ML18053A500
| ML18053A500 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 08/01/1988 |
| From: | Krimm R Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| To: | Congel F Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18053A502 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8808220007 | |
| Download: ML18053A500 (107) | |
Text
Federal Emergency Management Agency Washington, D.C. 20472 AUG 1 1988 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Frank J. Congel Director FROM:
SUBJECT:
Division of Radiation Protection and Emergency Preparedness Off ice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
~;v~ssion
.Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Final Exercise Re_port for the February 17, 1988, Exercise of Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans for the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant Attached is a copy of.the final exercise re_port of the Febru_ary 17, 1988, exercise of offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans site-specific to the Palisades, Nuclear Power Plant. This final exercise ~e_port was pre-pared by the legion V off ice staff of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
There were no deficiencies identified during this exercise: however, there are several areas requiring corrective actions. A schedule of corrective actions is included in this re_port.
Based on the results of this exercise, the offsite radiological emergency plans and preparedness are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken offsite to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of an ~ccident-at the Palisades Nucl~ar Power Plant, and the 44 CFR 350 approval granted on July 2, 1982, remains in effect.
If you should have any questions, please contact me at 646-2871.
Attachment 8808220007 880801 PDR ADOCK 05000255 F
PNU
Federal Emergency Management. Agency Region V 175 West Jackson, 4th Floor, Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 431-5500 June 29, 1988 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Assistant Associate Director ATTENTION:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Megs Hepler, SL-NT-TH t/t'a..-r 6. ~*
Wallace/J. Weaver, Chairman Regional Assistance Committee Palisades Nuclear Power Plant Exercise Schedule and Final Exercise Report.
Enclosed is a copy of.the schedule of corrective actions from the State of Michigan for the weaknesses identified during the February 17, 1988 joint exercise involving the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant.
The schedule of corrective actions has been reviewed by FEMA, Region V and found to be adequate to correct the weaknesses identified during the exercise.
A copy of the final exercise report is also enclosed for your review and approval prior to transmittal to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
State of Michigan Joint Public Information Center Van Buren County Allegan County Berrien County EXERCISE REPORT Introduction
- 1.
Exercise Background
- 2.
Participating and Non-Participating and Local Governments
- 3.
List of Evaluators
- 4.
Evaluation Criteria
- 5.
Exercise Objectives
- 6.
Exercise Scenario
- 7.
State and Local Resources Planned To Be Used in the Exercise
- 8.
Exercise Findings in Past Exercises
- 9.
Exercise Objectives Still To Be Effectively Achieved Narrative
- 1.
State of Michigan
- 2.
Public Information Center
- 3.
Van Buren County
- 4.
Allegan County
- 5.
Berrien County
SUMMARY
LISTING OF EXERCISE FINDINGS State of Michigan
- 1.
Deficiencies Affecting Public Health and Safety
- 2.
Areas Requiring Corrective Action
- 3.
Areas Recommended For Improvement 2
State page 4
page 4
page 5
page 7
page 8
page 10 page 10 page 10 page 11 page 11 page 11 Attach I page 15 Attach II page 16 page 17 page 23 page 27 page 33 page 38 page a page a page b
- Van Buren County
- 1.
Deficiencies Affecting Public Health and Safety
- 2.
Areas Requiring Corrective Action
- 3.
Areas Recommended For Improvement Allegan County
- 1.
Deficiencies Affecting Public Health and Safety
- 2.
Areas Requiring Corrective Action
- 3.
Areas Recommended For Improvement Berrien County
- 1.
Deficiencies Affecting Public Health and Safety
- 2.
Areas Requiring Corrective Action
- 3.
Areas Recommended For Improvement 3
page c page c page d page e page e page e page f page f page f
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
State EOC, Lansing The Palisades Nuclear Power Plant exercise February 17, 1988, provided the Michigan State Police-Emergency Management Division (MSP/EMD) the opportunity to demonstrate its proficiency in radiological emergency response operations.
The State Emergency Operation Center (EOC) at the Knapp Centre was activated and staffed for partial participation in the exercise.
The emergency staff carried out their assigned tasks in an effective and professional manner.
Administrative management was effective.
Communications were promptly established and functioned at a high level throughout the exercise.
When emergency classifications were announced the EOC staff responded, taking the appropriate action to communicate the emergency response with the operating field offices in the vicinity of the nuclear power plant.
When the Governor declared a "State of Disaster" and the decision was reached to classify the nuclear accident as a
"General Emergency", the State issued protective actions consistent with the emergency response plan.
The facilities in the EOC provide a wholesome environment and favorable working conditions.
Appropriate maps and status boards were effectively displayed and used.
When difficult problems were encountered they were easily resolved using the human and materiel resources within the EOC and State government.
The exercise was climaxed by a
gradual withdrawing of the established restrictions placed by the State pertaining to protective actions.
Each State Department coordinated their resources to effectively establish safe reentry conditions.
Joint.Public Information Center, Benton Harbor The Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) was activated initially at the "Alert" notification.
Utility personnel were present to set up the operations areas, develop press releases and informally brief the media.
State and County Public Information Officers (PIOs) and support staff were prepared for opening the JPIC.
During the period of initial staffing, early coordination of emergency information was lacking.
Notification of the Governor's declaration of "State of Disaster" was issued at 0400.
The JPIC staff were not aware of this information until 0530.
This resulted in a delay opening the JPIC as well as the notification of the Rumor Control Center.
As the exercise progressed, staff were effective in the management of the JPIC operations and in their interaction with the media.
4
The JPIC facility, located at Lake Michigan Community College,
-was spacious and well suited to staff and media needs.
The communications systems included several transmission capabilities.
All systems were functional, al though facsimile capabilities were operational after the JPIC was opened.
Media releases that were prepared for the press and faxed to other emergency organizations were presented on different forms.
Early in the exercise press releases utilized utility letterhead and later JPIC forms were used.
Within the JPIC, message logs were maintained for tracking incoming and outgoing messages.
Press released hard copies were not uniformly faxed to the Counties.
The Van Buren County EOC received one faxed press release developed in JPIC, whereas the Allegan and Berrien County EOCs received no hard copy material.
Information to the media was provided in media kits, hard copy press releases and regular press briefing by a panel comprised of State, County and utility spokespersons.
Following the press briefing, members of the media were encouraged to ask questions of the panel.
Media briefings were developed by a caucus of panel spokespersons and their technical staffs.
These meetings were well coordinated and served to organize and disseminate the most current information on the emergency situation.
Rumor control, which had previously been conducted at the JPIC, was moved and *conducted during the exercise at the utility's district office in Kalamazoo, Michigan.
Rumor control.
activities at the JPIC were limited to rerouting calls to the designated Rumor Control Center.
The Rumor Control Center was staffed by utility personnel.
No State or local personnel were located at the Rumor control Center to facilitate the exchange of information.
The State did not have a staff person at the rumor control center to serve as liaison.
The operation of the center.
was dependent on the integration and flow of information from State, utility, Counties and JPIC.
This timely exchange of information did not occur.
The utility rumor control staff lacked sufficient training to interface with the utility, EOF, JPIC, State and counties in order to acquire and compile complex information on a fast breaking situation.
Van Buren County The Van Buren County. Sheriff's dispatcher received the "Alert" notification from the utility.
The call was placed on a
dedicated phone line.
Therefore the call was not verified.
Calls were made to key EOC personnel and the EOC was activated.
5
The initial staff had set up the operations room when the
- "General Emergency" notification was received.
Siren activation was simulated and a simulated EBS message followed immediately thereafter.
The message, though, stated the reason for the "General Emergency was the hostage situation rather than the plant conditions.
Van Buren county activities were coordinated with Allegan and Berrien Counties.
Full staff activation calls were made.
The EOC was fully staffed and operational with communications to all appropriate organizations.
When the protective action changed from "shelter" to "evacuate",
appropriate decisions and coordinating actions were taken to assure the emergency operations necessary to protect the public heal th and safety.
The EOC staff were knowledgeable of their duties, reflected later by the staff of a second shift which readily assumed their complex assignments in the matter of traffic and access control, reception and care of evacuees, vehicle decontamination, and orderly evacuation of mobility impaired individuals.
A coincident real world activity, an impediment to evacuation was resolved, namely control of *ice-covered roads.
Van Buren County demonstrated the equipment and personnel necessary for decontamination of vehicles in the limited demonstration prescribed in the exercise objective.
A vehicle decontamination station was set up at the Bangor Fire Station.
A Fire Lieutenant and six fire fighters were present; all indicated knowledge and training in their duties relative to monitoring and decontamination of individuals and vehicles passing through the station.
In addition to fire fighting vehicles with hose-down decontamination capabilities, an ambulance was available and standing by to transport contaminated/ injured individuals.
- a.
supply of monitoring and dosimetry devices, was available as well as protective equipment and clothing for personnel.
A useful technique was the attachment of monitoring probes to. long wands, enabling monitoring staff to readily reach distant areas of*
vehicles to measure for any contamination.
The rumor control center (for this exercise) was moved from the JPIC to the utility's district office in Kalamazoo, Michigan.
Van Buren county did not provide, as they have in the past, liaison personnel to the rumor control center to facilitate the timely exchange of information to enable the rumor control center to keep abreast of the situation.
The timely exchange of information between the rumor control center and Van Buren county did not occur during this exercise.
The utility rumor control staff lacked sufficient training to interface with the utility, State, JPIC and the counties in order to acquire and compile information on a fast breaking situation.
The County did provide a liaison person to the JPIC.
In the latter part of the exercise, the status of off site 6
protective actions, access control, evacuees, and affected areas
-were subject of reentry and recovery activities.
Plans were being made for return of evacuated population, reduction and adjustment of traffic and access control points.
Allegan County Allegan County received the "Alert" notification from the Michigan State Police and Van Buren County EOC.
The messages were received on the Law Enforcement Information Network (LEIN)
- The dispatchers notified the County Emergency Management Director and, at his direction notification was made of the initial EOC staff.
When the "General Emergency" notification was received the balance of the EOC staff was activated.
Staff briefings were held and the staff participated in the decision making process.
Protective actions were implemented as received from the State and congregate care shelters were opened to receive evacuees.
The visiting room in the County jail was used for the operations room.
The room is equipped with the necessary furniture and telephones.
All required maps were available and posted.
Point-to-point radios enforcement, fire and constitute the lanq operations.
were available in the EOC for law ambulance.
Telephone, LEIN and facsimile line facilities available for emergency Responsibility for public alerting and instruction rests with Van Buren County.
Liaison was maintained with Van Buren County for this specific purpose.
Necessary data was provided to Van Buren County for inclusion in the EBS messages.
Traffic control points were established at the time evacuation was o'rdered.
Equipment and personnel were available to keep evacuation routes clear during bad weather and to keep them free of stalled vehicles.
Media relations were not established at the County EOC.
Liaison was maintained with the JPIC and information was provided.
Allegan county did not provide liaison personnel to the rumor control center relocated during this exercise to the utility's district office in Kalamazoo, Michigan.
Allegan county liaison personnel, in the past, were assigned to the rumor control center when it was part of the JPIC to assist in the timely exchange of information between Allegan county and the rumor control center.
During this exercise the timely exchange of information did not occur.
The utility rumor control staff lacked sufficient training to interface with the utility
- EOF, 7
State, JPIC, and the counties in order to acquire and compile
-information on a fast breaking situation.
On June 8, 1988, Allegan County presented a demonstration of their capability to decontaminate emergency worker equipment which may result from exposure to radiation from an accident at the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant.
The demonstration was to fulfill objective #29 of the February 17, 1988 Palisades exercise.
During that exercise Allegan County equipment and procedures for decontamination of emergency equipment and vehicles.
The demonstration did not take place as scheduled during the exercise because the county Radiological officer, a deputy Sheriff, was required to appear in court at the time of the demonstration.
FEMA and the State of Michigan arranged for the demonstration at a later date which resulted in the June 8, 1988 demonstration.
The evaluation criteria used for the demonstration is published in NUREG 0654/FEMA REP 1.
The objectives listed in Tab "M" of the "Modular Format Form Uniformity of Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Observations and Evaluation" dated June 1983, and the evaluation tool used is the decontamination module.
The staff discussed when and how evacuees would be allowed to reenter the emergency planning zone (EPZ).
They also discussed the types of problems (mental, physical and fiscal) the evacuees would face and where they would receive advice and counseling.
Berrien County The State of Michigan and Van Buren County, via the LEIN, sent a message to the Berrien County Sheriff's Dispatch Center to inform them *of the "Alert" declared by the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant.
The County EOC set-up was initiated by the Sheriff's Department.
The
- Chairman, Berrien County Board of Commissioners effectively in charge.
A Berrien County Commissioner was in Van Buren County EOC to facilitate information exchange.
The staff was involved in the decision making process.
Periodic was the EOC EOC briefings were used to keep the staff informed.
The briefings could include more detail on the situation Van Buren County activated the Prompt Alert and System (sirens),
the Emergency Broadcast System radiological situation offsite, etc.
such as when Notification (EBS),
the The Berrien County EOC is in the basement of the Sheriff's Building.
It is a Federally approved facility that can support 8
operations over an extended period of time.
Maps and displays
-were posted in the EOC and used by the staff to support emergency operations.
The primary means of communications between the State and Allegan and Van Buren Counties was the LEIN.
Back-up communications was telephone and datafax.
Radio communications exists through the Sheriff's Dispatch Center and amateur radio.
Primary communication between the Berrien County EOC and the JPIC at Lake Michigan Community College was the telephone.
Communications with hospitals is by telephone and tone alert radios.
The Berrien County Sheriff's Dispatch Center has radio communications capability with ambulances.
Hardcopy (datafax) capability was not operational and/or demonstrated between the EOC and the JPIC.
Van Buren County has the responsibility to activate the Alert and Notification System sirens and EBS to alert the public within the 10 mile EPZ and to disseminate an initial instructional message within 15 minutes.
If necessary, Berrien County can activate the EBS radio and television stations by telephone or plectron (tone alert radios). Berrien County provided information to Van Buren County to enable Van Buren County to formulate and distribute*
appropriate instructions to the public in a timely fashion.
Two public information officers from the Berrien County Sheriff's Department were located at the JPIC to coordinate information with the other spokespersons from Allegan and Van Buren Counties, the State and the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant.
The primary Berrien County spokesperson participated in the media briefings.
The second Berrien County public information officer was primarily there for training.
During the exercise, rumor control was handled by Consumers Power Company at their District Office in Kalamazoo rather than at the JPIC.
No Berrien county liaison staff were present at the rumor control center to facilitate the exchange of information between Berrien county and the rumor control center.
Thus timely exchange of information did not occur.
The utility rumor control staff lacked sufficient training to interface with the utility, EOF, JPIC, State and counties in order to acquire and compile information on a fast breaking situation.
Although the plume did not affect Berrien County, the EOC staff identified and simulated the activation and manning of access control points.
Appropriate resources are available to keep evacuation routes clear during both good and bad weather and in the event of stalled or wrecked vehicles.
The EOC staff identified and placed on standby, reception centers in Berrien Springs, Eau Claire, and Benton Harbor.
The Watervliet, Coloma, and Hagar Shores Emergency Worker Decontamination Centers were also placed on standby status.
9
-The Heal th and Medical staff in the EOC identified mobility impaired individuals that required assistance in the event of an evacuation.
Ambulances were placed on standby and could have been used by those individuals who required ambulance supporte Private automobiles fr6m neighbors and staff of the Health and Medical service staff and school buses could also be used for individuals requiring transportation.
Upon the request of Van Buren County, emergency health staff from Berrien County were sent to assist at the Van Buren County Emergency Worker Decontamination Center, at Bangor.
EXERCISE REPORT Introduction
- 1.
Exercise Background This was the sixth joint exercise for the State, the Counties of Van
- Buren, Allegan and Berrien resulting from a
simulated accident at the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant.
The first joint exercise was December 9, 1980 and involved full participation by the State and the Counties of Van Buren, Berrien and Allegan.
The second joint exercise was February 23, 1982 and involved partial participation by the State, and full participation by Van Buren, Berrien and Allegan Counties.
The third joint exercise was May 25, 1983 and involved partial participation by the State and Berrien County and full participation by Van Buren and Allegan Counties.
The fourth joint exercise was August 20, 1985 and involved partial participation by the State and Berrien County and full participation by Van Buren and Allegan Counties.
The fifth exercise was August 19-20, 1986.
It was full participation for the State and Van Buren, Berrien and Allegan Counties.
This report addresses the most recent joint exercise for the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant which was conducted February 17, 1988.
It included partial participation by the State and Berrien County and full participation for Van Buren and Allegan Counties.
This exercise was conducted as an unannounced off hours exercise.
- 2.
Participating and Non-Participating State and Local Governments The 10-mile.EPZ of the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant impacts on parts of Allegan, Berrien and Van Buren Counties, as well as Lake Michigan, with the major portion of the land zone falling within the confines of Van Buren County.
The 1980 permanent population within the 10-mile EPZ is estimated at, 28, 664.
The influx of 10
summer vacationers increases the population considerably.
- However, this exercise was conducted during mid winter when summer recreational facilities are closed.
The 50-mile ingestion zone encompasses all or parts of nine counties in the State of Michigan and three counties in the State of Indiana, and the eastern area of Lake Michigan.
In addition to Van
- Buren, Allegan and Berrien Counties, other Michigan Counties within the SO-mile ingestion zone include Barry, Cass, Kalamazoo, Kent, Ottawa and St. Joseph.
The Indiana Counties are Elkhart, LaPorte and St. Joseph.
The 1980 permanent population within the 50-mile ingestion zone is estimated at 903,998.
The Michigan and Indiana Counties beyond the 10-mile EPZ did not demonstrate the procedures for implementation of protective actions by design of the scenario.
- 3.
List of Evaluators For this exercise there was a total of six federal evaluators evaluating off site exercise activities.
On site exercise activities were evaluated by a separate team from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
The off site evaluation team was composed of three evaluators from FEMA Region V and three contract evaluators from Argonne National Laboratory (ANL).
Danny Bement Gordon L. Wenger Sue Ann Curtis Edwin w. Hakala Bill Knoerzer Bill Knoerzer Ray Kellogg Danny Bement
- 4.
