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Category:DEFICIENCY REPORTS (PER 10CFR50.55E & PART 21)
MONTHYEARML17334B8201998-06-23023 June 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Defective & Missing Welds Found on Ice Basket Bottom Cross Bar & Bottom Basket Grids During Insp of Unit 1 Ice Condenser.Investigation Ongoing.Defective Ice Basket Bottom Rims Will Be Repaired or Replaced ML20217K5191997-10-24024 October 1997 Part 21 Rept Re Five Valves That May Have Defect Related to Possible Crack within Forging Wall at Die Flash Line.Caused by Less than Optimal Forging Temperatures.Newer Temperature Monitoring Devices at Forging Area Heating Ovens Procured ML17333A8651997-04-22022 April 1997 Part 21 Rept Re Defective Double Pole Torque Switch.Caused by Missing Spacer.Limitorque Instituted Addl Insp Check of Double Pole Torque Switches During Assembly & Licensees Must Review All Installed & in-stock Torque Switches ML17333A8441997-04-0909 April 1997 Part 21 Rept Re Limitorque Torque Assembly Used in SMB-00 Valve Actuators That Were Missing Spacer.Replaced or Repaired Defective Assemblies by Addition of Spacer ML17333A9041997-03-19019 March 1997 Part 21 Rept Re Spacer Missing from Torque Switch Assembly for MOV 2-MMO-421 Which Allows Torque Switch Shaft to Rotate Slightly Along Length of Shaft.Defective Assemblies Replaced or Repaired by Addition of Spacer ML17333A8161997-03-19019 March 1997 Part 21 Rept Re Missing Spacers from Standard SMB-00 Torque Switch Assemblies.Caused by Defective Lot Received from Limitorque Facility.Replaced or Repaired Defective Assemblies by Addition of Spacer ML20059F2631994-01-0707 January 1994 Part 21 Rept Re Air Start Distributor Cam Mfg by Fairbanks Morse.Mfg Suggests That Site Referenced in Encl App I Inspect Air Start Distributor Cam as Soon as Practical ML20126J5961992-12-31031 December 1992 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Loss of RHR Cooling During Nozzle Dam Removal.Nozzle Dams May Create Trapped Air Column Behind Cold Leg Nozzle Dam.Mod to Nozzle Dams Currently Underway. Ltrs to Affected Utils Encl ML20126F8081992-12-22022 December 1992 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Condition of Gag Plug in Cap of Valves That Cause Valves Not to Lift to Requirement for Providing Full Capacity.Affected Customers Notified.Removal of Caps &/Or Gag Plugs Recommended ML20127P5861992-11-23023 November 1992 Followup to 921005 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in SB/SBD-1 Housing Cover Screws.Procedure Re Replacement of SBD-1 Spring Cover Bolts Encl.All Fasteners Should Be Loosened & Removed.List of Affected Utils Encl ML17325B3641990-01-0909 January 1990 Part 21 Rept Re Westinghouse Class 1E Thermal/Magnetic molded-case Circuit Breakers Tripping During Attempts to Start Motor.Initially Reported on 900105.Vendor Requesting That Utils Verify Proper Breaker Performance ML17328A2281989-12-12012 December 1989 Followup Part 21 Rept Re Westinghouse molded-case Circuit Breakers Observed to Trip Before Allowable Time Band,Per Generic Ltr 88-10.Initially Reported on 891207.Breakers Purchased Prior to 1989 Purchase Order Not Subj to Problems ML17326B6001989-04-10010 April 1989 Part 21 Rept Re Level III Examiner Personnel Not Certified Per ANSI N45.2.6-1978.Initially Reported on 890406.Stop Work Order Issued to Prevent Addl Insps from Being Performed by Unqualified Personnel & Qualification Procedure Revised ML17326B5501989-03-0303 March 1989 Followup Part 21 Rept Re Failures of Closing Mechanisms in Two Bbc Brown Boveri,Inc,Type 5HJK250 Circuit Breakers Installed in Safety Sys at Plant.Initially Reported on 890301.Maint Procedure Will Be Revised ML17326B3661988-04-0404 April 1988 Part 21 Rept Re Environ Qualification of Torque Switches Designed by Limitorque Corp.Initially Reported on 880330. Design Not Qualification Tested for Nuclear safety-related Svc.Untested Torque Switches Will Be Replaced ML17334B1331987-08-26026 August 1987 Part 21 Rept Re Defective