ML18153C188

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LER 90-001-00:on 900314,emergency Svc Water Pumps Declared Inoperable Due to Emergency Shutdown Device Being in Tripped Condition.Caused by Procedural & Training Deficiencies. Procedures Changed & Training enhanced.W/900411 Ltr
ML18153C188
Person / Time
Site: Surry Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 04/11/1990
From: Kansler M
VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
90-212, LER-90-001-03, LER-90-1-3, NUDOCS 9004200749
Download: ML18153C188 (5)


Text

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VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY Surry Power Station P.O. Box 315 Surry, Virginia 23883 April 11, 1°990 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial No.: 90-212 Document Control Desk Docket Nos.: 50-280 Washington, D.C. 20555 50-281 License Nos.: DPR-32 DPR-37 Gentlemen:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specifications, Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report for Units 1 & 2.

REPORT NUMBER 90-001-00 This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be reviewed by Corporate Nuclear Safety.

Very truly yours, Station Manager Enclosure cc: Regiona1 Adainistrator Suite 2900*

101 Marietta Street, NW Atlanta, Georgia 30323 L£22.

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POW 28-06-01 MAC.Form 19-831 lfM e LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LEA)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULA TORY COMMISSION APPROVED 0MB NO. 3160-4104 EXPIRES: 1/31/.

FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET NUMBER 121 PAGE 31 Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2 o Is Io Io Io 1 2 18 1o TITLE 14' The Three Emergency Service Water Pumps Declared Inoperable Due to Their Emergency Shutdown Devices Being in a Tripped Condition EVENT CATE 151 LER NUMBER 161 REPORT DATE 171 OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 181 MONTH DAY YEAR  :,:;:,:;:; SEQUENTIAL I:':'::::: REVISION DAY YEAR FACILITY NAMES DOCKET NUMBERISI YEAR  :-:-:-:-:- NUMBEl'I 1:,::::::: NUMBER MONTH o ( 5 Io I ci IO I I I

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- II0.731111211UI II0.73(11(2111111 II0.73(11121(w1UIIII II0.731*11211*1 LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (121 NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE M. R. Kansler, Station Manager

_ 8 10 I 4 3 f 51 7 I i3 1 l 18. I 4 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED JN THIS REPORT 1131

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MANUFAC- MANUFAC-CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT TURER TO NPRDS 1::n@@r:::::::::::;::::::: CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT TURER REPORTABL TO NPRDS I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I

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IUPPLEMENTAL IIEl'OIIT ex,ECTID 11'1 MONTH DAY YEAR EXPECTED

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SUBMISSION DATE 1151

~ YES /If Yfl, comp/or. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DA TEI NO I I I On March 14, 1990 at 1405 hours0.0163 days <br />0.39 hours <br />0.00232 weeks <br />5.346025e-4 months <br />, with Units 1 and 2 at 100% power during the performance of a periodic test, the "B" Emergency Service Water Pump failed to start and was declared inoperable. Further investigation determined that the failure of the "B" pump to start was due to a tripped emergency engine shutdown device. Operations personnel performing the testing did not recognize the need to reset it prior to starting the pump. The device was reset at 1545 hours0.0179 days <br />0.429 hours <br />0.00255 weeks <br />5.878725e-4 months <br /> by one of the maintenance personnel. Examination of the other two ESWPs, "A" and "C", revealed that their emergency shutdown devices were also in the tripped condition. The three ESWPs were considered inoperable while the devices were tripped. A four hour non-emergency report was made to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission identifying this event. The periodic test procedures and pump operating procedure will be revised to include detailed instructions on operation of the engine shutdown device. In addition, operator training will be enhanced to include more detailed description of the shutdown device and its operation.

NRC Form JN 19-831

NIIC POIIMJMA U.1. NUCUAII IIEOULATOIIIY COI.IMISIION IMSII AffROVED OMI N0. 3150-0104 lX'111U: */JQ/112 LICENSEE &,. REPORT (LER)

  • MATED IURD(N PEIi IIIESl'ONSE TO COMl'LY WTH nos IIMATION COLLECTION IIIEOUEST: 50.0 HAI. PORWAIIO CXIYMENTS IIIEGARDING IURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE IIE~O.