Evaluation Criteria Exercise Team FEMA FEMA ANL ANL ANL ANL FEMA FEMA Exercise Director Team Leader, State Team Leader, JPIC Team Leader, Van Buren County Rumor Control, Kalamazoo Team Member, Van Buren County Team Leader, Allegan County Team Leader, Berrien County Objectives for this exercise were selected five standard objectives listed in Tab "M" For Uniformity of Radiological Emergency Observations and Evaluation" dated June numbers listed in Attachment III correlate from among the thirty-o f the "Modular Format Preparedness Exercise 1983.
The objective to Tab "M".
- 5.
Exercise Objectives The objectives selected by the State (S), Van Buren (VB), Allegan (A) and Berrien (B) Counties are indicated by "y"
(* indicates not adequately demonstrated) and are reflected in the following:
Objective S
VB A
B 11
- 1. Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and y
y activate facilities promptly.
- 2. Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities n
y and maintain staffing around the clock.
- 3. Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to y
y coordinate emergency activities.
- 4. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and y
y displays to support emergency operations.
- 5. Demonstrate ability to communicate with all y
y appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.
- 6. Demonstrate ability to mobilize and deploy n
n field monitoring teams in a timely fashion.
- 7. Demonstrate appropriate equipment and proced-n n
ures for determining ambient radiation levels.
- 8. Demonstrate appropriate equipment and proced-n n
ures for measurement of airborne radioiodine concentrations as low as 10-7 uCi/cc in the presence of noble gases.
- 9. Demonstrate appropriate equipment and proced-n n
ures for collectioni transport and analysis of samples of soil, vegetation, snow, water, and milk.
10.Demonstrate ability to project dosage to the n
n public via plume exposure, based on plant and field data, and to determine appropriate protective measures, based on PAGs, available shelter, evacuation time estimates, and all other appropriate factors.
11.Demonstrate ability to project dosage to the n
n public via ingestion pathway exposure, based on field data, and to determine appropriate protective measures, based on PAGs and other relevant factors.
12.Demonstrate ability to implement protective n
n actions for ingestion pathway hazards.
13.Demonstrate ability to alert the public with-y y
in the 10 mile EPZ, and disseminate an initial instructional message, within 15 minutes
- 12 y
y Y
n y
y y
y y
y n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n n
n y
y
I I,..
(Note: Van Buren County activates sirens and the EBS) 14.Demonstrate ability to formulate and distri-
-bute appropriate instructions to the public y
y y
y 15.Demonstrate the organizational ability to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the plume EPZ.
y y
y y
16.Demonstrate the organizational ability to deal with impediments to evacuation, as inclement weather or traffic obstructions.
y y
y y
17.Demonstrate the organizational ability to control access to an evacuated area.
y y
y y
18.Demonstrate the organizational ability to effect an orderly evacuation of mobility-irnpaired individuals with the plume EPZ.
in a timely fashion.
n y
y y
19.Demonstrate the organizational ability necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of schools within the plume EPZ.
n n
n n
20.Demonstrate ability to continuously mon-itor and control emergency worker* exposure.
n n
21.Demonstrate the ability to make the decision, n
n based on predetermined criteria, whether to issue KI to emergency workers and/or the general population.
22.Demonstrate the ability to supply and admin-n n
ister KI, once the decision has been made to do so.
23.Demonstrate ability to effect an orderly n
n evacuation of onsite personnel.
24.Demonstrate ability to brief the media in y
y a clear, accurate and timely manner.
25.Demonstrate ability to provide advance y
y coordination of information released.
n n
n n
n n
n n
y y
y y
26.Demonstrate ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated fashion
- y* y*
y* y*
13
- Rumor control in past exercises was demonstrated at the JPIC *
.,During this exercise it was demonstrated by the utility at the consumers power service center in Kalamazoo, Michigan.
27.Demonstrate adequacy of procedures for registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees.
28.Demonstrate adequacy of facilities for mass care of evacuees.
29.Demonstrate adequate equipment and pro-cedures for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment and vehicles.
30.Demonstrate adequacy of ambulance facilities and procedures for handling contaminated individuals.
31.Demonstrate adequacy of hospital facilities and procedures for handling contaminated individuals.
32.Demonstrate ability to identify need for, request, and obtain Federal assistance.
33.Demonstrate ability to relocate to and operate the alternate EOF/EOC.
34.Demonstrate ability to estimate total population exposure.
35.Demonstrate ability to determine and implement appropriate measures for contro-lled recovery and reentry.
n n
n n
n n
n n
n y
y n
n n
n n
n n
n n
y n
n n
n n
."n n
y n
n n
y y
y y
Due to the nature of this exercise, there will be limited reentry and recovery activities to close-out the exercise.
This will involve discussions at the State and County EOCs on the status of offsite protective action, access control, evacuees, and areas affected by the accident.
This objective will be limited to discussion only and simulated activities.
The State selected 15 objectives to demonstrate during the exercise.
Of that total, 1 was inadequately demonstrated (#26) and 1 was partially demonstrated (#25).
Van Buren County selected 16 objectives to demonstrate during the exercise.
Of that total, 1 was inadequately demonstrated (#26) and 2 were partially demonstrated (#14 and 25).
14
-Allegan County selected 16 objectives to demonstrate during the exercise.
Of that total, 1 was not demonstrated (#29), 1 was inadequately demonstrated (#26) and 1 was partially demonstrated
(#25).
With regard to objective #29; Allegan County must reschedule, conduct and have Federally evaluated within 60 days of the issuance of this draft exercise report the decontamination demonstration of emergency workers, equipment and vehicles.
Berrien County selected 14 objectives to demonstrate during the exercise.
Of that total, 1 was inadequately demonstrated (#26) and one was partially demonstrated
(#14)~
- 6.
Exercise Scenario See Attachment I
- Palisades REP Exercise-88 Scenario
- 7.
State and Local Resources Planned To Be Used in the Exercise During this exercise the State of Michigan planned to use the State EOC in Lansing and the Joint Public Information Center at Lake Michigan Community College, Benton Harbor, Michigan.
The State also planned to use the necessary communications systems to conduct emergency operations.
Van Buren, Allegan and Berrien Counties planned to demonstrate the use of their EOC facilities, emergency response staff and communications sys*tems capabilities.
The three Counties planned to have spokespersons at the JPIC to demonstrate the ability to coordinate public information.
In addition, Van Buren, and Allegan Counties each planned to demonstrate one reception/congregate care center.
Van Buren and Allegan also planned to demonstrate decontamination centers.
- 8.
Exercise Findings In Past Exercises See Attachment II All exercise weaknesses identified in the August 19-20,1986 exercise have been addressed in this exercise or the last full participation exercise for the State.
There was one exception.
Allegan County during the February 17,1988 exercise failed to demonstrate the decontamination of equipment, vehicles and emergency workers.
FEMA Region 5 required this demonstration to be rescheduled, conducted and Federally evaluated within 60 days of the issuance of the draft report.
The Allegan County emergency worker equipment demonstration was conducted June 8, 1988.
No deficienies or areas requiring corrective action observed.
One recommendation was provided to Allegan County.
- 9.
Exercise Objectives Still To Be Adequately Demonstrated 15
-Guidance memorandum PR-1 "Policy on NUREG -0654/FEMA -
REP -1 and 44 CFR 350 Periodic Requirements" indicate that all the major elements of the State and local plans are to be tested within a six-year period on a site specific basis except for ingestion-related elements as the testing of such elements is not tied to a particular site for State governments.
The six year period commenced with the date of the first joint (utility, State, and local governments) exercise conducted after November 3, 1980.
The effective date of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Final Regulations on Emergency planning, 10CFR Part 50 (Appendix E)
(45 FR 55410, August 19, 1980.
The first six year exercise period for the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant was from December 9, 1980 to December 9, 1986.
The second six year exercise period is February 17, 1988 to February 17, 1994.
During this second six year exercise cycle the exercise objectives reflected below still need to be adequately demonstrated.
It should be noted that all objectives need not be fully demonstrated by a particular unit of government, e.g.
objective 12 is primarily the responsibility of State government but local government could have some limited role in implementing this objective.
State of Michigan 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 33, and 35.
Van Buren County 12, 14, 19, 2 0, 21, 2 2 ~ 2 3, 2 5, 2 6, - 2 7, 2 8, 3 0, 31, 32, and 35.
Allegan County 12, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, and 35.
Berrien County 2, 12, 14, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, and 35.
NARRATIVE State EOC, Lansing 16
-Activation and Staffing The initiating event of the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant exercise was the "Alert" classification declared at 0143 by the utility, Consumers Power Company.
The utility notified the Michigan State Police Command Post, Harrison Road, East Lansing, at 0150.
The communications watch officer recorded the message, completing it by 0153, then confirming the message with the utility by 0154.
The message was developed in teletype format (Law Enforcement Information Network, LEIN) and sent out to the Counties and State Police Posts in the ten mile EPZ around the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant.
The watch officer notified the MSP/EMD staff at their homes.
The telephone fan out to the emergency responders who staff the State EOC began by 0159.
There is an established communication system between the Michigan State Police Command Post which is the Michigan State Police Headquarters on Harrison Road, and the three utilities and four nuclear power plants in the State.
Two dedicated telephone lines serve as the primary communications link with the utilities.
The two line network is continuously monitored by the watch o-fficer at the Michigan State Police Command Post.
The watch officer used call up lists to notify the emergency response staff to mobilize and report to the State EOC.
The lists were current and the method was well executed.
The watch officer and the radio dispatcher exhibited knowledge and skill in the execution of the
- procedure.
Transfer of the primary contact between the utility and the Command Post was completed at 0303.
At this time and beginning with message #6, the messages from the utility came directly into the State EOC.
This procedure is by design and consistent with the State plan.
Staffing of the State EOC was completed at 0250.
Due to the limited level of participation, the following organizations were represented in the State EOC: Department of Natural Resources, Department of Health, Department of Agriculture, Department of Transportation, and the Operations Group from the Michigan State Police Emergency Management Division.
A shift change was not executed because of the limited participation level and the objectives were not selected for the exercise.
However, those who did participate in the State EOC for the exercise did exhibit knowledge and the ability to carryout an adequate response to the declared emergency.
By design of the scenario no State EOC representative was dispatched to the utility's EOF. This was in agreement with the State plan since a State representative is dispatched to the EOF 17
during full participation exercises.
However, information did flow between the utility EOF and the State EOC.
Emergency Operations Management The operations chief, is the senior executive in charge, and was filled by a MSP/EMD senior staff person.
He was appointed to the position for this exercise for the purpose of broadening the experience factor to a
wider range of Emergency Management Division staff.
Periodic briefings were held by the operations chief.
Those present in the EOC contributed to the emergency response effort through their exchange of information and facts with their central offices.
Decision making primarily involved the executive staff with input from the operating staff.
The plan was in a book case in the EOC and was available to the staff for reference.
Check lists were used and procedures were followed in a precise manner.
Messages coming into the EOC were received in the communications room, logged and copied for d~stribution.
The system implemented was efficient.
Access to the EOC and operations area on the third floor of an intown building has access control through a security officer at the entrance to the building.
Sign-in was required.
The State EOC was notified of the. following events relevant to the Palisades exercise at the stated times:
"Alert", 0245; "Site Area Emergency", (by passed); "General Emergency", 0401.
The Governor declared a "State of Disaster" at 0400.
Protective actions ordered were: shelter all sectors to 2 miles and sectors B, C and D to 5 miles at 0404, evacuate all sectors 5 miles and sectors B, C and D out to 10 miles.
A request was made for Federal assistance from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
and the U.S.
Coast Guard (USCG) through the State's contact with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
The assistance requested was for control of commercial and private aviation, protection of the environment, and the clearing of Lake Michigan of boats.
Facilities The State EOC, located in downtown Lansing, is on the third floor of the Knapp Centre at 300 Washington Square.
The facility is pleasantly furnished with ample furniture, space and lighting.
Air exchange is well moderated and comfortable.
The EOC operations room was set up real time for the exercise.
Those who arrived first and activated the EOC began the set up by putting 18
on the walls the necessary maps which covered: the plume EPZ
- (sectors were labeled), evacuation routes (which were clearly_
marked),
relocation centers (marked),
access control points (marked) radiological monitoring points and evacuation areas which had population numbers clearly marked.
Telephones were removed from storage and placed on the tabled area according to agency seating location.
The noise level was well suppressed contributing to pleasant work conditions.
The facility can support a modified extended living environment.
Showers and a kitchen are within the facility, but bunking areas are not provided.
Due to the close proximity of other State Police functions, movement of people in to and out of the facility would pose no problem.
Further the State EOC is not located within either a 10 or 50 mile EPZ of any nuclear power plant.
Back up power is available.
It was not tested for the exercise.
Emergency classification levels w~re posted and conspicuous to those in the room.
Status boards were at a sufficient height for good viewing by everyone in the operations room.
The boards were kept up to date with significant events which were taking place and relevant to the exercise.
Communications The communications room within the State EOC has extensive communications equipment, much of which was not used or necessary for the limited participation of State government during the exercise.
For the exercise the State used telephones for primary communications and had several other communications networking capabilities.
The three local EOCs activated for the exercise were contacted on hotlines (telephone) which were in the EOC operations room and manned full time by network operators.
- Again, several other means of backup exists; mainly radio systems.
The State contacted other States which ajoin Michigan using the LEIN; backup is radio or telephone.
Communications with the utility (licensee) is by dedicated telephone with State Police radio as backup.
Communications with the utility's EOF was not a part of the exercise and not demonstrated.
- However, telephone, radio and teletype are available for use.
Communication with FEMA was demonstrated using teletype; radio or telephone would be used for backup.
Contact with EBS by the State, which was not a part of the exercise, would be with radio which is specified as an individual system and facilities in the communications room of the EOC.
Backup would be telephone.
Communications with the JPIC was facsimile; radio or telephone would be backup.
Contact with the schools, ambulances and 19
radiological monitoring teams was not demonstrated as a part of
-the exercise.
However, contact with them would be by telephone or radio; one as primary and the other as backup.
Conferencing was not observed nor was it specifically designed in the exercise scenario for demonstration.
The capability does exist within the EOC.
Facsimile was demonstrated and used throughout the exercise for hard copy communications with the JPIC.
It was reliable and effective.
Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation The planning standard for preparedness was not a part of the scenario or objectives for the exercise.
Public Alerting and Instruction The State played a role in the public alerting process.
The State, using the radiological assessment analysis of the utility and making their own calculations, determined if the figures necessitated protective measures to be communicated to the public.
For the exercise demonstration, the State played a limited participation for driving the scenario.
The State Radiation Health Department was present in the EOC to assist in the implementation of the scenario to drive the exercise.
Their calculations and information received from the utility gave them sufficient information to recommend protective actions.
- Once conferencing had taken place at the State
- level, the recommendation was given to activate the Public Alert and Notification System.
The order sent to the Counties to activate the sirens (simulated) occurred at 0404.
The order was to shelter.
Following that order the order was issued at 0420 to evacuate.
Each order pertained to specific sectors and to specific distances.
A good exchange took place in the State EOC on the plant status and the meteorological conditions which have an impact on the release from the plant.
The State took the necessary actions to drive the scenario for the local jurisdictions to implement the protective actions.
The State Department of Natural Resources (DNR) ordered the evacuation of van Buren State Park, and a check for any boats and cars/trailers at access sites and closed access sites.
The Michigan Department of Transportation (DOT) ordered restricted air traffic to 5000 feet out to 10 miles around the plant; the stopping of all rail traffic out to a radius of 10 miles from the plant.
The State Department of* Agriculture (DA) gave an advisory of the need to place livestock on stored feed and contained water and to place animals inside and restrict air flow to a minimum.
20
Protective Action The State Department of Transportation in the State EOC worked up recommendations for coordinating and supporting traffic control and provided those recommendations with the coordination necessary utilizing State resources.
Protective actions ordered by the State were table top exercising.
The actuality of staging was not demonstrated by the State by design of the scenario and the objectives.
Appropriate actions were taken in the State EOC to control access to the contaminated area by directing the establishment of road blocks on highways and roads in the plume EPZ.
The State DOT coordinated the order to reroute air traffic and to assist in notifying all water traffic on the Lake, and stopping rail traffic, all in the EPZ.
The State Department of Health (DH) assisted in the coordination of activating reception centers and their staffing.
Evacuation of onsite individuals, mobility impaired and school children are not a function of State government.
The State DA provided the necessary information to drive the exercise scenario pertaining to agriculture in the EPZ.
Recommendations and orders were coordinated and issued from the State EOC to the Counties and the JPIC.
Sufficient data is on file to provide the necessary communications with specific farms in the affected EPZs.
Radiological Exposure Control In that this planning standard was not intended to be demonstrated for the exercise, it became inevitable by the fact some measure of input was necessary to drive the scenario; therefore the following comment.
The State Radiation Health Department in the State EOC provided continuous reactor status and dose data to the State EOC operations chief.
The individuals of the Radiation Health group made calculations using a hand held computer to project dose rates, which were consistent with the information provided by the utility.
The information provided was useful in the implementation of protective actions.
Media Relations This planning standard was an objective for the JPIC only.
Recovery & Reentry In the waning minutes of the exercise the State EOC staff took the appropriate measures to alert the Counties to secure the 21
evacuated areas to allow for reentry by residents and commercial enterprises, removing road blocks, clearing areas for agriculture
- use, notifying the various transportation industries that movement could be effected with no restrictions.
Scenario The scenario, by design, was to escalate from "Alert" to "General Emergency".
If there was an element of the exercise which was to surprise the participants, the fast moving classification level did.
It caught them unaware and stressed their talents to respond to the emergency.
Unknown to the Counties, but obvious to the State was a problem with the scenario.
Apparently, the utility, not following the predetermined scenario, allowed the simulated reactor conditions to drive the events to the extent that the State, based on reactor data, had to prepare to order the evacuation of sectors B, C and D beyond the ten mile EPZ.
Through the fast thinking of the State Controller, the matter was brought to the attention of the utility management at the EOF and the exercise scenario was brought back on course.
The scenario had its strengths and weaknesses.
A Persistent weakness is the problem of the amount and kind of emergency response assigned to the two Counties that are not significantly affected by the plume; namely Allegan and Berrien Counties.
Necessary in future exercises is the need for a plume shift and a greater increase in the by products released form the reactor;
_ specifically iodines.
