|
---|
Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML20217K9681999-10-19019 October 1999 Ack Receipt of Transmitting Rev 40 to Physical Security Plan for Washington Nuclear Plant 2.Based on Determination That Changes Do Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plan,No NRC Approval Required ML17284A8981999-10-14014 October 1999 Forwards Rev 0 to WNP-2 Cycle 15,COLR 99-15, IAW Requirements of TS 5.6.5 ML17284A9061999-09-24024 September 1999 Forwards Final Rept for 990812 out-of-sequence Drills for Energy Northwest Washington Nuclear Power Project 2 (Lab, Food Control Point & Milk Sampling).No Deficiences & No Areas Requiring C/A Identified in Three Drills ML17284A8881999-09-24024 September 1999 Informs NRC of Change in Schedule Pertaining to Final Implementation of Reactor Stability long-term Solution for WNP-2 ML17292B7591999-09-24024 September 1999 Forwards Rev 24 to WNP-2 Emergency Plan,Iaw 10CFR50.4(b), 50.54(q) & 10CFR50 App E.Detailed Synopsis of Changes,Encl ML17292B7581999-09-22022 September 1999 Forwards NRC Forms 396 & 398 for Nl Hancock,License SOP-50027-3,AR Herrington,License OP-50013-3,WH Sawyer, License SOP-50023-3 & Dl Strote,License SOP-50031-3,for Renewal of Licenses.Without NRC Forms 396 & 398 ML17284A8811999-09-0909 September 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990623 RAI to Support Review of Pending Request for Amend to Reactor pressure-temp Limit Curve TS GO2-99-168, Forwards Rev 40 to Physical Security Plan.Rev Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(3)1999-09-0808 September 1999 Forwards Rev 40 to Physical Security Plan.Rev Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(3) ML17284A8711999-08-30030 August 1999 Informs Staff of Errors in world-wide-web Database Related to WNP-2 Reactor Vessel Structural integrity.Marked-up Pages Containing Errors or Omissions Will Be Forwarded by 991201 ML17284A8751999-08-30030 August 1999 Provides Correct Page from License NPF-21 Marked to Show Rev Addressed in 990729 Application for Amend,Which Included Page That Was Inadvertently Included as Attachment 4.Replace Attachment 4 with Attached Page & Disregard Attachment 5 ML17284A8721999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards Proprietary Info to Support Review of Request for Amend to License NPF-21,re Min Critical Power Ratio Safety Limits Tss,As Requested During 990816 Conversation. Proprietary Encl Withheld ML17292B7531999-08-24024 August 1999 Requests That Eleven Individuals Listed Below Take BWR Generic Fundamentals Examination to Be Administered on 991006 ML17292B7511999-08-24024 August 1999 Forwards Fitness for Duty (FFD) Semiannual Performance Data Rept for Jan-June 1999,per 10CFR26.71(d) ML17284A8701999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards NRC Form 396, Certification of Medical Exam by Facility Licensee & NRC Form 398, Personal Qualification Statement - Licensee, for Jd Prescott (License SOP-50262-1).Without Encls ML17292B7501999-08-19019 August 1999 Informs Staff That Licensee Has Completed Review of NRC SER for B&Wog Util Resolution Guidance Document Addressing ECCS Suction Strainer Blockage ML17284A8681999-08-12012 August 1999 Submits Two ISI Program Plan Relief Requests for NRC Review & Approval,Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i).Proposed Alternatives Provide Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety ML20211A9501999-08-12012 August 1999 Discusses 990720-21 Workshop Conducted in Region IV Ofc,Re Exchange of Info in Area of Use of Risk Insights in Regulatory Activities.List of Attendees,Summary of Topic & Issues,Agenda & Copies of Handouts Encl ML20210L1461999-08-0303 August 1999 Informs That NRC Plans to Administer Gfes of Written Operator Licensing Exam on 991006.Requests Submittal of Ltr Identifying Individuals Taking Exam,Personnel Allowed Access to Exams & Mailing Address for Exams ML17284A8541999-08-0202 August 1999 Forwards Proprietary Addl Info to Support Review of Pending Request for Amend to MCPR Safety Limit Ts.Info Consists of Proprietary Ltr from Abb Combustion Engineering,Inc.Encl Withheld ML17284A8531999-07-30030 July 1999 Forwards Estimate of Number of Licensing Action Requests Planned for Submittal in Future,As Requested in Administrative Ltr 99-02.Twenty-nine Submittals Scheduled for Fy 2000 & Four for Fy 2001 ML17284A8301999-07-22022 July 1999 Clarifies Change of Licensee Name from Wpps to Energy Northwest & Change of Facility Name from Wppss Nuclear Project Number 2 to WNP-2,as Requested in 990719 Telcon with Js Cushing of NRC.Marked-up OL Pages,Encl ML17292B7451999-07-20020 July 1999 Forwards Rev 23 to WNP-2 Emergency Plan,Iaw 10CFR50.4(b) & 50.54(q) & 10CFR50 App E.Rev 23 Provides Updated Description Re Establishment of Separate Emergency Operation Centers for Benton & Franklin Counties ML17292B7391999-07-16016 July 1999 Submits Withdrawal of Request for Amend to Secondary Containment & Standby Gas Treatment Sys Ts.Util Currently Plan to re-submit Amend Request in Entirety by 991112 ML17292B7381999-07-12012 July 1999 Forwards NRC Form 396 & NRC Form 398,for If Sumsion,License OP-50487 & Ga Westergard,License SOP-50415 for Renewal of Operator Licenses.Without Encls ML17292B7171999-07-0606 July 1999 Provides Notification of Early Completion on 990630 of Exception Noted in 990629 Ltr.Equipment within Scope of GL 98-01,Suppl 1, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants, Evaluated & Y2K Ready ML17292B7181999-07-0202 July 1999 Responds to 990623 RAI to Support Review of Evaluation of Planar Indication Found on Weld Number 24RRC(2)A-1 During 1998 RO ML17292B7161999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards Addl Info Requested in 990513 Ltr to Support Review of Pending Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power Operated Gate Valves. ML17292B7131999-06-29029 June 1999 Forwards Response to NRC GL 98-01,Suppl 1, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Npps. ML17292B7091999-06-21021 June 1999 Forwards Proprietary Response to NRC 990603 RAI Re Licensee Request for Amend to MCPR Safety Limit Tss.Proprietary Info Withheld IAW Requirements of 10CFR2.790 ML17292B7041999-06-17017 June 1999 Forwards NRC Forms 396 & 398 for Three Individuals Listed Below for Renewal of Operator Licenses.Without Encls ML17292B7031999-06-10010 June 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990511 RAI Re License Request for Amend to Secondary Containment & SGTS Tss.Results of Addl Benchmark of Gothic Computer Code Performed to Demonstrate Modeling Capability of Drawdown Response,Encl ML17292B6841999-06-0404 June 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990326 RAI Re WNP-2 GL 96-05 Program for Periodic Verification of design-basis Capability of MOVs ML17292B6851999-06-0101 June 1999 Forwards 1999 Quality Audit of WNP-2 Emergency Preparedness Program, Per NUREG-0654,Section Ii,Criteria P.9.Seven Problem Evaluation Requests & Nine Recommendations for Improvement Were Issued as Result of Audit Activities ML17292B6831999-05-25025 May 1999 Informs That Request for NRC Approval of Changes to Emergency Plan Requesting Reduction in on-shift HP Staffing, Is Retracted.Util Will Resubmit Request with Required Addl Info at Later Date ML17292B6751999-05-25025 May 1999 Forwards Proprietary ABB-CE Ltr Re WNP-2 Cycle 15 SLMCPR & Core Reload Design Rept,Per Util Request for Amend Re MCPR Safety Limits.Proprietary Info Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790 ML20206U4501999-05-19019 May 1999 Ack Receipt of Which Transmitted Rev 39 to Physical Security Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).No NRC Approval Is Required,Since Changes Do Not Decrease Effectiveness of Security Plan ML17292B6661999-05-0707 May 1999 Requests Exemption to Requirement in 10CFR55.59(a)(2) Re Annual Operating Test requirements.One-time Exemption from Requirement to Period Not to Exceed 15-months from Last Date of Passing Operating Exam for Licensee at Facility ML17292B6531999-05-0303 May 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990402 RAI Re Licensed Operator Positive Drug Test.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790 ML17292B6561999-04-29029 April 1999 Forwards Rev 0 to Calculation ME-02-98-04, Fracture Mechanics Evaluation of N1 Safe End & Calculation Mod Record CMR-98-0243, Fracture Mechanics Evaluation of N1A Nozzle Safe End, as Suppl Info to ISI Exam ML17292B6421999-04-19019 April 1999 Responds to NRC 990319 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-397/99-01.Corrective Actions:Provisions Are Presently in Place to Maintain Adequate Level of Security GO2-99-073, Forwards Rev 39 to WNP-2 Physical Security Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Changes Do Not Decrease Effectiveness of Approved Plan.Encl Withheld IAW 10CFR73.21 & 10CFR2.7901999-04-19019 April 1999 Forwards Rev 39 to