Text

301 Initial Exam Draft Simulator Scenarios
	ML13325A939
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	11/18/2013
From:	; NRC/RGN-II
To:	; Duke Energy Progress
References
	50-400/13-301
	Download: ML13325A939 (203)
	v • d • e

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event# 3 Page 18 of 77 Event

Description:

Trip of Running CCW Pump, A Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: On cue from the Lead Evaluator insert Trigger 3 Trip of the A CCW Pump This event is a trip of the running A CCW Pump. The standby B CCW Pump fails to Auto Start due to a pressure transmitter failure. The B CCW will start Evaluator Note: manually when operated from the MCB. The crew should recognize the loss and enter AOP-014, Loss of Component Cooling Water. AOP-014 will direct the restoration of the CCW system.

Available Indications Multiple CCW alarms on ALB-005 ENTER AOP-014, Loss of Component Cooling Water AOP-014 SRO No Immediate Actions Procedure Note: This procedure contains no immediate actions. Loss of CCW may require implementation of the SHNPP Emergency Plan.

Directs SM to REFER TO PEP-i 10, Emergency Classification SRO And Protective Action Recommendations, AND ENTER the EAL Matrix.

SRO EVALUATE plant conditions AND GO TO the appropriate section. (Section 3.3, Loss of a CCW Pump)

Procedure Note: The standby CCW pump starts at 52 psig discharge pressure.

CHECK the standby CCW pump has STARTED. (NO)

RO Dispatch an operator to investigate Simulator If dispatched to the field to investigate report back after 2-3 Communicator: minutes that A CCW Pump breaker is tripped on overcurrent on C Phase.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 3 Event# 3 Page 19 of 77 Event

Description:

Trip of Running CCW Pump, A Time Position AppNcants Actions or Behavior j

RD START the standby CCW pump.

CHECK ALL RCPs operating within the limits of Attachment 1.

RD (YES)

RD CHECK CCW header pressure greater than 52 psig. (YES)

RD VERIFY adequate ESW cooling water flow to the associated CCW heat exchanger. (YES)

RD CHECK RHR operating. (ND)

REFER TO Technical Specification 3.7.3

. With only one component cooling water flow path SRO OPERABLE. restore at least two flow paths to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

SRO CONTACT Maintenance to determine the cause of the CCW pump failure, AND INITIATE corrective action.

SRO CHECK with Operations Staff to determine the desirability of using the swing CCW pump.

SRO CHECK COW flow RESTORED to the affected train.

rew May dispatch Aux Operator to Open the control power knife switch for the A CCW pump.

Simulator Acknowledge request.

Communicator I Open control power knife switch on A CCW pump then Operator contact MCR that control power has been removed.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 - 19 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 3 Event# 3 Page 20 of 77 Event

Description:

Trip of Running CCW Pump, A Time Position 1 Applicants Actions or Behavior 1

Crew may implement OWP-CC at this point. This OWP will have the crew verify the ESF Status Light Boxes.

Evaluator Note:

The implementation of the OWP is not required to continue with the scenario.

SRO EXIT this procedure.

Once the plant has stabilized and Tech Specs have been Lead Evaluator: evaluated, cue Event 4 Loss of IA-SA Emergency Bus with failure of CSIP A Room HVAC Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 - 20 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 21 of 77 Event

Description:

Loss of 1A-SA Emergency Bus with failure of CSIP A Room HVAC Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from the Lead Evaluator insert Trigger 4 Simulator Operator: Loss of IA-SA Emergency Bus with failure of CSIP A Room HVAC Breaker 105 will trip open de-energizing bus IA-SA. The Evaluator Note: A EDG will start supplying power to the bus and the loss of power sequencer will start appropriate equipment.

. Identifies multiple MCB alarms and a partial loss of Indications lighting in the MCR Available:

Identifies A sequencer in operation Crew Diagnosis BKR 105 open with 106 closed and then A EDG carrying the 1A-SA bus Crew Identifies entry conditions are met to AOP-025 AOP-025 Loss of One Emergency AC Bus (6.9KV) or One Emergency DC Bus (125V)

The crew should NOT perform the immediate action RNO of isolating letdown since guidance is provided in AOP Evaluator Note: 025 Basis Document stating that this should only be done if the seqencer does not start the CSIP. IF letdown is secured the crew will have to restore letdown lAW OP-I 07.

Immediate: CHECK ANY CSIP RUNNING. (NO)

Action RO Does not Isolate letdown Enters AOP-025 SRO Makes Plant PA announcement for AOP entry Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 - 21 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 22 of 77 Event

Description:

Loss of 1A-SA Emergency Bus with failure of CSIP A Room HVAC Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Procedure Note: Step I is an immediate action.

RO Check any CSIP running (YES started by sequencer)

VERIFY at least one Emergency AC Bus is ENERGIZED BOP (YES both Emergency Buses are energized)

Procedure Note: Loss of electrical power may require initiation of the Emergency Plan.

REFER TO PEP-I 10, Emergency Classification and Protective SRO Action Recommendations, and ENTER EAL Matrix.

a. ReferstoT.S.

