ML18320A189

Nuscale Power, LLC Submittal of Changes to Final Safety Analysis Report, Tier 1 Section 2.5, Module Protection System and Safety Display and Indication System, Tier 2 Sections 14.2, Initial Plant Test Program, and 14.3, Certified Design ...

ML18320A189
Person / Time
Site:	NuScale
Issue date:	11/16/2018
From:	Rad Z NuScale
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of New Reactors
References
LO-1118-62962
Download: ML18320A189 (97)

Text

L0-1118-62962 November 16, 2018 Docket No.52-048 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738

SUBJECT:

NuScale Power, LLC Submittal of Changes to Final Safety Analysis Report, Tier 1 Section 2.5, "Module Protection System and Safety Display and Indication System ,"

Tier 2 Sections 14.2, "Initial Plant Test Program ," and 14.3, "Certified Design Material and Inspections, Tests , Analyses , and Acceptance Criteria"

REFERENCES:

Letter from NuScale Power, LLC to Nuclear Regulatory Commission , "NuScale Power, LLC Submittal of the Nu Scale Standard Plant Design Certification Application , Revision 1," dated March 15, 2018 (ML18086A090)

During an October 24 , 2018 Public meeting to discuss the NRC Staffs review of NuScale's Initial Test Program , NuScale Power, LLC (NuScale) discussed potential updates to Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Tier 2 Section 14.2. As a result of this discussion , NuScale changed Tier 1 Section 2.5 and Tier 2 Sections 14.2 and 14.3. The Enclosure to this letter provides a mark-up of the FSAR pages incorporating revisions to Tier 1 Section 2.5 and Tier 2 Sections 14.2 and 14.3, in redline/strikeout format. Nu Scale will include this change as part of a future revision to the NuScale Design Certification Application.

This letter makes no regulatory commitments or revisions to any existing regulatory commitments.

If you have any questions , please feel free to contact Carrie Fosaaen at 541-452-7126 or at cfosaaen@nuscalepower.com.

Sincerely, Zackary W. Rad Director, Regulatory Affairs NuScale Power, LLC Distribution: Samuel Lee , NRC , OWFN-8G9A Gregory Cranston , NRC , OWFN-8G9A Cayetano Santos , NRC , OWFN-8G9A NuScale Power, LLC 1100 NE Circle Blvd , Suite 200 Corvallis, Oregon 97330 Office 541.360-0500 Fax 541.207.3928 www.nuscalepower.com

LO-1118-62962 Page 2 of 2 11/15/18

Enclosure:

Changes to NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Sections Tier 1 Section 2.5, "Module Protection System and Safety Display and Indication System, Tier 2 Sections 14.2, Initial Plant Test Program, and 14.3, Certified Design Material and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria NuScale Power, LLC 1100 NE Circle Blvd., Suite 200 Corvallis, Oregon 97330 Office 541.360-0500 Fax 541.207.3928 www.nuscalepower.com

LO-1118-62962

Enclosure:

Changes to NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Sections Tier 1 Section 2.5, "Module Protection System and Safety Display and Indication System, Tier 2 Sections 14.2, Initial Plant Test Program, and 14.3, Certified Design Material and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria NuScale Power, LLC 1100 NE Circle Blvd., Suite 200 Corvallis, Oregon 97330 Office 541.360-0500 Fax 541.207.3928 www.nuscalepower.com

NuScale Tier 1 Module Protection System and Safety Display and Indication System Table 2.5-7: Module Protection System and Safety Display and Indication System Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (Continued)

No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria xiii. An analysis will be performed of xiii. The output documentation of the the output documentation of the MPS Testing Phase satisfies the System Testing Phase. requirements of the System Testing Phase.

xiv. An analysis will be performed of xiv. The output documentation of the the output documentation of the MPS Installation Phase satisfies the System Installation Phase. requirements of the System Installation Phase.

2. Protective measures are provided to A test will be performed on the access Protective measures restrict modification restrict modifications to the MPS control features associated with MPS to the MPS tunable parameters without tunable parametersNot used. tunable parametersNot used. proper configuration and authorizationNot used.

3. Physical separation exists between An inspection will be performed of i. Physical separation between the redundant separation groups the MPS Class 1E as-built redundant separation groups and and divisions of the MPS Class 1E instrumentation and control current- divisions of MPS Class 1E instrumentation and control carrying circuits. instrumentation and control current-current-carrying circuits, and carrying circuits is provided by a between Class 1E instrumentation minimum separation distance, or by and control current-carrying circuits barriers (where the minimum and non-Class 1E instrumentation separation distances cannot be and control current-carrying circuits. maintained), or by a combination of separation distance and barriers.

ii. Physical separation between MPS Class 1E instrumentation and control current-carrying circuits and non-Class 1E instrumentation and control current-carrying circuits is provided by a minimum separation distance, or by barriers (where the minimum separation distances cannot be maintained), or by a combination of separation distance and barriers.

4. Electrical isolation exists between An inspection will be performed of i. Class 1E electrical isolation devices the redundant separation groups the MPS Class 1E as-built are installed between redundant and divisions of the MPS Class 1E instrumentation and control circuits. separation groups and divisions of instrumentation and control circuits, MPS Class 1E instrumentation and and between Class 1E control circuits.

instrumentation and control circuits ii. Class 1E electrical isolation devices and non-Class 1E instrumentation are installed between MPS Class 1E and control circuits to prevent the instrumentation and control circuits propagation of credible electrical and non-Class 1E instrumentation faults. and control circuits.

5. Electrical isolation exists between i. A type test, analysis, or a i. The Class 1E circuit does not degrade the EDSS-MS subsystem non-Class combination of type test and below defined acceptable operating 1E circuits and connected MPS Class analysis will be performed of the levels when the non-Class 1E side of 1E circuits to prevent the Class 1E isolation devices. the isolation device is subjected to propagation of credible electrical the maximum credible voltage, faults. current transients, shorts, grounds, or open circuits.

ii. An inspection will be performed ii. Class 1E electrical isolation devices of the MPS Class 1E as-built are installed between the EDSS-MS circuits. Subsystem non-Class 1E circuits and connected MPS Class 1E circuits.

Tier 1 2.5-15 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Tier 1 Module Protection System and Safety Display and Indication System Table 2.5-7: Module Protection System and Safety Display and Indication System Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (Continued)

No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

6. Communications independence A test will be performed of the Class Communications independence between exists between redundant 1E MPSNot used. redundant separation groups and separation groups and divisions of divisions of the Class 1E MPS is the Class 1E MPSNot used. providedNot used.

7. Communications independence A test will be performed of the Class Communications independence between exists between the Class 1E MPS and 1E MPS. the Class 1E MPS and non-Class 1E digital non-Class 1E digital systems. systems is provided.

8. The MPS automatically initiates a A test will be performed of the A reactor trip signal is automatically reactor trip signalNot used. MPSNot used. initiated for each reactor trip function listed in Table 2.5-1Not used.

9. The MPS automatically initiates an A test will be performed of the An ESF actuation signal is automatically ESF actuation signalNot used. MPSNot used. initiated for each ESF function listed in Table 2.5-2Not used.

10. The MPS automatically actuates a A test will be performed of the The RTBs open upon an injection of a reactor trip.Not used. MPS.Not used. single simulated MPS reactor trip signal.Not used.

11. The MPS automatically actuates the A test will be performed of the The ESF equipment automatically engineered safety feature MPS.Not used. actuates to perform its safety-related equipment.Not used. function listed in Table 2.5-2 upon an injection of a single simulated MPS signal.Not used.

12. The MPS manually actuates a A test will be performed of the The RTBs open when a reactor trip is reactor trip.Not used. MPS.Not used. manually initiated from the main control room.Not used.

13. The MPS manually actuates the ESF A test will be performed of the MPS. The MPS actuates the ESF equipment to equipment. perform its safety-related function listed in Table 2.5-3Table 2.5-2 when manually initiated.

14. The reactor trip logic fails to a safe A test will be performed of the Loss of electrical power in a separation state such that loss of electrical MPS.Not used. group results in a trip state for that power to a MPS separation group separation group.Not used.

results in a trip state for that separation group.Not used.

15. The ESFs logic fails to a safe state A test will be performed of the Loss of electrical power in a separation such that loss of electrical power to MPS.Not used. group results in an actuation state for a MPS separation group results in a that separation group.Not used.

predefined safe state for that separation group.Not used.

Tier 1 2.5-16 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Tier 1 Module Protection System and Safety Display and Indication System Table 2.5-7: Module Protection System and Safety Display and Indication System Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (Continued)

No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

16. An MPS signal once initiated A test will be performed of the MPS i. Upon initiation of a real or simulated (automatically or manually), results reactor trip and engineered safety MPS reactor trip signal listed in in an intended sequence of features signals. Table 2.5-1, the RTBs open, and the protective actions that continue RTBs do not automatically close when until completion, and requires the MPS reactor trip signal clears.

deliberate operator action in order ii. Upon initiation of a real or simulated to return the safety systems to MPS engineered safety feature normal. actuation signal listed in Table 2.5-2, the ESF equipment actuates to perform its safety-related function and continues to maintain its safety-related position and perform its safety-related function when the MPS engineered safety feature actuation signal clears.

17. The MPS response times from A test will be performed of the MPS. The MPS reactor trip functions listed in sensor output through equipment Table 2.5-1 and ESFs functions listed in actuation for the reactor trip Table 2.5-2 have response times that are functions and ESF functions are less less than or equal to the design basis than or equal to the value required safety analysis response time to satisfy the design basis safety assumptions.

analysis response time assumptions.

18. The MPS interlocks function as A test will be performed of the The MPS interlocks listed in Table 2.5-4 required when associated MPS.Not used. automatically establish an operating conditions are met.Not used. bypass for the specified reactor trip of ESF actuations when the interlock condition is met. The operating bypass is automatically removed when the interlock condition is no longer satisfied.Not used.

19. The MPS permissives function as A test will be performed of the The MPS permissives listed in Table 2.5-4 required when associated MPS.Not used. allows the manual bypass of the specified conditions are met.Not used. reactor trip or ESF actuations when the permissive condition is met. The operating bypass is automatically removed when the permissive condition is no longer satisfied.Not used.

20. The MPS overrides function as A test will be performed of the The MPS overrides listed in Table 2.5-4 required when associated MPS.Not used. are established when the manual conditions are met.Not used. override switch is active and RT-1 interlock is established. The Override switch must be manually taken out of Override when the Override, O-1, is no longer needed.Not used.

21. The MPS is capable of performing its A test will be performed of the With a safety function module out of safety-related functions when one MPS.Not used. service switch activated, the safety of its protection channels is placed function is placed in trip or bypass based in maintenance bypass.Not used. on the position of the safety function module trip/bypass switch.Not used.

22. MPS operational bypasses are A test will be performed of the MPS. Each operational MPS manual or indicated in the MCR. automatic bypass is indicated in the MCR.

23. MPS maintenance bypasses are A test will be performed of the MPS. Each maintenance bypass is indicated in indicated in the MCR. the MCR.

Tier 1 2.5-17 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Tier 1 Module Protection System and Safety Display and Indication System Table 2.5-7: Module Protection System and Safety Display and Indication System Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (Continued)

No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

24. The MPS self-test features detect A test will be performed of the MPS. A report exists and concludes that:

faults in the system and provide an

• Self-testing features verify that faults alarm in the main control room. requiring detection are detected.

• Self-testing features verify that upon detection, the system responds according to the type of fault.

• Self-testing features verify that faults are detected and responded within a sufficient timeframe to ensure safety function is not lost.

• The presence and type of fault is indicated by the MPS alarms and displays.

25. The PAM Type B and Type C displays An inspection will be performed for The PAM Type B and Type C displays are indicated on the SDIS displays in the ability to retrieve the as-built PAM listed in Table 2.5-5 are retrieved and the MCR. Type B and Type C displays on the displayed on the SDIS displays in the SDIS displays in the MCR. MCR.

26. The controls located on the A test will be performed of the The IHAs controls provided on the operator workstations in the MCR controls on the operator workstations operator workstations in the MCR operate to perform IHAs. in the MCR. perform the functions listed in Table 2.5-6.

27. The RTBs are installed and arranged An inspection will be performed of The RTBs have the proper connections for in order to successfully accomplish the as-built RTBs, including the the shunt and undervoltage trip the reactor trip function under connections for the shunt and mechanisms and auxiliary contacts, and design conditions.Not used. undervoltage trip mechanism and are arranged as shown in Figure 2.5-2 to auxiliary contacts.Not used. successfully accomplish the reactor trip function.Not used.

28. Two of the four separation groups An inspection will be performed of Separation groups A & C and Division I of and one of the two divisions of RTS the as-built MPS.Not used. RTS and ESFAS utilize a different and ESFAS will utilize a different programmable technology from programmable technology.Not separation groups B & D and Division II of used. RTS and ESFAS.Not used.

29. The MCR isolation switches that An inspection will be performed of The MCR isolation switches are located in isolate the manual MCR switches the location of the as-built MCR the remote shutdown station.Not used.

from MPS in case of a fire in the MCR isolation switches.Not used.

are located in the remote shutdown station.Not used.

Tier 1 2.5-18 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-2: Pool Cleanup System Test # 2 (Continued)

System Level Test #2-1 Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria

i. Verify the PCUS demineralizers are i. Place the SFPCS in service to flow i. a. The MCR indication for SFPCS protected against high water through a pool cleanup filter and a pump flow satisfies the design temperatureVerify the SFPCS and the demineralizer and return flow to the flow rate specified in Table RPCS provide design flow rate to the spent fuel pool. 9.1.3-1a UHS when aligned for PCUS water AND b. The MCR indication for RPCS cleanup. Place the RPCS in service to flow pump flow satisfies the design ii. Verify the SFPCS and the RPCS through a different pool cleanup flow rate specified in Table provide design flow rate to the UHS filter and demineralizer and return 9.1.3-1b following a PCUS isolation. flow to the reactor pool. ii. a. SFPCS flow and RPCS flow to the ii. Simulate a high water temperature pool cleanup filters and upstream of one of the pool cleanup demineralizers stop.

filters. b. The SFPCS flow is bypassed to the spent fuel pool.

c. The RPCS cooling flow is bypassed to the reactor pool.

d. The MCR indication for SFPCS pump flow satisfies the design flow rate specified in Table 9.1.3-1a

e. The MCR indication for RPCS pump flow satisfies the design flow rate specified in Table 9.1.3-1b Tier 2 14.2-23 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-4: Pool Surge Control System Test # 4 Preoperational test is required to be performed once.

The pool surge control system (PSCS) is described in Section 9.1.3.2.4 and the function verified by this test is:

System Function System Function Categorization Function Verified by Test #

The PSCS supports the UHS by providing nonsafety-related Test #4-1 surge control for UHS operations.

The PSCS supports the UHS by providing nonsafety-related Test #4-1 a reactor inspection dry dock makeup and drain capability.

Prerequisites

i. Verify an instrument calibration has been completed, with approved records and within all calibration due dates, for all instruments required to perform this test.

ii. For system level test #4-1, the drydock gate can be open or closed.

Component Level Tests Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria

i. Verify each PSCS remotely-operated Operate each valve from the MCR and MCR display and local, visual valve can be operated remotely. local control panel (if design has local observation indicate each valve fully valve control). opens and fully closes.

ii. Verify each PSCS air-operated valve Place each valve in its non-safe position. MCR display and local, visual fails to its safe position on loss of air. Isolate and vent air to the valve. observation indicate each valve fails to its safe position.

iii. Verify each PSCS air-operated valve Place each valve in its non-safe position. MCR display and local, visual fails to its safe position on loss of Isolate electrical power to each air- observation indicate each valve fails to electrical power to its solenoid. operated valve. its safe position.

iv. Verify each PSCS pump can be Stop and start each pump from the MCR. MCR display and local, visual started and stopped remotely. observation indicate each pump starts and stops.

v. Verify the PSCS automatically Initiate a real or simulated high radiation i. The PSCS tank inlet isolation valve is responds to mitigate a release of signal in the PSCS tank vent line. closed.

radioactivity. ii. The PSCS tank outlet isolation valve is closed.

[ITAAC 03.09.10]

vi. Verify a local grab sample can be Place the system in service to allow flow A local grab sample is successfully obtained from a PSCS grab sample through the grab sampling device. obtained.

device indicated on the PSC piping and instrumentation diagram.

vii. Verify each PSCS instrument is Initiate a single real or simulated The instrument signal is displayed on an available on an MCS or PCS display. instrument signal from each PSCS MCS or PCS display, or is recorded by the (Test not required if the instrument transmitter. applicable control system historian.

calibration verified the MCS or PCS display.)

System Level Test #4-1 Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria Verify PSCS automatic control for dry Align the PSCS for fill and drain of the dry i. a. Pump is stopped and return line dock fill and drain. dock. to pool surge control tank Fill the dry dock to a level that allows isolation valve is closed.

operation of the reactor inspection dry b. Pump is stopped and return line dock evacuation pump. to PSCS tank isolation valve is

i. Start a PSCS pump and simulate the closed.

following PSCS conditions: c. PSCS tank main discharge line

a. Dry dock low level isolation valve is closed.

b. PSC tank high level

c. High dry dock level Tier 2 14.2-25 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-5: Ultimate Heat Sink Test # 5 There are no preoperational tests for the UHS.

The UHS is described in Section 9.2.5. The only active functions for the UHS are to provide PAM Type D instrument signals to the safety display and indication system (SDIS). Refer to Table 14.2-66: Safety Display and Indication test

1. 66 for testing of PAM Type D displays.

System Function System Function Categorization Function Verified by Test #

NoneThe UHS supports the DHRS by N/Asafety-related N/AReactor Trip from 100 Percent accepting the heat from the DHR heat Power Test # 104 exchanger.

Prerequisites:

N/A Component Level Tests None Tier 2 14.2-26 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-8: Chilled Water System Test # 8 Preoperational test is required to be performed once.

The chilled water system (CHWS) is described in Section 9.2.8 and the function verified by this test is:

System Function System Function Categorization Function Verified by Test #

The CHWS supports the following nonsafety-related Test #8-1 systems by providing cooling water: Test #8-2

• Reactor Building HVAC system (RBVS)

• normal control room HVAC system (CRVS)

• Radioactive Waste Building HVAC system (RWBVS)

• liquid radioactive waste system (LRWS)

• gaseous radioactive waste system (GRWS)

Prerequisites

i. Verify an instrument calibration has been completed, with approved records and within all calibration due dates, for all instruments required to perform this test.

ii. Verify a CHWS flow balance has been performed.

iii. Verify a pump curve test has been completed for the CHWS pumps.

iv. Chiller performance has been verified by either an Air Conditioning, Heating, and Refrigeration Institute (AHRI) certification or a chiller performance capacity test witnessed at the factory with all test documentation provided.

Component Level Tests Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria

i. Verify each CHWS remotely-operated Operate each valve from the MCR and MCR display and local, visual valve can be operated remotely. local control panel (if design has local observation indicate each valve fully valve control). opens and fully closes.

ii. Verify each CHWS air-operated valve Place each valve in its non-safe position. MCR display and local, visual fails to its safe position on loss of air. Isolate and vent air to the valve. observation indicate each valve fails to its safe position.

iii. Verify each CHWS air-operated valve Place each valve in its non-safe position. MCR display and local, visual fails to its safe position on loss of Isolate electrical power to each air- observation indicate each valve fails to electrical power to its solenoid. operated valve. its safe position.

iv. Verify the speed of each CHWS Align the CHWS to provide a flow path to MCR display indicates the speed of each variable-speed pump can be operate a selected pump. obtains both minimum and maximum manually controlled. Vary the CHWS pump speed from pump speeds.

minimum to maximum from the MCR. Audible and visible water hammer are not observed when the pump starts.

v. Verify automatic operation of CHWS Align the CHWS to allow for chiller MCR display and local, visual pumps and CHWS chiller to protect operation. Place a pump in service. observation indicate the following:

plant equipment. Initiate a simulated start signal for the i. a. Operating pump stops following system conditions. b. Operating chiller stops

i. Loss of chilled water flow. ii. Operating chiller stops ii. Loss of SCWS cooling flow to the operating chiller.

vi. Verify each CHWS instrument is Initiate a single real or simulated The instrument signal is displayed on an available on an MCS or PCS display. instrument signal from each CHWS MCS or PCS display, or is recorded by the (Test not required if the instrument transmitter. applicable control system historian.

calibration verified the MCS or PCS display.)

Tier 2 14.2-30 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-8: Chilled Water System Test # 8 (Continued)

System Level Test #8-1 Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria Verify CHWS cooling water flow rates i. Align the CHWS to provide flow to all The CHWS cooling flow to each heat satisfy design. heat exchangers cooled by the exchanger under test meets the CHWSRVS chiller: minimum flow rate acceptance criteria RBVS air handling units contained in the CHWS flow balance RBVS fan coil units report.

CRVS air handling units CRVS fan coil units RWBVS air handling units RWBVS fan coil units LRW degasifier condenser GRWS gas coolers ii. Open all CHWS flow control valves.

System Level Test #8-2 Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria Verify CHWS cooling water flow rates i. Align the CHWS to provide flow to The CRVS standby CHWS cooling flow to satisfy design flow. the CRVS air handling units and the each heat exchanger meets the CRVS fan coil units cooled by the minimum flow rate acceptance criteria CHWSRVS standby chiller. contained in the CHWS flow balance ii. Open all CHWS flow control valves. report.

Tier 2 14.2-31 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-10: Circulating Water System Test # 10 This preoperational test is required to be performed once for each circulating water subsystem.

The circulating water system (CWS) is described in Section 10.4.5 and the function verified by this test and power ascension testing is:

System Function System Function Categorization Function Verified by Test #

The utility water system (UWS) supports nonsafety-related Component-Level Test vi.

the CWS by providing makeup water to Ramp Change in Load Demand maintain water level in the CWS cooling Test #100 tower basins.

The CWS function verified by another test is:

System Function System Function Categorization Function Verified by Test #

The CWS supports the FWS by removing nonsafety-related CAR Test #32-1 heat from the main condenser. Ramp Change in Load Demand Test #100 100 Percent Load Rejection Test #103 Prerequisites Verify an instrument calibration has been completed, with approved records and within all calibration due dates, for all instruments required to perform this test.

Component Level Tests: NPM #1 (#7)

The minimum inventory of pumps, fans and valves tested for NPM #1 (#7) is that inventory required for 6A (6B) CWS operation to support operation of NPM #1 (#7). The testing will continue until all 6A (6B) CWS equipment is tested.

Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria

i. Verify each CWS remotely-operated Operate each valve from the MCR and MCR display and local, visual valve can be operated remotely. local control panel (if design has local observation indicate each valve fully valve control). opens and fully closes.

ii. Verify each CWS air-operated valve Place each valve in its non-safe position. MCR display and local, visual fails to its safe position on loss of air. Isolate and vent air to the valve. observation indicate each valve fails to its safe position.

iii. Verify each CWS air-operated valve Place each valve in its non-safe position. MCR display and local, visual fails to its safe position on loss of Isolate electrical power to each air- observation indicate each valve fails to electrical power to its solenoid. operated valve. its safe position.

iv. Verify each CWS cooling tower fan Align the CWS to allow for cooling tower MCR display and local, visual can be started and stopped remotely fan operation. observation indicate each cooling tower Stop and start each cooling tower fan fan starts and stops.

from the MCR.

v. Verify each CWS pump can be started Align the CWS to allow for pump i. MCR display and local, visual and stopped remotely. operation. observation indicate each pump Stop and start each pump from the MCR. starts and stops.

ii. Audible and visible water hammer are not observed when the pump starts.

iii. CWS pump cavitation is not observed.

iv. Cooling towers do not experience flow surge or overflow.

vi. Verify automatic operation of the i. Initiate a cooling tower basin low MCR displays and local, visual CWS cooling tower basin level level signal. observation verifies the following:

control valve to maintain CWS ii. Initiate a cooling tower basin high i. The cooling tower basin level cooling tower basin level. level signal. control valve is open.

ii. The cooling tower basin level control valve is closed.

Tier 2 14.2-34 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-11: Site Cooling Water System Test # 11 Preoperational test is required to be performed for each NPM.

The site cooling water system (SCWS) is described in Section 9.2.7 and 11.5.2.2.13 and the functions verified by this test and power ascension testing are:

System Function System Function Categorization Function Verified by Test #

The SCWS supports the following nonsafety-related Test #11-1 systems by providing cooling water.

• turbine generator system (TGS)

• RCCWS

• condenser air removal system (CARS)

• PSS

• CHWS

• instrument air system (IAS)

• SFPCS

• RPCS

• FWS

• balance-of-plant drain system (BPDS)

The UWS supports the SCWS by nonsafety-related Component-Level Test vii.

providing makeup water to maintain Ramp Change in Load Demand water level in the SCWS cooling tower Test #100 basins.

Prerequisites

i. Verify an instrument calibration has been completed, with approved records and within all calibration due dates, for all instruments required to perform this test.

ii. Verify an SCWS flow balance has been performed and the system flow balance records have been approved.

iii. Verify a pump curve test has been completed and approved for the SCWS pumps.

Component Level Tests Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria

i. Verify each SCWS remotely-operated Operate each valve from the MCR and MCR display and local, visual valve can be operated remotely. local control panel (if design has local observation indicate each valve fully valve control). opens and fully closes.

ii. Verify each SCWS air-operated valve Place each valve in its non-safe position. MCR display and local, visual fails to its safe position on loss of air. Isolate and vent air to the valve. observation indicate each valve fails to its safe position.

iii. Verify each SCWS air-operated valve Place each valve in its non-safe position. MCR display and local, visual fails to its safe position on loss of Isolate electrical power to each air- observation indicate each valve fails to electrical power to its solenoid. operated valve. its safe position.

iv. Verify each SCWS cooling tower fan Align the SCWS to allow for cooling MCR display and local, visual can be started and stopped remotely. tower fan operation. observation indicate each cooling tower Stop and start each cooling tower fan fan starts and stops.

from the MCR.

v. Verify each SCWS pump can be Align the SCWS to allow for pump MCR display and local, visual started and stopped remotely. operation. observation indicate each pump starts Stop and start each pump from the MCR. and stops.

Audible and visible water hammer are not observed when the pump starts.

vi. Verify the SCWS standby pump Align the SCWS to allow for pump MCR display and local, visual automatically starts to protect plant operation. Place a pump in service. observation indicate the standby pump equipment. Initiate a simulated start signal for the discharge valve opens to a throttled following system conditions. position, the pump starts, and then the

i. Low pump header pressure signal. discharge valve fully opens.

ii. Low pump header flow signal. Audible and visible water hammer are not observed when the pump starts.

Tier 2 14.2-36 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-13: Utility Water System Test # 13 Preoperational test is required to be performed once.

The UWS is described in Section 9.2.9 and the functions verified by this test and power ascension testing are:

System Function System Function Categorization Function Verified by Test #

1. The UWS supports the circulating nonsafety-related CWS Test #10 Component-Level Test vi.

water system by providing makeup Ramp Change in Load Demand water to maintain water level in the Test #100 CW system cooling tower basins.

2. The UWS supports the SCWS by nonsafety related SCWS Test #11 Component-Level Test providing makeup water to maintain vii.

water level in the SCWS cooling Ramp Change in Load Demand tower basins. Test #100

3. The UWS supports the following nonsafety-related component-level tests systems by providing makeup water:

-demineralized water system (DWS)

-fire protection system (FPS)

-PWS

-CHWS

-Reactor Building (RXB)

-Turbine Generator Building (TGB)

-Radioactive Waste Building (RWB)

-Annex Building (ANB)

-Control Building (CRB)

Prerequisites

i. Verify an instrument calibration has been completed, with approved records and within all calibration due dates, for all instruments required to perform this test.

ii. Verify a pump curve test has been completed for the UWS pumps.

Component Level Tests Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria

i. Verify each UWS remotely-operated Operate each valve from the MCR and MCR display and local, visual valve can be operated remotely. local control panel (if design has local observation indicate each valve fully valve control). opens and fully closes.

ii. Verify each UWS air-operated valve Place each valve in its non-safe position. MCR display and local, visual fails to its safe position on loss of air. Isolate and vent air to the valve. observation indicate each valve fails to its safe position.

iii. Verify each UWS air-operated valve Place each valve in its non-safe position. MCR display and local, visual fails to its safe position on loss of Isolate electrical power to each air- observation indicate each valve fails to electrical power to its solenoid. operated valve. its safe position.

iv. Verify each UWS pump can be started Align the UWS to allow for pump MCR display and local, visual and stopped remotely. operation. observation indicate each pump starts Stop and start each pump from the MCR. and stops.

Audible and visible water hammer are not observed when the pump starts.

v. Verify UWS flow capability by Align the UWS to allow for pump MCR display and local, visual automatic start of each UWS pump operation. Place a pump in service. observation indicate the standby pump while in standby mode. Initiate a simulated pump trip. starts.

Audible and visible water hammer are not observed when the pump starts.

vi. Verify utility water system (UWS) Align the UWS to allow for pump MCR display and local, visual pumps automatically stops to protect operation. Place a pump in service. observation indicate each pump stops.

plant equipment. Initiate a simulated UWS storage tank low level signal.

Tier 2 14.2-39 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-14: Demineralized Water System Test # 14 Preoperational test is required to be performed once.

The DWS is described in Section 9.2.3 and 11.5.2.2.16 and the function verified by this test is:

System Function System Function Categorization Function Verified by Test #

The DWS supports the following systems nonsafety-related component-level tests by providing coolingmakeup water.

• CVCS

• boron addition system (BAS)

• liquid radioactive waste system (LRWS)

• SFPCS

• RCCWS

• process sampling system (PSS)

• FWS

• ABS

• CRVS

• CARS

• CES

• RBVS

• RWBVS

• CPS

• PCUS

• annex building (ANB)

• balance of plant drains (BPDS)

• turbine building HVAC system (TBVS)

• annex building HVAC system

• reactor building (RXB)

• radioactive waste building (RWB)

• feedwater treatment system (FWTS)

Prerequisites

i. Verify an instrument calibration has been completed, with approved records and within all calibration due dates, for all instruments required to perform this test.

ii. Verify a pump curve test has been completed for the DWS pumps.

Component Level Tests Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria

i. Verify each DWS remotely-operated Operate each valve from the MCR and MCR display and local, visual valve can be operated remotely. local control panel (if design has local observation indicate each valve fully valve control) opens and fully closes.

ii. Verify each DWS air-operated valve Place each valve in its non-safe position. MCR display and local, visual fails to its safe position on loss of air. Isolate and vent air to the valve. observation indicate each valve fails to its safe position.

iii. Verify each DWS air-operated valve Place each valve in its non-safe position. MCR display and local, visual fails to its safe position on loss of Isolate electrical power to each air- observation indicate each valve fails to electrical power to its solenoid. operated valve. its safe position.

iv. Verify the DWS pump can be started Align the DWS to allow for pump MCR display and local, visual and stopped remotely. operation. observation indicate each pump starts Stop and start each pump from the MCR. and stops.

Audible and visible water hammer are not observed when the pump starts.

v. Verify DWS flow capability by Align the DWS to allow for pump MCR display and local, visual automatic start of each DWS pump operation. Place a pump in service. observation indicate the standby pump while in standby mode. Initiate a simulated pump trip. starts.

Audible and visible water hammer are not observed when the pump starts.

Tier 2 14.2-41 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-18: Control Room Habitability System Test # 18 Preoperational test is required to be performed once.

The control room habitability system (CRHS) is described in Section 6.4 and the functions verified by this test are:

System Function System Function Categorization Function Verified by Test #

1. The CRHS supports the Control nonsafety-related Test #18-1 Building (CRB) by providing clean Test #18-2 breathing air to the control room Test #18-3 envelope (CRE) and maintaining a positive control room pressure during high radiation or loss of offsite power conditions.

2. The CRHS supports the CRB by nonsafety-related Test #18-1 providing high pressure, clean Test #18-2 breathing air in air bottles for use.

3. The CRVS supports the CRB by nonsafety-related Test #18-1 providing isolation of the CRE from the surrounding areas and outside environment via isolation dampers.

4. The plant protection system (PPS) nonsafety-related Test #18-1 supports the CRHS by providing actuation and control signals.

5. The CRVS supports the CRB by nonsafety-related Test #18-1 providing isolation of the CRE from the surrounding areas and outside environment via isolation dampers.

6. The CRVS supports the PPS by nonsafety-related Test #18-1 providing instrument information signals relating to isolation of the CRE and activation of the CRH system.

7. The CRVS supports the CRB by nonsafety-related Test #18-1 (radiation detection) isolating the CRVS outside air intake CRVS Test #19-3 (smoke/toxic gas) when radiation is detected downstream of the charcoal filtration unit.from the environment and operating CRVS in recirculation mode to prevent exposure to smoke and toxic gas, or when radiation is detected downstream of the charcoal filtration unit.

8. The PPS supports the CRVS by nonsafety-related Test #18-1 providing actuation and control signals to the CRE isolation dampers.

Prerequisites

i. Verify an instrument calibration has been completed, with approved records and within all calibration due dates, for all instruments required to perform this test.

ii. Verify a CRHS air balance has been performed and the CRHS air balance records have been approved. [This prerequisite is not required for component-level tests.]

iii. Verify CRHS air bottlers are pressurized to their design working pressure. [This prerequisite is not required for component-level tests.]

iv. Component Level Tests i. and ii. must be performed under preoperational test conditions that approximate design-basis temperature, differential pressure, and flow conditions to the extent practicable, consistent with preoperational test limitations.

Tier 2 14.2-47 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-18: Control Room Habitability System Test # 18 (Continued)

Component Level Tests Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria

i. Verify each CRHS remotely-operated Place the CRHS air bottles in service. i. MCR workstation display, safety valve can be operated remotely. Place CRVS in service to supply air to the display instrument display and local, CRE. visual observation indicate each Operate each valve from the MCR. valve fully opens and fully closes under preoperational temperature, differential pressure, and flow conditions.

[ITAAC 03.01.02]

ii. Verify each CRHS solenoid-operated Place the CRHS air bottles in service. i. MCR display, safety display valve fails to its safe position on loss Place CRVS in service to supply air to the instrument display and local, visual of electrical power to its solenoid. CRE. observation indicate each valve fails

i. Place each valve in its non-safe open under preoperational position. Isolate electrical power to temperature, differential pressure, its solenoid. and flow conditions.

[ITAAC 03.01.03]

iii. Verify each CRHS instrument is Initiate a single real or simulated The instrument signal is displayed on an available on an MCS or PCS display. instrument signal from each CRHS MCS or PCS display, or is recorded by the (Test not required if the instrument transmitter. applicable control system historian.

calibration verified the MCS or PCS display.)

System Level Test #18-1 Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria

i. Verify PPS provides actuation signals Place the CRVS in automatic operation. i. MCR workstation display and local, for CRHS and CRVS. Place the CRHS air bottles in service. visual observation indicate the ii. CRHS realigns to provide breathable Place CRVS in service to supply air to the following:

air to the CRE under accident CRE. ia. The CRVS outside air damper conditions. Start CRVS filter unit. closes.

iii. CRVS realigns to isolate outside air Initiate each of the following real or iib. The CRVS filter unit fan stops.

dampers and CRE under accident simulated CRHS actuation signals: iiic. The CRVS control room conditions.

• High radiation signal downstream of envelope isolation dampers Verify the CRHS and the CRVS the CRVS filter unit close.

automatically respond to provide

• Loss of AC power. ivd. The CRHS air supply isolation breathable air to the CRE under accident valves open.

conditions. ve. CRHS pressure relief isolation valves open.

vif. CRVS air handling unit stops.

viig. CRVSE general exhaust fan stops.

viiih. CRVS battery room exhaust fan stops.

[ITAAC 03.09.02]

(items i.a. through i.e.v)

i. PPS generates alarms in the MCR for the following:

a. High radiation

b. Loss of AC power.

Tier 2 14.2-48 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-19: Normal Control Room HVAC System Test # 19 Preoperational test is required to be performed once.

The CRVS is described in Sections 6.4.3.2, 9.4.1, and 11.5.2.2.1, and the functions verified by this test are:

System Function System Function Categorization Function Verified by Test #

1. The CRVS supports the CRB by nonsafety-related Test #19-1 providing cooling, heating and Test #19-2 humidity control to maintain a suitable environment for the safety and comfort of plant personnel.

2. The CRVS supports the systems nonsafety-related Test #19-1 located in the CRB by providing Test #19-2 cooling, heating and humidity control to maintain a suitable environment for the operation of system components.

3. The CRVS supports the CRB by nonsafety-related Test #19-1Test #19-3 (smoke/toxic gas) maintaining the CRB at a positive CRHS Test #18-1 (radiation) pressure with respect to adjacent areas during normal operation.The CRVS supports the CRB by isolating the CRVS outside air intake from the environment and operating the CRVS in recirculation mode to prevent exposure to smoke and toxic gas, or when radiation is detected downstream of the charcoal filtration unit.

4. The CRVS supports the CRB by nonsafety-related Test #19-1 (CRB positive pressure) maintaining the CRB at a positive RBVS Test #20-1 (RXB negative pressure) ambient pressure relative to the Reactor Building (RXB) and the outside atmosphere to control the ingress of potentially airborne radioactivity from the RXB or the outside atmosphere to the CRB.

5. The PPS supports the CRVS by nonsafety-related Test #19-3 providing actuation and control signals to the outside air isolation dampers.

6. The CRVS supports the CRB by nonsafety-related Test #19-4 protecting personnel from exposure to radiation during a design basis accident, when power is available, by removing radioactive contamination from outside air via charcoal filtration, as required by radiation dose analyses.

The CRVS functions verified by other tests are:

The CRVS supports the CRB by isolating nonsafety-related CRHS Test #18-1 the CRVS outside air intake when radiation is detected downstream of the charcoal filtration unit.

The CRVS supports the CRB by providing nonsafety-related CRHS Test #18-1 isolation of the CRE from the surrounding areas and outside environment via isolation dampers.

Tier 2 14.2-50 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-19: Normal Control Room HVAC System Test # 19 (Continued)

The CRVS supports the PPS by providing nonsafety-related CRHS Test #18-1 instrument information signals relating to isolation of the CRE and activation of the CRHS.

Prerequisites

i. Verify an instrument calibration has been completed, with approved records and within all calibration due dates, for all instruments required to perform this test.

ii. Verify a CRVS air balance has been performed and the CRVS air balance records have been approved. [This prerequisite is not required for component-level tests.]

iii. Verify CRVS high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) and charcoal adsorbers have been installed and tested and the test records have been approved. [This prerequisite is not required for component-level tests.]

iv. Verify CRVS control room isolation dampers have been leak tested and the test records have been approved. [This prerequisite is not required for component-level tests.]

v. Component Level Tests x. and xi. must be performed under preoperational test conditions that approximate design-basis temperature, differential pressure, and flow conditions to the extent practicable, consistent with preoperational test limitations.

Component Level Tests Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria

i. Verify each CRVS remotely-operated Operate each damper from the MCR and MCR display and local, visual damper can be operated remotely. local control panel (if design has local observation indicate each damper fully damper control). opens and fully closes.

ii. Verify each CRVS air-operated Place each damper in its non-safe MCR display and local, visual damper fails to its safe position on position. Isolate and vent air to the observation indicate each damper fails loss of air. damper. to its safe position.

iii. Verify each CRVS air-operated Place each damper in its non-safe MCR display and local, visual damper fails to its safe position on position. Isolate electrical power to its observation indicate each damper fails loss of electrical power to its solenoid. to its safe position.

solenoid.

iv. Verify CRVS dampers automatically Open each damper actuated by a smoke MCR display and local, visual close on associated smoke or fire or fire signal. Initiate an alarm signal for observation indicate each damper signals. each damper. closes.

v. Verify each required CRVS fan stops Initiate an alarm signal for each fan. MCR display and local, visual on actuation of its associated fire or observation indicate each fan stops.

smoke alarm.

vi. Verify each CRVS pressurization fan Initiate an alarm signal for each fan. MCR display and local, visual starts automatically on the actuation observation indicate each pressurization of its associated fire or smoke alarm. fan starts.

vii. Verify the fan speed of each CRVS Vary the speed of each fan from the MCR MCR display indicates the speed of each variable-speed fan can be manually and local control panel (if design has fan varies from minimum to maximum controlled. local fan control). speed.

viii. Verify the standby CRVS main supply Place an AHU in service. Place the MCR display and local, visual air handling unit (AHU) starts standby AHU in automatic control. Stop observation indicate the standby AHU automatically on the stop of the the operating AHU. starts.

operating CRVS main supply AHU.

ix. Verify each standby CRVS fan coil unit Place an FCU in service. Place the standby MCR display and local, visual (FCU) starts automatically on the stop FCU in automatic control. Stop the observation indicate the standby FCU of the operating CRVS fan coil unit. operating FCU. starts.

x. Verify each CRVS control room Place each damper in its non-safe Each CRVS control room envelope envelope isolation damper fails to its position. Isolate and vent air to the isolation damper fails to its closed safe position on loss of air. damper. position on loss of air under preoperational temperature, differential pressure, and flow conditions while the CRV system is supplying flow to the CRE.

[ITAAC 03.02.01]

Tier 2 14.2-51 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-19: Normal Control Room HVAC System Test # 19 (Continued)

System Level Test #19-3 Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria Verify the CRVS isolates makeup air when Place the CRVS in automatic operation. Outside air dampers is closed to isolate smoke or toxic gas is detected in the i. Initiate a simulated high smoke or makeup air.

makeup air ductworkVerify PPS actuates toxic gas signal for the makeup air CRVS outside air dampers when toxic gas ductwork upstream of the CRVS filter or smoke is detected in the makeup air unit.

ductwork.

System Level Test #19-4 Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria Verify the CRVS automatically responds Place the CRVS in automatic operation. i. Outside air is diverted through the to mitigate the consequences of high Initiate a real or simulated high radiation CRVS filter unit by closing the CRVS radiation in the outside air. signal for the outside air ductwork filter unit bypass dampers and upstream of the CRVS filter unit. opening the CRVS filter unit isolation dampers.

ii. The CRVS filter unit fan starts.

[ITAAC 03.09.01]

(items i. and ii.)

Tier 2 14.2-53 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-20: Reactor Building HVAC System Test # 20 Preoperational test is required to be performed once.

The RBVS is described in Section 9.4.2 and the functions verified by this test are:

System Function System Function Categorization Function Verified by Test #

1. The RBVS supports the RXB by nonsafety-related Test #20-1 providing cooling, heating and Test #20-2 humidity control to maintain a Reactor Building Ventilation System suitable environment for the safety Capability Test # 96 and comfort of plant personnel.

2. The RBVS supports the systems nonsafety-related Test #20-1 located in the RXB by providing Test #20-2 cooling, heating and humidity Reactor Building Ventilation System control to maintain a suitable Capability Test # 96 environment for the operation of system components.

3. The RBVS supports the RXB by nonsafety-related Test #20-1 maintaining the RXB at a negative Test #20-3 ambient pressure relative to the outside atmosphere to control the movement of potentially airborne radioactivity from the RXB to the environment.

4. The CRVS supports the CRB by nonsafety-related Test #20-1 (RXB negative pressure) maintaining the CRB at a positive CRVS Test #19-1 (CRB positive pressure) ambient pressure relative to the Reactor Building (RXB) and the outside atmosphere to control the ingress of potentially airborne radioactivity from the RXB or the outside atmosphere to the CRB.

5. The RWBVS supports the RWB by nonsafety-related Test #20-3 (off-normal RBVS exhaust maintaining the RWB at a negative alignment) ambient pressure relative to the RWBVS Test #21-1 (normal RBVS exhaust outside atmosphere to control the alignment) movement of potentially airborne radioactivity from the RWB to the environment.

Prerequisites

i. Verify an instrument calibration has been completed, with approved records and within all calibration due dates, for all instruments required to perform this test.

ii. Verify an RBVS air balance has been performed and the RBV system air balance records have been approved. [This prerequisite is not required for component-level tests.]

iii. RBVS high-efficiency particulate air and charcoal adsorbers have been installed and tested. [This prerequisite is not required for component-level tests.]

Component Level Tests Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria

i. Verify each RBVS remotely-operated Operate each damper from the MCR and MCR display and local, visual damper can be operated remotely. local control panel (if design has local observation indicate each damper fully damper control). opens and fully closes.

ii. Verify each RBVS air-operated Place each damper in its non-safe MCR display and local, visual damper fails to its safe position on position. Isolate and vent air to the observation indicate each damper fails loss of air. damper. to its safe position.

Tier 2 14.2-54 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-23: Radioactive Waste Drain System Test # 23 Preoperational test is required to be performed once.

The RWDS is described in Section 9.3.3 and the functions verified by this test or another preoperational test are:

System Function System Function Categorization Function Verified by Test #

1. The RWDS supports the RWB by nonsafety-related Test #23-1 collecting radioactive waste in drain sumps and tanks and transfers it to the LRWS for processing.

