ML20246J657
| ML20246J657 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 08/31/1989 |
| From: | Thompson H NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | DUKE POWER CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20246J654 | List: |
| References | |
| EA-89-046, EA-89-46, NUDOCS 8909050232 | |
| Download: ML20246J657 (9) | |
Text
_
g, L .
[" . .
[' s e UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414 Duke Power Company ) License Nos. NPF-35 and NPF-52 (Catawba Units 1 and 2) ) EA 89-46 ORDER IMPOSING CIVIL MONETARY PENALTY I
Duke Power Company, Charlotte, North Carolina (licensee) is the holder of Operating' License Nos. NPF-35 and NPF-52 (licenses) issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Commission or NRC) on January 17, 1985 and May 15, 1986, respectively. The licenses authorize the licensee to operate Catawba Units 1 and 2 in accordance with the conditions specified therein.
II NRC inspection of the licensee's activities under the license was conducted on November 27, 1988 - February 4,1989. The results of this inspection indicated that the licensee had not conducted its activities in full compliance with NRC requirements. A written Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) was served upon the licensee by letter dated May 19, 1989. The ;
1 Notice stated the nature of the violations, the provisions of the NRC's require- !
ments that the licensee had violated, and the amount of the civil penalty proposed for Violation A. The licensee responded to the Notice by letter dated 1
June 16, 1989. In its response, the licensee admitted the violations but contended that Violation A did not warrant escalation of the proposed civil l penalty and requested that the civil penalty be partially mitigated. In addition, )
the licensee asserted that Violation B should be categorized as a Severity Level )
IV instead of a Severity Level III violation. I i
8909050232 s?O831 _
l ppR ADOcK0500g3 o ,
. _ - _ - _ _ _ _ . - - _ _ _ - _ . _ .i
op . . :
- III Afteritonsideration of the licensee's response and the statement of fact, explanation, and argument for partial mitigation of Violation A and recategori-zation of Violation B contained therein, the Deputy Executive Director for Nuclear Materials Safety, Safeguards, and Operations . Support (DEDS)' has deter-mined, as set forth in the Appendix to this Order, that the penalty proposed for Violation A designated in the Notice-of Violation and Proposed Imposition of the Civil Penalty should be imposed, and that Violation B was properly categorized.
IV In view of the foregoing and pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
The licensee pay a civil penalty in the amount of Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars ($75,000) within 30 days of the date of this Order, by check, draft, or money order, payable to the Treasurer of the United States and mailed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555.
V The licensee may request a hearing within 30 days of the date of tnis Order. A request for a hearing shall be clearly marked as a " Request for an Enforcement Hearing'.' and shall be addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C.
20550, with copies to the Assistant General Counsel for Hearings and Enforcement, at the same address, the Regional Administrator, Region II,101 Marietta Street, N.W., Atlanta, Georgia 30323, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at Catawba.
If a hearing is requested, the Commission will issue e.i Order designating the time and place of the hearing. If the licensee fails to request a hearing within 30 days of the date of this Order, the provisions to this Order shall be effective without further proceedings. If payment has not been made by that time, the matter may be referred to the Attorney General for collection.
In the event the licensee requests a hearing as provided above, the issues to be considered at such hearing shall be whether on the basis of Violation A set forth in the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty referenced in Section II above, which the licensee has admitted, the Order to pay a Seventy-Five Thousand Dollar civil penalty should Le sustained.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION f/##
Hug L. Thompson J r.
De uty Executive Dire or for i Nuclear Materials Safety, Safeguar3s and Operations Support I Dated at
- thisj;) dayRockville, o Hagland 9
6 L.:
p V. .
APPENDIX-EVALUATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS I
l On May 19, 1989, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty was issued for'. violations identified during a routine NRC inspection. .The Notice cited two. Severity Level III violations, and proposed a civil penalty for.
Violation A.' Duke PoJ r Company (DPC) responded to the Notice on June 16, 1989. In its response, :'e licensee requested mitigation of the proposed Civil Penalty and a reduction in severity level of Violation B. The NRC's evaluation
, and conclusions regarding DPC'c ~ arguments are as follows:
RESTATEMENT OF VIOLATION Violation A Technicai Specification 3.6.5.6 requires in Modes 1 through 4 that two independent Containment Air Return and Hydrogen Skimmer Systems (VX) be CPERABLE. With cre Containment Air Return and Kydrogen Skimmer System (VX) inoperable,- the inoperable system shall be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or the unit is to be in at least HOT STANDBY within -
the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, ard in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
Contrary to the above, during a period of 42 days from February 19, 1988 to April 1,1988, Unit 2 operated in Modes 1 through 4 with one of the two independent Containment Air Return and Hydrogen Skimmer Systems (YX) inoperable. During this period, both trains of VX were requirt,+o be operabic.
