ML20038C021

Equipment Survivability Rept.

ML20038C021
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	11/16/1981
From:	TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
Shared Package
ML19268A511	List: ML20038C015 ML20038C019 ML20038C020 ML20038C021 ML20038C023 ML20038C024
References
NUDOCS 8112090427
Download: ML20038C021 (53)

Text

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SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR _ PLANT EQUIPMENT SURVIVABILITY REPORT NOVEMBER- 16, 1981 i

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TABLE OF CONTENTS P

1.0 Introduction 2.0 Resolution of Operating License Conditions

.2.1 Containment Temperature Calculations 2.2 Equipment Tamperature Evaluation 2.3 Confirmatory Equipment Testing 3.0 Conclusions 4

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1.0 Ictrodsstien

. In January 1981 the Operating License for Sequoyah unit I was

[ amended with the following conditions:

- (a) TVA shall amend its research program on hydrogen control

measures to include, but not limited to, the following '(

i items:

(i) Improved calculational methods for containment 4 temperature and ice condenser response to hydrogen I combustion and local detonation.

(ii) Confirmatory tests on selected equipment exposed to

, hydrogen burns.

(iii) New calculations to predict dif ferences between

)

expected equipment temperature environments and containment temperatures.

(iv) Evaluate and resolve any anomalous results from the ongoing test program.

l (a) The results of these investigations will be provided to the staff for review in May 1981. A schedule for confirmatory tests beyond this date will be provided consistent with the requirement to meet the January 31, 1982, deadline, Section (22)D(2) of the license. -

1 In addition, the NRC issued "upplement No. 4 to the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Safety Evaluation Report in January 1981. Our submittal of June 2,1981, addressed the May 1981 Operating License conditions and unresolved items in the Safety Evaluation Report through identification of key equipment, i evaluation of that equipment by analysis and experiment, and >

dezesstration of its survivability for hydrogen burn

environments. The staff requ sted 3dditional'information by letter on August 27, 1981. This report addresses the concerns raised in that letter.

I The information provided includes the results of analyses considering radiation heat transfer to equipment at the adiabatic flame temperature and flame speeds of one f t/sec,

!~ additional data on the Singleton test program, and preliminary information from the LPRI tests of equipment.

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.2.0 Racolatica of Operating Liecass Cc=diticas 2.1 Containment Temperature Calculations CLASIX computer code analyses have been performed for

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- the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant to determine the containment response to a small break LOCA with a concurrent f ailure q of the ECCS (S2 D).- The analysis used to evaluate the .

thermal-effects on equipment was based on a flame speed of one f t/sec. Table 2.1 provides a summary of the results. Figures 2.1-1 through 2.1-10 provide the containment temperature and pressure response for this-Case.

2'. 2 Equipment Temperature Evaluation I An evaluation of the effects of hydrogen burns on key equipment inside containment is required to show that

ieliberate ignition of hydrogen is an acceptable method of protecting against events that result in significat.t hydrogen generation. In previous submittals, TVA has

supplied data on the expected thermal response of equipment for (a) short durations by using adiabatic flame temperatures in conjunction with radiation and l

natural convection heat transfer coefficients and (b) h the long-term heatup based on an energy balance between the various heat removal features in the containment and the energy released. These approaches were taken at

that time due to the lack of mothese to reasonably ~

predict the containment atmospheric temperature response to a hydrogen burn. While these methods are valid, the more straightforward approach of using an atmospheric temperature profile to evaluate equipment survivability is now available as a result of the modifications to the CLASIX code.

In the analyses discussed below, modified CLASIX atmospheric temperature profiles were used in

conjunction with a radiative heat flux during burns.

The analyses were run from just before the first burn until well after all burns were completed to allow for the incremental heatup that results from each burn and to ostablish the cooldown rate at the end of the l transient. Each piece of equipment analyzed was 1 initially assumed to be in thermal equilibrium with the containment a tmosphere at the highest value predicted by l CLASIX prior to the first burn in the compartment where the equipment was located.

