ML18026A435
| ML18026A435 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 01/17/1994 |
| From: | Byram R PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Chris Miller Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17158A090 | List: |
| References | |
| GL-89-10, PLA-3949, NUDOCS 9401270113 | |
| Download: ML18026A435 (31) | |
Text
ACCELERATED DI UTION DEMONS TION SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR: 9401270113 DOC. DATE: 94/01/17 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACXL:50-387 Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 1, Pennsylva 05000387 50-388 Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 2, Pennsylva 05000388 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATXON BYRAM,R.G. Pennsylvania Power 6 Light Co.
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION MXLLER,C.L. Project Directorate I-2
SUBJECT:
Provides revised plan 6 commitments for completion of tasks necessary to meet guidelines of GL 89-10 6 justification for D deferral of work on valves associated w/MSIVLCS within GL 89-10 program.Rev 1 to Calculation EC-VALV-0503 encl. S DISTRIBUTION CODE: A064D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ]
TXTLE: Response to Generic Ltr 89-10, "Safety"Related ENCL l MOV SIZE:
Testing
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6 7
Surveill NOTES: A RECXPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES D ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD1-2 PD 1 1 CLARK,R 1 1 D INTERNAL: ACRS 1 1 AEOD/DSP/ROAB 1 1 AEOD/DS P/TPAB 1 1 NRR/DE/EMEB 1 1 NRR/DRI L/RPEB NRR/PD111-3 RES/DSIR 1
1 1
1 1
1 RGFE01 BS/D OGCB
/EIB/B 1
1 1
1 1
1 EXTERNAL: NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC 1 1 D
D D
NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!
TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 14 ENCL 14 p,k'~
Pennsylvania Power 8 Light Company Two North Ninth Street~Allentown, PA 18101-1179 ~ 215/774-5151 Robert G. Byram Senior Vice President-Nuclear 21 5/774-7502 JAN 17 1994 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. C.L. Miller, Project Director Project Directorate I-2 Division of Reactor Projects U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION REVISION TO GENERIC LETTER 89-10 COMPLETION PLAN Docket Nos. 50-387 PLA-3949 FILE R41-2 and 50-388
Dear Mr. Miller:
The purpose of this letter is to:
- 1) provide the staff with Pennsylvania Power & Light Company's revised plan and commitments for the completion of all tasks necessary to meet the guidelines of Generic Letter 89-10,
- 2) provide justification for deferral of work on the valves associated with the Main Steamline Isolation Valve Leakage Control System (MSIV-LCS) within our Generic Letter 89-10 program as reflected in our latest Generic Lettex 89-10 scope, and
- 3) provide the valve groupings which we are using in our dynamic confirmatory tests.
Com letion of Generic Letter 89-10 Activities Addressing the issues included on Generic Letter 89-10 has been a priority at Pennsylvania Power & Light Company. Soon after the Generic Letter was issued, PP&L formed a project team to address the issues. In PP&L's initial response to Generic Letter 89-10, we stated that:
- 1) A pxogram description and schedule would be completed by June, 1990.
- 2) Every effort would be made to meet the 5 year schedule although preliminary indications were that it is overly aggressive for the scope of work involved.
- 3) Testing would be limited to those MOVs needed to prevent inadvertent failures.
- 4) Motor-operated dampers would not be included in the scope.
-~8Ari.c;.g 9401270113 940117 PDR ADOCK 05000387 PDR
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FILE R41-2 PLA-3949 Mr. C. L. Miller When the schedule was developed in 1990, it showed that all Generic Letter 89-10 physical activities would be completed during the Unit 2 6th RIO which is to end in May 1994. The only activity which would be completed after June 28, 1994 was the summary report. This report was scheduled to be issued prior to 10/01/94.
During the September 1991 NRC Inspection of our Generic Letter 89-10, the NRC raised several technical issues which needed to be resolved. Also, as the technology on MOV testing evolved, additional technical issues were raised. A summary of these technical issues is provided in Attachment A. During the resolution of each technical issue we noted that the results were interdependent and a new static test may be required after each issue was resolved. Calculations needed to support the MOV design and testing were continuously revised as each issue was resolved. Also, it was noted that the resolution to any one issue could put the MOV in a non-conservative setup when compared to the final setup which integrated the res'olutions of all the technical issues. Therefore, in the Fall of 1992, PP&L determined that it was prudent and in the best interest of safety to defer MOV testing until all the Technical issues could be resolved.
