ML19309D078

Comments on Proposed Rule 10CFR50 on Behalf of Suffolk County,Ny:Emergency Planning Must Be Viewed as Equivalent Rather than Secondary to Siting Design in Achieving Public Protection

ML19309D078
Person / Time
Site:	05000516, 05000517, Shoreham  File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date:	02/26/1980
From:	Gilmartin D, Like I REILLY & LIKE
To:	Chilk S, Jamgochian M NRC OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT, NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY)
Shared Package
ML19309D080	List: ML19309D078 ML19309D087 ML19309D095
References
FRN-44FR75167, RULE-PR-50, TASK-OS, TASK-SD-906-1 NUDOCS 8004100041
Download: ML19309D078 (13)

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9% A %,s y February 26, 1980 Hon. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch Mr. Michael T. Jangochian Re: Comments of the County of Suffolk on Proposed Rule Amendments (published at 44 Fed. Reg. 75167, 12/19/79) to 10 CFR Part 50 and Accendix E

Dear Secretary Chilk:

The County of Suffolk is an intervenor both in NRC -

construction license proceedings involving the Long Island Lighting Company's application to' site two 1150 MW nuclear power stations at Jamesport, New York (Docket Nos. 50-516 and 517), and in operating license proceedings involving that same utility's application to operate an 320 MW nuclear power station at Shoreham, New York (Docket No. 50-322). In each proceeding, the issue of the adequacy of emergency res-ponse planning procedures and evacuation capability in the event of a serious radiation accident occuring at either the Jamesport or Shoreham site has been a prime, ongoing concern of the County, and, in the state and federal Jamesport licen-sing proceedings, was a subject of extensive testimony and debate.

To place in context the County's comments on the pro-posed rule amendments, let me first briefly review the position taken by the County in the Jamesport and Shorehe on emergency response planning and evacuation .'; q ' dings ay  %

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?Aedly amd $Ae Hon. Samuel J. Chilk February 26, 1980 Page 2 The proposed Jamesport nuclear power stations were to be located in the so-called East End of Long Island on the.

north fork of a dead-ended geographic peninsula bordered by large bodies of water to the north and south. The County concluded after the close of the Jamesport record and review of all the testimony that this site was unacceptable from an evacuatic' standpoint. This position was based in large measure L an testimony provided on behalf of the County by the Unitea States Environmental Protection Agency. The EPA testified that the State of New York could not provide radio-logical emergency response protection to citizens residing within a_ ten mile radius of Jamesport that is consistent with protective actions outlined in EPA's " Manual of Protection Action Guides and Protection Actions for Nuclear Accidents".

The EPA found that if a design basis accident should occur at Jamesport at a time when the wind conditions are unfavor-able-- conditions, according to EPA, that would exist 40% of the time - the major routes of land evacuation around that facility would be susceptible to the highest exposure levels making evacuation as a protective action impossible.

Former County Executive John Klein also submitted testimony on the issue of evacuation and concluded that, following a nuclear accident, evacuation of a significant number of people from a ten to twenty mile radius of the Jamesport plants in less than several days would be impossible.

Klein had conferred with various government officials of the State of Pennsylvania and discussed in detail the issue of evacuation of the Three Mile Island area during the crisis conditions at the plant. He came away with the view that notwithstanding the three hundred sixty degree evacuation >

capability'from Harrisburgh, evacuation of approximately 650,000 people within a twenty-mile radius of that facility would have been a multi-day undertaking. Translating these difficulties to the dead-ended Jamesport site, and the al-ready overtaxed and congested westward roadways and bridges that would provide a westward escape route,'Klein found that

-evacuation of the endangered population within a short period of time would not be feasible.

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Hon. Samuel J. Chilk February 26, 1980 Page 3 The EPA and Klein testimonies were submitted in the state construction permit proceedings for Jamesport (NYS Board on Electric Generation Siting and the Environment - Case 80003) and accordingly, are not documents of record in NRC licensing proceedings. I have, therefore, enclosed a copy of these testi-monies to be made a part of the County's comments presented herein.

From an emergency planning / evacuation standpoint, the site for the proposed Shoreham nuclear power station has many of '

the same serious, and perhaps insurmountable, disadvantages as were identified at Jamesport. Although located to the west of the Jamesport site, thus opening up some alternative evacuation routes, the population density surrounding Shoreham is far greater.

