ML18153B568

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
LER 88-025-00:on 881208,determined That Power Supplies for Two Safety Injection Valve Operators Reversed.Caused by Error During Initial Plant Const.Engineering Work Request Issued to Correct as-found conditions.W/890109 Ltr
ML18153B568
Person / Time
Site: Surry Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 01/09/1989
From: Kansler M
VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
88-070, 88-70, LER-88-025-02, LER-88-25-2, NUDOCS 8901130031
Download: ML18153B568 (5)


Text

NRC Form 366 e POW 28-06-01 U.S. _NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 19-83)

APPROVED 0MB. NO. 3150-0104 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (L~R) EXPIRES: 8/31/88 DOCKET NUMBER 12) I PAGE 131

!0 15 FACILITY NAf.'IE 11)

Surry Power Station, Unit 2 IO IO IO 12 I 81 l 1 loF O 14 TITLE 14)

LHSI Pump Discharge MOVs 2863A & B Power Supplies Interchanged EVENT DATE 15) LER NUMBER 16) REPORT DATE 17) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 18)

MONTH llAY YEAR YEAR j]: SE~~~~~~AL tr ~5i~~~ MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAMES DOCKET NUMBERIS) 1 I 2 o 18 8 8 8I8 - o12 1s ~ o io o 11 oI 9 8 I9 0151010101 I I THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUl,REMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Chock on* or mar* of th* fol/ooylng/ 111)

N t--r---------,---.------'----'-----r-~------..:....:~.---"T"""-----------1 OPERATING MODE (9)

I 20.4021b) 20.40510) 50.73(1)12)1iv) 73.71(b) 20.40511111 icu 50.311(0)11) li0,73(1)12)1v)

.__ 73.71(cl POWER I--

LEVEL c,01 01 0 I 0 20.405(1)(1 )(II) li0,36(cll21 50.73(1)12llvll) .__ 0TH ER ,s,,.clfy in Ab,troct bolow ond In T*xt, NRC Form 20.40611)11 llilll 60.7311)12)11) 50.7311l12)1vlll)IAJ 366A) 20.40511111 llM 20.406(1l11Jlvl

~

50,7311)12)1111 50.73loll211iiil LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER 1121

- 50.73loll2llvlll)IBJ 50.7311l12llxl NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE M. R. Kansler, Station Manager 81 0 14 3 15 17 I- 13 1 l 18 14 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT 1131 R~60~~:gtE !i!!!!!!!l!\!l!!!l:l!l!l:l!l!l!l!l!l!l!l:l!l1l!l:l!I!

CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC- MANUFAC-TURER CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT TURER I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 1141 MONTH DAY YEAR EXPECTED

~

SUBMISSION I YES (If yes, comp/et* EXPECTED SUBMISSION DA TEI . NO DATE 1151 I I I ABSTRACT /Limit to 1400 1pac*s, I.*** *pproximotely fifre*n singl*-spac* typewritten lin*s! 1161 On December 8, 1988, both Unit 1 and Unit 2 were in Refueling Shutdown (RSD). While investigating a station deviation report, it was determined that the power supplies for two safety injection valve operators were reversed. The 11 11 A Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI) pump discharge valve operator (MOV-SI-2863A) was powered from the "B" train power supply, and the "B" LHSI pump discharge valve operator (MOV-SI-2863B) was powered from the 11 A11 train power supply.

This condition violates the train independence criterion. A detailed review of drawings and pertinent documentation was completed and field walkdowns were performed. As a result of these efforts, it was concluded that this error occurred during original plant construction. Inspections of other motor-operated valves (MOV) that are located in parallel flow paths were also performed to verify power train separation. These inspections did not identify any similar conditions and indicated the above arrangement is .an isolated occurrence. A detailed report is being prepared by a management significant event review team which will provide corrective action recommendations.

8901130031 890109 PDR S ADOC*< r* oi::coo!")e

., ) ,:.; 1 PNLJ NRC Form 366 19-83)

POW 28-06-01

~ NRC Form 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (9-831 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LERI TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED 0MB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 8/31 /88 FACILITY NAME (11 DOCKET NUMBER (21 LER NUMBER 161 PAGE (31 YEAR  :::;::::::: SEQUENTIAL ::;:::::::: REVISION

NUMBER  :::::::::: NUMBER Surry.Power Station, Unit 2 TEXT (ff more spoce is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) 1171 1.0 Description of the Event On December 8, 1988, both Unit 1 and Unit 2 were in Refueling Shutdown (RSD). While investigating a station deviation report, it was discovered that the power supplies to two Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI)

Pumps' [EIIS-P] discharge valve motor operators

[EIIS-MO] were reversed. These valves supply the suctions of the High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) pumps

[EIIS-P]. The A" LHSI pump discharge valve operator (MOV-SI-2863A) was powered from the "B" train power

  • supply, and the "B" LHSI pump discharge valve operator (MOV-SI-2863B) was powered from the "A" train power supply. The above condition violates the train independence cri_terion.