At the time the decision to defer testing and resolve all the technical issues was made, approximately 85% of the engineering calculations had been performed at least once with many being revised several times, and 158 of the 170 static diagnostic tests had been performed.
Approximately 10 of 42 dynamic tests on rising stem valves had been performed and approximately 1 of 22 dynamic tests on butterfly valves had been performed. The technical issues were resolved by the Spring of 1993 ~
As a result of the resolution of the technical issues, all MOVs had to be reanalyzed with the new torque switch settings and thrust criteria established, 112 static diagnostic tests needed to be reperformed, and an operability assessment had to be developed and documented for those valves which needed to be retested. Also, a decision was made to defer work on the MSIV-LCS valves since a project to remove this system was being formed. A discussion on these valves is contained later in this letter.
A valve-by-valve schedule was then developed. The schedule showed that four valves would not be static diagnostic retested by 6/28/94, two butterfly valves and 8 rising stem valves would not be dynamically tested by 6/28/94. The deferral of these tests is due to system availability for testing.
The following is a summary schedule and status as of December 1, 1993 of the activities which are necessary to complete the Generic Letter 89-10 project.
A. For each of the valves in the scope of Generic Letter 89-10, except for the MSIV-LCS valves, the following will be accomplished prior to June 28, 1994:
FILE R41-2 PLA-3949 Mr. C. L. Miller
~ The design basis for the operation of each MOV will be completed and will include flows, pressures, degraded voltages and weak link analyses for normal and abnormal events in the safety directions (open and/or closed).
Status: The design basis for operation of all MOVs has been developed. The weak link analysis are approximately 90% complete. The weak link analysis for the MOVs is presently scheduled to be completed by March 1, 1994.
~ The correct switch settings will be established for valve opening and/or closing.
Status: The correct switch settings have been established for each Unit 1 and common rising stem MOV and 30% of Unit 2 rising stem MOVs. The correct switch settings for all butterfly MOVs and all Unit 2 rising stem MOVs are presently scheduled to be established by April 1, 1994.
~ The MOV configuration willbe verified in the field; including actuator, spring pack, gearing and motors.
Status: The configuration of 100% of Unit 1 and common MOVs and 32% of Unit 2 MOVs has been verified.
~ The proper limit switch settings will be verified by physical inspection.
Status: The proper limit switch settings of 100% of Unit 1 and common MOVs and 32% of Unit 2 MOVs have been verified.
~ The stem lubrication will be insured to be adequate by application of grease or by inspection.
Status: Adequate stem lubrication has been assured on 100% of the accessible Unit 1 and common MOVs and 32% of the accessible Unit 2 MOVs.
~ The torque switch settings will be set in the field to meet Generic Letter 89-10 acceptance criteria with the exception of the following valves:
151F009 151F023 See Attachments B and D for the valves'hysical description and safety function respectively.
4 FILE R41-2 PLA-3949 Mr. C. L. Miller Status: Torque switch setting have been established on 83% of the Unit 1 and common MOVs and 32% of the Unit 2 MOVs.
~ All rising stem valves will be static diagnostic tested at least once. The following valves which have been previously tested require new tests due to the resolution of either the VOTES 10CFR21 or a deficiency:
151F007A 151F 009 151F023 251F017A See Attachments B and D for the valves'hysical description and safety function respectively.
Status: Static diagnostic testing of rising stem valves has been completed on 100%
of Unit 1 and common MOVs at least once and 32% of Unit 2 MOVs.
~ All butterfly valves will be dynamically tested except for the following valves in the ESW system:
11215A 11215B 21210 A 21215 A 21215B Status: Dynamic testing has been performed on 5% of the 22 butterfly valves within the scope of Generic Letter 89-10.
~ In addition, one butterfly valve out of each group of similar valves will be dynamically tested with diagnostics (a total of 7) except for a valve from the E Diesel valve grouping.