An analysis was run using CLASIX to generate temperature

< profiles to be used in evaluating the effects of a hydrogen burns on equipment. The case consider ~ed was an S2D reduced was base care sensitivit from six f t/ysec runtoinone which the (Section flame speed ft/sec j 2.1). Burns were predicted to occur in the upper plenum and the lower compartment. Burns were not found to occur in the upper or dead-ended compartments in either analysis. The peak atmospheric temperature in the lower i

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j eccpartac2t was 884CF. Th3 posk tempeertura in ths upper plenum was calculated to be 1114*F. The adiabatic flame temperature used in the calculation of the heat -

flux was 1400*F, as determined for a burn -in an 8 v/o r dry air hydrogen mixture.

, Figures 2.2-1 and 2.2-2 provide the temperature profiles of the lower compartment and upper plenum. The temperature peaks in the upper plenum are very brief due to the small quantity of hydrogen consumed in each burn (15-20 pounds), the large vent' area available out of the upper plenum, and the relatively cold air (less than 100*F) exiting the ice bed. As expected, the peak atmospheric temperatures were lower in the one f t/sec case than in the base case. This is a result of the lower energy addition rate due to the hydrogen burning at a slower rate. The duration of the temperature spikes is longer and tilghtly more hydrogen is burned in the one f t/sec case, thus increasing the radiative heat transfer to equipment. Figures 2.2-3 and 2.2-4 are

1. segments of Figures 2.2-1 and 2.2-2 that shows with more i definition the duration of the high temperature peaks and the time between burns in both the upper plenum and lower compartment. The figures are for a period of time in which lower compartment burning occurs, but is representative of behavior throughout the entire transient.

l Eaulement Selection A list of 'the equipment essential for safe shutdown of i the Sequoyah Plant was provided in Appendix E of our i report on core degradation effects submitted December 15, 1980. This list is included as Table 2.2-1. The l

list was reviewed for components which, because of low heat capacity, inclusion of heat sensitive components.

or location in the containment, would be more

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j susceptible than other items in the table. If the most susceptible items on the list are shown to have a reasonable assurance of surviving a degraded core event, l these evaluations will bound all items on the list.

l The exposed RTD and therrocouple cable associated with the hot and cold les tempersture monitors and the core j exit thermocouples were chosen for detailed evaluation l due to their small size and therefore low heat capability. The igniter power cable in conduit was also chosen because of the small size and location in the l upper plenum of the ice condenser where a large number I of burns occur. The igniter assembly, due to its -

l location in the upper plenum, was chosen for detailed r evaluation. A transmitter was the last item picked for the de tailed evaluations. It is relatively small and heat sensitive solid-state components were used in its

construction.  ;

l Each of the items listed above was analyzed or tested as -

an isolated component neglecting mountings on walls or i 1

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in steads. As ca czample, th3 tressaitters era escated flush in a 1/4-inch steel plate, which is then welded to

. .a steel frame mounted to or very near a wall. This mounting would greatly increase the heat capacity of the transmitter case, which would in turn lower the temperature of the transmitter; yet~ this'has conservatively been neglected.

h.RAlI111 The equipment analyses were performed using the HEATING 5 computer code (Reference 1). The CLASIX atmospheric

- temperature profiles for the one f t/sec burn was used as the temperature forcing function input into the HEATING 5 models and a separate heat addition was included to model radiation from the flame front at the adiabatic flame temperature for the period of time that. a burn was occurring.

The pieces of equipment chosen to be analyzed were the l transmitter case, igniter assembly, and cable in conduit. The components chosen for analysis have an outside surface of steel.or cast iron and are therefore zeenable to analysis since surface degradation is not a concern. The exposed thermocouple and KID cables were tested to provide assurance that effects such as surface degradation were properly accounted for (see Section 2.3 for a discussion of the confirmatory tests). The transmitter was analyzed using the lower compartment ,

temperature profile. The igniter box was ' analyzed using the upper plenum temperatnte profile. The cable in conduit was analyzed using both profiles.

The boundary conditions for the HEATING 5 models were either convective or a combination of radiative and i convective heat transf er acdes. Radiative heat transfer

, from the flame to exposed surf aces of the selected equipment is assumed to occur during each burn peried.

