ML18152B247

LER 88-037-00:on 880918,electrical Penetration Not Completely Filled W/Fire Retardant Foam,Surrounding Cables as Required.Fire Watch Not Posted within Hour of Discovery. Caused by Personnel Error.Personnel counseled.W/881018 Ltr

ML18152B247
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	10/18/1988
From:	Benson D VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
88-056, 88-56, LER-88-037, LER-88-37, NUDOCS 8810250285
Download: ML18152B247 (4)

Text

POW 28-06-01 NRC Form 3H U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 19-83)

APPROVED DMB NO. 3151M11~

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) EXPIRES: 11/31/88 FACILITY NAME 11) !DOCKET NUMBER 12) I PAGE 131 Surry Power Station, .Unit 1 o 151 o JO Io I 21810 I 1 loF O 13 TITLE 141 Fire Watch Not Posted at Improperly Sealed Penetration Within One Hour Due to Personnel Error EVENT DATE 151 LER NUMBER 161 REPORT DATE 17) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 18)

MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR .it SE~~~:~~AL ff~~~~~~ MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAMES DOCKET NUMBERISI ol 9 1 I B B B sIs - o13 I 7 - o Io 1 lo 1 Is sIs OPERATING THII REPORT II SUBMITTED PURIUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: /Ch<<:k on* or more of th* folloll(inr,I 111)

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50.73111CZllvlllllAI 366AI NAME 50.731111Zlllll IICl.7311112111111 LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER 1121 50,7311IIZllvlllllBI 50,7311IIZllxl TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE David L. Benson, Station Manager 8 10 I 4 31 5 I 7 I- I 3 11 B I 4 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT 1131 MANUFAC, MANUFAC*

CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT TURER TURER I I I I I I I . I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I IUP,LEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 1141 MONTH DAY YEAR EXPECTED n YES /If,,_, Htnp/ne EXPECTED SUIIMISSION DATE/

AalTRACT (Limit ID 1400 - * ,.... *PPIO*im*r.ty fl'-n 11,,,,.._. ry,,..inan /inn/ 1111 SUBMISSION DATE 1151 -

I I I On September 18, 1988 at 1000 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br />, with Unit 1 at cold shutdown (CSD), a Quality Assurance (QA) inspector discovered that an electrical penetration was not completely filled with fire retardant foam, surrounding-the cables as required. Prior to this discovery, the electrical penetration was verified intact by a Periodic Test performed on September 2, 1988. The control room shift supervisor was not promptly notified of the condition, and a fire watch was not posted at the penetration within an hour as required by Technical Sp~cification 3.21.B.7. The failure to establish a fire watch within an hour of discovery of the unsealed penetration was due to personnel error. A fire watch was posted at the penetration approximately three and one ha.lf hours after the initial discovery and remained there until the cables were removed and the penetration was sealed.

The event has been discussed with the personnel involved, and they were reminded of the need to take prompt corrective actions when discovering or receiving reports of any abnormal plant conditions.

8810250285 881018 PDR ADOCK 05000280 S PNU NAC Form :NI IA.A..11

POW 28-06-01 NRC Form 3811A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (9-831 LICENSEE E T REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUA , N APPROVED 0MB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: .B/31 /88 FAQILITY NAME (1 I DOCKET NUMBER (21 LER NUMBER (61 PAGE (31

• • • • • SEQUENTIAL *:,:,:*:*:* REVISION Y~AR *:::::::::: NUMBER  ::::::::::' NUMBER Surry Power Station, Unit 1 0 5 0 0 0 TEXT {II-.-.*,.,,,,_,, ,- HdltiaMI NRC fo,m 315SA'*I (17) 1.0 Description of the Event On September 18, 1988 at 1000 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br />, with Unit 1 at cold shutdown (CSD), a Quality Assurance (QA) inspector discovered that an electrical penetration was not completely filled with fire retardant foam, surrounding the cables as required. The penetration contained three abandoned cables running through the floor of the unit 1 normal switchgear room to a cable tray in the ceiling of the cable tray room below.

These abandoned cables had been severed above the floor penetration. Prior to this discovery, the electrical penetration was verified intact, by a Periodic Test performed on September 2, 1988.

The control room shift supervisor was not promptly notified of the condition, and a fire watch was not.

posted at the penetration within an hour, as required by Technical Specification 3.2l.Bo7.

2.0 Safety Consequences and Implications The integrity of the fire barriers ensure that*a fire in one area of the plant will be confined, or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent areas.

Both areas have adequate fire detection systems and both areas are protected by CO2 systems. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3.0 Cause The failure to establish a fire watch within an hour of discovery of the unsealed penetration was due to personnel error. The QA inspector did not promptly report the condition to the control room and op~rations personnel, once notified, failed to post a fire watch within an hour.

The three cables had been previously cut apove the penetration and were being supported solely by the foam in the penetration. It is postulated that the fire retardant foam was pulled down through the penetration, due to either the weight of the cables, or by workmen in the immediate area, who may have in-advertently bumped the cables during an adjacent cable pull on September 17, 1988.

• NRC FORM 36eA

• U.S.GPO: 1986*0-624-538/455 (9-831

POW 28-06-01 NRC Fa,1113MA U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l!MIJI LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED 0MB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: B/31 /BB FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET NUMBER 121 LER NUMBER 181 PAGE 131 YEAR ********** SEQUENTIAL ,:,:-:*:*:* REVISION

NUMBER  :*:*:*:*:* NUMBER Surry Power Station, Unit 1 o 1s Io Io Io I 21 a I o al a - ol 3 I 7 - oI n nl l OF nI ~

4.0 Immediate Corrective Action(s)

A fire watch was posted at the penetration approximately three and one-half hours after the initial discovery and remained there until the cables were removed and the penetration was sealed. /

5.0 Additional Corrective Action(s)

The similar penetration on unit 2 was inspected and verified as satisfactory.

6.0 Action(s) Taken to Prevent Recurrence The event has been discussed with the personnel involved and they were reminded of the need to take prompt corrective actions when discovering or receiving reports of any abnormal plant conditions. Although the method used to abandon the cable, prior to this event, is not prohibited, it is not considered good practice and is rarely used. Therefore, this is considered an isolated case and no additional actions are required.

7.0 Similar Events None.

8.0 Manufacturer/Model Number N/A N .. C FO .. M 388A 111-831

• U.S.GPO: 1988*0*824*538/455

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC ANO POWER COMPANY Surry Power Station P.O. Box 316 Surry, Virgini11 23883 October 18, 1988 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial No.: 88-056 Document Control Desk Docket No.: 50-280 016 Phillips Building Licensee No.: DPR-32 Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specifications, Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report for Surry Unit 1.

REPORT NUMBER 88-037-00 This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be reviewed by Safety Evaluation and Control.

Very truly yours,

~if'~

David L. Benson Station Manager Enclosure cc: Dr. J. Nelson Grace Regional Administrator Suite 2900 101 Marietta Street, NW Atlanta, Georgia 30323