~ Rising stem valves will be assessed for operability within a calculation by a combination of valve set up, static diagnostic tests and functionality assessments based upon one of the following:
FILE R41-2 PLA-3949 Mr. C. L. Miller g~'0 P ERABILITY';;ll-', 3!".l:.<TOTAL':.;"::::;::::.:::::::.:;,'-:;,:,;;AFTER:,6/28/94
- .
- w:ASSESSMENT,:,::::,:;:
In-Situ Dynamic Tests w/Diags. Test 34 10 (Notes 3 5 5) w/o Diags. Test 8 1 tNotes 3 5 5)
Diff. Press. = 0 Note 1 Excessive Margins Note 1 Globes - Flow under Seat and Note 1 Open Only Safety Function Similarity to In-Situ Tested Valve Similarity 14 Analysis NON-TESTA BLES Note 2 96 96 tNotes 4 5 5)
TOTAL 170 Note 1: Static test sufficient to determine operability.
Note 2: Non-Testables rely on either EPRI tests and EPRI methodology or engineering analysis to assess operability.
Note 3: Physical description contained in Attachment B.
Note 4: Physical description contained in Attachment C.
Note 5: Safety function description provided in Attachment D.
B. For each of the valves in the scope of Generic Letter 89-10 which have not been tested prior to June 28, 1994, the following is the completion schedule.
~ Testing of the five remaining butterfly valves will be completed by July 15, 1994.
~ For those valves listed in Attachment B, set-up and testing will be completed prior to or during the startup following the next refueling and inspection outage on each unit after June 28, 1994. These refueling and inspection outages are scheduled to begin in March, 1995 for Unit 1 and in September, 1995 for Unit 2. Those valves listed in Attachment C will have functionality assessments completed by 12/31/95 based upon the EPRI methodology being issued by April 30, 1994.
C. PP8rL has identified the need to perform an additional dynamic test with diagnostics on one valve from the E Diesel Butterfly valve grouping. This test is needed in order to support the use of the EPRI/Kalsi Model. This valve grouping has already been tested to meet the requirements of Generic Letter 89-10. Presently, the next scheduled work window for the E Diesel Generator and ESW is in August 1994. The test is being planned for this work window.
FILE R41-2 PLA-3949 Mr. C. L. Miller D. On 12/07/93, an Engineering Deficiency Report (EDR) was written to document inaccuracies in the VOTES results. This EDR is presently being evaluated. We will inform the NRC should this EDR effect the Generic Letter 89-10 completion schedule.
On 12/08/93, an Engineering Deficiency Report (EDR) was written to document wiring discrepancies for 2 valves in the RCIC system and 1 valve in the HPCI system. This EDR is presently being evaluated. We will inform the NRC should this EDR effect the Generic Letter 89-10 completion schedule.
Main Steam Line Isolation Valve - Leaka e Control S stem PP&L is deferring the Generic Letter 89-10 work on the motor operated valves associated with the Main Steam Line Isolation Valve-Leakage Control System (MSIV-LCS) in anticipation of removing this system from Susquehanna SES. PP&L has formed a project team to evaluate the feasibility of the deletion of this system and is involved with the BWROG's efforts with respect to this system. During the Unit 1 7th RIO, a walk-down was performed to evaluate the seismic concerns associated with the removal of the MSIV-LCS. Based on preliminary findings from the walk-down, there are few seismic problems associated with the removal of the system. A formal determination to remove the system must be made. If a determination to remove the system has not been made prior to the next refueling and inspection outages after June 28, 1994, the MOVs on this system will be addressed in accordance with PP&L's Generic Letter 89-10 requirements prior to the start up following these refueling and inspection outages.
These valves are tested in accordance with our Inservice Testing Program for Pumps and Valves.
The requirements in this program for these valves are:
~ Quarterly exercise tests which are conducted at power or in a cold shutdown condition.
~ Stroke time measurement concurrent with quarterly exercise tests.
~ Leakage rate test once per 24 months on containment isolation valves.
D namic Test Sco e Attached is PP&L's Generic Letter 89-10 Motor Operated Valve Dynamic Test Scope. This scope document provides the basis for the grouping of MOVs for dynamic testing and is updated to reflect testable/nontestable changes. The MOVs have been grouped into 9 types. These types are:
~ Non-Testable MOVs
~ Valves with Excess Margin
~ Globe Valve Exclusions
~ Quarter Turn
~ MOVs with dP 6 200 psi and diameter 6 4 inches
FILE R41-2 PLA-3949 Mr. C. L. Miller
~ MOVs with dP ( 50 psi
~ Remaining MOVs to be Tested
~ MOVs with dP = 0 psi A valve is included in only one type even if it meets the criteria of several types.
