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Category:Letter
MONTHYEARIR 05000382/20230102024-01-31031 January 2024 Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection Report 05000382/2023010 IR 05000382/20230032024-01-23023 January 2024 Acknowledgment of Reply to a Notice of Violation NRC Inspection Report 05000382/2023003 ML24012A1962024-01-12012 January 2024 Response to 2nd Round Request for Additional Information Concerning Relief Request Number EN-RR-22-001 Proposed Alternative to Use ASME Code Case N-752, Risk-Informed Categorization and ML23340A2292023-12-28028 December 2023 Withdrawal of an Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3/4.3.2 to Remove Exemption from Testing Certain Relays at Power to Support Elimination of Potential Single Point Vulnerability (EPID L-2022-LLA-0169)-LTR ML23349A1672023-12-21021 December 2023 Request for Withholding Information from Public Disclosure ML23348A3572023-12-14014 December 2023 Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Use Online Monitoring Methodology Slides and Affidavit for Pre-Submittal Meeting ML23352A0292023-12-13013 December 2023 Entergy - 2024 Nuclear Energy Liability Evidence of Financial Protection ML23340A1592023-12-13013 December 2023 Entergy Operations, Inc. - Entergy Fleet Project Manager Assignment ML23333A1362023-11-29029 November 2023 Supplement to Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation ML23325A1442023-11-21021 November 2023 Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation ML23312A1832023-11-14014 November 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000382/2023003 and Notice of Violation ML23311A2082023-11-0909 November 2023 Reassignment of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Branch Chief in the Division of Operating Reactor Licensing for Plant Licensing Branch IV IR 05000382/20234012023-10-0404 October 2023 Cyber Security Inspection Report 05000382/2023401 (Cover Letter Only) IR 05000382/20230052023-08-21021 August 2023 Updated Inspection Plan for Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 - (Report 05000382/2023005) IR 05000382/20233012023-08-15015 August 2023 NRC Initial Operator Licensing Examination Approval 05000382/2023301 IR 05000382/20230022023-08-0808 August 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000382/2023002 IR 05000382/20234022023-08-0707 August 2023 NRC Security Inspection Report 05000382/2023402 (Full Report) IR 05000382/20230402023-07-12012 July 2023 Revised 95001 Supplemental Inspection Report 05000382/2023040, Exercise of Enforcement Discretion, and Follow-Up Assessment Letter ML23191A4562023-07-10010 July 2023 Notification of Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection (050003822023010) and Request for Information ML23158A1042023-06-0808 June 2023 Information Request for the Cybersecurity Baseline Inspection, Notification to Perform Inspection 05000382/2023401 ML23145A2272023-06-0202 June 2023 95001 Supplemental Inspection Report 05000382/2023040, and Exercise of Enforcement Discretion ML23130A2732023-05-10010 May 2023 and Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station - Response to Regulatory Issue Summary 2023-01, Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations ML23117A2172023-05-0101 May 2023 Safety Evaluation for Quality Assurance Program Manual Reduction in Commitment IR 05000382/20230012023-04-24024 April 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000382/2023001, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Report 07200075/2023001, and Exercise of Enforcement Discretion ML23111A2132023-04-21021 April 2023 Responses to RAI Concerning Relief Request Number EN-RR-22-001 Proposed Alternative to Use ASME Code Case N-752, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment for Repair/ Replacement Activities ML23110A1122023-04-20020 April 2023 Annual Report for Entergy Quality Assurance Program Manual Changes Under 10 CFR 50.54(a)(3), 10 CFR 71.106, and 10 CFR 72.140(d). Notification of Application of Approved Appendix B to 10 CFR 72 Subpart G ML23108A2542023-04-18018 April 2023 WCGS Information Request, Security IR 2023401 IR 05000382/20234032023-04-17017 April 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000382/2023403 ML23093A2122023-04-0303 April 2023 Annual Report on Westinghouse Electric Company LLC Combustion Engineering Emergency Core Cooling System Performance Evaluation Models for Calendar Year 2022 ML23089A0602023-03-30030 March 2023 Entergy Operations, Inc. - Fleet Project Manager Assignment ML23088A3922023-03-29029 March 2023 Nuclear Onsite Property Damage Insurance (10 CFR 50.54(w)(3)) ML23080A2882023-03-21021 March 2023 Decommissioning Funding Status Report Per 10 CFR 50.75(f)(1) Entergy Operations, Inc ML23059A2592023-03-0707 March 2023 Correction to Issuance to Amendment No. 270 Adoption of TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b ML23065A2002023-03-0303 March 2023 EN 56252 Update - Flow Serve - Final Notification of Potential Part 21 on Peerless 56 Frame DC Motors ML23060A1092023-03-0101 March 2023 Proof of Financial Protection (10 CFR 140.15) IR 05000382/20220062023-03-0101 March 2023 Annual Assessment Letter for Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, (Report 05000382/2022006) ML22322A1092023-02-17017 February 2023 Issuance of Amendment No. 270 Adoption of TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b IR 05000382/20230902023-02-0101 February 2023 Final Significance Determination of a White Finding, NOV, and Follow-Up Assessment Letter; NRC Inspection Report 05000382/2023090 ML23032A5062023-02-0101 February 2023 Technical Specification Index and Bases Update to the NRC for the Period November 11, 2021 Through July 25, 2022 ML23030A6642023-01-27027 January 2023 Flowserve, Part 21 Second Interim Notification Report Re Peerless 56 Frame DC Motors IR 05000382/20220042023-01-26026 January 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000382/2022004 and Independent Fuel Storage Installation Inspection Report 07200075/2022001 ML23024A0822023-01-20020 January 2023 Stephens Insurance, Entergy - 2023 Nuclear Energy Liability Evidence of Financial Protection ML23018A2202023-01-18018 January 2023 Quality Assurance Program Manual Reduction in Commitment IR 05000382/20220912023-01-12012 January 2023 Emergency Preparedness Inspection Report 05000382/2022091 and Preliminary White Finding and Apparent Violation IR 05000382/20220032023-01-0505 January 2023 Revised Integrated Inspection Report 05000382/2022003 ML22342B1402022-12-0202 December 2022 56252-EN 56252 - Flowserve - Limitorque - Interim Report Potential Part 21 on Peerless 56 Frame DC Motors ML22300A2082022-11-30030 November 2022 Issuance of Amendment No. 269 Adoption of 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors ML22332A5292022-11-29029 November 2022 Notification of NRC Initial Operator Licensing Examination 05000382/2023301 IR 05000382/20220132022-11-28028 November 2022 Design Basis Assurance Inspection (Programs) Inspection Report 05000382/2022013 IR 05000382/20220022022-11-0101 November 2022 Revised Integrated Inspection Report 05000382/2022002 2024-01-31
[Table view] Category:Report
MONTHYEARW3F1-2023-0056, Owner'S Activity Report Form for Inservice Inspection Performed During Operating Cycle 24 / Refuel 242023-12-19019 December 2023 Owner'S Activity Report Form for Inservice Inspection Performed During Operating Cycle 24 / Refuel 24 ML23325A1442023-11-21021 November 2023 Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation W3F1-2022-0042, SR-22-003-00 for Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, Radiation Monitor Inoperable Greater than 7 Days2022-06-27027 June 2022 SR-22-003-00 for Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, Radiation Monitor Inoperable Greater than 7 Days W3F1-2021-0064, Proposed Revision to Reactor Vessel Surveillance Capsule Withdrawal Schedule to Support Relocation of Capsules 104 and 2842021-11-30030 November 2021 Proposed Revision to Reactor Vessel Surveillance Capsule Withdrawal Schedule to Support Relocation of Capsules 104 and 284 CNRO-2021-00023, Entergy Operations, Inc. - Supplement to CNRO-2021-00002, Basis for Concluding the Terms of Confirmatory Order EA-17-132/EA-17-153 Are Complete, Element L2021-10-0606 October 2021 Entergy Operations, Inc. - Supplement to CNRO-2021-00002, Basis for Concluding the Terms of Confirmatory Order EA-17-132/EA-17-153 Are Complete, Element L W3F1-2021-0050, Response to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Adopt2021-10-0101 October 2021 Response to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Adopt ML21272A3032021-09-30030 September 2021 Technology Inclusive Content of Application Project (Ticap) for Non-Light Water Reactors Westinghouse Evinci; Micro-Reactor Tabletop Exercise Report ML21237A0512021-08-25025 August 2021 Follow-on Risk Informed Performance Based Implementation Guidance Needed for Advanced Non-Light Water Reactors ML21081A1922021-06-30030 June 2021 Enclosure - USNRC-CNSC Joint Report Concerning X-Energy's Reactor Pressure Vessel Construction Code Assessment W3F1-2021-0004, License Amendment Request to Relocate Chemical Detection Systems Technical Specifications to the Technical Requirements Manual2021-04-0505 April 2021 License Amendment Request to Relocate Chemical Detection Systems Technical Specifications to the Technical Requirements Manual ML21272A3382021-04-0101 April 2021 Technology Inclusive Content of Application Project (Ticap) for Non-Light Water Reactors Versatile Test Reactor Ticap Tabletop Exercise Report ML21090A0332021-03-31031 March 2021 Historical Context and Perspective on Allowable Stresses and Design Parameters in ASME Section III, Division 5, Subsection Hb, Subpart B (ANL/AMD-21/1) ML21083A1362021-03-23023 March 2021 Completed Activities ML21083A1412021-03-22022 March 2021 Strategy 3 ML21083A1372021-03-22022 March 2021 NEIMA Reporting ML21083A1442021-03-22022 March 2021 Strategy 6 ML21083A1382021-03-22022 March 2021 Rulemaking ML21083A1392021-03-22022 March 2021 Strategy 1 ML21083A1402021-03-22022 March 2021 Strategy 2 ML21083A1432021-03-22022 March 2021 Strategy 5 ML21083A1422021-03-22022 March 2021 Strategy 4 W3F1-2021-0015, Revised Vendor Oversight Plan Summary - License Amendment Request to Implement a Digital Upgrade to the Core Protection Calculator (CPC) System and Control Element Assembly Calculator (Ceac) System2021-01-29029 January 2021 Revised Vendor Oversight Plan Summary - License Amendment Request to Implement a Digital Upgrade to the Core Protection Calculator (CPC) System and Control Element Assembly Calculator (Ceac) System ML21014A2672021-01-14014 January 2021 Preapplication Engagement to Optimize