ML20040C641

Requests Remission or Mitigation of Penalties,Or That Penalty Will Not Be Imposed.Violation Minor & Falls within Severity Level VI

ML20040C641
Person / Time
Site:	University of Wisconsin
Issue date:	12/23/1981
From:	Kearl B WISCONSIN, UNIV. OF, MADISON, WI
To:	Deyoung R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
References
EA-82-011, EA-82-11, NUDOCS 8201290111
Download: ML20040C641 (3)

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UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON g I

CHANCELLOR h, Bascom Hall o 500 Lincoln Drive Madison, Wisconsin 53706 608-262-9946 December 23, 1981 O

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Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission pgCENED Washington, DC 20555 - .Q T J/W ?. 71982> C Attention: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung 'Cy gg, -

Director m:t.M WEut M I TG REGARDING: License No. R-74 1 0

Docket No. 50-156 4 g EA 82-0 Request for Remission or Mitigation of Penalties as Provided under 10 C.F.R. 2.205 The Universirj of Wisconsin-Madison submits this Request for Remission or Mitigation of Penalities as part of its response to the Notice of Violation which was transmitted under ccrar letter dated November 24, 1981. The University has submitted a Statement and Exalanation in Response to Notice of Violation dated December 23, 1981. As provided under 10 C.F.R. 2.205(b), the Us.iversity is also requesting that the proposed penalties not be impcz,2d or that the penalties be remitted or mitigated.

Remission or mitigation of the proposed penalty is requested because the proposed penalty does not comply with the standards and criteria for penalties as established by the Commission's Interim Enforcement Policy, 45 F.R. 66754 (October 7, 1980) (hereaf ter, " Policy").

The Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of a Civil Penalty classify this as a Severity Level III violation.Section III of the Policy provides that a Severity Level III violation involves an "actu<.1 or high potential impact on the public." A high potential'impac't does not exist for a 1000 KW TRIGA reactor even without an operator in attendance. Mr. DeYoung's November 24, 1981 letter transmitting the Notice of violation acknowledged that the safety significance of the incident is limited when considering the operating characteristics of the reactor. The inspection report, No. 50-156/81-02, stated that the recaarch reactur is, by design, inhatently safe, and that the incident did not measurably increase the hazards to the facility or to the public. The record demonstrates that the incident falls far short of the threshhold for a severity Level III violation. This conclusion is supported by reference to Supplement I to the Policy which defines the Severity categories for reactor operation. A severity Level III violation in reactor operations must involve:

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- . Richard C. DeYoung December 23, 1981 Page 2 (1) exceeding a Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation without satisfying the action statement; (2) inability of a system to prevent or mitigate a serious safety event to perform its intended function; (3) release of radioactivity greater than a Technical Specification limit; or (4) violation of 10 C.P.R. 50.59 such that an amendment was not sought.

None of these conditions is present in the incident for which the University was cited.

The violation falls within Severity Level VI, violations of minor concern, or at most it might be Severity Level V, violations which are less ~~~

serious than Levels I-IV and w: ich are of other than minor concern. That the violation is of minor concern is supported by the factors in the Commission's record which have been discussed above. In addition, we note that, at the time of the incident, there were at least four licensed personnel in the immediate areas who would have been able to hear and respond to any alarm calling for an operator response. Although these individuals were not within the area de-signated as the control room, they were no further away than they might be in some facilities with larger defined control room areas. Moreover, the accidents considered in the Safety Analysis Report do not require the presence of an operator to limit consequences to the public to safe levels. Plant emergency procedures do not require any immediate operator actions to provide protection to the public since there are no engineered safeguard systems to be monitored in the event of a reactor malfunction.

No penalty is provided for a Level VI violation (Policy, Table I.),

and no penalty should be imposed in this case.

Even assuming that it could be concluded that the incident constituted a Level V violation for which a penalty is provided under Table I, the announced policy of the Commission does not support imposition of a penalty in this case.Section IV.B of the Policy provides that a penalty will be imposed for a Severity Level V violation where there have been similar viola-tions in the past which have been discussed in a previous enforcement conference and for which the enforcement conference was ineffective 12 achieving the required corrective action. Th'at cannot be said in this case.

Facilty management had established procedures to insure the presence of a licensed operator at the controls when required. Management had provided that operating personnel -ere adequately trained in these procedures and had established a policy of strict adherence to the procedures. The operators had received training in the procedure that was violated in this case as well as on IE Circular 81-02 on March 5, 1981. Both operators involved in the incident had correctly answered questions on this subject on the requalification program written exam given on May 28, 1981. In fact, both operators admitted that they knew the written requirements and that it was management policy to adhere to them.

Richard C. DeYoung December 23, 1981 Page.3 That the facility had operated for 20 years without such an incident and without citation for violation of 10 C.F.R. 50.54(k).is evidence that managtment controls were adequate. Obviously, it is also evidence that the basis for imposition of a penalty for a Severity Level V violation, similar violations in the past and ineffective corrective action, is not present.

This occurrence, despite management controls, was due to a temporary

. lapse primarily by one individual where management'had no evidence that the operators involved were not capable of properly carrying out their license 4 responsibilities due to attitude or physical or mental disability.

Further assuming that a penalty for Severity Level V_ violation would be consistent with the Policy in this case, the penalty which is proposed should be substantially reduced. The Policy, sec. IV.B, provides that the

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base civil penalty, $1000, should be reduced by 50% where t.he. violation is

. stif-reported. The University notified the Commission of this violation by a telephone call to NRC Regior. III on the day of the incident, and by letter dated September 3, 1981 to the Director of Licensing which was received on September 8. (We take exception to the Notice of Violation which states that the violation was discovered as a result of an inspection conducted on September 18, 1981. That statement is contradicted by the facts.) The records shows that the University promptly reported the violation.

The Policy also provides for further mitigation based on good faith as demon-strated by the licensee's taking extraordO1arily prompt and comprehensive corrective action. The record supports the University's good fcith. The incident was discovered within about 12 seconds and the controls assumed by a licensed operator, the involved operators were immediately orally reprimanded, and the reprimand was placed in writing in the operators'

! personnel files. These prompt actions corrected the immediate situation and reinforced both the procedures and mar.agement's policy of strict adherence to them. Beyond the immediate situation, corrective action wac takcn to prevent recurrence. .All operators sere required to attend a requalification program lecture the day following tne incident. The lecture reviewed j operator responsibilities under the license and University procedures, and 2

stressed strict compliance with these procedures. The University's response could not have been more prompt in correcting the situation nor more thorough in addressing the incident's immediate and longer term implicaticas.

Sincerely,

=

Br n E. Kearl t

ce Chancellor -- Academic Affairs for Chancellor Irving Shain 3 r

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