Ifyou have any questions or comments please contact Mr. C.T. Coddington at (215) 774-7915.
Very truly yours, R. G. B a Attachments CC: 8RC33~ocumen ConrroIZ)eslP(original)
NRC Region I Mr. G. S. Barber, NRC Sr. Resident Inspector - SSES Mr. R. J. Clark, NRC Sr. Project Manager - Rockville
S ~
.9401270113 1 ATTACHMENTA TO PLA-3949 ATTACHMENTA
SUMMARY
OF SIGNIFICANT TECHNICAL ISSUES "VOTES" 10CFR21 Liberty Technologies issued a 10CFR21 indicating that the as measured thrust readings from their Valve Operation and Evaluation System (VOTES) are incorrect.
In general, the thrusts are actually higher than measured. The specific issues include:
- inaccuracies in the stem material constants
- correcting for stem torque
- incorrect effective stem diameters
- incorrect width of the transition zone (where the stem threads stop)
In addition, during the 10CFR21 review it was discovered that PPBL used the incorrect thread type when performing the VOTES analyses. This should also produce thrusts higher than measured.
The resolution of the VOTES 10CFR21 has been incorporated into the MOV program and into the new tests. The VOTES 10CFR21 is also being incorporated into all previous tests.
- 2. POWER UPRATE The Power Uprate project has issued MOV Design Basis Change Notices increasing valve pressures and flows up to 5 percent.
WEAK LINK EVALUATIONS Stress analyses of the majority of the valves within the G.L. 89-1 0 Program are being performed to determine the valves'hrust and/or torque capabilities. The analyses are performed with and without seismic accelerations to envelope postulated dynamic events as well as a motor stall. The results of the stress analyses, in conjunction with the actuator's capabilities, are then factored back into the MOV actuator sizing calculations and MOV Drawings to indicate the valve assembly's capabilities.
DEGRADED VOLTAGE CALCULATIONS The existing Degraded Grid analysis has been replaced by a newer version (as a result of the Electrical SSFI). In addition, the existing degraded voltage calculations concluded that the voltages at the motor terminals were very low. Therefore, the degraded voltage calculations have been revised using the new Degraded Grid analysis and removing all excess conservatisms.
Page 1
I ph V
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IV 0
ATTACHMENTA TO PLA-3949
- 5. NEW ALLOWABLETHRUST METHODOLOGY In order to provide greater "thrust windows"for VOTES testing a new allowable thrust methodology has been developed. The new methodology includes the following changes:
- a. Open and close directions are listed separately.
- b. VOTES accuracy is not included in the design values but is accounted for in the field.
- c. Static and Dynamic test thrust criteria is listed separately.
- d. In process testing allowable thrusts are now listed.
- 6. SPRING PACK DEFICIENCY reference EDR G20012 The Limitorque published spring pack curves do not match the actual spring pack behavior. This deficiency has been verified theoretically (Calculation M-VLV-445) and by site spring pack testing. Limitorque is aware of this issue and is performing an assessment. PP&L has developed spring pack curves which are being used for design and testing.
- 7. TOR UE MEASUREMENT Previously, PP8 L did not measure torque for any valves. Torque measurement is required for
- a. Quarter turn valves
- b. Rising-rotating valves
- c. To validate use of 0.15 stem factor PPLL is presently measuring torque on selected valves.
- 8. TEMPERATURE EFFECTS ON AC MOTORS Previously, the voltage drop calculations and mechanical MOV performance calculations do not address the effects of elevated temperature on MOV output.
Specifically, the AC voltage drop calculations did not compensate for the motor resistance used in the circuit model for elevated temperature.
Limitorque has issued a Part 21 and a maintenance update which PPAL has incorporated into the design of the MOVs.
Page 2
ATTACHMENTA TO PLA-3949
- 9. VALVE OESIGN FACTORS Previously, PP8 L used the Industry methodology to calculate MOV thrust and to size actuators. Specifically, a valve factor of 0.3 had been used.