Application Reviews January 12 Version - Copy W3F1-2020-0038, License Amendment Request to Implement a Digital Upgrade to the Core Protection Calculator (CPC) System and Control Element Assembly Calculator (Ceac) System2020-07-23023 July 2020 License Amendment Request to Implement a Digital Upgrade to the Core Protection Calculator (CPC) System and Control Element Assembly Calculator (Ceac) System W3F1-2019-0043, Annual Report on Westinghouse Electric Company LLC Combustion Engineering Emergency Core Cooling System Performance Evaluation Models for Calendar Year 20182019-07-0101 July 2019 Annual Report on Westinghouse Electric Company LLC Combustion Engineering Emergency Core Cooling System Performance Evaluation Models for Calendar Year 2018 W3F1-2019-0022, Resubmittal of Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program Capsule Test Results2019-03-14014 March 2019 Resubmittal of Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program Capsule Test Results ML18275A2342018-12-27027 December 2018 NRC Record of Decision for the License Renewal Application for Waterford, Unit 3 W3F1-2018-0029, Submittal of Annual Report on Westinghouse Electric Co., LLC Combustion Engineering Emergency Core Cooling System Performance Evaluation Models for Calendar Year 20172018-06-0707 June 2018 Submittal of Annual Report on Westinghouse Electric Co., LLC Combustion Engineering Emergency Core Cooling System Performance Evaluation Models for Calendar Year 2017 ML17163A1852017-06-30030 June 2017 Biological Evaluation of Impacts to Federally Listed Species for Waterford License Renewal W3F1-2017-0042, Focused Evaluation of External Flooding2017-05-17017 May 2017 Focused Evaluation of External Flooding ML17023A2822017-02-27027 February 2017 Flood Hazard Mitigating Strategies Assessment ML16308A4472016-10-19019 October 2016 Final ASP Program Analysis Precursor for Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 Re. Both Emergency Diesel Generators Declared Inoperable (LER 382-2015-007) ML15268A0202015-09-23023 September 2015 Attachment 3, Fuel Thermal Conductivity Degradation Evaluation (Non-Proprietary) W3F1-2015-0042, Attachment 2 to WF3-CS-15-00010, Rev. 0, Document 51-9227040-000, Fukushima Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report, Pp. 3-147 Through the End2015-07-21021 July 2015 Attachment 2 to WF3-CS-15-00010, Rev. 0, Document 51-9227040-000, Fukushima Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report, Pp. 3-147 Through the End ML15204A3242015-07-21021 July 2015 Attachment 2 to WF3-CS-15-00010, Rev. 0, Document 51-9227040-000, Fukushima Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report, Pp. 3-62 Through 3-146 ML15204A3232015-07-21021 July 2015 Attachment 2 to WF3-CS-15-00010, Rev. 0, Document 51-9227040-000, Fukushima Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report, Pp. 1 Through 3-61 ML14129A3502014-04-29029 April 2014 Report of Facility Changes, Tests and Experiments and Commitment Changes for Two Year Period Ending April 25, 2014 ML13220A4022013-11-22022 November 2013 Interim Staff Evaluation Relating to Overall Integrated Plan in Response to Order EA-12-049 - Mitigation Strategies ML13317A9692013-11-20020 November 2013 Mega-Tech Services, LLC Technical Evaluation Report Regarding the Overall Integrated Plan for Waterford Steam Electric Generating Station, Unit 3, TAC No.: MF0977 W3F1-2013-0054, CFR 71.95 Report on Issues Involving Radwaste Cask 8-120B2013-09-0909 September 2013 CFR 71.95 Report on Issues Involving Radwaste Cask 8-120B W3F1-2013-0027, Closure Option for Generic Safety Issue - 1912013-05-16016 May 2013 Closure Option for Generic Safety Issue - 191 ML13120A4642013-03-25025 March 2013 Engineering Report WF3-CS-12-00003, Attachment C, Rev. 0, Safety Injection Sump Outlet Header B Isolation, Enclosure to W3F1-2013-0024, Pages 312 - 591 of 1014 W3F1-2013-0024, Engineering Report WF3-CS-12-00003, Attachment D, Rev. 0, Area Walk-by Checklists (Awcs), Enclosure to W3F1-2013-0024, Pages 592 - 817 of 10142013-03-25025 March 2013 Engineering Report WF3-CS-12-00003, Attachment D, Rev. 0, Area Walk-by Checklists (Awcs), Enclosure to W3F1-2013-0024, Pages 592 - 817 of 1014 ML13120A4622013-03-25025 March 2013 Engineering Report WF3-CS-12-00003, Attachment G, Rev. 0, Peer Review Checklist for SWEL, Enclosure to W3F1-2013-0024, Pages 820 - 1014 of 1014 ML13120A4612013-03-25025 March 2013 Engineering Report WF3-CS-12-00003, Revision 1, Wateford, Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, Enclosure to W3F1-2013-0024, Pages 1 - 311 of 1014 CNRO-2013-00002, Responses to NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding Application for Order Approving Transfers of Licenses and Conforming License and ESP Amendments2013-01-29029 January 2013 Responses to NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding Application for Order Approving Transfers of Licenses and Conforming License and ESP Amendments W3F1-2012-0100, WF3-CS-12-00003, Rev. 0, Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic. Part 22012-11-16016 November 2012 WF3-CS-12-00003, Rev. 0, Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic. Part 2 ML12333A2772012-11-16016 November 2012 WF3-CS-12-00003, Rev. 0, Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic. Part 1 ML12333A2752012-11-16016 November 2012 WF3-CS-12-00003, Rev. 0, Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic. Part 5 ML12333A2742012-11-16016 November 2012 WF3-CS-12-00003, Rev. 0, Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3 Seismic Walkdown Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic. Part 4 2023-12-19