WNP-2 Physical Security Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Changes Do Not Decrease Effectiveness of Approved Plan.Encl Withheld IAW 10CFR73.21 & 10CFR2.790 ML17292B6401999-04-13013 April 1999 Requests That WNP-2 Operator Requalification Program Be Granted one-time Extension Beyond Requirement in 10CFR55.59(a)(2) for Annual Operating Tests ML17292B6371999-04-12012 April 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990211 RAI Re Util Request for Amend to Secondary Containment & SBGTS TS ML17292B6281999-04-0606 April 1999 Informs NRC That Insp Interval Ending Date for ISI Program Plan Has Been Extended by One Year to Dec 12,2005 Due to Changes in Plant Refueling Outage Schedule ML20196K6961999-03-30030 March 1999 Ack Receipt of ,Transmitting Rev 38 to Physical Security Plan for Plant.No NRC Approval Is Required,In Accordance with 10CFR50.54(p) GO2-99-060, Submits Rept of Status of WNP-2 Decommissioning Fund as of 981231,IAW 10CFR50.75(f)(1)1999-03-26026 March 1999 Submits Rept of Status of WNP-2 Decommissioning Fund as of 981231,IAW 10CFR50.75(f)(1) ML17292B6131999-03-24024 March 1999 Forwards Rev 0 to Calculation ME-02-98-04, Fracture Mechanics Evaluation of N1 Nozzle Safe End. Info Will Be Used to Assist NRC in Review of WNP-2 ISI Activities Associated with Evaluation of Planar Indication ML20204F0261999-03-19019 March 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-397/99-01 on 990201-04 & 0303-05.No Violations Noted.Areas of Physical Security Plan Effectively Implemented with Listed Exceptions ML17292B6001999-03-16016 March 1999 Responds to Weakness Noted in Insp Rept 50-397/98-24. Corrective Actions:Developed Document to Identify Areas Needing Improvement,Assigned Responsibility for Actions & Provided Milestones for Achievement ML17292B5941999-03-16016 March 1999 Forwards NRC Form 396, Certification of Medical Exam by Facility Licensee, & NRC Form 398, Personal Qualification Statement - Licensee, for MD Comstock,Mc Naulty & RR Nelson.Without Encls 1999-09-09
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARML17284A8981999-10-14014 October 1999 Forwards Rev 0 to WNP-2 Cycle 15,COLR 99-15, IAW Requirements of TS 5.6.5 ML17284A9061999-09-24024 September 1999 Forwards Final Rept for 990812 out-of-sequence Drills for Energy Northwest Washington Nuclear Power Project 2 (Lab, Food Control Point & Milk Sampling).No Deficiences & No Areas Requiring C/A Identified in Three Drills ML17292B7591999-09-24024 September 1999 Forwards Rev 24 to WNP-2 Emergency Plan,Iaw 10CFR50.4(b), 50.54(q) & 10CFR50 App E.Detailed Synopsis of Changes,Encl ML17284A8881999-09-24024 September 1999 Informs NRC of Change in Schedule Pertaining to Final Implementation of Reactor Stability long-term Solution for WNP-2 ML17292B7581999-09-22022 September 1999 Forwards NRC Forms 396 & 398 for Nl Hancock,License SOP-50027-3,AR Herrington,License OP-50013-3,WH Sawyer, License SOP-50023-3 & Dl Strote,License SOP-50031-3,for Renewal of Licenses.Without NRC Forms 396 & 398 ML17284A8811999-09-0909 September 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990623 RAI to Support Review of Pending Request for Amend to Reactor pressure-temp Limit Curve TS GO2-99-168, Forwards Rev 40 to Physical Security Plan.Rev Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(3)1999-09-0808 September 1999 Forwards Rev 40 to Physical Security Plan.Rev Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(3) ML17284A8751999-08-30030 August 1999 Provides Correct Page from License NPF-21 Marked to Show Rev Addressed in 990729 Application for Amend,Which Included Page That Was Inadvertently Included as Attachment 4.Replace Attachment 4 with Attached Page & Disregard Attachment 5 ML17284A8721999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards Proprietary Info to Support Review of Request for Amend to License NPF-21,re Min Critical Power Ratio Safety Limits Tss,As Requested During 990816 Conversation. Proprietary Encl Withheld ML17284A8711999-08-30030 August 1999 Informs Staff of Errors in world-wide-web Database Related to WNP-2 Reactor Vessel Structural integrity.Marked-up Pages Containing Errors or Omissions Will Be Forwarded by 991201 ML17292B7531999-08-24024 August 1999 Requests That Eleven Individuals Listed Below Take BWR Generic Fundamentals Examination to Be Administered on 991006 ML17292B7511999-08-24024 August 1999 Forwards Fitness for Duty (FFD) Semiannual Performance