1. T.S. 3.0.3 due to loss of 2/4 containment radiation monitors and CVIS affect on CNMT vacuum relief 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months to initiate actions or be in HSB within next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months

2. T.S. 3.3.3.1 due to mop MCR CAl rad monitors

3. TS 3.8.1.1 one off site circuit inoperable perform surveillance with 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and restore within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months SRO 4. TS 3.8.3.1 one required divisions of AC ESF buses not fully energized energize the division within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months or be in HSB within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months

5. TS 3.4.6.1 RCS leak detection due to RM 3502A mop (gaseous & particulate) action C; operation may continue for 72 hrs provided grab samples at least once per 24 hrs and RCS inventory balance at least once per 8 hrs Tech Spec 3.0.3 is the most limiting Tech Spec due to the isolation of CNMT vacuum relief valves caused by 214 I_________ Radiation monitors failing high after losing power.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 23 of 77 Event

Description:

Loss of 1A-SA Emergency Bus with failure of CSIP A Room HVAC Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior GO TO the appropriate section for further actions as indicated I in the following table:

IF: GO TO SECTION PAGE I nf iA-R Fnwg AC RHS ctinn 3 1 7 SRO Loss of 18-SB Emergenc AC Bus. Section 32 2 Loss of DP-1ASA Emerncy DC Bus. Section 3.3 42 Loss o DP-1 3-SB Emerncy DC Bus. Section 3.4 4 Determines that Section 3.1 is appropriate CHECK EDG A is RUNNING PROPERLY:

BOP . Voltage normal range (YES)

. Frequency normal range (YES)

BOP CHECK Bus 1A-SA is ENERGIZED (YES)

CHECK ESW A header cooling water flow:

ESWA Pump is RUNNING (YES)

RO OR

NSW flow in ESW A header (NO)

The operator should allow the sequencer to complete its cycle Procedure Caution: prior to attempting to start any large electrical loads including loads the sequencer may have failed to start.

RO CHECK ANY CSIP - RUNNING (YES)

RCPs are restricted to a maximum run time of ten minutes without cooling water to the oil coolers.

If both trains of CCW were in service supporting Procedure Caution: RHR operations, do not attempt to manually realign the CCW Non -

Essential Header without consideration of creating CCW Pump runout conditions.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 24 of 77 Event

Description:

Loss of 1A-SA Emergency Bus with failure of CSIP A Room HVAC Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior VERIFY A Train CCW SUPPLYING the Non-Essential Header:

. VERIFY A Train CCW Pump RUNNING (YES)

. CHECK 1 CC-99, CCW HEAT EXCHANGER A TO NONESSENTIAL SUP OPEN (YES)

. CHECK 1CC-i 28, CCW NONESSENTIAL RETURN TO A HEADER OPEN (YES)

RO VERIFY B Train CCW SUPPLYING the Non-Essential Header:

. VERIFY B Train CCW Pump RUNNING (YES)

. CHECK I CC-i 13, CCW HEAT EXCHANGER B TO NONESSENTIAL SUP OPEN (YES)

CHECK 1CC-127, COW NONESSENTIAL RETURN TO B HEADER OPEN (YES) 1 CC-252 will automatically shut if flow exceeds 198 gpm for Procedure Note: greater than 3 seconds. This is indicated by receipt of ALB 005/1-2A, RCP THERM BAR HDR HIGH FLOW, and may be caused by auto start of the standby CCW Pump.

CHECK 1 CC-252, THERMAL BARRIERS FLOW CONTROL RD FCV-685), is OPEN (YES)

VERIFY Charging and Letdown flow per OP-i 07, Chemical and RD Volume Control System, to maintain Pressurizer level.

(Normal flow rate and Pressurizer level normal)

Due to the single shot circuitry, any TDAFW Pump steam supply valve shut in the following step (while any of the three start signals are still present) will not automatically re-open if an AFW actuation is received. TDAFW FOVs do not receive Procedure Caution:

auto-open signals.

Stopping a MDAFW Pump powered by the EDG or shutting a MDAFW FCV will block further automatic actuations until the original condition for pump start is cleared.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 - 24 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 25 of Event

Description:

Loss of 1A-SA Emergency Bus with failure of CSIP A Room HVAC Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Evaluator Note: If the crew secures TDAFW pump or adjusts flow, they should recognize the pump remains operable.

CONTROL AFW as necessary to maintain reactor power and BOP S/G levels.

(Controls AFW flow to maintain Rx power and SG levels)

IF the crew does not identify that AH-9A did not re-start A CSIP will become inoperable based on OWP-ECW-01 for not maintaining the CSIP ventilation available and PLP-114 Evaluator Note:

Attachment 4, Area Temperature Monitoring.

A high room temperature of 124°F (104°F + 20°F) could also make the CSIP inoperable.

VERIFY ventilation support equipment for operating CSIP is IN SERVICE:

P-4 Pump (YES)

WC-2 Chiller (YES)

BOP

CSIP Room HVAC (NO) informs CRS that the A CSIP Room HVAC did not restart to support A CSIP operation and starts AH-9A SA RD CHECK Instrument Air pressure > 90 psig. (YES)

BOP CHECK at least two (2) CRDM Fans operating (YES)

RD CHECK RHR operation was in progress (NO)

Evaluator Note: OMM-004 Attachment 12 is included at the back of this guide see page 59.

