ML20050B536

Overhead Handling Sys Review, Final Rept

ML20050B536
Person / Time
Site:	Limerick
Issue date:	03/31/1982
From:	PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC
To:
Shared Package
ML20050B525	List: ML20050B524 ML20050B536
References
TASK-A-36, TASK-OR NUDOCS 8204060011
Download: ML20050B536 (100)

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{{#Wiki_filter:-_ -_. -. 1-4 4 t t I t L V LIMERICK GENERATING STATION OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS REVIEW FINAL REPORT f f ( i,, i i i i l I i l P i l l l l t 1 Revision 1 March, 1982 8204060011 820402 i PDR ADOCK 05000352 l A PDR - i ... ~. -..

LIMERICK GENERATI 7JG STATION OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS' REVIEW FINAL REPORT CONTENTS 1.

SUMMARY

/ CONCLUSIONS 2.

RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION Information Requested in Section 2.1 (Changes to previous submittal) Information Requested in Section 2.2 (Load-bandling systems near. spent fuel) Information Requested in Section 2.3 (Load-handling systems near systems required for safe-shutdown or decay heat-removal) 3. REFERENCES Table 1 - Index of Overhead Handling Systems Table 2 - Load Tabulation Table 3 - Limerick Special Lifting Devices Table 4 - Refueling Floor Heavy Load Height Restrictions Appendix A - Systems Required for Safe Shutdown and Decay Heat Removal Appendix B - Hazard Evaluations Attachment - Safe Load Path Drawings -i-Revision 1 March, 1982

1.

SUMMARY

/CONCLUSIO_N_S_

This report on overhead heavy load handling systems at Limerick was prepared in response to Sections 2.2 and 2.3 of Reference 1 (Enclosure 3 to the NRC letter to all licenses dated December 22, 1980). It also includes minor revisions to data previously transmitted to the NRC by Reference 2. The format of Section 2 of this report follows that of Reference 1. Detailed information on each crane and hoist, including hazard evaluations, statistics, loao/1.npact area matricles etc. are included in the Tables and Appendicles. This review focused on cranes and hoists in Unit 1 and the common areas of the Limerich facility and included monorails and lifting beams for which no hoists have been purchased but which may be used occasionally for equipment replacement or repair. In most cases the evaluations and conclusions for Unit 1 load handling systems will apply to Unit 2, but differences in equipment locat'.ons and commodity layout will require a separate review for Unit 2 at a later date, since Unit 2 design is not complete. An as-built review will be performed for both Units ta verify that modifications made subsequent to this review do not affect its conclusions. The reactor enclosure crane is the only load handling system capable of carrying heavy loads which could damage irradiated fuel if dropped. Though the crane itself generally complies with the NUREG 0612 quide-lines, its special lifting devices and associated load attachment points do not. This is particularly true for critical loads, where NUREG 0612 recommends twice the normal design safety factor. Since these items have already been fabricated it is proposed to substitute proof load testing in lieu of full compliance with NUREG 0612. All crcnes and hoists were evaluated to determine whether a dropped load could affect the ability to safely shut down the plant and continue to remove dee'y heat from the reactor and fuel pool. Systems required for safe shutdown and decay heat remove. are listed in Appendix A and hazard evaluations are provided in Appendix B. In most cases it was possible o sho,w that, based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems or other plant-specific considerations, no real hazard P-24/6 exists. In some cases it was found advisable to establish load carrying height restrictions or other administrative controls to eliminate concern about potential damage to safety-related systems. There are also a few specific load handling situations where confirmation is needed from the NSSS supplier-that a heavy load drop will not affect fuel or reactor vessel integrity. Conclusions regarding these cases will be provided later. One load-handling situation which cannot be addressed by this report is the case where movement of a heavy load is so infrequent or unexpected that no crane, hoist monorail or lifting beam has been provided. These operations must be treated on a case-by-case basis with the load handling preparations, instructions and equipment based on NUREG 0612 guidelines, to assure that the probability of a load drop is extremely small or that the consequences are acceptable. P-41(b)/9 -lii-Revision 1 March, 1982

List of Ef fective Pages for the Limerick Generating Station Overhead Handling Systems Review Final Report Page Page Page Number Revision

• Number

_ Revision Number Revision i 1 B-1 Original B-31 Original 11 Original B-2 Original B-32 Original lii 1 B-3 1 B-33 1 iv 1 B-4 Original B-34 Original 1 Original B-5 Original B-35 1 2 Original B-6 Original B-36 Original 3 Original B-7 Original B-37 Original. 4 Original B-8 1 B-38 Original 5 Orig inal B-9 1 6 Original B-10 Original 7 Original B-ll Original Table 1 Original 8 Original B-12 Original Table 2 1 9 1 B-13 Original Table 3 Original 10 Original B-14 Original Table 4 1 11 Orig inal B-15 Orig inal 12 Original B-16 Original 13 Orig inal B-17 Orig inal 14 1 B-18 Original 14a 1 B-19 Original 15 Original B-20 Original B-21 1 B-22 1 A-1 Original B-23 Original A-2 Original B-24 1 A-3 Original B-25 1 A-4 Orig inal B-26 Original A-5 Original B-27 Original A-6 Original B-28 Orig inal B-?.9 Original B-30 Original

• Original prepared September, 1981 Revision 1 prepared March, 1982 P-41(b)/9

- iv -

INFORMATION REQUESTED IN SECTION 2.1: This information was previously submitted and was based on a general review of the Limerick overhead handling systems. Changes are required as a result of the detailed review which fallowed. These changes are listed below by paragraph number. Pa,agrap_h 2.1-1 Holst Categorization r The hoists below were not identified during the initial review. They have been incorporated in Table 1 as Items 61, 62 and 63. Items 62 & 63 belong to the group of hoists which carry heavy loads in the vicinity of safety-related equipment. During the detailed review it was determined that other hoists should also be included in this group. These additions are based on a change in the interpretation of the term load path to include areas below grating and hatches, and on more conservative assumptions regarding routing of electrical conduit. Tables 1 and 2 have revised accordingly. Reactor Enclosure Upper Fan Room Hoists (Iten 61) Reactor Enclosure Lower Fan Room Hoists (Item 62) North Stack Instrument Room Dumbwaiter (Item 63) Pa r_ag rap _h, 2.1-3-a Safe Load Paths some of the safe load path drawings have been revised to clarify the load path, or to reflect a better understanding of the load handling methods. ParagrapL2d-3-c Load Tabulation Revisions have been made to Table 2, Load Tabulation, and a hazard elimination category has been assigned to each load / impact area combination (where applicable) as required by Section 2.3-2. Parag,rapL2.1-3-d Special Lifting Devices In the list of critical loads the number of fuel pool gates should be "two Lair per unit". Minor changes have been made to Table 3 based on new information. - P-24/6

INFORMATION REQUESTED IN SECTION 2.2: 2.2 " SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS OPERATING IN THE REACTOR BUILDING NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.4, provides guidelines concerning the design and operation of load-handifng systems in the vicinity of spent fuel in the reactor vessel or in storage. Information provided in response to this section should demonstrate that adequate measures have been taken to ensure that, in this area, either the likelihood of a load drop which might damaca spent fuel is extremely small, or that the estimated consequences of such a drop will not exceed the limits set by the evaluation criteria of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1, Criteria I through III." Pa r_a,ggph_ _2. 2-1 " Identify by name, type, capacity, and equipment designator, any cranes physically capaole (i.e., ignoring interlocks, moveable mechanical stops, or operating procedures) of carrying loads over spent fuel in the storage pool or in the reactor vessel." .R e_s y,,1s,g The following cranes are capable of carrying loads over spent fuel: Reactor Enclosure Crane - Overhead bridge crane with a. 125 ton and 15 ton hoists, equipment number 00H201. Refueling Platform - Gantry crane with one fuel handling b. grapple hoist and two auxiliary 1000 lb. capacity hoists, equipment number 10S272. Fuel Pool Jib Cranes - 1000 lb. capacity, equipment numbers c. OAH208 and OBH208. d. Fuel Channel Handling Boom - Jib crane, 500 lb. capacity, equipment number 10H224. P_a rag r_ay,h 2. 2-2 " Justify the exclusion of any cranes in this area from the above category by verifying that they are incapable of carrying heavy loads or are permanently prevented from movement of heavy loads over stored fuel or into any location where, following any failure, such load may drop into the reactor vessel or spent fuel storage pool." T-24/6

Re,sponse; The refueling platform is excluded from the above category since its hoists do not carry heavy loads. All loads are less than or equal to the weick~ of a fuel bundle. The two auxiliary hoists have load cells with insarlocks to prevent them from lifting anything as heavy as a fuel bundle. The jib cranes are excluded from the above category since they are not required to carry heavy loads. Since their capacity of 1000 lbs. exceeds the heavy load definition, the jib cranes will be derated to a capacity of 700 lbs. This will be accomplished by adjustment of the load limiting device and establishment of necessary sdmini-strative controls. The channel handling boom is excluded from the above category since it does not carry heavy loads. Its capacity is less than the weight of a fuel bundle. Paragraph 2.2-_3_ " Identify any cranes listed in 2.2-1, above, which you have evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for this evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG 0617. Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or addi-tional design features). For each crane so evaluated, provide the load-handling-system (i.e., crane-load-combination) information specified in Attachment 1." R,g s_pyy s_e, The reactor enclosure crane has been evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small for the loads listed below. The basis for this evaluation was compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, except where noted. Load Handling Sy, stem Information Item 1: " Provide the name of the manufacturer and the design-rated load (DRL). If the maximum critical load (MCL), as defined in NUREG 0554, is not the same as the DRL, provide this capacity.'

Response

Manufacturer - Harnischfeger Corporation. Design-rated load (DRL) 125/15 tons. Maximum critical load (MCL) - 110/6 tons. P-24/6 i

Item 2: " Provide a detailed evaluation of the overhead handling system to the features of design, fabrication, inspection, with respect testing and operation as delineated in NUREG 0554 and supplemented by the identifed alternatives specified in NUREG 0612, Appendix C. This evaluation must include a point-by-point comparison for each section of NUREG 0554. If the alternatives of NUREG 0612, Appendix C, are used for certain applications in lieu of complying this should be explicitly with the recommendation of NUREG 0554, stated. If an alternative to any of those contained in NUREG 0554 or NUREG 0612, Appendix C, is proposed, details must be provided on the proposed alternative to demonstrate its equivalency."

Response

A detailed evaluation of the reactor enclosure crane was made with respect to the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.104 which preceded NUREG 0554. A point-by-po, int comparison of the crane features with the sections of the regulatory guide is presented in Table 9.1-12 of the Limerick FSAR. The auxiliary hoisting system does not meet all of the design criteria of either NUREG 0554 or R.G. 1.104. Specifically, the means of load attachment is not of redundant design. As an alternative we propose to reduce the load rating for the auxiliary hoist from 15 tons to 6 tons when handling critical loads. This will effectively double the design safety factor and provide an additional margin for wear and dynamic loads. Item 3: "With respect to the seismic analysis employed to demonstrate that the overhead handling system can retain the load during a seismic event equal to a safe shutdown earthquake, provide a description of the method of analysis, the assumptions used, and the mathe-matical model evaluated in the analysis. The description of assumptions should include the basis for selection of trolley and load position."

Response

Load-bearing members and main hoist equipment of the reactor enclosure crane are Hacioned in accordance with seismic Category I criteria so that'the crane can structurally withstand the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) and maintain the fully rated load in a static position during the following an SSE. The crane was analysed using a 41-node lumped-mass model to determine natural frequencies. To assure that the worst case would be included, three trolley positions were analysed (end of span, 1/4 span and center of the bridge). Highest and lowest positions of the rated load were considered for each trolley position, as P-24/6

well - a no load condition. Accelerations at the crane supports were determined based on crane natural frequencies and reactor enclosure response spectra. 1% crane damping was assumed for the Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) and 2% damping was assumed for the SSE. Resulting crane stresses were then calculated based on the worst case seismic loads. Design stresses were limited to 0.9 Fy in bending, 0.85 Fy in tension and 0.5 Fy in shear where Fy equals the material yield stress at the design temperature. Rertraints were installed to preclude derailment of the bridge or trolley under seismic loading. Item 4 & 5: " Provide an evaluation of the lifting devices for each single-failure-proof handling system with respect to the guidelines of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6." " Provide an evaluation of the interfacing lift points with respect to the guidelines of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6."

Response

We consider lifts of the following loads to meet the criteria of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6. Spent Fuel Cask - Limerick is under construction. Since licensing a. under 10CFR71 is not evidence that the spent fuel shipping cask lifting device and lift points meet the requirements of NUREG 0612, the NUREG 0612 requirements will be a basis for selection of shipping cask (s) for Limerick. b. Refueling Shield - The special lifting device for the refueling shield does not fully meet the requirements of NUREG 0612 Section 5.1.6. In particular it does not satisfy the ANSI N14.6-1978 recommendation to use twice the normal design safety factor for lifting devices which carry critical loads (see Table 3). We do not believe that an increase in safety factor will produce a proportionate improvement in lifting device reliability and, since this special lifting device has already been fabricated, we take exception to this requirement. As an alternative to full compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, and as a demonstration of design adequacy we propose to perform a load test of the lifting device at 150% of its rated capacity, followed by non-destructive examination of its load bearing welds. There are four lifting points on the refueling shield itself. They provide a minimum static factor of satety of 4.8 with respect to material ultimate strength. This does not satisfy the NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, safety factor requirement.

Again, we take exception to this requirement and propose to perform a qualifying load test of the lift points.

I P-24/6 l

Fuel Pool Stop Logs - The spei:ial lif ting device for the fuel c. pool stop logs does not fully meet the requirements of Section 5.1.6. In particular it does not satisfy the ANSI N14.6-1978 reccNnendation to use twice the normal design safety factor for lift'ing devices which carry critical loads (see Table 3). We We do not believe that an increase in safety factor will produce a proportionate improvement in lifting device reliability and, since this special lifting device has already been fabricated, we take exception to this requirement. As an alternative to full compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, and as a demon-stration of design adequacy we propose to perform a load test of lifting device at 150% of its rated capacity, followed by non-destructive examination of its load bearing welds. There are two lifting lugs on each fuel pool stop log. They provide a minimum f actor of safety of 7.25 with re.spect to material ultimate strength, plus an additional margin of 25% for dynamic loads. This does not satisfy the NUREG 0612 safety factor requirement. Again, we take exception to this requirement and propose to perform a qualifying losJ test of the lif t points, d. Fuel Pool Gates - The fuel pool gates are carried using conven-tional slings. These slings will be selected according to NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6(1). There are two lift points on each fuel pool gate. They provide a minimum static factor of safety of 9.3 with respect to material ultimate strength. This does not satisfy the NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, safety factor requirement. We do not believe that an increase in safety factor will produce a proportionate improvement in lift point reliability and, since this item has already been fabricated, we take exception to this requirement. As an alternative to full compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, and as a demonstration of design adequacy we propose to perform a 150% load test of the fuel pool gate lif t points, followed by non-destructive examination of the load bearing welds. Fuel Pool Jib Crane, Channel Handling Boom and Head Stud Rack - e. These heavy loads are carried near the reactor vessel or spent fuel pool, where a load drop could affect fuel. Conventional slings are used. These slings will ce selected according to NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6(1). In each case there is one lift point on the load which has a minimum static design safety f actor of 5 with respect to material ultimate strength. This does not satisfy the NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, safety factor require nents. We do not believe that an increase in safety factor will produce a proportionate improvement in lift point reliability and, since these items have.already been f abricated, we take exception to this requirement. As an alternative to full compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, and as a P-24/6 demonstration of design adequacy we propose to perform a load test of each lift point at 150% of normal load followed by nondestructive examination of the load bearing welds. Paragraph 2.2-4 "For cranes identified in 2.2-1, above, not categorized according to 2.2-3, demonstrate that the criteria of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1, are satisfied. Compliance with Criterion IV will be demonstrated in response to Section [2.3] of this request. With respect to Criteria I through III, provide a discussion of your evaluation of crane operation in the Reactor Building and your determination of compliance. This response should include the following informa-tion for each crane: Where reliance is placed on the installation and use of elec-a. trical interlocks or mechanical stops, indicate the circum-stances under which these protective devices can be removed or bypassed and the administrative procedures invoked to en-sure proper authorization of such action. Discuss any related or proposed technical specifications concerning the bypass of such interlocks, b. Where reliance is placed on the operation of the Stand-by Gas Treatment System, discuss present and/or proposed technical specifications and administrative or physical controls provided to ensure that these assumptions remain valid. Where reliance is placed on other site-specific considerations c. (e.g., refueling sequencing), provide present or proposed tech-nical specifications, and discuss administrative or physical controls provided to ensure the validity of such considerations. Analyses performed to demonstrate compliance with Criteria I d. through III should conform to the guidelines of NUREG 0612, Appendix A. Justify any exception taken to these guidelines, and provide the specific information requested in Attachment 2, 3, or 4, as appropriate, for each analysis performed." P-24/6

