ML18153D367

LER 93-008-00:on 930520,fire Watch Inadvertently Discontinued as Result of Inadequate Fire Barrier Repair Review Process.Penetration 2569 Repaired & Declared functional.W/930615 Ltr

ML18153D367
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	06/15/1993
From:	Kansler M VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
93-381, LER-93-008-01, LER-93-8-1, NUDOCS 9306220384
Download: ML18153D367 (4)

Text

10CFR50.73 Vu-ginia Electric and Power Company SmTy Power Station P.O.Bo:x:315 Surry, Vu-ginia 23883 June 15, 1993 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial No.: 93-381 Document Control Desk SPS:BCB Washington, D. C. 20555 Docket Nos.: 50-280 50-2.81 License Nos.: DPR-32

Dear Sirs:

DRP-37 Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specifications, Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report applicable to Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2.

BEPQRTNUMBER 50-280/50-281/93-008-00 This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be forwarded to the Management Safety Review Committee for its review.

Very truly yours, Enclosure cc: Regional Administrator 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 M. W. Branch NRC Senior Resident Inspector Surry Power Station 9306220384 930615 PDR ADOCK 05000280 '

S PDR ~

I- c NRC FORM 366 (6-89) e U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED 0MB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PEA RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER 12) I PAGE 13)

TITLE 141 Surry Power Station, Unit 1 Fire Watch Inadvertently Discontinued as a Result of

!o Is I o Io I o 12 18 1 ° 1 loF o 13 Inadequate Fire Barrier Repair Review Process EVENT DATE 151 L~R NUMBER 161 REPORT DATE 17) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (Bl MONTH DAY YEAR VEAR )(f SEQUENTIAL NUMBER I??

REVISION NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAMES DOCKET NUMBERIS)

Surry Unit 2 o 1s101010121sr1 ols 210 9 3 9 I 3 - o Io Is - olo ol6 1 15 9 I 3 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE R~QUIREMENTS DF 10 CFR §: /Chock on, or mar, of th, following) 1111 OPERATING MODE UII N 20.402lbl 73.711b)

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- OTHER ISPE:ifv in Abstract

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NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE M. R. Kansler, Station Manager 8 IO I 4 3 15 I 71 - 13 I 118 I 4 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT 1131 MANUFAC* MANUFAC*

CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT TUAEA TURER I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I *I I I I I I I I I I SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 1141 MONTH DAY VEAR rx, EXPECTED n YES (If VII, comp/1t1 EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE/ NO ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 1p,c11, i.,., 1pproxim1t1lv fihHn 1in11l**1P1CI tvP1Writt1n /inn/ (111 SUBMISSION DATE 1151 I I I On May 20, 1993, a fire watch, established as a compensatory measure for a non-functional fire barrier penetration seal, was inadvertently discontinued for a short period of time. This event occurred with Units 1 & 2 at 100% and 91.5% power. On May 12, 1993, 11 penetrations in the wall that separates the Auxiliary Building and the Unit 2 Cable Vault were found to have less than the required thickness of firestop material. The penetrations were declared non-functional, and a continuous fire watch was established at 1415 hours0.0164 days <br />0.393 hours <br />0.00234 weeks <br />5.384075e-4 months <br />. Repairs on the penetrations were believed to be complete, and the fire watch was discontinued on May 20, 1993, at 0913 hours0.0106 days <br />0.254 hours <br />0.00151 weeks <br />3.473965e-4 months <br />. The continuous fire watch was reestablished at 1408 hours0.0163 days <br />0.391 hours <br />0.00233 weeks <br />5.35744e-4 months <br /> when it was discovered, during a review of the repair documentation, that one of the non-functional penetrations had not been repaired. This event resulted in no safety consequences or implications since the Auxiliary Building and the Unit 2 Cable Vault are equipped with fire detection and suppression systems. This event was caused by a programmatic deficiency in the fire watch process. To prevent recurrence, the fire watch administrative process is being changed to require independent reviews to ensure that fire barriers are returned to a functional status prior to discontinuing a fire watch. This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

NRC Form 366 (6-89)

1 NRc FORM 366A (6-89) '

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) e U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION e APPROVEO 0MB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD

{ COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IP-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO 1"HE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET NUMBER 12) LER NUMBER 16) PAGE 13)

Surry Power Station, Unit 1 o 1s I o Io I o 12 1s I o 9 13 - o Io I a - o1o o I 2 oF o I 3 TEXT (H mom apace i8 mqultH, u11t1 *dditianal NRC Farm 366A'a/ 117)

1.0 DESCRIPTION

OF THE EVENT On May 20, 1993, a fire watch, established as a compensatory measure for a non-functional fire barrier penetration seal, was inadvertently discontinued for a short period of time. This event occurred with Units 1 & 2 at 100% and 91.5% power, respectively.