Torque Switches for in Valve Motor Operator Supplied to Plant by Limitorque Corp. Initially Reported on 870821.Caused by Inadequate Design of Double Torque Switch.Defective Switches Replaced ML17325A2691987-08-26026 August 1987 Part 21 Rept Re Metallic Beads Discovered in Reliance Electric Co motor-operated Valves Installed on Limitorque SMB-000 Valve Operators.Initially Reported on 870821.Caused by Abrasive Cleaning Process.Limitorque Refurbished Motors ML17325A2331987-07-31031 July 1987 Part 21 Rept Re Corrosion on Leads to Transformers Supplied by Brown Boveri Corp.Initially Reported on 870727.Corrosion Sufficient to Create Safety Hazard Had Transformers Been Installed W/O Repair.Brown Boveri Corp 870526 Ltr Encl ML20203N2351986-09-18018 September 1986 Part 21 Rept Re Defective Terry Corp Emergency Head Lever Supplied for Auxiliary Feed Pump.Defective Parts Never Installed in Facility & Returned to Mfg.Replacement Parts Installed ML20210F4741986-09-16016 September 1986 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Sticking in Closed or Partially Open Position on Dresser 3050 Diaphragm Valves.Initially Reported on 850118.Disc Caps,Including Chamfers on Outside Diameter,Will Be Modified ML20206S0841986-06-30030 June 1986 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Cut Wires in Wire Harness of Bbc Brown Boveri K600/K800 Circuit Breakers.Initially Reported on 860509.Safety Implications Listed.Gear Guard Designed to Prevent Cut Wires NRC-86-3095, Part 21 Rept Re Nonupper Head Injection Analog Versions of Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation Sys.Initially Reported on 860109.Changes to Upgrade Steam Density Compensation Circuit Identified1986-01-0909 January 1986 Part 21 Rept Re Nonupper Head Injection Analog Versions of Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation Sys.Initially Reported on 860109.Changes to Upgrade Steam Density Compensation Circuit Identified ML20136H0721985-12-20020 December 1985 Part 21 Rept Re Supply of Weld Electrodes W/Incomplete Flux Coating.Initially Reported on 851217.NDE Records & Welder Interviews Revealed Rods Not Used in Facility.No Safety Hazard Identified.Details Encl ML20100B7201985-03-22022 March 1985 Part 21 Rept Re Error in TOODEE2 Code Used in LOCA-ECCS Analysis for DC Cook Unit 1.Initially Reported on 850315. Analysis Affected by Coding Error Reperformed Using Corrected Version of TOODEE2 ML20094H9341984-08-0303 August 1984 Part 21 Rept Per 840720 Request Re Effects of Superheated Steam Following Postulated Main Steam Line Break.Util Will Participate in Westinghouse Owners Group Activities & Involvement Expected to Suppl Internal Review ML20092D9711984-06-15015 June 1984 Part 21 Rept Re Thermal Nonrepeatability & Other Calibr Errors in Barton Lot 1 Transmitters.Initially Reported on 840615.Transmitter Defects Identified & Expected Error Deviations Calculated.Utils Notified ML20091K6911984-05-25025 May 1984 Part 21 Rept Re Programming Error in Detector Code,Supplied by Shanstrom Nuclear Assoc,Inc.Initially Reported on 840523. Software Enhanced.Nmfm Procedure 7 Will Be Revised by 841231.LER Will Be Submitted ML20092P6691984-05-24024 May 1984 Potential Part 21 Rept Re Bug in Detector Computer Code for in-core Detectors.Bug Incorrectly Calculated Enthalpy Rise Peaking Factor.Bug Corrected ML20091G2071984-05-24024 May 1984 Part 21 Rept Re Bug in Detector Computer Code Resulting in Possible Miscalculation of Tech Spec Parameters for Enthalpy Rise Peaking Factor.Problem Corrected & Responsible Parties Notified ML20085K7291983-10-14014 October 1983 Interim Deficiency Rept Re Calibr Technique for Temp Compensation on Barton Transmitters.Westinghouse Part 21 Rept Described Undefined Errors at Abnormal & Accident Temps.Next Rept in 14 Days ML20072N9891983-07-0808 July 1983 Interim Part 21 Rept Confirming 830705 Telcon Re Anomalies in Artificially Aged Apparatus (Using Ahrrenius Methodology W/Elevated Temp Aging).Deficiency Found During Qualification Testing for IEEE 323-1974.Draft Notices Encl ML20070C7631982-12-10010 December 1982 Part 21 Rept Re Problem W/Brown Boveri Electric,Inc Low Voltage Circuit Breakers W/Solid State Trip Devices.Units from San Onofre 2 & 3 Failed Due to long-term Degradation of Filter Capacitor C205.Suspect Trip Units Should Be Tested ML17326A8531981-02-27027 February 1981 Final Deficiency Rept Re Possible Svc Water Leak in Ventilation Unit of Lower Vol Containment,Initially Reported 810220.Drip Pan Pipe Had Become Plugged.Drip Pan Overflowed. No Leak Exists.Requests Notification of Withdrawal 1998-06-23