Data Rept for Jan-June 1999,per 10CFR26.71(d) ML17284A8701999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards NRC Form 396, Certification of Medical Exam by Facility Licensee & NRC Form 398, Personal Qualification Statement - Licensee, for Jd Prescott (License SOP-50262-1).Without Encls ML17292B7501999-08-19019 August 1999 Informs Staff That Licensee Has Completed Review of NRC SER for B&Wog Util Resolution Guidance Document Addressing ECCS Suction Strainer Blockage ML17284A8681999-08-12012 August 1999 Submits Two ISI Program Plan Relief Requests for NRC Review & Approval,Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i).Proposed Alternatives Provide Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety ML17284A8541999-08-0202 August 1999 Forwards Proprietary Addl Info to Support Review of Pending Request for Amend to MCPR Safety Limit Ts.Info Consists of Proprietary Ltr from Abb Combustion Engineering,Inc.Encl Withheld ML17284A8531999-07-30030 July 1999 Forwards Estimate of Number of Licensing Action Requests Planned for Submittal in Future,As Requested in Administrative Ltr 99-02.Twenty-nine Submittals Scheduled for Fy 2000 & Four for Fy 2001 ML17284A8301999-07-22022 July 1999 Clarifies Change of Licensee Name from Wpps to Energy Northwest & Change of Facility Name from Wppss Nuclear Project Number 2 to WNP-2,as Requested in 990719 Telcon with Js Cushing of NRC.Marked-up OL Pages,Encl ML17292B7451999-07-20020 July 1999 Forwards Rev 23 to WNP-2 Emergency Plan,Iaw 10CFR50.4(b) & 50.54(q) & 10CFR50 App E.Rev 23 Provides Updated Description Re Establishment of Separate Emergency Operation Centers for Benton & Franklin Counties ML17292B7391999-07-16016 July 1999 Submits Withdrawal of Request for Amend to Secondary Containment & Standby Gas Treatment Sys Ts.Util Currently Plan to re-submit Amend Request in Entirety by 991112 ML17292B7381999-07-12012 July 1999 Forwards NRC Form 396 & NRC Form 398,for If Sumsion,License OP-50487 & Ga Westergard,License SOP-50415 for Renewal of Operator Licenses.Without Encls ML17292B7171999-07-0606 July 1999 Provides Notification of Early Completion on 990630 of Exception Noted in 990629 Ltr.Equipment within Scope of GL 98-01,Suppl 1, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants, Evaluated & Y2K Ready ML17292B7181999-07-0202 July 1999 Responds to 990623 RAI to Support Review of Evaluation of Planar Indication Found on Weld Number 24RRC(2)A-1 During 1998 RO ML17292B7161999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards Addl Info Requested in 990513 Ltr to Support Review of Pending Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power Operated Gate Valves. ML17292B7131999-06-29029 June 1999 Forwards Response to NRC GL 98-01,Suppl 1, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Npps. ML17292B7091999-06-21021 June 1999 Forwards Proprietary Response to NRC 990603 RAI Re Licensee Request for Amend to MCPR Safety Limit Tss.Proprietary Info Withheld IAW Requirements of 10CFR2.790 ML17292B7041999-06-17017 June 1999 Forwards NRC Forms 396 & 398 for Three Individuals Listed Below for Renewal of Operator Licenses.Without Encls ML17292B7031999-06-10010 June 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990511 RAI Re License Request for Amend to Secondary Containment & SGTS Tss.Results of Addl Benchmark of Gothic Computer Code Performed to Demonstrate Modeling Capability of Drawdown Response,Encl ML17292B6841999-06-0404 June 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990326 RAI Re WNP-2 GL 96-05 Program for Periodic Verification of design-basis Capability of MOVs ML17292B6851999-06-0101 June 1999 Forwards 1999 Quality Audit of WNP-2 Emergency Preparedness Program, Per NUREG-0654,Section Ii,Criteria P.9.Seven Problem Evaluation Requests & Nine Recommendations for Improvement Were Issued as Result of Audit Activities ML17292B6751999-05-25025 May 1999 Forwards Proprietary ABB-CE Ltr Re WNP-2 Cycle 15 SLMCPR & Core Reload Design Rept,Per Util Request for Amend Re MCPR Safety Limits.Proprietary Info Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790 ML17292B6831999-05-25025 May 1999 Informs That Request for NRC Approval of Changes to Emergency Plan Requesting Reduction in on-shift HP Staffing, Is Retracted.Util Will Resubmit Request with Required Addl Info at Later Date ML17292B6661999-05-0707 May 1999 Requests Exemption to Requirement in 10CFR55.59(a)(2) Re Annual Operating Test requirements.One-time Exemption from Requirement to Period Not to Exceed 15-months from Last Date of Passing Operating Exam for Licensee at Facility ML17292B6531999-05-0303 May 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990402 RAI Re Licensed Operator Positive Drug Test.