Response

The reactor enclosure crane, though single-failure-proof itself, is included in this category when used to carry the following loads. Lifting devices or lifting points which do not meet the single-failure-proof criteria of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, restrict the overall load handling combination to this category for these loads. Loads Carried Over the Spent Fuel Pool The reactor enclosure crane is prevented from carrying loads over or near the spent fuel pool by zone travel limit switches on the bridge and trolley. The associated electrical interlock can be bypassed by conscious operator action via a keylocked switch. Administrative procedures will be developed prior to plant opera-tion to control bypassing of the interlock. Loads which must be carried over the spent fuel poo. will be carried by a high-reliability load handling system and are categorized according to Paragraph 2.2-3. Therefore the potential for the load drop over the spent fuel pool is extremely small. Loads Carried Over the Reactor Vessel The following loads must be carried over the reactor vessel. None of these loads have lifting devices which meet the single-failure-proof criteria of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6. They are therefore evaluated with respect to Criteria I through III of NUREG 0612 Section 5.1. Reactor well shield plugs - The reactor well shield plugs are a. carried over the reactor vessel only with the drywell head in place. The drop of a shield plug could damage the drywell head and seal plate but would be less severe than the drop of the drywell head or the RPV head. Therefore the drop of a shield plug will not damage fuel or cause unacceptable leakage from the reactor vessel, b. Drywe.'l Head - The drywell head is carried over the reactor vessel while the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head and insu-i lation support structure are in place. Depending on orientation a drop of the drywell head could damage the insulation support structure, rupture the RPV vent and head spray piping, damage the seal plate and impact the RPV itself. It is assumed that the effect of a drywell head drop on the reactor vessel is no more severe than an RPV head drop which is discussed below. i l This assumption is based on the fact that though the drywell head weighs about 13% more than the RPV, much of its kinetic i P-24/6..

b. energy will be absorbed by the insulation support structure and (cont.) the seal plate. Therefore a drop of drywell head will not cause fuel damage or unacceptable leakage from the reactor vessel. c. RPV Head, Steam Dryer, Steam Separator, Service Platform - The reactor vessel supplier (General Electric) has been asked to evaluate the case of a drop of these loads over the vessel. The results of this evaluation will be provided at a later date. Dased on the results of calculations for other plants we do not expect that these load drops will result in fuel damage or unacceptable leakage from the vessel. d. Service Platform Support (including seal surface protector) - The diameter of the service platform support is too large to allow it to fit inside the reactor vessel and is much lighter than the loads above. A drop of the service platform support will not cause fuel damage or unacceptable leakage from the reactor vessel, e. Refueling Shield - The refueling shield has been categorized according to Paragraph 2.2-3. f. Jib Crane - The jib crane has been categorized according to Paragraph 2.2-3. g. Head Stud Rack - The head stud rack has been categorized according to Paragraph 2.2-3. h. Other Loads Over the Reactor Vessel - There are no other heavy loads which must be carried over the open reactor vessel. Loads which are carried over the reactor vessel only while the RPV head is on (e.g. the insulation support structure and the head stud tensioner) will not cause damage to the fuel if dropped. A drop of these items over the reactor vessel is less severe than a drop of the drywell head or the RPV head itself. Therefore, there would be no unacceptable leakage from the vessel. Heavy loads which need not be carried over the reactor well are restricted from this area during refueling (See safe load path drawings for the reactor enclosure crane). Administrative proce-dures will be developed prior to plant operation to control the movement of loads over the reactor well. INFORMATION REQUESTED IN SECTION 2.3: "2.3 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS OPERATING IN PLANT AREAS CONTAINING EQUIPMENT REQUIRED FOR REACTOR SHUT DOWN, DECAY HEAT REMOVAL, OR SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.5, provides guidelines concerning the design and operation of load-handling systems in the vicinity of equipment or components required for safe reactor shutdown P-24/6 Revision 1 March, 1982

and decay heat removal. Information provided in response to this section should be sufficient to demonstrate that adequate measures have been taken to ensure that in these areas, either the likelihood of a load drop which might prevent safe reactor shutdown or prohibit continued decay heat removal is extremely small, or that damage to such equipment from load drops will be limited in order not to result in the loss or these safety-related functions. Cranes which must be evaluated in this section have been previously identified in your response to 2.1-1, and their loads in your response 2.1-3-c." Paragraph _2.3-1 " Identify any cranes listed in 2.1-1, above, which you have evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for this evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by siitable alternative or additional design features). For each crana so evaluated, pro-vide the load-handling-system (i.e., crane-load-combination) informa-tion specified in attachment 1." Re59o_n_se in this category except the reactor enclosure There are no cranes crane when it is used to carry the loads listed in the response to Paragraph 2.2-3. Paragraph 2.3-2 "For any cranes identified in 2.1-1 not designated as single-failure-proof in 2.3-1, a comprehensive hazard evaluation should be provided which includes the following information:" pu_bparagraph a, "The presentation in a matrix format of all heavy loads and potential impact areas where damage might occur to safety-related equipment. Heavy loads identification shoald include designation and weight or cross-reference to information provided 2.1-3-c. areas should be identified by construction zones and Impact elevations or by some other method such that the impact area can be located in the plant general arrangement drawings. Figure 1 provides a typicei matrix," - -,p_o,q,s e s This information is presented in Table 2 entitled ' Load Tabulation' P-24/6

Subyara_ graph b "For each interaction identified, indicate which of the load and impact area combinations can be eliminated because of separation mechanical stops and redundancy of safety-related equipment, and/or electrical interlocks, or other site-specific considera-Elimination on the basis of the aforemertioned considera-tions. tion should be supplemented by the following specific information: For load / target combinations eliminated because of separation (1) discuss the basis and redundancy of safety-related equipment, for determining that load drops will not affect continued system operation (i.e., the ability of the system to perform its safety-related function.) Where mechanical stops or electrical interlocks are to be pro-(2) vided, present details showing the areas where crane travel will be prohibited. Additionally, provide a discussion concern-ing the procedures that are to be used for authorizing the for verifying that bypassing of interlocks or removable stops, interlocks are functional prit to crane use, and for verifying that interlocks are restored to operability after operations which require bypassing have been completed. Where load / target combinations are eliminated on the basis (3) of other, site-specific considerations t2.g., maintenance sequencing), provide present and/or proposed technical specifications and discuss administrative procedure or physical constraints invoked to ensure the validity of such considerations."

Response

Table 2 indicates the basis for eliminating each load / area combi-nation from the hazardous category. Code letters used in the table correspond to the following hazard timination categories: Crane travel for this load / area combination prohibited by a. electrical interlocks or mechanical stops. System redundancy and separation precludes loss of capability b. of system to perform its safety-related function following this load drop in this area. Site-specific considerations eliminate the need to consider c. load / equipment combination. d. Likelihood of handling system f ailure 'for this load is extremely small (i.e. NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, satisfied.) P-24/6

Analysis demonstrates that crane failure and load drop will e. not damage safety-related equipment. A detailed evaluation of each crane / hoist which was categorized according to Paragraph 2.1-1 as potentially hazardous is presented in Appendix B. The following method was used to evaluate the consequence of a load drop from these load handling systems: The Limerick Fire Protection Evaluation Report and the separation 1) drawings were used to establish whether there was anything safety-related in the load path or on the next lower elevation. Except for the refueling floor and a few other cases where there were very heavy loads or high lif ts, it was assumed that there would be no sequential failure that could affect more than one floor below the load path. The basis of this assumption is that the presence of large quantities of reenforcing btr in the floor will prevent the formation of very large concrete spall fragments which are free to fall to the next floor. Major safety-related items are listed in the Appendix B hazard evaluations. 2) A more detailed study of the separation drawings was made to determine whether there was sufficient separation of safety-related items (as indicated by associated electrical divisions) to establish that, if these safety-related items were required for safe-shutdown or decay heat removal, only one method of safe shutdown or decay heat removal could be affected. If no further evaluation was required. Generally, no attempt so, was made to determine whether or not the safety-related items were actually part of systems required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal. Appendix A provides a discussion of safe shutdown methods and lists the systems required for safe shutdown and removal of decay heat from the reactor vessel and spent fuel pool. If there was not sufficient separation of safety-related items 3) in the load path and on the next lower evaluation, note was taken of which electrical divisions were predominant. Safety-related items associated with electrical divisions which were not pre-dominant were identified to see whether they were required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal. For example, if most components in the load path were associated with electrical divisions 1 and 3 (shutdown method 'A'), those components associated with electrical divisions 2 and 4 (shutdown method i 'B') were identified to see whether they belong to systems required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal. If not, then only one safe-shutdown or decay heat removal method could poten-tially be affected, and no further evaluation was required. l l l I P-24/6 i l L

4) If Step 3 was inconclusive safety related components associated with all electrical divisions were identified as necessary to establish whether there was sufficient distance between compo-nents of the two shutdown or decay heat removal methods to preclude the possibility of a given load drop affecting both methods. If so, no further evaluation was required. 5) If the load handling hazard could not be eliminated by the steps above, necessary adminstrative controls were established. For hazards on the next lower elevation, floor impact strength calculations were performed to establish what load carrying-height restrictions were needed, if any. 6) In some cases, site-specific considerations were used to elimi-nate the need to consider some load / equipment combinations. For example, since there will be no major maintenance activities in the drywell during reactor operation, only the consequences of load drops which would affect decay heat removal or vessel integrity were considered for the drywell. Subyara_ graph c "For interactions not eliminated by the analysis of 2.3-2-b, above, identify any handling systems for specific loads which you have evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small and the basis for this evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features). For each so evaluated, provide the load-handling-system (i.e., crane-load-combination) information specified in Attachment 1." EESPonse_ There are no interactions in this category. ,Subpa r,a_g raph d "For interactions not eliminated in 2.3-2-b or 2.3-2-c, above, demon-strate using appropriate analysis tt.2t damage would not preclude operation of sufficient equipment to allow the system to perform Section 5.1, its safety function following a load drop (NUREG 0612, Criterion IV). For each analysis so conducted, the following in-formation should be provided:" (1) An indication of whether or not, for the specific load being investigated, the overhead crane-handling system is designed and constructed such that the hoisting system will retain its ~ load in the event of seismic accelerations equivalent to those of a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). P-24/6

(2) The basis for any exceptions taken to the analytical guidelines of NUREG 0612, Appendix A. (3) The information requested in Attachment 4.

Response

As discussed in the hazard evaluations of Appendix B analysis was used to show that load drops from the following cranes / hoists would not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. Of this group only the reactor enclosure crane is designed to retain its load during a safe shutdown earthquake. Item numbers refer to Table 1. a. HVAC Equipment Hatch Hoist - Item 15 b. Reactor Enclosure Crane - Item 20 c. CRD Platform Holst - Item 33 d. Containment Hydrogen Recombiner Cover Hoist - Item 36 e. Control Room HVAC Equipment Hoist - Item 58 f. Control Structure Fans Lifting Beam Hoist - Item 60 No exceptions were taken to the analytical guidelines of NUREG 0612, Appendix A. The information requested by Attachment (4) is presented below: a. Initial Conditions / Assumptions 1) Weight of the load is as shown in Table 2. 2) Impact area of the load is as shown on the load path drawings. 3) Drop height is based on the maximum lift of the hoist except for the reactor enclosure crane where the purpose of the analysis was to establish maximum drop heights. 4) No credit was taken for impact limiters or environmental drag forces. 5) The heavy load is assumed to drop with a zero initial velocity. 6) The capacity of the slab is based on yield-line theory. 7) The capacity of the structural steel is based on a simple span, elasto-plastic design P-24/6 Revision 1 March, 1982

8) Slab stiffness is based on an effective moment of inertia of a reinforced concrete beam. 9) Fixed and simply supported boundary conditions are used in slab analysis. 10) Energy loss due to local deformation of the object at im-pact is disregarded. Slab and steel framing system are assumed to take the full impact energy with spalling of concrete. 11) The average interface force from the dropped load is assumed to be supported by punching shear capacity of the concrete. 12) Existing dead load is considered insignificant compared to the impact load and is neglected in the evaluation. Seismic load and live load are not considered to be present at instant of load drop. b. Method of Analysis 1) Structural response of the structural component is computed in terms of deformation limits, resistance functions and dynamic characteristics. 2) Interface forcing function is used in the determination of the applied forces. 3) Analytical and numerical techniques as per Bechtel Power Corporation Design Guide C-2.45 are used. 4) All calculations are done manually without computer assistance. 5) Height of drop is measured from the lowest point of the heavy load to the floor, unless noted otherwise. c. Conclusion

,a the Appendix B hazard evaluations for discussions of the results of these analyses.

P-24/6 - 14a - Revision 1 March, 1982

3. REFERENCES

1. to the NRC~ letter to all licensees, pated December 22, 1980.