I Turbulent free convective heat transfer from the i surrounding atmosphere to the equipment's surface was I assumed to occer throughout the transient. A turbulent convective heat transfer ccefficient based upon the most l

applicable geometric configuration was choson for all surfaces exposed to the surrounding atmosphere. The

! following geometric configurations and associated I convective heat transfer coefficients were used:

i

' Configuration Heat Transfer Coefficient l (BTU /hr-f t s_ep) i i

! Vertical plates and cylinders H = 0.19 (6 t)*/s l

Horizontal cylinder H = 0.18 (6 t) 2/ 8 i The temperature forcing function (ot) is the difference between the CLASIX compartment atmosphere and the equipment surface temperatures.

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Heat transfer by radiation to surfaces exposed to the hydrogen burns was modeled by a bounda.y heat flux -

table in the HEATING 5 runs. The radiative heat flux was determined by the radiative heat transfer equation, g=A F o (Tj-Tj) l A2 (1/E1 + 1/E2 -1) where o = Stefan-Boltzmann constant (1.714 x 10-* BTU /hr-ft* oR)

E1 = Emissivity of hydrogen . me (.3)

E2 = Equipment surf ace emissivity (1)

Al = Flame area (ft*)

> A2 = Equipment surface area (ft*)

F 1 -2= Radiative view factor T1 = Adiabatic flame temperature (*R)

T2 = Equipment surface temperature (*R)

Q/A2 = Heat flux per v. nit area of equipment surface

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Ths radiativo visw faster was dsperd:::itt spon the geometry of. the equipment and its location in relation to the propagating uflame front. For the purposes of

j. determing the radiative view factor, the flame front and the equipment (Igniter box, cable in conduit, and transmitter box) are assumed to be parallel concentric

, disks of unequal radii. The small disk (equipment) area is assumed equal to the exposed surface area of the equipment. The large disk (flane) area -is determined from a disk of where the radius is determined by the flame speed multiplied by the' duration of the burn. The flux term is applied to all exposed surfaces.

l Inniter Assemb1v The igniter assembly is shown in Figures 2.2-5 and 2.2-

6. The two-dimensional (X-Y) HEATING 5 igniter box model consisted of the box, transformer, cable, and air spaces

. (see Figures 2.2-7). The heat losses from the

transformer were modeled as a heat source inside the box. A steady state-run was made prior to analyzing the

burn transient to determine ths initial temperature profile that results from the heat produced by the transformer.

The boundary conditions imposed on the igniter assembly -

were a combination of convective and radiative heat transfer as shown on figure 2.2-7.

Figure 2.2-8 shows the results of the analysis of the igniter assembly to the -ice condenser upper plenum temperature profile.

5 The analysis showed the box interior air temperature was 2278F, the cable temperature was 171*F, and the transformer core temperature was 157'F. The transformer

is designed to operate at a maximum winding temperature of 428'F. Based on the temperature calculated in the

analysis and he margin in the transformer design,. it is concluded the igniter box will survive repeated hydrogen

! burns.

l j Barton Transmitter A two-dimensional axisymmetric HEATING 5 model (R-Z geometry) of the transmitter casing (Figure 2.2-9) corrssonds to the safety class 1E Barton pressure transmitter details given in Figure 2.2-10. The i boundary conditions imposed on the transmitter casing were a combination of convective and radiative heat i transfer as shown on figure 2.2-11.

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Figure 2.2-12 shows the results of the analysis of the Barton transmitter to the lower compartment t empe ra ture l pro f il e. The analysis showed the interior air temperature 231*F and the maximum case surf ace temperature was 245'F. The transmitter has been i qualified per NUREG-0588 and shown to operate at an MSLB I

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temperattro of [ l. B2s d on the temperattra calculated in the analysis and margin provided in qualification, it is concluded the Barton transmitter will operate during repeated hydrogen burns.

Cable in Cortdgil The cable in conduit was analyzed to determine the thermal response to temperature profiles encountered in the lower compartment and the ice condenser upper plenum. The section of conduit chosen for analysis contained the ninimum number of igniter cables (2).

This number of cables resulted in higher calculated interior temperatures due to reduced heat capacity. The one-dimensional cable in conduit model and boundary conditions are shown on Figure 2.2-13.