[Table view] Category:Miscellaneous
MONTHYEARW3F1-2023-0056, Owner'S Activity Report Form for Inservice Inspection Performed During Operating Cycle 24 / Refuel 242023-12-19019 December 2023 Owner'S Activity Report Form for Inservice Inspection Performed During Operating Cycle 24 / Refuel 24 ML23325A1442023-11-21021 November 2023 Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation W3F1-2022-0042, SR-22-003-00 for Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, Radiation Monitor Inoperable Greater than 7 Days2022-06-27027 June 2022 SR-22-003-00 for Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, Radiation Monitor Inoperable Greater than 7 Days CNRO-2021-00023, Entergy Operations, Inc. - Supplement to CNRO-2021-00002, Basis for Concluding the Terms of Confirmatory Order EA-17-132/EA-17-153 Are Complete, Element L2021-10-0606 October 2021 Entergy Operations, Inc. - Supplement to CNRO-2021-00002, Basis for Concluding the Terms of Confirmatory Order EA-17-132/EA-17-153 Are Complete, Element L ML21083A1362021-03-23023 March 2021 Completed Activities ML21083A1442021-03-22022 March 2021 Strategy 6 ML21083A1382021-03-22022 March 2021 Rulemaking ML21083A1432021-03-22022 March 2021 Strategy 5 ML21083A1422021-03-22022 March 2021 Strategy 4 ML21083A1402021-03-22022 March 2021 Strategy 2 ML21083A1412021-03-22022 March 2021 Strategy 3 ML21083A1392021-03-22022 March 2021 Strategy 1 ML21083A1372021-03-22022 March 2021 NEIMA Reporting ML21014A2672021-01-14014 January 2021 Preapplication Engagement to Optimize Application Reviews January 12 Version - Copy W3F1-2019-0043, Annual Report on Westinghouse Electric Company LLC Combustion Engineering Emergency Core Cooling System Performance Evaluation Models for Calendar Year 20182019-07-0101 July 2019 Annual Report on Westinghouse Electric Company LLC Combustion Engineering Emergency Core Cooling System Performance Evaluation Models for Calendar Year 2018 ML18275A2342018-12-27027 December 2018 NRC Record of Decision for the License Renewal Application for Waterford, Unit 3 W3F1-2018-0029, Submittal of Annual Report on Westinghouse Electric Co., LLC Combustion Engineering Emergency Core Cooling System Performance Evaluation Models for Calendar Year 20172018-06-0707 June 2018 Submittal of Annual Report on Westinghouse Electric Co., LLC Combustion Engineering Emergency Core Cooling System Performance Evaluation Models for Calendar Year 2017 W3F1-2017-0042, Focused Evaluation of External Flooding2017-05-17017 May 2017 Focused Evaluation of External Flooding ML17023A2822017-02-27027 February 2017 Flood Hazard Mitigating Strategies Assessment ML16308A4472016-10-19019 October 2016 Final ASP Program Analysis Precursor for Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 Re. Both Emergency Diesel Generators Declared Inoperable (LER 382-2015-007) W3F1-2015-0042, Attachment 2 to WF3-CS-15-00010, Rev. 0, Document 51-9227040-000, Fukushima Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report, Pp. 3-147 Through the End2015-07-21021 July 2015 Attachment 2 to WF3-CS-15-00010, Rev. 0, Document 51-9227040-000, Fukushima Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report, Pp. 3-147 Through the End ML15204A3242015-07-21021 July 2015 Attachment 2 to WF3-CS-15-00010, Rev. 0, Document 51-9227040-000, Fukushima Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report, Pp. 3-62 Through 3-146 ML15204A3232015-07-21021 July 2015 Attachment 2 to WF3-CS-15-00010, Rev. 0, Document 51-9227040-000, Fukushima Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report, Pp. 1 Through 3-61 ML14129A3502014-04-29029 April 2014 Report of Facility Changes, Tests and Experiments and Commitment Changes for Two Year Period Ending April 25, 2014 W3F1-2013-0054, CFR 71.95 Report on Issues Involving Radwaste Cask 8-120B2013-09-0909 September 2013 CFR 71.95 Report on Issues Involving Radwaste Cask 8-120B W3F1-2013-0027, Closure Option for Generic Safety Issue - 1912013-05-16016 May 2013 Closure Option for Generic Safety Issue - 191 W3F1-2012-0079, Special Report SR-12-002-00, Containment High Range Radiation Monitor ARMIRE5400 a Inoperable for Greater than 7 Days2012-09-20020 September 2012 Special Report SR-12-002-00, Containment High Range Radiation Monitor ARMIRE5400 a Inoperable for Greater than 7 Days ML12157A4262012-05-23023 May 2012 Attachment 38 to GNRO-2012/00039 - Ensr. 2007, Impingement Mortality and Entrainment Characterization Study (Imecs), Entergy -Waterford 3. December 2007 W3F1-2012-0034, Report of Facility Changes, Tests and Experiments and Commitment Changes for Two Year Period Ending April 25, 20122012-04-30030 April 2012 Report of Facility Changes, Tests and Experiments and Commitment Changes for Two Year Period Ending April 25, 2012 W3F1-2011-0074, License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Generating Plants (2001 Edition)2011-11-17017 November 2011 License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Generating Plants (2001 Edition) ML1017302002010-06-17017 June 2010 Chemical Effects Summary Related to RAI Response to GL-2004-02 ML1012704392010-05-0505 May 2010 