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML17335A5641999-10-18018 October 1999 LER 99-024-00:on 990708,literal TS Requirements Were Not Met by Accumlator Valve Surveillance.Caused by Misjudgement Made in Conversion from Initial DC Cook TS to W Std Ts.Submitted License Amend Request.With 991018 Ltr ML17335A5531999-10-0707 October 1999 LER 99-023-00:on 990907,inadequate TS Surveillance Testing of ESW Pump ESF Response Time Noted.Caused by Inadequate Understanding of Plant Design Basis.Surveillance Tests Will Be Revised & Implemented ML17335A5631999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 1.With 991012 Ltr ML17335A5621999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 2.With 991012 Ltr ML17335A5481999-09-30030 September 1999 Non-proprietary DC Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 & 2 Mods to Containment Sys W SE (Secl 99-076,Rev 3). ML17335A5451999-09-28028 September 1999 Rev 1 to Containment Sump Level Design Condition & Failure Effects Analysis for Potential Draindown Scenarios. ML17326A1291999-09-17017 September 1999 LER 99-022-00:on 990609,electrical Bus Degraded Voltage Setpoints Too Low for Safety Related Loads,Was Discovered. Caused by Lack of Understanding of Design of Plant.No Immediate Corrective Actions Necessary ML17326A1481999-09-17017 September 1999 Independent Review of Control Rod Insertion Following Cold Leg Lbloca,Dc Cook,Units 1 & 2. ML17326A1211999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit 2.With 990915 Ltr ML17326A1201999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit 1.With 990915 Ltr ML17326A1121999-08-27027 August 1999 LER 99-021-00:on 990728,determined That GL 96-01 Test Requirements Were Not Met in Surveillance Tests.Caused by Failure to Understand Full Extent of GL Requirements. Surveillance Procedures Will Be Revised or Developed ML17326A1011999-08-26026 August 1999 LER 99-020-00:on 990727,EDGs Were Declared Inoperable.Caused by Inadequate Protection of Air Intake,Exhaust & Room Ventilation Structures from Tornado Missile Hazards. Implemented Compensatory Measures in Form of ACs ML17326A0911999-08-16016 August 1999 LER 99-019-00:on 990716,noted Victoreen Containment Hrrms Not Environmentally Qualified to Withstand post-LOCA Conditions.Caused by Inadequate Design Control.Reviewing Options to Support Hrrms Operability in Modes 1-4 ML17326A0771999-08-0404 August 1999 LER 98-029-01:on 980422,noted That Fuel Handling Area Ventilation Sys Was Inoperable.Caused by Original Design Deficiency.Radiological Analysis for Spent Fuel Handling Accidents in Auxiliary Bldg Will Be Redone by 990830 ML17335A5461999-08-0202 August 1999 Rev 0 to Evaluation of Cook Recirculation Sump Level for Reduced Pump Flow Rates. ML17326A0871999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 1.With 990812 Ltr ML17326A0861999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Units 2.With 990812 Ltr ML17326A0741999-07-29029 July 1999 LER 99-018-00:on 990629,determined That Valve Yokes May Yield Under Combined Stress of Seismic Event & Static,Valve Closed,Stem Thrust.Caused by Inadequate Design of Associated Movs.Operability Determinations Were Performed for Valves ML17326A0661999-07-26026 July 1999 LER 99-017-00:on 990625,noted That Improperly Installed Fuel Oil Return Relief Valve Rendered EDG Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Fuel Oil Return Valve Was Replaced with Valve in Correct Orientation.With 