ML18153C708

LER 91-013-00:on 910723,MCC Room Fire Supression Sys Discovered Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Continuous Firewatch Posted at Unit 1 MCC Room & Door Blocking Device installed.W/910822 Ltr

ML18153C708
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	08/22/1991
From:	Kansler M VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
91-497, LER-91-013-01, LER-91-13-1, NUDOCS 9108270126
Download: ML18153C708 (5)

Text

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.Virginia Electric and Power Company Surry Power Station P.O.Box315 Surry, Virginia 23883

• August 22, 1991 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial No.: 91-497 Document Control Desk DocketNo.: 50-280 Washingt,<>n, D. C. 20555 License No*.: DPR-32 Gentlemen:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specifications,* Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report for Unit 1.

REPORT NUMBER 91-013-00 This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be reviewed by the Corporate Management Safety Review Committee.

Very truly yours, ansler Station Manager Enclosure cc: Regional Administrator Suite 2900

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NRC FORM 366 (6-891 u.s_. NUCLEAR REGULAT. ORY COMMISSIO- APPROVED 0MB NO. 3160-0104 ,*

EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS

• AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-5301. U.S. NUCLEAR **

REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-01041, OFFICE ..

OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET. WASHINGTON, DC 20503. *.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) I PAGE (31 .

TITLE (41 Surry Power Station, Unit 1 Io 15 10 10 101 2 18 1o 1 loF 0 14 MCC Room Fire Suppression System Inoperable Due To Personnel Error In Administratively Controlling The MCC Room Exit Door*

EVENT DATE (SI LER NUMBER (61 REPORT DATE (71 OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED Ill MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR .]t SE~~~~~~AL (? ~~~~~~ MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAMES DOCKET NUMBER(SI 0151010101 I *1 01 7 21 3 9 1 911 - o 11 13 - o I o oI a 212 911 01S1010101 I I OPERATING THII REPORT IS SUBMITTED P.URIUANT TO THE RlaDUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Ch<<lc on* .or mo,. of tho followin11/ (111 I 11 __._N.....,.--1

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LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (121 NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER M. R. Kansler, Station Manager COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT 1131 CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC-TURER R~~O~~~iE !!iiiiil!l!l!l!!!!il!!!lil!!!!i!i!!ii!!jj!!!!!!!i!i!l CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC*

TURER I I I I I I I I. I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I SUPPLEM.ENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 1141 MONTH DAY YEA EXPECTED SUBMISSION I YES (If yo,, comp/et* EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

DATE. 1151 I I I ABSTRACT (Limit ro 1~00 soact1s. i.*.. *pproximu11iv fift**n 1ingJ**s;Mc* rypawrirmn /inttsl '16, On July 23, 1991, at approximately 1030 hours0.0119 days <br />0.286 hours <br />0.0017 weeks <br />3.91915e-4 months <br />, with Unit 1 at 100% power and Unit 2 at 100% power, th~ Unit 1 Cable Vault upper level Motor Control Center (MCC) *room exit door was found blocked open. This condition, which limited the ability of the carbon dioxide fire suppression system to perform its intended function, had existed for a period in excess of that allowed by Technical Specifications (TS) 3.21.B.4. On July 23, 1991, at approximately 1430 hours0.0166 days <br />0.397 hours <br />0.00236 weeks <br />5.44115e-4 months <br />, a continuous firewatch was posted at the Unit 1 MCC room and at approximately 1630 hours0.0189 days <br />0.453 hours <br />0.0027 weeks <br />6.20215e-4 months <br />, a door blocking clevice, designed to release upon actuation of the fire protection system, was installed and tested. The cause of this event is attributed to a cognitive error on the part of utility personnel in administratively controlling the MCC room exit door. To prevent recurrence, signs have been installed on both sides of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 MCC room exit doors cautioning that the door is a carbon dioxide fire protection system boundary. In addition, station doors will be evaluated and labeled or color coded, as appropriate, to indicate their safety significance to station operation. The event is being reported, pursuant to 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), since this condition is prohibited by TS 3.21.B.4.

NRC Form 366 16-891

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (6-$91

• APPROVED 0MB NO. 3150-0104_

- EXPIRES: 4/30/92 .

91MATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE E-T REPORT (LERI INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 60.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-6301. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, W.clSHINGTON, DC 20666, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT 13150-01041. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, OC 20603.

' FACILITY NAME !11 DOCKET NUMBER (21 LER NUMBER CBI PAGE 131 Surry Power Station, Unit 1 0 I O OI 2 OF O 14 1ECT (If mota - * ,.,,.,;,.I. ,_ ~ NRC Fotm .'iliM~J 1171 1 .o DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT On July 23, 1991, at approximately_ 1030 hours0.0119 days <br />0.286 hours <br />0.0017 weeks <br />3.91915e-4 months <br />, with Unit 1 at 100% power and Unit 2 at 100% power, the Unit 1 Cable Vault upper level Motor Control Center (MCC) room exit door {EIIS-DR} was found blocked open. It was determined that this condition, which limited 1he ability of the carbon diox*ide fire suppression system {EIIS-KQ} to perform its intended function, had existed .

for a period in excess of that allowed by Technical Specifications (TS). TS 3:21.B.4 requires that a continuous fire watch be established within one hour when the system is inoperable. A second occurrence of this event was observed on July 29, 1991.

This event was discovered by utility personnel during a review of the compensatory actions for Justification For Continued Operation (JCO) 1-91-3.

This JCO is associated with the Unit 1 pressurizer heater breakers {EIIS-BKR}

and, in part, requires that the Unit 1 MCC room ambient temperature be maintained as close as possible to 40 degrees Centigrade or lower. Direction is provided for lowering the temperature of the room by installing portable fans and opening and administratively controlling the MCC room exit door.