The NRC has questioned the use of this factor as being unconservative. In addition, a phenomenon (Rate of Loading) has been discovered whereby the MOV develops less thrust at the torque switch trip setpoint under differential pressure conditions than it does under static conditions. Therefore, Rate of Loading was not accounted for in the design calculations previously.
Presently, PP&L is using a valve factor of 0.5 for gate valves and a 10% factor for rate of loading and margin.
- 10. RISING-ROTATING VALVE TOR UE A methodology to accurately calculate Rising-Rotating Valve torque has been developed and is being validated by site testing (by torque measurement).
Page 3
ATTACHMENT B TO PLA-3949 ATTACHMENTB RISING STEM VALVES SET-UP OR HAVE STATIC RETEST AFTER 6/94 VALVE TAG ¹ SYSTEM TYPE SIZE SAFETY FUNCTION RISK PRIORITY 151F007A RHR GT 0/C 151F009 RHR GT 20 151F023 RHR GB 251F017A RHR DG 20 0/C RISING STEM VALVES WITH DYNAMICTEST AFTER 6/94 VALVE TAG ¹ SYSTEM TYPE SIZE SAFETY FUNCTION RISK PRIORITY 149F007 RCIC GT 149F008 RCIC GT 152F005A CS GT 12 0/C 155F001 HPCI GT 10 166F002 HPCI GT 10 155F003 HPCI GT 10 249F007 RCIC GT 249F008 RCIC GT 255F002 HPCI GT 10 255F003 HPCI GT 10 255F012 HPCI GT 0/C RISK PRIORITY SCHEME PRIORITY DEFINITION Causes the loss of a safety function.
Causes loss of 1 of 2 systems used for a safety, function.
Not 1 or 2, but within Generic Letter 89-10 scope.
Page 1
ATIACHMENT C TO PLA-3949 ATTACHMENTC NON-TESTABLE VALVES i,":.:'bivalve".j)I 4',,:;:.;valve.,',~p $j::::s'afety.;;-C':::,, :;g:;,< risk! ('c'j ('.;
',";';v'alv'e':;ta'jj';""r'i'o'r'nb'e'r'::;:,':j.::.:':':,,:;,"s'y'stern:,~"',i ::::,';,,:i>i:,': sIie'".'j',:<,:,': ";)~:,fiinctIo'n"'.',~~ :;.:,':,,','prIorItyj~:,,~.
HV 112F075A RHRSW GT HV 112F075B RHRSW GT HV 11313 RBCCW GT HV 11314 RBCCW GT HV 11345 RBCCW GT HV 11346 RBCCW GT HV 12603 CIG GB HV 14182A Feed water GT HV 14182B Feedwater GT HV 143F031A Recirc GT 28 HV 143F031B Recirc GT 28 HV 143F032A Re circ GT HV 143F032B Re circ GT HV 144F001 RWCU GT 3 HV 144F004 RWCU GT HV 149F010 RCIC GT 0/C HV 149F013 RCIC GT 0/C HV 149F031 RCIC GT 0/C HV 149F059 RCIC GT 10 HV 149F060 RCIC GB HV 149F062 RCIC GT HV 149F084 RCIC GT HV 151F004A RHR GT 24 0/C HV 141F004B RHR GT 24 0/C HV 151F004C RHR GT 0/C HV 151F004D RHR GT 24 0/C Page 1
ATTACHMfNT C TO PLA-3949 NON-TESTABLE VALVES
';:KI,v'aI'v'el;: .. I:,:,>j;risk/),)"",
-..)valve:;tag,ri'umbe'ri,:.",:..',:',;:':,':::.ms jstem;.:,'::;;:g ::.;:.'p,:gyp'a ~pi,,'.; '."':,.:",:,"size'.',:::,',:,',.'.:::,I::..",'fi'ri'otloitI;",.:,."'::"ip'iiortty,,:"':'V 151F008 RHR GT 20 HV 151F009 RHR GT 20 HV 151F015A RHR GT 24 0/C HV 151F015B RHR GT 24 0/C HV 151F016A RHR GB 12 0/C HV 151F016B RHR GB 12 0/C HV 151F017A RHR DG 20 0/C HV 151F017B RHR DG 20 0/C HV 151F021A RHR GT 12 0/C HV 161F021B RHR GT 0/C HV 151F027A RHR GB 0/C HV 151F027B RHR GB 0/C HV 152F001A CS GT HV 152F001B CS GT 16 HV 155F004 HPCI GT 16 0/C HV 155F006 HPCI GT 14 0/C HV 155F042 HPCI GT 16 0/C HV 155F066 HPCI GT 20 HV 155F075 HPCI GT HV 155F079 HPCI GT HV 15766 SPCU GT HV 15768 SPCU GT HV 212F075A RHRSW GT HV 212F076B RHRSW GT HV 21313 RBCCW GT HV 21314 RBCCW GT HV 21345 RBCCW GT 3 HV 21346 RBCCW GT Page 2