2.0 Safety Consequences and Implications Recirculation Mode Transfer (RMT) (EIIS-JE) is the designation given to the circuit which initiates a change from the injection phase, where LHSI pump suction is taken from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST), to a recirculation phase where LHSI pump suction is taken from the Recirculation Spray (RS) sump during a Design Basis Event (DBE). This change automatically occurs when the level in the RWST reaches a specified setpoint. As part of this change, the LHSI pump discharge MOVs to the HHSI pump suctions open, and the RWST supply MOVs to the HHSI pumps close. The HHSI pumps provide low flow rates at a high discharge pressure, primarily to provide protection against small break LOCAs. All three (3) HHSI pumps receive an auto start signal upon SI initiation. One pump is normally locked out. Because of the above wiring discrepancy, a single failure of an emergency power supply could have resulted in a loss of suction to the HHSI pumps through the operable pump's normal flow path.

An alternate supply to the suction of the HHSI pumps was available, however. This flow path is provided by the LHSI pump discharge cross-connect and the operable LHSI pump discharge valve. The valves in the cross-connect are verified open each shift.

NRC FORM 366A *u.s. GPO: 1988-520-589100070 (9,831

~I I

POW 28-06-0l*

  • -' NRC Form 386A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (9-831 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED 0MB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (11 DOCKET NUMBER (21 LER NUMBER (61 PAGE (31 Surry Power Station, Unit 2 01s101010121s, 1 s,s -01215 - OJO 013 OFO 14 TEXT (If more :spa~ is required; use addftional NRC Form 366A's/ 1171 Since the LHSI pumps were capable of supplying the suction of the HHS! pumps, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3.0 Cause A detailed review of electrical wiring, cable routing, pip~ng schematics, flow diagrams, and piping isometric drawings has been conducted. In addition, plant startup testing, plant modifications, and work histories of MOV-2863A/B were reviewed, and physical system walkdowns were performed. Based upon these reviews and verifications, it was concluded that the error occurred during original construction.

4.0 Immediate Corrective Action(s)

At the time of discovery, Unit 2 was in RSD. The LHSI pump discharge to the HHS! pumps suction was not in use as the Technical Specification 3.2.A required flow path to* the core. Therefore, no immediate corrective actions were necessary.

5.0 Additional Corrective Action(s)

An Engineering Work Request (EWR) was written and approved on December 11, 1988 to perform inspections of Unit 1 and Unit 2 MOVs that are located in parallel flow paths which require train separation of power supplies. This EWR and other inspections indicate that the above conditi.on discovered on MOV-2863A & B is an isolated event.

A management significant event review team was formed on December 15, 1988 to investigate this event and to address generic implications. A detailed report b_ased on the team's findings will provide corrective action recommendations.

Finally, an EWR has been written to correct the "as found" discrepant conditions of MOV-2863A & B by rerouting and terminating the* cabling to the proper motor operators prior to the startup of Unit 2.

NRC FOAM 366A *U.S. GPO: l988-520-5S9,tl0070 (9.33;

., POW 28-06-01 NRC Form 366A (9-83)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMS NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

Surry Power Station, Unit 2 0 1s I O I O I O I 2 18 11 8 18 - 0 I 21 5 - 0 IO O14 OF O14 TEXT (ff more. spacs is required, use 11ddition11/ NRC Form 366A 's) (17) 6.0 Actions to Prevent Recurrence The final report submitted by the management significant event review team will provide corrective action -recommendations to prevent recurrence including the following: -

1) perform enhanced testing of certain Engineered Safety Feature MOVs, and
2) perform functional testing of the RMT circuitry and component actuations.

In addition to these recommendations, an Operational Assurance Program has been formed which will review systems and components required to perform a specific function to achieve cold shutdown or mitigate the consequences of an accident. These components and systems will be identified on plant drawings and walked down by knowledgeable personnel in order to:

1) verify physical location of the component within the system,
2) ensure proper identification of the component,
3) ensure proper orientation of the component,
4) ensure that discrepancies are identified and addressed, and
5) ensure that each component is fed from its proper.

power source.

7.0 Similar Events None.

8.0 Manufacturer/Model Number N/A NRC FORM 388A *u.s. GPO, 1988-520-58.9,00070 (9-83)

e e VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY Surry Power Station P. 0. Box 315 Surry, Virginia 23883 January 9, 1989 .

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial No.: 88-070 Docmnent Control Desk Docket No.: 50-281 016 Phillips Building License No. DPR-37 Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specifications, Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report for Unit 2.*

REPORT NUMBER 88-025-00 This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be reviewed by Safety Evaluation and Control.

Very~truly Y01!fS,

,///, ~

~ ~../:i_'<<v7 Station Manager Enclosure cc: Regional Administrator Suite 2900 101 Marietta Street, NW Atlanta, Georgia 30323