ML19346C904
ML19346C904 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | River Bend |
Issue date: | 12/17/2019 |
From: | Entergy Operations |
To: | O'Banion M Plant Licensing Branch IV |
O'Banion M, 301-415-1233 | |
References | |
EPID L-2019-LRM-0089 | |
Download: ML19346C904 (68) | |
Text
1 RIVER BEND STATION PRE-SUBMITTAL MEETING Proposed License Amendment Request Incorporate Tornado Missile Risk Evaluator (TMRE) into the River Bend Licensing Basis December 17, 2019
2 INTRODUCTION AND AGENDA Brian Jones - Licensing Engineer River Bend Station
3
Introductions
Brian Jones - RBS Licensing Engineer Titus Folds - RBS Licensing Specialist Rob Barrios - RBS Civil Engineering Supervisor Andrew Toups - RBS Civil Engineer Ray Dremel - Enercon Principal Engineer
4 Agenda
- Discuss the original RBS licensing basis and actions taken in response to RIS 2015-06.
- Seek feedback from the NRC staff before making the submittal.
5 BACKGROUND Brian Jones - Licensing Engineer River Bend Station
6 Licensing Basis RBS USAR Table 1.8 Conformance to NRC Regulatory Guides Regulatory Guide 1.76 (April 1974), "Design Basis Tornado for Nuclear Power Plants" Regulatory Guide 1.117 Rev 1 (April 1978), "Tornado Design Classification" RBS USAR Section 3.1.2.2 - Design Basis for Protection Against Natural Phenomena (Criterion 2)
RBS Design Conformance to GDC 2 - All safety-related structures, systems, and components are protected from or designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena.
RBS USAR Section 3.1.2.4 - Environmental and Missile Design Bases (Criterion 4)
RBS Design Conformance to GDC 4 - All safety-related structures, systems, and equipment are protected from, or designed to withstand, the effects of any conditions associated with normal operation, maintenance, testing, and postulated accidents, including the LOCA. Missile protection is discussed in Section 3.5.
7 Licensing Basis RBS USAR Table 3.5-24 Selected External Missiles Missile(1) Weight (lb) Horizontal Impact Velocity (mph)
Wood plank, 4" x 12" x 12(2) 200 288 Steel pipe, 3-in diameter, Schedule 40, 78 144 10 ft long(2)+
Steel rod, 1-in diameter x 3 ft long(2) 8 216 Steel pipe, 6-in diameter, Schedule 40, 285 144 15 ft long(2)
Steel pipe, 12-in diameter, Schedule 40, 15 ft long(2) 743 144 Utility pole, 13 1/2-in diameter, 35 ft long(3) 1490 144 Automobile, frontal area 20 sq ft(3) 4000 72 (1) All missiles are considered to be capable of striking in all directions, with vertical velocities equal to 80 percent of all the horizontal impact velocities.
(2) These missiles are to be considered at all elevations.
(3) These missiles are to be considered at elevations up to 30 ft above all grade levels within 1/2 mi of the facility structures.
8 Licensing Basis RBS USAR Section 3.5.2.2 Missile Barriers The exterior walls and roofs of the Seismic Category I structures act also as protective barriers to withstand the effects of missiles generated by natural phenomena. The thickness of these protective barriers meets or exceeds the minimum thickness requirements of NRC-SRP, NUREG-0800, Section 3.5.3, Table1, Revision 1, dated July 1981. These structures are listed in Table 3.2-1 and are shown in Fig. 1.2-2.
RBS USAR Table 3.2-1 Equipment and Structure Classification to this presentation contains the original Table 3.2-1, which contains the tornado protection designation for plant equipment. Page 19 contains the tornado protection designation for structures.
9 Licensing Basis RBS USAR Table 3.5-25 Missile Barriers for Natural Phenomena and Turbine-Generated Missiles Protected Components Missile Barrier RCPB and other protected equipment Exterior shield building wall and dome, inside containment containment structure, drywell, internal structures Main control room and protected Control building electrical, instrumentation, control, and ventilation equipment in control building Essential piping systems, ventilation, Exterior shield building wall and dome, electrical, instrumentation, control, and containment structure, auxiliary building other protected equipment in auxiliary and internal structures building Spent fuel pool Fuel pool walls, fuel building Emergency diesel generators Diesel generator building
10 Licensing Basis RBS USAR Table 3.5-25 Missile Barriers for Natural Phenomena and Turbine-Generated Missiles (cont.)
Protected Components Missile Barrier Diesel fuel oil system Sandfill around diesel fuel oil tanks and the diesel generator building Standby service water pumps SSW pumphouse, cooling towers, and basin SSW pumphouse, cooling and piping Portion of the RCPB in the Auxiliary building steam tunnel auxiliary building UHS cooling fans Fan motors protected by concrete enclosures.
Fans protected from horizontal and vertical missiles by 2-ft reinforced concrete cylinders and enclosure hoods. Debris protectors provided on fan outlets.
11 Licensing Basis RBS SER - Section 3 Section 3.3.2, "Tornado Loadings" Section 3.5.1.4, "Missiles Generated by Natural Phenomena" Section 3.5.2, "Structures, Systems, and Components To Be Protected from Externally Generated Missiles" to this presentation contains a copy of the applicable RBS SER Section 3.
12 Licensing Basis RBS SER Section 3.5.2 "Structures, Systems, and Components To Be Protected from Externally Generated Missiles" Safety-related structure, systems, and components to be protected from externally generated missiles and the protection provided in the plant design is in accordance with:
- GDC 2 and 4 with respect to missile and environmental effects;
- RG 1.13, Position C.2;
- RG 1.27, Positions C.2 and C.3; and
- RG 1.117, Positions C.1 through C.3 "The applicants list of safety-related structures, systems, and components to be protected from externally generated missiles and the provisions in the plant design providing this protection meet SRP 3.5.2 and are, therefore, acceptable."
13 Background - RIS 2015-06 In response to Regulatory Information Summary (RIS) 2015-06, "Tornado Missile Protection", Entergy took action to identify potential vulnerabilities in tornado missile protection at RBS.
- Plant walk downs were completed and non-conforming conditions were identified.
- The non-conforming conditions were reported to the NRC as an eight-hour notification on May 4, 2018.
- Operability determinations were completed and documented in the corrective action program using guidance in Revision 1 of Enforcement Guidance Memorandum 15-002.
- Compensatory actions were verified to be in place.
14 Background - Enforcement Discretion On May 10th, 2018 RBS submitted a request to the NRC to extend enforcement discretion provided in Enforcement Guidance Memorandum 15-002 for tornado-generated missile protection non-conformances identified in response to Regulatory Issue Summary 2015-06.
On June 6th, 2018 the NRC approved RBSs request to extend enforcement discretion until June 10th 2020.
15 TORNADO MISSILE RISK EVALUATOR (TMRE)
Ray Dremel - Enercon Principal Engineer
16 TMRE NEI 17-02 Rev 1B The RBS TMRE model is being prepared following the guidance in NEI 17-02 Rev 1B, Tornado Missile Risk Evaluator (TMRE) Industry Guidance Document, September 2018.
- Hazard Frequency
- Missile Identification
- Vulnerability Walkdowns
- EEFP Calculations
- HRA Review
- Model Development
- Quantification
17 Summary of Analyses (all results still draft)
- Hazard Frequency - ~6E-5/yr F2 to ~7E-8/yr F6
- Missile Identification - 204,000 total
- High Wind Equipment List (HWEL)
- Components from internal events
- Pipe from internal flooding
- Cables from internal fire
- Vulnerability Walkdowns
- Identify SSCs in path
- Determine if no line-of-site
- Exposed Equipment Failure Probability (EEFP)
- Generally use area of opening
- Generally group all SSCs in the area
18 Summary of Analyses (cont.)
- HRA Review
- Model Development
- Fail all OSP-dependent equipment
- Quantification
- Initial results show very small increase in CDF/LERF
- Conservative estimates
- Assume all equipment in a room fails, small hole/large room
19 LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST Brian Jones - Licensing Engineer River Bend Station
20 Current Schedule All the engineering work associated with TMRE is currently scheduled to be complete by the end of January 2020.
License Amendment Request is currently scheduled for submittal to the NRC by the end of February 2020.
RBS will be requesting a one year review time following the NRC acceptance review.
Completion of the NRC acceptance review will satisfy meeting the deadline of 6/10/2020 for enforcement discretion.