2. The RWDS supports the RXB by nonsafety-related Test #23-1 collecting radioactive waste in drain sumps and tanks and transfers it to the LRWS for processing.

3. The RWDS supports the ANB by nonsafety-related Test #23-1 collecting radioactive waste in drain sumps and tanks and transfers it to the LRWS for processing.

4. The RWDS supports the UHS by nonsafety-related Test #23-2 providing detection and monitoring of leakage through the UHS liner and the dry dock liner.

5. The LRWS supports the RWDS by nonsafety-related Test #23-1 receiving and processing the effluent LRWS Test #35-2 from the RWB radioactive waste drain sumps.

6. The LRWS supports the RWDS by nonsafety-related Test #23-1 receiving and processing the effluent LRWS Test #35-2 from the RXB radioactive waste drain sumps.

7. The LRWS supports the RWDS by nonsafety-related Test #23-1 receiving and processing the effluent LRWS Test #35-2 from the ANB radioactive waste drain sumps.

Prerequisites Verify an instrument calibration has been completed, with approved records and within all calibration due dates, for all instruments required to perform this test.

Component Level Tests Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria

i. Verify each RWDS remotely-operated Operate each valve from the MCR and MCR display and local, visual valve can be operated remotely. local control panel (if design has local observation indicate each valve fully valve control). opens and fully closes.

ii. Verify each RWDS air-operated valve Place each valve in its non-safe position. MCR display and local, visual fails to its safe position on loss of air. Isolate and vent air to the valve. observation indicate each valve fails to its safe position.

iii. Verify each RWDS air-operated valve Place each valve in its non-safe position. MCR display and local, visual fails to its safe position on loss of Isolate electrical power to each air- observation indicate each valve fails to electrical power to its solenoid. operated valve. its safe position.

iv. Verify each RWDS pump can be Align the RWDS to allow for pump MCR display and local, visual started and stopped remotely. operation. observation indicate each pump starts Stop and start each pump from the MCR. and stops.

v. Verify a local grab sample can be Place the system in service to allow flow A local grab sample is successfully obtained from an RWDS grab sample through the grab sampling device. obtained.

device indicated on the RWDS piping and instrumentation diagram.

Tier 2 14.2-61 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-23: Radioactive Waste Drain System Test # 23 (Continued) vi. Verify each RWDS instrument is Initiate a single real or simulated The instrument signal is displayed on an available on an MCS or PCS display. instrument signal from each RWDS MCS or PCS display, or is recorded by the (Test not required if the instrument transmitter. applicable control system historian.

calibration verified the MCS or PCS display.)

System Level Test #23-1 Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria Verify RWDS pumps start and stop Align each RWDS sump or tank to allow MCR displays and local, visual automatically and transfer liquid waste water in a selected sump or tank to be observation verifies the following:

to its design location in the LRWS. pumped to its design location in the i. The first pump starts on HI level and LRWS (as indicated by the RWDS piping transfers water to its design location and instrumentation diagrams). in the LRWS.

i. Fill the selected sump or tank until a ii. The second (alternate) pump starts HI water level is obtained to start the on HI-HI level.

first (primary) pump. iii. Both primary and alternate pumps ii. Continue filling the sump or tank stop on LO level.

until a HI-HI level starts the second iv. The alternate pump starts on HI (alternate) pump. level.

iii. Stop filling the sump or tank to allow the primary and alternate pumps to stop on low level.

iv. Refill the sump or tank until the alternate pump starts on HI level.

System Level Test #23-2 Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria Verify each RWDS equipment drain sump Fill the selected sump at a rate that PCS data indicates the sump fill rate alarms on a fill rate that exceeds the pool exceeds the PLDS leakage rate setpoint. alarmed at the PLDS leakage rate leakage detection system (PLDS) leakage setpoint.

rate setpoint.

Tier 2 14.2-62 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program RAI 09.03.03-1S2, RAI 14.02-6, RAI 14.02-6S1 Table 14.2-24: Balance-of-Plant Drain System Test # 24 Preoperational test is required to be performed to support sequence of construction turnover of the BPDS system.

BPDS system is described in Section 9.3.3 and 11.5.2.2.15 and the functions verified by this test are:

System Function System Function Categorization Function Verified by Test #

1. The BPDS supports the condensate nonsafety-related Test #24-1 polisher demineralizers, the three Test #24-7 cooling tower chemical addition systems, and the DWS reverse osmosis units by providing a means to collect and transfer chemical wastes to either the LRWS or to the UWS.

2. The BPDS supports the two TGBs, the nonsafety-related Test #24-1 two diesel generators, the auxiliary Test #24-7 boiler, the combustion turbine, the Central Utility Building, and the diesel driven firewater pump by providing a means to collect, treat, and transfer the waste water to the either the LRWS or to the UWS.

3. The BPDS supports the CRB floor nonsafety-related Test #24-1 drains by providing a means to Test #24-7 collect, treat, and transfer the waste water to the UWS.

Prerequisites Verify an instrument calibration has been completed, with approved records and within all calibration due dates, for all instruments required to perform this test.

Component Level Tests Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria

i. Verify each BPDS remotely-operated Operate each valve from the MCR and MCR display and local, visual valve can be operated remotely. local control panel (if design has local observation indicate each valve fully valve control). opens and fully closes.

ii. Verify each BPDS air-operated valve Place each valve in its non-safe position. MCR display and local, visual fails to its safe position on loss of air. Isolate and vent air to the valve. observation indicate each valve fails to its safe position.

iii. Verify each BPDS air-operated valve Place each valve in its non-safe position. MCR display and local, visual fails to its safe position on loss of Isolate electrical power to each air- observation indicate each valve fails to electrical power to its solenoid. operated valve. its safe position.

iv. Verify each BPDS pump can be Align the BPDS to allow for pump MCR display and local, visual started and stopped remotely. operation. observation indicate each pump starts Stop and start each pump from the MCR. and stops.

Audible and visible water hammer are not observed when the pump starts.

v. Verify the pump speed of each BPDS Vary the speed of each pump from the MCR display indicates the speed of each variable-speed pump can be MCR and local control panel (if design pump varies from minimum to manually controlled. has local pump control). maximum speed.

vi. Verify each BPDS instrument is Initiate a single real or simulated The instrument signal is displayed on an available on an MCS or PCS display. instrument signal from each BPDS MCS or PCS display, or is recorded by the (Test not required if the instrument transmitter. applicable control system historian.

calibration verified the MCS or PCS display.)

Tier 2 14.2-63 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-24: Balance-of-Plant Drain System Test # 24 (Continued)

System Level Test #24-1 Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria Verify BPDS automatically controlled Align each BPDS sump or tank to allow MCR displays and local, visual pumps in sumps and tanks with a fire water in a selected sump or tank to be observation verifies the following:

water removal pump, start and stop pumped to its design location. If the i. The primary pump starts on HI level automatically and transfer liquid waste sump fill rate in the following test and transfers water to its design to its design location. method is insufficient for automatic start location in the LRWS or UWS system.

of the alternate pump or fire pump, the ii. The alternate pump starts on HI-HI primary pump or alternate pump may be level.

temporarily removed from service to iii. The fire water removal pump starts allow an increase in the sump level.

on HI-HI-HI level.

i. Verify that Pump #1 is set to the iv. The fire water removal pump stops primary pump and Pump #2 is set to on HI-HI level.

alternate. Fill the selected sump or tank until a HI water level is obtained v. Both primary and alternate pumps to start the primary pump. stop on LO level.

ii. Continue filling the sump or tank vi. The primary pump starts on HI level.

until a HI-HI level starts the alternate vii. The alternate pump starts on HI-HI pump. level.

iii. Fill the sump or tank until a HI-HI-HI level starts the fire water removal pump.

iv. Stop filling the sump or tank to allow the fire water removal pump to stop on HI-HI level.

v. Continue (or start) sump or tank dewatering to allow the primary and alternate pumps to stop on LO level.

vi. Change pump controls to make Pump #2 the primary pump and Pump #1 the alternate pump, and refill the sump or tank until the primary pump starts on HI level.

vii. Continue filling the sump or tank until a HI-HI level starts the alternate pump.

Note: Pump #1 and Pump #2 are not the actual names of the pumps, these names are used to differentiate between the two pumps.

Tier 2 14.2-64 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-24: Balance-of-Plant Drain System Test # 24 (Continued)

System Level Test #24-2 Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria Verify the BPDS automatically responds Place a north chemical waste water sump i. The north chemical waste water to mitigate a release of radioactivity. pump in operation. Initiate a real or sump pump stops.

simulated high radiation signal on the 6A ii. North chemical waste collection CPS regeneration skid waste effluent. sump to BPDS collection tank Repeat the test for each pump. isolation valve is closed.

iii. North chemical waste collection sump to LRW high conductivity waste tank isolation valve is closed.

[ITAAC 03.17.02]

(i through iii)

System Level Test #24-3 Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria Verify the BPDS automatically responds Place a south chemical waste water i. The pump stops.

to mitigate a release of radioactivity. sump pump in operation. Initiate a real or ii. South chemical waste collection simulated high radiation signal on the 6B sump to BPDS collection tank CPS regeneration skid waste effluent. isolation valve is closed.

Repeat the test for each pump. iii. South chemical waste collection sump to LRW high conductivity waste tank isolation valve is closed.

[ITAAC 03.18.02]

(i through iii)

System Level Test #24-4 Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria Verify the BPDS automatically responds Place a north waste water sump pump in i. The north waste water sump pump to mitigate a release of radioactivity. operation. Initiate a real or simulated stops.

high radiation signal in the BPDS north ii. North waste water sump discharge TGB floor drains. to BPDS collection tank isolation Repeat the test for each pump. valve is closed.

iii. North waste water sump discharge to LRW high conductivity waste tank isolation valve is closed.

[ITAAC 03.17.03]

(i thorugh iii)

System Level Test #24-5 Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria Verify the BPDS automatically responds Place a south waste water sump pump in i. The south waste water sump pump to mitigate a release of radioactivity. operation. Initiate a real or simulated stops.

high radiation signal in the BPDS south ii. South waste water sump discharge TGB floor drains. to BPDS collection tank isolation Repeat the test for each pump. valve is closed.

iii. South waste water sump discharge to LRW high conductivity waste tank isolation valve is closed.

[ITAAC 03.18.03]

(i through iii)

Tier 2 14.2-65 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-24: Balance-of-Plant Drain System Test # 24 (Continued)

System Level Test #24-6 Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria Verify the BPDS automatically responds Place a north waste water sump pump in i. The north chemical waste water to mitigate a release of radioactivity. operation. Initiate a real or simulated sump pump stops.

high radiation signal in the BPDS ii. North chemical waste collection auxiliary blowdown cooler condensate. sump to BPDS collection tank Repeat the test for each pump. isolation valve is closed.

iii. North chemical waste collection sump to LRW high conductivity waste tank isolation valve is closed.

[ITAAC 03.17.04]

(i through iii)

System Level Test #24-7 Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria Verify BPDS automatically controlled Align each BPDS sump or tank to allow MCR displays and local, visual pumps, in sumps and tanks without a fire water in a selected sump or tank to be observation verifies the following:

water removal pump, start and stop pumped to its design location. If the i. The primary pump starts on HI level automatically and transfer liquid waste sump fill rate in the following test and transfers water to its design to its design location. method is insufficient for automatic start location in the LRWS or UWS system.

of the alternate pump, the primary pump ii. The alternate pump starts on HI-HI may be temporarily removed from level.

service to allow an increase in the sump iii. Both primary and alternate pumps level. stop on LO level.

i. Verify that Pump #1 is set to the iv. The primary pump starts on HI level.

primary pump and Pump #2 is set to alternate. Fill the selected sump or v. The alternate pump starts on HI-HI tank until a HI water level is obtained level.

to start the primary pump.

ii. Continue filling the sump or tank until a HI-HI level starts the alternate pump.

iii. Stop filling the sump or tank to allow the primary and alternate pumps to stop on LO level.

iv. Change pump controls to make Pump #2 the primary pump and Pump #1 the alternate pump, and refill the sump or tank until the primary pump starts on HI level.

v. Continue filling the sump or tank until a HI-HI level starts the alternate pump.

Note: Pump #1 and Pump #2 are not the actual names of the pumps; these names are used to differentiate between the two pumps.

Tier 2 14.2-66 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-27: Main Steam System Test # 27 Preoperational test is required to be performed for each NPM.

The MSS is described in Section 10.3. MS functions are not verified by this test. The MSS functions verified by other tests are:

System Function System Function Categorization Function Verified by Test #

1. The MSS supports the SG by nonsafety-related TGS Test #33-2 delivering steam to the main condenser.

21. The MSS supports the TGS by nonsafety-related TGS Test #33-2 providing steam to the TGS. Ramp Change in Load Test #100

32. The MSS supports the CNTS by nonsafety-related MPS Test #63-6 providing secondary isolation of the main steam lines.

43. The MSS supports the DHRS by nonsafety-related MPS Test #63-6 providing a backup means for required boundary conditions for DHRS operation.

Prerequisites

i. Verify an instrument calibration has been completed, with approved records and within all calibration due dates, for all instruments required to perform this test.

Component Level Tests Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria

i. Verify each MSS remotely-operated Operate each valve from the MCR and MCR display and local, visual valve can be operated remotely. local control panel (if design has local observation indicate each valve fully valve control) opens and fully closes.

ii. Verify each MSS air-operated valve Place each valve in its non-safe position. MCR display and local, visual fails to its safe position on loss of air. Isolate and vent air to the valve. observation indicate each valve fails to its safe position.

iii. Verify each MSS air-operated valve Place each valve in its non-safe position. MCR display and local, visual fails to its safe position on loss of Isolate electrical power to each air- observation indicate each valve fails to electrical power to its solenoid. operated valve. its safe position.

iv. Verify automatic operation of MSS Initiate a simulated signal for the Any remote display or local verification extraction steam to protect the main following system conditions. indicates the following:

turbine. i. feedwater heater high level i. extraction steam block valve closes ii. turbine trip ii. extraction steam non-return check valve closes

v. Verify each MSS instrument is Initiate a single real or simulated The instrument signal is displayed on an available on an MCS or PCS display. instrument signal from each MSS MCS or PCS display, or is recorded by the (Test not required if the instrument transmitter. applicable control system historian.

calibration verified the MCS or PCS display.)

System Level Tests None Tier 2 14.2-70 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-28: Feedwater System Test # 28 Preoperational test is required to be performed for each NPM.

The FWS is described in Section 10.4.7; Section 9.2.6 (condensate storage tank); Section 10.4.1 (condenser); FWS functions are not verified by FWS tests. FWS functions verified by other tests are:

System Function System Function Categorization Function Verified by Test #

1. The FWS supports the CPS by nonsafety-related CPS Test #30-1 providing water for CPS rinse and CPS resin transfer.

2. The FWS supports the TG by cooling nonsafety-related TGS Test #33-1 superheated steam in the gland Ramp Change in Load Test #100 steam desuperheater prior to the steam entering the gland seals.

3. The FWS supports the containment nonsafety-related TGS Test #33-1 system (CNTS) by supplying Ramp Change in Load Test #100 feedwater to the SGs.

4. The FWS supports the turbine nonsafety-related TGS Test #33-1 generator by cooling superheated 100 Percent Load Rejection Test #103 turbine bypass steam in the turbine bypass desuperheater prior to the steam entering the main condenser.

5. The FWS supports the turbine nonsafety-related TGS Test #33-1 generator by accepting turbine 100 Percent Load Rejection Test #103 bypass steam into the main condenser.

6. The FWS supports the CNTS by nonsafety-related MPS Test #63-6 providing secondary isolation of the feedwater lines.

7. The FWS supports the decay heat nonsafety-related MPS Test #63-6 removal system (DHRS) by providing secondary isolation of the feedwater lines, ensuring required boundary conditions for DHRS operation.

Prerequisites i.Verify an instrument calibration has been completed, with approved records and within all calibration due dates, for all instruments required to perform this test.

ii.Verify a pump curve test has been completed for the FWS pumps.

Component Level Tests Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria

i. Verify each FWS remotely-operated Operate each valve from the MCR and MCR display and local, visual valve can be operated remotely. local control panel (if design has local observation indicate each valve fully valve control). opens and fully closes.

ii. Verify each FWS air-operated valve Place each valve in its non-safe position. MCR display and local, visual fails to its safe position on loss of air. Isolate and vent air to the valve. observation indicate each valve fails to its safe position.

iii. Verify each FWS air-operated valve Place each valve in its non-safe position. MCR display and local, visual fails to its safe position on loss of Isolate electrical power to each air- observation indicate each valve fails to electrical power to its solenoid. operated valve. its safe position.

iv. Verify each FWS condensate pump Align the FWS to allow for pump MCR display and local, visual can be started and stopped remotely. operation. observation indicate each pump starts Stop and start each pump from the MCR. and stops.

Audible and visible water hammer are not observed when the pump starts.

Tier 2 14.2-71 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-29: Feedwater Treatment System Test # 29 Preoperational test is required to be performed for the 6A NPMs and for the 6B NPMs.

The feedwater treatment system (FWTS) is described in Section 10.4.11 and the function verified by this test and power ascension testing is:

System Function System Function Categorization Function Verified by Test #

The FWTS supports the FWS by nonsafety-related Component-level tests controlling and maintaining feedwater Primary and Secondary Chemistry chemistry. Test #79 Prerequisites Verify an instrument calibration has been completed, with approved records and within all calibration due dates, for all instruments required to perform this test.

Component Level Tests Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria

i. Verify each FWTS remotely-operated Operate each valve from the MCR and MCR display and local, visual valve can be operated remotely. local control panel (if design has local observation indicate each valve fully valve control). opens and fully closes.

ii. Verify each FWTS air-operated valve Place each valve in its non-safe position. MCR display and local, visual fails to its safe position on loss of air. Isolate and vent air to the valve. observation indicate each valve fails to its safe position.

iii. Verify each FWTS air-operated valve Place each valve in its non-safe position. MCR display and local, visual fails to its safe position on loss of Isolate electrical power to each air- observation indicate each valve fails to electrical power to its solenoid. operated valve. its safe position.

iv. Verify each FWTS pump can be Align the FWTS to allow for pump MCR display and local, visual started and stopped remotely and operation. observation indicate each pump starts locally (if designed). Stop and start each remotely-controlled and stops.

pump from the MCR. Audible and visible water hammer are Stop and start each locally-controlled not observed when the pump starts.

pump locally.

v. Verify the speed of each FWTS Vary the speed of each pump from the MCR display indicates pump speed variable-speed pump can be MCR and local control panel (if design varies from minimum to maximum manually controlled. has local pump control). speed.

vi. Verify each FWTS instrument is Initiate a single real or simulated The instrument signal is displayed on an available on an MCS or PCS display. instrument signal from each FWTS MCS or PCS display, or is recorded by the (Test not required if the instrument transmitter. applicable control system historian.

calibration verified the MCS or PCS display.)

System Level Tests None Tier 2 14.2-73 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-30: Condensate Polishing System Test # 30 (Continued)

System Level Test #30-1 Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria Verify the CPS automatically completes Align the FWS to support CPS resin i. The resin transferred to the resin regeneration. regeneration. regeneration skid.

Align the ABS to support CPS resin ii. The CPS regeneration cycle regeneration. completed successfully.

i. Automatically transfer the test resin iii. The resin transferred to a bed from a condensate polisher to condensate polisher.

the CPS regeneration skid. iv. ABS steam maintains hot water ii. Initiate an automatic regeneration of heater outlet temperature at design the resin. setpoint during resin regeneration.

iii. Automatically transfer the test resin bed from the CPS regeneration skid to a condensate polisher.

Tier 2 14.2-75 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-31: Feedwater Heater Vents and Drains System Test # 31 Preoperational test is required to be performed for each NPM.

The feedwater heater vents and drains system (HVDS) system is described in Section 10.4.7. and the functions verified by this test and power ascension testing are:

System Function System Function Categorization Function Verified by Test #

1. The HVDS system supports the FWS nonsafety-related Component level tests by venting the feedwater heaters.

2. The HVDS system supports the FWS nonsafety-related Component level tests by controlling level in the shell sides Ramp Change in Load Demand feedwater heaters. Test #100 Prerequisites Verify an instrument calibration has been completed, with approved records and within all calibration due dates, for all instruments required to perform this test.

Component Level Tests Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria

i. Verify each HVDS remotely-operated Operate each valve from the MCR and MCR display and local, visual valve can be operated remotely. local control panel (if design has local observation indicate each valve fully valve control). opens and fully closes.

ii. Verify each HVDS air-operated valve Place each valve in its non-safe position. MCR display and local, visual fails to its safe position on loss of air. Isolate and vent air to the valve. observation indicate each valve fails to its safe position.

iii. Verify each HVDS air-operated valve Place each valve in its non-safe position. MCR display and local, visual fails to its safe position on loss of Isolate electrical power to each air- observation indicate each valve fails to electrical power to its solenoid. operated valve. its safe position.

iv. Verify automatic operation of HVDS Initiate a simulated turbine trip. Any remote display or local verification valves to protect the turbine on indicates the following:

turbine trip. i. Low, intermediate and high pressure feedwater heater extraction steam supply valves are closed.

ii. Low, intermediate and high pressure feedwater heater air assisted check valves are closed.

iii. Low, intermediate and high pressure feedwater heater extraction steam dump valves are open.

v. Verify automatic operation of HVDS Initiate a simulated signal for the Any remote display or local verification valves to protect turbine on high following system conditions. indicates the following:

feedwater heater level. i. Low pressure feedwater heater high i. Low pressure feedwater heater level. extraction steam supply valve and ii. Intermediate pressure feedwater low pressure feedwater heater heater high level. extraction steam dump valve are iii. High pressure feedwater heater high open.

level ii. Intermediate pressure feedwater heater extraction steam supply valve and intermediate pressure feedwater heater extraction steam dump valve are open.

iii. High pressure feedwater heater extraction steam supply valve and high pressure feedwater heater extraction steam dump valve are open.

Tier 2 14.2-76 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-32: Condenser Air Removal System Test # 32 Preoperational test is required to be performed for each NPM.

The condenser air removal system (CARS) is described in Section 10.4.2 and the functions verified by this test and power ascension testing are:

System Function System Function Categorization Function Verified by Test #

1. The CARS supports the condensate nonsafety-related Test #32-1 and FWS by removing air and non-condensable gases from the main condenser.