Y020100187 - List of Historical Leaks and Spills at U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants W3F1-2010-0003, License Amendment Request for Approval of Leak-Before-Break of the Pressurizer Surge Line2010-02-22022 February 2010 License Amendment Request for Approval of Leak-Before-Break of the Pressurizer Surge Line W3F1-2009-0033, Blind Sample Investigation Report2009-07-15015 July 2009 Blind Sample Investigation Report W3F1-2008-0049, Day Report for Reactor Pressure Vessel Head and Pressurizer Inspection/Repair for the Spring 2008 Refueling Outage2008-07-24024 July 2008 Day Report for Reactor Pressure Vessel Head and Pressurizer Inspection/Repair for the Spring 2008 Refueling Outage W3F1-2007-0030, Day Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report for the 14th Refueling Outage2007-06-21021 June 2007 Day Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report for the 14th Refueling Outage ML0705902052007-02-21021 February 2007 Inspection and Mitigation of Alloy 600/82/182 Pressurizer Butt Welds W3F1-2006-0059, Core Operating Limits Report - Cycle 14 Revision 0 Change 12006-11-0707 November 2006 Core Operating Limits Report - Cycle 14 Revision 0 Change 1 CNRO-2006-00034, Supplement to Request for Use of Delta Protection Mururoa V4F1 R Supplied Air Suits; Arkansas Nuclear One, Indian Point, Grand Gulf, Waterford, FitzPatrick, River Bend, Pilgrim, Vermont Yankee2006-07-13013 July 2006 Supplement to Request for Use of Delta Protection Mururoa V4F1 R Supplied Air Suits; Arkansas Nuclear One, Indian Point, Grand Gulf, Waterford, FitzPatrick, River Bend, Pilgrim, Vermont Yankee W3F1-2006-0012, Report of Facility Changes, Tests and Experiments and Commitment Changes2006-05-0101 May 2006 Report of Facility Changes, Tests and Experiments and Commitment Changes CNRO-2006-00023, Request for Alternative CEP-PT-001 Visual Examination of Vent and Drain Connections During System Leakage Tests2006-04-24024 April 2006 Request for Alternative CEP-PT-001 Visual Examination of Vent and Drain Connections During System Leakage Tests W3F1-2006-0008, Supplement to Amendment Request NPF-38-260 Tubesheet Inspection Depth for Steam Generator Tube Inspections for Waterford, Unit 32006-03-22022 March 2006 Supplement to Amendment Request NPF-38-260 Tubesheet Inspection Depth for Steam Generator Tube Inspections for Waterford, Unit 3 W3F1-2005-0067, Supplemental Startup and Power Report for Cycle 14 Waterford, Unit 32005-12-0808 December 2005 Supplemental Startup and Power Report for Cycle 14 Waterford, Unit 3 ML0612801172005-12-0101 December 2005 ER-W3-2000-0334-000, Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning Equipment Room and Component Cooling Heat Exchanger Room Calculations Correction ML0612801142005-10-19019 October 2005 ER-W3-2005-0334-001, Temporary Alteration for Reactor Vessel Gasket Leak-off Pressure High Annunciator ML0612801122005-09-14014 September 2005 ER-W3-2005-0378-000, Outside Containment Leak Reduction Program Test Medium Change ML0612801132005-09-14014 September 2005 ER-W3-2005-0396-000, Confirmatory Criticality Calculation Correction for Spent Fuel Racks ML0520901582005-08-0202 August 2005 2004 External Stakeholder Response; 2004 Reactor Oversight Process External Survey - Attachment ML0612801082005-06-0606 June 2005 ER-W3-2004-0276-002, Steam Generator Tube Rupture Impacts Due to Alternate Source Term Methodology with Revised Assumptions ML0612801112005-06-0606 June 2005 ER-W3-2004-0122-000, Pressurizer Heater Sleeve and Instrument Nozzle Repair 2023-12-19
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 February 27, 2017 Site Vice President Entergy Operations, Inc.
Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3 17265 River Road Killona, LA 70057-3093
SUBJECT:
WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3 - FLOOD HAZARD MITIGATION STRATEGIES ASSESSMENT (CAC NO. MF7989)
Dear Sir or Madam :
By letter dated March 12, 2012 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12053A340), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a request for information to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status, pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Section 50.54(f) (hereafter referred to as the "50.54(f) letter"). The request was issued in connection with implementing lessons learned from the 2011 accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant, as documented in the NRC's Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) report (ADAMS Accession No. ML111861807). to the 50.54(f) letter requested that licensees reevaluate flood hazards for their sites using present-day methods and regulatory guidance used by the NRC staff when reviewing applications for early site permits and combined licenses (ADAMS Accession No. ML12056A046). Concurrent with the reevaluation of flood hazards, licensees were required to develop and implement mitigating strategies in accordance with NRC Order EA-12-049, "Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events" (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A735). In order to proceed with implementation of Order EA-12-049, licensees used the current licensing basis flood hazard or the most recent flood hazard information, which may not be based on present-day methodologies and guidance, in the development of their mitigating strategies.