21 License Amendment Precedent The RBS License amendment will be based on the following on the following TMRE related submittals:
- Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 currently under NRC review (ML19119A090)
- Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1 approved June 18, 2019 (ML19123A014)
- Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 approved March 29, 2019 (ML18347A385)
- Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 approved January 11, 2019 (ML18304A394)
22 License Amendment Overview 1.0
SUMMARY
DESCRIPTION 2.0 DETAILED DESCRIPTION
- Background Information
- Current Licensing Basis
- General Design Criteria (GDC)
- Reason for the Proposed Change
3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION
- Tornado Missile Risk Evaluator Methodology
- Traditional Engineering Considerations
23 License Amendment Overview
3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION
(continued)
- Risk Assessment
- High Wind Equipment List
- Vulnerable SSC Walkdowns
- Missile Walkdowns
- Tornado Hazard Frequency
- Target Evaluation
- Model Development
- Model Quantification Results
- Tornado Intensity Contribution
- Sensitivities
- TMRE Missile Distribution Sensitivity
- Compliant Case Sensitivity
- Plant Grade Sensitivity
- Single Event Cutset Sensitivity
- HFE Sensitivity
- Conclusions
24 License Amendment Overview
4.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION
- Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria
- Precedent
- No Significant Hazards Consideration Analysis
- Conclusions
5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
6.0 REFERENCES
- Probabilistic Risk Assessment Technical Adequacy Documentation - RBS Updated Safety Analysis Report Page Markups - RBS Updated Safety Analysis Report Page Clean Pages
25 Proposed License Changes Update USAR Table 1.8-1 Page 168 "Conformance to NRC Regulatory Guides" to include the use of the TMRE as an alternate methodology.
Table 1.8-1 currently states that RBS complies with Regulatory Guide 1.117 Rev. 1 (April 1978).
RBS proposes to add a statement allowing the use of TMRE for SSCs as an NRC accepted method and state that it can only be applied to discovered conditions where tornado missile protection was not provided, and cannot be used to avoid providing tornado missile protection in the plant modification process.
26 Proposed License Changes Update USAR Section 3.5.1 to describe RBS use of TMRE for SSCs as an NRC accepted method and state that it can only be applied to discovered conditions where tornado missile protection was not provided, and cannot be used to avoid providing tornado missile protection in the plant modification process.
Add new USAR Table 3.5-29 to include a listing of Non-Conforming Safety-Related SSCs that do not require protection from tornado-generated missiles based on TMRE.
27 QUESTIONS?
28 CLOSING COMMENTS Brian Jones - Licensing Engineer River Bend Station
Attachment 1 RBS USAR Table 3.2-1 Equipment and Structure Classification
RBS USAR TABLE 3.2-1 EQUIPMENT AND STPUCTURE CLASSIFICATION Quality<3> Tornado<4 > Scope<6>
Safety<t> Seismic<2> Assurance Protection of Design<n
£!s§§ £ategQ£I £s!gg.2£I _Qs ig1rnJ:.!.Q!! Location 1£.E!Y Detail MH!
I. Peactor_System
- 1. Reactor vessel 1 I B E D GE CBIN
- 2. Reactor vessel support skirt 1 I B E D GE CBIN
- 3. Reactor vessel appurtenances, pressure retaining portions 1 I B E D GE CBIN
- 7. Control rods 2 I B E D GE GE
- 8. Control rod drives 2 I B E D GE GE
- 12. Reactor vessel insulation NNS NA s E D p s I I. Nuclear_Boiler_s1stem
- 2. Vesse ls, air accumulators 2 I B E D p s
- 3. Piping, relief valve discharge 3 I B E C,D p s
- 4. Piping, main steam within outermost isolation valve 1 I B E A,C,D GE GE
- 5. Pipe supports, main steam 1 I B E D GE GE
- 6. Pipe restraints, main steam 1 I s E D GE GE
- 7. Piping, other within outermost isolation valves I B E D p s (12)
- 8. Piping, instrumentation beyond outermost isolation valves NNS NA s E D p s (12)
- 9. Safety/relief valves 1 I B E D GE V
- 10. Safety/relief valve position monitors NNS I B E C,D,R p V
- 11. Valves, main steam isolation valves 1 I B E A,D GE V
- 12. Valves, other, isolation valves and within 1 I B E A,D p V (12)
- 13. Valves, instrumentation beyond outermost isolation valves NNS NA s E A,C p V (12) 1 of 34 August 1987
Quality<3> Tornado<*> Scope<6>
Safety< 1 > Seismic<2> Assurance Protection of Design C7 >
1s.§.§ f.s!.§gQ!:Y f.s!!l9Q!:Y Designation Location !:!.E.ElY Detail !Q!g.§
- 16. Cable, with safety function 2 NA B E p s III. Recirculation SystmJ!
- 4. Pumps 1 I B E D GE V
- 5. Valves 1 I B E D GE V
- 6. Motor, pump 2 I B E D GE V
- 8. Cable with safety function 2 NA B E p s
- 2. Valves insert and withdraw lines 2 I B E C p V C 9 >
- 3. Valves, other NNS NA s E C,F/A,C P/GE V
- 4. Piping, scram discharge volume lines 2 I B E C p s (20)
- 5. Piping, insert and withdraw lines 2 I B E C,D p s (9)
- 6. Pipin g, other NNS NA s E C,D,F p s (12)
Quality<3> T ornado< o ScopeC6>
Safety<1> Seismic<2> Assurance Protection of DesignC7>
£1s§§ £s.tgg2n £s.t21 Designation 12£stion< §..!!fil!il tail Note2
- v. sta:gg__!2y Liguid C ontrol System
- 1. Standby liquid control tank 2 I B E C GE GE
- 2. Pump 2 I B E C GE V
- 3. Pump Motor 2 I B E C GE V
- 4. Valves, explosive 1 I B E C GE V
- 5. Valves, isolation and within 1 I B E C p V
- 6. Valves, beyond isolation valves 2 I B E C p V
- 7. Piping, within isolation valves 1 I B E C p s (12)
- 8. Piping, beyond isolation valves 2 I B E C p s (12)
- 2. Cable 2 NA B p V VIII. Process_Padiation_Monitors ( 34)
- 1. Main steam line monitors and related electrical modules 2 I B E A,C GE GE
- 2. Main plant exhaust (gas extended range) , fuel building exhaust, reactor building annulus ventilation, main control room air intakes, containment atmosp here, drywell atmosphere, EHR heat exchanger service water, containment purge isolation, and related electrical modules 2 I B E A,C,F,M,R,T p V ( 35) 3 of 34 August 1987
BBS lJSAF TABLE 3. 2-1 (Cont)
Ouality<3> Tornado< > Scope<6>
Safety<t> Seismic<2> Assurance Protection of Design C7 >
Cl.§.§ £!!!.9:Q!:Y £teg_g£Y Desi gnation Location 2.\!.EElY Dela!! §.
- 3. All other monitors (fixed and portable) and related electrical modules and cable NNS NA s E A,W,F,T,M p V
- 4. Cable, monitors with safety function 2 NA B E p s
- 5. Electri cal modules for process liquid, process ventilation, air ejector off gas, and standby gas treatment radiation monitoring systems NNS NA s E A,P,T,¥,F 1? s
- 7. Portable in-plant I2 monitoring equipment NNS NA s E p V rx. RHR_System
- 3. Piping, within outermost i solation valves 1,2 I B E C,D p s (12,40)
- 4. Piping, beyond outermost isolation valves 2 I B E A p s (12)
- 5. Pumps 2 I B E A GE V
- 6. Pump motors 2 I B E A GE V
- 7. Valves, isolation, LPCI and shutdown lines 1 I B E D,A p V
- 8. Valves, isolation, other 2 I B E A p V (12)
- 9. Valves, beyond isolation valves 2 I B E A p V (12)
- 11. Cable, with safety function 2 NA B E p s
- 12. Discharge line fill pump 2 I B E A p V
- 13. Piping through tunnel, drains NNS NA s E A,M p s
- 14. Flush drain to rad waste 3 I B E A,W p s
- x. Low_Pressure_Core_S£ray
,. Piping, within outermost isolation valves 1 I B E C,D p s (12)
- 2. Piping, beyond outermost isolation valves 2 I B E A 1) s (12) 4 of 34 August 1987
RBS USAF TABLE 3. 2-1 (Cont)
Quality<3> Tornado< o scope< 6>
Safety<1> Seismic<2> Assurance Protection of Design<?>
£.!.!!.§.§ £s.!99.!:.Y _£_!!tegg£Y. Designation 19.£.stiQ.!! .§.!!.Elli Qgtai! NOt!;t.§
- 3. Pump 2 I B E A GE V
- 4. Pump motor 2 I B E A GE V
- s. Valves, isolation and within 1 I B E C,D p V (12)
- 6. Valves, beyond outermost isolation valves 2 I B E A p V (12)
- a. C able, with safety function 2 NA B E p s
- 9. Water leg pump 2 I B E A p V XI. High_Pressure_Core SEra_y
- 1. Day supply diesel tank 3 I B E s p s
- 2. Piping, within outermost containment isolation valve 1 I B E C,D p s (12)
- 3. Piping, diesel service water 3 I B E s p s
- 4. Piping, return test line to condensate storage tank beyond second isolation valve; piping suction line from the condensate storage tank to the piping tunnel NNS NA s E 0 p s
- 5. Piping, beyond outermost containment isolation valve 2 I B E A p s (12)
- a. Valves, outer isolation and within 1 I B E C,D P,GE V (12)
- 9. Valves, beyond isolation valves, motor operated 2 I B E A GE V (12)
- 10. Valves, diesel service water 3 I B E 0 p V
- 11. Valves, other 2 I B E A p V (12)
- 15. Water leg pump 2 I B E A p V XII. RCIC system
- 1. Piping, within outermost isolation valves 1 I B E C,D p s (12) 5 of 34 August 1987
R BS USAR TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont)
OualityC3> Tornado<*> ScopeC6>
Safety<1> Seismic<2> Assurance Protection of Design<?>
£1s§§ £s.!gQ £s_!§gQH Designation Location< s> .§.Y..E.E!Y QgtaiJ, .§.
