ML18227A530

08/16/1977 Letter Finding No Proprietary Information in Inspection Reports 05000250/1977015 and 05000251/1977015

ML18227A530
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	08/16/1977
From:	Robert E. Uhrig Florida Power & Light Co
To:	Moseley N NRC/IE, NRC/RGN-II
References
IR 1977015
Download: ML18227A530 (10)

Text

P. O. BOX 013100, MIAMI, FL 33101 0

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY August 16, 1977 L-77-253 Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director, Region Office of Inspection and Enforcement II U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 230 Peachtree Street, N. N., Suite 1217 Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Re: RII:JEO 50-250/77-15 50-251/77-15 Florida Power 6 Light Company has reviewed the subject inspection report. There is no proprietary information in the report.

ery truly yours, Robert E. Uhrig Vice President REU/MAS/cpc cc: Robert Lowenstein, Esquire

1 RICO UNITED STATES (4%,0.8 00 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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~p 1 n REGION II 230 PEACHTREE STREET, N.W. SUITE 1217 g ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303

<<+*<<+ AUG 8 1g In Reply Refer To:

RII:JEO 50-250/77-15 50-251/77>>15 Florida Power and Light Company Attn: Dr. R. E. Uhrig, Vice President of Nuclear and General Engineering P. 0. Box 013100 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33101 Gentlemen:

This refers to the inspection conducted by Mr. J. E. Ouzts of this office on July 20-22, 1977, of activities authorized by NRC Operating License Nos. DPR-31 and DPR-41 for the Turkey Point 3 and 4 facilities, and to the discussion of our findings held with Mr. H. E. Yaeger at the conclusion of the inspection.

Areas examined during the inspection and our findings are discussed in the attached inspection report. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observations by the inspector.

Within the scope of this inspection, no items of noncompliance were disclosed.

As a result of the failure of safeguards train "A" to trip during the initial Unit 4 safeguards integrated test; caused by relay (SIR-1) failure to operate due to a loose terminal contact being lodged in the operating mechanism, the licensee agreed to inspect the relays in all safeguards and protection racks for loose terminal screws and any other loose parts that may have lodged on the relays that could prevent the relays from operating. He agreed to discuss this corrective action in the Licensing Event Report (LER) to be submitted to NRC on the failure of safeguards train "A" to trip.

In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and the attached inspection report will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room. If this report contains any information that you believe to be proprietary, it is necessary that you submit a written application

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Florida Power and Light Company to this office requesting that such information be withheld from public

.disclosure. If no proprietary information is identified, a written statement to that effect should be submitted. If an application is submitted, it must fully identify the bases for which information is claimed to be proprietary. The application should be prepared so that information sought to be withheld is incorporated in a separate paper and referenced in the application since the application will be placed in the Public Document Room. Your application, or written statement, should be submitted to us within 20 days. If we are not contacted as specified, the attached report and this letter may then be placed in the Public Document Room.

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, we will be glad to discuss them with you.

Very truly yours, F. J. Long, Chief Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch

Attachment:

RII Inspection Report Nos.

50-250/77-15 and 50-251/77-15

REGS (4+OR UNITED STATES 0 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION w7 REGION II 230 PEACHTREE STREET, N.W. SUITE 1217 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 4P 0~

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%p*~4 Report Nos.: 50-250/77-15 and 50-251/77-15 Docket Nos.: 50-250 and 50-251 License Nos.: DPR-31 and DPR-41 Licensee: Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street P. 0. Box 013100 Miami, Florida 33101 Inspection at: Turkey Point Site, Homestead, Florida Inspection conducted: July 20-22, 1977 Inspector: J. E. Ouzts Reviewed by:

R. D. Martin, Chief ate Nuclear Support Section Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Ins ection Summar Ins ection on Jul 20-22 1977 (Re ort Nos. 50-250/77-15 and 50-251/77-15)

Areas Ins ected: Routine, announced inspection of performance of Unit 4 engineered safeguards and emergency power systems integrated test, review of metal impact monitoring system to be used for detecting any loose Unit 4 steam generator tube plugs and the method of verifying the status of the number and location of steam generator tubes plugged. The inspection involved 13 inspector-hours on site by one NRC inspector.