VERIFY proper load sequencing per OMM-004, Post BOP Trip/Safeguards Review, Attachment 12.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 - 25 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 26 of 77 Event

Description:

Loss of 1A-SA Emergency Bus with failure of CSIP A Room HVAC

[ Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CHECK A Sequencer Load Block 9 AUTO ACT COMPLETE BOP MAN LOAD PERMITTED light is LIT. (YES)

Re-energizing 480V Emergency Bus 1A1 will restore power to the following:

PZR PORV Block Valves Procedure Note:

Air Compressor IA (Compressor will not auto start)

NNS I25V Battery Charger 1A and lB

PZR Heater Bank A BOP RE-ENERGIZE 480V Emergency Bus IAI After 480 V Emergency Bus IAI is restored cue event 5 Lead Evaluator: SG C PORV Pressure Instrument fails high and the PORV stays OPEN requires crew to reduce power to < 100% lAW AOP-042 Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 26 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 27 of 77 1 Event

Description:

SG C PORV Press Inst fails high wI PORV staying OPEN AOP-042 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from the Lead Evaluator insert Trigger 5 Simulator Operator: SG C PORV Press Inst fails high wI PORV staying OPEN requires entry into AOP-042 This event is a Steam Generator PORV Pressure Instrument failing high. This will require the BOP to take Evaluator Note: manual control of the PORV to shut it. The SRO should evaluate Tech Specs 3.3.3.5, Remote Shutdown System, and 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves.

. ALB-014-8-5, Computer Alarm Steam Generators Available Indications: . Control Rods will withdraw due to lower RCS temperature ALB-01 4 SRO ENTERS APP-ALB-01 4-8-5 BOP IDENTIFIES C SG PORV is OPEN BOP DEPRESS Manual Pushbutton for PK-308C1 to take manual control of C SG PORV Provide pressure band for PORV manual control SRO (Maintain < 1170 psig).

LOWER output for PK-308 to SHUT C SG PORV 1 MS-82 BOP (PORV will NOT shut)

Informs CRS that C SG PORV is failed OPEN Reviews/prepares OMM-001, Attachment 5 Equipment SRO Problem Checklist for the failure of PT-308B.

Contacts WCC and support personnel for repairs.

Simulator IF contacted to isolate C PORV locally then acknowledge Communicator: the request.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 - 27 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 28 of Event

Description:

SG C PORV Press Inst fails high wI PORV staying OPEN AOP-042 Time Position L Applicants Actions or Behavior CREW Identifies entry conditions met for AOP-042 AOP-042 Secondary Steam Leak! Efficiency Loss Procedure Note: This procedure contains no immediate actions.

CHECK that the plant can be operated safely:

CHECK ALL Reactor Protection parameters WITHIN TRIP SRO LIMITS. (YES)

CHECK Turbine Building envelope safe for personnel entry.

(YES)

BOP CHECK a steam leak exists. (YES C SG PORV is OPEN)

SRO NOTIFY personnel of evacuation requirements. (NONE)

REFER TO PEP-I 10, Emergency Classification and Protective SRO Action Recommendations, AND ENTER the EAL Matrix.

Initial target reduction may be up to 100 MW less than current Procedure Note: REFERENCE value and may be changed as necessary to reduce power to less than 100%.

DETERMINE the required megawatt change needed for the CREW power reduction. ( power reduction.)

BOP NOTIFY Load Dispatcher that the Unit is reducing load.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 29 of 77 Event

Description:

SG C PORV Press Inst fails high wI PORV staying OPEN AOPO42 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

If load reduction rates in excess of 45 MW/mm are required, the Unit should be tripped.

If OSI-PI is available, VIDAR is functio Procedure Note: ning properly if the DEH_MEGAWATTS point is updating. (Attachment 1, Checking VIDAR Functioning, provides alternative methods of checking VIDAR functioning.)

Procedure Caution: Failure of the DEH computer VIDAR Unit while in OPER AUTO has resulted in a plant trip.

CHECK BOTH of the following:

BOP

DEH System in AUTO (YES)

VIDAR functioning properly (YES)

PERFORM the following at the DEH panel:

a. DEPRESS the LOAD RATE MW/MIN pushbutton.

b. ENTER desired rate (NOT to exceed 45 MW/MIN) in DEMAND display.

BOP c. DEPRESS ENTER pushbutton.

d. DEPRESS REF pushbutton.

e. ENTER desired load in DEMAND display.

f. DEPRESS ENTER pushbutton.

g. CHECK HOLD pushbutton LIT.

RO CHECK Rod Control in AUTO. (YES)

Procedure Note: During the load reduction, it is permissible to periodically move between GO and HOLD and to vary the load rate.

COMMENCE turbine load reduction at the DEH panel:

a. CHECK OPER AUTO Mode AVAILABLE. (YES)

(1) DEPRESS GO pushbutton.

(2) VERIFY the value in the REFERENCE display LOWERS VERIFY Generator load AND Reactor power LOWERING.