The JCO temperature control compensatory actions were initially implemented by assigning a continuous firewatch to monitor the temperature of the MCC room and report high temperatures to the Control Room. It was subsequently determined that a continuous fire watch was not required since the MCC room exit door is not a fire door (not fire rated). As a result, the monitoring was revised to have a firewatch qualified individual check the ambient temperature of the room every two hours.

This event occurred when the MCC room exit door was mechanically blocked open, as a temperature control measure, and a continuous fire watch was not assigned.

Upon discovery that the door was blocked open, the MCC room carbo.n dioxide fire suppression system was considered inoperable since the exit door functions as a suppression system boundary .

. The *event is being reported, pursuant to 10CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B), since this condition is prohibited by TS 3;21.B.4.

2.o SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS .

The Unit 1 Cable Vault upper level MCC room is located above the Unit 1 outside Containment Electrical Penetration Vault. The two areas are connected by a circular stairway and the floor is penetrated by open ventilation ducts. The areas have a smoke detection system {EIIS-IC}, which alarms in the control room, and an _automatic heat~actuated total flooding carbon dioxide fire suppression system .

. NRC Form 366A (6-891

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION lf.-891 APPROVED 0MB NO. 3150-0104

- EXPIRES: 4/30/82

...,ATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EV. . REPORT (LER) INFORMATION COLLECTION. REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS

• TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IP-6301, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, ANO TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT 13150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET NUMBER 121 LER NUMBER (BJ PAGE 131 VEAR  ;:;::::::: SEQUENTIAL :*>:*:*:* REVISION

.".".".":" NUMIIER  :-:*:*Z* NUMBER Surry Power Station, Unit 1 011 I3 - 0 I O OI 3 OF OI 4 TEXT '" mot9 - a requited, ua MldltioM/ NRC Farm 35M'al 1171 The MCC room contains nonsafety-related 480 volt MCCs {EIIS-MCC}, the heating and ventilation equipment for the MCC room and Containment Electrical Penetration Vault below, and a small amount of combustible. material (cable insulation).

The Containment Electrical Penetration Vault contains safety related cables

{EIIS-CBL} including control and power cables for safe shutdown equipment.

An engineering evaluation determined that the consequences of a fire in the Unit 1 MCC room would be minor. This conclusion was based on the limited quantity of combustibles in the room and that the smoke detection system would generate a fire brigade response. It was also determined that the open MCC room door would not impair the Containment Electrical Penetration Vault fire. suppression system of performing its function since carbon dioxide, being heavier than air, would not be drawn upward to the MCC room. In addition, the MCC room was inspected by a firewatch every two hours. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

• 3 .o CAUSE The cause of this event is attributed to a cognitive error on the part of utility personnel in administratively controlling the MCC room exit door. It was not recognized that a continuous fire watch is required when the door is open and the automatic door blocking device (designed to allow the door to close upon actuation of the fire protection system) is not in place. This error was fostered by the fact that the door is not fire rated. Fire rated doors are painted red and recognized by station personnel as a fire boundary that should not be blocked open without a

• continuous fire watch assigned. The subject door is painted green and is not labeled to indicate its significance to fire suppression.

• A contributing factor to this event was that the JCO did not provide explicit instructions as to why and how the subject door was to be* administratively controlled. The preparation of the JCO required a safety evaluation be performed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59. The safety evaluation contains a series of questions designed to determine if the proposed activity is safe or constitutes an unreviewed safety question. If the response to the safety evaluation question pertaining to fire protection systems had provided additional detail, more explicit direction may have been provided in the JCO.

4. o IMMEPJATE CORRECIJYE ACJION<Sl On July 23, 1991, at apprnximately

• 1430 hours0.0166 days <br />0.397 hours <br />0.00236 weeks <br />5.44115e-4 months <br />, a continuous firewatch was posted at the Unit 1 MCC room with specific instructions to close the exit door in the event of a fire protection system actuation or of indications of a possible fire.

NRC Form 366A 16-891

NRC FORM 366A . U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (F.S!ll LICENSEE E.T TEXT CONTINUATION REPORT (LER)

APPROVED 0MB ND. 3160-0104 EXPIRES: 4/30/92

-MATEO BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS

. AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-6301. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION. WASHINGTON. DC 20555, ANO TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-01041, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT ANO BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1J DOCKET NUMBER 121 LER NUMBER (Bl PAGE 131 Surry Powe~ Station, Unit 1 n>cT ( H - - a ,eqund, -Mldlriont,I NRC Fam, 35&4~11171 5 .O ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVE ACT!ONCS)

On July 23, 1991, at approximately 1630 hours0.0189 days <br />0.453 hours <br />0.0027 weeks <br />6.20215e-4 months <br />, a door blocking device, designed to release upon actuation of the fire protection system, was installed and tested, as required.

6

• O

• ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE A memorandum

• emphasizing the proper means of administratively controlling the MCC room door was issued to personnel responsible for monitoring the temperature of the MCC room. Signs were also installed on both sides of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 MCC room exit doors cautioning that the door is a carbon dioxide fire protection system boundary.

Station doors* will be evaluated and labeled or color coded, as appropriate, to indicate their safety significance to station operation.

• Additional training will be conducted for appropriate personnel to clarify JCO documentation requirements and to emphasize the need to provide specific instructions in JCOs as to why and how plant systems and components are to be administratively controlled.

7 .O SIMILAR EVENTS 88-014-00 Failure To Comply With Technical Specificati_on Due To

• Administrative Oversight 89-011-00 TS Required Fire Watch Patrol Not Maintained While Containment Smoke Detectors Were Inoperable

8. 0 -MANUFACTURER/MODEL NUMBER N/A NAC Form 366A 16-891