Proposeo Civil Penalty - $75,000 Summary of Licensee's Response:
Duke Power Company admits the violation occurred. However, the licensee maintains that escalation of the base civil penalty to $"/5,000 was not warranted and proposes that the civil penalty be mitigated to $25,000.
The licensee's response addresses the following three mitigation factors and other reasons for mitigation as summarized below.
Identification and Reporting The licensee maintains that the NRC characterization that the post redifi-cation test should have been capable of detecting this unique problem is in error. The licensee contends thet their Post Modification Testing and Independent Verification Programs work together in detecting problems, and that the performance test (the VX test), used as the post modification test in this situation, worked properly in evaluating VX operability. The impact of the " sneak-path" established by the wiring error was not fully understood for the YX performance test until lengthy and detailed tests were performed recreating the original miswired condition.
x - __ _ - - - __- _-
A Appendix Corrective Action to Prevent P.ecurrence The Notice stated, "the base penalty for Violation A was increased by 50 percent because initial corrective actions were narrowly focused on correcting the improperly installed electrical wiring and failed to address the broader problem of inacequate Fl:T."
The licensee's response states that the 50 percent escalation of tre civil penalty was inappropriate for two reasons:
A major effort was required to understand the reason for the failure of the VX Periodic Test to catch the unique error. The comprehensive aspect of that review and the revision to LER 414/88-33 that reported those findings showed initiative on their part to ensure this situa-tion would not recur. The issues of licensee initidtive end compre-hensive action are both factcrs for mitigation in this category.
The improvements made to the PMT process through the TOPF0RM program have come about subsequent to this modification and as a result no other similar violations have occurred. Further, the additional
" lessons learned" approach taken shows " extensive" corrective action in PMT to prevent recurrence.
The licensee contends that rather than a 50 percent escalation of the base penalty, a 50 percent reduction should be applied since the actions taken in regard to PMT and those that are ongoing have been complete and Liuely in preventing recurrer.ce.
Past Performance The licensee's reply contends tant with no similar problems in the past two years and an overall SALP 2 rating, which is clearly " adequate," at least a 50 percent reduction in the base civil penalty should be applied.
Other Reasons for Hitigating the Civil Penalty The licensee's response argues that the issue of safety significance must play a part in establishing a final level of the civil penalty. The licensee's response states that in the Enforcement Conference it was shown through onalysis that equipment qualification profiles were not exceeded l and the damper could be tsopened within 30 minutes as demonstrated in a drill. The licensee also argues that the "B" train of VX being out of service for a total of 7 irours curir.s the 42 days that "A" train was unknowingly inoperable was relatively insisreificant in that the probabil-ity of a LOCA event having a "one train response" from the VX system was low.
A .
Appendix NRC's Evaluation of Licensee's Response Identification and Reporting The Licensee's Post Modification Testing and Independent Verification Programs failed to detect a si ttificant VX system operability problem due to a control circuit wiring error prior to placing the reactor in a mode that required the VX system to be operable. Regardless of the failure of the Independent Verification Program to detect the wiring error during the design modification process, an adequate post modification test should have identified the error. The performance test chosen by the licensee as the post modification test was inadequate for this situation becacse 1t did not verify operability of that portion of the VX control circuit that would be activated by the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) during an actual emergency, even though the modification was to the control circuit. The error was discovered during reactor operation by performance of the SSPS logic test, which verifies the slave relay actuation of the VX centrol circuit. Clearly, the licensee's post modification test should have identified the installation error prior to reactor startup, and the NRC, therefore, does not consider this factor as edequate to justify mitigation.
Corrective Action to Prevent Recurrence In evaluating this event in terms of corrective actions, it was noted that inmediate corrective actions on April 1, 1988, were to correct the wiring error, retest the damper in accordarce with the criginal post modification test and declare the system operable. Although the VX damper inoperability and wiring error had been detected by a Technical Specification (TS) required SSPS surveillance test, once the wiring error had been corrected, this test was not repeated prior to declaring the system operable. Instead the same test which had originally failed to detect the wiring error in January 1988 was used to cetermine operability. Not only did the licensee rely on a test (VX functional) that had already proven itself inadequate, but the system was returned to service without performing the failed TS required SSPS surveillance test that initially icentifieo the ceficier.cy.
This, ir. terras of corrective action, is both unacceptable and narrow in focus.
Substantial changes have subsequently been made in the Post-Modification Test Program and full implementation is in progress. As presentea in Duke's meeting with the NRC at Region II on August 15, 1989, the changes include focusing respcr.sibility un the " system expert," verifying that the design basis has not been compromised, and verifying that the system is functionally operable after modification. The f.eu procedures were first used in April,1989 for S/G PORV modification, but full development is still in progress, including additional training of system experts.
However, while these are extensive and appropriate currecent ections, these actions were not sufficiently timely to warrant mitigation. The licensee's June 16, 1989 response to this enforcement action continued to take the narrow view of post modification test requirements. Therefore, the NRC considers the 50 percent escalation vi the civil penalty based en this factor warranted.