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ATTACHMENT C TO PLA-3949 NON-TESTABLE VALVES
'.i-:,valv'e'.'ta'j"..'iiumb'er';:;:,'-:.;..:::;"'::,'.;,ssystem.'."'..::;.i': l)i,""prior'i@';:P!;,:
HV 22603 CIG GB HV 24182A Feed water GT HV 24182B Feed water GT HV 243F031A Re circ GT 28 HV 243F031 B Re circ GT 28 HV 243F032A Re circ GT HV 243F032B Recirc GT HV 244F001 RWCU GT HV 244F004 RWCU GT HV 249F010 RCIC GT 0/C HV 249F013 RCIC GT 0/C HV 249F031 RCIC GT 0/C 3 HV 249F059 RCIC GT 10 HV 249F060 RCIC GB HV 249F062 RCIC GT HV 249F084 RCIC GT HV 251F004A RHR GT 24 0/C HV 251F004B RHR GT 24 0/C HV 251F004C RHR GT 24 0/C HV 251F004D RHR GT 24 0/C HV 251F008 RHR GT 20 C HV 251F009 RHR GT 20 HV 251F015A RHR GT 0/C HV 251F015B RHR GT 24 0/C HV 251F016A RHR GB 12 0/C HV 251F016B RHR GB 12 0/C HV 251F017A RHR DG 20 0/C HV 251F017B RHR DG 20 0/C Page 3
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ATTACHMfNT D TO PLA-3949 ATTACHMENTD SAFETY FUNCTION DESCRIPTIONS HV-1 12F075A These valves are the RHR/RHRSW cross-tie valves. These valves are HV-112F075B normally closed and their safety function is to open to provide a HV-212F075A flowpath from the RHRSW system to the RPV or containment, via HV-212F075B the RHR system, for RPV/containment flooding or suppression pool make-up.
HV-11313 These valves are containment isolation valves for the RBCCW to the HV-11314 reactor recirculation pump seal and motor oil coolers. These HV-11345 valves'afety function is to close for containment isolation on a HV-11346 high drywell pressure or low reactor level 1 signal.
HV-21313 HV-21314 HV-21345 HV-21346 HV-12603 These valves are the Containment Instrument Cas compressor HV-22603 suction inboard containment isolation valves. These valves are normally open to provide a suction path for the containment instrument gas compressors. The valves'afety function is to close on a containment isolation signal.
HV-14182A These valves are the RWCU return isolation valves to the feedwater HV-1 4182B header and are considered outboard manual containment isolation HV-241 82A valves. These valves are normally open and will remain open unless HV-24182B remote manually closed. These valves'afety function is to remote manually close to effect long term containment isolation.
HV-1 43 F031 A These valves are the reactor recirculation pump discharge valves.
MV-143F031 B These valves are normally open to provide a discharge path for the HV-243 F031 A recirculation system. The safety function of these valves is to close HV-243 F031 B on a LOCA plus low reactor pressure signal, to assure the proper alignment for LPCI injection.
Page 1
ATTACWMENT D TO PLA-3949 HV-143F032A These valves are the reactor recirculation pump discharge bypass HV-143F032B valves. These valves are normally open and provide a discharge HV-243 F032A path for the recirculation system during pump start-up. The safety HV-243F0326 function of these valves is to close on a LOCA plus low reactor pressure signal, to assure the proper alignment for LPCI injection.