2. Philadelphia Electric Company letter to the NRC, dated June 18, 1981. i e i

Limerick Ovarhocd Hcndling Systems Ravicw September, 1981 i { i t TABLES t l I i I ) I i l l I I l'-

l' 1 B 3 1 F D 1, A 1, W n r 4 A 4 E 9 I o h en 9, E A A A 9, V i t wo 8 N 1, C / 9 / 8, 7 7 7 f E t a oi C A 4 1 N 8 N 8 8 9 8 I t 4 9 1 o R c:P 8 1 6 9 D l es a 9, 8 1 9, 1 4 1 et ad tv D8 roea xe B rrn el 4 5 C i W9 PPAI NE 9 9 e 1 ga Y 1 P S r?en wo or yd n oi A A t e I t eOI t L b et a o o O o O / / N N N D m f amtv N t t t N e al exe A t Set el RI NE l p l D e A S n E oa l ii iR d sr E e ue A A A A C C A V t l t O a ci l xr e EC R n yI t ? emdh f eat o o o o o O O N N t t t t t at oa SII P 0" 0 4 0" 0" 6 0 .tt xrf '2 '8 7 1 aei '0 3 MVL 6 1 9 4 3 2 1 1 la B B i r A A B B r e e .b 8 5 8 8 8 8 8 t qm 2 1 2 3 3 3 3 M-aeu MRN M M M M M M NOM y n t i n 5 n n n o MC c o 1 o o o 2 t a t / t t t / p 0n 1 n 2 a 0 1 o 0 6 5 - o / I C 1 1t 2 1 1 1t 1 T 3 1 2 05 6 0 I g 1 N w 1 1 1 1 12 1 1 U r 1 1 1 1 11 1 1 D M M M M MM M M S '0 v '7 9 0 0 m e 7 9 l 1 6 1 3 0 8 0 S E 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 T Y 1 S 5, E o L 4, t B i A L a 3, 3, 7, T D e 2 6 8 8 7 N r 7 2, A A 1 ll D r A e d e g E c e n d e e t l i e a l eg e z 'r R v Far B td t i e r p s i E r eC ai al n e n li V e rr e sr s a i e tl r u ei o O S oAe ns nB nrr bc aa oPnOf l / t g ie e e eeet nit evt t i F e c pd bn ipn dt ns cvs hos cdbep r O m ari ra nna nl mi cri emi aerbn a eur br cur oieo eeo reo eeumu 'C CPC CFDl RSl PRi RFTI P I l l l X N RPB E 1 22 5 7 8 2 3 I J r 0 00 0 0 0 1 1 t e t pe 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 I I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 n sib H I 1 1 1 a ium rroqu 0 A8 0 0 0 0 0 Col EN 1 U0 1 1 0 0 1 l me 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 t I l

Page 2 of 9 GVEMIEAD !!ANDLING SYSTEM REVIEW TABIE 1 September, 1981 INDEX OF OVERllEAD liANDLItG SYSTEMS - UNIT I & COMMON Fire Safety-Protection Crane Safety Related Related Areas: or lloist Material Max. Item In Item On Ioad Path Fquip. Req. Ve rt. Ioad Exclusion Next Lower Next Lower Item Ntzrber flame / Service Area Elev. Drwq. Capacity Number Lift Path? Criteria Elevation? Elevation 8 10-H116 Turbine 6 217' M-lll 5-ton M-38BA 30'-0" ?O A NO 94A 89A Enclosure Aux. Fquip. Itatch floist 9 00-11117 Condensate 9 217' M-lll 1-ton M-38BB 22'-9" to A NO 94A Filter 89A,898 Domineralizer llolding Pumps lioist 10 00-11118 Main Lube Oil 1 239' M-112 4-ton M-38BA 43'-0" to A NO 95 93 Tank lloist 11 0A-Ill19 Recirc. Pump 6,7 269' M-113 24-ton M-38BA 25'-0" NO A NO 98A 88A,88C,88D,97 0B-11119 M-G Set iloist ca. 12 00-11120 Drywell 7 302' l1-115 6-ton M-38BA 10'-3" to A to 99A Chiller 98A,98C,98D floist 13 10-11122 Drywell 7 302' M-ll5 6-ton M-38BA 42'-0" NO A NO 99A 98A Chiller flatch lloist 14 00-11124 16C0 Filter 11 313' M-121 5-ton M-38BC 17 ' - 4 " MG C YES 48A Demineralize r 47A l Iloist

Page 3 of 9 i O/ERIEAD llANDLIfC SYSTDt REVIEM September, 1981 l TABIE, 1 INDEX OF OVER! LEAD llANDLI?C SYSTFMS - UNIT I & COMMON Fire Safety-Protection l Crane Safety Related Related Areas: or Material Max. Item In Item On Imi Path i Ibist Req. Vert. Imi Exclusion Next Iower Next Irwer Equip. Itan Number Name/Fervice Area Elev Drw1. Camcity Number f.ift Path? Criteria Elevation? Elevation l l YES 28A 1 15 ) 0 0 -111 : o 1 INhc Equip. ' 8 350' M-124 L2-ton M-38BB 53'-9" YES 4 27A i / 1 latch ifoist 304' 16 OA-W127 Ibt Mactiine Mmin. 217' IA-7001 2-ton M-38BB 10'-11" tO A to N/A 08-!!127 Shop Mono g Bltk). Sht. If N/A OC-Ill27 ' rail floists r i 17 00-Ill29 Control Itn. ; 8 200' M-110 5-ton j M-3SGB 26'-0" YES go ig,13 7'-4" lA, B,J, K,G,il l 00-H130 Chiller ,M-125 4-ton 11oists 16 10-11131 Reactor Encl. 16 313' M-121 6-ton M-38BC LG6'-6" to C YES 48A 47A Fquip.11atch lloist 19 Control Roar. 8 217 M-lli 3-ton M-38BC

• 15'

YES, YES 2

I IL IIVAC Lif t M-126 Beams j 20 00-11201 Reactor Bldg. 11-16 352' M-122 125/15 M-16 165'-6" iES YES 78A,B,C 48A,B,C,78A,30A t ton Overhead Crann 21 1A-Il203 Recirculation Drywell 253' M-119 24-ton M-38A 41'-0" YES YES 30A 29A IB-Il203 Pump Motor ca. ~ lloists < i 22 OA-Il208 Fuel Pool 12 352' M-122 1/2-ton M-1 50' N/A B N/A 78A l OB-{l208 Jib Cranes (GE) 78A {

• Iloist to be borrowed from another location when needed.

l p ?.in /d

Page 4 of 9 l l (NER11EAD !!NIDLIPC SYSTDt REVIEW TARIE. 1 September, 1981 i ItJDEX OF OVERilEAD IINJDLItC SYSTU*S - t?3IT I & CtY1Mtli l i Fire l Safety-Protection Crane Safety Related Related Areas: or floist Material Max. Item In Item On Ioad Path Equip. Req. Vert. Imi Exclusion flext Iower Next Lower ! Item Wunber flame / Service Area Elev. Drwo. Canacity ?Jumher Lift Path? Criteria Elevation? Elevation l 23 00-11213 CRD Ptrp 6 200' M-110 5-ton M-38A 7'-2" to A tJ/A 89A i N/A f Ibist i i 24 10-11215 tIPCI/RCIC 11,15 217' M-118 10-1/2 M-38BC 56'-0" YES YES 44 42A Dquip. Iloist ton 25 10-11216 Core Spray 11 217' M-118 5-ton M-38BA 59'-3" YES YES 44 42A,42B Punps lloist 26 10-!!217 Core Spray 12 217' M-118 5-ton M-38BA 59'-3" YES YES 44 41 Punp lbist 27 175121P Reactor Encl. 12,16 217' M-118 12-1,'2 M-38LC 32'-0" YES YES 44 IBH218 Cooling Water ten ca. 56'-0" 41 IIX & Core Spray Punp lbist 28 10-11219 RllR Punps 15,16 217' M-118 10-ton M-38BA 55'-9" YES YES 44 31,32,42A lbist 29 10-11220 Containment 11 253' M-119 6-ton ri-38BA 16'-0" YES YES 45A 44 j Eriuip. [bor 11oist 30 1A-II221 Personnel Iock 16 253' M-119 20-ton M-38BC 16'-6" ?JO C YES 45A 43,44 115-112 2 1 lbist ea. l i n_7 in /A

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l l t l t ? N W 0 n r 2 X E 2 9 I o h en V i t wo C N N A H A M 1 L A A f E t a o ', 5 4 0 0 9 1 1 1 0 0 4 / / o R 1 c:P I t 4 4 2 2 1 2 2 2 A 2 8 9 N N 8 es a 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 l 7 2 l 6 M9 et ad tv 1 ro xe irmao el f 1 e T fPAI NE g b a Y r P S e r?en t wo Ca t' d n o i A A ? I t eOI t S L p et a E o o o o o / / N N t t t t t D e f amtv Y N S al exe A Setel RI NE l f DA n E oa I ii R d sr E e ue C A A A A A A / t l t O a ci l xr e EC R n yI t ? S eml hnt D o O o o O E O f et N Y N N at a 1 t t t SII P 0" "9 "0 0 0 6 0 1 .tt '0 '0 xrf '3 2 1 0 6 aei 4 MVL 1 2 2 5 5 6 2 2 la i r A C A B r e a B B B B e .b 8 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 t qm 3 8 3 3 3 3 2 2 aou MRN M M M M M M M M J T tM y 4 t n n n DC c n o n n n n o o i m o t o o o o t t t t t t t a 0 5 5 I C 1 2 4 2 2 4 1 1 1 1 I 9 3 1 3 3 2 5 0 T s 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 0. N w U r 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7t D h M M M M M M M AS S '7 '7 '7 7 t v '5 7 n e 3 7 l 5 3 9 5 5 1 1 1 S' E 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 I Y e 1 S ru E C 2 s n. o ig 2, I f A L a G. l md B I l c l T D e 5 2 9 0 2 0 N r 1 2 1 2 2 2 Dn AB P A A l dt p l D n l s i i A e a i ii u m t pe E c e l y uo qt e& s on i r ya Bl Fs D i ha l i ro re Sr R v - A Cw F r n e )v e eC 'e o eeI or C l tp tA tl t z t u e e i e t r f O S ac si ci sN s si. l ass ne / a1 e uPt aI ah al p eroe ig / Mnm wdn d/s w wc wai sel n hd a F e O m Dna dna ori dg dt dru enca ci i enr ar a Rer aar reo an aa aea X N CtC Rl C Pdf Ri Rl RnF DGEC MB l I I E 9 2 6 7 8 0 1111 2 T. I .r 3 0 0 0 0 1 0000 0 t e tpe 2 3 3 3 3 3 5555 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 l 1 l 1 1 4 1 1 1 I 1 I 1 1 / _ n sib a iur 1 1 1 rroqu 0 0 0 0 0 0 ABC1 0 n 4 CoI EN 1 0 0 0 0 0 11I1 0 t l 7 l n me 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 t 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 I l j < j' i i

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TfBLE 2 LOAD TABULATION This table provides a load / impact area matrix for each crane and hoist. Hazard elimination categories are indicated by letters which correspond to the list below. Detailed hazard evaluations for each load handling system can be found in Appendix B. Hazard Elimination Categories a. Crane travel for this area / load combination prohibited by electrical interlocks or mechanical stops. b. System redundancy and separation precludes loss of capability of system to perform its safety-related function following this load drop in this area. Site-specific considerations eliminate the need to c. consider load / equipment combination. d. Likelihood of handling system f ailure for this load is extremely small (i.a. section 5.1.6 NUREG 0612 satisfied), Analysis demonstrates that crane failure and load drop e. will not damage safety-related equipment. 1 T-23/56

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P. 3 i TABLE 2 LOAD TABULATION CRANE / HOIST: Reactor Enclosure Overhead Crane (00-1I201)* Location Reactor Enclosure - Unit 1 Impact Refueling Floor - Elevation 352' Refueling Iloistway - Elevation 217' Area ~ Columns 15.5-23, D-J Loads Satety-miateu liazard Safety-Belatect Y. Elevation Elim nation Elevation Equipment Elg..na lon Equipment Catego W Dryer / Separator Irradiated a,c 217' None N/A Storage Pit 352'-0" Fuel Canal Plugs (45 tons) Rocirculation System; Below Below 217' N/A N/A Electrical conponent: ; b,e Strongback II 352 Fuel Pool Cooling Slab Slab P-N tn :r

e. e O*

Fuel Pool Gates d DE (~3 tons each) s:n -a p 3: a $5 d o3

re en HM em CS "

Refueling Shield d N* (22 tons) Refueling Shield

n Lift Rig

$e-d if y V V y y l

• Table 1 - Item 20

D U<noC c ge*5 =

D't o<Qw WG - g gnn# ~W $ ro itv ar d no A !^ f ric / i 4 a me N zit ala H EC P F -D t We n y a 5 m i f c w l p 0 3 t 3 ei 2 u e A s 2 r i - q n / m yE o N o 5 t e N t l ) I 2t 1 2 f I 0 g 2 a 2 n S i s n f I l n o 1 0 e m i 0 u u t 0 e ( f l a w f l e o v e R C e 7 o b b l7 a a N n l 1 e1l T O a E 2 B2S I r T C n A o L d i U a tn e, c e a B e A h dnn d, e, rim a d a b b a T r am e '2 zie D v 5 al A O 3 I Er l O 1 n L e o l l r t i a u i t e cl s n a u ie 2x F ru o U v ntF e e J t t l l 2 c E a n d oc g i( ;n n D l e e tl si f i E E e em t aEtl p a l no t L r u 'm n ( eb i B r u r 3 yi c A o s o 2 t u d reo T t o o eq a i t pl c l l 5 f E r cs o a r e yo o a c F S I RSCP e n 5 R E g 1 n n r i s o o l n i t e m t 0 c u u a w e ( i t b T a f l v o '2 a e 2 l S e e o e l I R R C l 5 e5l p 3 B3S O E m J i c l/ m m E r r t N o o on A a k f f R t e s t t n C c r a )s a a o n a A l l n i f n e P P o t o p a m o d i ) i t I t k u ) o e s e a t s l a s i 0 Y c n c e a n a c d i o i g H l o v k v t vn u t E a 0 o 1 s r ri V s L ( a e 6 el P n 9 C S( SS R I (

l l o<yrOS s:awWS uM)e8 yu<"Q s zOg m rO f 3 CMS H[', w

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no itW A A 6 / / 1 N N 71 P 2 no d it e a t v a e F l l e E D e R n A 0 g o / 2 5 y N N y tq m a 3 E e w2 I ) t t 1 s - ^ I 0 .i 8 o5 2 l 2 n I 0 g 2 o 1 0 n i e i s t ( l n a '7 l e m e u u v 1 b n f l e 2 g a N a e o l T O r R C E I C T n A d o L a i U e ty r B h n A r m d d d d d d T ev '2 s D O 1 5 3 c AO e t n L r i o l l u n i s U t e a a u cl o v J F ie l e ru t ntF c l 2 n e E D n d oc n ( E r e ie;n t tl si E u L r s r 3 a aEtl l no i B o o o 2 i u;eh A t l o u d rmnC c T c c l 5 q a u r it pl a n F E e E 5 r cs uo cy uo R g 1 I PSCP r n o i s n t l n o c e m i a u u t 0 f e f l a S T R e o v 2 R C e y S 5 I l g 3 O E H/ m E r N o.' m A a f l o R t e t C c r & a eo) l s) nBs n a A da lPes n n o p o nn ago i m o ) L s oeao hnt t I n Pcrt Ci a l4 c e k o iC n c t l v 2 ld/ o ^ en3 L a o erb r l 5 uei2 ua~ b FSJ( Fl l ( C B

l $ o#:o g n E oer j m$< Sg5u :w$y n .a t 1r g "l 7 P 5 me t I 1 e l ) 8 b N 0 a O 1 T 1 I 1 T r A 0 .o i L 0 ty U ( ar no Y Nig A B a A t ^me / T s 2it N i 3l a D o HEC A l l O n L e o c m i m v o d r C e e 0 tt 2 S 0 N an l Re 2 e E r e M L e r n - p yi e e e e e e B n u o A i t i 5 tu n n n n n n eq o o o o o o T b c t m u a 6 E N N N N N N fa o r v 2 S c t e e S l 0 R E 2 n l o s i o r 8 n t w,b t m a