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790 ML17292B6561999-04-29029 April 1999 Forwards Rev 0 to Calculation ME-02-98-04, Fracture Mechanics Evaluation of N1 Safe End & Calculation Mod Record CMR-98-0243, Fracture Mechanics Evaluation of N1A Nozzle Safe End, as Suppl Info to ISI Exam ML17292B6421999-04-19019 April 1999 Responds to NRC 990319 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-397/99-01.Corrective Actions:Provisions Are Presently in Place to Maintain Adequate Level of Security GO2-99-073, Forwards Rev 39 to WNP-2 Physical Security Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Changes Do Not Decrease Effectiveness of Approved Plan.Encl Withheld IAW 10CFR73.21 & 10CFR2.7901999-04-19019 April 1999 Forwards Rev 39 to WNP-2 Physical Security Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Changes Do Not Decrease Effectiveness of Approved Plan.Encl Withheld IAW 10CFR73.21 & 10CFR2.790 ML17292B6401999-04-13013 April 1999 Requests That WNP-2 Operator Requalification Program Be Granted one-time Extension Beyond Requirement in 10CFR55.59(a)(2) for Annual Operating Tests ML17292B6371999-04-12012 April 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990211 RAI Re Util Request for Amend to Secondary Containment & SBGTS TS ML17292B6281999-04-0606 April 1999 Informs NRC That Insp Interval Ending Date for ISI Program Plan Has Been Extended by One Year to Dec 12,2005 Due to Changes in Plant Refueling Outage Schedule GO2-99-060, Submits Rept of Status of WNP-2 Decommissioning Fund as of 981231,IAW 10CFR50.75(f)(1)1999-03-26026 March 1999 Submits Rept of Status of WNP-2 Decommissioning Fund as of 981231,IAW 10CFR50.75(f)(1) ML17292B6131999-03-24024 March 1999 Forwards Rev 0 to Calculation ME-02-98-04, Fracture Mechanics Evaluation of N1 Nozzle Safe End. Info Will Be Used to Assist NRC in Review of WNP-2 ISI Activities Associated with Evaluation of Planar Indication ML17292B5991999-03-16016 March 1999 Informs That Listed Property & Liability Insurance Coverage for WNP-2 Is in Force,In Compliance with Licensing Responsibilities Delineated in 10CFR50.54(w)(3) ML17292B5911999-03-16016 March 1999 Forwards 1998 Environ Operating Rept, Per Reporting Requirements of Section 5.4.1 of WNP-2 Epp.No Design or Operational Changes or Tests in 1998 Involved Unreviewed Environ Question ML17292B5941999-03-16016 March 1999 Forwards NRC Form 396, Certification of Medical Exam by Facility Licensee, & NRC Form 398, Personal Qualification Statement - Licensee, for MD Comstock,Mc Naulty & RR Nelson.Without Encls ML17292B6001999-03-16016 March 1999 Responds to Weakness Noted in Insp Rept 50-397/98-24. Corrective Actions:Developed Document to Identify Areas Needing Improvement,Assigned Responsibility for Actions & Provided Milestones for Achievement ML17292B5901999-03-11011 March 1999 Forwards Hard Copy of Addl Occupational Exposure Data Requested in GL 94-04,per 990303 e-mail.Original Electronic Version Was Corrupted ML17292B5681999-03-0101 March 1999 Forwards Radioactive Effluent Release Rept for 1998, IAW 10CFR50.36a(a)(2) & TS 5.6.3 & Complete Copy of WNP-2 ODCM Per TS 5.5.1 ML17292B5651999-02-22022 February 1999 Forwards Relief Request 2ISI-20,proposing Alternate Exam Expected to Reduce Dose Significantly & Still Provide Adequate Safety & Quality.Attached Relief Request Will Be Used to Support ALARA Dose Reduction Efforts During Maint ML17292B5581999-02-0404 February 1999 Requests Change to Co Which Modified WNP-2 OL to Reflect Schedule for Implementing Thermo-Lag 330-1 Fire Barrier C/As.Change Requested to Reflect That Final Implementation of C/As Will Be Completed During Fall 1999 Not Spring 1999 1999-09-09
[Table view] |
Text
CATE.GORY 1 REGULATi INFORMATION DISTRZBUTIOIQZSTEM (RIDE)
ACCFSSIOA. NBR:9702030200 DOC.DATE: 97/Ol/28 NOTARIZED: YES DOCKET N~
FACIL:50~397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 0500'0"397 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION PARRISH,J;V. Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)
SUBJECT:
Responds to GL 96-06, "Assurance of Equipment Operability &
Containment Integrity. During Design-Basis Accident Conditions."
