 5 miles downwind l
and recommend in-place shelter for zones not evacuated l
l (referencing Encl. 4.2, Page 2 of 3)."
l Mr. Herring then states that the immediate action step l
had been performed as the answer to Question 1, so that he l
then proceeded to the block "Large Fission Product Inventory Greater Than Gap Activity In Containment?" He asserts that l- he answered that question "no" which took him to the diamond l l l "Off-Site Doses Projected to Exceed Protective Action ;
I l Guides." Based on a projected dose of11.2 rem TEDE, his !
! l answer was yes, leading him to a block " Recommend Protective j i
Actions In Accordance With The Protective Action Guides !
(Encl. 4.3, page 3 of 3)." With a projected dose greater i than 1 rem TEDE, according to Mr. Herring, the PAR is
" Recommend evacuation of affected zones and shelter the remainder of the 10 mile EPZ not evacuated." He concludes 1
by asserting that he proceeded to Enclosure 4.2, page 3 of ;
i I
l I
3, which directs use of a table to determine recommended zones for evacuation, and he determined the zones as set forth in his examination answer.
In response to this line of argument, the Staff examiner disagrees with the action to be taken for the second step of Procedure RP/05, Section 3.0, Subseauent Actions, which I have quoted in pertinent part above. He claims that, because site meteorological conditions were changed significantly in Question 2 from those in Question 1, an update of the previous PAR per this step was the correct action to take. He adds that plant conditions had not changed and, therefore, he believed a knowledgeable operator would have expected a PAR determination similar in extent to that obtained in Question 1 but affecting different PAZs due to the change in wind direction. The Staff examiner goes on to agree with Mr. Herring that the subsequent action step of Section 3.0 directs the operator to the flowchart mentioned above. Payne aff., T 41.
At that point, however, the Staff examiner states that the " operator should enter the flowchart at the ' Start' block, proceed through the chart answering each decision block in turn based on plant and site conditions, and perform all associated actions as directed." Id. In other words, with a change in conditions, an operator should start again at.the " start" designation on the flowchart.
I
\
l
l .
l The Staff examiner acknowledges that the Applicant had j l
stated that the flowchart's Uraent blocks correspond to the i
Immediate Action step of Section 2.0 of Proccdure RP/05, and I
that, since Immediate Action had been performed in response to Question 1, he then proceeded to the next block (making no updated PAR as a result of the Uraent block). The Staff l
\
further acknowledges that the Catawba management i representative, Mr. Beadle, supported the course'of action followed by Mr. Herring in not making an updated PAR as a i
result of the Uraent block. Beadle aff., 1 18. In other words, neither Mr. Herring nor Catawba management would require a repeat of the entire flowchart. l
- Nonetheless, the Staff asserts that no procedural
- guidance or step in the Emergency Plan directs the operator 1
to skip portions of the flowchart. Nor has there been provided, either by Mr. Herring or Catawba management, any l
approved facility procedure or emergency plan " users guide" which sanctioned such an action or omission. Payne aff.,
T 41. Moreover, even though Catawba management supported l
l the initial steps followed by Mr. Herring, it reached the l
same result as advocated by the Staff. Catawba management reasoned that there were only two tables available to make PARS and that the table in Enclosure 4.2, page 3 of 3 (which Mr. Herring used in his answer), is eliminated inasmuch as there was no large fission product inventory greater than gap activity in containment, leaving the table in Enclosure
I l
l I
4.2, page 2 of 3, by elimination as the only table to use.
Beadle aff., i 19.
After review of all the material submitted, I conclude
)
that Mr. Herring failed to pass capic A.4 of Category A.
However, Mr. Herring also claims that the question (and particularly the referenced flowchart) were ambiguous and i
that the flowchart was later modified to remove the !
l ambiguities. That it was so modified is not in dispute. In !
l the view of plant management, however, the modifications were human factor enhancements that did not invalidate ,
1 Question 2, as written. Beadle aff., i 21. In addition, the correct answer to Question 2 (set forth in the answer key) was also changed to include evacuation of two additional PAZs from those originally designated, zones that j had been selected by Mr. Herring for evacuation. Mr. )
l Herring was given credit for evacuation of these PAZs.
l Payne aff., j 33.
1 In his Presentation (at p. 3), Mr. Herring challenges the correctness of the Staff statements to the effect that the only change between Que_stiona 1 and 2 was an increase in windspeed and change of direction. He claims that the projected dose was also changed. But the Staff disagrees, I
citing the initial plant conditions supplieu .o Mr. Herring for all three of the questions. Payne aff., i 42.
Mr. Herring further contends that the Emergency Plan provides no procedural guidance in Enclosure 4.3, page 3 of
l i
l 1 3, regarding which enclosure should be used at that point to determine affected PAZs. The Staff claims--and it is not rebutted--that Mr. Herri did not inform the examiner of a l
problem with the procedure nor did he indicate any confusion regarding how to proceed in a proper PAZ determination. It l
states that Mr. Herring had been trained in use of these l procedures and is also expected to be knowledgeable regarding actions to take if a procedure is confusing or in error. It concludes that the Staff does not expect licensed i I
operators to follow procedures they believe to be in error without addressing the issue with licensee management and that, if Mr. Herring concluded during the examination that the procedure was confusing or in error, he should have raised the issue with the examiner (which he did not).
Payne affidavit, $ 43.
Finally, along the same line, Mr. Herring's Presentation asserts a lack of guidance to determine which page of Enclosure 4.2 to use and that the procedure is thus
" faulty." In support, Mr. Herring relies both on Mr. Steve Christopher, Supervisor of Emergency Planning, and the i
- revisions to the procedure itself. The Staff indicates--
l correctly--that Mr. Christopher's concern was not shared by
- facility management (as indicated earlier in its analysis of proper actions to be taken) and, in addition, that Mr.