• 0b w'b 0

0 o0 T n a u v 0 o0 0 l0 a 0 0 a S o e l e 0 l0 a I C r o l 2 e2l 2 2l 2 e2l B S S B s O A C E H/ r E y t e N v i A a R t e c o C C c r a n a A p s o p a g r i m Cs u e n l n t i s t I a s to P c d st b y i h m l L o o5 c o a o a t 1 t c t L e a a R C I I

n m 5i et g<0 Nr O DC' 2$oUse txo$9e n e$- t 8 P 6 me t I 1 e l b aT ) N 2 O 1 I 1 1 T n 1 A o L 0 i U 0 tv ar ( B dno A rio A A T t ame / / s zit N N D i alaEc l A o n f o l O f L m l m a o v C 0 o 8 d m 1 et t n 2 e a R e n NN l e E r o bm e L r u i MM p I B e t t i n g yu o j A t c a t T a u v 35 eq N g e r e 22 f E h t l a e S E 24 S r 22 P l n o s o r 8 n i t m t n a u a w '0 b 0 o T o e l v 8 l8 a S C r o e 1 e1l A C l B S I O E l f / Iy E t N i A a c R t e a C c r pn r n a A ao e o p Ct t i m a t I t2 e a s s/ h c d i1 e o a o-r L o l 1 P L

t9 ABC o; @ n:N" 2$ogt3O mx0$(ae r .a n w$- a 9 ) P 4 2 1 1 1 0 0 ( t 4 s 1 io m l l e r t I ez i l 1 are e l n b i N m a O e T I D r T / o A r i, L e t U t an B l ino A nim A am / b / b A i N N T F zie alEr D p l l A u 1 O n t L a t i e i u d l n C U 3 n t l o li 1 at C au r 3 t n l cd 2 e a t e n le a in E a r o bm c ro p e i e t c 1 l L W u i B s t i n r n 1 c t o vi o c N e A r o a tt T o l v 8 eq N e l, l t c e 1 fE F c n l a E a E E 5 s e 1 n R r o 1 s o t 1 n i c m t a a u a "U '3 b 3 w o'b T e e l v 3 S R r o e 1 I1 a 1 l3 a 3 e1l N3l I A C l 3 S B3S O E H / y E t N i A a c R t e a n n C c r p i o s n a A a m i g o p C e t u i m D a l t I a s tn / l P) c d so r1l n it eea ho o a L o o tst ct L 5 l ss t l I ien a3 l ( FVI l n I'

$$r:on* 3$oYr3e U<sO$9u E<raC n v$- m ro i r ty ar e d no A t / a rgm 0 a N L 1 z a 1{a l l P de t ta ne l 4 m e e 5 0 p 3 P n 1 i o u N r n y o tq e m t e i E t y e a t f l aa I vw a eh S l c Et n ) 1 a o 6 l ,l i 2 8 t e 1 w w l '4 o '4 b b ao a 1 1 el v 0 l0 a a 0 re e 3 e3l T AB l B S N 0 E O ( IT t ro A s i L i ty U o ar B dno l I A rim A b am T h zit / c ala N D t Ec l l A a O n l f L o t t m i n m u d e o m C 0 d no p 5 et C t 2 i 3 n a u l e l E q e n em e a L E r o M R p n c i B u i i o r yu N t A C t t t T A c a 1 eq c V u v 2 f E e l I r e a E I t l 9 S S E 1 n s o l o 8 n i r m t w '2 b t a u a '2 o T n c l v 3 l3 a S o r o e 3 e3l B S I C A C l O E I I 7_ /E t N i A a c s R t e a u C c r p do n a A e a r o p C an i m a t I tn sl a s n so al c d it Fe o a L o o c 2, s l L 1 i M t I

iSe f O $ M:oMo :ouO5ma iMotOI" n I r n e u eo38E~ H$~ n 1 1 P 7 1 O me C t I M 1 M e l b N aT O W I T n A o i L h tv A U ar no / B b N A m T o r H D n aC o A h m O m t L i o u C

d M

M gn 0 no 0 K mic 2 m e 2 dn op t9 bil o r Pa I E o u n 5 i c hp l ri L R t o oer e B c i 5 S i, rlt n A l u t 2 tl c o T o r a nie N r t v 5 ohl t S e a CCE n l 0 S o l E 2 C o n s o r t 8 n i n m t a o a u a o' l0t T C e l v 0 S r o e 0 e0L I A C l 2 B2S O E H / ? s E c NA a i t R t e i C c r n a A cn o p ao i m pt a-s t I a s C4 r c d / e o a tn l L o so l i t i L o-h _t 5 C ,I !'llll i !ll l;i

kon$E,n [$ mNR 5 :<

• E

!s EH ~ n o ity 2 o A A A A r g / / / b / 1 e N b N N N ta EC P .r t .r s t n s I n g ,n I, gn li 1 p li ap 8 ) e ap e e ci e a n ci n n iP n 1 3 y i w o iP o o r o 1 H h N r N N tW N m c E tW cS e 0 t cS eE t a eE l t l E& I 1 E& ( I t n w o b b b b 1 s o a a a a i i l l l l l o t S S S S e e f H a w w l B v o' b o' h e 7 l7 I1 7 l7 Il a N c l 1 e1 U0 1 e1 2 B2 B2 2 B2 T O t E I a l n T f A o L t i U n ty r B e p A A A m / T p a N b / b N i t 1 a D u C A q 1 O E L t t t e i i i r n u u g d d u U s 3 E n n o 1 o o 2 l 3 D tn C c c e e l e l e a E n r n m a n c L E u o 5 n c o i o i s i i A r o t 2 N r N r B t t T o l a 2 q c e t c v E e c l l d n e 5 a a E l S E E e E 1 R r 2 n o o t 6 s i c 1 n t a m a w 3

w. b T

e a u v o'b 1 3 a 3 R e l e l3 a 3 e1l ? S 1 r o l e1l O A C E B3S B3S I 3 H/E ) N y A a t a R t e i c C c r c s s n a A a d gn o p p a uo i m a o lt t I C L P a 4 n/ c tn o so c u1 c-L it s 'a 5 o i l ( 6 M l l f

8 n s O<ONrOnO :c0uaH9ae tN*tOHu :o<>*eC t .UA 3 1 P 9 1 me t I 1 e l ba N r O I r T o A ,i L ty U ar B dnn A rir ame T zit b b al a D EC l l A n O t s; L o i rt m u ei m d l u o d n ld e r o in C 7 t t e c h x> C. c t 1 a n a l 2 2 l E e M e e w a nl e F m c T a r n - p d ;i c L B u o K yi egr li t i t l nt or u li c rt A e T c t f q ipe t c u a 4 aE hil ne r v 2 S C pE bl t e C E S l 2 E 2 n l o s i o r 8 n t w t m a o' b n a u v l7 a TS o e l 7 e1l e C r o 1 B2S l I 2 A C E O H/ s E N y ge A a t ni R t e i il C c r c lb n a A a om o p p oe i m a Cs t I C s a s &A c d tn o a so sl L o it ni L o ao I3 FC I ,I l ,I l il

P. 14 LOAD TABULATION TABLE 2 Recirculation Pump Motor lloists ( 1 A-II20 3, 1B-1I20 3)

• CRANE / HOIST:

Location Reactor Enclosure (Drywell) - Unit 1 Impact Drywell, Elevation 253', Area 11 Drywell, Elevation 253', Area 16 Area (Hoist 1BH203) (floist lA!!20 3) ""*d Safety-Helated Hazard Safety-Related Elimiration Elevation g. Equipment g g.. tlon Loads Elevatio" Equipment Catmon 254' Recirculation, M RV, Recirculation, MSRV ICIC & S/D cooling b,c Iloist Capacity: 253' piping: Electrical b,c 24 ton each & 238, conduit; Unit 238' pipingf Unit coolerj Electrical conduit cooler Recirc. Pump Below C'ntainment b Below Qantairrnent Vacuum (23 ton) 238' Re lie fs. Suppres-b 238' Vacuum reliefs; Motor Slab Suppression pool Slab sion pool t& p. tanp. sensors sensors [ R circulation, MSRV 253' Pccirculation, E RV, pip 1M; Elec ulcal b,c CIC & S/D cooling b,c Recirculation 253' Pump & 238, c nduit; Unit 238' pipingi Unit cooler; Electrical conduit as (13-3/4 ton) cooler 5 Co talment vacuum Be W Contairment Vacuun b p w n mi qelie fs ; suppres-b 8, r li fs; Suppression 'a 238' sion pool tonp. b pool tm p sensors Slab sensors tn Mm it* 9 tn O 28a< P. .4 l$ 5 " Table 1 - Item 21

I \\ ( {l Ua5? o<0EaeO tn3DUUe exn g 5. e n m 5 1 P 2 2 me t I ) 8 0 2 1 1 1 e 8 l 0 b N a O T I 8 T 0 n A 2 ,ol L I I dg U B A A A O / ru agr T a N 2 ( z 5 D s 3 l A e l O n 1 n I L a o r t i l C i t e n a n u b U v w F i e ot 2 J l dn d E te e E l e um t hp a L o r B o u r Si i A P s o u d T o o eq a l l l fE r e c F a r u n S I F E g n n r i o o l i t e t c u a T a f v 2 S e e e 5 I R R l 3 O E H/E NA a y R t e t C c r i ) e. n a A c o p aa l s i m pc db a nl t I a s Cn u c d o B0 o a tt 0 L o s l7 L i2 e( o/ u I I 1 F l ,I 1 l l'

P. 16 TABLE 2 LOAD TABULATION CRANE / HOIST: IIPCI/RCIC Equipment lioist (10-11215)* Location Impact Areas ]1, 15 - Elevation 217 Areas 11,15 - Elevation 177' (Below Ilatchway) ^#** Columns 14-15, D-II Saf ty-Related NifS5kation Elevation ' Y'"^* Loads Elevation Equipment gyq on nati Equipment Cateqcry Electrical cable; Iloist Capacity: 217' MIR, Recirculation b 177' ~ & Core Spray b 10-1/2 ton cagonents llPCI Turbine nelm lectrical cable; Below N/A N/A (10-1/2 ton)

217, IR, lH C & EIC b

177' o IIPCI Punp 91ab g nents Slab g (8 - 1/4 ton) es:r* Electrical cable; IIPCI/ICIC 217'

177, mIR, Recirculation b

heSm b crxnponents

Co ICIC Turbine Electrical cable; Below 21 177 N/A N/A 5

(2-1/2 ton) RIR, IIPCI & ICIC b j Slab c BCIC Punp atxuponents (3-1/4 ton) O Electrical cable; 177' IIPCI/ICIC l 2I/' MIR, Recirculation & Core Spray b a canponents b m" i

• g

) Delow Electrical cable; gyg t l l Ilatch Lovers 217' RilR, IIPCI & ICIC 777 (9-1/4, ain n ts b N/A N/A h7 Slab Slab Fi C B-1/2 tons) l G E i ' Table 1 - Item 24

P. 17 LOAD TABULATION TABLE 2 Core Spray Pumps lloist (10-11216)* CRANE / HOIST: Location Reactor Enclosure - Unit 1 Area 11, Elevation 217' Area 11, Elevation 177' Impact Area (Bel w Itatchway) Columns 15-17, G-J liazard Safety-Pelatal 11azard Sa -Rela Loads Elevation Elimination Elevation tior g Equipment MIR, Pccirculation, b Iloist Capacity: 217' IIPCI & Core Spray

177, llPCI, PCIC 5,,,,,ton

. Canponents & Core Spray b Core Spray Pump ( 3-1/2 ton) IIPCI, ICIC, RIR, Belm N/A N/A Belw Systen cua-b 177

217, SM Pon d s Slab E*

i RIR, Recirculation, IIPCI, ICIC Core Spray Pump IIPCI & Core Spray b 177' & Core Spray b Motor

217, m m ents mn (3-1/4 ton)

Belm IIPCI, ICIC, HIR, Belm N/A N/A l77' 217' tSW systen can-b Slab ponents Slab sn th

• Belm MIR, Recirculation, IIPCI, ICIC ligl% Plugs 217' ilPCI & Core Spray b

177' & Core Spray b 'O e (4-3/4 ton) Slab couponents , 5 W Belm IIPCI, ICIC, MIR, Belw N/A NA ) 217' rsw System com-b 177 g Slab ponents Slab g*l i

• Table 1 - Item 25

P. 18 LOAD TABULATION TABLE 2 Core Spray Pump Iloist (10-11217)* CRANE / HOIST: Location Reactor Enclosure - Unit 1 Impact Area 12, Elevation 217' Area 12, Elevation 177' Area Columns 20-23, II-J (Belcw llatchway) Safety-Related llanard safety-lelated b[zardimin tionElevation Loads Equipment Equipment % hon Elevation Category 177' Core Spray iloist Capacity: 217' ti b . ton pig gg b Systm tation & Electrical Core Spray Pump (3-1/2 ton) Below Fadwaste & ESW Belm N/A N/a 217' Valve::s, pipinstj nixi o 177 j Slab electrical Slab E coru spray anxi g Ibcirculation 177' O. Core Spray Pump 217' P1 Pin 3, instrumen-b (bre Saray

n Motor tation & electrical System as (3 -1/4 ton)

Below Radwaste & ESW Below 217' Valves, pipinj and 177' N/A N/A 5j Slab electriml b Slab sn M 5 Core Spray and Core Spray 0* 177' llatch Plug Recirculation b Sys h b l ( 5 -1/ 2 ton) 217' oiping; Electrica 1 &Tnntrnmontation

n Below

'tadwaste & ESW Below 217' valves, piping b 177' N/A N/A '$p c Slab & electrical Slab " Table 1 - Item 26

P. 19 LOAD TABULATION TABLE 2 CRANE / HOIST: Cooling Water IIX & Core Spray Pump Hoist (10-II218)

• Location Reactor Enclosure - Unit 1 Area 12' 16 - Elevation 217' Impact Areas 12,16 - Elevation 177' Area (Below Ilatchway)

Columns 22, E-II nazard Safety-Related Hazard Saf ty-RelatM Elimination Elevation Loads Elevation Equipment h N ry, " i Equipment Catego W RIR, Recirculation, IToist Capacity: ICIC & Main Steam b 177' Core Spray 217' instrunentation & Systen b 12-1/2 ton ea. electrical ~ ~ Cooling Water lleat Exchanger ESW & Radwaste f N/A 0" N./A piping, valves & b O Slab (24-1/2 ton) instruwmtatim es Slab

ro RIR, Recirculation, S'

Core Spray Pump ICIC & Main Steam b Core Spray

217, instrurentation &

Syston b

c Votor electrical g

(3-1/3 ton) o, (3-1/4 ton) P Below Below ESW & Radwaste b 217' piping, valves & 177' N/A N/A E Slab instrumentation Slab tn SCa RIIR, Recirculation, W RCIC & Main Steam b Core Spray g liatch Plugs 217' instrumentation & 177' Systen b s electrical (8-1/4 ton) S Below Belou

217, pp va s&

b 177' N/A N/A G e 1" C Slab Slab k " Table 1 - Item 27 s \\. w

P. 20 TABLE 2 LOAD TABULATION CRANE / HOIST: RilR Pumps lloist (10-11219)* Location Reactor Enclosure - Unit 1 Impact Areas 15, 16 - Elevation 217' Areas 15, 16 - Elevation 177' Area Columns 14-22, D-E (Belw HatcNay) Loads safety-Felatea llazard scifety-de. lated 11azard Elevation Elimimtion Elevation Equipment Equipment ggpon Cattvorv 1 Iloist Capacity: Elo:trical ~ j. 10 ton ? V7 ' conduit & b 177' MIR System b ges PilR Pumo BelN (9-1/2 ton) Be1W RIR, ESW valves; 217' Electrical b N/A N/A O l Slab Slab e Pt 7mo RilR Pump Motor. 21T' i;1ectrical 177' MIR System b conricit I" b g ( 7. ton) 'A1T's p 's Nelm Belw l[ 177' N/A N/A g l 217' RiR, NW valvss, 3' e g Slab Electrical ~ Slab tn g I s m l Eloctrical ^217' 177' RIR Systen b llatch Plugs conduit & b g (8-1/4 ton) E 's m (9-1/2 ton)

r' I*

M1R, tSW valves; b 7 Slab N/A N/A Slab i

• Table 1 - Item 28

p nO3sHr*q mgp*r0Dm :u< rec o E 3 O<4nh.D0 / MwH mDo i li t 1 2 l P / / / 9 2 i me -)- t I ) 0 a I 2 i 1 2 l 1 e 1 l 0 b 1 a ( T N O t I s T i n A o o i L l t y l U ar B r dno rim b b A o am T oD zit A t 1 lal a D l Ec s l O n g, L e t n i m i p .s p n i i U 3 l p u 5 x c q 2 J tt l y l s 2 E an a a at e n le c ; r, cn l e i t p ie l E t r o Rm ris rn p t u t o L n u i cp 3 B e s t 7 yi c d m-e n em A m o a 1 tu Ecm w l T n l v eq l E f i c e 5 aE a n l S t E C 5 1, n 1 f n o r j C o 1 s o t 1 n i c m t a a u a ,I, d T e e l v O b! S R r o e 3 l3a I A C l 5 05l .B2S O E 2 H t / ( i E u t N y q A a t E R t e .i C c r c t n a A a n o p l p e i m a m t I ,s C n a i c d tn a o a L o so t r it no L o. oo _l 6 CD f v', f, i!