By letter dated November 16, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16319A089), Entergy Operations, Inc. (Entergy, the licensee) submitted the mitigation strategies assessment (MSA) for Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 (Waterford). The MSAs are intended to confirm that licensees have adequately addressed the reevaluated flooding hazard within their mitigating strategies for beyond-design-basis external events. The purpose of this letter is to provide the NRC's assessment of the Waterford MSA.
The NRG staff has concluded that the Waterford MSA was performed consistent with the guidance described in Appendix G of the Nuclear Energy Institute guidance (NEI) document, NEI 12-06, Revision 2, as endorsed by Japan Lessons-Learned Division (JLD) interim staff guidance (ISG) document JLD-ISG-2012-01 , Revision 1, and that the licensee has demonstrated that the mitigation strategies are reasonably protected from reevaluated flood hazards conditions for beyond-design-basis external events. This closes out the NRC's efforts associated with CAC No. MF7989.
If you have any questions, please contact me at 301-415-2621 or at Robert .Bernardo@nrc.gov.
Sincerely,
~e--:::~ject Hazards Management Branch Manager Japan Lessons-Learned Division Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosure:
Staff Assessment Related to the Mitigating Strategies for Waterford Docket No: 50-382 cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv
STAFF ASSESSMENT RELATED TO THE MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3 AS A RESULT OF THE REEVALUATED FLOODING HAZARDS REPORT NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.1- FLOODING CAC NO. MF7989
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated March 12, 2012 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12053A340), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRG) issued a request for information to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status, pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Section 50.54(f) (hereafter referred to as the "50.54(f) letter). The request was issued in connection with implementing lessons learned from the 2011 accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant, as documented in the NRC's Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) report (ADAMS Accession No. ML111861807). Enclosure 2 to the 50.54(f) letter requested that licensees reevaluate flood hazards for their sites using present-day methods and regulatory guidance used by the NRG staff when reviewing applications for early site permits and combined licenses (ADAMS Accession No. ML12056A046). Concurrent with the reevaluation of flood hazards, licensees were required to develop and implement mitigating strategies in accordance with NRG Order EA-12-049, "Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events" (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A735). That order requires holders of operating reactor licenses and construction permits issued under 10 CFR Part 50 to modify the plants to provide additional capabilities and defense-in-depth for responding to beyond-design-basis external events, and to submit to the NRG for review a final integrated plan that describes how compliance with the requirements of Attachment 2 of the order was achieved. In order to proceed with implementation of Order EA-12-049, licensees used the current licensing basis flood hazard or the most recent flood hazard information, which may not be based on present-day methodologies and guidance, in the development of their mitigating strategies.
The NRG staff and industry recognized the difficulty in developing and implementing mitigating strategies before completing the reevaluation of flood hazards. The NRG staff described this issue and provided recommendations to the Commission on integrating these related activities in COMSECY-14-0037, "Integration of Mitigating Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events and the Reevaluation of Flood Hazards," dated November 21, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14309A256). The Commission issued a staff requirements memorandum on March 30, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15089A236), affirming that the Commission expects licensees for operating nuclear power plants to address the reevaluated flood hazards, which are considered beyond-design-basis external events, within their mitigating strategies.
Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) guidance document NEI 12-06, Revision 2, "Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide" (ADAMS Accession No. ML16005A625), has been endorsed by the NRG as an appropriate methodology for licensees to perform Enclosure
assessments of the mitigating strategies against the reevaluated flood hazards developed in response to the March 12, 2012, 50.54(f) letter. The guidance in NEI 12-06, Revision 2, and Appendix G in particular, supports the proposed Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events rulemaking. The NRC's endorsement of NEI 12-06, Revision 2, including exceptions, clarifications, and additions, is described in Japan Lessons-Learned Division (JLD) interim staff guidance (ISG) JLD-ISG-2012-01, Revision 1, "Compliance with Order EA-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events" (ADAMS Accession No. ML15357A163). Therefore, Appendix G of NEI 12-06, Revision 2, describes acceptable methods for demonstrating that the reevaluated flooding hazard is addressed within the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 (Waterford) mitigating strategies for beyond-design-basis external events.
2.0 BACKGROUND
By letter dated April 12, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16090A327), the NRC issued an interim staff response (ISR) letter for Waterford. The ISR letter provided the reevaluated flood hazard mechanisms that exceeded the current design basis (COB) for Waterford and parameters that are suitable input for the mitigating strategies assessment (MSA) (i.e., defines the mitigating strategies flood hazard information (MSFHI) described in NEI 12-06). For Waterford, the mechanisms listed as not bounded by the COB in the letter {ISR flood levels} are listed below, with the reason they were not bounded.
- Local intense precipitation {LIP) - the reevaluated flood hazard level was higher than the COB level
- Streams and rivers - the reevaluated flood hazard level for the probable maximum flooding (PMF) event on the Mississippi River was higher than the COB level
- Failure of dams and onsite water control structures - the PMF combined with a hypothetical dam break within the Mississippi River and levee failure was not considered in the COB.
- Storm surge - for a combined event of a 25-year flood in the Mississippi River with probable maximum surge including antecedent water level, levee failure, and coincident wind-generated waves, the maximum wave run-up was not considered in COB.