DISTRIBUTION CODE: A072D TITLE: GL COPIES RECEIVED:LTR 96=06, "Assurance of Equip Oprblty 6 i ENCL J SIZE:
Contain.Integ. during Design RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES NOTES~'NTERNAL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL NRR/WETZELFB 1 1 PD4-2 PD 1 1 COLBURN,T 1 1 1 1 NRR/DE/EMEB 1 1 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SPLB 1 1 EXTERNAL: NOAC 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 D
0 U
NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM OWFN 5D-5(EXT. 415-2083) TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!
TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 9 ENCL 9
WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM PO. Box 968 ~ Richianrl, Washington 99352-0968 January 28, 1997 G02-97-015 Docket No. 50-397 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:
Subject:
WNP-2, OPERATING LICENSE NPF-21, GENERIC LETTER 96-06, "ASSURANCE OF EQUIPMENT OPERABILITY AND CONTAINMENT;'NTEGRITY DURING DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT CONDITIONS,"
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION
References:
- 1) NRC Generic Letter 96-06, dated September 30, 1996, "Assurance of Equipment Operability and Containment Integrity During Design-Basis Accident Conditions"
- 2) Letter, GO2-96-213, dated October 30, 1996, JV Parrish (SS) to NRC, "Response to Generic Letter 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability and Containment Integrity During Design-Basis Accident Conditions" The Supply System hereby responds to the referenced generic letter and provides the requested information relative to the following concerns:
(1) Cooling water systems serving containment air coolers may be exposed to the hydrodynamic effects of water hammer during either a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) or a main steamline break (MSLB) for which they were not designed.
(2) Cooling water systems serving the containment air coolers may experience two-phase flow conditions during postulated LOCA and MSLB scenarios while the heat removal assumptions were based on single-phase flow conditions.
AQAARQ 9702030200 970i28 PDR ADOCK 05000397 P PDR
Page 2 GENERIC LETTER 96-06, REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (3) Thermally induced overpressurization of isolated water-filled piping sections in containment could jeopardize the ability of accident mitigating systems to perform their safety functions and could also lead to a breach. of containment integrity via bypass leakage.
In a previous letter (see Reference 2) the Supply System informed the staff that action would be taken and a response submitted within the requested 120 day time period to determine:
(1) if containment air cooler cooling water systems are susceptible to either water hammer or two-phase flow conditions during postulated accident conditions; and (2) ifpiping systems that penetrate containment are susceptible to thermal expansion of fluid so that overpressurization of piping could occur.
Included in the Attachment to this letter is a summary report addressing WNP-2's susceptibility to water hammer and two-phase flow in the containment air cooler cooling water system, and to overpressurization of piping that penetrates containment. Those systems that were found to be susceptible to the conditions discussed in the generic letter have also been identified. The basis for continued operations of affected systems and components is addressed, as well as a schedule for identifying planned corrective actions.
The Supply System will continue to support other industry groups such as the Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group, the Nuclear Energy Institute, and the Electric Power Research Institute to develop longterm corrective actions necessary to ensure the important issues noted by Generic Letter 96-06 are addressed appropriately.
Should you have any questions or desire additional information regarding this matter, please call me or Ms. L. C. Fernandez at (509) 377-4147.