- 2. Piping, beyond outermost isolation valves 2 I B E A,O p s (12)
- 3. Piping, return test line to condensate storage tank beyond second isolation valve NNS NA s E O,A p s (12)
- 4. Pump 2 I B E A GE V
- 5. Valves, isolation and within 1 I B E C p V (12)
- 6. Valves, return test line to condensate storage beyond second isolation valve NSS NA s E O,A p V (12)
- 7. Valves, other 2 I B E A p V (12)
- 8. Turbine 2 I B E A GE V (13)
- 10. Cable, with safety function 2 NA B E p s
- 11. Water leg pump 2 I B E A 0 V
Steam line plugs Dryer and separator sling UNC NA s E C GE GE and head strongback 2 I B E C GE GE xv. In-Vessel_Service EguiEment
- 1. Control rod grapple 3 I B E C GE GE XVI. Refueling_Egui_Ement
,. Refueling eguipment platform assemblies 2 I B E C,F GE GE
- 2. Fefueling bellows NNS NA s E D p s
- 4. Isolation valves, fuel transfer tube 2 I B E C,F p V 6 of 34 August 1987
RBS USAll TABLE 3. 2-1 (Cont)
QualityC3> TornadoC4 > Scope<6>
Safety<t> Seismic < 2> Assurance Protection of Design<7>
£!.!!.§.§ Category £steqq!:Y Designation Location 2!!.2.Eil Detail lli!k.§
- s. Penetra tion sleeve assembly, f uel transfer t ube 2 I B E C,F p s XVII. Storaqe_Egui,E!lent
,. Fuel building spent fuel storage racks 3 I B E F p V
- 2. Heat exchangers NNS NA s N w p V
- 3. Piping, other NNS NA s N W,11 p s
- 4. P umps NNS NA s N w p V
- s. Valves, flow control and (15) filter system NNS NA s N W,K p V
- 6. Valves, other NNS NA s N w p V (12)
- 7. Mechanical modules NNS NA s N w p V (15)
XIX. gs£tO- Water CleanuE system
- 3. Piping within outermost isolation valves 1 I B E C,D p s (12)
- 4. Piping, beyond outermost isolation valves 3/NNS I/NA B/S E A,C p s (12 ,25)
- 5. Pumps 3 I/NA B/S E A,C GE V (25)
- 6. Valves, containment isolation valves 1 I B E D ,A p V c12, 25>
- 7. Valves, beyond outermost isolation valves 3/NNS I/NA B/S E C,A t) V c12, 2s>
- 8. Valves, containment isolation 2 I B E A,C p V
- 9. Piping , containment isolation 2 I B E A,C p s
BBS USAB TABLE 3. 2-1 (Cont)
Quality< 3> Tornado<> Scope<6>
safety<1 > Seismic<2> Assurance Protection of Design< 7>
£.!§§ £.tggQ!;Y £.:t.§g.2n Designation Location Y..12.12.!Y. Detail, Not .§ xx. FuJ, Pool cooling_sni_£1n..!!.l2 system
- 1. Demin eralizer vessel NNS NA s E F p V
- 2. Filters NNS NA s E F p V
- 3. Heat exchangers 3 I B E F p V
- 4. Pumps, cooling 3 I B E F p V
- 5. Pumps, purification NNS NA s E F p V
- 6. Piping, containment isolation 2 I B E C,F p s Cl 2)
- 7. Valves, contain ment isolation 2 I B E C,F p V
- 8. Piping, cooling subsystem 3 I B E C,F p s
- 9. Valves, cooling subsystem 3 I B E C,F p V
- 10. Piping, purification subsystem NNS NA s E C,F p s
- 11. Valves, purification subsystem NNS NA s E C,F p V XXI. !:!sin_fQntrol Room Panels
- 2. Cable, with safety function 2 NA B E p s 2 NA B E GE s X XII. Local_Panels and !!.s£t§.
- 2. Cab le, with safety function 2 NA B E p s XXIII. Off_Gas_s1stem
- 3. Piping NNS NA s E T p s (12 16)
- 5. Valves, other NNS NA s E T p V (12 16)
XXIV. .§!,sndQy_service Water System
- 1. Piping 3 I B E A,F,O,P,S,R p s
- 2. Pumps 3 I B E p p V 8 of 34 August 1987
RBS USAP TABLE 3. 2-1 (Cont)
Quality< 3 > Tornado<*> Scope<6>
Safety<t> Seismic<2> Assurance Protection of Design C7 >
£!s.§.§ £s!gQ!:.Y £.s.1.fil!Q!:Y D esignation Location< s> .§.!!E.ElY. Detai! Note.§
- 3. Pump motors 3 I B E p p V
- 4. Valves, isolation 3 I B E A,F,S,R p V
- 5. Valves, other 3 I B E A,F,O,P,S,R p V
- 6. Electrical modules, with safety function 3 I B E R,P p s
- 7. Cable, with safety function 3 NA B E p s
- 8. Piping, containment isolation 2 I B E C,A p s
- 9. Valves, containment isolation 2 I B E C,A p V XXV. Normal_Service_Water_Sstem
- 1. Pumps NNS NA s N 0 1) V
- 2. Pump Motors NNS NA s N 0 p V
- 3. Valves, isolation from standby service water 3 I B E A,R,S p V
- 4. Piping, isolation from standby service water 3 I B E A,R,S p s
- 5. Piping, other NNS NA s E,N A,O,R,S p s
- 6. V alves, other NNS NA s E,N A,O,F,S p V
- 7. Other equipment NNS NA s E,N A,O,R,S p V XXVI. Instrume nt_and_Service Air_s_ystems (31)
- 1. Vessels, accumulators, supporting safety-related systems 3 I B E A,C,D,S p s (19)
- 2. Piping in lines between accumula-tors and safety-related systems 3 I B E A,C,D,S p s (19)
- 3. Valves in lines between accumula-tors a nd safety-related systems 3 I B E A,C,D,S l' V (19)
- 4. Piping, containment isolation 2 I B E A,C,D p s
- 5. Valves, containment isolation 2 I B E A,C,D p V
- 6. Electrical modules with safety function 2 I B E A,C,D,R p s (19)
- 7. Cables with safety function 2 NA B E p s (19)
- 8. Piping, other NNS NA B E,N M p s
- 9. Valves, other NNS NA B E,N I'I l' V 1 o. Other equipment NNS NA B E,N M p V 9 of 34 August 1987
Qu ality<3> Tornado<"'> Scope<6>
Safety<1> Seismic<2> Assurance Protection of Design< 7 >
£1§§ C ategory ££!tegQI Designation Location< s> ?.!!.E..Eil tail Not§ XXVII. Diesel_Generator_s1stems ("'<I,)
- 1. Diesel-generators
- b. Standby diesel-generator 3 I B E s p V
- 2. Electrical modules with safety functions (including the governor, voltage regulator, and exciter systems) (3<1,)
- b. Standby diesel-generator 3 I B E A,R,S p V
- 3. Cable, with safety functions 3 NA B E p s
- 4. Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System
- a. Fuel oil storage tanks 3 I B E s 1> s
- b. Fuel oil day t anks 3 I B E s p s
- d. Pump motors 3 I B E s p V
- e. Piping 3 I B E s p s ( <1,5)
- f. Valves 3 I B E s p V ( <1,5)
- 5. Cooling Water system - HPCS (3<1,)
Diesel-Generator (8)
- a. Water expansion tank 3 I B E s GE V
- b. Heat exchanger 3 I B E s GE V
- c. Oil cooler 3 I B E s GE V
- d. Pumps 3 I B E s GE V
- e. Piping and valves, integral with engine NNS I s E s GE V
- f. Piping, otber 3 I B E s p s
- g. Valves, other 3 I B E s p V
- h. Flexible connections 3 I B E s GE V E. Cooling Water System - (3<1,)
Standby Diesel-Generator (8)
- a. Standpipe 3 I B E s p V
- b. Heat exchanger 3 I B E s p V
- c. L ube oil cooler 3 I B E s p V
- d. Pump 3 I B E s p V
- e. Piping and valves, integral with engine NNS I s E s T> V
- f. Piping, other 3 I B E s p s
- g. Valves, other 3 I B E s p V 10 of 34 August 1987
BBS USA ll TABLE 3. 2-1 (Cont)
Quality< 3> T ornado<*> ScopC6>
Safety<1> Seismic<2> Assurance Protection of DesignCT>
J.s.2§ £g!;gggD: £steqq1;:y .Qfiliig!!g!..!Q!! 1gcation< s> §..!:!.E.Eil QgtaiJ, Note2
- 7. Starting System Diesel-Generator
- HPCS (3)
(8)
- a. Air receivers 3 I B E s GE V
- b. Air compressors NNS I s E s GE V
- c. Aftercooler, air to air NNS I s E s GE V
- d. Piping and valves, integral with engine NNS I s E s GE V
- e. Vendor piping between engine and air receiver isolation check valves 3 I B E s GE V
- f. Valves between engine and air receivers isolation check valves 3 I B E s GE V
- g. Flexible connections between engine and air receivers 3 I B E s GE V
- h. Piping and valves upstream from isolation check valves NNS I s E s GE V
- i. Flexible connections upstream from isolation check valves NNS I s E s GE V
- j. Air dryer, refrigerant NNS I s E s GE V
- k. Piping, other 3 I B E s p s
- 1. Valves, oter B s
- 8. Starting System - Standby 3 I E l) V (3)
Diesel-Generator (8}
- a. Air receivers 3 I E E s p V
- b. Air comi:,ressors NNS NA s E s p V
- c. Aftercoolers NNS NA s E s p V
- d. Air desiccant dryers NNS NA s E s p V
- e. Piping and valves, integral with engine NNS I s E s p V
- f. Piping, between engine and air receivers 3 I B E s p s
- g. Valves, between engine and air receivers 3 I B E s p V
- h. Piping, other NNS NA s E s p s
- i. Valves, other NNS NA s E s p V
- j. Flexible connections 3 I B E s p V 11 of 34 August 1987
RBS USAF TABLE 3. 2-1 (Cont)
Quality<J> Tornado<*> scope<6>
Safety<1> Seismic<2> Assurance Protection of DesignC7>
.!s§§ £at_ggQ!:.Y steI.Q!:Y. Designation Location cs> .!!.E.Eil Qgtai,! Not§
- 9. Lubrication system - HPCS (34)
Diesel-Generator
- a. Pumps 3 I E E s GE V
- d. Strainer 3 I B E s GE V
- e. Filter 3 I B E s GE V
- f. Piping and valves, integral with engine NNS I s E s GE V
- g. Piping, other 3 I E E s p s
- h. Valves, other 3 I B E s V 1) 1 o. Lubrication System Standby C 3)
Diesel-Generator
- a. Lube oil pump (engine-driven) NNS I s E s p V
- b. Before and after pump 3 I B E s p V
- c. I.ube oil cooler 3 I B E s p V
- d. Sump tank NNS I s E s p V
- e. Strainers NNS I s E s p V
- f. Filters 3 I B E s p V
- g. Piping and valves, integral with engine NNS I s E s p V
- h. Piping, other 3 I B E s p s
- i. Valves, other 3 I B E s p V Combustion Air Intake and 11.