Results: Of the areas inspected no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

RII Rpt. Nos. 50-250/77-15 and 50-251/77-15 DETAILS I Prepared by: <r atevr Ouzts, actor Inspector Nuclear Support Section Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Dates of Inspectio Reviewed by:

R. . Martin, Chief ate Nuclear Support Section Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch

1. Persons Contacted

• Mr. H. E. Yaeger, Plant Manager Mr. J. K. Hays, Plant Superintendent, Nuclear Mr. J. D. Hardy, Engineer Mr. J. P. Mendieta, I&C Supervisor

+Mr. J. E. Moore, Nuclear Operations Superintendent

• Mr. R. J. Spooner, QA Supervisor

+Ms. N. Ranek, Nuclear Licensing Engineer Various Operations and Technical Personnel

• Denotes those present at the exit interview.

2. Licensee Action on Previous Ins ection Findin s Not inspected.

3. Unresolved Items None

4. Exit Interview The inspector met with the licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on July 22, 1977.

The inspector summarized the purpose and scope of the inspection and findings. No apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

S.

RII Rpt. Nos. 50-250/77-15 and 50-251/77-15 I-2

5. Witnessin of Unit 4 En ineered Safe uards and Emer enc Power S stems Inte rated Test The inspector witnessed the performance of the engineered safeguards and emergency power systems integrated test per Operating Proce-dure 4104.2, to insure that the test was performed in accordance with sections 6 and 8 of the FSAR, section 4.1.2(b); 4.5.2.b.3; 4.5.1; 4.6.1, 4.6.2 and 4.8.1.b of the Technical Specifications.

Qualifications of individuals, establishment of prerequisites, data collection and licensee evaluation of test results were also evalua-ted. The following observations were made during the test:

a ~ During the initial performance of the test, engineered safeguards Train "A" failed to trip. An investigation showed the problem to be safety injection reset relay SIR-1 i'ailure to operate, as a result of a loose relay terminal contact jamming the relay operating mechanism. An inspection of the Unit 4 safe-guards relay racks revealed a number of spare relay contacts with loose screws that could possibly work loose and cause the same problem that was experienced. The licensee agreed to inspect all the Unit 3 and 4 safeguards and protection relay racks for loose terminal screws and loose material that could prevent relay operation. He will include a report of this inspection under corrective action of .the Licensing Event Report (LER), to be submitted to NRC as a result of safeguard train "A" failure to operate.

b. During the second performance of the test, diesel generator "B" failed to start due to being in the lockout mode. The operators failed to observe the diesel generator ready light not being on prior to initiating t'e test. The cause of the diesel engine being in lockout was being investigated and any findings were to be made to NRC. On the third attempt to run the test, all equipment operated satisfactorily.

As a result of witnessing this test, no apparent items of noncompli-ance or deviations were identified.

6. Review of Plans for Monitorin for Loose Steam Generator Tube Plu s in Unit 4 Under Reactor Coolant Flow Conditions The inspector discussed with the licensee plans for monitoring the reactor coolant system for any loose steam generator plugs. He plans to use a Westinghouse Metal Impact Monitoring System (MIMS) with sensors located on three movable detector thimbles located 120 apart just below the reactor vessel. The sensors will be wired through preamplifiers and to signal conditioning, and audible

RII Rpe. Nos. 50-250/77-15 and 50-251/77-15 I-3 and recording equipment in the spreading room. Data will be taken during various flow conditions up to three pump flow. In addition to this data, additional data will be taken at points on the pumps and loop piping using a stethoscope. On July 27 the licensee reported that data taken during test runs on July 23 had been analyzed. This analysis indicated an object approximately the size of a tube plug was impacting with the reactor vessel components under flow conditions of less than three pumps. At the time of the licensee's report, the plant was at 350 F and secondary chemistry was being brought in specifications. His plans were to increase temperature to hot shutdown conditions at 557 0 F and perform zero power physics tests. Power will be held to less than 2 percent until the loose tube plug problem is resolved and concurrence is received from Licensing to escalate above that level.

As a result of these discussions, no additional questions remain on this subject at this time.

7. Review of Licensee's S stem for Verification of the Status of Steam Generator Tube Plu in Based on discrepancies that existed between steam generator tube plugging records for Unit 4 and photographs taken of the lower tube sheet following the plugging operations that the records covered, future methods to be used to verify whether or not tube plugs had worked loose were discussed with the licensee. Records were examined and photographs of each quadrant of the lower surface of the tube sheet taken from within the channel head were viewed. From these photographs the plugged tubes could be easily detected. In the future, the licensee will take photographs prior to closing the steam generator after tube plugging and immediately upon opening the steam generator prior to starting future tube plugging operations.

A comparison of these two sets of photographs will show any tube plugs that came loose and fell out during the interim operating period.

As a result of these discussions, no further questions remain on this subject at this time.

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