ML20044H042

Requests That NRC Take Immediate Action to Prevent Restart of Plant

ML20044H042
Person / Time
Site:	Vermont Yankee
Issue date:	04/11/1993
From:	Daley M NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON NUCLEAR POLLUTION
To:	Selin, The Chairman NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
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ML20044H043	List: ML20044H042
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Download: ML20044H042 (1)

Text

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L NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON NUCLEAR POLLUTION 802-257-0336 r

URGENT -- URGENT -- URCENT ~~ URGENT --

April 11, 1993 Ivan Selin, Chairman U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Dear Chairman Selin:

We are writing to ask that you and the Commission take immediate action to prevent the restart of.the Vermont Yankee reactor.

A recent Vermont Yankee report has just come to our at-tention. The report casts doubt on the ability of the 11-censee's current surveillance and maintenance programs to assure that the emergency diesel generators can meet their safety function.

The enclosed letter from us to Region I Administrator Thomas Martin describes the situation in detail. It in-cludes our appeal to Region I to keep Vermont Yankee -- cur-rently off line for-feedwater leak repairs -- from restart-ing until the numerous issues raised by this latest informa-tion can be answered to our satisfaction.

We sent the letter to Mr. Martin on April 8,_1993 and have received no response. The situation is in need of im-mediate attention as Vermont Yankee.is planning to restart soon. The assurance of public safety the NRC requires can-not be given by Vermont Yankee in light of these outstanding )

uncertainties. '

Therefore, we ask that you personally intervene to keep {

the reactor shut down until the uncertainties can be resolved.

We vould appreciate knowing your intentions at the ear-

. liest opportunity on Monday, April 12. I can be contacted that day at the Conservation Law Foundation offices in Bos- I ton between 9:30 AM and 2:30 PM, telephone (617)-350-0990. '

Sincerely, q

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/ d6 M Q' 4 Michael J. ey for the ard of the New England Coal [ on on Nuclear Pollution l TWO PAGES FOLLOW

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Box 543. Brattleboro Vermont 05301 k .

Phone (802) 257 0Mo April 8, 1993 Theinas T. Hartin. Regional Admint'strator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission--Region I 475 Allendale Road l King of Prussia, PA 19506

Dear Hr. Martin:

As you know, Vermont Yankee is currently shut down to deal with a feedwater leak. We are writing you to demand that the reactor remain in cold shut down untti plant management can provide proof that the emergency diesel generators at the Vermont Yankee tion.

nuclear power plant are able to meet their safety func-In p'revious letters to you and to Chairman Selin, and in legal briefs filed in a recent intervention, we have shown that ,'

this plant has a history of problems with its diesel generators, and that its attempts to solve these problems with the plant operating at full power were unsafe and illegal.

tion has compounded our concern. Recent informa-According to LER 90-017-01, dated 2-19-93, diesel generator "A" was damaged by overload conditions suf f ered during testing in August through October of 1990. The "B" the same testing regime. unit also suffered under the causes of the repeated Versont failuresfankee of thenow believes that one of l "A" unit in the summer

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l of 1992 was the damage from this testing.

The overloading resulted from inappropriate actions taken in response to an NRC-identified violation indicating that the emergener diesel generators had -- for twenty years -- not been tested at loads consis. tent with the maximus expected accident load. The history of this is documented in LER 90-010-00, 01, and 02, NRC inspection reports 50-271/9080, and 90-10, and NRC information notice 91-13.

The identification of damage nearly two years after the '

originating conditions raises a number of questions which must be immediately answered if Vermont fankee is going to be allowed to depend on these machines to fulfill the regulatory requirements for adequate on-site emergency backup power systems.

1. What other flaws with estastrophic potenttal might remain undiscovered in both generators as a result of the 1990 overload conditions? Given the inability of previous testing to identify the cylinder flaws, what new testing procedures can be applied to provide assurance that hidden flaws are revealed?

2. Why did the LIMITED inspection conducted tu October 1990 fall to identify the " original flaws" (LER 90-017-01) in the cylinder walls?

2a. Why did all surveillance and maintenance activities E du ca ting the l' u lo ll e in Cle a n A lt er n a t t r e s t us Nu cle ar Po wer

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during the ensuing two and a half years fail to find this problem before it resulted in gross failure xndicationa?

2b. Was Vermont Yankee's desire not to Jeopardize its capacity factor and its record-setting operations responsible for its decision not to undertske more thorough (though time consuming and costly) investigations?

2c. How can the public have confidence in Vermont Yankee surveillance practices and NRC oversight to asaure operability of safety systems when these practices failed to identify the damage done to the machines by the overloading?

3. Given the pivotal safety role of the emergency diesel generators, why were the defects in the original co,mponents not identified at the time of manufacture, or by over twenty years of 'p; maintenance? What other unidentified flaws might exist in the units, or in other plant equipment with equally vital safety functicns? e

4. What other equipment used in normal plant operations and for back-up safety purposes have suffered similar abuses? Can the NRC provide assurances that potentially dangerous conditions have all been identified and corrected in these instances?

5. Vermont Tankee recently canceled plans to do a major overhaul of the "B" generator. Given the new evidence contained in the root cause analysis of LER 92-017-01, is it prudent to postpone an1 service of this machine?

5. Did the NRC act prudently in allowing continued operation  !

of Vermont Yankee in August 1990 after identification of a viola- l tion indicating that the emergency diesel generators' ability to  !

handle expected e'mergency load had never been aspirically veri-fled?

7. What assurances can' be made that the current testing regime in f act demonstrates the units' ability to meet expected emergency loeds?

In light of this information and the numerous serious questions raised here, the NRC should require Vermont Yankee to remain shet down until satisfactory answers are provided.

Since oly - - .

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Michael . aley 4'c '&

A f or/ t6e oard of the New land Coalit n on Nuclear Pollution cc. Gov. Howard Dean Leslie Greer, assistant Attorney General, Ha,ssachusetts

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