2. The circulating water system (CWS) nonsafety related Test #32-1 supports the FWS by removing heat Ramp Change in Load Demand from the main condenser. Test #100

3. The ABS supports the turbine nonsafety-related Test #32-1 generator by supplying gland seal steam.

4. The auxiliary boiler supports the FWS nonsafety-related Test #32-1 by supplying steam to the condenser for sparging when necessary.

Prerequisites Verify an instrument calibration has been completed, with approved records and within all calibration due dates, for all instruments required to perform this test.

Component Level Tests Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria

i. Verify each CARS remotely-operated Operate each valve from the MCR and MCR display and local, visual valve can be operated remotely. local control panel (if design has local observation indicate each valve fully valve control). opens and fully closes.

ii. Verify each CARS air-operated valve Place each valve in its non-safe position. MCR display and local, visual fails to its safe position on loss of air. Isolate and vent air to the valve. observation indicate each valve fails to its safe position.

iii. Verify each CARS air-operated valve Place each valve in its non-safe position. MCR display and local, visual fails to its safe position on loss of Isolate electrical power to each air- observation indicate each valve fails to electrical power to its solenoid. operated valve. its safe position.

iv. Verify each CARS pump can be Align the CARS to allow for pump MCR display and local, visual started and stopped remotely. operation. observation indicate each pump starts Stop and start each pump from the MCR. and stops.

Audible and visible water hammer are not observed when the pump starts.

v. Verify CARS valves automatically Initiate a simulated signal for the Any remote display or local verification operate to maintain CARS seal water following system conditions. indicates the following:

separator tank level. i. CARS seal water separator tank high i. CARS seal water separator tank level. makeup valve is closed and drain ii. CARS seal water separator tank low valve is open.

level. ii. The CARS seal water separator makeup valve is open and drain valve is closed.

vi. Verify a CARS standby pump Align the CARS to allow for pump MCR display and local, visual automatically starts to protect plant operation. Place a pump in service. observation indicate the standby pump equipment. Initiate a simulated main condenser high starts.

pressure. Audible and visible water hammer are not observed when the pump starts.

vii. Verify a local integrated grab sample Place the system in service to allow flow A local grab sample is obtained.

can be obtained from the CARS grab through the grab sampling device.

sample device.

Tier 2 14.2-78 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-32: Condenser Air Removal System Test # 32 (Continued) viii. Verify each CARS instrument is Initiate a single real or simulated The instrument signal is displayed on an available on an MCS or PCS display. instrument signal from each CARS MCS or PCS display, or is recorded by (Test not required if the instrument transmitter. the applicable control system historian.

calibration verified the MCS or PCS display.)

System Level Test #32-1 Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria Verify the CARS can maintain main Place the ABS in automatic control to i. Maintain main condenser design condenser vacuum pressure. supply gland seal steam. vacuum pressure.

Place the FWS in automatic control to ii. The ABS is capable of providing condense the gland seal steam in the sparging steam to the main gland exhaust condenser. condenser as indicated by steam Place the CWS in automatic control to flow.

provide cooling to the main condenser. iii. The ABS is capable of supplying

i. Place the CARS in service to establish gland seal steam to the turbine vacuum in the main condenser. generator at design pressures.

ii. Open the feedwater sparge isolation valves to provide steam sparging to the main condenser.

Tier 2 14.2-79 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program RAI 10.02-3, RAI 10.02.03-1, RAI 10.02.03-2 Table 14.2-33: Turbine Generator System Test # 33 Preoperational test is required to be performed for each NPM.

The TGS is described in Sections 10.2, 10.4.3, and 10.4.4. The TGS and other functions verified by this test and power ascension testing are:

System Function System Function Categorization Function Verified by Test #

1. The TGS supports the MSS by nonsafety-related Test #33-1 providing steam bypass from the 100 Percent Load Rejection Test #103 MSS to the main condenser.

2. The MHS supports the CVCS by non-safety related Test #33-1 adding heat to primary coolant.

3. The CVCS supports the reactor nonsafety-related Test #33-1 coolant system (RCS) by heating primary coolant.

4. The ABS supports the module heatup nonsafety-related Test #33-1 system (MHS) by supplying steam for heating reactor coolant at startup and shutdown.

5. The FWS supports the CNTS by nonsafety-related Test #33-1 supplying feedwater to the SGs. Ramp Change in Load Test #99

6. The FWS supports the TGS by cooling nonsafety-related Test #33-1 superheated turbine bypass steam in 100 Percent Load Rejection Test #103 the turbine bypass desuperheater prior to the steam entering the main condenser.

7. The FWS supports the TGS by nonsafety-related Test #33-1 accepting turbine bypass steam into 100 Percent Load Rejection Test #103 the main condenser.

8. The FWS supports the TGS by cooling nonsafety-related Test #33-1 superheated steam in the gland Ramp Change in Load Test #100 steam desuperheater prior to the steam entering the gland seals.

9. The MSS supports the SGS by nonsafety-related Test #33-12 delivering steam to the main condenser.The CVCS supports emergency core cooling system (ECCS) valves by providing water to reset the ECCS valves.

10. The MSS supports the TGS by nonsafety-related Test #33-2 providing steam to the TGS. Ramp Change in Load Test #100 Prerequisites

i. Verify an instrument calibration has been completed, with approved records and within all calibration due dates, for all instruments required to perform this test.

The following prerequisites are not required for component testing:

ii. Verify Test #32-1 has been completed to verify the CARS can maintain main condenser vacuum pressure (reference test 14.2-32).

iii. The SG feedwater flush is complete.

iv. The CARS is automatically maintaining main condenser vacuum.

v. Initial RCS temperature must be approximately 200°F to allow for hot functional testing to obtain data at an RCS temperature of 200°F and above.

vi. The NPM and supporting systems are aligned to increase RCS temperature and pressure.

Tier 2 14.2-80 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-33: Turbine Generator System Test # 33 (Continued)

System Level Test #33-1 Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria

i. Verify the CVCS is capable of Close the ECCS valves. i. CVCS pressure is sufficient as supplying water at sufficient pressure Align the plant to cool the RCS via the indicated by closure of the ECCS to close the ECCS valves. TGS bypass system. valves.

ii. Verify the MHS is capable of heating Warm main steam lines. ii. a. CVCS supply remains in a the RCS to a temperature sufficient to Place the TGS steam bypass valve in sub-cooled state while heating obtain criticality. automatic control. the RCS using the module heatup iii. Verify the MHS is capable of heating system as verified by CVCS Place the feedwater regulating valve in the RCS to establish natural temperature and pressure.

steam generator inventory control.

circulation flow sufficient to obtain b. RCS temperature is sufficient to Place the MHS and the CVCS in automatic criticality. obtain criticality.

control to heat the RCS.

ivii. Verify the TGS automatically controls iii. RCS natural circulation flow is Place the ABS high-pressure system in turbine bypass flow to the main sufficient to obtain criticality.

automatic control to heat the MHS heat condenser. ivii. The TGS bypass flow is maintained exchanger from RCS ambient iv. Verify the FWS automatically controls temperature to the highest temperature maintains steam pressure at flow to the SGs to maintain SG achievable by MHS heating. setpoint.

inventory. iv. The feedwater flow to the steam Align the FWS to cool the gland seal vi. Verify the FWS automatically cools steam desuperheater. generator is maintained at setpoint.

the TGS bypass steam flow in the vi. The cooled TGS bypass main steam desuperheater. flowtemperature is maintained at vii. Verify a local grab sample can be setpoint.

obtained from an MHS system grab vii. A local grab sample is successfully sample device. obtained at RCS normal operating viii. Verify the FWS automatically cools temperature and pressure.

the TGS gland steam in the gland viii. The cooled gland seal steam steam desuperheater. temperature is maintained at ix. Verify hotwell level is automatically setpoint.

controlled while receiving bypass ix. Hotwell level is maintained at steam. setpoint while receiving bypass steam.

System Level Test #33-2 This test may be performed after the completion of Test 33-1 when the RCS is at normal operating pressure and the RCS has achieved the maximum temperature achievable by warming the RCS using MHS heating.

Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria Verify the maximum main turbine speed Place the main turbine in service as The maximum main turbine speed is that can be obtained using the MHS to follows: obtained.

heat the RCS. i. Ensure the RCS is at RCS is at normal operating pressure and the RCS is at maximum temperature achievable by warming the RCS using MHS heating.

ii. Place turbine on turning gear with seal steam in service.

iii. Warm up turbine to required temperature.

iv. Increase main turbine speed.

Tier 2 14.2-82 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-35: Liquid Radioactive Waste System Test # 35 Preoperational test is required to be performed once.

The LRWS is described in Section 11.2 and 11.5.2.1.5 and the functions verified by this test are:

System Function System Function Categorization Function Verified by Test #

1. The LRWS supports the solid nonsafety-related Test #35-1 radioactive waste system (SRWS) by Test #35-2 receiving and processing liquid Component-level test xi radioactive waste from the SRWS SRWS Test #37-7 dewatering skid.

2. The LRWS supports the SFPCS by nonsafety-related Test #35-1 receiving contaminated pool water Test #35-2 to aid in the removal of titrated water Component-level tests or boron. Treated liquid radwaste has the option to return to the pool as makeup.

3. The LRWS supports the CVCS by nonsafety-related Test #35-1 receiving and processing primary Test #35-2 coolant from CVCS letdown. CVCS Test #38-1

4. The LRWS supports the RWDS by nonsafety-related Test #35-1 receiving and processing the effluent Test #35-2 from the RWB radioactive waste drain RWDS Test #23-1 sumps.

5. The LRWS supports the RWDS by nonsafety-related Test #35-1 receiving and processing the effluent Test #35-2 from the RXB radioactive waste drain RWDS Test #23-1 sumps.

6. The LRWS supports the RWDS by nonsafety-related Test #35-1 receiving and processing the effluent Test #35-2 from the ANB radioactive waste drain RWDS Test #23-1 sumps.

7. LRWS supports the CVCS by receiving nonsafety-related Test #35-1 and processing the noncondensable gases and vapor from the pressurizer.

The LRWS functions verified by other tests are:

System Function System Function Categorization Function Verified by Test #

The LRWS supports the CVCS by nonsafety-related CVCS Test #38-1 receiving and processing primary coolant from CVCS letdown.

The LRWS supports the RWDS by nonsafety-related RWDS Test #23-1 receiving and processing the effluent from theRWB radioactive waste drain sumps.

The LRWS supports the RWDS by nonsafety-related RWDS Test #23-1 receiving and processing the effluent from theRXB radioactive waste drain sumps.

The LRWS supports the RWDS by nonsafety-related RWDS Test #23-1 receiving and processing the effluent from the ANB radioactive waste drain sumps.

Prerequisites Verify an instrument calibration has been completed, with approved records and within all calibration due dates, for all instruments required to perform this test.

Tier 2 14.2-84 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-35: Liquid Radioactive Waste System Test # 35 (Continued) ix. Verify LRW pumps automatically Align the LRWS to allow each of the MCR displays and local, visual operate to prevent tank overflow. following LRW transfer pumps to observation indicate the following:

automatically transfer effluent to one of i. The transfer pump starts and its design locations. transfers effluent to its design Degasifier transfer pump A and B location.

LCW collection tank transfer pump A and ii. The transfer pump stops.

B HCW collection tank transfer pump A and B

LCW sample tank transfer pump A and B HCW sample tank transfer pump A and B Detergent waste collection tank transfer pump Demineralized water break tank transfer pump

i. Simulate a HI HI level signal in each of the above tanks.

ii. Simulate a low level signal in each of the above tanks.

x. Verify a local grab sample can be Place the system in service to allow flow A local grab sample is successfully obtained from a LRWS grab sample through the grab sampling device. obtained.

device indicated on the LRW piping and instrumentation diagram.

xi. Verify SRWS dewatering skid effluent Align SRWS dewatering skid discharge to SRWS dewatering skid effluent is can be transferred to LRW high- one of the LRW high-conductivity waste transferred to the LRW high-conductivity waste (HCW) collection collection tanks. Fill the SRWS conductivity waste collection tank. The tanks. dewatering skid high integrity container SRWS dewatering skid diaphragm pump (HIC) to above the low level pump stop is stopped.

setpoint. Start the SRWS dewatering skid diaphragm pump.

xii. Verify each LRWS instrument is Initiate a single real or simulated The instrument signal is displayed on an available on an MCS or PCS display. instrument signal from each LRWS MCS or PCS display, or is recorded by the (Test not required if the instrument transmitter. applicable control system historian.

calibration verified the MCS or PCS display.)

System Level Test #35-1 This test should be performed after the completion of Test 33-1 when the RCS is at normal operating pressure and the RCS has achieved the maximum temperature achievable by warming the RCS using MHS heating.

Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria

i. Verify LRWS can process a gaseous Align LRWS to receive pressurizer i. The LRW degasifier removes waste stream. gaseous waste from the pressurizer condensable gases and vents waste during hot functional testing. to the RBVS or GRWS.

Process the pressurizer gaseous waste ii. The LRW degasifier liquid transfer through the LRW degasifier. pumps transfer the liquid condensate waste to the low conductivity waste collection tanks.

Tier 2 14.2-86 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-36: Gaseous Radioactive Waste System Test # 36 Preoperational test is required to be performed once.

The GRWS is described in Section 11.3 and 11.5.2.2.6 and the functions verified by this test or another preoperational test are:

System Function System Function Categorization Function Verified by Test #

1. The GRWS supports the LRWS by nonsafety-related Test #36-1 receiving and / or collecting potentially radioactive and hydrogen-bearing waste gases which require processing prior to release to the environment.

2. The GRWS supports the CES by nonsafety-related Test #36-1 receiving and / or collecting CES Test #41-2 potentially radioactive and hydrogen-bearing waste gases which require processing prior to release to the environment.

Prerequisites Verify an instrument calibration has been completed, with approved records and within all calibration due dates, for all instruments required to perform this test.

Component Level Tests Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria

i. Verify each GRWS remotely-operated Operate each valve from the (main MCR display and local, visual valve can be operated remotely. control room) MCR and local control observation indicate each valve fully panel (if design has local valve control). opens and fully closes.

ii. Verify each GRWS air-operated valve Place each valve in its non-safe position. MCR display and local, visual fails to its safe position on loss of air. Isolate and vent air to the valve. observation indicate each valve fails to its safe position.

iii. Verify each GRWS air-operated valve Place each valve in its non-safe position. MCR display and local, visual fails to its safe position on loss of Isolate electrical power to each air- observation indicate each valve fails to electrical power to its solenoid. operated valve. its safe position.

iv. Verify GRWS valves automatically i. Initiate a real or simulated high GRWS MCR display and local, visual operate to maintain vessel volume. moisture separator level. observation indicate the following:

ii. Initiate a real or simulated low GRWS i. The moisture separator drain valve is moisture separator level. open.

ii. The moisture separator drain valve is closed.

v. Verify GRWS inlet isolation valves Simulate a GRWS inlet stream oxygen MCR display and local, visual automatically close and nitrogen concentration high signal. observation indicate the following:

purge valve opens on high inlet i. The inlet stream isolation valves are stream oxygen concentration. closed.

ii. The nitrogen purge valve is open.

vi. Verify GRWS isolates upon loss of Simulate a loss of RWBVS exhaust flow. MCR display and local, visual RWBV exhaust flow. observation indicate the GRWS isolation valves are closed.

vii. Verify radiation isolation of GRWS i. Initiate a real or simulated GRWS MCR display and local, visual charcoal decay beds upon detection train A decay bed discharge flow observation indicate the following:

of decay bed discharge flow high high radiation signal. i. GRWS train A charcoal decay bed radiation level. ii. Initiate a real or simulated GRWS discharge isolation valve is closed.

train B decay bed discharge flow high [ITAAC 03.09.04]

radiation signal.

ii. GRWS train B charcoal decay bed discharge isolation valve is closed.

[ITAAC 03.09.05]

Tier 2 14.2-88 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-37: Solid Radioactive Waste System Test # 37 Preoperational test is required to be performed once.

The SRWS is described in Section 11.4 and the functions verified by this test or another preoperational test are:

System Function System Function Categorization Function Verified by Test #

1. The SRWS supports the LRWS by nonsafety-related Test #37-1 receiving spent resin and carbon bed Test #37-4 from LRW processing skids. Test #37-6 Test #37-7

2. The SRWS supports the CVCS by nonsafety-related Test #37-2 receiving spent resin from CVCS ion Test #37-5 exchange vessels. Test #37-7

3. The SRWS supports the PCUS by nonsafety-related Test #37-3 receiving spent resin and sludge Test #37-5 from PCUS ion exchange vessels. Test #37-7

4. The SRWS supports the CRVS by nonsafety-related Test #37-8 receiving exhausted HEPA filters to be compacted and shipped off site.

5. The SRWS supports the RWBVS by nonsafety-related Test #37-8 receiving exhausted HEPA filters to be compacted and shipped off site.

6. The SRWS supports the RBVS by nonsafety-related Test #37-8 receiving exhausted HEPA filters and charcoal bed from RXB and normal control room HVAC, to be compacted and shipped off site.

7. The SRWS supports the GRWS by nonsafety-related Test #37-8 receiving contaminated or exhausted charcoal beds, packaging the waste in approved containers and shipping it to a licensed facility.

8. The SRWS supports portions of the nonsafety-related Test #37-8 Annex Building HVAC system by receiving, compacting, packaging, and storing exhausted HEPA and charcoal filters for storage and shipment offsite.

9. The LRWS supports the solid nonsafety-related Test #37-7 radioactive waste system (SRWS) by LRWS Test #35-2 receiving and processing liquid radioactive waste from the SRWS dewatering skid.

Prerequisites Verify an instrument calibration has been completed, with approved records and within all calibration due dates, for all instruments required to perform this test.

Component Level Tests Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria

i. Verify each SRWS remotely-operated Operate each valve from the MCR and MCR display and local, visual valve can be operated remotely. local control panel (if design has local observation indicate each valve fully valve control). opens and fully closes.

ii. Verify each SRWS air-operated valve Place each valve in its non-safe position. MCR display and local, visual fails to its safe position on loss of air. Isolate and vent air to the valve. observation indicate each valve fails to its safe position.

Tier 2 14.2-90 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-38: Chemical and Volume Control System Test # 38 Preoperational test is required to be performed for each NPM.

The CVCS is described in Section 9.3.4 and 11.5.2.2.11 and the functions verified by this test, other preoperational tests and power ascension testing are:

System Function System Function Categorization Function Verified by Test #

1. The CVCS supports the RCS by nonsafety-related Test #38-1 providing primary coolant makeup. Ramp Change in Load Demand Test #100

2. The CVCS supports the RCS by nonsafety-related Test #38-1 providing primary coolant letdown. Ramp Change in Load Demand Test #100

3. The CVCS supports the RCS by nonsafety-related Test #38-2 providing pressurizer spray flow for Ramp Change in Load Demand RCS pressure control. Test #100

4. The CVCS supports the RCS by nonsafety-related Test #38-3 changing the boron concentration of the primary coolant.

5. The BAS supports the CVCS by nonsafety-related Test #38-3 providing uniformly mixed borated water on demand.

6. The LRWS supports the CVCS by nonsafety-related Test #38-1 receiving and processing primary LRWS Test #35-2 coolant from CVCS letdown.

The CVCS functions verified by other tests are:

The CVCS supports emergency core nonsafety-related MPS Test #63-6TGS Test #33-1 cooling system (ECCS) valves by providing water to reset the ECCS valves.

The CVCS supports the RCS by heating nonsafety-related TGS Test #33-1 primary coolant.

The CVCS supports the RCS by isolating safety-related MPS Test #63-6 dilution sources.

The CVCS supports the RCS by providing nonsafety-related MPS Test #63-11 primary coolant makeup in beyond design basis events.

Prerequisites

i. Verify an instrument calibration has been completed, with approved records and within all calibration due dates, for all instruments required to perform this test.

ii. Verify a pump curve test has been completed and approved for the CVCS pumps.

iii. Component Level Tests iv., v., and vi. must be performed under preoperational test conditions that approximate design-basis temperature, differential pressure, and flow conditions to the extent practicable, consistent with preoperational test limitations.

Component Level Tests Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria

i. Verify each CVCS remotely-operated Operate each valve from the MCR and MCR display and local, visual valve can be operated remotely. local control panel (if design has local observation indicate each valve fully valve control). opens and fully closes.

ii. Verify each CVCS air-operated valve Place each valve in its non-safe position. MCR display and local, visual fails to its safe position on loss of Isolate electrical power to each observation indicate each valve fails to electrical power to its solenoid. air-operated valve. its safe position.

iii. Verify each CVCS air-operated valve Place each valve in its non-safe position. MCR display and local, visual fails to its safe position on loss of air. Isolate and vent air to the valve. observation indicate each valve fails to its safe position Tier 2 14.2-93 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-38: Chemical and Volume Control System Test # 38 (Continued)

System Level Test #38-1 Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria Verify proper operation of the automatic This test will be performed in i. MCS data indicates that automatic pressurizer level control. conjunction with turbine generator pressurizer level control is test #33-1, which heats the RCS from maintained within the design ambient conditions to no less than operating level band.letdown 4205°F but as high as reasonably maintained pressurizer level at achievable. setpoint.

i. For pressurizer automatic level ii. MCS data indicates that the control on the low end of the design pressurizer level control results in an operating band usePlace pressurizer increased pressurizer level within level control in automatic operation acceptable limits of the target during RCS heatup to demonstrate pressurizer level.CVCS makeup to automatic letdown. Use the module the RCS to increase pressurizer level control system (MCS) data historian to the target setpoint.

to review pressurizer level at maximum-obtained RCS temperature.

ii. To raise pressurizer level, use MCS automation and operator permission to increase to a target pressurizer level.

Note: Pressurizer letdown level control is automatic; however pressurizer makeup level control is automatic with consent of operator.

System Level Test #38-2 Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria Verify proper operation of the automatic This test will be performed in i. MCS data indicates automatic pressurizer pressure control. conjunction with turbine generator pressurizer heater operation raised test #33-1 which heats the RCS from pressurizer pressure to the setpoint.

ambient conditions to no less than ii. MCS data indicates automatic 4205°F but as high as reasonably pressurizer spray valve operation achievable. lowered pressurizer pressure to the Place pressurizer pressure control in spray valve closure setpoint.MCS automatic and raise pressure setpoint to data indicates that automatic the normal operating band. pressurizer pressure control is Raise pressurizer pressure to the maintained within the design pressurizer spray valve open setpoint. operating pressure band.

Use the MCS data historian to review pressurizer pressure at maximum-obtained RCS temperature.