(YES)

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 29 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 30 of 77 Event

Description:

SG C PORV Press Inst fails high wI PORV staying OPEN AOP-042 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior I

BOP MAINTAIN Generator reactive load (VARs) within guidelines.

RO CHECK Tavg within 5°F of Tref.

WHEN Reactor power is less than 100%, THEN DEPRESS the BOP HOLD pushbutton.

BOP CHECK the HOLD pushbutton is LIT.

When the crew identifies that Reactor power is < 100%

Lead Evaluator: AND the Turbine is placed to HOLD then inform the Simulator Operator to SHUT the C SG PORV manual block valve (run trigger 15).

WHEN DIRECTED by the Lead Examiner:

Simulator Operator: After the crew has completed the ramp to reduce power to

< 100% then CLOSE the C PORV manual block valve.

Run Trigger 15 to close IMS-63 Simulator Communicator: Contact the MCR that C PORV has been isolated.

Lead Evaluator: Once the plant has stabilized, cue Event 6, SG C Tube Rupture Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 30 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 31 of Event

Description:

C SG Tube Rupture flme I Position Anolicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: On cue from the Lead Evaluator, initiate Trigger 6 SGTR on C SG at 200 gpm This is the start of the major events, a tube rupture in the C SG (SGTR) at 200 gpm. The crew should recognize the presence of a large leak in the primary. After determining that this leak is greater than makeup capability they should trip the Reactor, manually initiate Safety Injection, and carry out actions per E-0.

Evaluator Note: Once the Reactor is tripped a Main Steam Line break outside Containment will occur. MSIV auto isolation is defeated. The crew will transition from E-0 to E-3 to address the ruptured SG. At some point the Faulted SG will become apparent and the crew is expected to manually isolate the C SG in E-2.

Depending on crews pace through the procedure they may isolate the C SG prior to entering E-3. The Scenario Guide is written to support either implementation.

. Charging Flow increasing Available Indications: . VCT Level decreasing

. Pressurizer Level and Pressure decreasing

. C MSL Rad monitor AOP-016 SRO ENTERS AOP-016, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage Procedure Note: This procedure contains no immediate actions.

RD CHECK RHR in operation. (ND)

REFER TO PEP-ho, Emergency Classification And Protective SRD Action Recommendations, AND ENTER the EAL Matrix.

RD CHECK RCS leakage within VCT makeup capability. (NO)

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 - 31 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 32 of 77 Event

Description:

C SC Tube Rupture

[ Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Directs manual Reactor Trip and Safety Injection activation PERFORM the following:

CREW TRIP the Reactor, AND GO TO EOP-E-O. (Perform RNO substeps 4.b. and 4.c as time permits)

Procedure Note: If SI Actuation is required, the Reactor and Turbine should be verified tripped in E-O before manually actuating SI.

RO MANUALLY INITIATE Reactor Trip and Safety Injectioh.

SRO EXIT this procedure.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 - 32 -

Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 33 of 77 Event

Description:

C SG Tube Rupture Time U Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Xtn thrniIclh trw E-O SRO Makes plant PA announcement Verifies Reactor is Tripped (YES)

RZACTtJR TRLP CONRRMAflQN Immediate RO kact*r Tp ypa DKR O1N Action -

Rc4 ktto r4Sh1 (Ze Step.) LIT Nuuon H1u - DiWPING Verifies Turbine is Tripped All throttle valves shut (YES)

TURE STO? VLV 1 TSL-ZU I Immediate BOP T!R sro VIi 2 TSL-Zfl-2 Action TUR sroi VLV ¶SL-2-11-3 TURB STOP VLV 4 TSL3-2-114 Verify Power To AC Emergency Buses (YES)

Immediate AC emergency buses BOTH energized BOP Action

A bus powered by A EDG

B bus powered by Offsite Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 - 33 -

Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 34 of 77 Event

Description:

C SG Tube Rupture Time I Position AoDlicants Actions or Behavior Safety Injection Activated (NO Activates)

Both Trains Immediate RO Action BPLP 4-1SI ACTIIATEI 11 -

LIT CONTINUGUSLY)

Assigns foldout items of E-O to both the RO and BOP

. RO:

o RCP Trip criteria o Alternate Miniflow Open/Shut criteria SRO o RHR restart criteria

. BOP o Ruptured SG AFW Isolation criteria o AFW supply switchover criteria Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 - 34 -

Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: NRC Scenario# 3 Event# 6 Page 35 of 77 Event

Description:

C SG Tube Rupture Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Evaluator Aide: E-O foldout REACTOR TRIP OR WETY IIJECTTON FOLDOUT

RCP TRIP CRITERIA IF both of the following occur ThE stp all RCPs:

SI tk- GREATER THAN 200GPM

RCS pressure LESS ThAN 1400 PS[

ALTERNATE MINWLOW OPENJSHUT CIlTERM

IF RCS pressure drops to less than 180() PSIG; ThENverifij strnate rnlniftcw oFation OR rnin1ow block valves. SHUT-

F RCS pressure rises to greeter then 2200 PSIG, THEN eri(y a[lemata rniniflow tiQfl AND mlIliflQw bIQck valves QPEN -