The State made provision in the exercise for the Counties (Allegan and Berrien) to inject meaningful problems to stimulate thought provoking obstacles to force the Counties into greater response activities.
The Counties were to formulate the problems and submit them to the State for the State Controllers to inject.
The Counties did not submit any materials.
So now the State and the utility must take the lead in making provision in future scenarios for this kind of activity.
Two areas significant to the scenario were:
- 1) the planned decontamination demonstration in Allegan County which was never executed and, 2) the inconclusive demonstration of rumor control at the utility's district office in Kalamazoo.
The demonstration of the decontamination by Allegan County must be scheduled, conducted and Federally evaluated within 60 days of the issuance of this draft report.
A~ for rumor control; reconsideration must be given to the technique and procedures necessary for an adequately functioning rumor control.
Joint Public Information Center Activation and Staffing 22
Following the "Alert" notification, utility managers made the decision to open the JPIC.
Mobilization of the JPIC staff was successfully demonstrated.
All utility, State and County PIOs and support staff were promptly alerted and in place by 0600.
The initial activation began at 0315 by the utility representatives designated to set up the facility operational areas.
Following the arrival of State and County staffs and the Governor's declaration of "State of Disaster", the JPIC was formally opened (0530).
Notification took place through a call down network that crossed the participating organizations.
Notification procedures clearly demonstrated the ability of this network to activate staff during off hours.
All participating PIOs and support staff operated effectively.
PIOs maintained contact with their representative organizations and interacted well with their* JPIC counterparts during caucuses to develop the content of the media briefings.
During these briefings members of the media were updated on the status of power plant.
State and County actions to protect the public and were provided with information to answer through questions within the scope of the scenario.
This demonstration by all participants and including Van Buren County corrects an Area Recommended For Improvement for Van Buren County from the last exercise.
It should be noted that during the initial staffing, coordination of information among the JPIC staff and other organizations was lacking.
Notification of the Governor's declaration of "State of Disaster" was received late (1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />) in the exercise play and adversely affected the opening of the JPIC.
Area Requiring Corrective Action Prior to the arrival of State and local spokespersons at the JPIC the utility JPIC staff was lacking offsite information from the EOF concerning actions taken by the State and counties, e.g.
getting verification of the information pertaining to the Governor's declaration of "State of Disaster".
(NUREG 0654, Planning Standard G, Element 4.b) (25)
Recommendation:
Coordination of and staffing should be improved procedures that insure more rapid reporting JPIC staffs.
Facilities information during activation through the development of access to information for the The JPIC was located in the theater building of Lake Michigan Community College.
This is an exceptional spacious facility that 23
is available for use as a public center on a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> basis.
- offices, furniture, telephones and a briefing rooms were utilized by media staff.
Additional space, tables and telephones were designated for members of the press.
Additional areas were in place for use by the press to conduct interviews or make video productions.
This facility has the capability to accommodate more than 500 individuals during an actual emergency and to operate on back up power in the event the commercial power source fails.
Although the media center is located more than 10 miles beyond the 10 mile EPZ, an alternate location has been identified should an evacuation of this facility become necessary.
During the exercise the facility was effectively utilized.
Access control was provided and the appropriate graphics were displayed.
Communications The initial communications system at the JPIC was established by the utility.
The system was comprised of commercial telephone lines that later served a secondary backup system interlinking the utility, State and County organizations.
Prior to opening the JPIC, dedicated lines were made operational.
These lines interlinked all participating organizations, provided conferencing and permitted facsimile capability.
Facsimile machines were not operational until after the JPIC was officially opened.
The network of dedicated lines served as the primary communications system. *Police and fire radio systems were also available in department vehicles.
With the exception of one incident, all primary and secondary communications systems functioned accurately and message handling systems were in place.
The Governor's declaration of "State of Disaster" was issued at 0400.
The State representatives of the JPIC did not receive this information promptly because they had not a*rrived at that time.
The State JPIC staff obtained this information on their initiative at 0530 after their arrival.
Late notification delayed opening of the JPIC.
Hardcopy facsimile capability between the JPIC and the State and counties were not operational until after the JPIC was officially opened.
A procedure needs to be developed to place in the hands of the JPIC State staff, a file of hardcopy releases which are made by the State prior to the arrival of the State JPIC staff.
Area Recommended For Improvement Activate facsimile capabilities and install equipment when the utility begins initial activation of the JPIC.
Initial messages 24
would have hardcopy verification and accuracy would be improved for messages read over the telephone.
- Moreover, important information could be transmitted properly to all participating organizations and if they are not there at that time they could be held for their review upon their arrival.
Once the JPIC was officially opened hard copy capability was demonstrated between the JPIC, the State and to a limited degree with Van Buren county.
No hardcopy capability was demonstrated between the JPIC and Allegan and Berrien counties.
Area Requiring Corrective Action The counties reported not receiving hardcopies of all press releases given to the media at the JPIC (messages 1 Of 8).
Van Buren county EOC staff reported receiving only one copy of a press release.
Allegan and Berrien counties reported receiving no copies of press releases.
(NUREG 0654, Planning Standard G, Element (4.b) (25).
Recommendation:
Specific effort needs to be put forth to assure that Allegan, Berrien and Van Buren counties receive hard copies of all press releases given to the media at the JPIC.
All incoming and outgoing messages were logged.
Initially, press releases were prepared on utility stationary and later on the JPIC stationary.
The telephone number for the JPIC was not included on the forms.
Area Recommended For Improvement It is recommended that stationary used at the JPIC should include the telephone number of the JPIC.
Information Functions Media kits were available in the media briefing room from both the utility and the State.
Material in the kits included.
information on the utility, nuclear power, radiation emergency preparedness, and local maps with the EPZ defined.
During the exercise, two informal briefings were held prior to the formal opening of the JPIC in response to simulated media requests.
Following the 0530 opening of the
- facility, formal media briefings were presented by a panel of spokespersons from County, State governments and the utility.
Each briefing included a status report on the activities of their organizations.
Representatives utilized clear terminology and appropriate displays.
The utility presentations included technical support by operations and health/physics staff when appropriate.
Hard copy news releases were also made available to the media and the content of these releases summarized.
25
- Following the briefings and status reports, members of the press were encouraged to ask questions on specific topics and to address questions to individual panel participants.
Interview schedules and requests were also discussed.
Prior to the briefings, panel spokespersons caucused to exchange information and coordinate the release of information included in the press releases.
Panel spokespersons did not have immediate access to the radio and television information released through EBS or other news broadcasts.
Routine monitoring of radio and television was not observed in the JPIC operations area.
This type of information would contribute to the panel's ability to develop media briefings that would reduce rumors and reflect current, accurate information.
Area Recommended For Improvement Radio and television receivers should be placed in the JPIC and routinely monitored.
The technique would assist the staff in assisting in development of concise and up to date announcements over EBS.
Rumor control is an assigned responsibility to the State and County governments in addition to the utility.
The function was experimentally demonstrated at the Consumers Power Company District Office, in Kalamazoo.
Evaluation of this function is of concern.
Consumers Power Company used utility equipment and personnel to implement this function.
Prior to this exercise rumor control was located at the JPIC and State and local governments provided liaison personnel to assist in the timely exchange of information.
There are no procedures or guides, nor has there been sufficient training of utility personnel to adequately carry out the rumor control responsibility.
In addition, it does not appear consideration has been given to the trans.mission of detailed information for use in preparing responses to the would be callers.
Area Requiring Corrective Action Rumor control was placed in utility facilities utilizing utility equipment and personnel.
Personnel operating the rumor control center did not have the necessary documents, procedures or training to interface with State and local governments in order to effectively carry out the rumor control responsibility.
(NUREG 0654 Planning Standard G, Element 4.c) (26)
Recommendation:
A procedure for dealing with rumors needs to be developed and put in place to give assurance that there is a well defined, accepted and understood method for dealing with rumors to include State and local input.
The idea of moving the rumor control center away from the JPIC may want to be reconsidered.
26
If the utility's district office is going to continue to be used then the State and county should provide liaison personnel at the rumor control center.
Necessary resources such as individual working space, telephone, and hard copy (facsimile) capability must also be provided.
Public Instruction The development of public instructions released through the EBS network is a County and State function.
JPIC personnel received concurrent County/State information when the JPIC is activated and JPIC includes the EBS information on protective actions in routine press briefings and releases.
Van Buren County Activation and Staffing Activation and staffing of the Van Buren County EOC began with a call (0148) to the Sheriff's 24-hour dispatch from the utility (Consumers Power Company)
EOF.
The call was made over a
dedicated telephone line and therefore was not required to be verified.
Staff mobilization procedures were demonstrated using current call lists by which the dispatcher first notified key personnel who arrived between 0220 and 0315.
Following receiving the "General Emergency" notification at
- 0406, full staffing commenced, and was completed at 0510.
Organizations represented in the EOC were the County Board of Commissioners, County Emergency Management, Michigan State Police, County Human Services, County Health and Medical, County Sheriff, Fire, County Road Commission, area
- Schools, the utility, and other representatives of Allegan and Berrien Counties.
Around the clock* staffing capability was demonstrated by a
full shift change.
Both shifts displayed training and knowledge of their assigned responsibilities.
Emergency Operations Management Effective emergency operations management was displayed through the leadership of members of the County Board of Commissioners, as designated in the plan.
Periodic briefings were held on the general and radiological situations, including ~n especially effective presentation by the utility representative who explained what happened at the nuclear power plant.
The EOC staff were involved, as appropriate, in decision making.
A copy of the plan, SOPs and checklists were available and used for reference.
The County Emergency Management Director 27
indicated the plan, which has numerous updates noted therein, is
-due for republication in the near future.
Area Recommended For Improvement The proposed revision of the County plan be expedited and published as soon as possible.
Though there was limited written message flow, messages were reproduced and distributed as appropriate.
Message handling was efficient.
It would be enhanced if the message controller kept a master file copy of each message.
Throughout the exercise, the leadership made the necessary decisions and coordinated activities to support emergency operations.
This was particularly noteworthy in the activating of the
- EOC, the response to the "General Emergency" with a
limited staff, evacuation and care of the population, traffic and access control, and planning for reentry and recovery.
Unknown to the EOC staff, the scenario elevated the classification from "Alert" to "General Emergency" and bypassed "Site Area Emergency".
This placed an extra measure of stress on the skeletal staff in bringing the EOC up to full operations absent full staff.
Normally the County EOCs' begin full staffing at the "Site Area Emergency" notification.
Area Recommended For Improvement
~he internal message distribution system be reviewed and revised, to assure that the message log controller has a file copy of each message.
Facilities The County EOC is located in the Court House Annex adjacent to the Sheriff's communication facility.
The sheriff's communication center is equipped with a backup power system which is being considered for upgrading to include the operations room.
Area Recommended For Improvement Backup power from the Sheriff's communications center be upgraded and extended to the operations room of the EOC.
The EOC is secure by virtue of the fact that the County Sheriff has security responsibility for the entire complex.
The EOC has sufficient furniture, space, lighting and telephones.
It can support extended operations.
Displays are adequate to support emergency operations, having maps posted or available indicating:
plume EPZ with sectors labeled; evacuation routes; relocation centers; access control points; radiological monitoring points; and, population by evacuation area.
28
The emergency classification level was promptly posted as it changed.
The EOC staff uses a clearly visible status board which is actually a light powered Vu-graph.
It was kept up to date on significant events as they occurred.
This technique would be more effective if the projection area were larger and the method of making status entries refined.
Area Recommended For Improvement The technique of using a light powered Vu-graph as a status board be improved to permit writing of more information.
Communications The EOC has a capability for communications with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.
The Sheriff's department radio system has a large console with redundant radio and telephone systems, including the dedicated line to the utility.
The primary communications equipment between the EOC,
- State, and other EPZ Counties is the
- LEIN, with back up commercial telephones and various police and fire radio networks.
All are accessible through the dispatch console.
A hard copy facsimile machine is available in the EOC for transmission to the State EOC, the JPIC, and EPZ Counties.
Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation This function is principally the State Department of Radiation Health responsibility.
Therefore it is not an objective of the County.
Public Alerting and Instruction Public alerting and instruction in the
- EPZ, including disseminating an initial instructional message within fifteen minutes, was accomplished.
Following receipt of a State EOC message at 0406, sirens were sounded at 0412 with coincident activation of tone alert radios.
The initial instructional EBS message followed one minute later.
The initial EBS message provided the public with appropriate protective actions but was worded incorrectly as to the cause of the "General Emergency".
The initial EBS message gave the cause of the "General Emergency" to be the hostage situation rather than plant conditions.
Subsequent public alerting occurred at 0435, with an EBS message at that time and again at 0456.
Calls (simulated) to schools staffs were made at 0450, recommending closing of schools and placing school bus drivers and transportation equipment on standby.
The initial EOC staff were in the process of setting up the operations area and responded rapidly to the unexpected immediate 29
requirements of "General Emergency".
Initially the response was
-to follow instructions.
As the situation escalated and the protective action guides were
- changed, there was effective discussion and consultation among the staff.
Area Requiring Corrective Action The EBS instructional message following the sounding of sirens at "General Emergency" attributed the reason for the General emergency classification level as the "Hostage Situation".
In actuality, it was the nuclear reactor degradation and release of contamination that determined the "General Emergency" clas-sification.
(NUREG 0654, Planning Standard E, Element ( 5)
(14)
Recommendation:
A procedure be established to provide for review and if necessary correction of EBS messages prior to public release.
Pre-scripted emergency public instructions were used.
They were clear and appropriate with geographical protective action areas referred to in familiar geographic boundaries and land marks.
Sheltering instructions included proper guidance (close windows, limit air exchange, stay indoors, etc.).
Timing of public instruction was coordinated with public alerting.
The instructional message was periodically repeated in simulated EBS radio broadcasts.
Only one news release was received from the JPIC.
Protective Action As evacuation became the required protective action, the EOC staff demonstrated its ability to manage an o~derly evacuation of a portion of the EPZ.
Traffic control points were promptly ordered, with effective action by the Sheriff and other police elements who were knowledgeable of traffic volume, evacuation routes and ultimate destinations of evacuees.
A real world
- activity, clearing and controlling ice covered
- roads, demonstrated a capability to handle impediments to evacuation.
Additional resources were available but not activated.
In demonstrating access control, all roads were identified and assigned either officers or barricades (simulated).
This was an especially thorough element of protective action.
Though there was no Lake Michigan water traffic due to winter weather and ice, the Sheriff's Marine patrol was prepared to clear the area of boaters or fishermen.
Reception centers were ordered activated in a timely fashion through planning and direction by the County Human Services staff.
Using EOC reference materials, check lists, and procedures, the group resolved the needs of evacuees, and were 30
routinely cognizant oE the evacuation status, including that of
- mobility impaired individuals.
Special vehicles for this category of evacuee were on call and dispatched as needed.
These actions were based on written lists of mobility impaired, with names, addresses and special needs indicated.
Emergency Worker Decontamination Demonstration In a separate limited demonstration of equipment and procedures for decontamination of vehicles, a decontamination station was established at the Bangor Fire Station.
The decontamination activity was staffed by a Fire Lieutenant and six firemen.
Decontamination monitoring and dosimetry instructions are known and understood by the seven firemen.
One effective adaption was the attachment of a monitoring probe to the end of a long pole.
This innovation permitted easy monitoring of high points of vehicles, thus speeding the processing.
It was estimated that a minimum of three vehicles per hour could be decontaminated.
Additional decontamination personnel and equipment were available if needed to increase the flow of vehicles through the station.
Following monitoring of vehicles and equipment, if required, decontamination would be a flush-down with high pressure fire hose water.
Schools were not in session during the exercise scenario and were directed not to open.
There was no school evacuation activity necessary.
School bus drivers and transportation equipment were on standby for evacuation service as needed.
Radiological Exposure Control This function is principally a State responsibility and therefore not an objective to be demonstrated by the County.
Media Relations This function is principally performed at the JPIC.
Information from the Van Buren county EOC is provided to the Van Buren county spokesperson at the JPIC who coordinates this information with the other public information officers prior to briefing the media and releasing written press releases.
Copies of all news releases given to the *media at the JPIC were not transmitted (facsimile) to the Van Buren county EOC.
Area Required For Improvement van Buren County reported receiving only one copy of the eight news releases given to the media at the JPIC.
- 0654, Planning Standard G, Element 4.b) (#25)
Recommendation:
Specific effort needs to be put forth to assure that Van Buren County receives hard copies of all press releases 31
given to the media at the JPIC
- Activities during the exercise resolved four corrective actions required from the previous exercise: 1) monitoring teams at the vehicle decontamination point were trained in radiological monitoring; 2) bus drivers have been given instructions relative to transporting evacuees in a radiological emergency; 3) copies of the County plan are available at reception/congregate and decontamination centers;
- 4) clean clothing is available for
- evacuees, per agreement between Red Cross and Seventh Day Adventist Church.
Rumor control is an assigned responsibility to the State and County governments in addition to the utility.
The function was experimentally demonstrated at the Consumers Power Company District Office in Kalamazoo.
Evaluation of this function is of concern.
Consumers Power Company used utility equipment and personnel to implement this function.
There are no procedures or
- guides, nor has there been sufficient training of utility personnel to adequately carry out the rumor control responsibility.
In addition, it does not appear consideration has been given to the hardcopy transmission of detailed State and local government information for use in preparing responses to the would be caller.
Area Requiring Corrective Action Rumor control was placed in utility facilities utilizing utility equipment and personnel.
Personnel operating the rumor control did not have the necessary documents, procedures or training to interface with State and local governments in order to effectively carry out the rumor control responsibility.
(NUREG 0654 Planning Standard G, Element 4.c) (26)
Recommendation:
A procedure for dealing with rumors needs to be developed and put in place to give assurance that there is a well defined, accepted and understood method for dealing with rumors to include State and local input.
The idea of moving the rumor control center from the JPIC may want to be reconsidered.
If the utility's district office is going to continue to be used then Van Buren county should provide liaison personnel at the rumor control center.
Necessary resources such as individual working space, telephones and hard copy (facsimile) capability must also be provided for the Van Buren county liaison personnel at the rumor control center.
Recovery and Reentry The EOC objective for recovery and reentry provided for discussions of the status of off site protective actions, access control, evacuees and areas affected by the incident.
The EOC 32
leadership effectively described the situation and directed the
-staff to plan for reduction of roadblocks, revision of traffic control point locations, movement of evacuees, and shutdown of reception and care centers.