There are 98,920 Suffolk County residents within 10 miles of the Shoreham plant; 548,500 living within 20 miles; and 2,745,000 Nassau and Suffolk residents within a 50 mile radial area of the plant. This latter figure does not include a large section of Connecticut, and smaller sections of Queens and Westchester Counties, falling within the 50 mile zone. The same congested Long Island traffic and road conditions identified by former County Executive Klein in the Jamesport case will work to make swift evacuation of the population surrounding Shoreham problema-tical. The confounding and unique meteorological conditions that exist at coastal sites such as Shoreham, and their impact upon sound emergency planning, have not been properly analyzed by the Shoreham applicant. No provision has been made to conduct a mock evacuation drill at Shoreham; thus there will be no in-dependent confirmation that the applicant can timely notify the population at risk surrounding Shoreham and that responsible fed-eral, state and local agencies can adequately respond to a radio- ,

logical emergency. Perhaps most important, the Shoreham applicant has revised its emergency plan to provide for evacuation of the County population residing within a ten mile radial area - previously the planning distance had been about two miles - of the plant. As will be noted later in these comments, there is no scientifically defensible basis for assuming that evacuation out to ten miles, even if it can be demonstrated to be possible, will adequately protect those County residents placed at risk by a major, Class 9 accident (ie., breach of containment, or meltdown with interdiction of groundwater) occurring at Shoreham. The ten mile limit is an ar-bitrary cut-off point, largely the product of guesswork, which un-- ,

fortunately can be used to provide justification - what has been termed an " illusion of protection" - for siting plants in areas that are totally unsuited for operating nuclear reactors. These and other-issues related to emergency planning and evacuation have been raised by the County as contentions in the Shoreham opera-ting-license-proceedings and will be the subject of testimony

<Ye arttl b e Hon. Samuel J. Chilk February 26, 1980 Page 4 when the hearing phase of those proceedings begins.

4 The proposed amendments to the emergency response regulations - a direct response to Three Mile Island-related criticisms of a gross lack of governmental and utility emergency preparedness and evacuation capability - signify the NRC's out-ward acceptance of two general propositions. First, that emer-gency. planning must henceforth be viewed as equivalent to, rather than secondary to, siting and design in achieving public protection from severe radfation accidents. Second, that in order to achieve the NRC's primary mandate to protect public health and safety, it must be'in a position to know that off-

, site governmental evacuation plans have been reviewed and found adequate. While these goals are unquestionably sound in prin-ciple, it is not clear to the County that either the regulations themselves, or the assumptions upon which they are premised, will result in adequate protection of public health and safety from serious nuclear accidents.

] Assumption. Evacuation planning and preparedness can j be limited to a 10 mile emergency planning zone (EPZ) from a nuclear reactor for direct plume exposure.

1 I The 10 mile EPZ is an arbitrary and scientifically in-l supportable planning distance. It is based on recommendations' made in NUREG-0396 (" Planning Basis for the Development of 4 State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Plants", dated.12/78).

The Rogovin Report had this to say about the 10 mile planning i distance and NUREG-0396:

"However, we believe the NRC's proposed 10 mile planning zone is, by itself, inadequate

as an arbitrary cut-off point. Wider evacuation may clearly be necessary in some unlikely acci-i dent situations. And as Three Mile Island demon-strated, an ordered evacuation out to'10 miles would undoubtedly have effects to 20 miles-and-more. Therefore, at the very least, significant centers of_ population beyond 10 miles from the plant must be considered in the planning as well.

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Yet and $th Hon. Samuel J. Chilk February 26, 1980 Page 5 The selection of a 10-mile emergency planning

. zone by the NRC/ EPA study as a ballpark figure, and the adoption of this number by the NRC in its proposed new regulations, appear to us to have been relatively arbitrary. This should be regarded only as a starting point. The NRC/ EPA study developed estimates of probable maximum radiation doses from various projected accidents at different distances from'a plant. This work should be carried forward by the Commission into specific criteria that incorporate maximum dose levels, proba-bility factors and associated time limits.

Once the Commission has established criteria that define the level of risk, each site can then be examin-ed to develop a minimum evacuation planning zone, within which evacuation must be capable of being carried out in a safe fashion within the prescribed time period to pro-tect those threatened by a serious accident in a nearby plant. This zone will have to be determined by taking into account the same factors discusced above in connec-tion with siting, including population density, evacuation routes, prevailing wind patterns, and so on." (Emphasis supplied) l The Rogovin Report thus finds that the NRC simply has not performed the analysis and research, and developed the spe-cific criteria, necessary to produce a scientifically supportable emergenqy planning distance. Since this proposed planning distance is a central and vital part of the proposed rule changes, and is intended to_ provide a "ballpark" figure upon which State and local governments can rely in assessing the adequacy of their evacuation plans, it is obviously significant that the Rogovin Report finds.

the NRC's selection of the 10 EPZ to have been "relatively arbitrary".