RHRRESTARTCRITERIA 11 ROS piesure drops Ia less than 231) P316 in en uncontrolled manner, THEN restart RHR pumps 10 supply water to te RCS

RUPTURED SG A.FW lSOLATlQNCRlERIA IFafl of the followinç occur lo any 5G. THEN stopfeed flow Ly sliuttüig the olaUon vlv (preferred) OR&w ontrI a[ve t thAI SG:

a Any SG tev& rises in urontroIled manner has. abnornia[sendary radiation

Narrow range level GREATER TI-AN 2% f40%]

a AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRlTEFlA IF CST level drops to lass than 10% THEI4 switch the AFW water sgpIy to:

tI P-17, AXl[IAY rEDWATER SYSTEM , Se1iQn.1.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 - 35 -

Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 36 of 77 Event

Description:

C SG Tube Rupture Time H Position Appicants Actions or Behavior SRO Evaluate EAL Matrix.

Verifiy CSIPs all running (YES)

RD A and B running Verify RHR Pumps all running (YES)

RD A and B running Safety Injection flow> 200 gpm (YES)

RD RCS pressure -> 230 PSIG (YES)

Both RHR HX header flows >1000 gpm (NO)

Verify RHR valves properly aligned:

RWST to RHR pump suction valves OPEN I Sl-322 (YES)

ISI-323 (YES)

RD RHR HX outlet valves OPEN 1 RH-30 (YES) 1 RH-66 (YES)

Verify low head SI to cold leg valves OPEN 1 Sl-340 (YES) 1 5 1-341 (YES)

Locally Unlock AND Turn ON The Breakers For The CSIP BOP Suction AND Discharge Cross-connect Valves: Refer to Attachment 2 Acknowledge communications:

Simulator Run CAEP :cvcpath-1 att 6 csip suction valves power.txt.

Communicator I Simulator Operator When the CAEP is complete, report completion to the MCR.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 36 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 37 of 77 Event

Description:

C SG Tube Rupture Time Position or Behavior Main Steam Line Isolation Actuated (NO)

SWM IJN 1 I5cii A TIOH ?CflJRION CRRtA BOP (J pnr - ATRR TTT*}{ (R W)AT. )

G piiz TE KM1 O EV?J4 IG HAJAI - OEGESWAXWN EUWMU AUVDKATIU .MUIttQM BOP Verify All MSIVs AND Bypass Valves SHUT (YES)

Any SG pressure 100 PSIG LOWER THAN PRESSURE IN SOP -

TWO OTHER SGs (NO)

Check CNMT Pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 RO PSIG (YES)

Verify AFW flow AT LEAST 210 KPPH ESTABLISHED (NO)

Identifies that the TDAFW pump has tripped and A MDAFW Critical pump failed to auto start.

SOP Task #1 Informs crew and starts the A MDAFW pump Critical task Start the A MD AFW Pump to prevent a Loss of Heat Sink and entry into FR-H I If contacted by the crew to investigate the TDAFW pump trip report back after 3 minutes that the indications locally look normal. But the trip linkage is tripped.

Simulator Communicator: IF asked to reset acknowledge wait 2 minutes and report back that the trip linkage has come apart and the TDAFW pump trip cannot be reset. You will contact Maintenance and the WCC for help.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 37 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 38 of 77I Event

Description:

C SG Tube Rupture Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Sequencer Load Block 9 Actuated I Both Trains (YES)

BOP Energize AC buses 1A1 AND IB1 Evaluator Note: E-O, Attachment 3 is located in the back of this guide.

E-O Attachment 3 is included in the back of this scenario.

The RO will perform all board actions until the BOP completes Attachment 3. The BOP is permitted to properly align plant equipment lAW E-O Attachment 3 without SRO Evaluator Note:

approval.

The Scenario Guide still identifies tasks by board position because the time frame for completion of Attachment 3 is not predictable.

Verify Alignment Of Components From Actuation Of ESFAS BOP Signals Using Attachment 3, Safeguards Actuation Verification, While Continuing With This Procedure.

Directs AO to place IA and lB Air Compressor in the local BOP control mode per E-O Attachment 3 step 22 Acknowledge the request to place IA and lB Air Simulator Compressor in the local control mode per E-O Attachment Communicator 3 step 22 When directed to place the IA and lB Air Compressor in Simulator Operator the local control mode:

Run APPair\acsjo_Iocal When the APP for IA and lB Air Compressor has Simulator completed running call the MCR and inform them that the Communicator air compressors are running in local control.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 - 38 -

Rev. 2

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event# 6 Page 39 of 77 Event

Description:

C SG Tube Rupture Time Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior Stabilize AND Maintain Temperature Between 555°F AND 559°F Using Table 1.

TABLE 1: RCS TEMPERATuRE CONTROL GUIDELINES FOLLOWING RI Thi?

. Guidance is applicable until another procedure directs otherwise.

no RCPa running+ use wide range cold leg tenperature.