Allegan County Activation and Staffing Allegan County received their first notification of the nuclear power plant accident at 0200.
The 11Alert" notification was received at the County warning point in the Sheriff's dispatch center via the LEIN.
Information was provided by both the Michigan State Police and Van Buren County.
The dispatchers immediately called the County Emergency Services Director.
He directed the dispatchers to call a County Board Member, the Radiological Officer, and the Chief of Staff.
Upon receipt of the "General Emergency" classification at 0409, the dispatch center personnel completed the notification and activation of the EOC staff.
They used an updated call list to complete the task.
In addition to the initial staff the EOC was staffed by representatives of: law enforcement, fire, schools, Red Cross, social services, health department, mental health, the Road Commission, a public information officer, the assessment officer and liaison officers from Van Buren County, the MSP/EMD and Consumers Power Company.
The EOC was staffed and operational by 0515 and fully staffed at 0557 with the exception of the PIO in the EOC who did not arrive until 0633.
Around the clock staffing was demonstrated by the presentation of a roster.
Area Recommended For Improvement The PIOs function is important and needs to be timely in close coordination with the JPIC PIOs.
Measures should be taken to improve the reporting time of the PIO to the County EOC.
Emergency Operations Management At the time of the "General Emergency" (0409), the County was notified that the Governor had declared a " State of Disaster" at 0400.
The initial protective actions, "shelter all sectors to 2 miles and sectors B, C, & D to 5 miles", were received at 0409.
At 0420 instructions were received from the State to "evacuate all sectors to 5 miles and sectors B, C & D to 10 miles".
The Allegan High School staff was activated at 0425 to prepare the 33
lo-school to receive evacuees.
At 0515 the Plainwell schools were activated to host evacuees from Van Buren County and at 0520 the Otsego schools were put on standby to receive the possible overflow of evacuees.
Plans and SOPs were available and used by the EOC staff.
Message logs were kept.
Periodic briefings were conducted and the staff participated in the decision making process.
Facilities -
The visiting room, in the jail was used as the operations room.
While smaller than the former operations room, the room has sufficient space and is located immediately adjacent to the communications/dispatch center.
The room was equipped with the necessary furniture.
Telephone leads are stored in the ceiling and were hooked up promptly.
All required maps were available and posted.
An overhead projector system was used as the status board.
The room was set up for operation by the EOC staff.
Emergency power is available.
It was not tested.
Communications The Sheriff's dispatch center is the warning point and communication center.
In addition to telephones, the center has LEIN, county. fire radio, county ambulance services radio, law enforcement radio and point-to-point radio with the Sheriffs of the adjacent counties.
Telephone and facsimile are the principle means of communications to and from the operations room.
Communications were maintained between the operations room and the State EOC, Van Buren County, the licensee, the JPIC and the various reception/ congregate care facilities_.
Dose and Protective Actions Dose assessment and protective action recommendations are not Allegan County responsibilities.
Alerting and Instruction Public alerting and instruction are not Allegan County responsibilities.
Van Buren County activates the Allegan County Alert and Notification System.
Liaison was maintained with Van Buren County for this purpose and for information inclusion in the EBS messages.
Protective Action When evacuation was ordered at 0420, traffic control points were established at the perimeter of the impacted area.
The road commission engineer/manager indicated that the county had or could get the necessary equipment and personnel to keep 34
evacuation routes clear during bad weather and free of stalled
-vehicles.
After the evacuation was ordered, police and fire personnel made a door to door sweep of the evacuated area.
This action was completed by 0600.
Fire personnel also inspected each of the buildings activated for sheltering evacuees.
Van Buren County has the responsibility for evacuating the mobility impaired persons living in the Allegan County portion of the EPZ.
Allegan County schools suspended operation early in the day before school was to begin.
Therefore, there existed no need for the evacuation of school children.
Exposure Control The Allegan County EOC is outside the 10 mile EPZ.
Field workers were not activated.
Media Relations Media relations were not conducted at the EOC.
Liaison was maintained with the JPIC and input was provided.
No hard copy of press releases given to the media at the JPIC was transmitted (facsimile) to the Allegan County EOC
- Area Required For Corrective Action The Allegan County EOC reported receiving no facsimile copies of the press releases given to the media at the JPIC.
(NUREG 0654, Planning Standard G, Element 4.b) (25)
Recommendation:
Specific effort needs to be put forth to assure that Allegan County receives hard copies of all news releases given to the media at the JPIC.
Rumor control was a function of Consumers Power Company at the Kalamazoo District Office.
Rumor control is an assigned responsibility to the State and County governments in addition to the utility.
The function was experimentally demonstrated at the Consumers Power Company District Office in Kalamazoo.
Evaluation of this function is of concern.
Consumers Power Company used utility equipment and personnel to implement the rumor control function.
There are no procedures or guides, nor has there been sufficient training of utility personnel to adequately carry out the rumor control responsibility.
In addition it does not appear consideration has been given to the transmission of detailed State and local information for use in preparing responses to the would be caller.
35
Area Requiring Corrective Action Rumor control was placed in utility facilities utilizing utility equipment and personnel.
Utility personnel operating the rumor control did not have the necessary documents, procedures or training to interface with State and local governments in order to effectively carry out the rumor control responsibility.
(NUREG 0654 Planning Standard G, Element 4.c) (26)
Recommendation:
A procedure for dealing with rumors needs to be developed and put in place to give assurance that there is a well defined, accepted and understood method for dealing with rumors to include State and local input.
The idea of moving the rumor control center away from the JPIC may want to be reconsidered.
If the utility's district office in Kalamazoo, Michigan is going to continue to be used then Allegan county should provide liaison personnel at the rumor control center.
Necessary resources such as individual working space, telephones and hard copy (datafax) capability must be provided for the Allegan county liaison personnel at the rumor control center.
Recovery and Reentry The EOC staff discussed the procedure to be used when releasing the evacuees for return to their residences and businesses.
They decided to release returnees a shelter at a time and determined the roads to be used.*
They discussed the length of time to maintain traffic control points after the evacuees had passed and how to control the sightseers.
They dealt with the type of information to be released by the JPIC and the timing of the news releases.
Concern was expressed for the mental heal th of the evacuees and where they could receive counseling.
Another point discussed was how evacuees would be reimbursed for lost wages, profits and for damage property.
Decontamination Demonstration The facility used for the decontamination is located at the Allegan Fire Department, 300 Monroe Street, Allegan, Michigan.
The building is the administrative office for the fire department and a
six bay vehicle garage for storage of material and equipment.
The building is of new construction, modern and well maintained.
It has a wide spacious paved parking and driveway area.
The location of the building is in the City of Allegan and Monroe Street is a
well traveled roadway for a
small municipality.
Monroe Street is State Route M-118 giving it easy access to the area for decontamination.
Present at the demonstration from the Michigan State Police/Emergency Management Division was the Commanding Officer and Planning Specialist from the Pre-Disaster Services Section, 36
Allegan County Emergency Management Coordinator (of the County
- sheriff's Department), an Allegan County Deputy Sheriff, Allegan City Fire Chief, two city fire department members, and two County Health Department workers.
All of the above participated in the demonstration with the exception of the two State people.
Most of the information for the evaluation was gained through interviewing those supervising and those performing the work.
The facilities would be available for the decontamination of vehicles and personnel from local and State law enforcement, local fire department personnel. local and State radiological personnel, school bus drivers and evacuees that are directed to the site.
In addition to the personnel listed above who participated in the demonstration, the following equipment was brought into play:
dosimetry (pencil type CDV 742s; these were issued at the beginning of the demonstration to the emergency workers and at that time they were given instructions on their use and purpose) :
and survey meters.
It was said that TLDs have been provided by the utility and are stored at the County EM office in the Sheriffs Department.
In one instance this was the first time in several years that the worker had received instructions on the use of the dosimetry.
This was due to his outside work schedule and his duty hours on the fire department, therefore he missed indoctrination.
Other equipment used on the demonstration:
one 750 gallon pumper truck anq a 1-1/2" rubber coated hose with v~riable spray pattern nozzle.
The other fire fighting equipment in the facility could be used to assist in the decontamination process.
And, if it became necessary, the decontamination water supply system could be coupled to the municipal water supply.
Two emergency workers conducted the surveying and two emergency workers simulated flushing a four wheel drive, 1/4 ton enclosed vehicle.
One passenger in the vehicle was asked to exit.
He was surveyed in addition to the interior of the passenger compartment and the rear cargo carrying area.
Wheel wells, engine, engine air cleaner and the front of the vehicle was surveyed.
The emergency workers did not suit up in protective clothing.
Rather, that portion of the demonstration was simulated.
The reason given for not suiting up was that, that is a normal routine in fire fighting and there was no real benefit to be gained.
Discussion prevailed as to the unknowns of radiation (no smell, taste, feel or visual aspect) and the need to protect one's body from contamination.
One comment offered.* was that contaminated vehicles and/or evacuees would more than likely not result from an accident at the power plant; that low level radiation would be below the threshold of allowable levels.
The area where the decontamination demonstration took place was on a slopping paved area near a storm drain which emptied into the municipal surface drainage and into the Kalamazoo River which 37
is within five hundred feet (estimate) of the building.
The river is sixty to eighty feet below the level of the fire facility and the decontamination area.
The planned action is to sand bag the area, blocking the drains and building a four foot barricade around the flushing area.
The trapped water would be contained for evaluation of contamination and proper disposal.
Sand bag materials are available and in sufficient supply due to the history of flooding experienced in the municipality.
The emergency workers were surveyed for radiological contamination.
If clothing was found to be contaminated the individual would be stripped by appropriately suited emergency
- workers, the contaminated clothing would be placed in large plastic bags, sealed and prepared for transport t the utility for proper disposal.
Equipment (hose, nozzle, fire truck, dosimetry, etc.)
would be flushed with water for decontamination and resurveyed.
Emergency workers estimated that eight to twelve vehicles could be processed per hour at this station.
AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:
It is recommended that those who are assigned to carry out this particular function in a radiological emergency need periodic training on the use and purpose of dosimetry, an radiological contamination (its effects, transport and disposal).
Berrien County Activation and Staffing The State and Van Buren County notified Berrien County, via the LEIN at 0155, of the "Alert" declared at the nuclear power plant at 0143.
The Berrien County dispatcher made initial notification to the Sheriff and secretary.
Notification of key staff, began at 0200 and was completed by 0206.
The Sheriff ordered (at 0200),
the EOC to be set up which was completed by 0240.
Staffing of the EOC was completed by 0316.
The staff notification was made from a written call list that was up to date.
Calls directing activation and call up of staff at any hour of the day is received by the Berrien County Sheriff's dispatch center which is manned 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day.
Notification is via the LEIN with telephone and radio as backup.
The EOC staff activation and mobilization demonstrated training and knowledge of their responsibilities.
The Chairman, Berrien County Board of Commissioners, was effectively in charge of operations with assistance from the Berrien County Sheriff.
Other Sheriff personnel served as: map plotter, public affairs, JPIC public affairs, etc.
Berrien County sent a Sheriff Deputy to the Van Buren county EOC and the JPIC as a backup to the primary Berrien County spokesperson at the JPIC.
38
"Emergency Operations Management The Chairman of the Berrien j County Board of Commissioners was effectively in charge of EOC operations.
He was assisted by the Berrien County Sheriff and EOC staff.
Periodic briefings were held to update staff on current events.
The briefings in some instances did not provide detailed information on actions taken by Van Buren County, e.g. when Van Buren county activated the prompt alert and notification system and EBS.
Area Recommended ¥6r Improvement Recommendation:
The EOC periodic briefings include specific information concerning actions taken by Van Buren county, e.g.
the time Van Buren county =activated the prompt alert and notification system, EBS, etc.
The EOC staff was involved in the decision making process.
Plans, procedures, checklist, etc. were available for reference.
Both a master log and individual agency logs were maintained *.
Messages were reproduced and distributed as appropriate.
Message handling for Berrien County's partial participation was efficient.
The EOC being in the County Sheriff's building has controlled access.
EOC staff was informed of the following events:
"Alert" declared at plant at 0143 received at Berrien County at 0155; "General Emergency" declared at the plant at 0400 was received by Berrien County at 0410.
The following protective actions were initiated by Berrien County:
0408, shelter 2 miles all sectors and sectors B,
C, D out to 5 miles; 0425, release from plant (0420),
evacuate all sectors 0-5 miles and sectors B, C, & D 5-10 miles;
- 0456, 20 mile livestock advisory for sectors B,
c,
& D.
Am:Oulance service and hos pi ta ls.were notified of the situation
- ~-*.and *placed on standby.
Congregate care and emergency worker
- decontamination centers were identified and placed on s~andby.
- Fad.. li t.j.es The Berrien County EOC is a Federally approved facility that has been evaluated during previous exercises.
It can support operations over an extended period of time.
It has sufficient furniture, space,. lighting, telephones and other amenities to support operations. -The facility i& located in the basement of the Sheriff building.
The
- Sheri ff kitchen, showers, and bunks are available to the EOC staff.
Back up power is available.
It was not demonstrated.
Emergency classification levels were posted in the EOC.
Appropriate maps and displays were posted within the EOC and used by the staff.
Th~y included: pl~me EPZ, evacuation routes, relocation centers, access control points, and population by evacuation area.
The EOC status board was not 39
maintained due to partial staffing of the EOC.
Communications The Berrien County Sheriff Dispatch Center has been evaluated in previous exercises.
It can support emergency operations.
The LEIN is the primary communication system between Berrien County and the State as well as Allegan and Van Buren Counties.
Telephone, facsimile, and radio are backup systems.
Official information flow is from the State and Van Buren County.
Be~rien County can activate Berrien County EBS stations by telephone or plectron (tone alert radios).
Communications between the Berrien County EOC and the JPIC is by telephone.
It is not clear if facsimile capability exists as hard copy back up.
Communications to support hospitals is via telephone and tone alert radio.
Communication with ambulance service is by radio thorough the Sheriff's dispatch.
Telephone conferencing capability for a
least three parties at the same time is available through telephone located in the two offices adjoining the EOC.
Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation This function is not a responsibility of the County during this exercise.
Public Alerting and Instruction The Berrien County EOC played a limited role in public alerting.
Van Buren County has the responsibility to activate the Alert and Notification System in both Van Buren and Berrien county.
The
-Berrien County public affairs officer at the EOC coordinated information with the Berrien County spokesperson at the JPIC located at Lake Michigan Community College.
The Berrien County spoke.sperson at the JPIC coordinated information with the spokesperson. from Allegan and Van Buren Counties as well as the State prior to briefing the media.
Van Buren County activated the Alert and Notification System (sirens) and the EBS at 0435.
Emergency public information was telephoned from the EOC to the Berrien County spokesperson at the JPIC.
No hard copy (facsimile) capability between the Berrien County EOC and the JPIC was demonstrated during this exercise.
Area required For Improvement Hard copy (facsimile) capability did not exist between the Berrien County EOC and the JPIC.
The Berrien county EOC did not receive any facsimile copies of the news releases given to the media at the JPIC. (NUREG 0654, Planning Standard G, Element 4.b) 40
Recommendation:
Berrien County needs to establish facsimile capability between the JPIC and the Berrien county.
Specific effort needs to be put forth to assure that the Berrien county EOC receives hard copies of all news releases given to the media at the JPIC.
Prescripted messages were available in the EOC but not used.
Prescripted messages have been developed for use in making news releases to the press.
This was done as a convenience and to assist in the development of accurate and timely news releases.
Area Recommended For Improvement Recommendation:
Prescripted messages be utilized for releasing of information to the news media.
Rumor control is an assigned responsibility to the State and County governments in addition to the utility.
The function was experimentally demonstrated at the Consumers Power Company District Office in Kalamazoo.
Evaluation of this function is of concern.
Consumers Power Company used utility equipment and personnel to implement the rumor control function.
There are no procedures or guides, nor has there been sufficient training to interface effectively with State and local governments in order to effectively carry out the rumor control responsibility.
In addition, it does not appear consideration has been given to the transmission of detailed information for use in preparing responses to the would be caller.
Area Requiring Corrective Action Rumor control was placed in utility facilities using utility equipment and personnel.
Personnel operating the rumor control did not have the necessary documents, procedures or training to interface effectively with State and local governments in order to adequately carry out the rumor control responsibility.
(NUREG 0654, Planning Standard G, Element 4.c) (26)
Recommendation:
A procedure for dealing with rumors needs to be developed and put in place to give assurance that there is a well defined, accepted and understood method for dealing with rumors to include State and local government input.
Berrien county liaison personnel need to be at the rumor control center.
Necessary resources such as individual work space, telephones and hardcopy (facsimile) capability must also be provided to the Berrien county liaison personnel at the rumor control center.
Protective Action:
Simulation of the activation of access control points were 41
- promptly identified by the County road commission member of the EOC staff when protective actions to evacuated all sectors 0-5 miles and sectors B, c,* & D between 5 to 10 miles was made.
The following access control points were identified:
Climer road to 48th Avenue, Beck Road to 48th Avenue, Coloma Road to 48th Avenue, Johnson Road to 48th Avenue and Blue Star Highway to 48th Avenue.
Appropriate resources are available to keep clear during both good and bad weather and stalled or wrecked vehicles.
evacuation routes in the event of The State ordered air traffic and rail traffic in the vicinity of the plant to be diverted to avoid the 10 mile EPZ.
Water traffic on Lake Michigan would be diverted by the USCG and/or the Sheriff Marine Division.
Due to the severity of the winter weather, this was not necessary.
Berrien Springs, Eau Clare and Benton Harbor High Schools reception centers were placed on standby at 0445.
The Watervliet High School, Coloma High School and Hagar Shores Fire Department emergency worker decontamination centers were also placed on standby at 0445.
The Health and Medical staff in the EOC possessed updated list of 24 mobility impaired individuals.
The list provided addresses and 'telephone numbers and identified individual problems.
The list of mobility impaired was updated as of February 1, 1988.
Transportation for these mobility impaired individuals was also identified.
Ambulances had been placed on standby and were available to transport individuals if needed.
Private automobiles of Health Department staff and other individuals could be used to transport people not requiring an ambulance.
School buses could also be used.
Upon request, the Van Buren County Health Department staff were dispatched to assist at decontamination sites at 0700.