The ISR letter also stated that NRC staff would evaluate, as applicable, the flood event duration parameters (including warning time and period of inundation) and flood-related associated effects developed by the licensee during the NRC staff's review of the MSA. This is consistent with the guidance provided in Revision 2 of NEI 12-06. The licensee submitted the MSA by letter dated November 14, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16319A089). The MSA also included the relevant information regarding the flood event duration parameters and associated effects needed to complete the review.
3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION
3.1 Mitigating Strategies under Order EA-12-049 The NRC staff is evaluating the Waterford strategies as developed and implemented under order EA-12-049, as described in the Waterford final integrated plan (FIP) (ADAMS Accession
No. ML16203A321 ). That review will be documented in a safety evaluation, separate from this assessment. The purpose of the safety evaluation is to document how the licensee's guidance and proposed designs, if implemented appropriately, will adequately address the requirements of Order EA-12-049. An inspection will confirm compliance with the order.
3.2 Evaluation of FLEX strategies A brief summary of the licensee's FLEX strategies are as follows:
- For Phase 1, decay heat is removed by steaming to atmosphere from the steam generators (SGs) through the atmospheric dump valves (ADVs) or SG safety valves, and makeup to the SGs is initially provided by the turbine-driven emergency feedwater (TDEFW) pump taking suction from the condensate storage pool (CSP). Natural circulation in the RCS is maintained as operators cool the plant. The operators take action to prolong vital battery life until backup generators can be deployed.
- For Phase 2, operators will transition SG makeup to a permanently mounted FLEX core cooling pump (FCCP) that will take water from one of several available sources (CSP, wet cooling tower (WCT) basins, or refueling water storage pool (RWSP)). RCS makeup and boration will be initiated within approximately 12.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> of the ELAP to ensure that natural circulation , reactivity control, and boron mixing is maintained in the RCS. RCS makeup will use the installed charging pumps taking suction from the RWSP or boric acid makeup tank (BAMT). The backup FLEX diesel generator (DG) will be in service within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The FLEX DG is pre-staged in a new enclosure on the roof of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB).
- For Phase 3, the licensee will use equipment from the National SAFER Response Center (NSRC) to establish and maintain long term cooling. The NSRC will provide high capacity pumps and large combustion turbine-driven generators (CTGs).
As noted in the licensee's FIP, the FLEX design basis (DB) flood height is 30 feet mean sea level (ft. MSL). The nuclear plant island structure (NPIS) is a reinforced concrete box structure with solid exterior walls. The NPIS is the common structure of the reactor containment building (RCB), reactor auxiliary building (RAB) and the Fuel Handling Building (FHB) . All seismic Category I structures, safety-related systems and components are housed in the NPIS. All exterior doors and penetrations which lead to areas containing safety-related equipment are watertight up to +30 ft. MSL. The NPIS protects the required credited FLEX structures, systems and components from all applicable external hazards. As noted earlier, four flooding mechanisms are not bounded by the COB. Two of those four mechanisms are bounded by the FLEX DB. The two flooding mechanisms that are not bounded by the FLEX DB are LIP and the combined event following a 25-year flood combined with levee failure and wind-generated waves.
The licensee states that one complete set of equipment (N) is stored within the NPIS. The LIP (outside the NPIS) maximum flow depths range from 0.5 ft. at the southeast side of the NPIS to 1.1 ft. at the southeast side of the independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) pad. A LIP event could inundate the deployment paths from the "N+ 1" storage building (located south of the ISFSI , outside of the NPIS). The equipment stored in the "N+ 1" storage building is not the primary equipment and only serves as a backup capability should the "N" equipment unexpectedly become unavailable. The primary storage location for a full "N" set of equipment is inside and on top of the NPIS and is fully protected from external flooding up to +30 ft. MSL,
well above the hazard level for a LIP event. Thus, the FLEX strategies should be successfully implemented during a LIP event. Additionally, the licensee has provisions to relocate the spare equipment if the primary set will be down for maintenance for an extended period of time.
A LIP event can affect the dry cooling tower (OCT) basins within the NPIS, as well as cause ponding within the main steam isolation valve (MSIV) east and west areas. The LIP maximum flood depth within OCT Basin A is 1.53 ft. and around OCT Basin B is 1.63 ft. Each OCT basin is connected via four, 4-inch-diameter pipes (each with a flapper) to the FHB sub-basement.
This area of the FHB (-35 ft. MSL) is considered to be rain water storage capability for the OCT areas. The FLEX strategies do not credit the OCT basins, nor equipment located in the FHB subbasement. Therefore, even when the area in and around the OCT basins becomes inundated during a LIP event, the FLEX strategies can be implemented successfully.
The emergency feedwater (EFW) control and isolation valves are located in the MSIV area.
The level of ponding in this area (less than 0. 7 feet) does not challenge the manual operation of these valves during an extended loss of alternating current power (ELAP) event. The travel path to get to these valves is within the RAB structure, which is protected from flooding; therefore, the valves are accessible. Thus, the FLEX strategies are not affected by the LIP event (inside the NPIS) and can be implemented successfully.
The combined event flood was also not bounded by the FLEX DB flood height. During this event, the still water elevation is 26 ft. MSL, which is below the FLEX DB. However, the maximum wave run-up reaches a level of 31.8 ft. MSL, on the east side of the NPIS. Since the DCTs are the only portions of the NPIS open to the outside (with the exception of the ventilation intake described below), water will accumulate in the bottom of the OCT basins from wave overtopping. The overtopping rate and resulting ponding is bounded by the LIP event discussed above. Since the FLEX strategies do not credit the OCT basins, they are not affected by this overtopping and ponding.