RCS TEMPERATuRE TREND LESS TEAM GREATER TEAM STABLE AT OR 557P AtW 557H AND TRENDING TO DROPIflG RISING 557P

Stop 4uping f. condenser

Control feed steam available flow and steam RD TEEM trasfar 4uunp to

. Control feed steea dump to establish and flow STEAM PRESSURE maintain RCS mode using temperature Maintain total W-126. between 555F feed flow Section 5.3 AND 559Y OPERATOR greater tban AND dump steam ACTION 210 KPPE to condenser until level greater than - OR -

15% [4011 in at least one flutap ateaz on intact SG using intact SG PORVa

IF cooldown continues. . Control feed Tiit sht flow to MSIVs AND maintain SC SYPASS valves levels PRZ PORVs SHUT (YES)

RD PRZ Spray Valves SHUT (YES)

PRZ PORV Block Valves AT LEAST ONE OPEN (YES)

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 - 39 -

Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 40 of 77 Event

Description:

C SG Tube Rupture Time I Position Apjlicants Actions or Behavior The SG Tube Rupture, Reactor trip, and Safety Injection can mask the indications for the Steam Line break. If the Evaluator Note: crew identifies the fault at this point then they will transition to E-2 now to isolate C SG. If not then later in the scenario Foldout Criteria in E-3 will send them to E-2.

E-2 steps are included in this Guide.

Identify Any Faulted SG:

Check for any of the following:

RO/BOP . Any SG pressures - DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (NO)

. Any SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED (NO)

Identify Any Ruptured SG:

RO/BOP . Any SG - ABNORMAL RADIATION OR UNCONTROLLED LEVEL RISE (YES)

SRO Ruptured SG IDENTIFIED (YES, C)

Event 7 Check Feed Flow To Ruptured SG(s) ISOLATED (NO)

SRO/

Critical BOP triticai I asic - Isolate /-ki-VV flow to me ruptured (. prior to Task #2 entering ECA 3.1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant:

Snhnnnld Rr.nvrv

-.----.--.j GO TO E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE, SRO Step 1.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 - 40 -

Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 41 of 77 Event

Description:

C SG Tube Rupture Time I Position pphcanVsAconsorBehavior j

E-3 Steam Generator Tube Rupture At some point the steam break will become apparent.

Evaluator Note: When it does the crew will transition to E-2 from the foldout criteria.

Procedure Note: Foldout applies Assigns foldout items of E-3 to both the RO and BOP

. RO:

o Alternate Miniflow Open/Shut criteria o RHR restart criteria o SI Reinitiation criteria SRO o Cold Leg Recirculation Switchover criteria

. BOP o Secondary Integrity criteria o Multiple Tube Rupture criteria o AFW supply switchover criteria SRO Implement Function Restoration Procedures As Required.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 41 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 42 of 77 Event

Description:

C SG Tube Rupture Time Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Evaluator Aide E-3 Foldout FOLDOUT

ALTERNME MNIFLOW OPENISHtIT CRI11ERIA

. IF RCS pressure drops to less thar WOO P510, THEN)verify alterna IalIon RminltIow blodc ca1ves SHUT te mflow

IF RCS pressure rises to greaterthan 221)0 P51G. THEN verify alterna Isolation L4L miniflow block vaIe OPEN te mThiflow

RHR RESTART CRfFERIA IE RCS pressure drops to less than 2O PS1 in an unconfrollad manner THEN restart RHR pumps to supply water to The RCS.

Si REIIIA1iON CflI1FRIA IF any ofthe following occurs:

RCSwbcodin-LESSTHAN 10F 141N9-C 2OF [50FJ-M

PRZ level CAN NOT BE MJNTMNED GREATER THAN IC%[30%1 THEN perform the fdlori:

a. IE CSIP suction atigred to JOT, TFIFN realign to RWST.

b. SI,.jt d,aigirig line iaIation valvea AND een BIT vs1ve.

c. Verify normal minifiow olationvahes SHUT -

d. IF necessary to restore conditions THEN restart standby CSIIP.

e. IF rejnltiatjon occurs after Step 76 THEN3OTG ECA3.1.

SGTR WITH LOSS OF EATOIfLANT: SUBCIOQI.ED REcOVERY Step 1. ,

COW LEG RECIRCULATION SWITC HOVER CRITERIA IF RWST level drops to IessThari 23.4% (214 Low-Low a[ami THEN GO TO E-1.3, 1 9TIANSFER TO COLD LEG RECiRCiJLATlON, Step 1

SECONDARY INTEGRITY CRITERIA IF any ofihe folkving accirs THEN GO TO E-2, TOLAT1ON Step i. (unless tuhtdSG is needed FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR for RCS cooldown)

Any SO pressure DROPS IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER AtflD Ti-tAT EHfi NOT BEEN ISOLATED SO

Any SO COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED THATSG 5 BEEN ISOLATED

MULTIPLE TUBE RUPTURE CRITERIA any intact SO level rises in an uncortrolled manner OWany intact SO has radiation levels, ThEN stop RCS depressurizaffon andold abnormal uwn AND GO RETIJRN TO Step 1.