Christopher has offered inconsistent opinions on this issue.
Payne aff., i 44. Beyond that, the Staff notes that the
i question had been posed to one other applicant trained and qualified in the same manner as Mr. Herring and that this applicant had no trouble in answering the question correctly. Id. The Staff concludes that a "less than optimal, but accurate, procedure does not excuse poor operator performance or lack of knowledge. Likewise, the fact that a procedure has been revised does not mean it was not useable or that future improvements won't be made." Id.
Based on the entire record, and as set forth earlier, I conclude that Mr. Herring answered Question 2 of Topic A.4 incorrectly. But I also reevgnize the considerable ambiguities in answering this question raised by Mr.
Herring, particularly with respect to use of page 2 or page 3 of Enclosure 4.2. It is apparent that page 3 of 3 is to be used only when large fission product inventory is greater than gap activity in containment, but page 3 of 3 does not appear to include that caveat. Moreover, the flowchart is confusing in that it fails to state clearly that an operator should return to the " Start" designation each time a variation in meteorological conditions appears. That being so, I am giving Mr. Herring the benefit of doubt in this area and am holding that his answer to Topic A.4 should not be considered in determining whether he passed the examination administered to him.
- 3. Importance of Tooic A.2 Because I have determined not to consider Topic A.4 in
4-l l ' Catawba management also believes that questions '
concerning operation and operability of the RN system are l important. They were developed to test a candidate's knowledge of the Tech.lical Specifications for the RN system l
and the documents necessary to determine. operability of the I
system's trains and components, and are based on certain l
( . knowledge requirements listed in NUREG-1122, rev. 1 (draft).
Beadle aff., 13. They also require that the operator be
[ familiar with and follow the RN Decign Basis Specification.
l l
Id., 1.7. The questions require knowledge that valve 1RN-2B j' has a safety function and has Technical Specification significance requiring operator action, knowledge as to which Mr. Herring had received training. Id., 1 9. ,
Management adds that "Mr. Herring's contention has merit as an engineering evaluation for operability, but it would be considered a subsequent action to the licensed operator actions taken at the time the valve failure was found. Mr.
Herring was being evaluated as a licensed senior reactor operator candidate, not as a systems engineer." Id., 1 10.
Based on my own evaluation, and taking into account my l
disregard of the. incorrect answer to Topic A.4, for reasons set forth earlier, I regard Mr. Herring's incorrect' answer
_to Topic A.2 as si gnii f cant enough to lead to his failure of r
i the entire operator examination. I find particularly I significant the belief by Catawba management (cited above) i
- 'that Mr, Herring's contentions on Topic A.2 would have merit b
i-1 -
l from the standpoint of a systems engineer (:Mr. Herring's current position) but not from the standpoint of an SRO for which he is seeking a license.
E. Relief When Mr. Herring's licensw application was denied on May 18, 1998, he was permitted to file this appeal, whi h he did. He also was told he could re-apply for an SRO license no earlier than two months from the date of that letter (see 10 C.F.R. S 55.35 (a) ) , with the written examination being waived if the application wn:e submitted within one year of the written examination (December 12, 1997).
Because I am upholding the Staff's denial of the SRO license, this Decision will become the focal point for re-applying for an SRO license, should Mr. Herring e-Icr. to do so. Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. S 55.35 (a) , a renewal application may be submitted no earlier than two months from the date of this Decision. Because the earlier waiver of the written test will have expired, and because the regulation permitting such waiver (10 C.F.R. S 55.35 (b)) appears to have no time limitation, I am pointing out that the Staff is author _.ed to extend the written-examination waiver to encompass a prompt re-application if it deems such action to be appropriate.
F. Order For the reasons stated, and based on the entire record, it is, this lith day of December, 1998 a _-
3 G
ORDERED
- 1. The appeal of Mr. Randall Herring from the NRC Staff's denial of his application for a SRO license is hereby denied.
- 2. If Mr. Herring chooses to re-apply for an SRO license, he may do so any time following two months from the date of this Decision. 10 C.F.R. S 55.35(a).
- 3. A petition for review of this Decision by the Commission may be filed pursuant to 10 C.F.R. S 2.786. Any such petition must be filed within 15 days after service of this Decision and must conform to requirements set forth in 10 C.F.R. S 2.786. Within 10 days after service of a petition for review, the NRC Staff may file an answer supporting or opposing Commission review.
Presiding Officer mb, ~
Charles Bechhoefer /
ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE Rockville, Maryland i December 11, 1998 l
i l
1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of RANDALL L. HERRING Docket No.(s) 55-22234-SP 1 (Denial of Reactor Operator's License Application) ]
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing INITIAL DECISION LBP-98-30 have been served upon the following persons by U.S. mail, first class, except as otherwise noted and in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Sec. 2.712.
Administrative Judge Office of Commission Appellate Charles Bechhoefer Adjudication Presiding Officer U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Washington, DC 20555 Mail Stop - T-3 F23 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
! Washington, DC 20555 l
l Administrative Judge l l Richard F. Cole Susan L. Uttal, Esq. l Special Assistant Office of the General Counsel Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Mail Stop 15 B18 l Mail Stop - T-3 F23 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 I l Washington, DC 20555 i
.Randall L. Herring 2148 Raven Drive Rock Hill, SC 29732 i-Dated at Rockville, Md. this //
11 day of December 1998 f/ l l
Office of the Se ary of the Commission 9
I V. ,
i
-