990722 Ltr ML17326A0651999-07-22022 July 1999 LER 98-014-03:on 980310,noted That Response to high-high Containment Pressure Procedure Was Not Consistent with Analysis of Record.Caused by Inadequate Interface with W. FRZ-1 Will Be Revised to Be Consistent with New Analysis ML17326A0491999-07-13013 July 1999 LER 99-016-00:on 990615,TS Requirements for Source Range Neutron Flux Monitors Not Met.Caused by Failure to Understand Design Basis of Plant.Procedures Revised.With 990713 Ltr ML17326A0331999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-004-01:on 971030,failure to Perform TS Surveillance Analyses of Reactor Coolant Chemistry with Fuel Removed Was Noted.Caused by Ineffective Mgt of Tss.Chemistry Personnel Have Been Instructed on Requirement to Follow TS as Written ML17326A0511999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 2.With 990709 Ltr ML17326A0501999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 1.With 990709 Ltr ML17326A0151999-06-18018 June 1999 LER 99-014-00:on 990521,determined That Boron Injection Tank Manway Bolts Were Not Included in ISI Program,Creating Missed Exam for Previous ISI Interval.Caused by Programmatic Weakness.Isi Program & Associated ISI Database Modified ML17325B6421999-06-0101 June 1999 LER 99-013-00:on 990327,safety Injection & Centrifugal Charging Throttle Valve Cavitation During LOCA Could Have Led to ECCS Pump Failure.Caused by Inadequate Original Design Application of Si.Throttle Valves Will Be Developed ML17325B6311999-06-0101 June 1999 LER 99-S03-00:on 990430,vital Area Barrier Degradation Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Insp & Maint of Vital Area Barrier.Repairs & Mods Were Made to Barriers to Eliminate Degraded & Nonconforming Conditions ML17326A0061999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Dcp.With 990609 Ltr ML17326A0071999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 2.With 990609 Ltr ML17325B6351999-05-28028 May 1999 LER 99-S02-00:on 990428,vulnerability in Safeguard Sys That Could Allow Unauthorized Access to Protected Area Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Original Plant Design.Mods Were Made to Wall Opening to Eliminate Nonconforming Conditions ML17265A8231999-05-24024 May 1999 LER 98-037-01:on 990422,determined That Ice Condenser Bypass Leakage Exceeds Design Basis Limit.Caused by Pressure Seal Required by Revised W Design Not Incorporated Into Aep Design.Numerous Matl Condition Walkdowns & Assessments Made ML17325B6001999-05-20020 May 1999 LER 99-012-00:on 990420,concluded That Auxiliary Bldg ESF Ventilation Sys Not Capable of Maintaining ESF Room Temps post-accident.Caused by Inadequate Control of Sys Design Inputs.Comprehensive Action Plan Being Developed ML17325B5861999-05-10010 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990415,discovered That TS 4.0.5 Requirements Were Not Met Due to Improperly Performed Test. Caused by Incorrect Interpretation of ASME Code.App J Testing Will Be Completed & Procedures Will Be Revised ML17325B5811999-05-0404 May 1999 LER 99-011-00:on 990407,air Sys for EDG Will Not Support Long Operability.Caused by Original Design Error.Temporary Mod to Supply Makeup Air Capability in Modes 5 & 6 Was Prepared ML17325B5771999-05-0303 May 1999 LER 99-010-00:on 990401,RCS Leak Detection Sys Sensitivity Not in Accordance with Design Requirements Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Original Design of Containment Sump Level. Evaluation Will Be Performed to Clearly Define Design ML17335A5301999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 1.With 990508 Ltr ML17335A5291999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 2.With 990508 Ltr ML17325B5581999-04-16016 April 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990115,personnel Identified Discrepancy Between TS 3.9.7 Impact Energy Limit & Procedure 12 Ohp 4030.STP.046.Caused by Lack of Design Basis Control.Placed Procedure 12 Ohp 4030.STP.046 on Administrative Hold ML17325B5471999-04-12012 April 