Figures 2.2-14 and Figure 2.2-15 show the thermal response of the cable in conduit to the lower compartment and ice condenser upper plenum temperature profiles, respectively. The maximum copper cable temperature, 251*F, occurred in the analysis of the lower compartment profiles. The maximum insulation temperature, 260*F, occurred in the lower compartment analysis too. The maximum conduit surface temperature, 332*F, occurred in the upper plenum analysis.

Manuf acturer-supplied data and tests at Singleton Laboratory indicate that the cable in conduit will function without degradation up to temperatures of 600'F (see Section 2.3). Based on temperatures calculated in the analysis and margin demonstrated, it is concluded the cable in conduit will survive repeated hydrogen burns.

Model Verificatiqn Verification of a computer model can be performed in a number of ways. Tho methods of verification frequently used are (1) comparison of calculated results with the calculated results of other accepted computer programs l and (2) comparison of calculated results with test-measured results.

i The validity of the transmitter model was determined by comparison with the temperature transient analysis

! performed for the equipment qualification of the transmitter by Westinghouse using the COCO computer i program and qualification testing. The Westinghouse results are summarized in WCAP 8936 (Reference 2).

The TVA transmitter model was the same one used to

! predict .he transmitter response to the hydrogen burns.

j The boundary condition used for verification was the instantaneous heat flux reported on Figure 2.2-16 taken from the Westinghouse report. Since this heat flux l represents the sum of all heat transfer mechanisms at l the boundary, no other boundary conditions were assumed.

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The graphical comparison of WCAP 8936 and HEATING 5 l analyses of the initial transient for the internal and l external case temperatures are shown in Figures 2.2-17 l

and 2.2-18. The curve for both internal and external i case temperature show very good agreement. 'l Additionally, both models predict approximately the same long-term maximum t emperature. Comparisons of the  ;

L Westinghouse analysis with the tests are provided in the j topical report (WCAP 8936). i The conservatism of the CLASIX-HEATING 5 radiation heat flux modeling technique in predicting thermal responses to hydrogen burns was also verified by modeling a Fenwal i test. Fenwal tests showed some teflon insulation surrounding an iron-constantan thermocouple melted. The verification consisted of modeling the Fenwal thermocouple wire thermal response to a 12 percent volume fraction hydrogen burn (Phase 1 Part 1 Test 1 -

Reference 3). The temperature profiles for the Fenwal test sphere were obtained from CLASIX and were incorporatd into the boundary conditions of a one-I dimensional HEATING 5 model (Figure 2.2-19). Radia t ive ,

as well as convective, heat transfer was considered in the boundary conditions in exactly the same way as used in the analysis of equipment inside the containment.

• Compnter model results predicted the entire teflon insulation to melt in 1.4 seconds as a result of the single burn in the test.

< 2.3 Confinsatory Equipment Testing Sinnieton Laboratory To address concerns raised about ta: survivability of the exposed incore thermocouple cables and the hot and cold les RTD cables located in tts lower compartment, tests have been performed on these cables at TVA's Singleton Laboratory. These tests were designed to confirm that the cables could survive the temperatures i to which they would be subjected during a hydrogen burn. Additional testing on the igniter power cables was perf ormed to determine temperature limitations for the Interim Distributed Ignition System (IDIS).

- 71e thermocouple and RTD cables were repeatedly exposed to a high temperature (approximately 1400*F) environment intended to represent the adiabatic flame temperature associated with hydrogen burns in the lower compartment. Constant temperature tests of the IDIS power cable were performed for several temperatures up to 700*F for 45 minutes which also conservatively bounds the integrated heat flux that would result during an

&ctual transient.

Before end af ter the temperature tests, the cables were each tested to establish the functionality of the cable insulation. These tests consisted of applying 1500V de 2.0-7

fcr cne ciento f rom esndreter to condnoter exd from conductor to shield before and after the cables were subjected to the temperature profile. The value of 1500V dc was chosen because this was the voltage used to test the thermocouple cable before original acceptance from the manufacturer. In addition, each of the test specimens were visually examined for degradation following the temperature te s ts. Testing details for each cable type are summarized below. No anomalous results were reported.

Thermocounle Cable The incore thermocouple cables are located in the lower compartment and world be subj ected to six burns as shown in Figure 2.3-1. To confirm that the thermocouple cable would survive the temperatures produced during the burns, the cable was exposed to the temperature test profile also shown in figure 2.3-1. The test conditions conservatively bound the calculated containment atmospheric conditions.