Radiological Exposure Control This function is the responsibility of the State and not an objective for the County.
Media Relations Media relations were not conducted at the EOC affairs officer maintained contact with the spokesperson at the JPIC and provided input.
Recovery and Reentry The EOC public Berrien county This function was not an objective for the County during this exercise.
42
\\!... fffG Std/Ele
!Obj) r G. :1. b
( 2:'i l r;.
. J.,
( '.'.:'.
F'3 l i s:\\Li es Nuclear Poh'er Plant l~;~erc:i~,e. FebrlJHry 17, 1988 State Listing of Deficiencies Exercist:
Findinit
- \\c ti on Proposed No deficiencies observed during the exercise.
State ListinEI: of Areas Requiring Corrective Actions Prior to the arrival of State and local spob:::spersons at the JP[l' th<~
u t i 1 i t ~*'
J Pl C s la f f i--a s J a c Id n ic:
offs it<"
inform:::i.t.i.on concerning actions Sb'"lte and cnuntit:s, from taken EC1F the P:.g:.
!!;f~ttin11 verification of the information Go~:ernor ! s "State of pertaining to the declaration of a
Disaster",
T\\J,=, e:c:11.ir1.ti.ro'.3 reportt-:d nc)t r*cc1::i\\*inc~
h;:rcl.copies of al.l press reL::::ises 12: i \\ i:~ n t n t:lH; mt~ d i a n 1-.
t h , ! P H * *
\\ * ;:; 11 Burt::n county EOC:
stnff rr-pn1*1*Pd r,=* c e i. \\. i 11 g relea:::e.
ro11nt i<'S C) n l ;:
n n ('
c () r,,-
.*\\ 1 J CL'.nll tif it
- 11r*i":~*.-~~;.;
nnd i\\:'.1*ri*"n r 1*' pn I' 1* r' i l 1
- c* c* <' i v i n Q" l10 co r> i f; ;0; o f f1 re s s r e J ea s t: s.
- a.
Date of Completion
G.,1
- r>
.( :..'.G l h'umor cnntrol 1*:as facilities using and personnel.
placed in utility uiility equipment personnel operating control center did necessary documents, training to interface local governrnments effectively carry control function.
The utilit~.-
the rumor not ha\\*e the procedures, or with State and J.n order to out.
the rumor
- -=;;.~t,e Listinq: of Areas Recommended For Improvement Activate facsimile capabilities and install erJ1.1ipment
~.;hen tlH: uti 1 i ty bertins initial acti,*ation of the
.JPlC.
Initi<:tl mPs.s:*1ges h'ou!d lia'.*e h::i rdcopy Yer if i Lea t. ion and accurnc ::
i-*ou l.d l.w*
- i mpenved for me!".sri.~f;S 1~t::1d oYer the telephone.
- Moreover, irnp,;.r*L1nt inforniation could be transmitted properly to all p R r t i c i p 8. t i. r1 g or g B ri i z F.l. t i n 11 s and i f they are not there at the time the~
,. o 1 ii d *he he l d for t. he i r: r P v i i'd'-'
11 !',., 1 i t.li*;~j r arri,-3].
11-.
J s rc:<~ommended th;::, t:
Jyt IJ)1'l<<<1:*l stationer;.-
usc:d at. t.he,IF'1C Si1u1iJd h:1\\-1
th.~
.JPJC.'
t:r;Jr,phone nun:hF'r,,n
- i t..
- b.
~JU)'ECi Stcl/Ele (Ob.i l E.5
( 1.j )
I~~"' d i o and
- t. e l r, v 1 s i on r c; c,,d. v er s shou]d he placed
.in the
,Jf'lC and 1:*n11tini=:-I~- mon.il.ored.
Th(*~
t<?.chniqu<'~
would assist the staff in assisting in development of concise and up to date anno11ncement.s ovf~r EBS.
\\*an Duren County List.in~ of Deficiencies Exercise Finding No deficiencies observed durin~ the exercise.
Action Proposed
"\\an l\\ u re n Co u 11 t ~- List in J! of
.\\re;:,s !(equirino; Corrective Action The EDS instructional message follo!:ina: the soundina: of sjrens at
"(ienc1*a l Emc::rccnc;.""
at tri buh::d. the 1:-t'Hsc.i1 f'o1..
t:.lu-:-
<"ienerR]
l~mi*-1*q:;**11c*~-"
.:-_*];1.ss.i ficaU nn le\\*el :=1.S the "ho~;1 ;-.;g;:,
s i. t 1 1:1 t. i. u n .
I 1 1
- \\.-~ t u 3. l i t.'-*,
i L i : a :::;
the nuclc-:ar reactor cler,;rcl::.i.tior1
<-1!H.l t'**'"i.(;;1se of r'ont:;-unination that.
- d. f~ t e i
- m i n e d t h e
" G en E:r 0. l Erne r g: e 11 c ;.- "
r I ;-1..::. s i r i c '*°' t i n n *
- c.
Date of Completion
- 1. b
( 2 :) )
- I
- 1:
( :2 G l Van Duren county reported receivinq only one cop;;-
of the eiC!ht nei;s releases ~iven to the media at the
.JPIC.
l~ um or control was placed i n u t i l j t ~
f ac i lit i es using utility equipment and personnel.
The ut i lit>'
personnel operating the rumor control center did not have the necessar:-.'
documents, procedures, or training to interface with Stile antl local governments in order to effectively carry out the rumor control responsibility.
\\.'a n nu ; *en co 11 n t >-
L :i. s t i n g o f Areas Recommended for Improvement The proposed revision plan be expedited and soon as possible.
The internal messaae system be reviewed and assure that the c c: n L l
- o 11 c r ha ~~
a f i l 0.
of the County published as distribution revised, to mcssac:;e Jog cop:-.* of (*,r1ch Pack up po,,.£:' r from the
- -; he r* j ff ' :3 communications center be upf!r<1ded a n cl ex t e n ck* cl t c t h.-; ope: r 3 t i u n ::;
r o.-:, ;n of the EOC.
- d.
!~UKECi Std/ELe
!OB.J l The technique powered Vu-graph be improved to more information.
E:-:ercise Findin.g of using a
li~ht as a
status board permit writing of Alletran o 1.1 n t,,.
I. i s L i. n q n f 11 e f i (' j enc i es
- \\ct ion Proposed No deficiencies observed during the exercise.
u.. 1 b The Alleg;an County EOC Allegan Count>' Listin!.! of Areas Req~jring Corrective Action staff (25) reported receiving no facsimile copies of the press reJ.eases ~iven G. k (26) to the media at the.JPfC.
Hur.llJr control Has f~cilities using and personnel.
placed in utiJit.\\-
utilit;,-
equipn1eut~
The utilit~-
pPcsonnel operatinq t.h e rumor control center did not h~:n*e th(*
nc*cessar:v dor.uments, prnr.edur*r:2. (*I' t1 *a in in£.(' to i n t er face w i t. h St Cl t e ;; n cl l OC=" l go\\*er*nmr~n tp.
in
(*! f f P. c t i Ye J. :v c a r r ;">
o u t control r*esponsib*i lit~-.
ord01*
I;,
th
rumc) r
- e.
Da t.e of Completion
NUREG Std/Ele Allegan County Listing of Areas Recommended For Improvement The PIOs function is important and needs to be timely in close coord-ination with the JPIC PIOs.
Measures should be taken to improve the reporting time of the PIO to the County EOC.
Those individuals assigned to demon-strate adequate equipment and proce-dures for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment and vehicles need periodic training on the use and purpose of dosimetry and radiological contamination (its effects, transport, and disposal.
Berrien County Listing of Deficiencies Exercise Finding No. deficiencies observed during the exercise.
- f.
Action Proposed Date of Completion
G, I. b t25J G *,:~
I
(~
(2SJ
!lPrric~n Co11nty List.*i11g of Areas Hequiring Corrective Action llard cop:v facsimile cap~bili t:v did nnt:
p:~ist beti.:Pen the BerriPn Count:-.-
EOC and the JPlC.
The Berrien county EOC staff ct id not receive an:-.-
facs imi le copies of news releases given to the media at the JPIC.
Rumor control was placed in utility facilities using utility equipment and personnel.
The utility personnel operating the rumor control center did not have the necessary documents, procedures or training to interface effectively h"i th State and local go\\-ernments in order to effectively carry out the
~umor control function.
- g.
Berrien County Listing of Areas Recommended For Impro\\*ement EOC briefings include specific information concerning actions takP.n by Van Buren coun t:v, e.g. the time Van Buren county act. i \\*a ted the prompt alert and notification system, EBS, etc.
Prescripted messages be utilized for the releasing of information to EBS and the news media.
- h.
"..'!...~:~::;.;_*~
~*
.;:" ;*.* ~.. ~- *,
June 29, 1988
~:I.:HORAHDUH FOR:
A!:sistant Ai:;sociate Director ATTENTION:
FROM:
Sl:'DJ'ECT:
Office of Nat:ural ancl Technological lfazardt~
Mct;s Hepler, SL-NT-T!{
- 71'.;~d Wallace J. lleavt~r, Chainlan r.egional Assistance C0mr.J.itt~e Pelisades Nuclear Power Plant ExcrciLJe Schedule and Fin.~l Exercise Report.
I:nclose::d i<J n cop:,* e.f the fichedul~ of corrccti ve actions frorn the Stat2 of Eichlcau for the..:cakn.;:;~<>;;:8 identified during the February 17, 1988 jviP.t e;ict:rcise:
involvint-;
th~ Pal:tsad<!s Nucle~r Power Plc:;.nt.
The schedule of corre::ctiv~ action::. ha;; tx.?en reviewed hy FEK"..,
Region V
and found to be adequate to corr~ct the ~eakn~sses identified during the exercise.
A copy of the finnl excrcisi:. report is alHo enclosed for yom: revlew and approval prior to t:ranatJittal to the iiuclear Ret,ulatory Ccmmissioa.
jV;;f.t. *.
... ~ f'
- STAT!<: 01" MICHIGAN i..~~
-~
y,..,cet":'fl C....-:cd...
~
',.1:' )
.. _-;l.4 EMERGENCY MANAGE:\\rnNT DIVISIO:'-.'
JAMESJ. BI.ANCIIARD, GOVERNOR DEPARTMJ.i~NT OF STATE POLICE Mr. Wallace J. Weaver, Chairman Regional Assistance Committee FEMA Region V 175 W. Jackson, 4th Floor Chicago, IL 60604 CO!.. It. T. lJAVIS, OIRE:CTOR May 26, 1988 RE:
Palisades-88 REP Exercise Critique Schedule of Corrective Actions
Dear Mr. Weaver:
KNAl'l'S C~:NTIH;, SVITE31111 31111 SOUTll WASlllNGTON SQt;AIU:
LANSING, MIClllGAN -11<~13 l'llON~:: 517 3:>1-7950 Attached is the Schedule of Corrective Actions for the State of Michigan, VanBuren. Allegan and Berrien Counties for the Palisades-88 REP Exercise.
Allegan County will be conducting its decontamination on Wednesday, June 8, Station. 300 Monroe St.. Allegan. MI.
(Ix. 616/673-3954).
re-demonstration of emergency worker 1988 at 9:30 a.m. at the Allegan Fire The contact person is Chief Blanchard A point of clarification regarding JPIC operations is warranted.
Prior to the arrival of the State PIO's, the JPIC facility is not the State of Michigan Joint Public Information Center. It can function as the utility media center and provide information on utility actions; however. it cannot release information on specific off-site actions!
A basic principle of Michigan Emergency Public Information is that each organization speaks for itself.
This was the status of the Lake Michigan Community College prior to the 5:30 a.m. arrival of the State PIO's.
When the Governor.declared a State of Disaster at 4 a.m., he ordered the JPIC activated.
The utility TSC was informed of this and steps were initiated to activate the JPIC.
When State
- personnel arrived, they opened the hotline to the SEOC and were provided with a hard copy of the Governor's Disaster Declaration for release to the media.
- Mr. Wallace Weaver May 10. 1988 Page Two State staff and local EOC's and PIO's were aware that the Governor had declared a State of Disaster. and neither exercise play, nor JPIC activation and operation were in any way delayed.
If you have any questions, please feel free to contact this office.
JMT/DS/sc Attachment cc:
Mr. Gordon Wenger, FEMA Sincerely,
~~-/~-
F/~t~~:-. Tyler Commanding - "f icer Pre-Disaster Services Section Hr. Phil Loomis, Consumers Power Co.
Mr. Richard-Gordenier,-VanBuren Co.
Hr. Robert Larr, Allegan Co.
Mr. James Collis. Berrien Co.
Lt. Christi Palmer, 5th District Coordinator Lt. Gordon VanGelder, 6th District Coordinator
SU~EG Std/I:: le IObJI I G. 4. b
! 25 l G.*1.b r 2 5 i
()
a -
P/EMD 88 Pali. s:ld.:- s
~*:11c J. i:a r Poi.:er Plant E ~~ e r c i s e, r-P. b r u n r ~* 1 7, 1 9 8 8 State Listin~ of Deficiencies Exercise Findin!!
Action Proposed Date of Completion No deficiencies observed durin!! the exercise.
State Listina: of Areas Pequirin~ Corrective ~ctions Prior to the arrival of State and local spol;espersons at. the JP [C the~
utiJ.j t~"
JPIC staff KUS J.ackinC!
nffsitP informRtion from the EOF c0ncerr.in~ actions taken by the St:rit.e nnd count:ies, e.!;!.
~F.:tti.11!!
verification of the information pertaining to the Go\\*ernor:s declaration of a
"State of Disast~r",
Th.,-.
c~ount:i.es reportf=:d Jl(:t rccei'.*inq hardcopies of all press rele.!lsE:s gi*.-E-n ti) the media ::it. t:hi:? JPJC'.
\\";:;11 Huren count~-
EOC staff rt:po1*ted recP. i.\\*i.11g onl~*
onP.
cop~' of a prc"ss release.
A 11 c ~an n n d n err i *' n r o u n I i P. s r ~-:- p n r t "~ d r c=-r* f' i. '\\.. i n g n :.1 copi.e.s of press releases.
- a.
-Prior to the arrival 6£ State spokesperson at the JPIC, the facility is not the State JPIC.
The EOF was not operational at that time, the TSC had off-site actions - but the utility should not be releasing information on off-site actions
-ARCA not valid.
-Hard copy is not a NUREG requirement.
PIO's are supposed to provide information to the county EOG on press releases.
The SEOC received copies of all press releases.
-Training will be conducted with local PIO's to provide information to the EOG on press releases.
-CPCo will revise procedures and conduct additional training of personnel to ensure copies of releases are sent to local EOC's *
.. *~
G. :I
- r.
- ~GI Rumor
~11nt.r1)l ims facilities usin~
p 1 :iced i* n u t i li t: y ut i l i t.:1-* equ i pm0n t:
- Jnd pers<rnnel.
ei::'rsonnel opera tin:!
~ontrol center did necessary docum~nts, training to int.P.rface local governmments effectively corr~
cont.i*ol fun(.!tlon.
The 11tilit*.-
the ru~no1*
not h::1':c-
- h~
procedure:=;. or 1--i t. h S t a t e nu d in order t~*
out the rum*::ir
-Additional training of rumor control personnel will be conducted by.CPCo and state personnel.
-Message flow procedures to/from rumor control will be reviewed and corrections made.
State Listinq of
~reas Recommended For Improvement Activate facsimile capabilities and instn.11 equipmP.nt when th8 uti l j t.y l
i'nitlal actin1tion of the Je~1ns
,TPl~.
Ini.tj<l]
mP.ssa~P.s 1.:ould.
h~n*e h:1rdcop::
Yeri fication and accu1*nc;-.*
1-*011!.d be im}H'n\\*ed. fl.n* messa~es rP.;i.d o\\*e1*
the telephone.
~loreover, imp.,t't.. "lnt information could be transmitted properly to all part: j c i p::i t. in~
organ i z at ions
- t n d if the>- are not th~re at the time the>*
r:* 0 II 0
) d. h ~
" p l d f Q t* u I e i r. r P.,,. i "' I '
II p nJ I t:hejr arrin:d.
lt is rec:nmr:iend~d th8t let.t.e1.*IJF-:ad stationer~.-
used at the JPIC shuuJd h;n**.:'
t.lir~
.JPl'C telephone number on
.1 l
b *
~JU\\'EG
~~ tci/ Ele
(*)bj)
E,5
( 14)
H8dio
- ~n<l t.F.d.F*\\*isinn rrc.:!h*ers should he pl<Jcr:~rl in the
.ll'IC: :i11rl l'*)\\I t. i.111? l :: mnn i l.o red.
l'lil~
1..-~cl: n in it*~
i-*ould assist the st.L?.ff in assisting in de\\*~lopmen!:.
nf crrnr.ise and up to date nnnollncemen ts O\\"f'r* EBS.
\\"~n Dui-.::n Count:-*
L~~tin!.!; of Deficiencies
.Exercise Finding
- \\ct ion Proposed Date of Completion No deficiencies observed durina the exercise.
\\"an Buren County Listin!! of
.\\re::ts Hequiri1:g Corrective Action ThF.:
EUS instructional mcssa!!e f o L Lo 1: in g-the sound in~ o f s i re n s at
- (~*~r.era.l r:meraeJl'~~-**
3ttribut.ed the r.""::1c;.::.n fnr th*~ **ni::ner<ll Em**~r*qc-nc~-"
c: 1 :i s s j f i c rt U o n l c *; e l as t h e " h o s t. n g e s it 11 ::l t. i. on.,.
I. 11 act u a 1 i t y,
i t was the nuclear reactor de~rdation nnd re.l.e~se of contamination that de:termined the "General Emer!;!ency**
- r. 1. <'I s s i f i. c :.\\ t i n n
- c *
-Better communications between the SEOC and County EOG will be stressed.in training programs to ensure accurate data flow.
-Improved message flow and content will be demonstrated at the next exercise.
I. b I 2.il I I. r:-
C 26 l 0 *'
I*
Van Duren cpunty reported ~eceivinq only one cop~-
of the ei!!ht net:s releases.!!i \\"en to the med in at the
.J PT1;.
-See G.4.b. above for State of Michigan.
Rumor cnntrol 1-:ns pl:lcen in tJti }j ty facilities usin~ utilit:* eq1.1iprr.i:>1?t
-See G.4.c. above for the State of Michigan.
a n d 11 e r* i=: on 11 e L.