Respectfully, J
..ad V. Parrish Chief Executive Officer Mail Drop 1023 Attachment CC: LJ Callan - NRC RIV JE Dyer - NRC RIV KE Perkins, Jr. - NRC RIV, WCFO TG Colburn - NRR NRC Sr. Resident Inspector - 927N DL Williams - BPA/399 NS Reynolds - Winston & Strawn
STATE OF WASHINGTON )
Subject:
Generic Letter 96-06
) Request for Information COUNTY OF BENTON )
I, J. V. PARRISH, being duly sworn, subscribe to and say that I am the Chief Executive Officer for the WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM, the applicant herein; that I have the full authority to execute this oath; that I have reviewed the foregoing; and that to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief the statements made in it are true.
DATE cP+ vM~, 1997 J . Parrish hief Executive Officer On this date personally appeared before me J. V. PARRISH, to me known to be the individual who executed the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged that he signed the same as his free act and deed for the uses and purposes herein mentioned.
GIVEN under my hand and seal this day of 1997.
f Publicm and r the STATE OF WASHINGTON Residing a I
My Commission Expires
~ ~
+~ad A
"gati(<>>~>>"
GENERIC LETTER 96-06, REQUEST FOR INFORMATION Attachment Page 1 of 4
$ gm~mry WNP-2 has performed an evaluation to address the three primary concerns identified in Generic Letter 96-06. The evaluation addressed the potential, during design basis accident (DBA) conditions, for the containment air cooler cooling water system to experience water hammer or two-phase flow conditions. It was determined that the potential for water hammer or two-phase flow is not a concern because the non-safety related containment air coolers are isolated during design basis accidents. The containment air coolers are not safety-related systems and are not relied upon to mitigate the consequences of any design basis accidents.
The evaluation also addressed the potential for piping systems that penetrate containment to overpressurize during DBA conditions due to thermal expansion of fluid between closed isolation valves. It was determined that for the piping systems that penetrate containment, three of the systems, and their associated isolation valves, were susceptible to overpressurization due to thermal expansion of trapped fluid. However, with the exception of the containment penetration itself, these piping systems are not part of any safety-related systems. In addition, containment integrity for the containment penetrations associated with these piping systems is not compromised because the pressures experienced by the piping and the associated isolation valves do not cause these components to exceed the appropriate ASME Code faulted allowable limit.
WNP-2 was not licensed by the NRC for the faulted load combination represented by the accident conditions identified in Generic Letter 96-06. The WNP-2 licensed faulted load combinations did not include the postulated pressure loading caused by heating trapped fluid in isolated sections of piping following an accident.
Estimated expenditures by WNP-2 in order to support the evaluation required by Generic Letter 96-06 are approximately $ 140,000 to date.
The Supply System will provide the staff by May 30, 1997 a list of corrective actions, and an implementation schedule, to ensure the two susceptible piping systems are not exposed to thermal overpressurization during design basis accident conditions.
Additional Information In regard to the potential for water hammer and two-phase flow in the containment air cooler cooling water system, WNP-2 utilizes five containment air coolers during normal operation, but does not credit the use of containment air coolers to mitigate the consequences of any design basis accident. These non-safety-related coolers are isolated during and after a design basis loss of coolant accident, or main steam line break. Isolation of the air cooler systems eliminates the potential for water hammer and two-phase flow.
'h GENERIC LETTER 96-06, REQUEST FOR INFORMATION t
Attachment Page 2 of 4 Restart of the containment air coolers during design basis accident recovery scenarios is beyond the design basis assumptions and is controlled by the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs).
The concern in Generic Letter 96-06 regarding "delayed sequencing of equipment" is not considered applicable to the restart of containment cooling at WNP-2. Cooling water to the containment air coolers is supplied by the Reactor Closed Cooling Water System (RCC). The RCC is an open system outside containment, with a surge tank maintaining piping head pressure and a coolant inventory reserve. During DBA conditions the RCC will isolate. Rising containment temperatures will thermally expand the fluid trapped between containment inboard and outboard isolation valves (as discussed later), while other fluid in RCC piping inside containment can be relieved through a relief valve should thermal expansion occur. Subsequent if long term fluid cooling, any, inside containment following the accident could create vacuum pockets in the piping system when the containment temperature drops below boiling.
Conversely, if the containment temperature was above boiling, the opening of isolation valves may result in two phase flow and/or boiling. After opening the isolation valves, the surge tank would ultimately restore a positive static pressure throughout the system, minimizing any voids.