The comments made on this issue at the January 15, 1980 public hearing session in New York City ~were highly critical of the selection of a 10 mile EPZ. Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtz-man stated that by picking a 10 mile limit, the NRC has avoided confronting the real hazards associated with a major radiation accident; she termed the regulation a " fig leaf" that offers no

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Hon. Samuel J. Chilk February 26, 1980 Page 6 protection to the public and recommended that the evacuation planning distance be expanded to a minimum of 50 miles. A representative of the New York Public Interest Research Group noted that the 10 mile limit arrived at in NUREG-0396-is in-defensible because: (1) the study assumes, without foundation, that the worse the accident, the less probable are the chances of occurrence; and (2) it provides no basis for estimating the probability of occurrence of various accidents and relies on the discredited Reactor Safety Study. PIRG recommended that nuclear power plants should not be sited within 100 miles of any major population center. Finally, a member of the Penn-sylvania TMI Commission indicated that contingency evacuation planning should extend out to 20 miles because the NRC has not come forward with or published any scientific basis for the 10 mile radiarl area.

Assumotion. The NRC can be counted on to effectively regulate the nuclear industry and strictly enforce its own regulatory criteria.

The Kemeny Commission Report was harshly critical of the NRC for allowing the TMI plant to disregard the nominal safety precautions required. Because the NRC requires so little discipline of the industry, the report concludes, the Three Mile Island plant was not equipped with adequate safety apparatus, its operators were untrained, its emergency procedures were defective, and its control room was simply not set up to cope with a major emergency. Metropolitan E,dison, the company  :

to which the NRC awarded a license to operate the plant, lacked the basic competence to do so safely. The President's Commission i also concluded that the NRC itself, when it was called upon to provide crisis management, performed with marked ineptitude.

The Commission's summary judgment was "With its present organ- ,

ization, staff, and attitudes, the NRC is unable to fulfill its responsibility for providing an acceptable level of safety for nuclear power plant.s". The Rogovin Report was no less critical of the NRC's perforn ance of its regulatory function:

a bt$y ased $tke Hon. Samuel J. Chilk February 26, 1980-Page 7 "We have found that the Nuclear Regulatory ,

Commission itself is not focused, organized, or ,

managed to meet today's.needs. In our opinion, the Commission is incapable, in its present con-figuration, of managing a comprehensive national safety program for existing nuclear power plants and those scheduled to come online in the next few years adequate to ensure public health and safety... The NRC, for its part, has virtually ignored the critical areas of operator, training, human factors engineering, utility management, and technical qualifications."

Although pursuant to a recently-executed Memorandum of Understanding between the NRC and FEMA, the latter agency will be assuming the lead role in developing a program to assess the adequacy of State and local emergency response plans, it is the NRC that has formal responsibility for making deter-minations on the overall state of emergency preparedness for -

issuance of licenses or' shutdown of operating reactors. Is there any reason to believe that the NRC will act more respon-sibly in the future than it has in the past in fulfilling its regulatory mandates? A review of some of the proposed emer-gency planning rule amendments themselves raise doubts that the NRC has seriously committed itself to transforming its role from that of a protector of and apologist for the industry it regulates to an aggressive protector of the public health and safety from an inherently dangerous technology.

Item: The proposed regulations do not state as a matter of policy that safe and effective evacuation at certain sites (for operating and proposed. nuclear power stations) will not be possible. It would seem important for the NRC to exoli-citly recognize this fact, and regulations on evacuation plans would appear to be the logical place to do it. The NRC is on ample notice that allowing plants to operate at certain sites will pose a grave risk to the public. The Moffit Report (H.R.#

96-413) concluded that even with better emergency planning, evacuation of a sufficient area around a number of U.S. nuclear power plants is not feasible. This same conclusion can be drawn from the recommendations of the NRC's own Siting Task.

Force Report.(NUREG-06235) which calls for drastic revision and tightening of reactor siting criteria. For example, Recommendation #3 of the Siting Report calls for a revision of 10 CFR, Part 100 criteria to require a reasonable assurance ,

beh arid $4Yee Hon. Samuel J. Chilk February 26, :.980 Page 8

-that interdiction measures are possible to limit groundwater contamination resulting from Class 9 accidents within the immediate vicinity of the site. The project manager for-Shoreham recently admitted during testimony given at court proceedings that the plant's foundation sits below several feet of groundwater and that the facility was not designed and constructed to account for or consider a Class 9, core meltdown accident. This circumstance alone would appear to eliminate Shoreham as an acceptable site for an operating nuclear reactor.