Tier 2 14.2-96 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-38: Chemical and Volume Control System Test # 38 (Continued)

System Level Test #38-3 Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria Verify proper operation of CVCS This test will be performed in i. BAS storage tank sample boron automatic dilution and boration control. conjunction with turbine generator concentration is within test #33-1 which heats the RCS from specifications.

ambient conditions to no less than ii. MCS data indicates that the dilution 4205°F but as high as reasonably of the RCS results in a decreased achievable. boron concentration within Ensure that RCS low flow rate alarm is acceptable limits of the target clear to ensure adequate mixing for concentration.

dilution and boration. iii. MCS data indicates that the boration

i. Place the BAS storage tank on of the RCS results in a increased recirculation and sample boron boron concentration within concentration. acceptable limits of the target ii. Use the MCS automation and concentration.

operator permission to decrease to a target RCS boron concentration.

iii. Use the MCS and operator permission to increase to a target RCS boron concentration.

Tier 2 14.2-97 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-39: Boron Addition System Test # 39 Preoperational test is required to be performed for each NPM.

The boron addition system (BAS) is described in Section 9.3.4. The BAS function verified by this test is:

System Function System Function Categorization Function Verified by Test #

The BAS supports the SFPCS by providing nonsafety-related component-level test xiiiTest #39-1 borated water to the RXB pools.

The BAS function verified by other test is:

System Function System Function Categorization Function Verified by Test #

The BAS supports the CVCS by providing nonsafety-related CVCS Test #38-3 uniformly mixed borated water on demand.

Prerequisites

i. Verify an instrument calibration has been completed, with approved records and within all calibration due dates, for all instruments required to perform this test.

ii. Verify a pump curve test has been completed and approved for the BAS pumps.

Component Level Tests Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria

i. Verify each BAS remotely-operated Operate each valve from the MCR and MCR display and local, visual valve can be operated remotely. local control panel (if design has local observation indicate each valve fully valve control). opens and fully closes.

ii. Verify each BAS air-operated valve Place each valve in its non-safe position. MCR display and local, visual fails to its safe position on loss of air. Isolate and vent air to the valve. observation indicate each valve fails to its safe position.

iii. Verify each BAS air-operated valve Place each valve in its non-safe position. MCR display and local, visual fails to its safe position on loss of Isolate electrical power to each air- observation indicate each valve fails to electrical power to its solenoid. operated valve. its safe position.

iv. Verify the BAS transfer pump can be Align the BAS to allow for pump MCR display and local, visual started and stopped remotely. operation. observation indicate the pump starts Stop and start the transfer pump from and stops.

the MCR. Audible and visible water hammer are not observed when the pump starts.

v. Verify the BAS supply pump can be Align the BAS to allow for pump MCR display and local, visual started and stopped remotely. operation. observation indicate the pump starts Start and stop the supply pump from the and stops.

MCR. Audible and visible water hammer are not observed when the pump starts.

vi. Verify the speed of the BAS variable- Align the BAS to provide a flow path to MCR display indicates the speed of each speed pumps can be manually operate a selected pump. pump obtains both minimum and controlled. Vary the BAS pump speed from maximum pump speeds.

minimum to maximum from the MCR. Audible and visible water hammer are not observed when the pump starts.

vii. Verify BAS valves automatically i. Initiate a real or simulated high BAS MCR display and local, visual operate to protect plant equipment. batch tank level signal. observation indicate the following:

ii. Initiate a real or simulated high BAS i. The batch tank fill and return valves storage tank level signal. are fully closed.

ii. The storage tank fill and recirculation valves are fully closed.

Tier 2 14.2-98 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-39: Boron Addition System Test # 39 (Continued) viii. Verify the BAS transfer pump stops Align the BAS to allow for pump MCR display and local, visual automatically to protect plant operation. observation indicate the following:

equipment. i. Place the BAS transfer pump in i. The transfer pump stops.

service on recirculation to the BAS ii. The transfer pump stops.

batch tank. Initiate a simulated a low batch tank level signal.

ii. Place the BAS transfer pump in service on recirculation to the BAS storage tank. Simulate a low storage tank level signal.

ix. Verify BAS supply pumps stop Align the BAS to allow for pump MCR display and local, visual automatically to protect plant operation. observation indicate the following:

equipment. i. Place a BAS supply pump in service i. The supply pump stops.

on recirculation to the BAS batch ii. The supply pump stops.

bank. Initiate a simulated a low batch tank level signal.

ii. Place a supply pump in service on recirculation to the BAS storage tank.

Initiate a simulated low storage tank level signal.

x. Verify BAS flow capability by Align the BAS to allow for pump MCR display and local, visual automatic start of each BAS supply operation. Place a supply pump in observation indicate the standby pump pump while in standby mode. service. Initiate a simulated pump trip starts.

signal. Audible and visible water hammer are not observed when the pump starts.

xi. Verify supply pump low flow Align the BAS to allow a BAS supply MCR displays and local, visual protection. pump flow sufficient to close the pump observation verifies the following:

recirculation valve to the storage tank. i. The pump recirculation valve is

i. Manually throttle a valve in the pump open.

flow path until the flow rate reaches ii. The pump recirculation valve is the pump minimum flow setpoint. closed.

ii. Open the throttled valve xii. Verify a local grab sample can be Place the system in service to allow flow A local grab sample is successfully obtained from a BAS grab sample through the grab sampling device. obtained.

device.

xiii. Verify the BAS automatically adds a i. Verify the BAS batch tank contains a MCR displays and local, visual specified quantity of borated water sufficient volume of water to conduct observation verifies the following:

from the BAS batch tank to the RXB this test. i. The BAS to SFPCS valve initially pools. ii. Align the BAS and the SFPCS to opens to supply water from the BAS supply water from the BAS to the to the SFPCS pump suction.

SFPCS pump suction. ii. The BAS to SFPCS valve iii. Enter a BAS batch tank target level to automatically closes when the BAS terminate batch operation to the batch tank obtains the target level.

spent fuel pool.

xiiiv.Verify each BAS instrument is Initiate a single real or simulated The instrument signal is displayed on an available on an MCS or PCS display. instrument signal from each BAS MCS or PCS display, or is recorded by the (Test not required if the instrument transmitter. applicable control system historian.

calibration verified the MCS or PCS display.)

Tier 2 14.2-99 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-39: Boron Addition System Test # 39 (Continued)

System Level Tests NoneSystem Level Test #39-1 Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria

i. Verify the BAS automatically adds a i. Verify the BAS batch tank contains a MCR displays and local, visual specified quantity of borated water sufficient volume of water to conduct observation verifies the following:

from the BAS batch tank to the RXB this test. i. The BAS to SFPCS valve initially pools. ii. Align the BAS and the SFPCS to opens to supply water from the BAS supply water from the BAS to the to the SFPCS pump suction.

SFPCS pump suction. ii. The BAS to SFPCS valve iii. Enter a BAS batch tank target level to automatically closes when the BAS terminate batch operation to the batch tank obtains the target level.

spent fuel pool.

Tier 2 14.2-100 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-41: Containment Evacuation System Test # 41 Preoperational test is required to be performed for each NPM.

The CES is described in Sections 9.3.6, 11.5.2.2.7 and 5.2.5 and the functions verified by this test or another preoperational test are:

System Function System Function Categorization Function Verified by Test #

1. The CES supports the CNTS by nonsafety-related Test #41-1 removing water vapor from the Test #41-2 containment vessel (CNV). Test #41-3

2. The CES supports the CNTS by nonsafety-related Test #41-1 condensing water vapor removed Test #41-2 from the CNV in the containment Test #41-3 evacuation condenser.

3. The CES supports the CNTS by nonsafety-related Test #41-1 removing non-condensable gases Test #41-2 from the CNV. Test #41-3

4. The CES supports CNTS by providing nonsafety-related Test #41-4 leak-before-break leak detection monitoring capability.

5. The CES supports the RCS by nonsafety-related Test #41-3 providing RCS leak detection monitoring capability.

6. The GRWS supports the CES by nonsafety-related Test #41-2 receiving and / or collecting GRWS Test #36-1 potentially radioactive and hydrogen-bearing waste gases which require processing prior to release to the environment.

Prerequisites Verify an instrument calibration has been completed, with approved records and within all calibration due dates, for all instruments required to perform this test.

Component Level Tests Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria

i. Verify each CES remotely-operated Operate each valve from the MCR and MCR display and local, visual valve can be operated remotely. local control panel (if design has local observation indicate each valve fully valve control). opens and fully closes.

ii. Verify each CES air-operated valve Place each CES valve in its non-safe MCR display and local, visual fails to its safe position on loss of air. position. Isolate and vent air to the valve. observation indicate each valve fails to its safe position.

iii. Verify each CES air-operated valve Place each CES valve in its non-safe MCR display and local, visual fails to its safe position on loss of position. Isolate electrical power to each observation indicate each valve fails to electrical power to its solenoid. CES air-operated valve. its safe position.

iv. Verify each CES pump can be started Stop and start each pump from the MCR. MCR display and local, visual and stopped remotely. observation indicate each pump starts and stops.

v. Verify the speed of each CES variable- Vary the speed of each pump from the MCR display indicates pump speed speed pump can be manually MCR and local control panel (if design varies from minimum to maximum controlled. has local pump control). speed.

vi. Verify each CES pump automatically Place a pump in operation. Initiate a real MCR displays and local, visual stops to protect plant equipment. or simulated signal for each pump trip observation verifies the pump stops.

condition.

vii. Verify each CES pump suction and Open the pump suction and discharge Each pump suction and discharge valve discharge valve automatically closes valves. closes on each real or simulated valve to protect the CES equipment. Initiate a real or simulated signal for each close condition.

valve close conditions.

Tier 2 14.2-102 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-41: Containment Evacuation System Test # 41 (Continued) viii. Verify a local grab sample can be Place the system in service to allow flow A local grab sample is successfully obtained from a CES grab sample through the grab sampling device. obtained.

device indicated on the CES piping and instrumentation diagram.

ix. Verify each CES instrument is Initiate a single real or simulated The instrument signal is displayed on an available on an MCS or PCS display. instrument signal from each CES MCS or PCS display, or is recorded by the (Test not required if the instrument transmitter. applicable control system historian.

calibration verified the MCS or PCS display.)

System Level Test #41-1 Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria Verify the automatic operation of the CES After the containment flooding and drain The automated control establishes and to establish and maintain design vacuum system (CFDS) completes draindown of maintains vacuum in the CNV.

for the CNV. the CNV and the NPM is in hot functional testing, place the CES in automatic operation.

System Level Test #41-2 Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria Verify radiation isolation and flow The NPM is in hot functional testing with i. The CES effluent flow path to the diversion on high radiation level in the the RCS at normal operating pressure. RBVS is isolated and diverted to CES. The CES is operating in automatic control GRWS.

with a CNV steady-state vacuum pressure [ITAAC 02.07.01]

indicating the noncondensable gases have been removed from the CNV.

ii. The CES effluent to process sample Initiate a real or simulated high radiation panel isolation valve is closed.

signal for the CES vacuum pump

[ITAAC 02.07.01]

discharge.

iii. The CES purge air solenoid valves to the vacuum pumps are closed.

[ITAAC 02.07.01]

iv. The automated control maintains vacuum in the CNV.

Tier 2 14.2-103 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-48: Decay Heat Removal System Test # 48 Preoperational test is required to be performed for each NPM.

The DHRS is described in Section 6.3. DHRS functions are not verified by DHRS tests. DHRS functions verified by other tests are:

System Function System Function Categorization Function Verified by Test #

1. The DHRS supports the RCS by safety-related MPS Test #63-6 opening the DHRS actuation valves Reactor Trip from 100 Percent Power for DHRS operation. Test # 104

2. The DHRS supports the MPS by safety-related MPS Test #63-1 providing MPS actuation instrument information signals.

3. The DHRS supports the MPS by nonsafety-related SDIS Test #66-2 providing PAM instrument information signals.

4. The UHS supports the DHRS by safety-related Reactor Trip from 100 Percent Power accepting the heat from the DHRS Test # 104 heat exchanger.

Prerequisites Verify an instrument calibration has been completed, with approved records and within all calibration due dates, for all instruments required to perform this test.

Component Level Tests Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria

i. Verify each DHRS instrument is Initiate a single real or simulated The instrument signal is displayed on an available on an MCS or PCS display. instrument signal from each DHRS MCS or PCS display, or is recorded by the (Test not required if the instrument transmitter. applicable control system historian.

calibration verified the MCS or PCS display.)

System Level Tests None Tier 2 14.2-113 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-49: In-core Instrumentation System Test # 49 Preoperational test is required to be performed for each NPM.

The in-core instrumentation system (ICIS) is described in Section 7.0.4.7 and the function verified by this test and power ascension testing is:

System Function System Function Categorization Function Verified by Test #

1. The ICIS supports the MPS by nonsafety-related Test #49-1 providing reactor core (RXC) Reactor Coolant System Temperature temperature information. Instrument Calibration Test #93 The ICIS functions verified by another test is:

System Function System Function Categorization Function Verified by Test #

The ICIS supports the MPS by providing nonsafety-related SDIS Test #66-2 RXC temperature information.

Prerequisites

i. The ICIS instrument strings are inserted into the core.

ii. Verify an instrument calibration has been performed on all ICIS thermocouples by cross-calibrating the thermocouple to the RCS narrow range resistance temperature detectors (RTDs) prior to RCS heatup.

Component Level Tests None System Level Test #49-1 Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria Verify proper temperature indication is Heat the RCS from ambient conditions to MCS data indicates that the ICIS obtained from the ICIS thermocouples. normal operating temperaturethe thermocouples respond properly.

maximum RCS temperature that can be obtained by the Module Heating System.

Use the MCS data historian to cross-check the ICIS thermocouples to each other and the RCS narrow-range and wide range RTDs.

Tier 2 14.2-114 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-53: Process Sampling System Test # 53 (Continued)

System Level Test #53-3 Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria Verify sampling capability of the i. The NPM is in hot functional testing i. The PSS secondary sampling system secondary sampling points. with the RCS at normal operating feedwater/main steam sample panel pressure and the maximum instruments provide indication of operating temperature achievable by the water and steam analysis.

heating the RCS with the MHS. ii. The feedwater/main steam ion The FWS and MSS are in service. chromatography analysis panel Align the FWS, MSS, PSS, and ABSPSS monitors the programmed ion.

to provide continuous sampling flow iii. The feedwater/main steam ion to the PSS secondary sampling chromatography analysis panel system feedwater/main steam monitors the programmed ion.

sample panel. iv. The feedwater/main steam ion ii. Open the manual feedwater/main chromatography analysis panel steam ion chromatography analysis monitors the programmed ion.

panel valve to obtain a feedwater to v. The feedwater/main steam ion SG sample. chromatography analysis panel iii. Open the manual feedwater/main monitors the programmed ion.

steam ion chromatography analysis panel valve to obtain an SG-1 steam sample.

iv. Open the manual feedwater/main steam ion chromatography analysis panel valve to obtain a SG-2 steam sample.

v. Open the manual feedwater/main steam ion chromatography analysis panel valve to obtain a condensate pump discharge sample.

Tier 2 14.2-127 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program RAI 01-1 Table 14.2-57: Highly Reliable DC Power System Test # 57 Component level tests are required to be performed for each NPM, and once for the EDSS common channels.

System Level Test #57-1 and Test #57-2 are required to be performed once.

System Level Test #57-1 and Test #57-2 may be performed concurrently.

System Level Test #57-3 is required to be performed once for each NPM.

The EDSS is described in Sections 8.1.2.2, 8.1.4.2 and 8.3.2.1.1, and the functions verified by this test are:

System Function System Function Categorization Function Verified by Test #

The highly reliable DC power system nonsafety-related All functions are verified by component-(EDSS) supports the following systems by level tests.

providing DC electrical power. System level tests provide additional

• MPS verification as follows:

• neutron monitoring system (NMS) PLS - Test #57-1

• fixed area radiation monitoring system SDIS - Test #57-2 (RMS)

MPS - Test #57-3

• plant lighting system (PLS)

• PPS

• safety display information system (SDIS)

• CRVS EDS system functions verified by other tests are:

System Function System Function Categorization Function Verified by Test #

1. EDSS supports the MPS by providing nonsafety-related Reference 14.2-66SDIS Test #66, EDSS module-specific operating Component-level test: Module-Specific parameter information signals. test iii.

Component level test

2. EDSS supports the PPS by providing nonsafety-related Reference 14.2-66SDIS Test #66, EDSS common operating parameter Component-level test: Common test iii.

information signals. Component level test Prerequisites

i. Verify an instrument calibration has been completed, with approved records and within all calibration due dates, for all instruments required to perform this test.

ii. Verify a valve-regulated lead-acid battery acceptance tests has been performed on all EDSS batteries to confirm battery capacity in accordance with IEEE Standard 1188 Sections 6 and 7.

iii. Verify battery charger performance testing has been completed by the manufacturer or a site acceptance test has been completed in accordance with manufacturer instructions.

Component Level Tests Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria

i. Verify each EDSS bus can be powered Configure the EDSS batteries and battery EDSS bus voltage is within design limits.

by its associated batteries. chargers associated with an EDSS bus such that one of the batteries is the only source of power to the bus.

Repeat the test using the other battery associated with the EDSS bus under test as the only power source.

Repeat the test for the remaining EDSS channels.

Tier 2 14.2-132 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-57: Highly Reliable DC Power System Test # 57 (Continued) ii. Verify each EDSS bus can be powered Configure the EDSS batteries and battery EDSS bus voltage is within design limits.

by its associated battery chargers. chargers associated with an EDSS bus such that one of the battery chargers is (Test may be performed as part of the only source of power to the bus.

site acceptance testing.)

Repeat the test using the other battery charger associated with the EDSS bus under test as the only power source.

Repeat the test for the remaining EDSS channels.

iii. Verify each EDSS instrument is Initiate a single real or simulated The instrument signal is displayed on an available on an MCS or PCS display. instrument signal from each EDSS MCS or PCS display, or recorded by the (Test not required if the instrument transmitter. applicable control system historian.

calibration verified the MCS or PCS display.)

System Level Tests System Level Test #57-1 Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria Verify the EDSS common buses provide i. With both EDSS common buses i. The MCR lighting designed to be independent power to the main control energized and providing power to powered by the EDSS Division I room (MCR) emergency lighting. MCR emergency lighting, common bus is de-energized, and de-energize the EDSS Division I the MCR emergency lighting (RG 1.41 Independence Test) common bus. designed to be powered by the EDSS Division II common bus is ii. With both EDSS common buses energized.

energized and providing power to MCR emergency lighting, ii. The MCR emergency lighting de-energize the EDSS Division II designed to be powered by the common bus. EDSS Division II common bus is de-energized, and the MCR emergency lighting designed to be powered by the EDSS Division I common bus is energized.

System Level Test #57-2 Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria Verify the EDSS common buses provide i. With EDSS Division I and Division II i. Power is available in the MCR for independent power to all SDIS MCR common buses energized verify SDIS displays.

displays. power is available in the MCR for all SDIS displays. ii.a. Power is not available in the MCR for (RG 1.41 Independence Test) SDIS Division I displays.

ii. De-energize the EDSS Division I common bus. ii.b. Power is available in the MCR for SDIS Division II displays.

iii. Re-energize the EDSS Division I common bus and de-energize the iii.a. Power is not available in the MCR for EDSS Division II common bus. SDIS Division II displays.

iii.b. Power is available in the MCR for SDIS Division I displays.

Tier 2 14.2-133 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-63: Module Protection System Test #63 Preoperational test is required to be performed for each NPM.

The MPS is described in Sections 7.0, 7.1, and 7.2 and the functions verified by this test and power ascension testing are:

System Function System Function Categorization Function Verified by Test #

1. The MPS supports the CNTS by safety-related Test #63-4 removing electrical power to the trip Test #63-6 solenoids of the following CIVs on a containment system isolation actuation signal:

• RCS injection containment isolation valves

• RCS discharge containment isolation valves

• Pressurizer spray containment isolation valves

• RPV high point degasification containment isolation valves

• Feedwater containment isolation valves

• Main steam containment isolation valves

• Main steam bypass valves

• CES containment isolation valves

• RCCWS containment isolation valves

• CFDS containment isolation valves

2. The MPS supports the CNTS by safety-related Test #63-4 removing electrical power to the trip Test #63-6 solenoids of the following valves on a DHRS actuation signal.

• DHRS actuation valves

• Main steam isolation valves

• Main steam bypass isolation valves

• Feedwater isolation valves

3. The MPS supports the ECCS by safety-related Test #63-4 removing electrical power to the trip Test #63-6 solenoids of the following valves on an ECCS actuation signal.

• Reactor vent valves

• Reactor recirculation valves Tier 2 14.2-144 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-63: Module Protection System Test #63 (Continued)

4. The MPS supports the safety-related Test #63-4 CNTSontainment system by Test #63-6 removing electrical power to the trip solenoids of the following containment isolation valves on a CVCS isolation actuation signal:

• RCS injection containment isolation valves

• RCS discharge containment isolation valves

• PZR pressurizer spray CIVs

• RPV high point degasification containment isolation valves

5. The MPS supports the CVCS by safety-related Test #63-4 removing electrical power to the trip Test #63-6 solenoids of the DWS supply isolation valves on a DWS isolation actuation signal.

6. The MPS supports the ECCS by safety-related Test #63-4 removing electrical power to the trip Test #63-6 solenoids of the reactor vent valves on an LTOP actuation signal.

7. The MPS supports the ELVS by safety-related Test #63-4 removing electrical power to the Test #63-6 pressurizer heaters on a pressurizer heater trip actuation signal.

8. The MPS supports the EDNS by safety-related Test #63-4 removing electrical power to the Test #63-5 CRDS for a reactor trip.

9. The DHRS supports the RCS by safety-related Test #63-6 opening the DHRS actuation valves on a DHRS actuation signal for DHRS operation.

10. The CNTS supports the DHRS by safety-related Test #63-6 closing CIVs for the main steam and feedwater systems when actuated by the MPS.

11. The CNTS supports the RCS by safety-related Test #63-6 closing the CIVs for pressurizer spray, RCS injection, RCS letdown, and RPV high point degasification when actuated by the MPS.

12. The CNTS supports the RXB by safety-related Test #63-6 providing a barrier to contain mass, energy, and fission product release by closure of the CIVs upon a containment isolation signal.

13. The ECCS supports the RCS by safety-related Test #63-6 opening the ECCS reactor vent valves and reactor recirculation valves when their respective trip valve is actuated by the MPS.