1999 LER 99-009-00:on 990304,as-found RHR Safety Relief Valve Lift Setpoint Greater than TS Limit Occurred.Cause Investigation for Condition Has Not Been Completed.Update to LER Will Be Submitted,Upon Completion of Investigation ML17325B5321999-04-0707 April 1999 LER 99-S01-00:on 990308,discovered That Lock for Vital Gate Leading to Plant 4KV Switchgear Area Was Nonconforming & Vulnerable to Unauthorized Access.Caused by Inadequate Gate Design & Inadequate Procedures.Mods Are Being Made to Gate ML17325B5161999-04-0101 April 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 981020,calculations Showed That Divider Barrier Between Upper & Lower Containment Vols Were Overstressed.Engineers Are Currently Working on Analyses of Loads & Stress on Enclosures ML17325B5491999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 2.With 990408 Ltr ML17325B5441999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 1.With 990408 Ltr ML17325B5221999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 960610,degraded Component Cooling Water Flow to Containment Main Steam Line Penetrations,Identified on 990226.Caused by Inadequate Understanding of Design Basis.Additional Investigations Ongoing ML17325B4801999-03-18018 March 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 971030,failure to Perform TS Surveillance Analyses of Rc Chemistry with Fuel Removed Was Noted.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation.Corrected Written Job Order Activities Used to Control SD Chemistry Sampling ML17325B4741999-03-18018 March 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 940512,determined That Rt Breaker Manual Actuations During Rod Drop Testing Were Not Previously Reported.Caused by Lack of Training.Addl Corrective Actions,Including Preventative Actions May Be Developed ML17325B5671999-03-0202 March 1999 Summary of Unit 1 Steam Generator Layup Chemistry from 980101 to 990218. ML17325B4631999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2.With 990308 Ltr ML17325B4621999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for DC Cook Nuclear Plant,Unit 1.With 990308 Ltr ML17325B4571999-02-24024 February 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990107,CR Pressurization Sys Surveillance Test Did Not Test Sys in Normal Operating Condition.Caused by Failure to Recognize Door 12DR-AUX415 as Part of CR Pressure Boundary.Performed Walkdown of Other Doors 1999-09-30
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ACCELERATED DISFIGBUTION DEMON ZION SYSTHM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:9001300119 DOC. DATE: 90/01/09 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET g FACIL: Sc-s(s AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILXATXON JOHNSON,W.J. Westinghouse Electric Corp.
RECIP.NAME RECXPIENT AFFILIATION MURLEY,T.E. Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Director (Post 870411 R i
rept re Westinghouse Class 1E thermal/magnetic
SUBJECT:
Part 21 molded case circuit'reakers performance charcteristics.
ENCL 8 SIZE: D DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE19D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR TITLE: Part 21 Rept (50 DKT)
NOTES:
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'e Westinghouse Energy Systems Box 355 Electric Corporation Pmsbvrgh Pennsylvania 15230 0355 January 9, 1990 NS-NRC-90-3481 Mr. T. E. Murley Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
Dear Mr. Murley:
The following information is provided pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR Part 21 to report the potential for the existence of a substantial safety hazard as communicated by Mr. P. J. Morris and Mr. R. P. DiPiazza of Westinghouse to Mr. C. E. Rossi of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission by telephone on January 5, 1990. This issue concerns the potential for all models and sizes of Westinghouse Class lE thermal/magnetic molded case circuit breakers'erformance characteristics to deviate from published information.