Item: The proposed rule a nendments set forth two al-ternatives or options for dealing with pre-operational and operational reactors that have not received NRC concurrence in State and local government emergency response plans. Al-ternative "A" would not automatically require deferral of license issuance or suspension of plant operation for lack of concurrence on the date specified in the rule if the appli-cant can demonstrate that the deficiencies in the plans are "not significant" for the plant in question, that "alterna-tive compensating actions" have been or will be taken promptly, or that there are " compelling reasons" for license issuance.

Alternative "B" provides that lack of NRC concurrence wotid automatically require plant shutdown unless an exemption is granted on the basis of the same criteria listed above fo.'

Alternative "A". Needless to say, the phrases "not signifi-cant", " alternative compensating actions" and " compelling reasons" are subject to extremely broad interpretation, Vest almost total discretion with the NRC to gut the purpose of the rule and invite agency abuse. If the promnigation !>f rules specifying the essential elements of State and local plans are seen as necessary to protect public health and safety then'a failure to achieve strict compliance should result in the deferral of the grant of an operating license or suspension of a licensed plant's operation. Period. The paramount considerations must be ability to evacuate and protection of public health and safety. The presence of gaping loopholes in the presently-drafted regulations leaves one with the impression that NRC may be,willing to consider other arguments in deciding whether or not to' halt the

> operation of plants located in areas with inadequate evacuation plans. Finally, hearings held to determine whether a suspended plant's licenne should be reinstated should be public hearings and should be held in.the affected locality.

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$ and be Hon. Samuel J. Chilk February 26, 1980 Page 9 Assumption. Utility management will have the ability to and can transmit accurate information in a timely fashion to the potentially affected public.

Assumption. Instrumentation will exist in every operating nuclear power plant to provide plant personnel with accurate, unambiguous information so that the reactor opera-tors can: (a) react and respond intelligently ~and correctly, and (b) accurately and in a timely manner inform plant manage-ment and all other officials of current plant conditions. ,

Assumption. Control room operators will be properly trained so that they will know how to react to the plant instru- ,

mentation and to recognize the nature and extent of the accident.

Assumption. All control rooms are designed for maxi-mum efficiency and with minimal possibilities for confusion and ambiguity of the nature-and extent of an accident.

Assumption. No political pressure will be applied to encourage any involved organization to downplay the severity of the accident.

'Ihe foregoing assumptions, and others not mentioned must prove out if the public is to be timely notified of an emergency. The proposed rule recognizes the need for speed of assessment and notifica-tion in the event of a serious radiation accident. Indeed, it states that "the capability will be provided to essentially complete alerting of the public within the plume exposure path-way EPZ within 11 minutes of the notification by the licensee of local and State officials." Various TMI reports make the County skeptical that licensees will have the capability to recognize, respond to and then timely notify the public of a serious radiological accident.

?Aedly amd MAe Hon. Samuel J. Chilk February 26, 1980 Page 10 The Kemeny Commission found that while the major factor that caused the serious accident at TMI was inappro- ,

priate operator action, many factors contributed to the action -

of the operators, such as deficiencies in their training, lack of clarity in their operating procedures, failure of organiza-tions to learn the proper lessons from previous incidents, and deficiencies in the design of the control room. The Commission noted that its analysis of the TMI accident raised the serious question of whether all electric utilities automatically have the necessary technical expertise and managerial capabilities for administering such a dangerous high technology plant.

Similarly, the Rogovin Report found that strong measures are needed to strengthen the onsite technical capability and management of utilities at reactor sites, including a new philos- ,

ophy and new programs for improved operator training; and new NRC requirements to ensure that qualified engineer supervisors with intimate knowledge of the plant will be part of the entire supervisory management chain on every reactor operating shift.

The factors which led to the " human failure" at TMI included, according to Rogovin, not only inadequate training but also poor operator procedures, a lack of diagnostic skill on the part of the entire site management group, misleading instrumentation, plant deficiencies, and poor control room design.