The test was conducted in a Lindberg Tube Furnace with a low temperature zone maintained at a constant 300 1 10*F and a high temperature zone maintained at a constant l 1400 1 25'F. The temperatures of the zones were l monitored with 20 gage chromel-alumel thermocouples. At l the beginning of the temperature test, the cables were j placed in a 300*F environment f or 60 minutes. At the i

end of this 60 minute per'_od, the cable was transferred ,

to a 1400*F environment f or 30 seconds and then back into the 300*F environment for 170 seconds. The 1400*F for 30 seconds followed by the 300*F for 170 seconds cycle was repeated until five cycles were completed.

) Af ter the fif th cycle, the cable was maintained in a l

300*F environment for an additional 60 minutes. The cable was then allowed to cool to ambient temperature.

During the temperature test, a thermocouple junction was formed a t one end of the thermocouple cable under test.

The frayed edges of the test cable above the thermocouple junction were coated with ceramic paste to ,

seal the end of the cable. Cable temperatures as measured by the thermocouple itself increased continuously upon transfer to the 1400*F zone and decreased continuously upon return to the 300*F zone.

The highest temperature recorded from this junction was 1368'F which occurred during the fif th cycle in the 1400*F environment.

In addition, a measurement thermocouple (20 gage, chromel-alumel) was placed beneath the outer silicone-impregnated fiberglass jacket of ths thermocouple cable under test. The temperatures recorded by the measurement thermocouple were, on the average, 242*F below those recorded by the thermocouple junction at the end of the test cable during the time the cable was in ,

the 1400*F environment. The temperatures recorded by l l

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ths ccostrentat tharmecc7plo ccro, em tho cysross, 28'F

. higher than those recorded by the test cable during the time the cable was in the 300*F environment af ter the first cycle in the 1400*F environment. The difference in these two temperature measurements demonstrates the ability of even the outermost fiberglass jacket to aid in the thermal insulation of the conductors. The cable is designed with three layers of Kapton film, a copper shield with a minimum of 85 percent coverage, and a second silicone impregnated fiberglass braid in addition to the overall fiberglass jacket (see Figure 2.3-2). A visual inspection of the cabic after the test revealed that the outer jacket had changed color from yellow to gray and the Kapton film had changed from y 3110w to black. However, the cable successfully passed the 1500V dc test for one minute from conductor to conductor and from conductor to shield described above. Due to the severity of the temperature test and the successful completion of the voltage test, we believe that the incore thermocouple cables will survive the temperatures produced by hydrogen burns in the lower compartment.

RTD Cable The hot and cold leg RTD cables are located in the lower compartment and would be subjected to the same environmental conditions as the incore thermocouple I cables. The test procedure, temperature profile, and tube furnace used in the thermocouple cable test were utilized in the testing of the RfD cable. The RTD cable is a four conductor cable designed with two tightly woven stainless stesi shields separated by a layer of l fiberglass in addition to the insulation on the individual conductors. A A*asurement thermocouple (20-l gage, chromel-alumel) was pi6ced beneath the outer stainless steel shield. The highest temperature l

j recorded by this thermocouple was 1013*F. The lowest l temperature recorded by the measurement thermocouple l while in the 300*F environment af ter being exposed to i

the 1400*r environment for one cycle was 342*F. The i

measurement thermocouple alternated between an average temperature of 340*F and 993*F as the cable was cycled I between the 300*F and the 1400*F environments. The RTD cable was not energized during the temperature test. A visual inspection of the cable revealed a change in l color from yellow to dark gray of the fiberglass braid l between the stainless steel shields and a darkening of i the insulation on the individual conductors. After the test, the RID cable successfully passed the 1500V dc

! voltage test. Due to the severity of the temperature l test and the successtal complecion of the voltage test, we believe that the hot and cold leg RTD cables will also survive the temperatures produced by hydrogen burns in the lower compartment.

Evaluation of the Test Profile The test profile for the RTD and thermocouple cables l

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consistad of fivo buras, chers ca CLASIX prsdicts six lower compartment burns to occur. The tests were perf crued before mid year 1981. At that time five burns were predicted in the lower compartment by CLASIX.