I o<0:rOna naDaW>*=se exotoUu E<&o* n e wwN n 1 t 2 2 P tnemp 0 i 3 uq m E e t I L ) 1 e 2 l 2 b H a N B T O l I / 1 T n 2 A o L 2 i I U B 1 A A 1r T a c, I z A ( a / b D E N l I A L O t 1 L s t i i t u o i 3 d n 5 n l l U 2 F o k t c 2 c n D n a# l o o l e E L e i L r t 5 n .c i o r B l u a A e s v 1 N tc T n o e 2 g e f n l l 8" E l o c E 0 E s n 2 r E e 6 s n P r 1 n o o m i t a u t c e l a

m. b 3

T a r o v l3a 5 S e A C e e5l 2 B2S I R l O E H/ E N y A a t R t e i C c r c n a A a. o p pa l i m ac e t I C nk a s n nc 1 c d to oo o a st sl L o i rr L o0 ei Ti 2 PA

I odn: a,ns & *e,e mu$r8 ?<$* r e Us ruO 3 2 l P 1 3 ~ me t I ) 1 3 2 e 2 l 1 b 1 a 0 T N 1 O ( I ln T t A s o i L i ty U o ar dno l B I A ri o T X ame b b b b zit l al a f D iEC l A p O u s L n 1 y S ae t l l o l i i C n 3 s o r e U 8 t t r

tt

tt l nn 2

r 2 o n lnn M aeo i l e e a aeo cmc E t e n F mm c c c imC in L a r o - p it B W u i D yi ri ri .n ri s t r. u tu taso t as A e cd ct ot mt o s n m T r o a q en enotmy l o r t o l v 7 aE l o l S EC t c e 1 S Ec EC A A c n l a E E 4 1 n e o R r o 2 s i t 1 n t w w o'b c m a o' b 3 3 l3 a T a a u v l3 a 8 e8l S e e l e 8 e8l 2 B2S 2 B2S R r o l I O A C E H t , e a / v e E l N y i r I s A a t te e s R t e i ag e l c c rnI v d C c r n a A a ea i n d tr o p p nh n u i m a ec ae u B t I C gx rg B a s eE en e c d tn R 'e nab o a soU-t hu L o i t C n a'b c T u x L i3.MoeT o Nl E l I l

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• t n

i o A ) L 9 n i U 2 U tyar B 2 dno rio e c, A 1 1 T ame zit b 0 ) D 1 l 3 al a Er l ( l 5 l AO e 2 L t w l s y o l i r v a o;s o D e t Psf l ( l a ne re f E l t wn noi 2 m e e n oi osl e dl i ne r r 1 t seB - m ug sS E o u ) y L f s l t p hn e.nz r t B t o l ei Si A a l e f u l ppu T l c w aq Ro pnc b uea I P n y S E RC STV I E r D D R r ( C o n t 5 o c 1 i a t w e a a T R e v 3 o'b l8 a S r e 5 e3l I A l 2 B2S O E H l D / ~ R E C NA a y / t w R t e i C c r n a A c l a a s o p p v b i m a oml t I a s C mr eo0 c d tn Rf 5 o a L o so t 3 it Da1 L Rl o C P (~ I 1 I l

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g 2

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P. 28 TABLE 2 LOAD TABULATION Containment flydrogen Recombiner Cover lloist (10-11237)* CRANE /IlOIST: Location Reactor Enclosure - Unit 1 Areas 11 - Elevation 283' Area 16 - Elevation 283' Impact Columns 15-17,II-J Columns 20-21, F-G Area l Loads f tphW M% - Safety-Related Hazapd Elevation Elimination Elevation. Eliminat1( in Equipment Equipment C11tegorv F'ateaorv Electrical; doist Capacity: Ehrtrical; ~ b

283, Ilydrogen b

1 ton Ilydrogm Ib-Recombiner II Recombiner embiner Caver Below Below Electrical cnneluit 283' Electrical e slab conduit; $0 283' b $ *7 Slab rRD hydraulien m p. 4 oS u n H M 3: S w H P1

• a 3 w@

tn 5co et 5 E ac

• Table 1 - Item 36

P. 29 TABLE 2 LOAD TABULATION CRANE /IIOIST: Equipment llatch Bridge Crane (10-11238)* Location Reactor Enclosure - Unit 1 Impact Area 15 - Elevation 253' Area 15 - Elevation 217' (Tlelow hatchway) Area Columns 21.5 - 22.5, D-F Loads Safety-Iblated llazard Safety-Belated llazard na - Elevation Elistior Elevation

g.. ylon Equipment Ca W ry Equipment l'

IIoist Capacity: None N/A None N/A 283' 25 ton Miscellaneous Below Below Electrical; falR Loads Electrical b Instrumentation;

217, conduit ESW piping b

e slab Slab N

r e

Dr De

C f

n Q. 5ne m Nm et m m tom a C U

• Table 1 - Item 37

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s J e n n r

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eo A

Pp msTs / L o u B M s 5 E yi ue n M A o 1 tu uvl e T l l eq cl os 1 fE aao l c e n 2 2 a Vvp w E 1 S t 6 1 n e r W o 1 o t 1 s .i w'b c n t o2 a a s m a 0 l8l T e a u v 2 o3 e1s S R e l e 8t2 B I r o l 1 O A C E l I s', I /E eC N y: ,i, A a t flB R t e .i eb C c r c .i m A n a A a l e7 o p p es3 i m a Rs1 t I a s C A-m 7 c d tnue5 o a souv-L o .i t c l V L o aaS 2 VVP l f

I P. 39 TABLE 2 LOAD TABULATION CRANE / HOIST: Control Structure Fans Lifting Beam lloist* Iocatior. Control Structure - Unit 1 Impact Area 8, Elevation 321' Area Columns 21-24.5, K-M Loads Satety-Mia W !!azard Elevation Equipment glimination 31tmorv l 304' to Electrical Iloist Capacity: 321' conduit b 2 ton Control Room fiVAC Fans Electrical conduit; Belov e PCCC's

O 304' e <:

<: e Slab $} Hg o e o a. P :n - = 3: no W w, N >*- au o*e tn W -@ gpg mtr we9 0' 4 i

o i

m >^ mC

• Table 1 - Item 60

i ? ' Ooe :1r9oo :x:suo.Uuo "<%oN ?<yc 8r s me w$~ 1 6 n n o a i t tg I dmg A ri / am N 1 zi al a e 0 iEC l l b 4 3 a 1 T P 3 no d i e t t ) a y a l t e v a bn n e w e o I l h - m N E c yI ti t eu a f q H aE 5 S s 1 w t o s a l n b i e e o o r B i '3 a t 1 l A l ( a 3 S f v m e N o l O o E I R T n A n o L a i U F ty B ar l nO A n r 1 a 'i ]X b T mi e 3 p 1 3 z 1t la '9 D p A l U t n O, i o e n i I r U t d u a e s v t o e a t t l e l E l c r E e n i 2 l u l n u D R e ad a m cn c E E s -y p io i L o i rc r B r l 6 3 t t t A o c 1 2 e u c c T t n f q e e 4 aE l l c E a 5 1 S E E e r 1 R o n t s m c a u a e l e r o w R A C 1 o T 3 l S 3 e I B S O l I/ E NA ^ su R t & o C c e n a ^ sna o p ml i m Fl t I e a s Ni c c d s o a L o M I L

c es n a<$r:oMO :>uDH>*a* m<seaUs Nm5 mC m@ Uc~ o ~ 1 4 P 2 6 me t I 1 e lbaT t s io l I m N o O o I R T n A n L o a .i O F tjan l l A n.n n b b l r amm T i e w z.i als D o 3 A l L 1 O l 1 3 L a e cs r t n d im u i o e r s n i t dte ct i o U t a t ueI l a l c v e n ql 2 l iE n e E R e a L m c E E e l r E D y p it yl L r u t.i ri bo B e u t u dr A cd nt o s T t o 3 f q en an c l 6 2 aE l o t o a c 1 S Ec SC e n 4 R E 1 n 5 r 1 s o .i o n t t s m c a u a 3 wb 1 v T a e l 3 S e r o e l3 a l e1l I R A C O E B3S l I / s E u N o A a e n R t e a C c r sl n a A nl o p ae i m Fc s t I Ci a s AM c d V o a I I L o L llllll tIf

n n o

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}uno. c:enOWrne t<atOUt r t Us e n 0 uDt ( 2 3 4 6 P n a t I 1 e lbaT I N r O e I t l n T a A w o ,i L b tv U m ar B u dno D A rig ame b b T m zit o al a D b Ec l l A I O t L nem urt det s '2 t n l 2 n a l I 3 a e c a 3 K l m i c E e L kc e n J R p r i B a r o i te r yu cl te A t u i eb cl T S t t 2 t 9 l a eb c a 2 eE Ec l a f h u v a Ec t r e 5 S r t l o S E 1 2 n N l o o s W i r 8 n '2 0 '2 b t m t n a u a 3 l a 3 e3l T o e l v B3S S C r o e A C l I O E l l/E & s N A a y u t ko R t e i se C c r c an n a A a o p p Ca i m a l C rl t I ee a s t] tc c d sn l s o a i o L o ot iiFM l L I[ 1

Overhand Hrndling Systcms R view Septembar, 1981 TABLE 3 LIMERICK SPECIAL LIFTING DEVICES P.1/1 Load Design Complies Item Special Lifting Device

Weight, Safety with W

Factor

• ANSI N14.6

-1978? 1 Dryer & Separator Sling 45/74 5xW No (GE-F19-E008) tons 2 RPV Head Strongback 92 tons 5xW No 3 Head Nut & Washer Rack Sling 700 lbs. 5xW N/A** 4 Service Platform Rack Sling 6 tons 5xW No (GE-F21-E001) 5 General Purpose Grapple 600 lbs. 5xW N/A** (GE-F21-E001) 6 Refueling Shield Lif t Rig 22 tons 3xW No (Bechtel 8031-C-90) Reactor Well Shield Plugs & Up to 4.5(W+25%) No 7 Dryer / Separator Canal Plug 90 tons Strongback I (Bechtel) 8 Dryer / Separator Canal Plugs 45 tons 4.5(W+25%) No Strongback II (Bechtel) 9 Refueling Slot Shield Plugs 16 tons 4.5(W+25%) No Lif ting Ass' y I (Bechtel) 10 Fuel Pool Stops Logs 35 tons 4.5(W+25%) No Lif ting Ass' y II (Bechtel) 11 Spent Fuel Cask Yoke 100 tons Bechtel

• GE design safety f actors based on material ultimate strength.

design safety factors are conservative estimates based on minimum ASTM material yield strengths. Actual design stresses are based on Ameri-can Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) recommended allowables which vary with type of stress and component shape.

• • Not a heavy load

) P-240(b)/4

l i },- a aos gyW5tva i N /' . 4.l-+ i.ci- /. a ns w );Y &;h'@OFY WUN" \\ O M .jg ,f / -d ',9 E.-- i _3 <lf g

• 7

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APPENDIX A SYSTEMS REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN DECAY HEAT REMOVAL P-41(b)/7 i

APPENDIX A SYSTEMS REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN AND DECAY HEAT REMOVAL The lists of systems required to achieve safe shutdown of the reactor and to remove decay heat are based on the " Analysis of Capability to Achieve Safe Shutdown", Chapter 5 of the Limerick Fire Protection Evaluation Report. The following specific assump-tions were made for the overhead handling systems review: 1. Of fsite power is assumed to be unavailable. 2. A single active component failure is not assumed to occur at the same time as the heavy load drop. 3. Plant accidents and severe natural phenomena are not assumed to occur at the same time as the load drop. The control room is assumed to remain habitable. The following paragraphs provide descriptions of methods that can be used for reactor shutdown and cooldown from the control room without offsite power. Each of these methods includes a system by which makeup water can be added to the reactor vessel, a system by which energy can be removed from the reactor vessel, and any support systems needed to accomodate energy removal to an ultimate heat sink or to return water to its supply source. Although the safe shutdown analysis places primary emphasis on achievement of reactor shutdown using the methods described below, many alternative shutdown methods would be available. Use of safety-related and nonsafety-related systems not addressed in the safe shutdown analysis, plus manual operation of certain equipment and controls, would provide numerous combinations of systems with adequate capability to safely shut the plant down. For the purposes of this safe shutdown analysis, two me thods of shutdown that are operable without of f site power were selected for de tailed study. Shutdown method A requires Class IE power from Divisions 1 and 3 (both ac and dc) in order to be operable. Shutdown l method B requires Class lE power from divisions 2 and 4 (both ac and de) plus de power from either Division 1 or Division 3 for ADS valve actuation in order to be operable. The two methods are described below. P-24/6 A-1

s f/. 4*p Method A After insertion of the control rods and closure of the main steam isolation valves, the RCIC system is used to supply makeup water to the reactor vessel fron the suppression chamber. The operation of the RCIC system also r.emoves energy from the reactor in the form of steam used to drive the RCIC turbine. During the period in which steam is generated at a rate greater than the consumption f? of the RCIC system, steam is relieved to the suppression pool by ~ the automatic actuation of the main steam relief valves, which s open when reactor pressure reaches the valve setpoint. Heat is / : removed from the suppression pool by operating one loop of the .., ~ ' " RHP system in the suppression pool cooling mode. In this mode, water f rom the suppression pool is circulated through an RHR heat exchanger and then returned to the suppression pool. In

f.. '- O order to initiate operation of the shutdown cooling cooling mode of the RHR system, it is necessary to depressurize the reactor

? ' below a nominal pressure 75 psig. This is accomplished by using '~ the ADS valves to discharge steam to the suppression pool. When the reactor has been depressurized below 75 psig, operation of - the RCIC system is terminated and the RHR system is switched from the suppression pool cooling mode to the shutdown cooling mode. In both of these modes, heat is removed from the RHR heat exchanger by the RHRSW system, which in turn dissipates heat at the spray pond. The shutdown cooling mode of RHR will maintain s the reactor in a cold shutdown condition. ~ The items of equipment that are required for this shutdown method include the following: ~, Main steam relief valves (self-actuated mode only) and main f a. steam isolation valves. b. ADS valves (If a compressed gas supply is needed in ad- ' dition to that stored in the ADS accumulators, the com- ^, pressed gas cylinders of the primary containment instru-ment gas system will provide the necessary gas. If the outboard containment isolation valve on the gas supply line cannot be opened by its motor operator, the valve will be opened manually.) _7 c. RCIC pump and associated valves, d. RHR heat exchanger " A" e. RHR pump "A" and associated valves (The outboard isola-tion valve on the shutdown cooling return line is a motor-operated valve powered from the Division 2 switch-this valve will be operated manually at the valve gear; T location if Division 2 power is not available.) .-( P-24/6 A-2 ~ 4 4

p ./ w W ~ 2 m s / ~ ~ s-

f. ~ RHR' shutdBin cooling suction i'aolation vaHes (The out-

board valve is a motor-operated val've powered from the-

-i' ,.bivision 2 switchgear; 'this v'alve will be M perated s . manually at t e va ve ocation if Divisi'o6 2 power is h l l 4' v. not availabid) I s, y_, s ^: n, RHRSW p'ob,b '*h. and ad, +Ibiated valver, cfdr Unit.1); fg. RHRSW PGrup "C"fl5nd associated valves { for' Unit 2) - p, ,o A [ h. ESW pump " A" and associated valves ( for, Unit 1); s. ESW< pump "C" and associtted valves (for Uni _t 2) j r ~ -e n. ~ i RHri,compar tment unit cooler " A",_

r,'

m s. s f j, - RCIC compartment unit cooler " A" ,{ ~ ' N' g k. Spray porid pump structure f an " A" [ 1. DiNsel-generator enclosure f ans " A", "C", E", and "G" Reactor vessel pressure and level recorder " A" m. t ?> ': n. Su'p7rdssion Pool Temperature ' Instrumentation y

c. CSCandby diesel-generators "A" and,",C" x

~ -r p. G a s s; IE AC Power bistribution System, Divisions 1 & 3. s s sq'.'., glass IE DC Power Distribution',,Syste'm, Divisions 1 & 3. w

p.,

Reactor Finclosure EquipmentsCom)Ertment' Vent;ilation. r. y, . Spray Pond Pump Structure 96ntil'ation' s. ~ 't. Diesel Generator Enclosure Ventilation s e- . Control Structure Ventilatiod u. v. . Corf trol Structure Chilled Water -[ ', '\\ t ,s 't. Control' Rod Drive hydraulic 6ontrol units y m ,e %g 4 4 ~* O g .q e p A, y P-24 /6 A-3 . i,. ty \\ - ~ s s 4ll1 m %s* L