It is, of course, not presently known whether any of these deficiencies - which contribute directly to accident recog-nition and control, and ultimately, to timely notification by the licensee to appropriate agencies and to the public of emergency plant conditions - will be adequately addressed by the individual licensees or by the NRC. Here in Suffolk County there is cause for concern over issues of this nature because-the applicant for the proposed Shoreham facility has no experience v in-constructih6 or operating a nuclear power facility. This is the same applicant who, in the Jamesport construction license proceedings, insisted that the two mile emergency planning zone would. adequately protect Suffolk County residents, that the so-called Class 9 accident could not happen and therefore need not be considered in licensing proceedings, despite recommendations by the County of Suffolk and the'U.S. Department of the Interior to the contrary, and that the new discredited Reactor Safety

. Study provided a defensible basis for assuming that Class 9 accidents are improbable events. With regard to the confidence inspired by the NRC, it is relevent to note that it has never

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?Aedl amd YAe n, Samuel J. Chilk February 26, 1980 Page 11 refused a utility-applicant a license to operate a nuclear plant, irrespective of the level of technical proficiency and competency of that applicant. This record should be considered against the statement of Verner H. Condon, a high official of General Public Utilities, that its management was equal to er better than most utilities operating nuclear plants. ,

Assumption. Members of the public will not panic when informed that large releases of radioactive materials have es-caped from a nuclear power plant to the envircament.

. Assumption. Those residents living beyond the proposed 10 mile EPZ will not voluntarily evacuate their homes thereby complicating execution of the planned-for evacuation.

Assumption. State and local officials around every nuclear power plant either have or can develop the capability to carry out a large scale evacuation, including the capability to notify all endangered residents of the emergency situation within 15 minutes or accident notification by the licensee.

Assumption. There will be enough cars and buses to .

evacuate all who need evacuation. Traffic will not be snarled to the point of preventing movement. Accidents will not occur.

There will be no gas shortages. The weather will cooperate.

Necessary volunteer personnel will be available for duty.

Institutionalized individuals can be evacuated.

As all of the foregoing comments demonstrate there are many uncertainties, many " ifs", associated with carrying out a safe and effective evacuation following a serious radiolo-gical accident. Neither the County nor any other locality can responsibly afford to live with these " ifs". The risks are too great.

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4 b and $$ke Hon. Samuel J. Chilk

-February 26, 1980 Page 12 In the 1958 AEC Report " Theoretical Possibilities and Consequences of Major Accidents in Large Nuclear Power

. Plants" (WASH-740, issued 1957) it was concluded:

"For the three types of assumed accidents, the theoretical estimates indicated that personal damage might range from a lower limit of none in-jured or killed to an upper limit, in the worst case, of about 3410 killed and about 43,000 injured... .

Under adverse combinations of the conditions consi-dered, it was estimated that people could be killed .

c at distances up to 15 miles, and injured at distances of about 45 miles. Land contamination could extend for greater distances".

The update to WASH-740, an analysis made during the

'43 1969's, estimated anticipated deaths from a single nuclear-plant accident at 45,000, raised the estimate of anticipated injuries to 100,000 and calculated that property damage could range from $17 to $280 billion. Recent work on radioactivity dispersed from an accident of a nuclear power plant done by engineer Richard F. Webb, an expert on nuclear plant accidents and their consequences, projects a million deaths from one catastrophic accident. A report by Dr. Jan Beyea, to the President's Council on Environmental Quality finds that the number of (delayed) cancer deaths resulting from the postulated l hypothetical releases of the TMI site, beyond a 10 mile radial area from the damaged plant, would range from zero to about

> 23,000 for " typical" meteorological conditions. It also in-dicates that had the reactor core been in operation for many years rather than a few months, the larger inventory of long-lived radioactive cesium would result in the high end of'the range of estimated cancer deaths increasing to 60,000.

Human carnage would not be the only result of a large nuclear accident. A witness appearing for the applicant in the Jamesport licensing proceedings testified that a core melt accident at the facility would cause $17 billion in property. damage, contaminate the groundwater supply ~of Long Island - its sole source of drinking water - for decades, destroy the economy of Long Island, contaminate 3200 square miles of land and require ~ relocation of.the population living within.a 290 square mile area.

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PAedly and TlAe Hon. Samuel J. Chilk

' February 26, 1980 Page 13 ,

The stakes involved in reliance on the nuclear tech-nology are extraordinarily high. Should something go dras-tically wrong at Shoreham,.the County would have an unparalleled disaster on its hands. Post-Three Mile Island Reports of utility-ccmpetency, and NRC dedication to its mission, are hardly encoura-ging. As the NRC commendably proceeds with its efforts to shore up evacuation plans, a most obviously neglected area of nuclear plant licensing and regulation, the County will continue to closely monitor these efforts and to insist thac the safety of its residents be the paramount concern of the regulator and the utility-applicant.

Very truly yours, David J. Gilmartin Su .- County Attorney By: Irv ng Like Richard C. Eand Of Counsel IL/jg 1

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