L _ _ - -- - - -
. l 1
- Appendix Past Performance With regard to the licensee's contention that a base civil penalty be mitigated 100 percent for a SALP 1 rating, 50 percent for a SALP 2 rating, and 0 percent for a MLP 3 rutirr, the NRC does not believe that application of such a rigid formula serves to appropriately exphin the need to improve performance. The Enforcement Policy clearly allows application of broad discretion in this area by allowing the base civil penalty to be either escalated or mitigated b;r up tv ICL greer.t. Application of discretion (in either direction) can only be taken after due consideration of the nany facts that make up each case.
The NRC recognizes that the licensee's general past performance has been adequate as evidenced by an overall SALP 2 rating in all functional areas. '
However, upon examination of the details in several of the last SALP's functional areas (Operations, Maintenance and Surveillance, ar,c Safety Assessment) that are related to the violations cited here, it was notec' that the licensee has experienced past problems with the proper classification and reporting of safety component failures and significant events in a timely manner. Other specific concerns also addressed by the last SALP included the adequacy of maintenance and modification retesting and the need to improve the support provided by the Compliance ar.d Design Engineering groups in determining technical specification compliance. Although these concerns were judged not to be significant enough to warrant a category 3 SALP rating, they were indicative of a r.eed for further improvement.
While the licensee's overall past performance was adequate, the staff has determined that the past performance was not such as to cerit mitigation in this case.
Other Reasons for Mitigating the Civil Penalty Once the Severity Level is determined in accordance with the Enforcement Policy (Policy), the base civil penalty is esteLiisi.ec in Table IB of the Policy. The escalaticn and i;iitigation factors are then considered to determine what adjustments, if any, to the base civil penalty are warranted.
Safety significance is not an escalation or mitigation factor but a determinant of the severity level. In this case, the NRC appropriately considered safety significance in establishing the Leverity level of ths violation. Specifically, the licensee's Post Modification Testing Program did not ensure that a technical specification required safety system train was crerable prior to placing the reactor in a mode where that system was required to be operet'e. Such program errors are considered significant because they could be applied to any safety system.
Restatement of Violation Violation B 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) requires the submittal of a Licensee Event Report within 30 days after discovery of any operation or condition prohibitcd by the plant's Technical Specifications.
Cor trary to the abac, on September 14, 1988, the licensee determined that
Appendix -S-Catawba Unit 2 had previously operated for 42 days in a condition prohib-ited by the plant's Technical Specifications because train A of the Containment Air Return and Hydrogen Skimmer (VX) System had been inoperable
.and a Licensee Event Report was not submitted until January 27, 1989.
Sur, mary of Licensee's Response Duke Power Compaqy adnits the violation. In the response, however, the licensee contends that as they interpret the enforcement polic) a Severity Level III should not have been imposed in this case and that the violation should have been characterized as a Severity Level IV. The response states that because of the complexity-of the circuit as-a result of the wiring swap and the time required to understand the effects, an unusual enount of time was taken to report the problem.
NRC Evaluation of Response to Violation 8 As stated in the NRC letter of May 19, 1989, Violation E cor.cerned the excessive arount of time that it took to report this event. It is not acceptable to take 10 months to evaluate an event to determine report-ability. The NRC was particularly concerr.ed that after the licensee correctly determined that the system was previously inoperable, it took an additional 4 months to issue the LER. This represents a significant programmatic weakness with the licensee's event evaluation and reporting system. The staff recognizes that the Enforcement Policy provides an example at a Severity Level IV for a violation involving the failure to submit an LEP. However, the examples in the Supplement are just that.
In accordance with the Enforcement Policy they are neither contrciling nor exhausthe. Under the circumstances of this case the staff con-cluded that the delay in submitting this report represented a significant regulatory concern therefore justifying a Severity Level III categorization.
After review of the licensee's response, which provided no additional information not already considered, the NRC determined that there is insufficient cause to reduce the severity level of Violation B.
1
=-
n;;g ,
< . a
" ' 'l
.' Du ke. Power Company--
Distribution PDR-LPDR SECY ,
'CA i HThompsca, DEDS j JTaylor, DEDR, ;
SEbneter, RII.
JLieberman, OE !
TMurley, NRR !
'JPartlow, NRR-
-JGoldberg, OGC' 'i Enforcement Coordinators "i RI,' RII, RIII, RIV, RV FIngram, PA . ,
1 .GJohnson, RM !
' BHayes 01 EJordan, AEOD.-
~MMalsch, 0IG EA' File Day-File
.DCS i
I
- c. j l
OE46/
- RIld4/
OGC M OE DEDS WTroskoski SEbnete ~ JColdberg d erman HThompson j 8/S /89- 8/4 /89 8/f//89 8/d/89 8/3p/89 -
SL pr A - f-s,s/s,4 4,y */5 M .;
i I
1 l
l 1
.