BACKGROUND Westinghouse supplied 224 molded case circuit breakers from the FB family for Class 1E service for unspecified applications to the Indiana Michigan Electric Company, D. C. Cook Nuclear Station. D. C. Cook personnel informed Westinghouse on November 22, 1989 that they installed one of these breakers in the Turbine Room No. 2 sump pump circuit, a non-Class lE motor starting circuit, and that the breaker tripped open during attempts to start the motor. Following this occurrence, two other FB3125L breakers were put in the circuit but did not remain closed during the start up of the 75hp motor. After this sequence of events, the suspect breakers were bench tested and found to have lower trip currents than published commercial curves at currents between 300% and 550% of rated current.
Representatives from Westinghouse and D. C. Cook performed tests on the breakers at the Westinghouse Distribution 5 Control Business Unit, Low Voltage Breaker Division, and these tests also confirmed the deviation of these breakers at these currents.
EVALUATION Thermal/magnetic breakers have maximum and minimum time/current curves included in the published information. These breakers have two trip mechanisms resulting in two distinct portions of the time/current curves.
The thermal portion of the minimum curve defines the performance characteristics of the breaker for continuous current for which the breaker will remain closed. The magnetic portion of the minimum curve
'V001300119 900i09 PDR ADOCK 05000315 S POR i,0
h defines the instantaneous current under which the breaker is expected to remain closed. The thermal trip function is caused by a bimetal thermal element being heated by the overcurrent and pushing against the 4t ip bar until the circuit breaker trips. The magnetic trip is caused by increasing flux in the magnetic circuit, produced by high overloads, that will attract the armature and trip the circuit breaker.
The thermal and magnetic trip functions overlap in the region from 300% of rated current to the beginning of the instantaneous portion of the curve.
The functions interact in this area because the thermal element pushes against the trip bar and at the same time the magnetic element oscillates against the trip bar, causing the breaker to trip open sooner than the curve indicates. The. shape of the published typical curve does not reflect this interaction and, therefore, may not be bounding for all breakers in the specific area. In the application of this breaker, in a motor starting circuit, the breaker needs to remain closed when the motor is starting and running. Westinghouse performs confirmatory tests at two points to demonstrate compliance to the thermal portion of the standard time/current curves and for most breaker families verifies the magnetic trip. Specific electrical confirmatory tests are not performed in the interaction region so the capability of the breaker to remain closed in the interaction area was not verified prior to shipment.
SAFETY IMPACT Circuit breakers in a typical commercial application have an equipment and personnel safety function. This safety function is to trip on any overcurrent condition before a piece of equipment or conductors are damaged. If the breaker trips quicker than expected, it is a nuisance but still is a safe situation. While the breaker for D. C. Cook was not installed in a nuclear safety related circuit, the breakers were sold as Class IE breakers. The possibility exists for Class IE breakers with similar time/current performance to be installed in a safety related circuit at other plants.
Two Class IE applications where thermal/magnetic breakers are known to be used are in motor and coordination applications. Thermal/magnetic breakers which have been installed in similar motor applications where periodic startup testing has not been performed may trip open and prevent operation of safety related equipment if called upon to start. Where thermal/magnetic breakers are being used for coordination, they should be sized in such a manner that these irregularities in the time/current curves will not affect the coordination scheme or that a premature opening would be conservative. Therefore, the breakers will still perform their intended safety function. If these breakers are installed in Class IE motor starting circuits, credit must be taken for testing of these breakers. Initial circuit testing and periodic surveillance testing will expose any deficiencies in the circuit breakers if this testing is typical of actual service.