Exhaust System - HPCS Diesel-Generator
- a. I ntake and exhaust silencers 3 I B E s GE V
- b. Intake air filter 3 I B E s GE V
- c. Expansion joints 3 I B E s GE V
- d. Piping 3 I B E s p s Combustion Air Intake and 12.
Exhaust System - standby Diesel-Generator
- a. Intake and exhaust silencers NNS I s E s p V
- b. Intake air filter NNS I s E s p V
- c. Expansion jo ints (intake) 3 I B E s p V
- d. Piping 3 I E E s 1? s
- e. Expansion joints (exhaust) NNS I s E s p s 12 of 34 August 1987
QualityC3> TornadoC*> Scope<6>
Safety<t> Seismic<z> Assurance Protection of Design < 7 >
1.s§§ £!SlQf:I £.tgsr.Q£I Desisrnation 1Q.£ation< s> SUJU!il _Qg_tai_! fotg_§ XXVIII. Combustible Gas Control system
- 1. Pipin g 2 I B E C,D p s
- 2. Valves 2 I B E c,D p V
- 3. Fans 2 I B E C p V
- 4. Hydrogen recombine rs 2 I B E C p V
- 5. Electrical modules with safety functions 2 I B E C,D,R p s
- 6. Cables with safety function 2 NA B E p s XXIX. !&!!QQY Gas Treatment System
- 1. Charcoal filter units 2 I B E A p V
- 2. Exhaust fans 2 I B E A p V
- 3. Ductwork 2 I B E A p V
- 4. Isolation dampers 2 I B E A p V
- 5. Electrical modules with a safety function 2 I B E R,A p s
- 6. Cable with a safety function 2 NA B E p s XXX. Containment Ventilation Sy.§!§!!
- 1. Containment unit coolers/coils 2/3 I E E C p V ( 30)
(1HVR*UC1A, UC1B)
- 2. Pressure relief dampers 2 I B E C p V
- 3. Containment unit cooler discharge backdraft dampers 2 I B E C p V
- 4. Containment unit cooler ductwork up to pressure relief damper 2 I B E C p s
- 5. Ductwork, other NNS NA s E C p s
- 6. Dampers, other NNS NA s E C p V
- 7. Dome recirculation fan NNS NA s E C p V
- 8. Containment unit cooler (1HVR*UC1C) NNS NA s E C p V XXXI. Auxiliary_BuildinS{_Ventilation_SI§tem
- 2. Unit cooler ductwork 3 I B E A p s
- 3. Unit cooler dampers 3 I B E A p V
- 4. Exhaust ductwork to isolation dampers 3 I B E A p s 13 of 34 August 1987
RBS USAP TABLE 3. 2-1 (Cont)
Quality<3> TornadoC*> Scope<6 >
Safety<1> Seismic<2> Assurance Protection of Design<7 >
!s§§ £slggsn:1 £9'teggn, Designation b.Q.f,S!ton ( .!!.EE!Y J2§.!!! Not§
- 5. Inlet isolation dampers 3 I B E A p V
- 6. Outlet isolation dampers 2 I B E A p V
- 8. Inlet tornado dampers 3 I B p A t> V
- 9. outlet tornado dampers 2 I B p A p V
- 10. Fire dampers 3 I B E A p V
- 11. Exhaust system balancing dampers 3 I B E A p V
- 12. Exhaust system back draft dampers 3 I B E A p V
- 13. Inlet and exhaust fans NNS NA s E A p V
- 14. In take and exhaust filters NNS NA s E A p V
- 15. Dampers, other NNS NA s E A p V
- 16. D uctwork, other NNS NA s E A p s 1 7. Unit coolers/coils ( 1HVF*UC2 through UC11A, B) 3/3 I B E A p V
- 18. Unit cooler 1 HVF-UC14 NNS NA s E A p V XXXII. Power_Conversion_.§._ystem
- 3. Feedwater line from second isolation valve to and including outermost 2 I B E A p s (10 11 isolation valve 43) 14 of 34 August 1987
OualityC3) TornadoC*> ScopeC6>
Safety<1> Seismic<2> Assurance Protection of DesignCT>
1s.§.§ g_1g_gg_£y £gj;g_g_£y Designation 12£:Ea tion C ..=2. 1!:!JH!.!Y. .Qg,tai! Notg§
- 4. Branch lines off the feed water line between the second iso-lation valve and the outermost isolation valve, from the branch point at the feed water line t o and including the first valve in the branch line 2 I E E A p s (10)
- 5. MSL piping downstream of the third isolation valve to the turbine stop valves and all branch lines NNS NA s E,N A,T p s (10 21)
- 6. Turbine bypass piping NNS NA s N T p s (10)
- 8. Turbine valve, turbine control valve, turbine bypass valves, and the main steam leads from the turbine c ontrol val ve to the (10 21 turbine casing NNS NA s N T p V 22 23)
- 9. Feedwater system components be-y ond the outermost feed water NNS NA s E,N A,T l? s (10 3) isolation valve XXXIII. Condensate_Makeu2_and_Drawoff 12:rni§!!!
- 1. C ondensate storage tank NNS NA s N 0 p V (l)
- 2. Piping, containment isolation 2 I B E A,C,F p s
- 3. Valves c ontainment isolation 2 I B E A,C,F p V
- 4. Other piping NNS NA s E A,C,F,D, p s T,M,",O
- 5. Other valves and components NNS NA s E A,C,F,D, l? V T,l'l,W,O X XXIV. Auxiliary_AC_Power_S.Y§tem (Class 1 E)
- 1. 4160-volt switchgear 2 I B E A,F,'R p V
- 2. 480-volt load centers 2 I B E A,R p V
- 3. 480-volt motor control centers 2 I E E A,F,R,l'l p V
- 4. 4160/480-volt transformers 2 I B E A,R,M p V
- 5. 120-volt instrument (vital) bus 2 I B E R p V 15 of 34 August 1987
Ouality<3> Tornado<*> scope< 6 >
Safety<1> Seismic< 2 > Assurance Protection of Design<7>
f.!it§§ £.f!.tgSIQ!:1 £.!!j;g_gQ!:_.Y Desi_gnation _1ocation< s> .§.Q.E.Eil Qgta!1 Note§
- 6. Protective relays for Items 1 through 5, above 2 I B E A,F,P,M p V
- 7. Cables (including splices) with safety function 2 NA B E p V
- 8. Terminal blocks 2 I B E p V
- 9. Conduits NNS NA s E p
- 10. Cable trays, tray supports, and conduit supports 2 I B E p v,s (33)
- 11. Containm ent electri cal penetrations and protection 2 I B E C p V
- 12. E mergency lighting battery (33,34) packs NNS NA s E,N p V
- 13. Raceway fire stops and seals NNS NA s E,N p V X XXV. 125-Vol t. DC Power System (Class 1 E)
- 1. 125-vol t batteries 2 I B E R p V
- 2. Battery chargers 2 I B E R p V
- 3. Battery racks 2 I B E R p V
- 4. Uninterruptible po wer supplies (UPS) 2 I B E R p V
- 5. 125-volt switchgear 2 I B 1'
'-' i:i p V
- 6. 125-volt distribution panels 2 I B E F p V
- 1. Protective relays 2 I B E R p V
- 8. Cables with safety function 2 NA B E p V
- 9. Conduits NNS NA s E V 1 o. Cable trays, tray supports, and conduit supports 2 I B E p v,s (33) 1 1. Raceway fire stops and seals NNS NA s E,N p V XXXVI. Miscellaneous_Comonents
- 1. Reactor building polar crane 3 I B E C p V
- 2. Spent fuel cask trolley NNS I B E F p V
- 3. Fuel building bridge crane NNS NA s E F p V (18)
- 4. Radwaste building crane NNS NA s N w p V 16 of 34 August 1987
Quality<3> TornadoC4> Scope< 6 >
Safety<1> Seismic< 2 > Assurance Protection of Design<?>
fl:s§§ s!.§.9:.Q!:Y f.s.!.§.9:.Q!:Y D esignation LocationC s> l!.E.Eil Detail ]:ote§.