Method B s Af ter insertion of the control rods and closure of _ the main steam isolation valves, the HPCI systet is used to sepply makeup water to the reactor vessel from the suppression chamber. The operation of the HCPI system a190 removes energy f rom the reactor in the form of steam used to drive the HPCI turbine. During the period in which steam is generated at a rate greatee than the consumption of the HPCI system, steam is relieved to the suppression pool by the automatic actuation of tha main steam relief valves, which open when r9 actor pressure reaches the valve I' setpoint. Heat is removed from the suppression pool by operating one loop of the RHR system in the suppression pool cooling mode. In this mode, water from the suppression pool is circulated through an RHR heat exchanger and then returned to the suppression pool. In order to initiate operation of the shutdown cooling mode of the RHR system, it is necessary to depressurize the reactor below a nominal pressure of 75 psig. This is accomplished by using the ADS valves to discharge steam to tha. suppressior pool. When the reactor has been depressurized below '75 psig, the kHR system is switched from the suppression pool cooling mode td the shutdown cooling mode. Heat is removed from the RHR heat exchanger by the RHRSW system, which in turn dissipates heat at the spray pond. The shutdown cooling mode of RHR will maintain the reactor in a cold shutdown condition. The items of equipment that are required for this shutdown method include the following: Main steam relief valves (self-actuated mode only) and a. main steam isolation valves. b. ADS valves (If a compressed gas supply is needed in addition to that stored in the ADS accumulators, the compressed gas cylinders of the primary contain nent instrument gas system will provide the necessary gas. If the outboard containment isolation valve on the gas supply line cannot be opened ty'its motor operator, the valve will be opened manually.) c. HPCI pump and associated valves d. RHR heat exchanger "B" e. RHR pump "B" and associated valves P-24/6 A-4

f. RHR shutdown cooling suction isolation valves (The inboard valve is a motor-operated valve powered from the Division 1 switchgear; this valve will be operated manually at the valve location if Division 1 power is not available.) 9 RHRSW pump "B" and associated valves (for Unit 1); RHRSW pump "D" and associated valves (for Unit 2) h. ESW pump "B" and associated valves (for Unit 1); ESW pump "D" and associated valves (for Unit 2) 1. RHR compartment unit cooler "B" j. HPCI compartment unit cooler "A" k. Spray pond pump structure fan "B" 1. Diesel-generator enclosure fans "B", "D", "F", and "H" Reactor vessel pressure and level recorder "B" m. Suppression Pool Temperature Instrumention n. o. Standby diesel-generators "B" and "D" Class IE AC Power Distribution System, Divisions 2 & 4. p. Class IE DC Power Distribution System, Division 2 & 4 q. plus 1 or 3. Reactor Enclosure Equipment Compartment Ventilation r. Spray Pond Pump Structure Ventilation s. t. Diesel Generator Enclosure Ventilation u. Control Structure Ventilation v. Control Structure Chilled Water System Control Rod Drive hydraulic control units w. The above safe shutdown analysis includes systems required for decay heat removal from the reactor vessel. Decay heat removal from the spent fuel pool is normally accomplished by the fuel pool cooling and cleanup system (FPCC). Since this is not a safety-related system and does not appear on the separation drawings no general attempt was made to see whether the FPCC f P-24b/6 A-S

system would be affected by a load drop. If the system is disabled by a load drop the fuel pool can be cooled using the RHR 'B' pump and heat exchanger as described in Section 9.1 of the Limerick FSAR. The supply piping from the RHR system to the fuel pool and the return pipiiig from the skimmer surge tank to the RHR pump suction was included in this review. In cases where components of the RHR system wnich are required for backup fuel pool cooling could be damaged by a load drop, credit is taken for FPCC system operation. A review of the area was then made to verify that the same load drop could not disable the FPCC system as well. The FPCC system is available after a loss of of fsite power. P-24/6 A-6

APPENDIX B HAZARD EVALUATIONS This appendix contains detailed hazard evaluations for each crane and hoist. Major safety-related items located in the load path or on the next lower elevation are listed. A descrfption of the effect of a load drop on systems required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal is provided, followed by a conclusion. Unless otherwise noted, safe shutdown capability also includes the ability to establish or maintain a means of decay heat removal from the reactor vessel and the spent fuel pool. A discussion of shutdown methods A and B is included in Appendix A. Shutdown method A requires the avail-ability of electrical divisions 1 and 3. Shutdown method B requires the availability of electrical divisions 2 and 4, plus DC power from division 1 or division 3 for ADS valve actuation. Where hazard evaluations conclude that electrical divisions 2 and 4 will remain available following a load drop, a review has been made to assure that the necessary DC power is also available. B-1 P-41(b)/8

LGS Ovorhocd Handling Systsmo R2 View September, 1981 RUCU FILTER DEMINERALIZER HOIST (Item 14, Equipment Number 00-H124) This monorail hoist is used to remove hatch plugs and filter deminera?izer elements from compartments on elevation 313' of the reactor enclosure. The safe load path is defined on the Item 14 load path drawing. Major safety-related items ist the load path: None Majo safety-related items on the next 1cwer elevation: (1) Electrical conduit (Divisions 1, 2, 3 and 4) Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: There are no safety-related items in 6he load path. All items on the next lower elevation are associated with electrical divisions 1 and 3 except for a few conduit associated with divisions 2 and 4. None of the division 2 and 4 electrical cabling is required for safe shutdown. Therefore, at a minimum, shutdown method B will remain available for safe shutdown of the plant.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related sytems, a load drop by the RWCU filter demineralizer hoist will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. l i P-165(a)/6 B-2

LGS Overhead llandling Systems Review Revision 1, March 1982 IIVAC EQUIP!!ENT IIATCII IlOIST (Item 15, Equipment Number 0011126) This monorail hoist is used to carry llVAC fans and miscellaneous i equipment between elevations 304' and 350' in the control structure. The safe load path for this hoist is defined by the Item 15 load path drawing for elevation 332' and above and by the Item 58 load path drawing for elevation 304 '. i Major safety-related items in the load path: (1) Electrical conduit (Divisions 1, 3 and 4) Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation (Below 304' floor slab) (1) Remote shutdown pancis, 10C201 and 20C231 (2) Electrical cable trays and conduit associated with the t' emote shudown panels (Divisions 1, 2, 3& 4) Ef fect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: All safety-related items in the load path (including conduit embedded in the elevation 304' floor slab) are associated with electrical divisions 1 and 3, except for one division 4 conduit which does not carry cable required for safe shutdown. Therefore, at a minimum, shutdown method B will remain available following a load drop to safely shut down the plant. Calculations show that the elevation 304' slab cannot sustain a potential heavy load drop without spalling. The remote shutdown panel, and safety-related cable tray and conduit associated with all electrical divisions and both safe shutdown methods, are located below the 304' floor slab. It is possible that both safe shutdown methods could be af fected by a heavy load drop f rom the ilVAC equipment hatch hoist.

== Conclusion:== It is not possible to show by analysis that both safe shutdown method 3 could not be affected by a heavy load drop from the liVAC equipment hatch hoist. Therefore energy absorbing material will be used to pad the floor directly below the hoist or a redundant load bearing path will be provided when using this hoist.to carry heavy loads. These administrative procedures will be developed prior to plant operation to assure that failure of the IIVAC equipment hatch hoist will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. ? i P-41(b)/5 B-3

LGS Overhacd Hcndling SystGmn R3 view S3ptcmbar, 1981 CONTROL ROC CHILLER HOISTS (Item 17, Egupment Numbers, OOH 129, OOH 130) These monorail hoists will be used to service control room chiller OAK 112 and handle the equipment hatch plugs on elevation 200' of the control structure. [A portable gantry hoist (Item 50) will service control room chiller OBKil21. The safe loal path is defined by the Item 17 load path drawing. Major safety-related items in the load path: (1) Chiller OAK 112 & associated piping / instrumentation (2) Electrical conduit (Divisions 1, 2 and 3! Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: None Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: All safety-related items which are necessary for safe shutdown are associated with shutdown method A. Therefore should a load drop occur shutdown method B will still be available to safely shut down the plant.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the control room chiller hoists will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. i P-165(a) B-4

LGS Overhead Handling Systems Review September, 1981 REACTOR ENCLOSURE EQUIPMENT HATCH HOIST (Item 18, Equipment Number 10H131) This monorail hoist is used to lift items between elevations 217' and 313' of area 16 of the reactor enclosure. The safe load path is defined on the Item 18 load path drawing. Major safety-related items in the load path: None Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: (Below 313 slab) (1) Electrical conduit (Division 4) (Below 217' slab) (1) Emergency Service Water Piping (Division 2) (2) Electrical Conduit (Divisions 2, 3 and 4) (3) Instrumentation (Divisions 2 & 4) (Below 201' Slab) None Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: There are no safety-related items in the load path. All compo-nents below the floor slabs at elevation 313' and 217' are associated with electrical divisions 2 and 4 except for three conduit. These conduit are associated with Division 3 but are not required for safe shutdown. Therefore a load drop could affect only shutdown method B. Shutdown method A will remain available to safely shut down the plant.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the reactor enclosure equipment hatch hoist will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. P-165(a) B-5

LGS Ovorhocd H9ndling Systeme Riview Saptembar, 1981 CONTROL ROOM HVAC LIFTING BEAM HOISTS (Item 19) These hoists are used to carry HVAC fans and cooling coils between elevations 217' ain 229'-8" in the control structure. The safe load path is defined on the Item 19 load path drawing. Major safety-related items in the load path: Chilled water piping for HVAC coils (Division 1 & 2) (1) (2) Electrical conduit (Divisions 2, 3 & 4) lower elevation: Major safety-related items on the next (Below 217' slab) Control room chillers OAKil2 & OBKll2 and associated (1) instrumentation and piping (Divisions 1 & 2) (2) Electrical conduit (Divisions 3 & 4) Ef fect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: The chilled water piping is at the same elevation and beside the hoist load and therefere cannot be affected by a load drop. Of the conduit in the losa path, only the Division 2 conduit is Since this conduit passes vertically required for safe shutdown. Therefore through the load path a load cannot be carried over it. neither shutdown method would be affected by a load drop. On the elevation below the 217' slab there is strict separation of Division 1, 3 and Division 2, 4 equipment by a wall, except for some Division 4 conduit which is not required for safe least one shutdown method would remain Therefore, at shutdown. available after a load drop to safely shut down the plant.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the control room HVAC lifting beam hoists will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. B~6 P-165(a) f

LGS Overh9ad Handling Systema Rsview Septtmbar, 1981 Reactor Enclosure Crane Titem 20, Equipment Number OOH 201) The reactor enclosure crane carries a variety of heavy loads over the refueling floor at elevation 352', and to and from grade elevation 217' through the refueling hoistway. The Item 20 load path drawings define the safe load paths. Major safety-related items in the load path: (1) Reactor vessel and fuel Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: (Below 352' slab on elevations 313' and 331') (1) Reactor enclosure recirculation system fans, lAV213 & 1Bv213 (2) Load center 10B201 (Division 1) and associated conduit (3) Load center 10B202 (Division 2) and associated conduit (4) Recirculation system valves / instrumentation and associated electrical cabling (Divisions 2, 3 and 4) (5) Motor control center 10B219 (6) Motor control center 10D220 (7) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with the following: (a) Motor control center OOB132 (Division 4) (b) Safeguard pump room unit cooler control panel 1DC208 (Division 4) (c) Control room HVAC (Divisions 2 and 4) (d) Diesel Generator HVAC control panel (Divisions 3 and 4) (8) Fuel Pool Cooling Piping (Below 217' slab) None. There is a solid concrete pedestal below the refueling hoistway which is structurally isolated from the reactor enclosure. P-165(a) B-7

LGS Overhead Handling Systems Review Revision 1, March 1982 Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: Heavy load handling in the vicinity of spent fuel and the reactor vessel is discussed elsewhere in this report. For new fuel, stored in the vault adjacent to the fuel pool, there is no potential for criticality due to a load drop for the reasons discussed in NUREG 0612, section 2.2.4. A load drop into the reactor well could not af fect safe shutdown capability since the well is only open when the reactor is shut down. Decay heat removal capability could be threatened only by a load large enough to damage the seal plate. Failure of the seal plate would not allow the large, heavy loads to f all into the drywell because their size is greater than the space between _the RPV and the drywell. The reactor well and the drywell are lined with steel plate which will retain any concrete which is fragmented by swinging or falling loads. It is doubtful that other debris large enough to damage shutdown cooling piping could fall through the labyrinth of intervening pining and structural steel. Howeve r, in the event that one shutdown cooling loop were disabled the other loop can maintain decay heat removal. Similarly, if debris from the load drop were able to cause leakage from exposed reactor vessel piping, makeup water could be supplied by any of a number of RHR and core spray injection lines until the leak could be repaired. Therefore, the drop of a heavy load into the reactor well would not af fect decay heat removal capability. Loads carried over the refueling floor weigh up to 104 tons. Calculations show that maximum load carrying heights must be established to limit damage to the floor due to a load drop, in order to prevent a sequential failure which may ultimately jeopardize safe shutdown capability. As a basis for calculating these heights, concrete failure and bending of the floor support beams is allowed. No failure which could cause damage to equipment on elevations other than those immediately below the ref ueling floor ( 331' & 313') is allowed. Refueling floor load height restrictions are described in Table 4. Administra tive procedures to implement these restrictions will be developed prior to plant operation. The only components on the elevations below the load path that are associated with shutdown methods A and B are two load centers (10B201 and 10B202), their associated transformers and some elec-trical conduit. The two load centers are separated by a distance of more than 35 feet. All cabling which is associated with these load centers and is needed for safe shutdown enters the load cen-ters from below, and is not exposed. Therefore spalling from a P-165(a)/6 B-8

LGS Overhocd Handling Systems Review Revision 1, March 1982 single load drop would not disable both load centers. All conduit associated with shutdown method B is located in the immediate vicinity of the 'B' load center and there is no conduit associated with shutdown method 'A' in the same area. Therefore a load drop on the refueling floor could cause damage to only one shutdown method. The other method would remain available to safely shut down the plant. An analysis was made to determine whether fuel pool decay heat removal capability could be affected by a load drop on the refueling floor. A common line from the skimmer surge tanks (16" HCC-106) to the fuel pool cooling system pumps (and to the 7HR system intertie) is located below elevation 352'. It was concluded that, by ob-serving the Table 4 load height restrictions, a load drop on the floor area above the fuel pool cooling pumps suction line would pro-duce minimal spalling. The spalled concrete would be contained by the steel decking and would not damage the fuel pool cooling pumps suction line.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related rystems, analysis of floor impact strength and the use of administrative pro-cedures to control load height, a load drop by the reactor enclosure crane in areas other than the reactor vessel and the spent fuel poo1* tuill not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. Heavy load handling over the reactor vessel and over the spent fuel pool is discussed elsewhere in this report. P-165(a)/6 B-9