CORRECTIVE ACTION While the breakers at D. C. Cook have not been bounded by the published perFormance curves, previous history in both the commercial and nuclear fields does not indicate many other reported instances of this particular behavior affecting a safety function. While other instances of this behavior cannot be ruled out, the lack of other similar reports indicates that such behavior may not be widespread. Westinghouse is notifying all nuclear utilities to verify performance characteristics applicable to their service conditions before the breakers are placed in service. If the breaker is already installed in a motor starting circuit, functional tests of the system is one method for verifying proper breaker performance. If thermal/magnetic molded case circuit breakers are being used for coordination and if the coordination relies on proper performance in the interaction region, it is recommended that those breakers be tested to ensure that their characteristics'upport the coordination requirements. This testing can be done on site or at the Westinghouse Distribution & Control Technical Center. Although NEHA Standard AB2 has been withdrawn, the guidelines found in the standard are applicable for field testing circuit breakers.
An attachment discussing the applications of thermal/magnetic breakers is included. An information copy of this notification will be forwarded to all nuclear utilities. Westinghouse is actively evaluating this issue to determine what corrective action, if any, may be necessary to preclude recurrence.
If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Hr. Pete Horris of my staff at (412)374-5761, or myself.
W. . ohn on, Hanager N 1 ar Sa ety
ATTACHMENT TO NS-NRC-90-3481 APPLICATION OF THERMAL/MAGNETIC CIRCUIT BREAKERS Circuit breakers have defined time/current characteristics which reflect both an overload (thermal) function and a short circuit (instantaneous/magnetic) function. The thermal portion defines the amount of time a breaker should take to trip for a given amount of overlo~d.
This curve has an inverse time characteristic, typically with an I T relationship. The magnetic portion defines the time at which point the breaker will trip with no intentional time delay. To accomplish the thermal characteristic, a bimetallic device is normally employed. For instantaneous tripping, a magnet and armature are normally used. Both interface with the breaker's trip bar to unlatch and trip the breaker for fault conditions. It is not common practice for Underwriters Laboratories or the manufacturers to check trip points at the transition between the thermal and magnetic functions.
The primary function of a thermal/magnetic molded case circuit breaker is the protection of conductors and specifically the conductors'nsulation.
Thermal/magnetic circuit breakers are not the first choice for the protection of equipment, such as motors. Other devices are specifically designed to provide this protection. In any case, it is important that the breaker always have a trip characteristic whereby the breaker opens and trips before the conductor and/or its insulation is damaged.
The possibility of molded case circuit breakers not having enough margin when being used in motor circuits could constitute a safety concern provided no startup tests were performed on the equipment or if no periodic surveillance testing was conducted. A wide range of transient inrush current profiles are possible based on the closing angle in each phase, the position of the motor's armature with respect to its stator, the motor's air gap, its armature and stator construction, the magnetic materials, and its copper and stray load losses. Each time a motor is started, its inrush may vary over a wide range due to these conditions, and consequently, the worse case transient will not necessarily occur each time. If a thermal magnetic .breaker must be used in a motor application, it should be sized taking advantage of the exception to the the National Electric Code which allows thermal/magnetic breakers to be sized up to 400% of full load current. Critical applications that require a higher immunity to nuisance tripping should be designed with a higher margin between the transient starting profile of the motor and the profile of the protective device. In installations where motor starting and running is paramount, consideration should be given to the use of special circuit breakers with special trip calibrations. Westinghouse recommends the use of MCPs or magnetic only breakers in conjuction with overload relays in lieu of thermal/magnetic breakers for motor starting circuits. In cases where very precise tripping of the branch circuit protective device may be required over a wide range of currents, other devices such as protective relays, should be used in conjuction with a molded case circuit breaker.
Time/current curves of molded case circuit breakers are provided for the purpose of determining the coordination of circuit breakers to other devices, such as other circuit breakers, fuses and overload relays, in a distribution system. In circuit breakers rated at 150 Amps or less, the time/current characteristic is fixed. Circuit breakers rated at above 150 Amps have the ability to adjust the time/current characteristic for different pickup and time delay values. Time/current curves typically available from the manufacturer are family curves and are not specific to a given amp rating. These are "typical" time/current curves for specific environmental conditions, such as those used for fuses and do not depict the trip points of individual circuit breakers with absolute accuracy.