Changes to the distributed ignition system and to the containment modeling assurptions resulted in substantial changes to the CLASIX input. These changes resulted in a different number of burns. However, this ooes not invalidate the test, A comparison of the test profile with the latest CLASIX predicted profile shows that each burn simulation in the test is substantially longer than was predicted by CLASIX based on a one f t/sec flame speed (Figure 2.3-1). In addition, the test temperature before and after the burns is much higher than is expected inside the containment. The test chamber temperature is equal to the adiabatic flame t emperature for an 8 v/o hydrogen burn in dry air (1400*F) and is therefcre conservative. The radiative heat flux is also much greater in the test than would be seen in a i containment. The ceramic tube has an emissivity greater than 0.9, as compared to a steam / gas emissivity of 0.3.

This provides a factor of 3 on the test heat flux, as compared to the containment heat fluz. The shape factor associated with the test is also greater than would to seen in the containment beause the test has a shape factor close to one. The test is therefore very conservative in that the temperature used was higher than would be found in cont.inment, the time at high temperature was longer, and the heat transfer was higher than would be present in the containment. Subsequently, the cable still passed insulation bresidown tests required of new cable.

Inn!ter Power Cables The igniter power cabler used for the Post Hydrogen Mitigation System (PHMS) are all enclosed in conduit and were analyzed to show qualification as discussed in the previous Section (2.2). The PHMS cables are Class IE components and have been qualified per NUREG-0588 to temperatures that are significantly higher than calculated from repeated hydrogen burns in the ice condenser upper plenum. The testing performed at Singleton Laboratory on igniter cable was not done to simulate the containment response to hydrogen burns but to determine the ability of the IDIS power cable to withstand high temperatures. The IDIS cable was not part of a NUREG-0588 qualification program, and the materials used in construction are more sensitive to heat than the PHMS cables. Yet, the tests show the IDIS cables could withstand temperatures several hundred degrees higher than the cabics vould reach as a result of hydrogen buens and still be functional. The test provides corroborating evidence thct either the PHMS or d

the IDIS igniter cables as installed in the plant wovid be able to function as intended. Details of the test are provided in the following re.ragraphs.

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p Tha test ccasicted of pinairs a.ssetica of tho igniter 1

, cable in a:1ength of conduit and sealing the ends of the conduit. A 20 gage chromel-alumel theosocouple was. also placed in the conduit to monitor the interior t empe rature. The conduit was then placed in a Blue M 1 oven, af ter which the temperature of the even was raised

to 700110*F and maintained at that temperature for 45 minutes. During the test, an-iron-constantan.

-thermocouple was used to monitor the temperature of the even. Approximately 15 minutes af ter the oven temperature reached 700'F, the thermocouple monitoring

- the interior temperature of the conduit also reached-4 700*F cad remained at that temperature for the remainder of.the. test (approximately 30 minutes). This interior conduit temperature was 350*F higher than was seen in the analysis, showing once again the conservative nature of the test.

Af ter a? lowing the oven to cool to ambient temperature, the cable was removed and a functional test and a visual r inspection of the insulation was performed. The functional test consists of applying 1500V dc between

the single conductor and a ground plate to which the

! cable had been strapped. The cable successfully passed this voltage test. A visual inspection revealed that

the PVC jacket which is used for mechanical protection

! of the insulation had decomposed. However, the insulation itself appeared to remain fully functional.

Additional Test Data I

l In April 1978, Tyle Laboratories performed environmental

qualification tests on electrical cable splice i

assemblies to be used at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant ,

(Wyle Laboratories Test Report No. 43854-3). The cable i used in several of the splice assemblies was the same type cable (a single conductor No.10 AWG) ~as that used i to supply power to the IDIS.