Tier 2 14.2-145 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-63: Module Protection System Test #63 (Continued)

14. The ECCS supports the RCS by safety-related Test #63-6 providing recirculated coolant from the containment to the RPV for the removal of core heat.

15. The ECCS supports the RCS by safety-related Test #63-6 providing LTOP for maintaining the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

16. The CVCS supports the RCS by safety-related Test #63-6 isolating dilution sources.

17. The FWS supports the CNTS by nonsafety-related Test #63-6 providing secondary isolation of the feedwater lines.

18. The MSS supports the CNTS by nonsafety-related Test #63-6 providing secondary isolation of the main steam lines.

19. The FWS supports the DHRS by nonsafety-related Test #63-6 providing secondary isolation of the feedwater lines, ensuring required boundary conditions for DHRS operation.

20. The NMS supports the MPS by safety-related Test #63-14 providing neutron flux data for Neutron Monitoring System Power various reactor trips. Range Flux Calibration Test #92

21. ECCS supports MPS by providing nonsafety-related Test #63-1 instrumentation information signals.

22. The DHRS supports the MPS by safety-related Test #63-1 providing MPS actuation instrument information signals.

23. The RCS supports the MPS by nonsafety-related Test #63-1 providing instrument information signals.

24. The RCS supports the MPS by safety-related Test #63-1 providing instrument information signals for LTOP actuation

25. The CVCS supports the RCS by nonsafety-related Test #63-116 providing primary coolant makeup in beyond design basis events.ECCS valves by providing water to reset the ECCS valves.

26. The CFDS supports the RCS by nonsafety-related Test #63-11 providing borated coolant inventory for the removal of core heat during a beyond design basis accident.

27. The MPS supports the DHRS by safety-related Test #63-6 removing electrical power to the trip solenoids of the DHRS actuation valves on a DHRS actuation signal.

28. The MPS supports the CNTS by safety-related Test #63-1 providing power to sensors.

29. The MPS supports the DHRS by safety-related Test #63-1 providing power to sensors.

30. The MPS supports the RCS by safety-related Test #63-1 providing power to sensors.

Tier 2 14.2-146 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-63: Module Protection System Test #63 (Continued)

Prerequisite Verify an instrument calibration has been completed, with approved records and within all calibration due dates, for all instruments required to perform this test.

A complete staging and testing of system hardware and software configurations will be conducted. This factory acceptance testing will be conducted in accordance with a written test procedure for testing the software and hardware of the MPS prior to installation in the plant. Following installation, site acceptance testing shall be completed in accordance with developed procedures to ensure the MPS is installed and fully functional as designed. This testing must be completed and approved prior to performing preoperational testing.

Component Level Tests None System Level Test #63-1 Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria Verify the instrument signals of MPS Table 7.1-2 lists all of sensors which input Each MPS monitored signal is displayed monitored variables are displayed in the to MPS. on an MCR workstation and the module-MCR. This test may be performed concurrently specific safety display instrument panel with safety display and indication system (if designed for safety display instrument (SDIS) test #66 -2 for PAM Type B and display).

Type C testing described in Section 14.2.12.

Inject a single signal as close as practical for each sensor listed in Table 7.1-2 and monitor its response on an MCR workstation and the module-specific safety display instrument panel (if designed for safety display instrument display).

If the sensor signal is designed to be disconnected when the NPM is moved then it will be necessary to test the signal from the sensor to the disconnect and then from the disconnect to the MCR display.

System Level Test #63-2 (Not used)

Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria

i. Verify the reactor trip logic fails to a This test will verify initiation of a trip i. Loss of electrical power in a safe state such that loss of electrical state for MPS separation groups on loss separation group results in a reactor power to an MPS separation group of power to that separation group. trip state for that separation group.

results in a reactor trip state for that Component actuation is not required or [ITAAC 02.05.14]

separation group. verified.

ii. Loss of electrical power in a ii. Verify the ESF logic fails to a safe i. Remove power from one separation separation group results in the state such that loss of electrical group of one reactor trip function predefined state for that separation power to an MPS separation group listed in Table 7.1-3 to provide a trip group.

results in a predefined safe state for state for that separation group. [ITAAC 02.05.15]

that separation group. Repeat tests for all separation groups for all reactor trip functions.

ii. Remove power from one separation group of one ESF actuation function listed in Table 7.1-4 to provide a predefined state for that separation group.

Repeat tests for all separation groups for all ESF actuation functions.

Tier 2 14.2-147 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-63: Module Protection System Test #63 (Continued)

System Level Test #63-3 Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria Verify each ECCS reactor vent valve (RVV) This test will verify the stroke time of Each ECCS RRV and RVV travels from fully and reactor recirculation valve (RRV) each RRV and RVV by actuating the closed to fully open in less than or equal operates to satisfy its ESF-actuated valves with RCS pressure below the to the time specified in Technical design stroke time. inadvertent actuation block Specifications.

i. Verify MPS operating bypass setpoint.operation of each operating i. a. The operating bypasses are interlocks are automatically bypass interlock and operating bypass automatically established.

established when the associated permissive. Component actuation is not

b. The operating bypasses are interlock condition is satisfied and required or verified.

automatically removed.

automatically removed when the i. Close all RVVs and RRVs.

[ITAAC 02.05.18]

condition is not satisfied. ii. Verify RCS pressure is below the ii. Verify MPS operating bypasses can inadvertent actuation block setpoint ii. a. The operating bypasses can be be manually established when the specified in Technical Specifications. manually established.

associated permissive condition is iii. Actuate ECCS using the manual ECCS b. The operating bypasses are satisfied and automatically removed actuation switches in the MCR. automatically removed.

when the condition is not satisfied. Table 7.1-5 contains the following [ITAAC 02.05.19]

iii. Verify MCR alarms when operating information: iii. Each established operating bypass is bypasses are established. alarmed in the MCR.

• The identification of each operating bypass interlock and operating bypass [ITAAC 02.05.22]

permissive and their logic.

• The function of the operating bypass

i. a. Simulate the logic for an operating bypass interlock.

b. Remove the logic.

Repeat test for all operating bypass interlocks.

ii. a. Simulate the logic for an operating bypass permissive and manually establish the operating bypass.

b. Remove the logic.

Repeat test for all operating bypass permissives.

Tier 2 14.2-148 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-63: Module Protection System Test #63 (Continued)

System Level Test #63-4 Test #63-4 is performed concurrently with Test #63-6 which operates all of the ESF actuation valves during hot functional testing.

Test #63-4 records the stroke times of DHRS actuation valves as they travel to their ESF-actuated position with the RCS pressure at normal operating pressure.

Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria Verify each DHRS actuation valve Time the operation of all DHRS actuation Each DHRS actuation valve travels from operates to satisfy its ESF-actuated valves as they actuate to their ESF fully closed to fully open in less than or design stroke time. position during the manual ESF equal to the time specified in Technical

i. Verify the MPS automatically initiates actuation testing in Test #63-6.This test Specifications.

a reactor trip signal. verifies initiation of reactor trip signals i. A reactor trip signal is displayed in and ESF actuation signals only. the MCR for all 2 out of 4 logic ii. Verify the MPS automatically initiates Component actuation is not required or combinations of each reactor trip an ESF actuation signal.

verified. function.

Test #63-1 is completed in order to use [ITAAC 02.05.08]

the associated test signals.

ii. An ESF actuation signal is displayed Real or simulated CNTS level, reactor trip in the MCR for all 2 out of 4 logic breaker position, RCS temperature and combinations each reactor ESF NMS signals may be required to provide actuation function.

the necessary bypass interlock status for

[ITAAC 02.05.09]

either the reactor trip or ESF actuation to be available.

i. Initiate an automatic reactor trip signal by simulating a reactor trip function for each function listed in Table 7.1-3.

All combinations of the 2 out of 4 logic are tested for each reactor trip function.

ii. Initiate an automatic ESF actuation signal by simulating an ESF actuation function for each function listed in Table 7.1-4. All combinations of the 2 out of 4 logic must be actuated for each ESF function.

System Level Test #63-5 (Not used)

Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria

i. Verify the MPS manually actuates a This test will verify the automatic and i. The reactor trip breakers open.

reactor trip. manual reactor trips. Reactor trip [ITAAC 02.05.12]

ii. Verify the MPS automatically actuation is verified by reactor trip actuates a reactor trip. breaker actuation. Only one trip function is required to perform the automatic ii. The reactor trip breakers open.

reactor trip, [ITAAC 02.05.10]

i. Initiate a manual reactor trip from the MCR.

ii. Initiate an automatic reactor trip signal by simulating any single reactor trip function.

Tier 2 14.2-149 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-63: Module Protection System Test #63 (Continued)

System Level Test #63-6 Test 63-6 is performed at hot functional testing concurrently with TGS test #33-1 (reference 14.2.12.33) to allow testing of ESF actuations at normal operating pressure and elevated temperatures. Test #33-1 heats the RCS from ambient conditions to the highest temperature achievable by MHS heating. These hot functional testing conditions provide the highest differential pressure and temperature conditions that can be achieved prior to fuel load.

Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria

i. Verify the MPS can manually actuate Figure 7.1-1 identifies all ESF actuation i. The MPS actuates the ESF equipment ESF equipment from the MCR. signals such as CVCS isolation and CNTS to perform its safety-related function ii. Verify deliberate operator action is isolation. as described in Table 7.1-4.

required to return the ESF actuated Table 7.1-4 lists all of the ESF functions. Each ECCS valve opens after receipt equipment to its non-actuated This test will verify the design response of an ESF signal and after RCS position. of ESF actuation signals using both a pressure is decreased to the iii. Verify the MPS can automatically single manual ESF signal and a single ESF threshold pressure for operation of actuate ESF equipment from all ESF function to provide an automatic ESF the inadvertent actuation block actuation signals. actuation signal. All manual and described in described in Section automatic ESF functionsactuation signals 6.3.2.2.

are tested. [ITAAC 02.01.13]

The RCS is at normal operating pressure [ITAAC 02.01.14]

supplying bypass steam to the [ITAAC 02.01.15]

condenser. [ITAAC 02.01.18]

i. Initiate a manual ESF actuation signal [ITAAC 02.01.19]

from the MCR.

[ITAAC 02.01.20]

ii. a. Attempt to operate the actuated ESF equipment from the MCR. [ITAAC 02.05.13]

b. Remove the manual ESF [ITAAC 02.05.16]

actuation signal and attempt to ii. a. The actuated equipment cannot operate the actuated ESF be operated from the MCR.

equipment from the MCR. b. The actuated equipment cannot

c. Use the MCR enable nonsafety be operated from the MCR.

control switch to allow operation c. The ESF equipment can be of the ESF actuated equipment operated from the MCR.

from the MCR.

[ITAAC 02.01.13]

Repeat for all MCR manual ESF

[ITAAC 02.01.14]

actuations.

[ITAAC 02.01.15]

iii. Initiate an automatic ESF actuation signal. The test may be performed [ITAAC 02.05.16]

with the RCS at ambient conditions. iii. The MPS automatically actuates the Repeat for all ESF actuation signals. ESF equipment to perform its safety-related function as described in Table 7.1-4.

[ITAAC 02.01.13]

[ITAAC 02.01.14]

[ITAAC 02.01.15]

[ITAAC 02.01.18]

[ITAAC 02.01.20]

[ITAAC 02.05.11]

[ITAAC 02.05.16]

Tier 2 14.2-150 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-63: Module Protection System Test #63 (Continued)

System Level Test #63-7 Test #63-7 is performed concurrently with Test #63-6 which operates all of the ESF actuation valves during hot functional testing.

Test #63-7 records the stroke times of containment isolation valves (CIVs) as they travel to their ESF-actuated position with the RCS pressure at normal operating pressure.

Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria Verify the CIVs operate to satisfy their Table 6.2-5 contains the design closure i. Each containment isolation valve ESF-actuated design stroke time. time for containment isolation valves. travels from fully open to fully closed in less than or equal to the time listed in Table 6.2-5Section 6.2.4.3 after Time the operation of all CIVs as they receipt of a containment isolation actuate to their ESF position during the signal.

manual ESF actuation testing in Test #63-

6. [ITAAC 02.01.08]

[ITAAC 02.05.17]

System Level Test #63-8 This test will verify the time response of MPS reactor trip and ESF actuation signals. The reactor trip test verifies response time through reactor trip breaker actuation. The ESF response time is tested through the de-energization of the associated solenoid valve or the opening of the pressurizer heater supply breaker. ESF valve response times are tested in Test #63-7.

Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria Verify the MPS response times from Section 7.1.4 contains a description of The MPS reactor trip functions listed in sensor output through: design basis event actuation delays Table 7.1-3 and ESF functions listed in

i. reactor trip breaker actuation for the assumed in the plant safety analysis and Table 7.1-4 have response times that are reactor trip function. listed in Table 7.1-6. The actuation delays less than or equal to the design basis do not include ESF actuated component safety analysis response time ii. de-energization of the associated delays for actuated valves. assumptions in Table 7.1-6.

solenoid valve for ESF-actuated valves.

iii. opening of the pressurizer heater Perform a time response test for the [ITAAC 02.05.17]

supply breaker for the pressurizer actuation signals listed in Table 7.1-6.

heater trip.

Response time testing for ESF actuated CNTS, DHRS, ECCS and DWS valves are found in Test #63-7.

System Level Test #63-9 (Not used)

Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria Verify protective measures are provided Section 7.2.9.1 provides the manual All actions described in Section 7.2.9.1 to restrict modifications to the MPS actions required to modify tunable are required to modify tunable tunable parameters. parameters. parameters.

A test will be performed to verify that all [ITAAC 02.05.02]

manual actions described in Section 7.2.9.1 are required to modify tunable parameters.

Tier 2 14.2-151 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-63: Module Protection System Test #63 (Continued)

System Level Test #63-10 Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria

i. Verify the MPS is capable of Section 7.2.4.2 discusses the operation of i. a. The SFM out of service provides a performing its safety-related the MPS maintenance bypass operation no trip to the respective functions when one of its separation for the MPS safety function module scheduling and voting groups is placed in maintenance (SFM).The purpose of this test is to verify module.Each automatic bypass.Verify MCR alarms when MCR alarms, not to verify the logic of the operating bypass is alarmed in automatic operating bypasses are operating bypasses. Any signal that the MCR.

established. establishes the bypass can be used. [ITAAC 02.05.22]

ii. Verify MCR alarms when manual Table 7.1-5 contains a list of operating ii. b. There is no change to the 2 out of operating bypasses are established. bypasses. 4 voting logic for the separation iii. Verify MPS maintenance bypasses group.Each manual operating are indicated in the main control i. For automatically established bypass is alarmed in the MCR.

room. operating bypasses perform the [ITAAC 02.05.221]

following:

iii. The inoperable status of the SFM is a..Simulate the logic required to provided in the MCR.

establish the operating bypass.

[ITAAC 02.05.23]

b..Remove the logic.

c..Repeat for each automatically established operating bypass.

i. For manually established operating bypasses perform the following:

a..Simulate the logic required to allow the operating bypass to be established.

b..Manually establish the operating bypass.

c..Repeat the logic.

d..Repeat for each manually established operating bypass.

ii. a. Place an SFM in maintenance bypass by using the out of service and trip/bypass switches associated with the SFM.

b. Repeat tests for all SFMs.

Tier 2 14.2-152 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-63: Module Protection System Test #63 (Continued)

System Level Test #63-11 Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria Verify the controls located on the Test is performed to verify operation of i. Water is added to the RCS.

operator workstations in the MCR redundant trains and divisions. ii. Water is added to the RCS.

operate to perform important human i. Use MPS Division I controls, BAS iii. Water is added to containment.

actions. supply pump A train, and CVCS iv. Water is added to containment.

makeup pump A train to perform the following:A test will be performed to [ITAAC 02.05.20]

verify the CVCS can add water to the [ITAAC 02.05.26]

RCS after a containment isolation (i., and ii., iii., and iv.)

signal using the O-1 override switch and MCR controls.

a. Insert a manual containment isolation signal.

b. Override the containment isolation signal using the CNTS isolation override switch.

c. Enable nonsafety controls using the enable nonsafety control switch.

d. Using an operator workstation in the MCR, align the BAS, CVCS, and CNTS to add inventory to the RCS.

ii. Use MPS Division II controls, BAS supply pump B train, and CVCS makeup pump B train to perform the following:A test will be performed to verify the CFDS can add water to containment after a containment isolation signal using the O-1 override switch and MCR controls.

a. Insert a manual containment isolation signal.

b. Override the containment isolation signal using the CNTS isolation override switch.

c. Enable nonsafety controls using the enable nonsafety control switch.

d. Using an operator workstation in the MCR, align the BAS, CVCS, and CNTS to add inventory to the RCS.

iii. Use MPS Division I controls and CFDS pump A train to perform the following:

a. Insert a manual containment isolation signal.

b. Override the containment isolation signal using the CNTS isolation override switch.

Tier 2 14.2-153 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-63: Module Protection System Test #63 (Continued)

c. Enable nonsafety controls using the enable nonsafety control switch.

d. Using an operator workstation in the MCR, align the CFDS and CNTS to add inventory to containment.

iv. Use MPS Division II controls and CFDS pump B train to perform the following:

a. Insert a manual containment isolation signal.

b. Override the containment isolation signal using the CNTS isolation override switch.

c. Enable nonsafety controls using the enable nonsafety control switch.

d. Using an operator workstation in the MCR, align the CFDS and CNTS to add inventory to containment.

Tier 2 14.2-154 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-65: Neutron Monitoring System Test # 65 Preoperational test is required to be performed for each NPM.

The NMS is described in Section 7.0.4.2 and the functions verified by this test and power ascension testing are:

System Function System Function Categorization Function Verified by Test #

1. The NMS supports the MPS by safety-related Test #63-41 providing neutron flux data for Neutron Monitoring System Power various reactor trips. Range Flux Calibration Test #92

2. The NMS supports the MPS by nonsafety-related Test #66-2 providing information signals for PAM.

3. The NMS supports the MPS by nonsafety-related Test #66-2 providing information signals for PAM during CNV flooded conditions.

Prerequisites Prerequisites associated with NMS testing are identified in the referenced test abstract cited under the Function Verified by Test # heading.

Component Level Tests None System Level Tests None Tier 2 14.2-156 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-66: Safety Display and Indication System Test # 66 (Continued)

System Level Test #66-1 Test 66-1 is conducted concurrently with TGS test# 33-1 which warms the RCS from ambient conditions to the highest temperature achievable by MHS heating.

Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria Verify that the output signals from the Increase RCS temperature from ambient Trended data shows agreement NPM level, pressure, temperature and to the highest temperature achievable between the two divisional instruments flow instruments listed in Table 7.1-2 by MHS heating. or the four safety group instruments properly trend while increasing RCS Using the MCS historian record the monitoring the same variable.All temperature and pressure. engineering values for the output of the instruments track within acceptable Note: This is not a verification of instruments described in the test design limits.

instrument calibrations. objective. Record data at approximately (Use Technical Specification channel 50 °F intervals from ambient temperature check limits, when applicable) to the maximum RCS temperature.

Note: Instrument signals are provided to the module-specific SDIS display and the main control room workstations.

System Level Test #66-2 Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria

i. Verify PAM Type B and C variables are i. Simulate an injection signal for the i. The PAM Type B and C variables displayed on the module-specific PAM Type B and C variables listed in listed in Table 7.1-7 are retrieved SDIS displays in the MCR. Table 7.1-7. and displayed on the SDI displays in ii. Verify alarms associated with PAM ii. Increase or decrease a simulated the MCR.

Type B and C variables are retrieved injection signal for the PAM Type B [ITAAC 02.05.25]

in the MCR. and C variables listed in Table 7.1-7 to iii. Verify module-specific PAM Type D obtain its associated alarm. ii. The alarms associated with the PAM variables are displayed on the iii. Simulate an injection signal for the Type B and C variables listed in Table module-specific SDIS displays in the PAM Type D variables listed in Table 7.1-7 are retrieved and displayed on MCR. 7.1-7 the SDI displays in the MCR.

iii. The PAM Type D variables listed in Table 7.1-7 are retrieved and displayed on the SDIS displays in the MCR.

Tier 2 14.2-159 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-67: Fixed-Area Radiation Monitoring System Test # 67 Preoperational test is required to be performed once.

The fixed-area radiation monitoring system is described in Section 12.3.4 and the function verified by this test is:

System Function System Function Categorization Function Verified by Test #

The fixed-area radiation monitoring nonsafety-related Component-level test system supports the following buildings by monitoring radiation levels:

• ANB

• CRB

• RWB

• TGB

• RXB RMS function verified by another test is:

System Function System Function Categorization Function Verified by Test #

The RMS supports the RXB by monitoring nonsafety-related SDIS Test #66-2 radiation levels in the building in proximity of the bioshield.

Prerequisites Verify an instrument calibration has been completed, with approved records and within all calibration due dates, for all instruments required to perform this test.

Component Level Tests Test Objective Test Method Acceptance Criteria

i. Verify each fixed airborne radiation Actuate the check source on a fixed MCR display and local, visual monitors response to an alarm airborne radiation monitor listed in Table observation indicate the following:

condition known source. 12.3-110. i. The main control room audible and Repeat test for the remainder of fixed visual alarms are received.

airborne radiation monitors. ii. The local readout, audible alarm and visual alarm are received.

ii. Verify each fixed area radiation Actuate the check source on a fixed area MCR display and local, visual monitors response to an alarm radiation monitor listed in observation indicate the following:

condition known source. Table 12.3-121. i. The main control room audible and Repeat test for the remainder of fixed visual alarms are received.

area radiation monitors. ii. The local readout, audible alarm and visual alarm are received.

System Level Tests None Tier 2 14.2-160 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-70: Hot Functional Testing Test # 70 Preoperational testing is required to be performed once for each NPM.

The following identifies the tests employed in support of the performance of hot functional testing.

Hot Functional Testing Tests Test Objective Verified by Test # Tested Function Categorization CES i. Verifies the automatic i. CES Test #41-1 nonsafety-related operation of the CES to ii. CES Test #41-2 establish and maintain iii. CES Test #41-3 design vacuum for the iv. CES Test #41-4 CNV.

ii. Verify radiation isolation on high radiation level in the ABS.

iii. Verifies the CES supports RCS leakage detection.

iv. Verifies the CES level and pressure instrumentation support leak-before-break leakage detection.

CVCS i. Verifies CVCS automatic i. CVCS Test #38-1 nonsafety-related operation to maintain ii. CVCS Test #38-2 pressurizer level. iii. CVCS Test #38-3 ii. Verifies automatic pressurizer pressure control.

iii. Verifies CVCS automatic boration and dilution of the RCS.