In addition, the licensee notes that a ventilation intake for the heat and ventilation (H&V) fan room is located at elevation 31.16 ft. MSL. The FLEX Diesel Generator Connection Panel is located within the H&V fan room , on the wall opposite to the air intake, approximately 2' above the floor. The combined event results in a maximum stillwater level at the NPIS of 26.0 ft. MSL, with a maximum significant wave crest elevation of 26.9 ft. MSL, and a maximum reflected wave crest elevation of 31 .8 ft. MSL with a duration of approximately 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> of wave overtopping (above elevation 31 ft. MSL) on the east side of the NPIS. Since the bottom of the H&V fan room air intake (31.16 ft. MSL) is located above the stillwater level elevation (26 ft. MSL) and the significant wave crest elevation (26.9 ft. MSL), only the maximum reflected wave crest elevation needs to be evaluated.
As noted in the FHRR, the H&V intake is located on the southeast side of the NPIS, where the maximum stillwater elevation is 24.6 ft. MSL. The maximum reflected wave crest of 31 .8 ft.
MSL corresponds to the east side of the NPIS, where the maximum stillwater elevation is 25.4 ft. MSL (because of the relative orientation to the storm direction). The maximum reflected wave height is a direct function of the stillwater elevation, thus the maximum reflected wave height at the H& V intake can be conservatively determined to be 0.8 ft. below the reported height of 31.8 ft. MSL, or at a height of 31 ft. MSL. This provides a 2 inch margin to the H&V intake opening. In addition, there is a missile grating structure that juts out from the wall, obstructing any wave splashing. Finally, any splashing that would enter the H&V room would not land on top of the FLEX connection panel, which is located on the opposite side of the room .
The licensee also notes that the maximum wave run-up duration is approximately 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, which is a relatively short duration.
In summary, the licensee stated in its MSA that the minimum set of FLEX equipment to support their mitigating strategies is stored within the NPIS, which is protected against flooding up to 30 ft. MSL. For the N+ 1 equipment, pre-planned strategies are already in place to relocate the N+ 1 equipment for predictable warning times. With the FLEX equipment protected from external flooding events, all mitigating strategy sequences previously evaluated are not impacted by the reevaluated flood hazards. For Phase 3 equipment, provisions for this equipment to be airlifted to the plant site are in place. Phase 3 equipment will be landed on the RAB roof (69 ft. MSL) and will not be impacted by the reevaluated hazards.
3.3 Evaluation of Associated Effects Debris hazards within the NPIS are not considered a credible hazard because of relatively low flow velocities and limited debris sources. Annual inspection and cleaning of roof drains on the reactor containment building ensure the roof drains remain free of debris. The NPIS is a box-like reinforced concrete structure, and sediment deposition and erosion is considered minimal. The potential hydrodynamic loading and debris loading are bounded by the missile load requirements of the NPIS exterior wall. The flow velocity of flood waters at the NPIS wall are relatively low due to the configuration of the combined effect flood, and as a result, the hydrodynamic loads and debris impact loads are also relatively low. The hydrodynamic loads and debris impact loads are thus bounded by the FLEX DB.
3.4 Evaluation of Flood Event Duration For all flooding events, flood event duration parameters have no effect on mitigating strategies because the N set of FLEX equipment is protected and stored away from any flooding areas. In addition , pre-planned strategies are in place to protect the N+ 1 set of equipment for predictable external events (hurricanes and floods) . The flood event duration is thus bound by the FLEX DB.
3.5 Evaluation of Flood Protection Features No additional flood protection features were necessary as a result of the mitigating strategies assessment.
4.0 CONCLUSION
The NRC staff has reviewed the information provided in the Waterford MSA related to the original FLEX strategies, as evaluated against the reevaluated hazards (ISR flood levels) described in Section 2 of this staff assessment, and found that:
- The FLEX strategies as described in the FIP are not affected by the impacts of the ISR flood levels (including impacts due to the environmental conditions created by the ISR flood levels) .
- The deployment of the FLEX strategies as described in the Fl P is not affected by the impacts of the ISR flood levels (although redundancy may be reduced for the LIP event).
- Associated effects and flood event durations are reasonable and acceptable for use in the MSA, and have been appropriately considered in the MSA.
Therefore, the NRG staff concludes that the licensee has followed the guidance in NEI 12-06, Revision 2, to demonstrate the capability to deploy the original FLEX strategies, as designed, against a postulated beyond-design-basis event for the LIP, PMF event on the Mississippi River, the PMF event combined with a hypothetical dam break, and the combined event flood ,
including associated effects and flood event duration. Based on the licensee's appropriate hazard characterization , methodology used in the MSA evaluation and the description of its current FLEX strategy, the staff concludes that the licensee has demonstrated that the mitigation strategies are reasonably protected from reevaluated flood hazards conditions.
ML17023A282 *by e-mail OFFICE NRR/JLD/JHMB/PM NRR/JLD/LA* NRR/JLD/JERB/BC* NRR/JLD/JHMB/BC(A) NRR/JLD/JHMB/PM NAME RBernardo Slent SBailey LGibson RBernardo DATE 1/20/17 1/24/17 2/15/17 2/15/17 2/27/17