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l Briefly, the Wyle qualification test consisted of irradiating the splice assemblies for s total integrated i dose of 6.9x107 rads, temperature aging for 168 hours0.00194 days <br />0.0467 hours <br />2.777778e-4 weeks <br />6.3924e-5 months <br /> in l air at 250*F, and then exposing them to a LOCA l environment 'while energized. The LOCA environment ,

included a temperature profile with a maximum

( temperature of 325*F for five minutes followed by a i

l decrease in temperature to 304*F over a 24 minute period. During the next 45 minute interval, the temperature was reduced to 282*F. At 75 minutes, the temperature was reduced very rapidly to 230*F. Then, -

! over a period of 23 hours2.662037e-4 days <br />0.00639 hours <br />3.80291e-5 weeks <br />8.7515e-6 months <br /> and 45 minutes, .the t

temperature was further decreased to 150*F. Referring l

to Section 2.2, these test temperatures bound the i temperatures calculated for the cable in conduit during l the series of upper plenum hydrogen burns.

l l The postaccident functional test was performed by Wyle l which included measuring the insulation resistance and I

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1sekago otrroats of ths cablo splies asectblios with the items immersed in water. Values of resistance were determined from conductor to conductor and from conductor to ground. Each circuit was then powered to produce an operating current of one ampere. All test items complied with the postaccident functional test requirement that the items shall carry its required load at no more than a ten percent reduction in operating voltage. The only visual indication of cable deterioration was a swelling of the PVC jacket.

Although the test was specifically for the qualification of an electrical splice, it represents an indication of the cables' ability to survive elevated temperatures that bound temperatures calculated during the series of upper plenum burns. Tierefore, based on the analysis, voltage tests and visual inspections after the Singleton temperature test and the Wyle qualification test, TVA believes the igniter cable would survive in a hydrogen burn environment.

Electric Power Research Institute's Electric Eaulement Survivability Tests (Acurer)

The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) has contracted with Acurez Corporation to perform tests to:

1. Observe the generic effects of hydrogen burning on representative samples of safety related electrical equipment used in nuclear reactor containments; and

2. To demonstrate survivability by performing equipment fun 3tional tests before, during, and after hydrogen burn exposure.

The following list of equipment was exposed to five hydrogen burns (two static and three dynamic tests).

1. Asco l Solenoid Valve l P/N NP831654E

2. Conax

Electrical Conductor Seal Assembly (ECSA) l P/N N-11001-32

3. bekoran Instrument Wire i

Mul tipair-Shielde d l P/N Dekorad Inst. Wire l Type 974, Samuel Moore Aurora, OH 0174778-2

( 4 pair,180s i

4. Dekoran

! Instrument Wire-Shielded l P/N Dekorad Inst. Wire l

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t l

Type 1952 Samuel Morro .

l Aurora,.OR 88975-15 single pair, 16Ga l 5. Foxboro Pressure Transmitter P/N NE11AM or NE13DM

6. Limitorque Valve Operator P/N SMB-000-2

7. Namco Controls Limit Switch P/N 180-11302 or P/N 740-20100

8. Rockbestos

• Power Cable P/N 600V Firewall III IHHW BEC Type TC (UL):

2 each 14 AWG2/C 8 5/C 1 each 4 AWG 3/C

9. Rockbestos Coaxial Cable RSS-6-104-1980

10. YEED Instruments RTD Sensor and Thernovell P/N IB5D/611

11. 00NAI Thermocouple Assembly Type E Dual The tests by Acurex have been completed and the preliminary information verbally provided to TVA showed' that all the equipment functioned satisfactorily af ter every test.

PORV Block Valves TVA still maintains that the PORY block valves are not one of the key camponents required to function to mitigate a small break LOCA degraded core event.

However, we believe the block valves are capable of withstanding a hydrogen burn environment for two reasons.

t

1. The PORY block valves and their motor operators have ,

been tested to temperatures of 286*F for 10,000 sec followed by a step decrease to 219'F for slightly over 21 hours2.430556e-4 days <br />0.00583 hours <br />3.472222e-5 weeks <br />7.9905e-6 months <br /> and an ambient temperature of 152*F thereafter.

2. The block valves are inherently less sensitive to 2.0-13 .

high temperettro thcs tho tressaittero cyc1 sated la Section 2.2 and for which the analysis showed a maximum temperature in the case of 245'F. The PORY block valves are large components with 6 much higher heat capacity than any of the analyzed equipment.

The POkVs will not be heated above their qualification temperature by hydrogen burns in the Sequoyah containment.