TEXT CONTINUATION NtlD IIEl'OIITI MANAGEMENT IIIANCH C,.&301 U I NUCL.LUI IIIEGULATOIIY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, oe' :lOli&e, ANO TO TH£ ,APERWOIIK IIEDUCTION ~ C T (3150-01041 OFl'ICE OF MANAGEMENT AND IUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC DOJ.

l'ACILITY NAME (11 DOCKET NUMIEIII tzl LEiii NUMIIII (II SEQUE .. TIAL . t,,fYIIIO" Surry Power Station, Units 1 & 2 llri(UJr,,,llf:" ,*. -.v ... lE 11111 0 I OI 1 _ 0 I O OI 2 OF OI 4 T'IXT r,""" - Al~ - lddllJo,wl NIIC Fonn -..*&1 "11 1.0 Description of the Event On March 14, 1990 at 1405 hours0.0163 days <br />0.39 hours <br />0.00232 weeks <br />5.346025e-4 months <br />, with Units 1 and 2 at 100% power, during the performance of l-PT-25.3B, (the "B" diesel driven Emergency Service Water Pump (ESWP) quarterly performance test) the "B" ESWP failed to start and was declared inoperable. Technical Specification 3.14.A.4 requires that all three ESWPs be operable, Ho.wever, T. S. 3 .14. B allows one ESWP (EIIS-BI, P) to be inoperable for a period not to exceed seven days. Consequently, when the "B" ESWP was declared inoperable, a seven day Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) was entered for both units. Upon further investigation, it was determined that the failure of the "B" pump to start was due to a tripped emergency engine shutdown device mounted on the engine air intake manifold. This device automatically actuates to shut down the engine to prevent damage by blocking air to its intake manifold when specific engine parameters are exceeded. It can also be manually actuated. The device must be manually reset following its actuation. Operations personnel performing the testing were not familiar with the operation of.this device and consequently did not recognize the need to reset it prior to starting the pump. Examination of the other two ESWPs, "A" and "C", rev~aled that their emergency shutdown devices were also in the tripped condition, The device was reset at 1545 hours0.0179 days <br />0.429 hours <br />0.00255 weeks <br />5.878725e-4 months <br /> when one of the maintenance personnel summoned to investigate the failure of the pump to start, determined that the device was in the tripped condition.

Since operations personnel were not familiar with the engine shutdown device, the three ESWPs were considered inoperable while the d~vices were tripped.

A four hour non-emergency report per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)iiiD was made to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission at 1850 hours0.0214 days <br />0.514 hours <br />0.00306 weeks <br />7.03925e-4 months <br /> identifying this event.

NRC I ' - :NGA 11-811

.{ '""CFOIIM . .A CMIII U.I. NUCU.All llfOVLATOIIY COMMISSION APPROVED OMI NO. 31&0~104

  • IXPIIIU: 4/lOm LICENSEE -NT REPORT (LER) . ,..... no IUROEN rEII IIUl'ONIE TO COMl'LY WTH THIS

-ORMATION COLLECTION IIIEOUEST: &0.0 HIIS. fORWAIIID TEXT CONTINUATION Cl)IAIIENTI IIEOARDING IURDEN EnlMATE TO THE l'ECOf!DC NtltJ l'IE,ORTI MANAGEMENT IRANCH C,-6l01, V.I. NUCUAII l'IIEGUL.ATOIIY COMMISSION, W.UHIH<iTON, CC 20&1111, AND TD TNE l'ArERWORI( l'IEOUCTION rl'IOJfCT 131&0~1041 OHia OF MANAGEMENT AND IUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC DI03.