HV-144F001 These valves are the RWCU inboard containment isolation valves.
HV-244F001 These valves are normally open and their safety function is to close on a reactor low level signal or on indication of a RWCU system break from the steam leak detection system.
HV-144F004 These valves are the RWCU outboard containment isolation valves.
HV-244F004 These valves are normally open and their safety function is to close on a reactor low level signal, on indication of a RWCU system break from the steam leak detection system, on initiation of Standby Liquid Control system, and on RWCU nonregenerative heat
. exchanger high outlet temperature.
HV-149 F007 These valves are the RCIC steam supply line to the RCIC turbine HV-1 49 F008 containment isolation valves. These valves are normally open for HV-249F007 RCIC operation and their safety function is to close for containment HV-249 F008 isolation when RCIC is not operating.
HV-149F010 These valves are the RCIC suction valves from the condensate HV-249F010 storage tank and are normally open. These valves'afety function is to close on suction transfer from the CST to the suppression pool.
HV-149F01 3 These valves are the RCIC injection shutoff containment isolation HV-249 F01 3 valves. These valves are normally closed and their safety function is to open on RCIC initiation, and to close for containment isolation when RCIC is not operating.
HV-149F031 These valves are the RCIC suppression pool suction containment HV-249 F031 isolation valves. These valves are normally closed and will open on low level conditions in the CST. The valves'afety function is to open on automatic RCIC suction transfer from CST to suppression pool, and to remote manually close for containment isolation.
HV-149F059 These valves are the containment isolation valves on the RCIC HV-249F059 turbine exhaust to the suppression pool. These valves are normally open and their safety function is to remote manually close if required to provide long term containment isolation.
Page 2
ATTACHMENT D TO PLA-3949 HV-149F060 These valves are the RCIC barometric condenser vacuum pump HV-249F060 discharge to the suppression pool containment isolation valves.
These valves are normally open and their safety function is to perform a manual containment isolation function.
HV-149F062 These valves are the outboard containment isolation valves on the HV-249F062 RCIC turbine exhaust vacuum breaker line. These valves are normally open and will close on a high drywell pressure plus low RCIC steam supply pressure signal. The safety function of these valves is to close on the above signals to effect containment isolation.
HV-149F084 These valves are the inboard containment isolation valves on the HV-249F084 RCIC turbine exhaust vacuum breaker line. These valves are normally open and will close on a high drywell pressure plus low RCIC steam supply pressure signal. The safety function of these
'alves is to close on the above signals to effect containment isolation.
HV-1 51 F004A These valves are the RHR suppression pool suction manual HV-1 51 F005 B containment isolation valves. These valves are normally open to HV-1 51 F004C provide a suction path for LPCI and their safety function is to HV-1 51 F004 D remote manually close to provide long term containment isolation.
HV-251 F004A HV-251 F004B HV-251 F004C HV-251F004D HV-151F007A This valve is the RHR pump minimum flow bypass valve. This valve is normally closed and its safety function is to open to prevent damage to the pumps during low flow condition and to close when sufficient flow exists to assure maximum LPCI flow to the vessel.
HV-151F008 These valves are the shutdown cooling supply outboard HV-251 F008 containment isolation valves. These valves are normally closed and are opened for shutdown cooling mode of RHR. The safety function of these valves is to close on a shutdown cooling isolation signal.
HV-1 51 F009 These valves are the shutdown cooling supply inboard containment HV-251F009 isolation valves. These valves are normally closed and are opened for shutdown cooling mode of RHR. The safety function of these valves is to close on a shutdown cooling isolation signal.
Page 3
ATTACHMENT D TO PLA-3949 HV-1 51 F01 5A These valves are the RHR injection inboard containment isolation HV-1 51 F0158 valves. These valves are normally closed and their safety function HV-251 F01 5A is to open on LPCI initiation during LOCA, and to close on low HV-251 F01 58 level 3 when in shutdown cooling.
HV-1 51 F01 6A These valves are the drywell spray header outboard containment HV-1 51 F01 68 isolation valves. These valves are normally closed. The safety HV-251 F01 6A function of these valves is to open for containment spray and to HV-251 F01 68 close for containment isolation.
