ML18153C050

LER 89-041-00:on 891206,Train a of Auxiliary Ventilation Removed from Svc by Placing Fan Control Switch in pull-to- Lock Position,Rendering Fan Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Fan Returned to Automatic control.W/900103 Ltr

ML18153C050
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	01/03/1990
From:	Kansler M VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
89-060, 89-60, LER-89-041, LER-89-41, NUDOCS 9001110181
Download: ML18153C050 (4)

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VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY Surry Power Station P.O. Box 315 Surry, Virginia 23883 January 3, 1990 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial No.: 89-060 Document Control Desk Docket Nos.: 50-280 Washington, D.C. 20555 50-281 License Nos.: DPR-32 DPR-37 Gentlemen:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specifications, Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report for Units 1 and 2.

REPORT NUMBER 89-041-00 This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be reviewed by Corporate Nuclear Safety.

Very truly yours,

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Station Manager Enclosure cc: Regional Administrator Suite 2900 101 Marietta Street, NW Atlanta, Georgia 30323

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FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET -aEII 121 I *°'G l;s1 Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2 TITLE 141 Auxiliary Vent Fan Taken Out or ::;ervice Witnout Implementing Technical I o Is I o Io I o 12 ,s I o , loFI o 13 Specification Action Statement Due to Personnel Error EVENT DATE Iii) *..--:::RE::PO:=R'.:'T":DA-:-::TE:-::(7:'."l-"T"------O-TH-E-R-F-AC-1-LI-T-IE-I-INV-O-L-V-E-D-la-1------------.I LEA NUMBER 181 YEAR FACILITY NAMES DOCKET NUMBERISI 1 I 2 o 16 8 9 8 9 -I o14 I 1 - o 10 011 Ol'EIIATING N I-TH-llf:R~EPO:;:R;:T:-IS-IU_ilM_ITT_E_D_l'U_RS:....:U_ArN.:_T T.:.O:'.T~H:'.:E==R~EOU:::;l.:.:A=Elilan'$=:.:.::..:O::F_::10:_:C::.::F_::11~§!.:.:_!:/Ch<<;;::::t_:o:,..:_:o:_r::.m:o::"_:o:_I:ttt:*.::'°:°""::::n:!vJ:_:1~1~11_,--_ _ _ __:__ _ _ ---1 MODE Ill t----'T""--""-4--l Z0.40Zlbl l'OWEII

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TELEP>tONE NUMBER M. R. Kansler, Station Manager AREA CODE COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACloi COMPONElll"T FAILURE DE&CRIBED,IN THIS REPORT 1131 MANUFAC, MANUFAC, CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT TUAER TURER I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I IWPFLE1tlENTA!. IIEPORT El(l'ECTEO ;1*1 MONTH DAY EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE 1151 I

ASITIIACT /Um/r ID 14()() _ . , , i.1 .. 1pp,011im1,..ly fihHn ,;fti/1--,;1 ryp,wnmn /inn} 1111 On December 6, 1989, the "A" train of auxiliary ventilation was removed from service by placing the fan control switch_ in the

• pull-to-lock (PTL) position. This removed the automatic start feature of the fan rendering the fan technically inoperable and the appropriate Technical Specification action statement was not implemented. The cause of the event was personnel error. The shift supervisor involved failed to consider that placing the swi.tch in PTL would render the fan inoperable. The fan was .returned to automatic control when the switch was placed in the automatic position 30 minutes after the event. All operations personnel have been directed to consider safety related equipment inoperable whenever placing the controls in the PTL position.

NRC Form 3N

NRC FORM llNA 16-fil - _

• U.1. NUCLEAII IIEGULATOIIY COMMISSION APPROVED OMI NO. 3160~10C EXPIRES: 4134/rl LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CLER) ISTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS N'ORMATION COLLECTION IIEOUEST: IWI.O HRS. FORWA,tQ TEXT CONTINUATION CX>IAIENTS REGARDING IIURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE ,tECOflDC N1lt:J REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IP.a301, U.I. NUCLEAA REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20IIII, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT l31~10CI, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20li03.

FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET NUMIEII 121 LER NUMIEII Ill PAGE I'!

Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2 TEXT flt more . . . * ~ ,,. iMldltloMI NRC Form .-..'al rm 01s1010.10121s10- Sf9 o 14 I 1 o, 0 o, 2 OF O f3 1.0 Description of the Event On December 6, 1989, with Unit 1 and Unit 2 at 100%

power, the Superintendent of Operations discovered through a review of control room operator's logs that the "A" train auxiliary ventilation exhaust (ELLS'.""VF) fan (l-VS-F-58A) (ELLS-FAN) had been removed from service earlier that day for approx"imately 30 minutes.

The fan's control switch had been placed in the pull-to-lock position at 1010 hours0.0117 days <br />0.281 hours <br />0.00167 weeks <br />3.84305e-4 months <br /> to support replacement of.the fan's oil level sight glass. The shift supervisor had received instructions earlier that the maintenance on the fan was to be performed under operator standby. This is an approved method used to control operation of equipment while maintenance is being performed on it. In this case operator standby was achieved by placing the control switch in the PTL position under the direct control of a control room operator. In the PTL position the fan would not automatically start as desiined upon the initiation of a safety injection. Consequently, the

• fan should have been considered inoperable. Technical Specifications 3.22 requires that when one train of the exhaust filter system is inoperable for any reason, the redundant train shall be demonstrated operable immediately and the inoperable train shall be returned to operable status within seven days or the unit be placed in at least hot shutdown. The seven day action statement was not entered nor was the "B" train demonstrated operable. At 1040 hours0.012 days <br />0.289 hours <br />0.00172 weeks <br />3.9572e-4 months <br />, fan control was returned to automatic after maintenance personnel determined that the correct parts were not available.

2.0 Safety Consequences and Implications The auxiliary ventilation system is designed to remove heat f~om various areas in the pla~t t~ ensure proper operation of safety related equipmerit in the event of a design basis accident (DEA). In'addition, this system is designed to remove particulate and iodine contaminants in the exhaust air from these areas following a DEA.

NRC Form 386A 16-891

HAC FOAM 3MA CMIII

• U.I. NUCLEAII IIEOULATOAY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION

• Al'PAOVEO OMII NO. 3160.0104 EXPIRES: 4/3(1/fl ISTIMATEO IUADEN PEA RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS

~RMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 60.0 HAS. FORWARD CDIAIENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE t'IECOflDa A1111D REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH CP-6301, u.a. NUCLEAl'I REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 2015&1, ANO TD THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT 13160,01041, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20!503.

FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET HUMIEII 121 LEII NUMaEII Ill PAOI 131 Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2 o Is I o I o I o I 2' 1s I o s 19 01411 01 0 0 I 3 OF O I 3 During the time that the control switch* for the "A" train of filtered exhaust was in the pull-to-lock position, the "B" train was operable and in automatic.

In addition, since the maintenance was not performed on the fan, the fan was available for operation at all times during this event. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3.0 Cause The cause of failure to enter the Technical Specification action statement was due to personnel error. The senior reactor operator (SRO) involved with the event failed to consider that placing the fan's control switch in the PTL position rendered it technically inoperable. Consequently, the actions required by Technical Specification for an inoperable fan were not implemented.

4.0 Immediate Corrective Action(s)

None required since the fan had been returned to automatic control when the event was discovered.

5.0 Additional Corrective Action(s)

None required.

6.0 Action(s) Taken to Prevent Recurrence A memorandum was issued by the operations coordinator to all operations shift supervisors directing that safety related equipment be considered inoperable whenever their controls are placed in the PTL position. The only exceptions would be if appropriate approved controls are taken. This memorandum has been placed in required reading for all licensed personnel.

7.0 Similar Events None.

8.0 Manufacturer/Model Number(s)

N/A.

NRC Form ,eaA 16-891