FACILITY NAME 111 DOCUT NVMIE II 121 LIii NUMIUI Ill rAOI IJI Surry Power Station, Units 1 & 2 0 I O O I 3 OF O 14 2.0 Safety Consequences and Implications Three diesel driven ESWPs provide service water to the intake canal in the event of a loss of power to the circulating water pumps. The accident analysis assumes operators will attempt to start the three pumps locally within two hours of a loss of off site power in coincidence with a design basis accident on one unit.

The pumps could have been started immediately upon resetting the trip devices at 1545 hours0.0179 days <br />0.429 hours <br />0.00255 weeks <br />5.878725e-4 months <br />, which is within the two hour time period. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3.0 Cause An investigative team has been formed to perform a Root Cause Analysis. The analysis identified some procedural and training deficiencies that contributed to the operators' failure to identify the tripped condition and take appropriate actions. Specifically, an item on the pre-start check off sheet for the periodic test procedure, intended to check the position of the shutdown device, was insufficient in detail. It did not adequately instruct operators unfamiliar with the device on how to correctly check its position and reset it if necessary. In addition, there was no reference to the device in the pump's operating procedure, OP-49.2.

The team has thus far been unable to determine why the three ESWPs emergency shutdown devices were in the tripped condition. However, automatic actuation of the device was ruled out since the engines' operating parameters were noted to be normal and each engine 1 s starting circuitry is independent.

In the event that the investigative team arrives at a root cause determination, a revision to this Licensee Event Report will be submitted.

NIIC , _ )NA 16-191

MIICfOIIM>MA U.I. NVCU.AII IIEOULATOIIY COMMISSION IMIII Arf'ROVED OMI HO. ll&O-<llCM EXPIIIU: 4no/92 MATED IURDEJII PEIi IIESl'ONU TO COWLY WTH TI41S LICENSEE . , . REPORT (LER)

  • RMATION COLLECTION IIEOVEST: &0.0 HIii. fORWAIIO a)IIAIENTI IIEOARDING IUIIDEN ESTIMATE TO THE IIECOIIDS TEXT CONTINUATION A/lllt:J IIEl'OIITI MANAGEMENT IIIANCH IP-6301 U I NVCUAlt 20il56 0

MGULATOIIY COMMISSION, WAJHINGTON OC AAD TO TNE rArEAWOIIK IIEDUCTION HIO.lfCT lll&O-<llCMI' Off IQ

~ MANAGEMENT AND IUOGET, W~INGTON, 0C :IQ!Ol.

fACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET NUMIEII 121 LIii NUMIIII Ill rAOI 1:11 Surry Power Station, Units 1 & 2 o 1s Io Io Io I 2 18 I o 9 1o o Io 1 1 01 0 0 I 4 OF O I 4 4.0 Immediate Corrective Action(s)

At 1545 hours0.0179 days <br />0.429 hours <br />0.00255 weeks <br />5.878725e-4 months <br />, after the discovery that the shutdown device on the "B 11 ESWP was in the tripped position and subsequent discovery that the other two pumps were in the same condition, the shutdown devices on the three ESWPs were reset. The 11 B11 ESWP was successfully started at 1610 hours0.0186 days <br />0.447 hours <br />0.00266 weeks <br />6.12605e-4 months <br /> and the periodic test 11 satisfactorily completed. The 11 A" and 11 C pumps were started at 1748 hours0.0202 days <br />0.486 hours <br />0.00289 weeks <br />6.65114e-4 months <br /> and 1753 hours0.0203 days <br />0.487 hours <br />0.0029 weeks <br />6.670165e-4 months <br /> respectively to verify operability of the pumps.

5.0 Additional Corrective Action(s)

The three ESWP's periodic test procedures were changed to include a detailed drawing of the shutdown device, illustrating its operation, with instructions on how to reset the device. The operating procedure was also changed to include the detailed drawing and a step in the procedure to verify the shutdown device is reset prior to start of the pumps.

6.0 Action(s) Taken to Prevent Recurrence In addition to the changes referenced above, licensed and*non-licensed operator training will be enhanced to include more detailed description. of the shutdown device and its operation.

7.0 Similar Events None.

8.0 Manufacturer/Model Number(s)

N/A.

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