Upon successful reopening of the valves and a pump restart, the parallel loops inside containment would slowly sweep any minor non-condensables, voids, or steam pockets into the return headers, out of containment and into the vented surge tank. The EOP currently addresses slowly reintroducing cooling flow into some components such as motor coolers. Neither water hammer nor two-phase flow would be an anticipated nuclear safety concern during this evolution. If there is containment air cooler cooling water system pressure boundary damage during the accident, two potential indications that this non-safety system had been affected would be observable when the isolation valves were reopened. Those indications would be a decreasing surge tank level and possibly increasing drywell unidentified leakage.
The evaluation determined that there are piping systems at WNP-2 that penetrate containment and are susceptible to thermal overpressurization during DBA conditions. An increase in trapped fluid pressure will occur in these systems between containment penetration isolation valves.
All containment penetrations were individually reviewed as part of the evaluation. A screening criterion was established which first identified ifthe line was potentially liquid filled. Lines that were air, gas, or steam filled were not susceptible. For those lines that were liquid filled, the next screening eliminated those lines where the fluid temperature is higher than the accident temperature or where the piping penetrated containment below the water level of the suppression pool and had no inboard isolation valve. The third level of screening determined if the line utilized an isolation check valve inside containment and connected to containment atmosphere, or to the reactor pressure boundary itself. The fourth level of screening eliminated those lines that have both isolation valves outside containment, but connect to either the containment atmosphere or the reactor pressure boundary. In none of these cases could the accident induce pressures above the design pressure of the line. At the fifth level, instrument lines (designed in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.11) which contained excess flow check valves outside containment and connected to either containment atmosphere or the reactor pressure boundary were evaluated. No instrument penetrations were identified that were susceptible to the Generic
IW GENERIC LETTER 96-06, REQUEST FOR INFORMATION Attachment Page 3 of 4 susceptible to the Generic Letter concerns. The sixth and final level of screening then individually evaluated the specific design configuration of each remaining line. These evaluations were documented separately and resulted in identification of the following piping systems that penetrate containment and are susceptible to thermal overpressurization:
- 1) a normally isolated two inch diameter demineralized water (DW) supply line to containment;
- 2) a currently isolated one inch liquid sample line in the Process Sample Radioactive (PSR)
System; and,
- 3) a ten inch diameter return line from containment in the Reactor Closed Cooling Water (RCC) System.
The two inch line passing through the containment DW penetration was confirmed to be drained of fluid. To support DW system and component operability, a revised valve line-up was implemented to preclude refilling the line with demineralized water during plant operation. This small bore line is only used during plant outages, if needed, to supply air or water to a distribution header inside containment. No further corrective action is required for this piping system.
The one inch PSR sample line would not normally be susceptible to thermal overpressurization because the two containment isolation valves associated with the line are designed such that thermal overpressurization would not occur. However, the two containment isolation valves recently exhibited leakage during in-service testing, thus requiring the sample line and it' respective containment penetration to be isolated by closing manual valves associated with the penetration. In the present isolated configuration, the sample line piping is susceptible to thermal overpressurization. It has been determined, based on a worst case design basis accident temperature profile, that the sample line isolation valves and piping will not exceed ASME Code faulted allowable limits, Containment integrity for the containment penetration associated with the sample line is maintained because the pressures experienced by the piping and the associated isolation valves do not cause these components to exceed Code faulted allowable limits. Sample system operability is also not compromised because the system remains isolated during the accident scenario, and ASME Code faulted allowable limits are not exceeded.
A containment penetration consisting of a ten inch diameter RCC System return line from containment, and the associated containment isolation valves, is also susceptible to thermal overpressurization during DBA conditions. This line automatically isolates 'during a Design Basis Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), and is not credited for mitigating any DBAs. Based on the incorporation of measured boundary leakage for this containment penetration, it has been determined that the piping and the containment isolation valves will not exceed ASME Code faulted allowable limits. In addition, containment integrity for the containment penetration associated with the RCC piping line is not compromised because the pressures experienced by
4 1
I'
GENERIC LETTER 96-06, REQUEST FOR INFORMATION
~ ~
Attachment Page 4 of 4 the piping and the associated isolation valves do not cause these components to exceed the ASME Code faulted allowable limits. The RCC system is not safety-related and not required to remain operable after a DBA LOCA. However, the system is expected 'to remain available for use after the accident because ASME Code stress limits are not exceeded.
The Supply System will provide the Staff by May 30, 1997 a list of corrective actions, and an implementation schedule, to ensure the two susceptible piping systems are not exposed to thermal overpressurization during DBA conditions.
1 t