XXXVII. 'Reactor Plant Com:eonent f.Q.QJ:::!,!!.9: 'Water
- 1. Pumps and heat exchangers NNS NA s E A p V
- 2. Piping, containment and drywell isolation 2 I B E A,C,D p s
- 3. Valves, containment and drywell isolation 2 I E E A,C,D p V
- 4. Piping, BHP pump and fuel pool coolers cooling water 3 I E E A,F p s
- 5. Valves, PHR Pump and fuel pool coolers cooling water 3 I B E D,A,F p V
- 6. Piping, other NNS NA s E A,C,D,F p s
- 7. Valves, other NNS NA s E A,C,D,F 1? V XXXVIII. }:;9.J!iEment and Floor D rair.a_gg
- rn:!&ll!§
- 1. sumps NNS NA s E A,C,D,F, p s T,W,M
- 2. Pumps NNS NA s E A,C,D,F, p V T,W,M
- 3. Piping, containment isolation 2 I B E A,C,D p s
- 4. Valves, containment isolation 2 I E E A,C,D p V
- 5. Cable, with a safety function 2 NA B E 1? s
- 6. Piping, other NNS NA s E A,C,D,F, p s W,T,M
- 7. Valves ., other NNS NA s E A,C,D,F, p V W,T,M XXXIX. Fuel Building Ventilation system
- 1. supply system air conditioning unit NNS NA s E F p V
- 2. Unit coolers NNS NA s E F p V
- 3. Exhaust fans NNS NA s E F 1? V
- 4. Charcoal filtration system fans 3 I B E F p V
- 5. Charcoal filtration system filters 3 I B E F 1_) V
- 6. Charcoal filtration system ductwork 3 I B E F p s 17 of 34 August 1987
FBS USA"l TABLE 3. 2-1 (Cont)
Quality< 3 > Tornado<*> scopeC6>
Safety<1> Seismic<2> Assurance- Protection of Design<7>
£1§§ £:!;ggQ!;'..Y £sJ:g_ggf:y Designation LocationCs> .§..!:!£.E.!Y. Detail Not_g2
- 7. Charcoal filtration system balancing dampers 3 I B E F p V
- 8. Emergency air intake ductwork 3 I B E F p s
- 11. Fire dampers 3 I B E F p V
- 12. Dampers, other NNS NA s E F p V
- 13. Ductwork, other NNS NA s 1? F p s XL. Area_Radiation_Monitoring_system (34)
- 1. Containment post-accident area monitor and drywell post-accident area monitor 2 I B E C,D p V
- 2. Cable, monitors with safety function NNS NA s E C 0 V
- 3. All other components NNS NA s E A,F,W,T,R p V XLI. Leak Detection S ystem
- 1. Temperature element 2 I B E C,D GE V
- 2. Temperature switch 2 I B E C,D GE V
- 3. Differential temperature switch 2 I B E C,D GE V
- 4. D ifferential flow switch 2 I B E C,D GE V
- 5. Pressure switch 2 I B E C,D GE V
- 6. Differential pressure switch 2 I B E C,D GE V
- 7. Differential flow summer 2 I B E C,D GE V XIII. Main_Steam-Positive_Leakage_Control_System_lMS-PLCSt_and Penetration_Val ve_Leakage_Control_System1PVLCSL
- 1. Piping and valves up to first isolation valve of inboard subsystem (MS-i:1LCS) 1 I B E C p s
- b. Electri cal modules (PVLCS) 2 I B E A p s
- 4. Compressor assembl y (PVLCS) 2 I B E A p V (29)
- 5. Cable, with safety function 2 I B E C,A p s 18 of 314 August 1987
RBS USAP TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont)
QualityC3> Tornado<*> ScopeC6>
Safety<1> Seis111ic<2 > Assurance Protection of Design<?>
£1s§§ fat§g.Qf:.! £s.:J:§g.Q!:.! D esignation Location< s> §.!!.E!lli Detail Note§ XlIII. Structures<32>
- 1. Primary containment 2 I B E p s
- 2. Drywell, including biological shielding 2 I B E p s
- 3. Shield building, including biological shielding 2 I B p p s
- 4. Auxiliary building, including biological shielding 2 I B p p s
- 5. Fuel building, including biological shielding 3 I B p p s
- 6. Control building, including control room, office area, and biological shielding 2 I B p p s
- 7. Diesel generator building 3 I B p p s
- 8. Star.dby service water cooling tower and basin 3 I B p p s (8)
- 9. Standby service water pump house 3 I B p p s
- 10. Piping and electrical tunnels housing safety-related systems 3 I B p p s
- 11. Turbine building UNC (26,28) s N p s
- 12. Radwaste building UNC (26) s N p s (27)
- 13. Auxiliary control building UNC NA s N p s
- 14. Services building UNC NA s N p s
- 15. Condensate demineralizer, regener- UNC (26,28} s N p s ation, and off-gas building
- 16. Spent fuel pool and liner 3 I B E C,F p s
- 17. Internal missile barriers 2 I B E C p s XLIV. Control_Building Chilled Water system
- 1. Centrifugal liquid chillers 3 I B E R p V
- 2. Condenser cooling water pumps 3 I B E R p V
- 3. Chilled water recirculation pumps 3 I B E R p V
- 4. Compression tanks 3 I B E R p s
- 5. Piping 3 I B E R p s
- 6. Valves 3 I B E R p V 19 of 311 August 1987
RBS USAB TABLE 3.2-1 {Cont)
QualityC3> Tornado<4> Scope< 6 >
Safety<t> seismic<2> Assurance Protection of Design<7>
£!s§§ £!gq2n £gj;lliJQ£1: Designation 12£tion< 5> §lli Detai! Notes XIV. Control Building Ventilation SY§i
- 1. Main control room air-conditioning units and heating coils 3 I B E R p V
- 2. Standby switchgear room air-conditioning units, return air fans and battery room exhaust fans 3 I B E R p V
- 3. Chiller equipment room air-conditioning units 3 I B E R p V
- 4. Main control room charcoal filter trains 3 I B E R p V
- 5. Smoke removal fans NNS NA s E R p V
- 6. Chiller equipment room supply and exhaust fans NNS NA s E p p V
- 7. Elevator equipment room, kitchen and toilet exhaust fans NNS NA s E R p V
- 8. Ductwork for the smoke removal system NNS I s E p s
- 9. Ductwork for a portion of the chiller equipment room ventilation supply and exhaust ductwork NNS I s E R p s
- 10. Dampers for the smoke removal system and for a portion of the chiller equipment room ventilation supply and exhaust ductwork NNS NA s E R p V
- 11. Ductwork for the control building ventilation and air-conditioning systems, including main control room and remote air intake (except pipe) 3 I B E M/R p s
- 13. Inlet and outlet tornado dampers 3 I B p M/R p V 20 of 34 August 1987
QualityC3> Tornado<*> scope<6>
Safety<1> Seis111ic<2> Assurance Protection of De sign< 7 >
11!§§ !!.!:.§_ggr_y: Cate_g_Qf:Y Designation Location< s> §.l:!Eill De:!:ai]: Notg§.