AFW SIJPP:LY SWITCHOWR CRITERIA IF csr level .lrops to less than 10%. ThEN itch The AFW water supp4y to tIle ESW system using OP-137, A1bCI[ERV IEEDW ATE1 SYSTEM, Section &1 Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario #

Event

Description:

3 Event # 6 C SG Tube Rupture Page 43 of 77 1 Time I Position Alicants Actions or Behavior RO Check RCP Trip Criteria:

. Any RCP RUNNING (YES)

Procedure Note: The RCP Trip Criteria is in effect until an RCS cooldown is initiated.

Check all of the following:

RO . SI flow GREATER THAN 200 GPM (YES)

. Check RCS pressure LESS THAN 1400 PSIG (NO)

Check Rupture SG(s) IDENTIFIED:

Ruptiire4 SGE i4iatin (Any of t1 fovin) 1v]. P.iSIt 1$ AN UROHTRQLT MANNER S Sap).e - RIH DIDN Xa+/-n Steaniite 141 RAt XAIQ}

BOP RH-c1HS-5fl .SL Mast Steen ]4e A RH-GUS -359:

Küi I4e fl a RH -(F1H$-3593 SL Maifl tea. Le .

SG level INCREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (YES)

SG activity sample HIGH RADIATION Main steamline radiation HIGH RADIATION (YES)

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 43 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6 Page 44 of 77 j Event

Description:

C SG Tube Rupture Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Adjust Ruptured SG PORV Controller Setpoint To 88% (1145 BOP PSIG) AND Place In AUTO.

(C SG PORV is manually isolated)

BOP Check Ruptured SG PORV SHUT (YES)

BOP Check Feed Flow To Intact SG(s) AVAILABLE FROM MDAFW PUMP (YES A MDAFW pump ONLY)

Shut ruptured SG steam supply valve to TDAFW pump:

BOP . SG B: IMS-70

. SG C: IMS-72 BOP Verify blowdown isolation.valves from ruptured SG SHUT Shut ruptured SG main steam drain isolation before MSIV:

BOP . SGA:1MS-231

. SG B: IMS-266

. SGC:1MS-301 Shut ruptured SG MSIV AND bypass valve.

BOP (NO, C MSIV fails to SHUT)

Indications of the Main Steamline Break should become identifiable and the crew should transition to E-2 using Foldout C, Secondary Integrity Criteria. E-3 continues later in this guide.

Evaluator Note:

The crew may also attempt a manual MSLI based on approaching ESF actuation criteria of any SG pressure less than or equal to 601 psig.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 44 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 9 Page 45 of 77 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line Isolation Signal Fails, C MSIV fails to shut Time Position I Anolicants Actions or Behavior I

E-2 Faulted Steam Generator Isolation 1 SRO SRO conducts an alignment brief for transition to E-2

. At least one SG must be maintained available for RCS cooldown.

Procedure Caution: . Any faulted SG OR secondary break should remain isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless needed for RCS cooldown.

SRO Initiate Monitoring Of Critical Safety Function Status Trees.

Verify all MSIVs SHUT Checks MSIVs AND Bypass Valves:

. Verify all MSIVs SHUT (NO, Shuts A AND B MSIV but C MSIV fails to SHUT)

Critical to shut A and B MSIV (these valves will not Critical automatically shut from ESF MSLI signal. It is critical to shut Task #3 BOP/RO them prior to exiting E-2.

Perform the following: (to attempt to isolate C MSIV)

. Locally shut instrument air supply to RAB 261: IIA-814 (north of AH-19 1A-SA)

. Locally remove cap AND open drain valve: I lA-i 876 (located in corridor outside VCT valve gallery)

Acknowledge request to vent air stall if later asked what is taking you so long to get the air vented. Say you are Communicator: working on it and if the MCR persists, state that you broke off the valve handwheel on IIA-814 and you are going for pliers to close the valve.

Simulator Operator: DO NOT vent Instrument Air no actions are desired Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 45 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario #

Event

Description:

3 Event # 9 Page 46 of Main Steam Line Isolation Signal Fails, C MSIV fails to shut 77 1

Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP/RO Verify all MSIV bypass valves SHUT (YES)

Check Any SG NOT Faulted:

BOP/RO

. Any SG pressure STABLE OR INCREASING (YES)

Identify Any Faulted SG:

. Check for any of the following:

BOP/RO . Any SG pressure DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (YES)

. Any SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED (NO)

Isolate Faulted SG(s):

. Verify faulted SG(s) PORV SHUT BOP/RO . Verify main FW isolation valves SHUT

. Verify MDAFW AND TDAFW pump isolation valves to faulted SG(s) SHUT Shut faulted SG(s) steam supply valve to TDAFW pump SHUT

. SG C: 1MS-72 (SHUT)

Verify main steam drain isolation(s) before MSIVs SHUT: -

. SGA: 1MS-231 (SHUT)

. SG B: IMS-266 (SHUT)

. SG C: IMS-301 (SHUT)

Verify SG blowdown isolation valves - SHUT Verify main steam analyzer isolation valves - SHUT BOP/RO Check CST Level GREATER THAN 10% (YES)

A SG may be suspected to be ruptured if it fails to dry out Procedure Note: following isolation of feed flow. Local checks for radiation can be used to confirm primary-to-secondary leakage.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 -46 -

Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 9 Page 47 of 77 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line Isolation Signal Fails, C MSIV fails to shut Time H Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP/RO Any SG ABNORMAL RADIATION OR UNCONTROLLED LEVEL RISE Check for all of the following:

. Condenser vacuum pump effluent radiation NORMAL -

. SG blowdown radiation NORMAL (NO)

. Main steamline radiation NORMAL (NO)

. SG activity sample NORMAL (WHEN AVAILABLE)

E-3 SRO GO TO E-3 SRO Implement Function Restoration Procedures As Required.