LGS Overhead Hcndling Systcms Rsview September, 1981 RECIRCULATION PUMP & MOTOR HOISTS (Item 21, Equipment Numbers lAH203, IBH203) These monorail hoista are used for removal of the recirculation pumps and motors, inside the drywell at elevation 253'. The Iten 21 load path drawing defines the safe load paths. Major safety-related items in the load path: (Hoist 1AH203) (1) Electrical conduit (Divisions 1 & 3) (2) Recirculation system piping (Loop 'A') (3) MSRV discharge piping (4) Drywell unit cooler 1GV212 (Division 1 & 3) (Hoist 1BH203) (1) Electrical conduit (Divisions 2 & 4) (2) Recirculation system piping (Loop 'B') (3) MSRV discharge piping (4) Drywell unit cooler 1HV212 (Division 2 & 4) (5) Shutdown cooling supply piping, 12" DCA-104 ( Loop ' B' ) (6) RCIC turbine steam supply piping, 4" DBA-107 Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: (1) Primary containment vacuum relief valve assemblies (2) Suppression pool temperature sensors Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: The reactor must be in cold shutdown prior to removal of the recir-culation pump or motor. During cold shutdown the primary safety concern is the removal of residual decay heat. A drop of the recir-culation motor or pump could cause rupture of the recirculation pip-ing or shutdown cooling loop 'B' supply piping. In this event RHR shutdown cooling loop 'A' and any one of several combinations of RHR and core spray injection loops would be available to maintain core cooling and supply makeup water until the leak could be repaired. If suppression pool water were needed for makeup, pool temperature indication would still be available due to redundancy and separation of the sensors.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, and the fact that load handling can be done only with the reactor in cold shutdown, a load drop by the recirculation pump and motor hoists will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. F-41(b)/5 B-10

LGS Overhacd Hcndling Systcms RSview Saptcmbar, 1981 HPCI/RCIC EOUIPMENT HOIST (Item 24, Equipment Numbers 10H215) This monorail hoist is used to carry HPCI, RCIC and core spray system equipment on elevation 217' of the reactor enclosure, and to and from elevation 177' via hatchways. The Item 24 load path drawing defines the safe load path. Major safety-related items in the load path: (1) Electrical conduit and cable trays (Divisions 1, 2, 3& 4) (2) RHR piping and instrumentation (Divisions 1 & 2) (3) Main steam & recirculation instrumentation (Divisions 1,2 & 3) (4) Motor control centers 10B211 & 10D201 (Divisions 2 & 4) Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: (Below 217' slab) (1) Electrical conduit and cable trays (Divisions 1, 2, 3 & 4) (2) HPCI ESW piping (3) RHR, HPCI & RCIC instrumentation (4) Motor control center 10B217 (Division 2) (Below hatchway @ 177') (1) Core spray, HPCI & RCIC system components Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: Of the various safety-related systems that have components located in and below the load path only the HPCI system is associated with shutdown method B. Therefore, the remaining systems associated with shutdown method B can be used to shut the reactor down, and full shutdown capability will be retained if a system other than HPCI is available to depressurize the reactor. This depressurization function can be provided by manual actuation of the automatic depressurization system (ADS). When shutting down the reactor without the aid of either the RCIC system or the HPCI system, the ADS serves to permit the operation of a low pressure core cooling system, rather than just allowing initiation of the shutdown cooling mode of the RHR system. With this scheme two RHR pumps will need to be operated simultaneously, of operation, in which case the following components must be available in addition to those listed under " Method B" in Appendix A. (1) RHR pump "D" and associated valves (2) RHR compartment unit cooler "D" P-41(b)/5 B-ll

LGS Overhasd Hcndling Systcms Raview Saptember, 1981 Since none of the above components (or their associated cabling) is located in or below the load path their availability is assured. Safe shutdown of the plant using shutdown method B modified as described above would be accomplished in the following manner. After closure of the main steam isolation valves, the reactor is depressurized by manually controlling the valves of the automatic depressurization system. The opening of these valves allows reactor steam to be discharged to the suppression pool. Makeup water is supplied to the reactor vessel from the suppression pool by operating one loop of the RHR system in the LPCI mode after reactor pressure has decreased to a nominal 295 psig. Heat is removed from the suppression pool by operating a different loop of the RHR system in the suppression pool cooling mode. In this mode, water from the suppression pool is circulated through an RHR heat exchanger and then returned to the suppression pool. When the reactor has been depressurized below a nominal 75 psig, the RHR loop operating in the suppression pool cooling mode is switched to the shutdown cooling mode. In both of these modes, heat is removed from the RHR heat exchanger by the RHRSW system, which in turn dissipates heat at the spray pond. The shutdown cooling mode of RHR will maintain the reactor in a cold shutdown condition.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the HPCI/RCIC equipment hoist will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. B-12 P-41(b)/5

LGS Ovarhssd Hcndling Systcms Rsvicw September, 1981 CORE SPRAY PUMP HOIST (Item 25, Equipment Number 10H216) This monorail hoist is used to carry Core Spray System Pumps, motors and other components on elevation 217' of the reactor enclosure, and to and from elevation 1778 via hatchways. The Item 25 load path drawing defines the safe load path. Major safety-related items in the load path: (1) Electrical conduit (Divisions 1, 2, 3 and 4) (2) Main steam, Recirculation, Core Spray and HPCI system instru-men'tation (Divisions 1, 2, 3 and 4) (3) RHR/ Core Spray Piping (loops A &C) (4) Motor Control Centers 108215 and 10D201 (Divisions 2 & 4) Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: (Below 217' slab) (1) Electrical Conduit & Cable trays (Divisions 1, 2, 3& 4) (2) Licuid Radwaste Systam Valves (Division 1 & 2) (3) Emergency Service Water, HPCI, RCIC, and Containment Atmospheric Control Sytems Valves and Piping (Below hatchway @ elevation 177') (1) Core Spray, HPCI and RCIC System Components Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: The effect of a' load drop is the same as for the FPCI/RCIC equipment hoist.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the Core Spray Pump Hoist (Item 25) will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. B-13 P-41(b)/5

LGS Overh2Ed Hcndling Syctsma Rsview September, 1981 CORE SPRAY PUMP HOIST (Item 26, Equipment Number 10H217) This monorail hoist is used to carry Core Spray system pump, motor and other components on elevation 217' of the reactor enclosure, and to and from elevation 177' via a hatchway. The Item 26 load path drawing defines the safe load path. Major safety-related items in the load path: (1) Electrical Conduit and Cable Tray (Divisions 1, 2, 3& 4) (2) Core Spray, Main Steam, Recirculation and Containment Atmospheric Control System Piping and Instrumentation (Divisions 1, 2, 3& 4) (3) Motor Control Center 10B212 (Division 2) Maior safety-related items on the next lower elevation: (Below 217' slab) (1) Electrical Conduit and Cable Trays (Divisions 1, 2, 3& 4) (2) Emergency Service Water Valves & Piping (Divisions 2 & 4) (3) Liquid Radwaste Valves and Instrumentation (Divisions 1 & 2) (Below hatchway at 177') (1) Core Spray System Components (Divisions 2 & 4) Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: Most safety-related items in and below the load path are associated with electrical divisions 2 and 4. None of the components associated with electrical divisions 1 & 3 are required for safe shutdown. Therefore shutdown method A will remain available to safely shut down the plant.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the Core spray pump hoist (Item 26) will not jeopardize safe shut down or decay heat removal capability. P-41/(b)/5 B-14 m

LGS Overhead Handling Systems Review September, 1981 CORE __ SPRAY PUMP HOIST & REACTOR ENCLOSURE COOLING HX HOIST (Item 27, Equipment Numbers 1AH218, IBH218) These monorail hoists are used to carry core spray system components and heat exchanger tube bundles on elevation 217' of the reactor enclosure, and to and from elevation 177' via hatchways. Major safety-related items in the load path: (1) Electrical Conduit and Cable Trays (Divisions 1, 2, 3& 4) (2) RHR Piping & Instrumentation (Division 2) (3) Main Steam and Recirculation instrumentation (Divisions 1,2,3 & 4) (4) RCIC Instrumentation (Division 1 & 3) Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: (Below 217' slab) (1) Electrical conduit & cable trays (Divisions 1,2,3 & 4) (2) ESW Valves & Piping (Divisions 2 & 4) (3) Liquid Radwaste System Valves & Instrumentation (Divisions 1 & 2) (4) Containment Atmospheric Control System valves & piping (Divisions 1 & 2) (Below hatchways at 177') (1) Core Spray System Components (Divisions 2 & 4) (2) RHR Instrumentation (Division 2) (3) HPCI Instrumentation (Division 2) Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: There are safety-related items in the load path associated with shutdown methods A and B. There is a minimum horizontal separat-ion of 16 feet between any component of shutdown method A and any component of shutdown method B. There is similar (and corresponding) separation below the floor slab. Therefore only one shutdown method would be affected by a load drop and the remaining shutdown method would remain available to safely shut-down the plant. If a load were dropped through a hatch to elevation 177' only shutdown method B would be affected and method A would remain available.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the core spray & reactor enclosure cooling HX hoist will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. P-41(b)/5 B-15

i LGS Overhacd Handling Systems Raview September, 1981 j RHR PUMPS HOIST (Item 28, Equipment Number 10H219) This monorail hoist is used to carry RHR pumps & motors, HPCI, RCIC and Core Spray System components on elevation 217' of the reactor enclosure, and to and from elevation 177' via hatchways. Major safety-related items in the load path: (1) Electrical conduit and cable trays (Divisions 1, 2, 3& 4) (2) Motor control centers 10B222, 10D202 (Division 2) Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: (Below 217' slab) (1) Electrical conduit and cable trays (Divisions 1, 2, 3, & 4) (2) RHR valves and instrumentation (Divisions 1 & 2) (3) ESW valves (Division 3) (Below hatchways @ 177') (1) RHR system (Divisions 1 & 2) Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: There is an boundary between Division 1 & 3 safety related items (west) and Division 2 & 4 items (east) at about the column 17 line, with a minimum horizontal distance of five feet between components associated with shutdown methods A and B. Below the 217' slab on elevations 201' and 177' there is strict separation between the electrical divisions (and shutdown method components) which is provided by a wall at the Column 13.5 line. There are a few items which are exceptions to this separation, however none of these items are required for safe shutdown. The only potential hazard is that a load could be dropped between column lines 17 and 18.5, causing damage to a method B component on elevation 217' and spalling which could af fect a method A component below the slab. This possibility is discounted for the following reason. All method B components are on the extreme south edge of the load path, at least 10 feet away from the hoist monorail (MCC 10D202 and cable trays above it), Loads which could affect these components must be those which are tall and could topple over (i.e. the ECCS pumps). Since these tall loads must ~ of necessity be carried close to the floor (because the lift of the P-41(b)/5 B-16

LGS Overh2Ed Handling Systsms Revicw Septembar, 1981 hoist above the floor is not much more than the length of the pumps) _no significant spalling can occur due to initial impact if they are dropped (& if the pump falls on the MCC there will be little energy left for a secondary floor impact). Therefore only one shutdown method can be affected by a load drop and the remaining method will be available to safely shut down the plant.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the RHR pumps hoist will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. P-41(b)/5 B-17

LGS Overhacd Handling SystGmc R3 view September, 1981 CONTAINMENT EQUIPMENT DOOR HOIST (Item 29, Equipment Numbir 10H220) This monorail hoist is used to remove and replace the drywell equipment access door on elevati.on 253'. The safe load path is defined on the Item 29 load path drawing. Major safety-related items in the load path: (1) Electrical conduit (Divisions 1 & 3) (2) Core spray piping (associatei with Division 2) Major safety-related items on the next lower elevations (Below 253' slab) (1) Electrical conduit and cable trays (Division 1, 2 & 3) (2) Motor control center 10B215 (Division 1) Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or dgca,v heat removal capability: Most safety-related components in and below the load path are associated with electrical divisions 1 and 3. Those which are not, are stot required for safe shutdown. Therefore only shutdown method A could be affected by a load drop and, at a minimum, shut down method B will remain available to safely shut down the plant. Conclunion: Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the containment equipment door hoist will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. l P-41(b)/5 B-18

LGS Overhead Handling Systems Review September, 1981 PERSONNEL LOCK HOIST (Item 30, Equipment Numbers lAH221, IBH221) This monorail hoist is used to remove and replace the personnel lock / equipment access door assembly on elevation 253' of the reactor enclosure. The Item 30 load path drawing defines the safe load path. Major safety-related items in the load path: None Major safety-relatod items on the next lower elevation: (Below 253' slab) (1) Electrical conduit and cable trays (Divisions 1, 2, 3& 4) (2) RHR 'B' piping and instrumentation Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: There are no safety-related items in the load path. On the lower elevation most safety-related items are associated next with electrical divisions 2 and 4. Of the items associated with electrical divisions 1 and 3 only a few are required for safe-shutdown and these are part of the RCIC system. Since the personnel lock assembly is part of the primary containment boundary it cannot be removed unless the reactor is shutdown. Therefore The RHR 'B' only reactor decay heat removal is of concern. snutdown cooling loop could potentially be af fected by spalling of the 253' slab but the RHR 'A' shutdown cooling loop would remsin available for decay heat removal. Conclusion Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the personnel lock hoist will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. B-19 P-41(b)/5

LGS Overhacd Handling Systems RDview Septsmbar, 1981 REACTOR WATER CLEANUP HEAT EXCHANGER HOIST (Item 31, Equipment Number OOH 223) This monorail hoist is used for removal and replacement of heat exchanger tube bundles on elevation 283' of the reactor enclosure. The Item 31 load path drawing defines the safe load path. Major safety-related items in the load path: (1) Electrical conduit and cable tray (Divisions 1, 2, 3& 4) Major safety-related items on_the next lower elevation: (Below 283' slab) (1) Electrical conduit (Divisions 1, 2, 3 & 4) (2) Containment atmospheric control valves and instrumentation (Divisions 1 & 3) Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: Most safety-related items in and below the load path are associated with electrical divisicar, 1 and 3. Those items associated with divisions 2 and 4 are not required for safe-shutdown. Therefore only shutdown method A could potentially be affected by a load drop and, at a minimum, shutdown method B will remain available to safely shut down the plant. Conclusion Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the RiiCU heat exchanger hoist will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. P-41(b)/5 B-20

LGS Overhead Handling Systems Review Revision 1, March 1982 CONTROL ROD DRIVE PLATFORM HOIST (Item 33, Equipment Number 10H229) This hoist is used to raise and lower the free end of the hinged CRD removal platform, located in the drywell at elevation 253'. The Item 33 load path drawing defines the safe load path. Major safety-related items in the load path: (1) RHR shutdown cooling suction line, 20" DCA-105 (2) Drywell unit cooler ducting Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: (Below 230' slab) (1) Primary Containment vacuum relief valves assemblies (2) Suppression pool temperature sensors Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: If the hoist were to fail, the free end of the CRD removal plat-form would fall about six feet and strike its support. Analysis shows that, with a loaded CRD removal cask on the platform, the impact would cause the support to fail and allow the platform to strike the shutdown cooling suction line which passes underneath. However, the line would not rupture or be seriously deforned by the impact and shutdown cooling flow would not be interrupted. Damage to suppression pool temperature sensors could occur due to spallirig of the elevation 238' slab but there is sufficient redundancy and separation of sensors to prevent loss of temperature indication. Conclusion Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems and on impact analysis, a load drop by the CRD platform hoist would not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. P-41(b)/5 B-21 6

LGS Overhoad Handling Systems R2 view R3 vision 1, March 1982 MAIN STEAM RELIEF VALVES SERVICE / REMOVAL HOISTS (Item 34, Equipment Numbers lAH233, 234, 235; IBH233,234, 235; 10H230; 10H232) These monorail hoists, or come-alongs installed on the hoist trolleys,.are used to carry main steam relief valves (MSRV's) and other valves on monorails at elevations 273' and 286' in the drywell, and to and from elevation 253' via hatchways. The Item 34 load path drawing defines the safe load path. Major safety-related items in the load ptth and below floor grating: (1) Main steam relief and isolation valves (2) ECCS system piping (including RHR shutdown cooling) (3) Drywell unit coolers (4) Containment isolation valves Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: (Below 238' slab) (1) Suppression pool temperature sensors (2) Primary containment vacuum relief valves Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: In order to remove valves in the drywell the reactor must be in cold shutdown. During cold shutdown decay heat removal is the primary safety concern. Calculations show that floor grating will not withstand the impact of a falling valve from any height. If a valve is dropped at specific locations in the drywell, damage to one shutdown cooling loop can be postulated but the other loop will remain available to continue decay heat removal. In the remote event that a dropped valve damaged shutdown cooling supply piping (between isolation valves and reactor vessel) or recircula-tion piping, makeup water can be supplied by the RHR or core spray systems until the leak can be repaired. There is sufficient redundancy and separation of suppression pool temperature sensors to prevent loss of pool temperature indication due to spalling of the elevation 238' slab.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, ~ and the f act that load handling will only be done with the reactor in cold shutdown, a load drop by the main steam relief valves service / removal hoists will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. P-41(b)/5 B-22