- 14. Inlet and outlet filters NNS NA s E R p V
- 15. Fire dampers 3 I B E R p V
- 16. Remote air intake pipe 3 I B E M/R p s (1)
XLVI. Qnwell V entilation System
- 1. Unit coolers NNS NA s E D p V
- 2. Ductwork NNS NA s E D p s
- 1. Pans 2 I E E A p V
- 2. Balancing dampers 2 I B E A p V
- 3. Ductwork 2 I E E A p s XLVIII. Annulus Pressure Control system
- 1. Ductwork from isolation damper to plant exhaust duct 2 I B E A p s
- 2. Isolation dampers 2 I B E A p V
- 3. Pans NNS NA s E A p V
- 4. Dampers, other NNS NA s E A p V
- 5. Ductwork, other NNS NA s E A p s XLIX. Containment_and_Drv.well_Purge_system
- 1. Containment and drywell penetrations and isolation valves ;: I B E A p V
- 2. Fire dampers 3 I B E A p V
- 3. Filters NNS NA s E A p V
- 4. Fans NNS NA s E A p V
- 5. Ductwork NNS NA s E A p V
- 6. Dampers, other NNS NA s E A p V L. Diesel_Ge ne rator_Building V entilation_system
- 1. Exhaust fans 3 I B E s p V
- 2. Tornado dampers 3 I B p s p V
- 3. Backdraft and balancing dampers 3 I B E s p V
- 4. Ductwork 3 I E E s p s
- s. DG control room vent fans 3 I E E s p V 21 of 34 August 1987
OualityC3> Tornado<4> Scope< 6 >
Safety<1> Seismic<2> Assurance Protection of Desig n< 7 >
!s§§ £s!.§.9.Qf:Y s.1filI9IT Designation Location Cs> 2!!.lHUY Detail !!g!!t§
- 6. DG control room ductwork 3 I B E s p s
- 8. Filters NNS NA s E s p V
- 9. Normal v entilation fans NNS NA s E s p V
- 10. Dampers, other NNS NA s E s p V
- 11. Ductwork, other NNS NA s E s p s LI. Standby_service_Wat er_PumEhouse_Ventilation_System
- 1. Fans 3 I B E p p V
- 2. Tornado dampers 3 I B p p p V
- 3. Ductwork 3 I B E p p s LII. Turbine_Buildin_g_Ventilation_system
- 1. Fans NNS NA s N T p V
- 2. Filters NNS NA s N T p V
- 3. Unit coolers NNS NA s N T p V
- 4. Dampers NNS NA s N T p V
- 5. Ductwork NNS NA s N T p s IIII. Padwaste_Building_Ventilation_.§.ystem
- 1. Fans NNS NA s N w p V
- 2. Unit coolers NNS NA s N w p V
- 3. Dampers NNS NA s N w p V
- 4. Ductwork NNS NA s N w p s
- 5. Charcoal filter NNS NA s N w p V
- 6. Filters, other NNS NA s N w p V LIV. Fire Pum[!house Heating and Ventilation system
- 1. Fans NNS NA s N p p V
- 2. Unit heaters NNS NA s N p p V LV. Normal_switch_gear_Buildin_g HVAC .§.y§_tg!!!
- 1. Air-conditioning units NNS NA s N M p V
- 2. Fans NNS NA s N M p V
- 3. Heating coils NNS NA s N M p V
- 4. Dampers NNS NA s N M p V
- 5. Ductwork NNS NA s N M p s 22 of 34 August 1987
Quality<3> Tornado<*> Scope<&>
Safety< 1 > Seismic<z> Assurance Protection of Design< 7 >
£1s§§ t;;_gj;g_g_g1;:y fgteqcg:y Designation 1ocation .!:!Elli Detail Note§ lVI. !Y.!ill&!:Y Boiler Building HVAC System
- 1. Air-conditioning units NNS NA s N M p V
- 2. Fans NNS NA s N M I? V
- 3. Dampers NNS NA s N M p V
- 4. Ductwork NNS NA s N M p s I VII. Makeu2_water_ Intake_Structure_and_Switchgear_Ventilation syste!!
- 1. Air-conditioninq units NNS NA s N M p V
- 2. Fans NNS NA s N M p V
- 3. Heaters NNS NA s N M p V
- 4. Ductwork NNS NA s N M p V
- 5. Dampers NNS NA s N M p s LVIII. Electrical_and_Pi£in_g_Tunnel Ventilation .§Y.§1!\l!!
- 1. Fire dampers in the Category I firewall 3 I s N M p V
- 2. Fans NNS NA s N M p V
- 3. Dampers, ot her NNS NA s N M p V
- 4. Ductwork NNS NA s N M p s lIX. Post-Accident_Sa.!!!£lin_g_system
- 1. Sample tubing, piping, and valves up to and including the outermost containment isolation valve, containment atmosphere monitoring isola-tion valves, and drain line isolation valves 2 I B E A,C p s
- 2. Cable with safety function 2 NA B E A,C p s
- 3. Other sample tubing, piping, and valves NNS NA s E A p s
- 4. Sample panel wet section NNS NA s E A,P.! GE V C 38)
- 5. Sample system control panel NNS NA s E A,M GE V ( 38)
LX. Permanent_Emer_gency su.1:rnort FacilitiesC3)
- 1. Technical Support Center (TSC) NNS NA s N TSC p V
RBS US A R TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont)
Qualityc H Tornado< 4 > ScopeC6>
Saf ety<1> Se ismic<2> Assuranc e Protection of Des ign<7>
£1.§_§ £!!.!g_gQ!:.! £teqq;i:;y: Designation Location SU£.Ell Deta il Note2
- 3. Operational Support Center (OSC) NNS NA s N BR p V LXI. Emerqency:_Res£ons e_Information_Sy:stem<J 4 >
- 1. Interfac e with Category I Systems ::'I I E E C GE V
A. Control Poom NNS NA s E R GE V B. TSC NNS NA s N TSC GE V
NOTES:
< 1 >safety Classes 1, 2, 3, and NNS are defined in Section 3.2.2. The equipment is constructed in accordance with the codes listed in Table 3.2-4. (unc. =
unclassified)
< 2
>r = The equipment is constructed in accordance with the seismic requirements for the SSE as described in Section 3.7. For civil and structural codes, see Section 3.8.
NA The seismic requirements for the SSE are not applic able to the equipment.
< 3 >B The equipment meets the quality assurance requirements of 10CFRS0, Appendix B, in accordance with the quality assurance program described in Chapter 17.
S The equipment meets the quality assurance requirements defined in the purchase specification.
< 4
>p = Those structures or components designed to wihstand a design base tornado.
E Those systems or components enclosed within the structure or component designed to withstand a design base tornado.
N = Those components and structures which are not designed for tornado protection.
< s >A = Auxiliary building C Part of, or within, containment D Drywell F Fuel building M Any other location 0 = Outdoors onsite p = Pump house R = Control building s = Diesel generator building T Turbine building w Radwaste building TSC Technical Support Center EOF = Emergency Operations Facility BR Baton Rouge 25 of 34 August 1987
= Gulf States
< 7 >GE General Electric - Nuclear Energy Business Group (NEBG) is responsible for details of component design.
S Stone & Webster is responsible for details of component design.
V = Component vendor is responsible for details of component design.
CBIN = Chicago Bridge & Iron Nuclear is responsible for details of component design.
Details of internal equipment design by Vendor.
< 9 >A portion of the CRD insert and withdraw lines from the drive flange are Safety Class 1. The remainder of the piping is Safety Class 2 up to and including the first valve on the hydraulic control unit.
< 10 >see Section 3.2.2.1 for explanation.
< 11 'rn addition to a swing check valve inside the containment and a positive acting check valve outside containment, a third valve*with high leaktight integrity is provided in each line outside the containment. The spring loaded piston operator of the positive acting check valve is held open by air pressure during normal operation. Fail-open solenoid valves are used to release air pressure to permit the check valve piston operator to close. The positive acting check valve and the high leaktight integrity isolation valve are remote manually operated from the main control room, using signals which indicate loss of feedwater flow.
The classification of the feedwater lines from the reactor vessel to and including the second isolation valve is Safety Class l; from the second isolation valve to and including the outermost isolation valve is Safety Class 2; beyond the outermost isolation valve is classified NNS, but seismically supported up to and including the anchor at the turbine building/auxiliary building interface.
< l 2 I 1. Lines equivalent to a 3/4-in or smaller liquid line which are part of the RCPB are Safety Class 2.
26 of 34 August 1987
- 2. All instrument lines which are connected to the RCPB and are utilized to actuate safety systems are Safety Class 2 from the outer isolation valve or the process shutoff valve (root valve) to the sensing instrumentation.
- 3. All instrument lines which are connected to the RCPB and not utilized to actuate safety systems are classified NNS from the outer isolation valve or the pr6cess shutoff valve (root valve) to the sensing instrumentation.
- 4. All other instrument lines:
- a. through the root valve are of the same classification as the system to which they are attached.
- b. beyond the root valve, if used to actuate a safety system, are of the same classification as the system to which they are attached.
- 5. All sample lines from the outer isolation valve or the process root valve through the remainder of the sampling system are classified NNS.
< 13 >The turbine does not fall within the applicable design codes. To assure the turbine is fabricated to the standards commensurate with their safety and performance requirements, General Electric has established specific design requirements for this component which are as follows:
- 1. All welding shall be qualified in accordance with Section IX, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.
- 2. All pressure-containing castings and fabrications shall be hydrotested at 1.5 times design pressure.
- 3. All high-pressure castings shall be radiographed according to:
ASTM E-94 E-142 Maximum feasible volume E-71, 186 or 280 Severity level 3 27 of 34 August 1987
- 4. As-cast surfaces shall be magnetic particle or liquid penetrant tested according to ASME,Section III, Paragraphs NB-2575, NC-2575, NC-2576, or NB-2576, NC-2576.
- 5. Wheel and shaft forgings shall be ultrasonically tested according to ASTM A-388.
- 6. Buff-welds shall be radiographed and magnetic particle or liquid penetrant tested according to ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. Acceptance standards shall be in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section III Paragraph NB-5340, NC-5340, NB-5350, and NC-5350, respectively.
- 7. Notification to be made on major repairs and records maintained thereof.
- 8. Record system and traceability according to ASME Section III, NA-4000.