HV-1 51 F01 7A These valves are the RHR outboard injection control valves. These HV-1 51 F01 78 valves are normally open and their safety function is to open and HV-251 F01 7A close as required to control injection flow during LPCI and HV-251 F01 78 containment cooling modes of RHR.
HV-151F021A These valves are the drywell spray header inboard containment HV-1 51F021 8 isolation valves. These valves are normally closed. The safety HV-251F021A function of these valves is to open for containment spray and to HV-251F021 8 subsequently close for containment isolation.
HV-151F023 This valve is the RHR head spray outboard containment isolation valve. This valve is normally closed and its safety function is to close, if open, on a reactor low level 3, RHR isolation, High Drywell pressure, or reactor pressure greater than allowable for shutdown cooling.
HV-151F027A These valves are the suppression chamber spray header inboard HV-151F0278 containment isolation valves. These valves are normally closed. The HV-251 F02 7A safety function of these valves is to open for suppression chamber HV-251F0278 spray.
HV-152F001A These valves are the Core Spray suppression pool suction manual HV-1 52F001 8 containment isolation valves. These valves are normally open to HV-252F001 A provide a suction path for core spray injection and their safety HV-252F001 8 function is to remote manually close to provide long term containment isolation.
HV-152F005A This valve is the Core Spray injection inboard containment isolation valve. This valve is normally closed and its safety function is to open on Core Spray initiation and low reactor pressure, and to close to provide containment isolation.
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ATTACHMENT D TO PLA-3949 HV-155F001 This valve is the HPCI injection valve. This valve is normally open, and the safety function of this valve is to open on a HPCI injection signal.
HV-1 55 F002 This valve is the HPCI steam supply line inboard containment HV-255 F002 isolation valve. This valve is normally open, and the safety function of this valve is to close on a HPCI isolation signal.
HV-1 55 F003 This valve is the HPCI steam supply line outboard containment HV-255F003 isolation valve. This valve is normally open, and the safety function of this valve is to close on a MPCI isolation signal.
HV-1 55 F004 These valves are the HPCI suction valves from the condensate HV-255 F004 storage tank and are normally open. These valves'afety function is to automatically close on suction transfer from the CST to the suppression pool.
HV-155F006 These valves are the HPCI injection shutoff containment isolation HV-255 F006 valves. These valves are normally closed and their safety function is to open on HPCI initiation, and to close for containment isolation when HPCI is not operating.
HV-255F012 This valve is the HPCI minimum flow bypass valve. This valve is normally closed and will open when HPCI is operating with inadequate flow, and will reclose when adequate HPCI flow is developed. The valves safety function is to open to provide minimum flow to the HPCI pump, and to close to ensure sufficient HPCI flow is sent to the RPV and to also provide containment isolation.
HV-155F042 These valves are the HPCI suppression pool suction containment HV-255 F042 isolation valves. These valves are normally closed and will open on low level conditions in the CST or high water level in the suppression pool. The valves'afety function is to open on automatic HPCI suction transfer from CST to suppression pool, and to remote manually close for containment isolation or realignment of HPCI suction to the CST.
HV-1 55 F066 These valves are the containment isolation valves on the HPCI HV-255 F066 turbine exhaust to the suppression pool. These valves are normally open and their safety function is to remote manually close if required to provide long term containment isolation.
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ATTACHMENT D TO PLA-3949 HV-155F075 These valves are the outboard containment isolation valves on the HV-255 F075 HPCI turbine exhaust vacuum breaker lines. These valves are normally open and will close on a high drywell pressure plus low HPCI steam supply pressure signal. The safety function of this valve is to close on the above signals to effect containment isolation.
HV-1 55 F079 These valves are the inboard containment isolation valves on the HV-255 F079 HPCI turbine exhaust vacuum breaker lines. These valves are normally open and will close on a high drywell pressure plus low HPCI steam supply pressure signal. The safety function of these valves is to close on the above signals to effect containment isolation.
HV-15766 These valves are the suppression pool cleanup system inboard HV-25766 containment isolation valves. These valves are normally closed and their safety function is to close, if open, on a LOCA signal.
HV-15768 These valves are the suppression pool cleanup system outboard HV-25768 containment isolation valves. These valves are normally closed and their safety function is to close, if open, on a LOCA signal.
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