LGS Overhead Handling Systemo R2 View September, 1981 DISPOSAL CASK CART REMOVAL 00IST (Item 35, Equipment Number 10H236) This monorail hoist handles the cart for the cask used for disposal of source and intermediate range detectors. It is located in the drywell between elevations 248' and 258', approximately. The Item 35 load path drawing defines the safe load path. Major safety-related items in the load path: None Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: (Below grating) (1) Electrical conduit (Divisions 1, 3 & 4) (Below 238' slab) (1) Suppression pool temperature monitors (2) Primary containment vacuum relief valves Ef fect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: Safety-related conduit below load path floor grating is not required for safe-shutdown. There is sufficient redundancy and separation of suppression pool temperature sensors so that damage resulting from possible spalling of the elevation 238' slab would not cause a loss of pool temperature indication.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the disposal cask cart removal hoist will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. B-23 P-41(b)/5

4: s, LGS Ovarhard H0ndling Systcms Riview Ravicion 1, March 1982 s_ 7' CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN RECOMBINER COVER HOIST (Item 36, Equipment Number 10H237) This monorail hoist is used to remove and replace the hatch covers over the hydrogen recombiners at two locations on elevation 283' of the reactor enclosure. The Item 36 load path drawing defines the safe load path. 'ss Major safety-related items in the load path: (Area 11) (1) Electrical conduit (Divisions 1, 3 and 4) (2) Hydrogen Recombiner (Area 16) (1) Electrical conduit (Divisions 2, 3 and 4) (2) Hydrogen Recombiner Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: (Area 11. below 283' slab) (1) Electrical conduit and cable trays (Divisions 1, 2 and 3) (Area 16, below 283' slab) (1) Electrical conduit ( Divisions 1, 2 and 3, (2) Reactor Vessel Instrumentation Panels (Divisions 2 & 4) (3) Control Rod Drive Hydraulic Control Units Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: (Area ll) Most safety-related items in and below the load path are associated with electrical divisions 1 and 3. Those items associated with electrical divisions 2 and 4 are not required for safe shutdown, Therefore only shutdown method A could potentially be af fected by a load drop. Shutdown method B would remain available to safely shut down the plant. (Area 16) Most safety-related items in and below the load path are associated with electrical dvisions 2 and 4. Of the items associated with electrical divisions 1 and 3, one conduit lo'cated below the floor slab contains cable required for safe-shutdown. CRD piping also traverses the area below the floor. Analysis has shown that a drop-of the hydrogen recombiner cover from the maximum hoist height of 8 feet will cause minor local damage to the elevation 283' floor slab but items below the floor will not be damaged. P-41(b)/7 B-24 O e m

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7 s-s LGS,Ovdrh2cd Handll'ng Syntama R2Viow s Ssptsmbor, 1981 N EQUIPMENT HATCH BRIDGE CRANE (Item 37, Equipment Number 10ii238) ~ This crane is used to carry m*scellaneous' loads between elevat-ions 217' and 283' of the reactor enclosure. The Item 37 load path drawing defines the safe load path.., .w Major safety-related itens' id~ the load p'ath: 1 r None Maior safety-related items on the'next lower elevation: (Below 283' slab) (1) Electrical conduit ( Divisions' 2,& 4) e (Below 217' slab) N (1) Electrical conduit (Divisions 2, 3& 4) (2) RHR Instrumentation'(Division 2) ~~. (3) Emergency Service Water Piping & Valves (Associated w/ Division 2) s Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or. decay heat, removal capability. There are no safety-relbted items in the load path. All safety-related items below the 30ad path are e.'ssociated with electrica'l divisions 2 and 4, except' for one division '3, conduit 'which is not required for safe-shutdown. Therefore'a load could potentially affect only shutdown method B. Shutdown method A,will remain available to safely shut down the plant.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related s'ysteks, I a load drop by the. equipment hatch bridge crane will nc't jeopardize ) safe shutdown or decay-heat removal capability. 1 \\ 'l \\ ~ .\\ c P-41(b)/7 3-26 3 \\ L r '~ g <~

LGS Ovorh0cd Hsndling Syntsms R2 View S2pt;mbar, 1981 CONTROL ROD DRIVE MAINTENANCE AREA CRANE (Item 38, Equipment Number 10H239) This crane handles control rod drives in the CRD maintenance area on elevation 253' of the reactor enclosure. The Item 38 load path drawing defines the safe load path. Major safety-related items in the load path: None Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: (Below 253' slab) (1) Electrical conduit and cable trays (Divisions 1 & 3) Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: There are no safety-related items in the load path. All safety-related items below the load path are associated with electrical divisions 1 and 3. Therefore a load drop could potentially affect only shutdown method A. Shutdown method B will remain available to safely shut down the plant.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the control rod drive maintenance area crane will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. I s P-41(b)/7 B-27

LGS Overhscd Handling Systcms Review September, 1981 DIESEL GENERATOR ENCLOSURE CRANES (Item 44, Equipment Numbers lAH501, IBH501, ICH501, IDH501) These cranes handle diesel generator parts and miscellaneous There is a separate crane for each diesel generator loads. The Item 44 load path drawing defines the safe load enclosure. paths. Major safety-related items in each load path: (1) Diesel generator and auxiliaries (2) Emergency service water supply / return valves ( 3) Diesel generator air exhaust fans (4) Diesel generator controls & power distribution panel (5) Electrical cable and motor control center Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: Not applicable Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat , removal capability: There is strict separation of safety-related items in the diesel The diesel generator 'A' enclosure contains generator enclosures. only items associated with electrical division 1, the diesel generator 'B' enclosure contains only items associated with electrical division 2, etc. Therefore a load drop in any one enclosure will affect only one shutdown method. The other shutdown method will remain available to safely shut down the plant.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by a diesel generator enclosure crane will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. B-28 P-41(b)/7

LGS Overhead Handling Systems Raview September, 1981 SPRAY POND PUMP HOUSE HOISTS (Item 49, Equipment Numbers OOH 511, OOH 513) These monorail hoists are used for handling of RHR service water and emergency service water system valves on elevation 268' of the spray pond pump house, and to and from elevation 251' via hatchways. The Item 49 load path drawing defines the safe load paths. Major safety-related items in the load path: (1) Electrical conduit Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: (Below 268' slab) (1) RHR service water valves (2) Emergency service water valves Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: There is strict separation of safety-related items in the spray pond pump house. Safety-related items on the west side of the pump house are associated only with electrical divisions 1 and 3. Those on the east side are associated only with electrical divisions 2 and 4. A concrete wall separates the two halves of the building. Therefore a load drop could affect only one shutdown method. The other shutdown method would remain available to safely shut down the plant. Conclusion Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the spray pond pump house hoists will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. P-41(b)/7 B-29

LGS Overhacd H:ndling Systcms R: view September, 1981 CONTROL ROOM CHILLER PORTABLE GANTRY HOIST (Item 50, Equipment Number 00H514) This hoist will be used primarily to service control room chiller of the control OBR 112 but can be used anywhere on elevation 200' The Item 50 load path drawing defines the safe load structure. path. Major safety-related items in the load path: (1) Control room chillers OAK 112 & OBK112 and associated piping & instrumentation (2) Electrical conduit (Divisions 1, 2, 3 & 4) Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: None Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: of the control structure. There is a dividing wall on elevation 200' On the east side of the wall safety-related components are On the west associated only with electrical divisions 2 and 4. side of the wall safety-related components are associated only with electrical divisions 1 and 3, except for a few division 4 conduit which are located against the south wall and are out of i Therefore a load drop can. reach of the portable gantry crane. affect only one shutdown method. The other shutdown method will remain available to safely shut down the plant.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the control room chiller portable gantry crane will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. a l B-30 l P-41(b)/7 i

LGS Overhead Har.51ing Systems Review September, 1981 MAIN STEAM TUNNEL MONORAIL HOISTS (Item 53) Monorail hoists will be borrowed from other locations for removal and replacement of main steam isolation valves or other valves and operators located in the main steam tunnel of the reactor enclosure (elevations 253' to 290'). The Item 53 load path drawing defines the safe load path. Major safety-related items in the load path: (1) Main steam isolation valves (MSIV's) ( 2) RCIC system piping and valves (3) MSIV leakage control system components Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: (Below 253' slab) None Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: can only Heavy loads in the steam tunnel (valves and operators) from their systems with the reactor in cold shutdown. be removed During cold shutdown the primary safety concern is to provide A load drop in the main steam tunnel will decay heat removal.the shutdown cooling loop of either shutdown method. not affect Decay heat removal capability will not be affected.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, and the fact that load handling will be done only with the reat or in cold shutdown, a load drop by the main steam tunnel monorail hoists will not jeopardize safe shutdcwn or decay heat removal I capability. l l t B-31 P-41(b)/7 l

LGS Overhtcd Handling Systcms R2 View September, 1981 SPRAY POND RHRSW AND ESW PUMPS YARD CRANE (Item 55) A mobile yard crane will be used for removal and replacement of RHR service water (RHRSW) and Emergency Service Water (ESW) pumps through roof batches in the spray pond pump house. The Item 55 load path drawing defines the safe load path. Major safety-related items in the load path: (1) RHRSW pumps and valves (2) ESW pumps and valves (3) Spray pond pump structure supply air fans (4) Motor control centers (5) Electrical conduit Maior safety-related items on the next lower elevation: (Below 268' slab) (1) RHRSW valves ( 2) ESW valves Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: There is strict separation of safety-related items in the spray pond pump house. Safety-related items on the west side of the pump house are associated only with electrical divisions 1 and 3. Those on the east side are associated only with electrical divisions 2 and 4. A concrete wall separates the two halves of the building. Therefore a load drop could affect only one shutdown method. The other shutdown method will remain available to safely shut down the plant.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the spray pond RHRSW and ESW pumps yard crane will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. P-41(b)/7 B-32

LGS Overhead Handling Systems Review Revision 1, March 1982 CONTROL ROOM HVAC EQUIPMENT HOIST (Item 58, Equipment Number 05ill33) This monorail hoist is used for handling of HVAC fans on elevation 313' of the control structure and to and from elevation 304' via hatchways. The Item 58 load path drawings defines the safe load path. Major safety-related items in the load path: (1) Electrical conduit ( Divisions 1, 2, 3& 4) Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: (Below 304' slab) (1) Electrical conduit and cable trays (Divisions 1, 2, 3& 4) (2) Power generation control complexes (PGCC's) for Unit i and Unit 2 Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: A load drop by this hoist in any area of its load path will affect cabling associated with only one shutdown method. This includes electrical cable embedded in the 304' floor slab. The other shutdown method would remain available to safely shut down the plant. Analysis shows that, since the fan loads are small and the maximum drop height is just 9 feet, the safety-related items below the floor slab will not be affected by a load drop.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems and analysis of the elevation 304' floor slab, a load drop by the control room HVAC equipment hoist will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. P-41 ( b)/ 7 B-33

LGS Overhard Handling Systems R3 view September, 1981 WETWELL MONORAIL HOIST (Item 59) This monorail hoist is used for maintenance activities in the wet-well of the primary containment. The Item 59 load path drawing defines the safe load path. Major safety-related items in each load path: (1) Primary containment vacuum relief valve assemblies (2) Suppression pool temperature sensors Major safety-related items on the next lower evaluation: _ Not applicable Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: Only the suppression pool temperature sensors are required for safe shutdown. There is sufficient separation and redundancy of sensors so that a load drop would not result in a loss of suppression pool temperature indication,

== Conclusion:== j Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by a diesel generator enclosure crane will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. B-34 P-41(b)/7

. LGS Overhnad Handling Systems Review Revision 1, March 1982 CONTROL STRUCTURE FANS LIFTING BEAMS HOISTS (Item 60) Hoists will be borrowed from other locations to carry HVAC fans be tween elevations 304 ' and 322' of the control structure. The Item 60 load path drawings define the safe load path. Major safety-related items in the load path : (1) Electrical conduit (Division 1, 2, 3& 4) Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation : (Below 304' Slab) (1) Electrical conduit and cable trays (Divisions 1, 2, 3& 4) (2) Power generation control complexes (PGCC's) for Unit 1 and Unit 2 Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: A load drop by this hoist in any area of its load path will affect cabling associated with only one shutdown method. This includes cable embedded in the 304' floor slab. The other shutdown method would remain available to safely shut down the plant. Analysis shows that, since the fan loads are small and the maximum drop beight is just 18 feet, the safety-related items below the floor slab will not be affected by a load drop.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and red'Indancy of safety-related systems and analysis of the elevation 304' floor slab, a load drop by the control structure fans lif ting beam hoists will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. P-41(b)/7 B-35

LGS Overh3cd Handling Systtma R3 view Saptembar, 1981 REACTOR ENCLOSURE UPPER FAN ROOM HOIST (Item 61) Monorail hoists will be borrowed from other locations for handling of fans and other HVAC items on elevation 331' of the reactor enclosure, and to and from elevation 313' via a hatchway. Major safety-related items in the load path: (1) Electrical conduit (Divisions 1 and 2) Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: (Below 331' Slab) (1) Electrical conduit (Divisions 1, 2, 3 & 4) (Below 313' Slab under hatchway) None Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: None of the safety-related items in the load path are required for safe-shutdown. On the elevation below the load path most items on the west side (Area 15) are associated with electrical divisions 1 and 3 and most items on the east side (Area 16) The items which are-are associated with electrical division 4. exceptions to this rule are not required for safe shutdown. Therefore only one shutdown method could potentially be affected The other shutdown method will remain available by a load drop. to safely shut down the plant.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the reactor enclosure upper fan room hoist will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal t capability. B-3 6 P-41(b)/7 m_.

LGS Ovarhard Handling Systems R2 View September, 1981 REACTOR ENCLOSURE LOWER FAN ROOM HOIST (Item 62) Monorail hoists will be borrowed from other locations for handling of fans and other HVAC items on elevation 313' of the reactor enclosure. The Item 62 load path drawing defines the safe load path. Major safety-related items in the load path: (1) Electrical conduit (Divisions 1, 2, 3 & 4) Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: (Below 313' slab) (1) Electrical conduit ( Divisions 1, 2, 3& 4) (2) Standby liquid control system components (3) Load center 10B204 (4) Motor control center 10B225 Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: Safety-related items in and below the western pcrtion of the load path (Area 15) are generally associated with electrical divisions Safety-related items in and below the eastern portion of 1 and 3. the load path are generally associated with electrical divisions 2 and 4. Items which are exceptions to this pattern are not required for safe shutdown. Therefore a load drop could potentially affect just one shutdown method. The other shutdown method will remain to safely shut down the plant.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the reactor enclosure lower fan room hoist will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. B-37 P-41(b)/7

l LGS Overhead Handling Systems Review September, 1981 NORTH STACK INSTRUMENT ROOM DUMBWAITER (Item 63) This elevator is used to carry filter casks and other items between elevation 332' of the control structure and the north stack instrument room (elevation 410'). The Item 63 load path drawing defines the safe load path. Major safety-related items in the load path: None Major safety-related items on the next lower elevation: (Below 332' slab) (1) Electrical conduit and cable tray (Divisions 1, 2 & 3) (2) Motor control center OOB131 (Division 3) Effect of a load drop on safe-shutdown or decay heat removal capability: There are no safety-related items in the load path. All safety-related items below the load path are associated with electrical divisions 1 and 3, except for one division 2 conduit which does not contain cable required for safe shutdown. Therefore only shutdown method A could potentially be affected by a load drop. Shutdown method B will remain available to safely shut d6wn the plant.

== Conclusion:== Based on separation and redundancy of safety-related systems, a load drop by the north stack instrument room dumbwaiter will not jeopardize safe shutdown or decay heat removal capability. P-41(b)/7 B-38}}