3 i

d 2.0-14

3.0 Cc:alusica of Snfoty Evcitatics R port Items The rew analyses and EPRI test data continue to support the conclusions presented in our earlier reports that all essential equipment will survive repeated hydrogen burus.

Where equipment has any p*otection such as the casing of transmitter or conduit for cable, large margins compared to qualification temperatures are present. It is concluded that the survivability of essential equipment has been established, and no corrective action is required.

3.0-1

REFERENCES

1. DEATING5 - AN IBM 360 Heat Conduction Program, Oak Ridge

' National Laboestory, ORNL/CSD/TM-15 ,

2. Testingho7se Topical Resort, Environmental Qualification -

Instrument Transmitter Temperature Transient Analysti, WCAP-8935 (Proprietary) 4

3. Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Core Degradation Program, Volume 2, Report on the Safety Evaluation of the Interim Distributed Ignition System, December 15, 1980 1

J f

l t

I a

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3 _ _ .

, i 1

TABLE 2.2-1 e

Category Justification of Category f Equipment Function LT-3-148, -156, -164, steam generator level input for 11 - 1 i

-171. -172, -173, -174, control or AFW flow

-175 '

1 Containment pressure'and t!-1 Air Return Fans hydrogen control II-4 All equipment is located in the annulus l

H I-43-200, -210 flydrogen analyzers with sensing lines Into containment.

2 Installation of flame arrester will stop

- propagation of flame to equipment.

H-4 Valves fail open and loss of air to valve FCV-43-201, -202, Allows air flow to hydrogen will rot arrect closure.

-207, -208 analyzers Allows associated FCV to'open H-4 Loss or these valves will not cause FSV-43-201, -202, associated FCV to close. .

-207, -208 Temperatures dun to hidrogen burn will Ice Condenser doora Allows steam riow through ice 11 - 3 have no errect on the doors. Require bed qualification for pressure only.

sump level for ECCS switchover H-1 LT-63-176, -177,

-178, -179 H-4 Not required to operate; must only FCV-63-172 Closed position required for maintain closed position. All relays

) proper ECCS flow path and controls for valve 'are outside centainment. Hydrogen burn cannot cause the valve to open.

H-1 i

LT-68-320, -355A Pressurizer level II-4 The only equipment inside containment are i

TE-63-1, -24. -43. -65 llot leg temperature the RTD's and cables inside conduits.

j Qualification of cables in conduits will 4 resolve these sensors.

S,

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I t

a .

Category Justification of Category Equipment Function V

Same as TE-68'-1, -24. -43, -65. 4

' TE-68-18, -41, -60, -83 Cold leg temperature 11 - 4 1

Hydrogen control 11 18 Fenwal test data and analysis have flydrogen Igniters demonstrated durability.

I Core exit thermocoJples Information.ror inadequate core H-1 cooling For reactor vessel level system H-4 Same as TE-68-1, -24, 43, -65.

TE-68, -373 through' TE-68-386 .

Itcactor vessel vent valves - H-1 FSV-68-394. -395,

-396, -397 Direct steam flow through ice II-4 Seals have been qualified for pressure j

Ice condenser seals requirements. Large heat sinks attached to seals will prevent dan ge due to high temperatures.

4 containment boendary, blind flange H Il Penetrations have been qualified fur Penetrations X-003, pressure requirements. 1.arge heat sinks'

-111, -113, -112, -0521, with 0-ring seal attached to the 0-ring seals will prevent'

-079A, -079D damage due to high temperatures.

Containment boundary H-2 Penetrations have been qualifhd for Electrical penetrations

, pres nre requirements.

H-4 Large heat sinks attached to the seals Airlock, Equipment llatch, Containment boundary will prevent damage due to high tempera-I and Personnel Airlock ture.

Seals Containment 'coundary 11 31 The containment isolation valves will be

Containment Isolation in the required position' prior to any Valves hydrogen burn. All air supplies will be isolated and all relays and controls are outside containment with only power feeds to the valves (i.e., the valves cannot

. change position).

Key for Table 2 s.1 v

H Evaluation fcr pressure and temperature environmental qualification required.

7 H Evaluation for temperature environmental qualification only required.

H Evaluation for pressure environmental qualification only required.

H No further evaluetion required.

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