- 9. Control and identification according to ASME Section III, NA-4000.
- 10. Procedures shall conform to ASME Section III, NB-5100, NC-5100.
- 11. Inspection personnel shall be qualified according to ASME Section III, NB-5500, NC-5500.
< 14 >The condensate storage tank is designed, fabricated, and tested to meet the intent of ANSI-B96.l.
< 15 >ASME Section VIII-1 and ANSI B31.l apply downstream of outermost isolation valves.
<l6
>The gaseous radwaste system piping, pumps, and valves containing gaseous radwaste are constructed in accordance with the applicable codes of classification NNS.
< 17 >The hydraulic control unit (HCU) is a GE factory assembled engineered module of valves, tubing, piping, and stored water which controls a single CRD by the application of precisely timed sequences of pressures and flows to accomplish slow insertion or withdrawal of 28 of 34 August 1987
RBS USAR TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont) the control rods for power control and rapid insertion for reactor scram.
Although the HCU, as a unit, is field installed and connected to process piping, many of its internal parts differ markedly from process piping components because of the more complex functions they must provide. Thus, although the codes and standards invoked for Safety Classes 1, 2, 3, and NNS pressure integrity quality levels clearly apply at all levels to the interfaces between the HCU and the connecting conventional piping components (e.g., pipe nipples, fittings, simple hand valves), it is considered that they do not apply to the specialty parts (e.g., solenoid valves, pneumatic components and instruments).
The design and construction specifications for the HCU do invoke such codes and standards as can be reasonably applied to individual parts in developing required quality levels, but these codes and standards are supplemented with additional requirements for these parts and for the remaining parts and details. For example, 1) all welds are LP inspected, 2) all socket welds are inspected for gap between pipe and scket bottom, 3) all welding* is performed by qualified welders, and 4) all work is done in accordance with written procedures. Classification NNS is generally applicable because the codes and standards invoked by that group contain clauses which permit the use of manufacturer's standards and proven design techniques which are not explicitly defined within the codes for Safety Classes 1, 2, or 3. This is supplemented by the QC techniques previously described.
< 10 >This crane is not seismically designed, but is provided with earthquake restraints to prevent the trolley and bridge from coming off the rails. This crane does not carry a load over spent fuel.
< 19 >The safety-related systems and equipment supported by the air systems are the automatic depressurization system, the main steam isolation valves, and the air starting system of the diesel generators.
<20 >rn addition to a swing check valve inside the drywell and a positive acting check valve outside the drywell, a third valve with high leaktight integrity is provided in 29 of 34 August 1987
RBS USAR TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont) each line. The spring loaded piston operator of the positive acting check valve is held open by air pressure during normal operation. Fail-open solenoid valves are used to release air pressure to permit the check valve piston operator to close. The positive acting check valve and the high leaktight integrity isolation valve are remote manually operated from the main control room, using signals which indicate loss of CRD system return line flow.
< 21 >All inspection records are maintained for the life of the plant. These records include data pertaining to qualification of inspection personnel, examination procedures, and examination results.
< 22 >All cast pressure-retaining parts of a size and configuration for which volumetric methods are effective are examined by radiographic methods by qualified personnel. Ultrasonic examination to equivalent standards is used as an alternate to radiographic methods. Examination procedures and acceptance standards are at least equivalent to those defined in Paragraph 136.4, Nonboiler External Piping, ANSI B31.l-1973.
< 23 >The following qualifications are met with respect to the certification requirements:
- 1. The manufacturer of the turbine stop valves, turbine control va s, turbine bypass valves, and main steam leads from turbine control valve to turbine casing utilizes quality control procedures equivalent to those defined in GE Publication GEZ-4982A, General Electric Large Steam Turbine Generator Quality Control Program.
- 2. A certification obtained from the manufacturer of these valves and steam loads demonstrates that the quality control program as defined has been accomplished.
< 24 >The nonregenerative heat exchanger is Safety Class 3 on the tube side and nonnuclear safety class on the shell side.
< 25
>The filter/demineralizer, heat exchangers, pumps, tanks, and valves supplied by GE which are Safety Class 3, are 30 of 34 August 1987
RBS USAR TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont) not required to mitigate the consequences of a LOCA, and their failure does not result in release to the environment of radioactive material which would give a single event dose greater than the annual dose from 10CFR20.105(1). Therefore, they are not Seismic Category I.
The purchaser-furnished piping and valves which are Safety Class 3 are also Seismic Category I.
< 25 >The design satisfies the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.143 as described in Sections 11.2 and 11.3. The seismic design of the charcoal adsorber tanks is discussed in Section 11.3.2.2.2.1.
< 27 >The radwaste building is not tornado-protected above grade.
< 20 >The structure is designed in accordance with the seismic analysis and design approach as described in Sections 3.7.2.17A and 3.8.4.4.9, respectively.
< 29 >The PVLCS compressor assembly includes the compressor, filter, moisture separator, aftercooler, and accumulator. All these components are supplied as a single skid-mounted unit.
< 30 >The cooling coils for the containment unit coolers are Safety Class 3.
< 31 >Requirements for instrument and pneumatic tubing and supports classified as Safety Class 2 and 3 are shown in Table 3.2-8.
< 32 >The classification of a structure described herein also applies to all major structural components of that structure.
< 33 >systems and components whose failure could adversely affect safety-related systems or components are analyzed to seismic Category I requirements and controlled in accordance with the pertinent requirements of the operational QA program.
< 34 >The pertinent provisions of the operational QA program are applied to the following items:
31 of 34 August 1987
- a. Radioactivity sampling (air, surfaces, liquids)
- b. Radioactivity contamination measurement and analysis equipment
- c. Personnel monitoring equipment
- d. Instrument storage, calibration, and mainte nance program
- e. Decontamination facilities, personnel, and equipment
- f. Respiratory protection equipment (including testing)
- g. Contamination control
- h. Equipment and other items associated with the emergency support facilities
- i. Site grading, including maintenance of the West Creek fabriform channel
- j. Activities affecting reactor internal structures
- k. Diesel generator auxiliaries including the lube system, jacket cooling water system, air start system, governor, voltage regulator, and excita tion systems.
< 35 >Effluent monitors meet the environmental qualification and quality assurance requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2.
< 35 >valve actuators for active safety-related valves are subject to the same quality assurance requirements as the valve.
< 37 >The safety-related instrumentation and controls described in Sections 7.1 through 7.6 are subject to the requirements of Appendix B, Quality Assurance Program, and Class lE requirements (TEEE 279). However, post accident monitoring instrumentation discussed in Section 7.5 has design and qualification criteria as designated in Table 7.5-2 (e.g., Category 1, 2, 3 or Regulatory Guide 1.97).
(38 'The sample panel and cooler rack are seismically supported. The instruments are not.
< 39 >supports for components designated as Quality Assurance (QA) Category B are also classified as QA Category B.
32 of 34 August 1987
< 40
>The piping between RHR valves MOV F042B and MOV F027B, and between MOV F042A and MOV F027A, is safety Class 2 as shown on Fig. 5.4-12.
< 41 >A portion of the main control room remote air intake utilizes pipe in lieu of ductwork. Since this pipe is intended to fulfill the function of ductwork, the pipe and its supports are designed, fabricated, and installed in accordance with ASME III, Class 3 requirements with the following exceptions:
- a. Visual inspection of the welds is performed.
- c. Being part of engineered safety filtration system operating at low pressure (inches W.G. ), it is tested in accordance with ANSI N509 as defined in Regulatory Guide 1.52.
<42 >Piping is seismically supported from the outermost isolation valve to and including the main turbine stop and control valve.
<43 >piping is seismically supported from the outermost isolation valve to and including the anchor at the turbine building/auxiliary building interface.
<44 >For the standby diesel generators, lEGS*EGlA and lEGS*EGlB, some components supplied meet earlier editions and addenda of the ASME Section III Code than were applicable at the date the purchase orders were awarded to the subsuppliers. See Note 4 of Regulatory Guide 1.26 position in Table 1.8-1.
< 45 >All fuel storage and transfer system piping and valves are QA Category B, Seismic Category I, Safety Class 3 except the standby diesel generators fuel oil backpressure regulating valves 1EGF*PCV25A and B and approximately 15 inches of 1-in pipe on each side of the valves. Valves 1EGF*PCV25A and B are classified as QA Category B, Seismic Category I, Safety Class 3, non-ASME III stamped components. These valves were procured from the manufacturer recommended by the standby diesel generator supplier and have been satisfactorily used in other standby diesel generator 33 of 34 August 1987
RBS USAR TABLE 3.2-1 (Cont) applications using TDI diesels. The 15 inches of 1-in pipe on either side of the valve is classified as QA Category B, Seismic Category I, Safety Class 3, non-ASME III stamped pipe. The pipe is procured, designed, analyzed, and installed to the requirements of ASME III.
34 of 34 August 1987
Attachment 2 RBS SER Sections 3.3.2, 3.5.1.4, and 3.5.2
The procedures that were used to transform the wind velocity into pressure loadings on structures and the associated vertical distribution of wind pressures and gust factors are in accordance with ANSI-A58.l and American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) Paper 3269, as appropriate. These docu ments are acceptable to the staff.