Th e u t i l i t y personnel opera tinq the rumo1*
control center di.d not h::l\\"e th.~
necesRar;-.*
documents, procedures, 01*
t l' a i n i. 11 ~ to i n t e r fa~ e ld th S t.'.\\ t e and Joe-al
!,!over11mcnts in order to et'f'ecti*.c:>J.~*
C.'.\\rT~"
out the rumor c:o11t:rol rcsponsihilit~-.
\\" :-l n nu :.
..-~ n
(.'. 01111 t. ~-. [, i. !': t i. fl ~ 0 f Arens Recommended For Improvement The proposed revision of the Count~
plan be e:-~pedi ted and pub! ished as soon as possible.
The internal messaae system be reviewed and assure that the cc:ntJ*oller has a file distribution re,*ised, to mr::'ssa qe l otr cop~- of P.'lch E3ckup po~er from the Sheriff's communications center be* U}H!rarJed and extended to the operations room of the EOC.
- d.
!'iUREG Std/E.Le 101.lJ l The technique po1.;ered Vu-p; raph be irnpro\\*cd to more information.
Exe re is~
Findln.~
of usinq
~a li~ht as a
status board permit
~ritinq of
- A l J. E* !!::U 1 e.. (>1 1 n t* :: l. i s t i. n o:!
o f ll i::- f i c i. P. n c i e "i
- \\ct ion l*'roposed No deficiencies observed dur in~ the e~:erc i se.
Alleqan County Listing of Are:Js Requiring Correct.]ve Action Date of Completion G. lb The Alle~an County EOC staff 12~1 reported receivin~ no facsimile
-See G.4.b. above for State of Michigan.
copies of the press releases qiven G. le
( 2 l) )
to thP. media at the JPfC.
Humor C*)nt.rol Has f,, c i.l i t.. i. e s u s i n ~
placed in utilit~
u t i J i t ~" e q u i p :1t en t and personnel.
pP.rsonnel.
operatinq co?itrol center did Th e u t i l i t ;\\-
t:he rumor not.
h~n-e thf' ni:*r:essar~-
docum*~nt.s, pi-o<~P.dU!'P.S Pl' t J *a in in !l'. to i n t er face 1.* i th S ta t e n n d loc11.l grn*e1*nments in orrl~i:
t.n
~:ffP.ct.i\\*elr carr~-
out the rum111*
1~ont.rol. 1*P.sponsibili t.~-.
-See G.4.c. above for the State of Michigan.
e
- I~.. 5. Ll Ii. !:. L 1291
~~? *!~EG
- -: 1* :.! IL J. r*
,\\11 e !!an count "!i did not con duet a d.~ mo n :::. t: r n t. i. r-i n procedures of df.*cnntar.iin.1t.jon as required b~-
the
-A re-demonstration of the emergency worker decontaminatio will be conducted on June 8, 1988 at 9:30 a.m. at the Allegan Fire Dept, Allegan, MI.
1.i J.1.i ror, ti. \\"P.S e':erc i se.
sel~cted for r.h~
~\\lli::-r.:-i11 Count~- Listint! of
,\\re:is Hi::comme11ded For lmpro\\*ement function is important :ind The f'!Os nP~cls to coordination he timely in close with the JPIC PIOs.
Meas11res f;hou Id he talurn to i mpro*;e the reporting time of the PIO to the Count:* EOC.
Berrien Count~ Listing of Deficiencies E:~ercise Fi rid in~
- \\ct.i.on F'1*,;pos1~d
~*ei deficiencies observed durin~ the e:*:en:*isc*.
- f.
Date of Completion
G,1.b
( 25 I G.4.c (26)
Berrien County Listing of Areas Requiring Corrective Action ttard copy facsimile capability did nnt exist between the Berrien County EOC and the JPIC.
The Berrien county EOC staff did not receive any facsimile copies of. news releases given to the media at the JPIC.
Rumor control was placed in utility facilities using utility equipment and personnel.
The utility personnel operating the. rumor control center did not have the necessary documents, procedures or training to interface effectively with State and local governments in order to effectively carry out the rumor control function.
- g.
-See G.4.b. above for State of Michigan.
-See G.4.c for the State of Michigan above.
)
I B~rrien County Listing of Areas Recommended For Improvement EOC briefings include specific information concerning actions taken by Van Buren county, e.g. the time Van Buren county activated the prompt alert and notification system, EBS, etc.
Prescripted messages be utilized for the releasing of information to EBS and the news media.
- h.
Attachment I
STATgOft'MICHIGAN JAMl!:S J. BLANC! IARD, GOVERNOR ngPAR'l'MgN'J' OF S'fA'l'fi~ POLICE COL. ll 1'. UAVIS, lllf(~C'rQll Mr. Wallace Weaver, Chairman Regional Assistance Committee Federal Emergency Management Agency Region V - Chicago 175 w. Jackson Blvd., 4th Floor Chicago, Illinois 60606 January 4, 1987 EMEUGENCY MANAGl'~MEN1' IJIVISION KNAl'l'S CJ,:NTllE, SUIT~! ~OU 3UU sou1*11 WASlllNU1'0N SQUAllE LANSING, MIClllUAN ~H!ll3 l'llONI::: 517 3:M-7!15U RE:
Palisades REP Exercise 1988 Offsite Authority Scenario
Dear Mr. Weaver:
Enclosed please find the offsite scenario for the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant Exercise.
This exercise is scheduled for the week of February 14, 1988 as an unannounced exercise.
The scenario shows key offsite events and actions as well as approximate timing.
The scenario is based on the technical scenario developed by Consumers Power Company for their onsite portion of the exercise.
Additional actions for the state and counties will be generated by messages inserted by State Controllers at the SEOC, VBEOC, AEOC and BEOC.
These messages are not included in this scenario.
Meterological data and dose rate information have not been provided to this office as of this time.
When the information is received, it will be forwarded promptly to your office.
If you have any questions, please feel free to contact this office.
JMT/SJR/sc Enclosure Sincerely,
<1~
~~n~ing Officer Pre-Disaster Services Section cc:
Phil Loomis, Consumers Power Company
EXERCISE SCENARIO Background Information Notes MSP/EMD 1/88
- 1.
The Palisades Exercise is scheduled to run during a one day period during the week of February 14, 1988 as an unannounced exercise.
- 2.
The exercise will be a full scale exercise for VanBuren and Allegan Counties, and a partial for the State of Michigan and Berrien County.
- 3. Facilities activated for the exercise include:
the SEOC, VBEOC, AEOC, EEOC and the Joint Public Information Center.
- 4.
Both VanBuren and Allegan Counties will demonstrate shift changes at their EOC's and the JPIC.
Shift changes will not be demonstrated at the Reception/Decontamination/Congregate Care facilities.
- 5.
The Prompt Alert Notification System (Sirens) will not be activated for the exercise.
The VanBuren County EOC will demonstrate the steps to be taken up to Siren Activation, but will not activate the sirens.
Contacting of the EBS will be completed by VanBuren County, but no message will be sent out over the EBS radio system.
The text of the EBS messages will be available for the Federal evaluators.
- 6.
The State and Counties will demonstrate the alert, notification and activation of their EOC's and staff.
The Reception/Decontamination/
Congregate Care Centers will not demonstrate alert and.activation as they will be activated out of sine with the Scenario.
- 7.
Times listed in the Scenario are for sequencing of events and should not be taken as absolutes due to the nature of the exercise and the need for realistic play, decision making, interpretation and analysis of data and reaction time.
- 8.
The rumor control function will be carried out at the Consumers Power Company, Kalamazoo District Office, 2500 E. Cork St., Kalamazoo, MI 49001.
- 9.
The demonstration of decontamination for Allegan County will be held at the Allegan Fire Station, 300 Monroe St., Allegan, MI 49010.
The contact person will be Kevin Blanchard.
Date and time are yet to be determined.
- 10. VanBuren County has not determined their date, time, location or contact person for a decontamination demonstration.
As soon as the information is received by this office, it will be forwarded to you.
r.*
PALEX 88 Initial Conditions A.
The plant is at full power at the end of core life.
B.
The following equipment is in a degraded condition:
- 1. Auxiliary Feedwater Pump P-8C is out of.service (OOS):
- a. It was declared "Inoperable" at 1300 yesterday when it was "Red Tagged" for replacement of one of its journal bearings.
(Last time the pump ran the bearing was overheating and very noisy.)
- b.
Currently, the old bearing has been removed and the new one is scheduled to be installed on "B" shift, but has not been retrieved from stock yet. Further, the shaft was scored and needs machining before the bearing can be mounted.
- c. Estimate eight hours for reassembly once the new b~aring has been procured and the shaft is machined.
- 2.
Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump P-67A is OOS:
- a. It was declared "Inoperable" at 0830 yesterday when upon completion of monthly Technical Specification Surveillance Test M0-23, pump vibrat:i.on was found to be in the "required action range."
- b.
An alignment check revealed the need to shim the pump.
Hence, it was "Red Tagged," uncoupled, an:d shimmed by 1600 yesterday.
- c.
Last shift ("C" shift) rechecked the alignment and found it better but still not what they would like it to be. It was decided there was still time to uncouple it and add the necessary piece of shim stock, recouple and test it before the LCO expires.
. d.
Currently, it is again uncoupled.
"A" shift maintenance is to add the necessary shim and recouple it; then Operations is to retest it.
- e.
Estimate 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> for maintenance to complete their work once they start.
- 3. Failed Fuel Monitor RE-0202 is OOS:
- a.
RE-0202 was declared inoperable and removed from service on 27 January 1988 when it failed a calibration check by I&C.
- b.
I&C has been unable to repair it and it is not known when it will be available again.
C.
The following alarm conditions exist:
NONE RP128 7-.0044B-TP12 1
\\ -*
PALEX 88 Initial Conditions D.
The meteorological conditions are as follows:
- 1. It is clear and cold with light winds.
The roads are clear though there are several inches of old snow covering the countryside.
Forecast calls for continued clear and cold with little change during the day.
The MET tower indicates the following at (
meters):
- a.
Wind speed:
- b.
Wincf direction:
- c. Stability:
- d.
Ambient temperature:
+21°F E.
Primary and secondary chemistry are stable at the following conditions:
- 1.
Primary system chemistry
- a.
pH:
6.8
- b.
Boron:
97 ppm
- c.
Dissolved 02:
<.02 ppm
- d.
H2:
23.7 cc/kg
- e.
Total beta gamma activity:
1.58 microcuries/mL
- f.
Iodine dose equivalent:
2.5 E-2 micocuries/mL
- g.
Total PCS gas activity:
4.22 microcuries/mL
- 2.
- Secondary system chemistry
- a.
Primary to secondary leak rate:
.002 gpm
- b.
Off-gas Xe 133:
2.95 E-6 microcuries/mL
- c.
Condenser air inleakage:
6.5 cfm
- d.
A and B S/G gross gamma activity:
<5.6 E-6 microcuries/mL G.
Primary Coolant System Leak Rate as of 0700 yesterday:
- 1. Identified:
0.1136 gpm 2.' Unidentified:
0.05 gpm
- 3.
Total:
0.1636 gpm RP1287-0044B-TP12 2
TIME PALISADES EXERCISE 1988 SCENARIO TIME/ACTIVITY "f
I UTILITY STATE VAN BUREN l I ALLEGAN BERRIEN
- 1.
The exercise will begin with the notification to the State and Counties of an ALERT at the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant.
Once this has been received by the initial warning entry points, the Counties will follow their plans in alerting, notifying and mobilizing their staffs and activating their EOC's.
Staff will report to the County EOC's and the JPIC and their facilities will be set up for operations. State personnel will also be involved in this demonstration, and go through alert and mobilization, except for JPIC staff and liaisons to local EOC's.
These personnel will be pre-placed in local motels and will be called by the state controller to report to the JPIC or EOC's.
- 2. All events will occur in real time.
There will be a small time jump to reach closeout conditions.
- 3. All data on the plant, radiological releases/status, and meteorological conditions will be acquired by the State and local players from the appropriate sources.
None will be supplied by the controllers.
- 4. Certain actions will be demonstrated actual vs. simulated as indicated by an (A) or an (S) in the scenario.
MSP/EMD 1/88 PAGE 1
JPIC
[
TIME UTILITY 1-CAS/SAS receives alarm on the bay roof door.
CAS dispatches officer to investigate.
-Security officer is taken hostage.
-Kidnapper calls the1 control room from the AO Pit.
-Plant declares an ALERT based on "adversaries commandering a nonvital area."
PALISADES EXERCISE 1988 SCENARIO TIME/ACTIVITY STATE
-MSP Operations re-ceives notice of ALERT at Plant.
(Al START OF THE EXERCISE VAN BUREN 1-Sheriff 's Dept. re-l ceives notice of I
ALERT at Plant.
(Al I
I ALLEGAN I I BERRIEN MSP/EMD 1/88 PAGE 2
JPIC
TIME UTILITY PALISADES EXERCISE 1988 SCENARIO TIME/ACTIVITY STATE
-Operations passes data on Plant to S. Haven Post, EMO, the District H.O.'s and Counties via LEIN.
(Al
-EMO and RHO confer on plant status.
Based on situation, Governor's office notified and state I
VAN BUREN
'I-Sheriff's Dept. not-ifies Co. Emergency I Services Coard.,
I Allegan and Berrien Co. Sheriff's and Emerg. Service Coord' s.
(Al I
of disaster declara-1
-Co. E. S. Coard.
notifies Chairman of Board of Comm-issioners who de-clares State of Emergency and activates Co.
tion requested. (Sl I Plan and EOC.
(A)
I ALLEGAN I
-Sheriff's Dept.
receives notice I of ALERT at Plant I from VanBuren Co.
I and MSP Operations.
I (A)
I-Sheriff's Dept.
I notifies Co. E.S.
Coard. and Sheriff.
(Al 1-co. *E.S. Coard.
I notifies Chairman I I of Board of Comm-1 ~~:~::e~:a::oo~e-1 Emergency and I
i activates Co.
. Plan and EOC. (Al l
BERRIEN l
j-sheriff's Dept.
j I receives notice I
I of ALERT at Plant I
I from VanBuren Co.
I I and MSP Operations.I (Al I
-Sheriff's Dept. I notifies Co. E.S.
Coard. and Sheriff.I (A) 1-co. E.S. Coard.
I notifies Chairman I
of Board of Comm-issioners who de-1 clares State of I Emergency and I activates Co.
I Plan and EOC. (Al HSP/EHD 1/BB PAGE 3
JPIC I
'I
TIHE UTILITY l I PALISADES EXERCISE 1988 SCENARIO TIME/ACTIVITY STATE
-Governor declares
- State of Disaster
- and orders MEPP activated.
(SJ
-Governor activates HI National Guard to support oper-ations.
(S)*
'j VAN 6UREN
-County staff notified I of ALERT per County I procedures and report I
to EOC-JPIC for oper-ations.
(A)
-County EOC set up I f I or operations.
I (Al I
ALLEGAN j-County staff nat-l ified and report I to EOC and JPIC for operations.
(A) 1-county EOC set up I for operations.
(A) l I
BERRIEN I 1-county staff not-1 ified and report I to EOC and JPIC I for operations.
(Berrien Co. will demonstrate par-tial EOC staffing.)
(Al MSP/EMD 1/88 PAGE 4
I JPIC 1-state, County and I Utility personnel I report to JPIC and I set it up for operations.
(Al 1-county EOC set up I I for operations.
I (A)
I I
I I
I I I I
1-sEOC activated by EHD staff. State agencies notified and report to SEOC for operations. (SJ I I I
I
-Operations con-I 1'
tinues to pass up-I l_'-~~~~~~~l-d_a_t-es~f-ro-m~p-la_n_t~~~-~~~~~~~~-l'~~~~~~~~-1..~~~~~~~---*~~~~~~~~JI j to SEOC.
(Al I
TIME UTILITY
-Electrohydraulic fluid line bursts and turbine generator control valves close.
PALISADES EXERCISE 1988 SCENARIO TIME/ACTIVITY STATE VAN BUREN ALLEGAN
-Once SEOC opera-tional, Operations notified and taken out of communica-ti on flow.
-SEOC notifies Coun-1-once VBEOC operation-ties and Utilities al notifies SEOC and 1-0nce AEOC opera-I tional notifies of Disaster Decla-opens communications ration, SEOC acti-to SEOC and JPIC. (A)
I I SEOC and opens communications to vation and status SEOC and JpIC. (Al of operations. (A)
-SEOC notifies FEHA I I
of plant status and State operations I
and Governor's I
Declaration via TWX.
(Al I
I I
BERRIEN 1-once EEOC opera-I tional notifies I SEOC and opens communications to SEOC and JPIC. (Al HSP/EMD 1/88 PAGE S
JPIC 1-JPIC opens lines I to SEOC, AEOC, I VBEOC, BEOC and I Utility and begins briefings on plant status and offsite.
(A)
TIME UTILITY
-Automatic reactor trip occurs.
"A" steam generator safety valve sticks open.
-Kidnapper surren-ders and is re-moved from site.
-Another ALERT is classified based on an unisolable main steam line break.
-Faulty safety valve fails-wide open.
PALISADES EXERCISE 1988 SCENARIO TIME/ACTIVITY I
I I
SIAYE I
VAN BUREN I
ALLEGAN I
BERRIEN
-(NOTE:
Heterologicall conditions will be I acquired from the Utility by the SEOC) with time of opening. I I
l I
HSP/EMD 1/88 PAGE JPIC I I 1-JPIC fully I
activated I
I I
I
TIME UTILITY
-260 gpm steam gen-erator tube rup-ture occurs in the "A" s/g. High alarm energized.
Low pressure safety injection pump fails to start.
-Utility declares GENERAL EMERGENCY and notifies the State.
Includes
+
P.A.R. 's
-Cooldown reestab-lished, PCS pres-sure dropped to reduce leak rate.
PALISADES EXERCISE 1988 SCENARIO TIME/ACTIVITY I
STATE I
VAN BUREN I
ALLEGAN l
BERRIEN I I I
1-SEOC receives notice 1-sEOC notifies VBEOC 1-SEOC notifies AEOC 1-SEOC notifies BEOC of GENERAL EMERGENCY.
of GENERAL EMERGENCY.
of GENERAL EMERGENCY., of GENERAL EHER-GENCY.