ECCS i. Each ECCS valve opens i. MPS Test #63-6 nonsafety-related after receipt of an ESF signal and after RCS pressure is decreased to the threshold pressure for operation of the inadvertent actuation block.

FWS i. Verifies the FWS i. TGS Test #33-1 nonsafety-related automatically controls flow ii. TGS Test #33-1 to the SGs to maintain SG inventory.

ii. Verifies the FWS automatically cools the turbine generator bypass steam flow in the main steam desuperheater.

ICIS i. Verifies proper i. ICIS Test #49-1 nonsafety-related temperature indication is obtained from the ICIS thermocouples.

LRWS i. Verifies the LRWS receives i. LRWS Test #35-1 nonsafety-related and processes a gaseous stream from the pressurizer.

Tier 2 14.2-164 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-70: Hot Functional Testing Test # 70 (Continued)

MHS i. Verifies the MHS is capable i. TGS Test #33-1 nonsafety-related of heating the RCS to a ii. TGS Test #33-1 temperature sufficient to iii. TGS Test #33-1 obtain criticality.

ii. Verifies the MHS is capable of heating the RCS to establish natural circulation flow sufficient to obtain criticality.

iii. Verifies a local grab sample can be obtained from an MHS grab sample device indicated on the MHS piping and instrumentation diagram.

MPS i. Verifies design responses i. MPS Test #63-6 safety-related to manual ESF signals. ii. MPS Test #63-7 ii. Verifies containment iii. MPS Test #63-6 isolation valves closure times.

iii. Verifies the ECCS valves closes when the CVCS provides water to reset the ECCS valves.

PSS i. Verifies sampling capability i. PSS Test #53-1 nonsafety-related of the primary sampling ii. PSS Test #53-2 points. iii. PSS Test #53-3 ii. Verifies sampling capability of the containment sampling points.

ii. Verifies sampling capability of the secondary sampling points.

SDIS i. Verify that the output i. SDIS Test #66-1 nonsafety-related signals from the NPM level, pressure, temperature, and flow instruments listed in Table 7.1-2 properly trend while increasing RCS temperature and pressure.

TGS i. Verifies the TGS i. TGS Test #33-1 nonsafety-related automatically controls ii. TGS Test #33-2 turbine bypass flow to the iii. TGS Test #33-1 main condenser.

ii. Verify the maximum main turbine speed that can be obtained using the MHS to heat the RCS.

iii. Verifies the ECCS valves close when the CVCS provides water to reset the ECCS valves.

Prerequisites Prerequisites associated with performing hot functional testing are identified in the referenced test abstract cited under the Verified by Test # heading.

Tier 2 14.2-165 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-76: Initial Fuel Load Test # 76 The Initial Fuel Load Test is required to be performed for each NPM.

This test is performed prior to initial fuel load.

Test Objectives

i. Conduct initial fuel load with no inadvertent criticality.

ii. Install fuel assemblies and control components at the locations specified by the design of the initial RXC.

Prerequisites

i. Plant systems required for initial fuel loading have completed preoperational testing.

ii. Plant systems required for initial fuel loading have been aligned per operations procedures.

iii. The design of the initial RXC that specifies the final core configuration of fuel assemblies and control components is completed.

iv. A core load sequence has been approved.

v. Neutron monitoring data from a previous NPM initial fuel loading or calculations showing the predicted response of monitoring channels are available for evaluating monitoring data.

vi. The lower RPV is installed in the RPV support stand.

vii. Control room communications are established.

viii. RXB radiation monitors are functional.

ix. Boron concentration in the pool is within Technical Specification limits.

Test Method

i. The overall process of initial fuel loading will be supervised by a licensed senior reactor operator with no other concurrent duties.

ii. Install fuel and control components per approved procedures.

iii. Monitor boron concentration inside the RPV periodically during fuel load to ensure it satisfies TS.

iv. Monitor neutron counts during the load of each fuel assembly and plot an independent inverse count rate ratio for each source range detector after each fuel load assembly is loaded.

v. Verify neutron count data are consistent with calculations showing the predicted response. For fuel loading of the second NPM and all subsequent NPMs use data obtained from previous fuel loadings.

vi. Demonstrate the inverse count rate ratio does not show significant approach to criticality.

vii. Maintain the status of the core loading.

viii. Maintain communication between fuel handling personnel and the MCR.

Acceptance Criterion

i. Each fuel assembly and control component is installed in the location specified by the design of the initial RXC.

ii. There is no indication of inadvertent criticality.

Tier 2 14.2-172 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-79: Primary and Secondary System Chemistry Test # 79 Startup test is required to be performed for each NPM.

This test is performed at approximately 25, 50, 75, and 100 percent reactor thermal power.

Test Objective Verify water quality in the primary system and secondary system using the PSS.

Prerequisites

i. The PSS instruments have been calibrated.

ii. The NPM is fully assembled.

iii. The RCS is at hot zero power (RCS at normal operating pressure and RCS temperature at the maximum temperature obtainable when heated only by the MHS).

Test Method

i. Use the PSS to sample the normal primary system sample points listed in Table 9.3.2-1.

ii. Use the PSS to sample the normal secondary system sample points listed in Table 9.3.2-3.

iii. To the extent practical, responses of PSS radiation monitors should be verified by laboratory analyses of grab samples taken at the same process location.

iv. Conduct the test at steady-state condition at approximately 25, 50, 75, and 100 percent reactor thermal power.

Acceptance Criterion The sample analysesis satisfyies the limits specified in plant procedures.

Tier 2 14.2-175 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-82: Pressurizer Spray Bypass Flow Test # 82 Startup test is required to be performed for each NPM.

This test is performed after initial fuel loading but prior to initial criticality.

Test Objective Verify the pressurizer spray bypass flow rate is adequate to prevent thermal fatigue of the spray line components and provide sufficient mixing in the pressurizer to maintain pressurizer water chemistry similar to the rest of the RCS while avoiding unnecessary energization of the pressurizer heaters.

Prerequisites

i. The core is installed.

ii. The NPM is fully assembled.

iii. The RCS is at hot zero power (RCS at normal operating pressure and RCS temperature at the maximum temperature obtainable when heated only by the MHS).

Test Method

i. With the automatic pressurizer spray valve closed, adjust the manual spray bypass valve to maintain a continuous spray bypass flow of approximately one gpm.

ii. If the continuous bypass spray flow requires the operation of the pressurizer backup heaters to maintain the pressurizer pressure setpoint, throttle close the bypass valve until pressurizer pressure is maintained by the proportional heaters.

Acceptance Criterion The spray bypass valve is throttled to maintain the required bypass flowflow satisfies design requirements.

Tier 2 14.2-179 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-90: Power-Ascension Test # 90 Startup test is required to be performed for each NPM.

This test is performed prior to power-ascension testing.

Test Objective Identify the sequence for the following power-ascension tests.

a. Core Power Distribution Map Test #91

b. Neutron Monitoring System Power Range Flux Calibration Test #92

c. Reactor Coolant System Temperature Instrument Calibration Test #93

d. Reactor Coolant System Flow Calibration Test #94

e. Radiation Shield Survey Test #95

f. Reactor Building Ventilation System Capability Test #96

g. Thermal Expansion Test #97

h. Control Rod Assembly Misalignment Test #98

i. Steam Generator Level Control System Test #99

j. Ramp Change in Load Demand Test #100

k. Step Change in Load Demand Test #101

l. Loss of Feedwater Heater Test #102

m. 100 Percent Load Rejection Test #103

n. Reactor Trip from 100 Percent Power Test #104

o. Island Mode Test for the First NuScale Power Module (Test #105)

p. Island Mode Test for Multiple NuScale Power Modules (Test #106)

q. Remote Shutdown Workstation Test #107NuScale Power Module Vibration Test #108

r. NuScale Power Module Vibration Test #108 Prerequisites None Test Method

i. Identify the specific plant conditions required for each power-ascension test procedure to maintain technical specification operability.

ii. Identify the prerequisites required for each power-ascension test procedure.

iii. Determine the test sequence for power-ascension testing based on technical specification requirements and test prerequisites.

Acceptance Criterion The sequence for power-ascension testing has been determined.

Tier 2 14.2-187 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-97: Thermal Expansion Test # 97 Startup test is required to be performed for each NPM.

This test is performed during plant heatup and cooldown.

Test Objectives

i. Verify that ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 system piping can expand without obstruction and that expansion is within design limits. All ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 system piping is within the RXB.

ii. Verify that high-energy piping inside the RXB can expand without obstruction and that expansion is within design limits.

Prerequisite Temporary instrumentation is installed on piping outside the NPM as required to monitor the deflections for the piping under test.

Test Method

i. Thermal expansion testing is performed in accordance with ASME OM Standard, Part 7 as discussed in Section 3.9.2.1.2.

ii. Record deflection data during plant heatup and cooldown.

iii. Identify support movements by recording hot and cold positions of the supports.

(Note: piping testing will be determined in COL Item 3.9-13) iv. All tested piping is within the RXB.

v. All tested piping is outside the NPM.

vi. All tested piping is contained within the MSS, FWS, ABS, PSS, and CVCS.

Acceptance Criteria In accordance with ASME OM Standard, Part 7, Ffor the piping systems tested:

i. There is no evidence of blocking of the thermal expansion of piping or component, other than by installed supports, restraints, and hangers.

ii. Spring hanger movements must remain within the hot and cold setpoints and supports must not become fully retracted or extended.

iii. Piping and components return to their approximate baseline cold position.

Tier 2 14.2-194 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-99: Steam Generator Level Control Test # 99 Startup test is required to be performed for each NPM.

This test is performed at approximately 25, 50, 75, and 100 percent reactor thermal power.

Test Objective

i. Verify the ability of SG inventory control systems to sustain a ramp increase in load demand.

ii. Assess the dynamic response of SG inventory for ramp increase in load demand.Verify the stability of the automatic SG level control system by introducing simulated transients at various power levels during the ascension to full power.

Prerequisite

i. The feedwater system is operating in steam generator inventory pressure control (Feedwater regulating valves in automatic control).The NPM is operating in a steady-state condition at the specified power level.

Test Method

i. Raise reactor thermal power to approximately 25 percent.Simulate an SG level transient by changing the level setpoint at approximately 25, 50, 75, and 100 percent reactor thermal power.

ii. Use the main control room turbine controls to provide a 5 percent of full power per minute load increase in demand at approximately 25, 50, and 75 percent reactor thermal power.Record the steam generator level control response when the control system is returned to automatic control.

iii. Use the main control room turbine controls to provide a 5 percent of full power per minute load decrease in demand at approximately 25, 50, and 75, and 100 percent reactor thermal power.Adjustments to the control systems are made, if necessary, prior to proceeding to the next power plateau.

Acceptance Criteria

i. The SG inventory control systems, with no manual intervention, maintain the following parameters within design limits during and following the transient:During recovery from a simulated steam generator level transient, SG level control response is consistent with the design for the following:

a. SG superheatovershoot or undershoot to the new level.

b. SG pressuretime required to achieve the new level.

c. SG inventoryerror between the actual level and control setpoint.

d. Feed pump speedfeedwater pump discharge pressure oscillations.

ii. SG inventory control systems response is reviewed and compared to expected performance. Necessary adjustments to the control systems have been made prior to proceeding to the next power plateau.Water hammer indications:

a. Audible indications of water hammer are not observed.

b. No damage to pipe supports or restraints.

c. No damage to equipment.

d. No equipment leakage as a result of the steam generator level transient.

Tier 2 14.2-196 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program RAI 03.09.02-69 Table 14.2-100: Ramp Change in Load Demand Test # 100 Startup test is required to be performed for each NPM.

This test is performed at approximately 25, 50, 75, and 100 percent reactor thermal power.

Test Objectives

i. Verify the ability of the plant automatic control systems to sustain a ramp increase in load demand.

ii. Assess the dynamic response of the plant for ramp increase in load demand.

Prerequisites

i. The NPM is operating in a steady-state condition at the designated power level.

ii. The plants electrical distribution system is aligned for normal operation.

iii. The following control systems are in automatic control:Reactor, turbine, and secondary control systems are in automatic mode.

a. Reactivity control

b. RCS temperature control

c. Pressurizer pressure control

d. Pressurizer level control

e. Turbine control

f. Feedwater level control

g. CWS basin level control

h. SCWS basin level control

i. Feedwater heater level control

j. Hotwell level control iv. If required, verify instrumentation is installed for piping vibration testing.

Test Method

i. Use the main control room turbine controls to provide a 5 percent of full power per minute load increase in demand at approximately 25, 50, and 75 percent reactor thermal power.

ii. Use the main control room turbine controls to provide a 5 percent of full power per minute load decrease in demand at approximately 25, 50, and 75, and 100 percent reactor thermal power.

iii. Conduct piping vibration testing, as required, during power changes.

Tier 2 14.2-197 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-100: Ramp Change in Load Demand Test # 100 (Continued)

Acceptance Criteria

i. The turbine does not trip.

ii. The reactor does not trip.

iii. The main steam safety valves do not open.

iv. The turbine does not overspeed.

v. The plant automatic control systems, with no manual intervention, maintain the following parameters within design limits during and following the transient:The primary and secondary control systems, with no manual intervention, maintain reactor power, reactor coolant system temperatures, pressurizer pressure and level, and SG levels and pressures within acceptable ranges during and following the transient.

a. Reactor Power

b. RCS temperature

c. Pressurizer pressure

d. Pressurizer level

e. SG superheat

f. SG pressure

g. SG inventory

h. Gland seal temperature

i. CWS basin level

j. SCWS basin level

k. Feedwater heater level

l. Main condenser hotwell level

m. Main condenser vacuum

n. Outlet temperature of turbine bypass desuperheater vi. Control system response is reviewed and compared to expected performance. Necessary adjustments to the control systems have been made prior to proceeding to the next power plateau.

vii. Water hammer indications

a. Audible indications of water hammer are not observed.

b. No damage to pipe supports or restraints.

c. No damage to equipment.

d. No equipment leakage as a result of the ramp change.

viii. Piping vibration - System specific steady state and transient vibration testing criteria are established by the piping designer. Actual acceptance criteria will depend on the selected test method, but may include:

a. Limits for stresses calculated based on the observed/measured vibration response of the system.

b. No permanent deformation or damage is observed in the piping system or supports.

c. Vibration displacements are not excessive, would not potentially cause the piping to come in contact with surrounding SSC, and are such that the movement of supports and flexible joints is within their allowable limits.

Tier 2 14.2-198 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-101: Step Change in Load Demand Test # 101 Startup test is required to be performed for each NPM.

This test is performed at approximately 25, 50, 75, and 100 percent reactor thermal power.

Test Objectives

i. Verify the ability of the plant automatic control systems to sustain step load increases and step load decreases in demand.

ii. Assess the dynamic response of the plant for a load step demand.

Prerequisites

i. The NPM is operating in a steady-state condition at the specified power level.

ii. The plants electrical distribution system is aligned for normal operation.

iii. The following control systems are in automatic control:Reactor, turbine, and secondary control systems are in automatic mode.

a. Reactivity control

b. RCS temperature control

c. Pressurizer pressure control

d. Pressurizer level control

e. Turbine control

f. Feedwater level control

g. CWS basin level control

h. SCWS basin level control

i. Feedwater heater level control

j. Hotwell level control Test Method

i. Use the MCR turbine controls to provide a 10 percent step load increase in demand at approximately 25, 50, and 75 percent reactor thermal power.

ii. Use the MCR turbine controls to provide a 10 percent step load decrease in demand at approximately 25, 50, 75, and 100 percent reactor thermal power.

Tier 2 14.2-199 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-101: Step Change in Load Demand Test # 101 (Continued)

Acceptance Criteria

i. The turbine does not trip.

ii. The reactor does not trip.

iii. The main steam safety valves do not open.

iv. The turbine does not overspeed.

v. The plant automatic control systems, with no manual intervention, maintain the following parameters within design limits during and following the transient:The primary and secondary control systems, with no manual intervention, maintain reactor power, RCS temperatures, pressurizer pressure and level, and SG levels and pressures within acceptable ranges during and following the transient.

a. Reactor Power

b. RCS temperature

c. Pressurizer pressure

d. Pressurizer level

e. SG superheat

f. SG pressure

g. SG inventory

h. Gland seal temperature

i. CWS basin level

j. SCWS basin level

k. Feedwater heater level

l. Main condenser hotwell level

m. Main condenser vacuum

n. Outlet temperature of turbine bypass desuperheater vi. Control system response is reviewed and compared to expected performance. Necessary adjustments to the control systems have been made prior to proceeding to the next power plateau.

vii. Water hammer indications

a. Audible indications of water hammer are not observed.

b. No damage to pipe supports or restraints.

c. No damage to equipment.

d. No equipment leakage as a result of the step load change.

Tier 2 14.2-200 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-102: Loss of Feedwater Heater Test # 102 Startup test is required to be performed for each NPM.

This test is performed at approximately 50 and 90 percent reactor thermal power.

Test Objectives

i. Verify the ability of the plant automatic control systems to sustain a loss of the high pressure feedwater heater during power operation.

ii. Assess the dynamic response of the plant for the loss of the high pressure feedwater heater.

Prerequisites

i. The NPM is operating in a steady-state condition at the specified power level.

ii. The plants electrical distribution system is aligned for normal operation.

iii. The following control systems are in automatic control:Reactor, turbine, and secondary control systems are in automatic mode.

a. Reactivity control

b. RCS temperature control

c. Pressurizer pressure control

d. Pressurizer level control

e. Turbine control

f. Feedwater level control

g. CWS basin level control

h. SCWS basin level control

i. Feedwater heater level control

j. Hotwell level control Test Method Close the turbine generator extraction steam supply isolation valve to the high pressure feedwater heater from the main control room at approximately 50 and 90 percent reactor thermal power.

Acceptance Criteria

i. The reactor does not trip.

ii. The turbine does not trip.

iii. The main steam safety valves do not open.

iv. The plant automatic control systems, with no manual intervention, maintain the following parameters within design limits during and following the transient:

a. Reactor Power

b. RCS temperature

c. Pressurizer pressure

d. Pressurizer level

e. SG superheat

f. SG pressure

g. SG inventory

h. Gland seal temperature

i. CWS basin level

j. SCWS basin level

k. Feedwater heater level

l. Main condenser hotwell level

m. Main condenser vacuum

n. Outlet temperature of turbine bypass desuperheater Tier 2 14.2-201 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-103: 100 Percent Load Rejection Test # 103 Startup test is required to be performed for each NPM.

This test is performed at approximately 100 percent reactor thermal power.

Test Objectives

i. Verify the ability of the plant automatic control systems to sustain a 100 percent load rejection from full power.

ii. Assess the dynamic response of the plant for a 100 percent power load rejection.

Prerequisites

i. The NPM is operating in a steady-state condition at full reactor thermal power.

ii. The plants electrical distribution system is aligned for normal operation.

iii. The following control systems are in automatic control:Reactor, turbine, and secondary control systems are in automatic mode.

a. Reactivity control

b. RCS temperature control

c. Pressurizer pressure control

d. Pressurizer level control

e. Turbine control

f. Feedwater level control

g. CWS basin level control

h. SCWS basin level control

i. Feedwater heater level control

j. Hotwell level control Test Method Manually trip the generator output breaker to provide a 100 percent load rejection.

Acceptance Criteria

i. The turbine trips.

ii. The reactor does not trip.

iii. The main steam safety valves do not open.

iv. The turbine does not overspeed beyond design limits.

v. The plant automatic control systems, with no manual intervention, maintain the following parameters within design limits during and following the transient:The turbine generator bypass valve opens and modulates steam flow to the condenser to maintain steam generator pressure.

a. Reactor Power

b. RCS temperature

c. Pressurizer pressure

d. Pressurizer level

e. SG superheat

f. SG pressure

g. SG inventory

h. Gland seal temperature

i. CWS basin level

j. SCWS basin level

k. Feedwater heater level

l. Main condenser hotwell level

m. Main condenser vacuum

n. Outlet temperature of turbine bypass desuperheater vi. The FWS automatically provides the necessary feedwater flow to the steam generator.

vii. Water hammer indications

a. Audible indications of water hammer are not observed.

b. No damage to pipe supports or restraints.

c. No damage to equipment.

d. No equipment leakage as a result of the load rejection.

Tier 2 14.2-202 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program RAI 04.06-2 Table 14.2-104: Reactor Trip from 100 Percent Power Test # 104 Startup test is required to be performed for each NPM.

This test is performed at 100 percent reactor thermal power.

Test Objectives

i. Verify the ability of the NPM to sustain a reactor trip from 100 percent reactor thermal power and automatically cool the RCS to mode 3 (all RCS temperatures < 420 °F).

ii. Assess the dynamic response of the plant to thea reactor trip.

iii. Verify each fully withdrawn CRA satisfies the CRA drop time acceptance criteria at full flow conditions.

iii. Verify the ability of DHRS to cool the RCS to Mode 3 (all RCS temperatures < 420 °F).

Prerequisites

i. The NPM is operating in a steady-state condition at full reactor thermal power.

ii. The plants electrical distribution system is aligned for normal operation.

Test Method

i. Manually trip the reactor from the MCR.

ii. Measure the drop time for each fully withdrawn CRA.

iii. Allow the RCS temperature trends to stabilize.

iv. Manually initiate DHRS.

viii. Allow the RCS to cool to mode 3 after DHR actuation.

Acceptance Criteria Acceptance criteria to be verified after manual reactor trip:

i.The reactor trips.

ii. The CIVs close.

iii. The decay heat removal valves open.

iiv. The turbine generator bypass valve operates to prevent opening of the main steam safety valve.

iiiv. The turbine tripsspeed does not exceed overspeed design limits.

vi. The reactor vent valves do not open.

ivii. Water hammer indications

a. Audible indications of water hammer are not observed.

b. No damage to pipe supports or restraints.

c. No damage to equipment.

d. No equipment leakage as a result of the reactor trip.

Acceptance criteria to be verified after DHR actuation:

v. a. DHRS actuation valves open.

b. MSIVs close.

c. FWIVs close.

d. Feedwater regulating valves close

e. Secondary main steam isolation valves close

f. Secondary main steam bypass isolation valves close

g. Pressurizer heater breakers trip viii. The RCS cools to a stable condition in mode 3 (all RCS temperatures < 420 °F) without operator intervention.

vii. RCS cooldown rate is within Technical Specification limits.

viiix.Each fully withdrawn CRA drop time is within Technical Specification limits.