The staff concludes that the plant design is acceptable and meets SRP 3.3.1 and GDC 2.
The applicant has met GDC 2 with respect to the capability of the structures to withstand design wind loading so that the design reflects (1) appropriate consideration for the most severe wind recorded for the site with an appropriate margin (2) appropriate combinations of the effects of normal and accident conditions with the effects of the natural phenonmena (3) the importance of the safety function to be performed The applicant has met these requirements by using ANSI A58.1 and ASCE Paper 3269, which the staff has reviewed and found acceptable, to transform the wind velocity into an effective pressure on structures and for selecting pressure coefficients corresponding to the structures' geometry and physical configuration.
The applicant has designed the plant structures with sufficient margin to prevent structural damage during the most severe wind loadings that have been determined appropriate for the site so that the requirements of item 1 above are met. In addition, the design of seismic Category I structures, as required by item 2 above, has included, in an acceptable manner, load combinations that occur as a result of the most severe wind load and the loads resulting from normal and accident conditions.
The procedures used to determine the loadings on structures induced by the design wind specified for the plant are acceptable because these procedures have been used in the design of conventional structures and have been proven to provide a conservative basis' that, together with other engineering design considerations, ensures that the structures withstand such environmental forces. The use of these procedures provides reasonable assurance that, in the event of design-basis winds, the structural integrity of the plant struc tures that have to be designed for the design wind will not be impaired. As a result, safety-related systems and components located within these structures are adequately protected and ,will perform their intended safety functions if needed, thus satisfying the requirement of item 3 above.
3.3.2 Tornado Loadings All seismic Category I structures exposed to tornado forces and needed for the safe shutdown of the plant were designed to resist a tornado with a 290-mph tangential wind velocity of a 70-mph translational wind velocity. The simul taneous atmopsheric pressure drop was assumed to be 3 p in 2 seconds. Tornado missiles are also considered in the design, as discussed in Section 3.5 below.
River Bend SER 3-4
The NRC staff concludes that the plant design is acceptable and meets SRP 3.3.2 and G0C 2.
The applicant has met SRP 3.3.2 and G0C 2 with respect to the structures*
capability to withstand the design tornado wind loading and tornado missiles so that their design reflects (1) appropriate consideration for the most severe tornado recorded for the site with an appropriate margin (2) appropriate combinations of the effects of normal and accident conditions with the effects of the natural phenomena (3) the importance of the safety function to be performed The applicant has met these requirements by using ANSI A58.1 and ASCE Paper 3269, which the staff has reviewed and found acceptable, to transform the wind velocity generated by the tornado into an effective pressure on structures and for selecting pressure coefficients corresponding to the struc tures' geometry and physical configuration.
The applicant has designed the plant structures with sufficient margin to prevent structural damage during the most severe tornado loadings that have been determined appropriate for the site so that the requirements of item 1 above are met. In addition, the design of seismic Category I structures, as required by item 2 above, has included in an acceptable manner load combina tions that occur as a result of the most severe tornado wind load and the loads resulting from normal and accident conditions.
The procedures utilized to determine the loadings on structures induced by the design-basis tornado specified for the plant are acceptable because these procedures have been used in the design of conventional structures and have been proven to provide a conservative basis that, together with other engi neering design considerations, ensures that the structures will withstand such environmental forces.
The use of these procedures provides reasonable assurance that, in the event of a design-basis tornado, the structural integrity of the plant structures that have to be designed for tornadoes will not be impaired. As a result, safety-related systems and components located within these structures will be adequately protected and may be expected to perform necessary safety functions as required, thus satisfying the requirement of item 3 above.
3.4 Water Level (Flood) Design 3.4.1 Flood Protection The water level (flood) design was reviewed in accordance with SRP 3.4.1 (NUREG-0800). Conformance with the acceptance criteria formed the basis for the NRC staff 1 s evaluation of the water level (flood) design with respect to the applicable regulations of 10 CFR 50. To ensure conformance with the requirements of GDC 2 with respect to protection against flooding, the staff reviewed the overall plant flood protection design, including systems and components whose failure as a result of flooding could prevent safe shutdown of the plant or result in uncontrolled release of significant radioactivity.
River Bend SER 3-5
turbine generator. The staff requires that relevant GE analyses be submitted for review and acceptance to verify the adequacy of the applicant's turbine maintenance program in terms of the probability of generating turbine missiles.
Within 3 years of startup, no cracks have been observed in a GE turbine wheel with depths greater than one-half the critical crack depth calculated for that wheel. For this reason, the staff is allowing the applicant up to 3 years from initiation of power output to propose a revised turbine maintenance program (which establishes, with NRC-approved methods, inspection and testing procedures and schedules) and obtain NRC approval of the program.
The staff requires that a license condition be imposed that requires the applicant to (1) submit for NRC approval, within 3 years of obtaining an operating license, a turbine system maintenance program based on the manufacturer's calcu lations of missile generation probabilities and NRC guidelines (see Table 3.1), or volumetrically inspect all low-pressure turbine rotors at the second refueling outage and every other (alternate) refueling outage thereafter until some other maintenance program is approved by the staff (2) conduct turbine steam valve maintenance (following initiation of power output) in accordance with NRC recommendations until a turbine system maintenance program is approved Provided the above license condition is met, the staff concludes that the turbine-missile risk for the proposed plant design is in compliance with GDC 4 and is, therefore, acceptable.
3.5.1.4 Missiles Generated by Natural Phenomena The FSAR regarding misiles generated by natural phenomena was reviewed in accordance with SRP 3.5.1.4. However, the SRP "Review Procedures" concerning the probability per year of damage to safety-related systems as a result of missiles were not used in this review. This review is concerned with estab lishing the missile spectrum, not with calculating the probability of damage.
GOC 2 requires that structures, systems, and components essential to safety be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena, and GOC 4 requires that these same plant features be protected against missiles. The missiles generated by natural phenomena of concern are those resulting from tornadoes.
The applicant has identified a spectrum of missiles for the tornado region in which the site is located (tornado Region I), as identified in RG 1.76. The spectrum includes weight, velocity, and impact area. The missile spectrum chosen is identical to missile spectrum A of SRP 3.5.1.4. The staff has evaluated this spectrum and concludes it is representative of missiles at the site; it is, therefore, acceptable. A discussion of the protection afforded safety-related equipment from identified tornado missiles, including compliance with the guidelines of RG 1.117, is in Section 3.5.2 of this report. A discus sion of the adequacy of barriers and structures designed to withstand the effects of the identified tornado missiles is in Section 3.5.3.
River Bend SER 3-16
Based on its review of the tornado-missile spectrum, the staff concludes that the spectrum was properly selected, meets GOC 2 and 4 with repsect to protection against natural phenomena and missiles, and meets RGs 1.76, Position C.l and C.2, and 1.117 with respect to identification of missiles generated by natural phenomena. It is, therefore, acceptable. The tornado-missile spectrum complies with SRP 3.5.1.4.
3.5.2 Structures, Systems, and Components To Be Protected from Externally Generated Missiles Structures, systems, and components to be protected from externally generated missiles were revised according to SRP 3.5.2. GDC 2 requires that all struc tures, systems, and components essential to the safety of the plant be protected from the effects of natural phenomena, and GOC 4 requires that all structures, systems, and components essential to the safety of the plant be protected from the effects of externally generated missiles. As noted above, the River Bend site is in tornado Region I. (The tornado missile spectrum is discussed in Section 3.5.1.4 above.)
The applicant has identified all safety-related structures, systems, and components requiring protection from externally generated missiles. All safety-related structures are designed to withstand postulated tornado generated missiles without damage to safety-related equipment. All safety-related systems and components and stored fuel are located within tornado-missile-protected structures or are provided with tornado-missile barriers. Buried safety-related systems such as piping and electrical circuits are adequately protected by the overlying earth. The ultimate heat sink (UHS) consists of a water storage basin and standby cooling towe,*. It is designed .
to seismic Category I and Safety Class 3 criteria and is designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena including tornadoes and tornado missiles.
(Compliance of the UHS design with Positions C.2 and C.3 of RG 1.27 is addressed in Section 9.2.5.) Thus, River Bend meets GOC 2 and 4 with respect to missile protection and RGs 1.13, Positions C.2; 1.27, Positions C.2 and C.3; and 1.117, Positions C.l, C.2, and C.3 concerning tornado-missile protection for safety-related structures, systems, and components, including stored fuel and the ultimate heat sink. Protection from low-trajectory turbine missiles, including compliance with RG 1.115, is discussed in Section 3.5.1.3 of this report.
On the basis of the above, the staff concludes that the applicant's list of safety-related structures, systems, and components to be protected from exter nally generated missiles and the protection provided in the plant design is in accordance with GOC 2 and 4 with respect to missile and environmental effects, and with RGs 1.13, Position C.2; 1.27, Positions C.2 and C.3; and 1.117, Positions C.l through ,C.3 concerning protection of safety-related plant features, inclu9ing stored fuel and the ultimate heat sink, from tornado missiles. The applicant's list of safety-related structures, systems, and components to be protected from externally generated missiles and the provisions in the plant design providing this protection meet SRP 3.5.2 and are, therefore, acceptable.
River Bend SER 3-17