-State issues P.A.
I I
order to Counties I
based on plant I
I status, nature of I
I I
I problem and pro-I I
I jected release dura-I I
. I I
I tion.
(Al I
I I
I l
I I I
MSP/EMD 1/88 PAGE 7
JPIC 1-SEOC notifies JPIC I of GENERAL EHER-GENCY.
I
~
I I
I I
I I I
TIME PALISADES EXERCISE 1988 SCENARIO TIME/ACTIVITY UTILITY STATE
-"B" s/g main steam- -P.A.'s relayed to I VAN BUREN 1-VBEOC receives evac-1 uation P.A. (Al 1-AEOC receives line radiological monitor alert alarm energizes.
-Low pressure in-jection pump re-turned to service.
-Plant on shutdown cooling. Cooldown
.* continues.
Counties via LEIN and hotline phones.
(A)
-(NOTE: There will be I
-County activates siren system.
(Sl no actual implement-
-County notifies EBS ation of P.A. orders I of evacuation order.
- but messages will be generated to effect sheltering or evacuation.)
I evacuation P.A.
I (Al I
1-Provide data to I VanBuren Co. for inclusion in EBS message.
(Al (VanBuren County has.responsibi-lity to activate sirens/EBS.l l i BERRIEN receives 1-BEOC I evacuation P.A.
I (Al 1-Provide data to I VanBuren Co. for inclusion in EBS message.
(Al (VanBuren County has responsibi-lity to activate sirens/EBS. l l I MSP/EMD 1/88 PAGE 8
JPIC
- 1 I
1-JPIC receives P.A. 'sl I from SEOC.
(Al I.
-Media briefing held on regular basis.
(Al I
I I
I I I I I I
-Access control
-Access control 1-Access control I
1 points designated points designated I points designated I
and manned.
(SI and manned.
(S)
I and manned.
(Sl I
L-----1---*---.L.__-----i...--'---------'
TIME UTILITY PALISADES EXERCISE 1988 SCENARIO TIME/ACTIVITY STAIE
-SEOC orders addi-tional P.A.'s for livestock, water supplies, others as necessary.
(A)
VAN BUREN
. -County opens R/D/CC Centers if not already opened.
(5)
-VBEOC provides SEOC with status of evacuated areas and access control points.
-County receives additional P.A.'s from SEOC and I implements them.
(A)
ALLEGAN
-County opens R/D/CC Centers if not already opened.
(5)
-AEOC provides SEOC with status of evacuated areas and access control points.
-County receives I, ;~::t~;~la:~A.'s implements them.
(A)
I BERRIEN 1-county opens R/D/CC Centers if not already opened.
(Sl
-BEOC provides SEOC with status I of evacuated areas and access control points.
1-county receives I additional P.A.'s I from SEOC and I implements them.
(A)
HSP/EMD 1/88 PAGE 9
I JPIC i
I I
I I I I
1-JPIC passes on I information on I evacuation areas I geographic bound-aries, access con-trol pts and loca-tion of reception center.
(Al
lIHE UTILITY PALISADES EXERCISE 1988 SCENARIO TIME/ACTIVITY STATE
-SEOC exchange status reports with Counties/ytility on P.A. implementation.
(Al
-state orders water
, areas around cleared of boaters and air-s pace closed.
(S)
- -SEOC notifies FEMA of P.A. 's.
(S)
-SEOC analyzes rel-ease data.
(A)
-Orders additional P.A.'s if necessary.
(A)
VAN BUREN
-VBEOC receives addi-tional P.A.'s and implements them.
(A)
ALLEGAN 1-AEOC receives add-itional P.A. 's and implements them.
(Al BERRIEN HSP/EHD 1/88 PAGE 10 JPIC 1-BEOC receives add-1-JPIC informed of I itional P.A.'s I release and pro-and implements I tective actions.
them.
(A)
I (Al I
I I
I I
TIME UTILITY
-Time jumps 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and 55 minutes.
Belease has become negligable.
-Utility enters recovery mode.
- PALISADES EXERCISE 1988 SCENARIO TIME/ACTIVITY STATE VAN BUREN ALLEGAN
-SEOC monitors evac-
-VBEOC informs SEOC of uation progress at evacuation progress.
County level.
(A)
(A)
BERRIEN
-During this period of time, additional actions for the State and Counties will be gener-ated by the Controllers in order to test other elements of the state and local plans.
-SEOC notified of release has become negligable.
(Al
-SEOC passes infor-mation on to Co.'s and JPIC.
(A)
-VBEOC*notified of I termination or release.
(A)
-AEOC notified of I termination of release.
(A) 1-BEOC notified of I termination of relea*se.
(A)
HSP/EMD 1/88 PAGE 11 JPIC
-JPIC continues briefings on rel-ease/plant status and offsite actions.
(A) 1-JPIC notified of I termination of release.
media.
Informs (A)
I TIME About*
UTILITY PALISADES EXERCISE 1988 SCENARIO TIME/ACTIVITY I
STATE 1-SEOC and Utility agree to de-escalate.
(Al Based on I
(NOTE:
plant conditions, de-escalation could be to an ALERT or SITE AREA EMERGENCY level.)
-SEOC notifies Co. of de-escalation, orders Re-entry and Recovery activities to begin.
(A)
VAN BUREN ALLEGAN
-VBEOC receives notice 1-AEOC receives of de-escalation.
(Al notice of de-escalation. (Al
-Begins R&R activities. -Begins R&R (Al NOTE:
R&R activities will be limited to I activities.
(Al message play including (1)
BERRIEN 1-BEOC receives notice of de-escalation. (Al
!~Begins R&R l
activities.
R R, (2) Status (A) reports from counties, (3) Discussion of public safety measures and other steps would be taken by the state and local government.
I MSP/EMD 1/88 PAGE 12 JPIC j-JPIC notified of I de-escalation.
Provides informa-tion to public.
(A)
-EXERCISE TERHINATEDj-The exercise will terlinate with a *essage frl* the SEOC which will ~generated by I controller there.
the I I
I
I APPENDIX A - SEQUENCE OF EVENTS/NARRATIVE
SUMMARY
RP1287-0044A-TP12
Time Actual (Scenario) 0100
(-0030) 0130 (0000) 0135 (0005) 0140 (0010) 0145 (0015) 0210 (0040) 0215 (0045) 0300 (0130) 0302 (0132) 0310 (0140) 0315 (0145)
PALEX 88 Sequence of Events Event Initial conditions - Normal full power Equipment out of service: Auxiliary Feed Pump P-SC, Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump (LPSI) P-67A, and the Failed Fuel Monitor Alarms:
None PCS leak rate as of 0700 yesterday:
0.05 gpm unidentified, 0.1136 gpm identified, 0.1636 gpm total Further historical data will be provided by the controller if requested.
CAS/SAS receives alarm on the Bay Roof Door.
CAS dispatches officer to investigate.
Security Officer arrives at alarming door and is taken hostage outside the vital area.
He is then taken to the AO Pit (auxiliary operators briefing/break room) located at the north end of the turbine deck.
His captor orders out any AOs there at the time and takes over the room.
Kidnapper calls the Control Room from-the AO Pit, describes the situation and makes demands.
SS assumes SED duties and classifies an "Alert" based on "adversaries commandeering a nonvi tal area. 11 Negotiator arrives.
Negotiator clears security and arrives at the scene.
Discussion ensues.
Electrohydraulic fluid line bursts, resulting in the turbine generator control valves closing.
An automatic reactor trip occurs when the high pressurizer pres-sure set point is exceeded.
Following the trip, one of the "A" steam generator safety valves sticks open.
Kidnapper releases his hostage and surrenders. Kidnapper is removed from the site in the custody of local law enforcement officers.
Another "Alert" is classified based on an unisolable main steam line break and notifications made.
When operators attempt to increase auxiliary feedwater flow, they will find they have no control of FIC-0727 from the Control Room.
RP1287-0044A-TP12 1
Time Actual (Scenario) 0325 (0155) 0340 (0210) 0345 (0215)
-0350
(-0220) 0355 (0225)
-0415
(-0245)
-0633
(-0503) 0750 (0620) 0755 (0625) 1050
-0955
(-0825)
PALEX 88 Sequence of Events Event Operators isolate "A" steam generator (S/G), and shortly there-after, *the faulty safety valve fails wide open.
Auxiliary oper-ator is manually controlling auxiliary feed flow and is in com-munication with Control Room for directions on how to throttle it.
"A" S/G is empty.
Operators stop two primary coolant pumps, and start dropping Primary Coolant System (PCS) pressure.
NOTE:
When operators first attempt to establish cooldown using CV-0511, they find it will not open.
An approximate 260 gpm steam generator tube rupture occurs in the "A" S/G as indi*cated by the "A" main steam line radiation monitor
!!!Q!! alarm energizing; this is followed by SIS actuation.
P-67B Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump fails to start.
SED classifies a "General Emergency" based on a loss of "2 out of 3 fission product barriers." Commences making notifications.
Operators have reestablished cooldown and are dropping PCS pres-sure to reduce the leak rate; they also block and reset safety injection.
NOTE:
When SIAS initially two primary coolant pumps.
restart "B" and "C" PCPs.
and try to establish a 75° occurred, they stopped the remaining Now that SI has been reset, they They also stop both boric acid pumps per hour cooldown rate.
"B" S/G main steam line radiation monitor alert alarm energizes.
Operato~s isolate letdown.
P-67A Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump returned to service and tested Plant is on shutdown cooling - cooldown continues.
Ti.me jumps 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and SS minutes to condition where the PCS has been cooled and depressurized to a point where the relea*se has become negligible.
Management enters the recovery mode.
Exercise ends.
Recovery adequately demonstrated.
RP1287-0044A-TP12 2
.J
- 0100 (0030)
INITIAL CONDITIONS PALEX 88 Narrative Swnmary A.
The plant is at full power at the end of core life, 10.4 GWD.
B.
The following equipment is in a degraded condition:
- 1. Auxiliary Feedwater Pump P-8C is out of service (OOS):
- a. It was declared "inoperable" at 1300 yesterday when it was "Red Tagged" for replacement of one of its journal bearings.
(Last time the pump ran, the bearing was overheating and very noisy.)
- b.
Currently the old bearing has been removed and the new one is scheduled to be installed on 11B11 shift, but has not been retrieved from stock yet. Further, the shaft was *scored and needs machining before the bearing can be mounted.
- c.
When new bearing has been procured and the shaft machined, estimate eight hours for reassembly.
- 2.
Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump P-67A is OOS:
- a. It was declared "Inoperable" at 0830 yesterday, when upon com-pletion of Monthly Technical Specification Surveillance Test M0-23, pump vibration was found to be in the "required action range."
- b.
An alignment check revealed the need to shim the pump.
Hence, it was "Red Tagged," uncoupled and shimmed by 1600 yesterday.
- c. Last shift ("C" shift) rechecked the alignment and found it better but still not what they would like. It was decided there was still time to uncouple it and add the necessary piece of shim stock, recouple and test it before the LCO expires.
- d.
Currently it is again uncoupled.
"A" shift maintenance is to add the necessary shim and recouple it; then Operations is to retest it.
- e. Estimate 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> for maintenance to complete their work once they start *.
- 3. Failed Fuel Monitor RE-0202 is COS:
- a.
RE-0202 was declared inoperable and removed from service on 27 January 1988 when it failed a calibration check by I&C.
- b.
I&C has been unable to repair it, and it is not known when (if ever) it will be available again.
C.
The following alarm conditions exist:
NONE RP1287-0044A-TP12 3
PAI.EX 88 Narrative Summary D.
The meteorological conditions are as follows:
- 1. It is clear and cold with light winds.
The roads are clear though there are several inches of old snow covering the countryside. Fore-cast calls*for continued clear and cold with little change during the day.
The MET tower indicates the following at (
meters):
- a.
Wind speed:
- b.
Wind direction:
- c. Stability:
- d.
Ambient temp_erature:
+21°F E.
Primary and secondary chemistry are stable at the following conditions:
- 1.
Primary system chemistry
- a.
pH:
6.8
- b.
Boron:
97 ppm
- c.
Dissolved 02:
<.02 ppm
- d.
H2:
23.7 cc/kg
- e. Total beta ga11UD.a activity:
1.58 microcuries/mI.
- f.
Iodine dose equivalent:
2.5 E-2 microcuries/mI.
- g.
Total PCS gas activity:
4.22 microcuries/mI.
- 2.
Secondary system chemistry
- a.
Primary to secondary leak rate:
.002 gpm
- b.
Off-gas Xe 133:
2.95 E-6 microcuries/mt
- c.
Condenser air inleakage:
6.5 cfm
- d.
A and B S/G gross gamma activity:
<5.6 E-6 microcuries/mI.
F.
P~imary Coolant System teak Rate as of 0700 yesterday:
- 1.
Identified:
0.1136 gpm
- 2. Unidentified:
0.05 gpm
- 3.
Total:
0.1636 gpm RP1287-0044A-TP12 4
0130-0255 (0000-0125)
PALEX 88 Narrative Summary A.
Exercise begins when security receives alarms in both the Central Alarm Station (CAS) and Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) for the Bay Roof Door.
B.
CAS dispatches an officer to investigate the alarm.
The responding officer is disarmed and taken hostage.
The kidnapper (a controller) forces the guard over to the AO Pit on the turbine deck and takes it over after ordering out any AOs present.
C.
Shift Supervisor is infQrmed of situation by:.
- 1.
Kidnapper calling and stating situation and demands
- 2.
Any additional personnel who may have witnessed the situation D.
Expected Actions:
- 1.
SS informs Security Shift Leader of situation and ascertains that the Security Contingency Procedures are activated.
SS requests copy of procedure be brought to the Control Room.
- 2.
SS assumes Site Emergency Director (SED) position and:
. a. Classifies an "Alert" per EI-1 based on "adversary commandeering a nonvital area"
- b.
Sounds the siren and notifies:
(1)
Michigan State Police (2)
FBI (3)
Duty and Call Superintendent (4) Plant General Manager (5) Vice President Nuclear Operations Department (6)
NRC
- c. Accountability conducted
- d. Directs actions of security response via the Plant Property
- erotectio,n Supervisor and Security Shift Leader.
- e. Directs operating personnel to:
(1)
Place the plant in a stable condition and secure/stop any high-risk activities in progress such as 11Refu.eling."
RP1287-0044A-TP12 5
PALEX 88 Narrative Summary (2)
SS/SED shall consider actions to place plant in a condition to minimize the effects of any reasonable sabotage attempt the.
kidnapper might make, including consideration of plant shutdown.
- f.
SS shall direct announcements be.made per EI-1 and/or SCP-7.
- 3.
Negotiator (also a controller) will arrive approximately at 0120 (0040).
After clearing security, he will proceed to the scene and commence dialogue with kidnapper.
0300-0330 (0130-0200)
A.
An electrohydraulic fluid line bursts, resulting in the turbine generator control valves closing and, shortly thereafter, causing an automatic reactor trip when the high pressurizer pressure set point is exceeded.
Further, as a result of this transient, one of the "A" steam generator (S/G) safety valves sticks partially open.
B.
Operators follow and perform actions of Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs).
- 1.
Operators perform and verify actions of EOP-1.0, "Standard Post Trip Actions."
NOTE:
During this time - approximately 0310 (0140) the kidnapper releases his hostage and surrenders.
The kidnapper is then removed from site in the custody of local law enforcement officers.
2.. Approximately 0315 (0145) indications of the S/G safety being stuck open are sufficient for operators to have diagnosed an "Excess Steam Demand Event" using the diagnostic flow chart in EOP 1.0.
C.
SED should classify another "ALERT" per EI-1 based on an "Unisolable Hain Steam Line Leak."
- 1.
Announcement should be made and alarm sounded.
- 2.
Augmentation of shift personnel should be started if not done previously.
D.
Operators should be following the actions directed by EOP 6.0, "Exces'S Steam Demand Event." This means they should initially:
- 1.
Close the Main Steam Isolation Valves (HSIVs).
- 2.
Isolate "A" S/G feed and steam paths.
- 3.
Borate to cold shutdown boron concentration.
E.
Also at about 0315 (0145) operators should recognize the need to increase auxiliary feedwater flow to the S/Gs as levels are continuing to drop.
RP1287-0044A-TP12 6
PALEX 88 Narrative Summary
- 1.
When they attempt to increase AFW flow to the "B" S/G from its post trip set point of 150 gpm using FIC-0727 they find they cannot control the flow control valve CV-0727 from the Control Room.
- a.
Normally they could shift to the alternate/redundant auxiliary feedwater train using P-8C, but it is OOS for a bearing replace-ment.
(See initial conditions.)
- b.
Their options would seem to be:
(1) Try shifting control of CV-0727 to the Remote Shutdown Panel C-33 or to the Alternate Hot Shutdown Panel C-150.
However, if they try this they will still not have control as the problem will be a malfunctioning current to pneumatic positioner (I/P-0727) which is common to all the remote controllers.
(2)
Upon realizing they have no remote control capability, it is expected they would send an AO to manually throttle one of two in series motor-operated isolation valves (MOV) downstream of CV-0727 while causing CV-0727 to fail open by isolating its air supply.
This will require that the AO at the HOV establish communication with the Control Room to control "B" S/G.level and that the AO must stay near the MOV *
- c.
The malfunctioning I/P-0727 obviously can be overcome by manual operator actions; however, it poses a significant operator distraction and ties up needed manpower at a crucial time.
- Hence, it is believed to l?e significant enough to warrant attention and should provide a means to exercise the TSC and MSC and I&C personnel in the diagnosis and repair.
(1)
The fix could be to replace the I/P with the one from the alternate train.
F.
At approximately 0325 (0155)
- 1.
Operators have completed isolating "A" S/G.
- 2.
Gained manual control of Auxiliary Feed Flow
- 3.
Additional actions taken in the last ten minutes:
- a.
One Hain Condensate Pump (MCP) and both Heater Drain Pumps are stopped as they are no longer needed.
- b. Part length control rods are inserted.
- c.
"B" HSIV bypass valve is opened to enable air ejector operation and recovery of vacuum
- RP1287-0044A-TP12 7
PALEX 88 Narrative Summary PAI.EX 88
- -----N~~:t:.a_ti~~ -~~a~----....
PALEX 88 Narrative Summary
- 4.