During an inspection of electrical penetrations on May 12, 1993, 11 penetrations in the wall that separates the Auxiliary Building and the Unit 2 Cable Vault were found to have less than the required thickness of firestop material. The penetrations were declared non-functional at 1320 hours0.0153 days <br />0.367 hours <br />0.00218 weeks <br />5.0226e-4 months <br />. Technical Specification 3.21.B.7 states that if one or more fire barrier penetrations protecting safety related areas are non-functional, a continuous fire watch must be established within one hour on at least one side of the non-functional barrier. A deviation report was submitted and a continuous fire watch was established in the Unit 2 Cable Vault at 1415 hours0.0164 days <br />0.393 hours <br />0.00234 weeks <br />5.384075e-4 months <br />.

Repairs on the penetrations were conducted on May 17 & 18, 1993. The repairs were believed to be complete, and the fire watch was discontinued on May 20, 1993, at 0913 hours0.0106 days <br />0.254 hours <br />0.00151 weeks <br />3.473965e-4 months <br />. The continuous fire watch was reestablished at 1408 hours0.0163 days <br />0.391 hours <br />0.00233 weeks <br />5.35744e-4 months <br /> when it was discovered, during a review of the repair documentation, that repairs had been performed on a functional penetration (#2567) in lieu of one of the 11 non-functional penetrations (#2569). Penetration

1. 2569 was subsequently repaired and the fire watch was released on May 20, 1993, at 1620 hours0.0188 days <br />0.45 hours <br />0.00268 weeks <br />6.1641e-4 months <br />.

This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFRS0.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by Technical Specification 3.21.B.7.

2.0 SIGNIFICANT SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS This event resulted in no safety consequences or implications since the Auxiliary Building and the Unit 2 Cable Vault are equipped with fire detection and suppression systems. In addition, an hourly fire watch passed through the Unit 2 Cable Vault during the short period of time in which the continuous fire watch was not present.

• The Auxiliary Building and Unit 2 Cable Vault are equipped with alarmed smoke detectors that annunciate in the Control Room. In case of a fire, Control Room Operators notify fire brigade members who promptly respond to extinguish the fire. In addition, the Unit 2 Cable Vault is equipped with an automatic CO2 system (with sprinkler backup) and there are several fire hose stations located in the Auxiliary Building. These fire protection and suppression systems were operable during the event. A fire in the area (i.e., Auxiliary Building or Unit 2 Cable Vault) would have been promptly detected, reported and extinguished. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

I i

L C Form 366A 16-891

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e e I

IIIRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (6-89) \ APPROVED 0MB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO 1'HE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3)

LER NUMBER (6)

Surry Power Station, Unit 1 0 15 IO IO IO 12 18 I O 9 I 3 - 01 0 I 8 - 0 I O O I 3 OF O 13 TEXT (ff mom ap.ace is ,equimd, U/ltJ *dditioMI NRC Fonn 36&4's) (17) 3.0 CAUSE OF THE EVENT This event was caused by a programmatic deficiency in the fire watch process. Inadequate supervisory methods and review processes resulted in the fire watch being discontinued without prior verification that the non-functional penetrations had been repaired.

A cognitive personnel error contributed to this event. Contractor personnel, responsible for repairing the non-functional penetrations, utilized an inaccurate sketch to identify the penetrations to be repaired; penetration #2567 was referenced instead of penetration #2569.

A list of the non-functional penetrations, included in the repair package documentation, should have been used.

4.0 IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS A continuous fire watch was immediately reestablished in the Unit 2 Cable Vault when it was discovered that penetration #2569 had not been repaired.

5.0 ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS On May 20, 1993, penetration #2569 was repaired and subsequently declared functional.

A Root Cause Evaluation (RCE) was initiated on May 21, 1993, to determine the cause of the event.

6.0 ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE The fire watch administrative process is being changed to require independent reviews to ensure that fire barriers are returned to a functional status prior to discontinuing a fire watch.

This event will be discussed with appropriate personnel to emphasize the importance of using the proper work package documentation and the actions to be taken when a discrepancy is identified.

7.0 SIMILAR EVENTS None.

8.0 MANUFACTURER MAKE/MODEL NUMBER N/A.

NRC Fonn 366A (6-89)