Tier 2 14.2-203 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program RAI 14.02-5 Table 14.2-105: Island Mode Test for the First NuScale Power Module (Test # 105)

This startup test is required to be performed for the first NPM in power operation. No other NPMs are in power operation. Test #105 is performed once per facility. Startup Test #106 tests island mode for multiple NPMs.

This test is performed at 100 percent reactor thermal power. Island mode operation is described in Section 8.3.1.1.1 Test Objective for the first NPM in power operation

i. Verify the first NPM in power operation can operate independently from an offsite transmission grid after transition from the transmission grid to island mode.

ii. Verify plant electrical loads may be transitioned from island mode to an offsite transmission grid without interruption to the operation of the first NPM in power operation.

Prerequisites The first NPM in power operation is in normal operation at 100 percent reactor thermal power.

Test Method Simulate a loss of the transmission grid by opening the switchyard supply breakers (reference Figures 8.3-2a and 8.3-2b).

Acceptance Criteria

i. a. The turbine generator associated with the NPMservice unit generator under test does not trip and changes from droop mode control to isochronous mode to control the loads on site.

b. The first NPM in power operation remains at approximately 100 percent reactor thermal power using turbine generator bypass operation.

c. Electrical power to plant loads is uninterrupted without loss of voltage or automatic bus transfers.

d. The auxiliary AC power source starts automatically but does not automatically load its associated bus.

ii. The plant electrical loads are transitioned back to the external offsite grid connection when it becomes available.

Tier 2 14.2-204 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program RAI 14.02-5 Table 14.2-106: Island Mode Test for Multiple NuScale Power Modules (Test # 106)

This startup test is required to be performed once with multiple (at least two) NPMs in operation. Test #106 is performed once per facility. Startup Test #105 tests island mode for a single NPM.

COL Item 14.2-7: A COL applicant that references the NuScale Power Plant design certification will select the plant configuration to perform the Island Mode Test (number of NuScale Power Modules in service).

This test is performed at 100 percent reactor thermal power for all NPMs under test. Island mode operation is described in Section 8.3.1.1.1 Test Objective for multiple NPM in operation:

i. Verify all NPMs under test can operate independently from an offsite transmission grid after transition from the transmission grid to island mode.

ii. Verify plant electrical loads may be transitioned from island mode to an offsite transmission grid without interruption to the operation of the service unit NPM.

Prerequisites The NPMs selected for test are in normal operation at 100 percent reactor thermal power.

Test Method Simulate a loss of the transmission grid by opening the switchyard supply breakers (reference Figures 8.3-2a and 8.3-2b).

Acceptance Criteria

i. a. The service unit turbine generator transitions to island mode by changing from droop mode control to isochronous mode control to control the load on the 13.8kV bus it is supplying.

b. The service unit NPM remains at approximately 100 percent reactor thermal power using turbine generator bypass operation.

c. The non-service unit turbine generators trip.

d. The non-service unit NPMs power reduces to approximately 95 percent reactor thermal power using turbine generator bypass operation.

e. Electrical power to plant loads is uninterrupted without loss of voltage or automatic bus transfers.

fd. The auxiliary AC power source starts automatically but does not automatically load its associated bus.

ii. The plant electrical loads are successfully transitioned back to an external offsite grid connection when it becomes available.

Tier 2 14.2-205 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program RAI 04.06-2 Table 14.2-107: Not UsedRemote Shutdown Workstation Test # 107 Startup test is required to be performed for each NPM.

This test is performed at approximately 10 - 20 percent reactor thermal power.

Test Objectives

i. Verify the NPM safety-related controls can be disabled at the remote shutdown station.

ii. Verify the NPM nonsafety-related controls are functional at the remote shutdown station.

iii. Verify each fully withdrawn CRA satisfies the CRA drop time acceptance criteria with the reactor operating at 10 - 20 percent reactor thermal power.

Prerequisites

i. Communication exists between the MCR and the remote shutdown station.

ii. The reactor is operating in a steady-state condition at 10 - 20 percent reactor thermal power.

Test Method

i. Using the appropriate operating procedure, the operator manually trips the reactor under test before leaving the MCR.

ii. Measure the drop time for each fully withdrawn CRA.

iii. Using the appropriate operating procedure, the operator uses manual switches in the remote shutdown station to isolate the module protection system manual actuation switches, override switches, and the enable nonsafety control switches for each nuclear power modules module protection system in the MCR to prevent spurious actuation of equipment due to fire damage.

Acceptance Criteria

i. An operator verifies that the module protection switch controls in the MCR have been disabled.

The displays in the remote shutdown station verify the following NPM status:

ii. The reactor is tripped.

iii. All CIVs are closed.

iv. The DHRS actuation valves are open.

v. All RCS temperatures cool to less than 420°F (mode 3, safe shutdown) without operator action.

vi. Safety-related components cannot be operated from the remote shutdown station.

vii. The nonsafety-related controls in the remote shutdown station controls can be used to place the plant in a configuration specified by the appropriate operating procedure.

viii. Each fully withdrawn CRA drop time is within Technical Specification limits.

Tier 2 14.2-206 Draft Revision 3

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Initial Plant Test Program Table 14.2-109: List of Test Abstracts (Continued)

Test Number System Abbreviation Test Abstract 99 N/A Steam Generator Level Control 100 N/A Ramp Change in Load Demand 101 N/A Step Change in Load Demand 102 N/A Loss of Feedwater Heater 103 N/A 100 Percent Load Rejection 104 N/A Reactor Trip from 100 Percent Power 105 N/A Island Mode Test for the First NuScale Power Module 106 N/A Island Mode Test for Multiple NuScale Power Modules 107 N/A Not UsedRemote Shutdown Workstation 108 N/A NuScale Power Module Vibration Tier 2 14.2-210 Draft Revision 3

Table 14.3-1: Module-Specific Structures, Systems, and Components Based Design Features Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Cross Reference(1) (Continued)

ITAAC No. System Discussion DBA Internal/External Radiological PRA & Severe FP Hazard Accident 02.05.01 MPS Section 7.2.1.1, I&C Safety System Development Process, discusses X the software lifecycle phases for the MPS. The purpose is to verify software implementation based on licensing commitments to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 1 (Quality), Appendix B (Quality Assurance Criteria), RGs 1.28, 1.152, 1.168, 1.169, 1.170, 1.171, 1.172, and 1.173, and the associated IEEE standards. The licensee shall perform analyses for each phase and generate technical reports to conclude that the lifecycle phases were implemented per the licensing commitments. Per RG 1.152, a generic waterfall software life cycle model consists of the following phases: (1) concepts, (2) requirements, (3) design, (4) implementation, (5) test, (6) installation, checkout, and acceptance testing, (7) operation, (8) maintenance, and (9) retirement.

The ITAAC verifies that output documentation of each Software Lifecycle phase satisfies the requirements of that phase for the MPS 14.3-28 and that software were implemented per licensing commitments Certified Design Material and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC1 (Quality), Appendix B (Quality Assurance Criteria), RGs 1.28, 1.152, 1.168, 1.169, 1.170, 1.171, 1.172, and 1.173, and the associated IEEE standards.

02.05.02 MPS Section 7.2.9, Control of Access, Identification, and Repair, X discusses the protective measures that prevent modification of the MPS tunable parameters without proper configuration and authorization. Guidance on this issue is provided in DI&C-ISG-04 Revision 1, "Highly-Integrated Control Rooms - Communications Issues," under interdivisional communications, staff position 10.

In accordance with Table 14.2-63, a preoperational test demonstrates that protective measures restrict modification to the Acceptance Criteria MPS tunable parameters without proper configuration and authorization. This test will be performed by attempting to modify the tunable parameters with the MPS not in the correct configuration or without authorization.Not used.

Draft Revision 3

Table 14.3-1: Module-Specific Structures, Systems, and Components Based Design Features Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Cross Reference(1) (Continued)

ITAAC No. System Discussion DBA Internal/External Radiological PRA & Severe FP Hazard Accident 02.05.06 MPS Section 7.1.2, Independence, discusses the communication X independence between redundant Class 1E digital communication system divisions. The purpose is to verify proper data isolation between redundant divisions. Requirements for independence are given in IEEE Std. 603-1991. Guidance for providing independence between redundant divisions of the Class 1E digital communication system is provided in Digital I&Cs Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) 04.

A vendor test demonstrates that independence between redundant divisions of the Class 1E MPS is provided.Not used.

02.05.07 MPS Section 7.1.2, Independence, discusses the communication X independence between Class 1E digital communication systems and non-Class 1E digital communication systems. The purpose is to verify that logical or software malfunction of the nonsafety-related system cannot affect the functions of the safety system.

14.3-31 Requirements for independence are given in IEEE Std. 603-1991.

Guidance for providing independence between the Class 1E digital Certified Design Material and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and communication system and non-Class 1E digital communication systems is provided in Digital Instrumentation and Controls ISG 04.

A vendor test demonstrates that independence between the Class 1E MPS and non-Class 1E digital systems is provided.

02.05.08 MPS Section 7.1.1.2.1, Protection Systems, describes automatic and X manual reactor trips, variables that are monitored to provide input into automatic reactor trip signals, and the features of the reactor trip system (RTS). The reactor trip functions are listed in Table 7.1-3:

Reactor Trip Functions. The reactor trip logic for the monitored variables is provided in Figure 7.1-1.

The MPS initiates an automatic reactor trip signal when the Acceptance Criteria associated plant condition(s) exist.

In accordance with Table 14.2-63, a preoperational test Draft Revision 3 demonstrates that a reactor trip signal is automatically initiated for each reactor trip function listed in Tier 1 Table 2.5-1.

The actuation of reactor trip breakers (RTBs) is not required for this test. The verification of the existence of a reactor trip signal is accomplished using main control room (MCR) displays.Not used.

Table 14.3-1: Module-Specific Structures, Systems, and Components Based Design Features Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Cross Reference(1) (Continued)

ITAAC No. System Discussion DBA Internal/External Radiological PRA & Severe FP Hazard Accident 02.05.09 MPS Section 7.1.1.2.1, Protection Systems, describes automatic and X manual engineered safety features (ESFs) actuations, variables that are monitored to provide input into automatic ESFs signals, and the features of the ESF systems. The ESFs functions are listed in Table 7.1-4: Module Protection System Engineered Safeguards Functions.

The ESFs logic for the monitored variables is provided in Figure 7.1-1.

The MPS initiates an automatic ESF actuation signal when the associated plant condition(s) exist.

In accordance with Table 14.2-63, a preoperational test demonstrates that an automatic ESF actuation signal is automatically initiated for each of the ESF functions listed in Tier 1 Table 2.5-2.

The actuation of ESFs equipment is not required for this test. The 14.3-32 verification of the existence of an ESF actuation signal is Certified Design Material and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and accomplished using MCR displays.Not used.

02.05.10 MPS Section 7.1.1.2.1, Protection Systems, describes automatic and X manual reactor trips, variables that are monitored to provide input into automatic reactor trip signals, and the features of the RTS. The reactor trip functions are listed in Table 7.1-3: Reactor Trip Functions. The reactor trip logic for the monitored variables is provided in Figure 7.1.

The MPS initiates an automatic reactor trip signal for the reactor trip functions when the associated plant condition(s) exist.

In accordance with Table 14.2-63, a preoperational test demonstrates that the RTBs open when any one of the automatic Acceptance Criteria reactor trip functions is initiated from the MCR. The RTBs are only opened once to satisfy this test objective.Not used.

Draft Revision 3

Table 14.3-1: Module-Specific Structures, Systems, and Components Based Design Features Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Cross Reference(1) (Continued)

ITAAC No. System Discussion DBA Internal/External Radiological PRA & Severe FP Hazard Accident 02.05.11 MPS Section 7.1.1.2.1, Protection Systems, describes automatic and X manual ESFs actuations, variables that are monitored to provide input into automatic ESFs signals, and the features of the engineered safety feature systems. The ESFs functions are listed in Table 7.1-4: Module Protection System Engineered Safeguards Functions. The ESFs logic for the monitored variables is provided in Figure 7.1.

The MPS initiates an automatic ESF actuation signal for the functions listed in Tier 1 Table 2.5-2 when the associated plant condition(s) exist.

In accordance with Table 14.2-63, a preoperational test demonstrates that ESF equipment automatically actuates to perform its safety-related function listed in Tier 1 Table 2.5-2 upon an injection of a single simulated MPS signal.Not used.

14.3-33 02.05.12 MPS Section 7.1.1.2.1, Protection Systems, describes automatic and X Certified Design Material and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and manual reactor trips, variables that are monitored to provide input into automatic reactor trip signals, and the features of the RTS. A manual reactor trip is one of the MPS manually actuated functions.

In accordance with Table 14.2-63, a preoperational test demonstrates that the RTBs open when a reactor trip is manually initiated from the MCR.Not used.

02.05.13 MPS Section 7.1.1.2.1, Protection Systems, describes manual ESFs X actuation, variables that are monitored to provide input into automatic ESFs signals, and the features of the ESF system. The ESFs functions that can be manually actuated are shown in Figure 7.1-1 Acceptance Criteria In accordance with Table 14.2-63, a preoperational test demonstrates that the MPS actuates the ESF equipment to perform its safety-related function listed in Tier 1 Table 2.5-23 when Draft Revision 3 manually initiated.

Table 14.3-1: Module-Specific Structures, Systems, and Components Based Design Features Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Cross Reference(1) (Continued)

ITAAC No. System Discussion DBA Internal/External Radiological PRA & Severe FP Hazard Accident 02.05.14 MPS Section 7.1.6, Safety Evaluation, describes the MPS conformance to X the GDC in 10 CFR 50 Appendix A. Guidance provided in Design Specific Review Standard Section 7.2.3, Reliability, Integrity, and Completion of Protective Action, states that the design incorporate protective measures that provide for I&C safety systems to fail in a safe state, or into a state that has been demonstrated to be acceptable on some other defined basis, if conditions such as disconnection of the system, loss of power, or adverse environments, are experienced.

Section 7.1.6 describes that consistent with GDC 23, the MPS is designed, with sufficient functional diversity as to prevent the loss of a protection function, to fail into a safe state or into a state demonstrated to be acceptable on some other defined basis if conditions such as disconnection of the system, loss of power, or postulated adverse environments are experienced. Section 7.2.3.2, 14.3-34 System Integrity Characteristics, states that the MPS is designed Certified Design Material and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and such that in the event of a condition such as a system disconnection or loss of power the MPS fails into a safe state.

In accordance with Table 14.2-63, a preoperational test demonstrates that when the loss of electrical power is detected in a separation group of the MPS that separation group fails to a safe state resulting in a reactor trip state for that separation group.Not used.

Acceptance Criteria Draft Revision 3

Table 14.3-1: Module-Specific Structures, Systems, and Components Based Design Features Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Cross Reference(1) (Continued)

ITAAC No. System Discussion DBA Internal/External Radiological PRA & Severe FP Hazard Accident 02.05.15 MPS Section 7.1.6, Safety Evaluation, describes the MPS conformance to X the GDC in 10 CFR 50 Appendix A. Guidance provided in Design Specific Review Standard Section 7.2.3, Reliability, Integrity, and Completion of Protective Action, states that the design incorporate protective measures that provide for I&C safety systems to fail in a safe state, or into a state that has been demonstrated to be acceptable on some other defined basis, if conditions such as disconnection of the system, loss of power, or adverse environments, are experienced.

Section 7.1.6 describes that consistent with GDC 23, the MPS is designed, with sufficient functional diversity as to prevent the loss of a protection function, to fail into a safe state or into a state demonstrated to be acceptable on some other defined basis if conditions such as disconnection of the system, loss of power, or postulated adverse environments are experienced. Section 7.2.3.2, 14.3-35 System Integrity Characteristics, states that the MPS is designed Certified Design Material and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and such that in the event of a condition such as a system disconnection or loss of power the MPS fails into a safe state. For an ESF function this predefined safe state may be that the actuated component remains as-is.

In accordance with Table 14.2-63, a preoperational test demonstrates that when the loss of electrical power is detected in a separation group of the MPS that separation group fails to a safe state for that separation group.Not used.

Acceptance Criteria Draft Revision 3

Table 14.3-1: Module-Specific Structures, Systems, and Components Based Design Features Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Cross Reference(1) (Continued)

ITAAC No. System Discussion DBA Internal/External Radiological PRA & Severe FP Hazard Accident 02.05.17 MPS Section 7.2.12.1, Automatic Control, describes the signals and X initiating logic for each reactor trip and required response times.

In accordance with Table 14.2-63, a preoperational test demonstrates that the measured time for the reactor trip functions listed in Tier 1 Table 2.5-1 is less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis.

Section 7.2.12.1, Automatic Control, describes the signals and initiating logic for each ESF and the required response times.

In accordance with Table 14.2-63, a preoperational test demonstrates that the measured time for the ESF functions listed in Tier 1 Table 2.5-2 is less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis.

Technical specification SR 3.0.1 bases states that surveillances may 14.3-37 be performed by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps provided the entire surveillance is performed within the Certified Design Material and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and specified frequency. The technical specification bases also describe an allowance for response time to be verified by any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel measurements.

02.05.18 MPS Section 7.2.4.1, Operating Bypasses, describes MPS operating X bypasses for reactor trip functions. Section 7.2.4.1, Operating Bypasses, describes MPS operating bypasses for ESF actuations.

The operating bypasses are applied automatically when plant conditions dictate that the safety function is not needed, or that the safety function prevents proper plant operation at a specific mode of operation.

In accordance with Table 14.2-63, a preoperational test Acceptance Criteria demonstrates that the MPS interlocks listed in Tier 1 Table 2.5-4 automatically establish an operating bypass for the specified reactor trip or ESF actuations when a real or simulated signal Draft Revision 3 simulates that the associated interlock condition is met; and are automatically removed when the real or simulated signal simulates that the associated permissive condition is no longer satisfied.Not used.

Table 14.3-1: Module-Specific Structures, Systems, and Components Based Design Features Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Cross Reference(1) (Continued)

ITAAC No. System Discussion DBA Internal/External Radiological PRA & Severe FP Hazard Accident 02.05.19 MPS Section 7.2.4.1, Operating Bypasses, describes MPS operating X bypasses for reactor trip functions. Section 7.2.4.1, Operating Bypasses, describes MPS operating bypasses for ESF actuations.

The operating bypasses are applied automatically when plant conditions dictate that the safety function is not needed, or that the safety function prevents proper plant operation at a specific mode of operation.

In accordance with Table 14.2-63, a preoperational test demonstrates that the MPS permissives listed in Tier 1 Table 2.5-4 allows the manual bypass of the specified reactor trip or ESF actuations when a real or simulated signal simulates that the associated permissive condition is met; and are automatically removed when the real or simulated signal simulates that the associated permissive condition is no longer satisfied.Not used.

14.3-38 02.05.20 MPS Section 7.2.4.1, Operating Bypasses, describes MPS operating X bypasses for reactor trip functions. Section 7.2.4.1, Operating Certified Design Material and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Bypasses, describes MPS operating bypasses for ESF actuations.

The operating bypasses are applied automatically when plant conditions dictate that the safety function is not needed, or that the safety function prevents proper plant operation at a specific mode of operation.

In accordance with Table 14.2-63, a preoperational test demonstrates that the MPS overrides listed in Tier 1 Table 2.5-4 are established when the manual override switch is active and a real or simulated RT-1 interlock is established.Not used.

Acceptance Criteria Draft Revision 3

Table 14.3-1: Module-Specific Structures, Systems, and Components Based Design Features Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Cross Reference(1) (Continued)

ITAAC No. System Discussion DBA Internal/External Radiological PRA & Severe FP Hazard Accident 02.05.21 MPS Section 7.2.4.2, Maintenance Bypass, describes the MPS X maintenance bypass operation mode. An individual protection channel can be placed in a maintenance bypass operation mode to allow manual testing and maintenance during power operation, while ensuring that the minimum redundancy required by the Technical Specifications is maintained. The reactor trip functions are listed in Table 7.1-3: Reactor Trip Functions. The ESFs functions are listed in Table 7.1-4: Module Protection System Engineered Safeguards Functions.

In accordance with Table 14.2-63, a preoperational test demonstrates that with a safety function module out of service switch activated, the safety function is placed in trip or bypass based on the position of the safety function module trip/bypass switch. Each separation group of the reactor trip functions listed in Tier 1 Table 2.5-1 and each separation group of the ESFs signals 14.3-39 listed in Tier 1 Table 2.5-2 is tested by placing the separation group Certified Design Material and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and in maintenance bypass.Not used.

02.05.22 MPS Section 7.2.4.2, Maintenance Bypass, describes the MPS X maintenance bypass operation mode. An individual protection channel can be placed in a maintenance bypass operation mode to allow manual testing and maintenance during power operation, while ensuring that the minimum redundancy required by the technical specifications is maintained. Section 7.2.4.2 discusses the status indication of MPS manual or automatic bypasses placed in maintenance bypass operation mode.

In accordance with Table 14.2-63, a preoperational test demonstrates that each operational MPS manual or automatic Acceptance Criteria bypass is indicated in the MCR.

Draft Revision 3

Table 14.3-1: Module-Specific Structures, Systems, and Components Based Design Features Tier 2 NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Cross Reference(1) (Continued)

ITAAC No. System Discussion DBA Internal/External Radiological PRA & Severe FP Hazard Accident 02.05.27 MPS Section 7.0.4.1.2, Reactor Trip System, discusses the arrangement of X the protection system RTBs. Figure 7.0-6: Reactor Trip Breaker Arrangement provides the arrangement of the RTBs.

This ITAAC verifies that the RTBs conform to the arrangement indicated in Tier 1 Figure 2.5-1. In addition, the ITAAC inspection verifies proper connection of the shunt and undervoltage trip mechanisms and other auxiliary contacts.Not used.

02.05.28 MPS Section 7.1.5.1, Application of NUREG/CR-6303 Guidelines, X discusses that two of the four separation groups and one of the two divisions of RTS and ESFAS will utilize a different programmable technology.

A ITAAC inspection is performed to verify that MPS separation groups A & C and Division I of RTS and ESFAS utilize a different programmable technology from separation groups B & D and 14.3-43 Division II of RTS and ESFAS.Not used.

Certified Design Material and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and 02.05.29 MPS Section 7.1.3.3, Redundancy in Nonsafety I&C System Design, X discusses that when operators evacuate the MCR and occupy the RSS, two manual isolation switches for the MPS divisions are provided to isolate the MPS manual actuation switches in the MCR to prevent fires in the MCR from causing spurious actuations of associated equipment.

An ITAAC inspection is performed of each MCR isolation switch location to verify that the switch exists in the RSS.Not used.

Acceptance Criteria Draft Revision 3