Shortly after the "A" S/G was isolated, the faulty "A" S/G safety valve fails full open as indicated by:
- a.
Increased noise from the steam release
- b.
Rapidly accelerating drops in "A" S/G pressure and level
- c.
This results in the operators closing the "B" HSIV bypass valve to try and reduce/limit the PCS cooldown rate.
0340 (0210)
A.
"A" S/G has blown itself dry/empty.
- 1. It is expected the operators will start dropping PCS pressure to stay within the cooldown curve limits and limit/reduce the effects of possible PTS (pressurized thermal shock) and minimize the D/P across the S/G tubes.
- 2.
As pressure drops, they should stop two primary coolant pumps per EOP 6.0.
Suspect they will stop "A" and "D" PCPs as pressurizer spray flow is provided by the "B" and "C" pumps.
B.
Operators should realize they have injected enough boron into the PCS and request confirmation samples from chemistry.
Results will be unavailable for 20 minutes.
- 0345-0410 (0215-0240)
A.
A 260 gpm tube rupture occurs in the "A" S/G resulting almost immediately in:
- 1. An "A" main steam line radiation monitor HIGH alarm energizing
- a.
The quick dr~tic response is due to the fact that unknown to the operators when the plant tripped something broke loose in the reactor vessel and has been banging around causing major fuel damage.
(1) It is not felt necessary to define exactly what happened to cause fuel damage, as in.real life you would have to respond to your indications and figure what caused it later if you ever could.
(2) It was felt this approach would enable us to meet the objective of causing a release high enough to warrant consideration of evacuation of Allegan County.
- b.
Gaseous waste monitor and Plant Area Radiation Monitors also alarm.
RP1287*0044A-TP12 8
PALEX 88 Narrative Summary
- c.
A safety injection actuation signal from pressurizer low pressure is generated.
(1) All available/operable safeguards equipment actuates.
(2)
The P-67B LPSI pump fails to start.
B.
Expected Actions:
- 1.
Believe operators will easily conclude the tube rupture has occurred and that a release is in progress.
- 2.
With these additional problems, operators should enter EOP 9.0, "Functional Recovery Procedure."
- a.
SS should identify "In Use Success Paths" and have EOP 9.0 Safety Status Function Checks (SSFCs) carried out every 15 minutes.
- b.
Upon completion of first set of SSFCs, he should identify any jeopardized success paths.
- c.
Direct actions should be taken as stated in EOP 9.0 for those areas identified as jeopardized, starting with the most critical.
(1)
They will have turned off the remaining two PCPs when SIAS occurred and stop the remaining main condensate pump.
(The SIS isolated its cooling water source.)
(2)
They will want to further drop PCS pressure to approximately 1000 psia to reduce the leak rate. from the PCS into the "A" S/G.
Subsequent to this, they will also want to continue cooldown so they will again open the "B" MSIV bypass valve to reestablish vacuum.
Block and reset SIS as allowed by EOP 9.0 to regain the main condensate pump cooling and restart "B" and "C" PCPs to regain pressurizer spray enabling better control of PCS depressurization.
Then they will attempt to open CV-0511 turbine bypass valve to the condenser to control cooldown. It will not open.
(This has not been uncommon in the past and will require no further explanation.) It will provide another operator distraction by forcing them to use the atmospheric dump valves on the "B" S/G to continue cooldown.
Again TSC, MSC personnel can be exercised in
- attempting to diagnose the problem.
- d.
SS and/or TSC Operations groups will be concerned that both LPSI pumps are COS.
(1)
SS should dispatch AO to investigate failure of P-67B to start when SIS actuated. *
(2)
TSC may dispatch electrician and/or mechanic to assist AO in diagnosing P-67B failure.
RP1287-0044A-TP12 9
PALEX 88
. Narrative Summary (3)
Investigation will reveal pump has seized and will require considerable time to repair.
(4) Expect TSC will direct that a priority be placed on regaining P-67A so that it will be available for further TSC/MSC exercising.
0410-0630 (0240-0500)
A.
Events and Actions
- 1. "B" S/G main steam line radiation monitor alert alarm energizes.
- a.
SS requests "B" S/G activity sample.
- 2.
Operators following actions of EOP 9.0 for Sections HR-3 and CI-2
- a. Isolate letdown.
- 3. A Containment Isolation Signal (CIS) is received.
- a.
Operators verify containment isolation.
- b.
Operators open PCP controlled bleedoff relief valve to limit pressure increase.
- 4.
Approximately 0440 (0310) operators establish about a 75°F/hour cooldown rate and continue depressurization.
- 5. Operators stop P-7A and P-52C, as they are not needed, at around 0455 (0325).
- 6.
At approximately 0550 (0420) operators recover E-bus and turn off cooling tower pumps.
- 7.
Approximately 0608 (0438) operators arm the Low Temperature Over-pressure Protection Circuitry (LTOP) and start all four "B" containment cooling fans, and open the No 1 containment cooler accident valve.
Operators also isolate the Safety Injection Tanks (SITs).
0630-0755 (0500-0625)
A.
Approximately 0633 (0503)
- 1.
Hech~nics complete repairs to P-67A LPSI pump; operators complete successful test run of P-67A.
- 2. Per SOP-1 operators rack out the P-66B HPSI pump and P-55C charging pump breakers.
B.
Approximately 0639 (0509) - Operators secure last running charging pump and go on HPSI pump for pressure control.
RP128?°-0044A-TP12 10
._._ c.
Approximately 0750 (0620)
PAI.EX 88 Narrative Summary
- 1.
Operators enable both channels of LTOP.
- 2.
PCS temperature is at 300°F by Core Exit Thermocouples (CETs).
- 3.
Suspect SS will obtain permission to forgo equalizing boron between PCS
- and shutdown cooling and warmup of the S/D cooling system so as not to put high activity coolant in the Safety Injection Refueling Water Tank (SIRWT) which is vented to atmosphere.
- 4.
Operators establish shutdown cooling operation.
D.
0755 (0625) - PCS has been cooled and depressurized to where the release has become negligible.
- 1. Operators secure steaming and feeding the "B" S/G~
- 2.
Management will now enter the recovery mode.
0955 (0825)
Exercise ends.
Recovery adequateiy. demonstrated.
RP1287-0044A-TP12 11
Attachment II
oe.. '
\\**
v___-r\\'
I l
-~ **
- t..
i
"!1 J**
(
STATE OF MICHIGAN
(
JUN 1 8 1987 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT DIVISION KNAP PS CENTRE, SUITE 300 JAMESJ. 81..ANCIIARD, GOVERNOR 300SOUTll WASlllNGTON SQUARE LANSING, MICHIGAN 411913 DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE PHONE: 517 33-4. 7950 Wallace J. Weaver, Chairman Regional Assistance Committee FEMA - Region V 300 S. Wacker, 24th Floor-Chicago, IL 60606
Dear Mr. Weaver:
COL. R. T. [JAVIS, DIRECTOR June 16, 1987 Attached is the Schedule of Corrective Actions for the State of Michigan and the Counties of Berrien, VanBuren and Allegan for the August 1986 Palisades full scale REP Exercise.
If yo~ have any questions, please feel free to contact this office.
/1~~~
~nE~*~i~~~
Pre-Disaster Services Section JMT/DMS/sc Attachments
(
(
SUMMARY
LISTING OF EXERCISE FINDINGS 52
Michigan (State)
Michigan (Co111111Jni ty)
NU REG Item Narrative Staterr.ent of Deficiency None UTILITY:
Palisades !Juclear Power Station Swlll.ary Listing of ~ficiencies Corrective Action Proposed 53 Schedulej Date August 19-20, 1986 (Di'lte)
Actual Date
Michigan (State)
Michigan (Corm.unity)
NU REG Item Narrative Statement of Weakness UTILITY:
Palisades Nuclear Power Station St.mmary Listing of Areas Requiring Corrective Actions Corrective Action Proposed Scheduled Date August 19-20, 1986 (D~te)
Actual Date I.8 &
K.3.b Fquipment used by staff at the State Since Tab I-20 of the Division of 09/01/87 I.B &
0.4.b Department of Heal th Laboratory in Radiological Health Emergency Response Lansing, at the radiological n1obile Plan has not been updated since 1930, and laboratory, and the field 1r1oni todng Tab I-32 since 1983, we propose to update tearrs needs to be calibrated and both of these tabs involving equipment marked with updated calibration inventories and calibration procedures and stickers in accordance with the assure compliance with calibration Departn.ent of Health Instrument schedules, includinp, placement of reference Maintenance and Calibration SOP (tab stickers on each portable instrument.
We I-20).
are also considerinp, making arrangements with }1SP for periodic calibration of HDPH Refresher trainung needs to be portable radiation survey meters at the conducted for replacenent staff
~1SP/Civil Preparedness ~aintenance and (second shift) at the radiological Calibration Facility.
rr1obile laboratory and standard operating procedures need to be Staff attrition has reduced the number of 09/01/87 developed that outline how the full-time radiological environmental radiological 1rt0bile laboratory is put monitoring staff to three.
Therefore, full into an operation rrade in an efficient double-shift radiological laboratories and manner.
staff with daily familiarity with equipment and procedures are not possible.
He will, therefore, provide annual refresher training of supnlernental staff and provide written standard operating procedures for start-uo and routine operation.
54
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UTILITY:
Palisades Nuclear Power Station Suuriary Lis ting of Areas Re..JU iring Corrective Actions Michigan (State)
Michigan (Co11111uni ty)
NUREG Item I.8 I.8 &
0.4.c Narrative State1rent of ~*~eakness Standard operating procedures for screenings, storing, and disposing of radiological sanples need to be develooed. Facilities at the radiol~gical 1r.obile laboratory need to be developed to preclude conta1rainating the area.
'Ihe State Deparb11ent of Agriculture field n1oni toring team collecting nai lk sa11ples did not have 1ri0bile radio c O!rmunications with the radiological mobile laboratory. It also did not have appropriate eqJipa.ent, protective clothing sa11~les and did not have K. I or !?roper dos iriP-t ry egu i pn.ent.
The State needs to develop a checklist (inventory) of necessary eguipn.ent and protective clothing for milk sai1.pling te~rs. Notification and activation SOP' s for 11.i 1 k sa11p ling teams need to be developed.
August 19-20, 1986 (Date)
Corrective Action Proposed Scheduled Date Standard operating procedures to be developed will include sam~le screening, storing and disposal to preclude contami-nation at both permanent and mobile radio-logical laboratory facilities.
09/01/87
-The State's position is that since DOA and n/a Dlm Field Teams are dispatched to specific points in the Ingestion Pathway, and return to the OSEOC from the points, radio communi-cations are unnecessary.
If these teams need to talk to the OSEOC, telephones would be satisfactory.
-~*IDOA Field Teams carry sample collection 9/87 equipment and clothing.
Additional work needs to be done for radiological sampling (gloves, etc.).
-Dosimetry and K.I. will be distributed by 9/86 MDPH from the OSEOC per State plans/procedures
-Ingestipn Pathway Planning includes devel-9/87 opment of SOP 1 s for field teams
-Notification procedures for ~IDOA field 9/87 teams exist and will be codified in REP procedures, i\\ctual Date
UTILITY:
Palisades Nuclear Power Station Surrmary Listing of Areas Requiring Corrective Actions Michigan (St.ate)
Michigan (C01111.uni ty)
NUREG Item I.B I.8 Narrative Statement of Weakness Procedures be prepared for milk and water saICpling that explain sarrpling techniques and methods to avoid pi:rsonnel/sa:1ple contamination.
Procedures shouid be placed in the State plan and distributed to individuals and organizations that ruay be expected to use them.
In addition, training should also be provided to those persons who wi 11 inplenent the above described saupling procedures.
Road rr~ps appropriate for ingestion pathway s&rpling (SO niile EPZ) should he added to the field tearrs andf field tearr. coordinator 8s map folders.
AUJUSt 19-20, 1986 (Date)
Corrective Action Proposed Scheduled Date Actual Date
-Additional training and procedures will be developed for DOA & DNR Field Teams.
DNR will use EPA procedures (attached).
-Procedures will be distributed to appropriate personnel and agencies.
-Training will be conducted for per-sonnel in sampling procedures, methods to avoid contamination, etc.
Fifty mile EPZ road maps are currently available and were available for PALEX-
- 86.
Unfortunately, all folders were not complete due to a distribution error.
This has been corrected.
56 9/87 9/87 9/87 9/01/86 9/01/86
Michigan (State)
Allegan County (COlliliUni ty)
NUREG Item Narrative Statenent of Deficiency None UTILITY:
Palisades Nuclear Power Station Summary Listing of Deficiencies Corrective Action Proposed 58 Scheduled Date August 19-20, 1986,
(Date)
Actual Date
. I UTILITY:
Palisades Nuclear Power Station Sll!lar.ary Listing of Areas Requiring Corre.cti ve Actions Michigan (State)
Allegan County (COJlililmi ty)
NUREG Iten1 K.3.a &
K.5.b Narrative Staterrent of Weakness Radiological record keeping cards should be available in the Ex:>C and distributed to appropriate field personnel when dosineters are issued. Dose inf onration should be recorded on a periodic basis and reported to a designated officer. Assurance should be provided that field workers are sufficiently trained in radiological exposure control and provided with written information when dispatched to the field.
Corrective Action
- Proposed
- Cards were distributed and completed by the designated officer (copies attached)
RH Training and training of other personnel will be carried out over the year.
59 Scheduled Date N/A FY87/88 August 19-20, 1986.
(Date)
Actual Date
Michigan (State)
Allegan County (Conmuni ty)
UTILITY:
Palisades Nuclear Power Station Stmmary Listing of Areas RGC01111.ended for IuprovE:11t?nt
- 1. Allegan County should ensure that back-up staff are available for all EDC staff positions.
August 19-20, 1986 (Date)
- 2.
Allegan County should explore ways to eliminate the tine delays observed in the receipt and logging of LEIN messages in the EX)C.
Message fonrs should consistently include the tine the nessage was received in the EOC by the Corrmunications Officer.
63
Michigan (State)
Berrien County (Co11muni ty)
NUREG Item Narrative Statement of Deficiency None UTILITY:
Palisades Nuclear Power Station Surrn1ary Listing of Defic~encies Corrective Action Proposed 61 Scheduled Date I
I
\\
August 19-20, 1986 (Date)
Actual Date
Michigan (State)
Berrien County (Conll.t.mi ty)
NUREG Item Narrative Statement of Weakness None UTILITY:
Palisades Nuclear Power Station St.nmary Listing of Areas Requiring Corrective Actions Corrective Action Proposed 62 Scheduled Date I
r
\\
August 19-20, 1986 (Date)
Actual Date I"'"-\\'
Michigan (State)
Berrien County (Corrmuni ty)
UTILITY:
Palisades Nuclear Power Station Sl.ll111iary Listing of Areas Reco1111iended for IuQrove11ent
- 1.
Use larger signs for directing e11P-rgency worker vehicles to the decontamination center.
- 2.
Issue protective clothing to the 'decontamination noni tors and sho*..Jer room attendants.
August 19-20, 1986 (Date)
- 3.
Standard operating procedures should be developed for the containnient of contarrdnated run-off water from contarriinated vehicles, e.g. washing down vehicles in a confined, grassy field.
- 4.
Ad'Jitional training should be provided to the Berrien County spokesperson at the JPIC to enable co11plete and timely answers to all questions raised by the 11edia.
63
Michigan (State)
Van Buren County (Conn.unity)
NU REG Item Narrative Staten.ent of Deficiency None UTILITY:
Palisades Nuclear Power Station SLiJTlt1ary Listing of Deficiencies
~orrective Action Proposed 64
~,_
--~-1 Scheduled Date August 19-20, 1986 (Date)
Actual Date
UTILITY:
Pali sades. Nuclear Power Sta ti on Swrnary Listing of Areas Re-quiring Corrective Actions Michigan (State)
Van Buren County (Conmuni ty)
NU REG Item J.12 0.5 J.12 J.12 Narrative Statenient of Weakness Monitoring tearri.S at both the Reception Center and Vehicle Decontan.ination Point need adjitional training in radiological moni taring of evacuees, e111ergency workers, equipn.ent and vehicles.
Drivers of e11.ergency vehicles need training and instruction on the proper procedures to follow when transporting evacuees during a radiological e1112rgency.
A copy of the Van Buren County plan and SOP's for the operations of the reception/congregate and deconta1raination centers needs to be available.
No arrangenents had been 11.ade to provide conta11.inated evacuees with clean clothing.
This responsibility n.ust be assigned.
Conduct shelter 11.anager training for reception, congregate care and decontairiination.
Corrective Action Prop:ised
-Conduct Refresher R"I Training or new RM Training Courses
-Provide Drivers with information on tales in Emergency response
-Copies of plans exist in Local EOC's - will emphasis that copies be available at centers.
-Red Cross Coordinates volunteer agencies who provide clean clothing.
-Red Cross is the Shelter Operations Chief
-DSS is Rec/Congregrate Care Chief
-Healrh Department provides DP.con support *
. 65 August 19-20, 1986 (Date)
Scheduled Date Nov/Dec. 1987 January 1988 Nov/Dec. 1987 January 1988 Actual Date
Michigan (State)
Van Buren County -
(Conn.unity)
UTILITY:
Palisades Nuclear Power Station Sunn.a.ry Listing of Areas Reco111r.ended for Iuiprovement August 19-20, 1986 *
(O.=t te)
- 1. County spokesperson at the JPIC did not provide C01'plete and tinely answers to s01re of the questions raised by the nedia.
Reconnend additional training be provided to all County spokespersons.
- 2. Provide radios and/or television sets at the reception/congregate care/shelter so evacuees and shelter staff can be infonraed through the EBS.
- 3.
Forrri.s or sone type of mark should be used to identify contanainated areas on an evacuee.
- 4. A rrethod should be devised and used to identify evacuees that have been rr<mitored, Distinguish between those found clean and those that had gone through decontamination.
5 Hard copy capability between the Van Buren County emergency operations center and the Joint Pub! l~ Inforro.ation Center is reconnaended.
6 Security in the eirergency vehicle decontamination center area was not available.
Evacuees could roam t.'ie area causing possible contamination of there.selves or clean areas.
Security and/or control of hun.an ni0venent in the emergency worker vehcile decontamination center area is recormaended.
66
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