Procedure Note: The RCP Trip Criteria is in effect until an RCS cooldown is initiated.

CHECK RCP Trip Criteria:

. Any RCP RUNNING (YES)

RO CHECK all of the following:

. SI flow GREATER THAN 200 GPM (YES)

. CHECK RCS pressure LESS THAN 1400 PSIG (NO)

IDENTIFY Any Ruptured SG:

CHECK for any of the following:

BOP . SG level INCREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER (YES)

. SG activity sample HIGH RADIATION

. Main steamline radiation HIGH RADIATION (YES)

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 47 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 9 Page 48 of 77 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line Isolation Signal Fails, C MSIV fails to shut Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

. At least one SO must be maintained available for RCS cooldown.

Procedure Caution: . If the TDAFW pump is the only available source of feed flow, one steam supply valve from an intact SG must be maintained open.

ISOLATE Flow From Ruptured SG:

BOP ADJUST ruptured (C) SG PORV controller setpoint to 88%

(1 145 PSIG) AND place in auto.

BOP CHECK ruptured SG PORV SHUT (YES)

SHUT ruptured (C) SG steam supply valve to TDAFW pump:

BOP

. SG C: 1MS-72 BOP VERIFY blowdown isolation valves from ruptured SG SHUT -

Shut ruptured (C) SG main steam drain isolation before MSIV:

BOP

. SGC:1MS-301 BOP Shut ruptured SG MSIV AND bypass valve. (NO, C MSIV fails to SHUT)

Isolate Intact SG(s) From Ruptured SG AND Minimize Steam Flow From Ruptured SG:

. Shut all remaining MSIV AND bypass valves.

. Place both steam dump interlock bypass switches to BOP OFF/RESET.

. Use intact SG(s) PORV for all further steam dumping

. Isolate steam release path from ruptured SG using Attachment 1.

Any intact SG MSIV AND bypass valve SHUT_(YES)

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 48 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 9 Page 49 of 77 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line Isolation Signal Fails, C MSIV fails to shut Time 1 Posion Appilcants Actions or Behavior IF ruptured SG is faulted AND is NOT need for RCS Procedure Caution: cooldown, THEN feed flow to that SG should remain isolated.

Monitor Ruptured SG Level:

. Ruptured SG FAULTED (YES)

. Ruptured SG NEED FOR RCS COOLDOWN (NO)

BOP . Level GREATER THAN 25% [40%] (NO) o Maintain feed flow to ruptured SG o When level > 25% [40%], THEN stop feed flow by shutting the MDAFW AND TDAFW isolation valves to ruptured SG.

The steam supply valve from the ruptured SG to the Procedure Caution: TDAFW pump should be shut OR isolated before continuing (unless this prevents feeding SGs to be used for cooldown).

BOP Check Ruptured SG(s) Pressure GREATER THAN 260 PSIG

[350 PSIG] (NO/YES) If NO, then goto EOP-ECA-3.1.

Depending on the crews pace through the procedures C Evaluator Note: SG pressure may not be less than 260 psig at this point. If thats the case then the crew will continue in E-3 and later transition to EOP-ECA-3.1 EOP EOP-ECA--3. 1, SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT ECA-3. I SRO SUBCOOLED RECOVERY, Step 1 SRO SRO conducts an alignment brief for transition to ECA-3.1 Foldout applies Assigns RO and BOP foldout items SRO

RO SI Reinitiation criteria, E-3 Transition criteria, Cold Leg Recirc Switchover criteria, RHR Restart criteria

. BOP Secondary Integrity criteria, AFW Supply Switchover criteria Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 -49 -

Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES.-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 9 Page 50 of 77 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line Isolation Signal Fails, C MSIV fails to shut Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 9 Page 51 of 77 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line Isolation Signal Fails, C MSIV fails to shut Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Evaluator Aide: EOP-ECA.-3.1 SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COQl.AI1T; SUCOOLEI)

RECQVRY FOU)OUT SI REINITLAT1ON CRITERIA JE any of tile following occurs:

RCS subcooling LESS THAN 10 F [40 F] C 20-F [5QF]-M PRZ level AM NOT BE MAINTAINED GREATER THAN 1fl

[30]

THEN perform the following:

a. Shut charging ltne isolation valves AND oer BET vatves

b. Verify norm at miniflow isolation valves SHUT

c. IF necessary to restore ccndifions, THEN resf.ad stand!by C SIP.

SECONDARY INTEGRFFY CRITEflIA IF any of the following ours,. THEN GO TO E-2, FAULTED ISOLATION, Step I (untess faulted SG is needed for RCS STEAM GENERATOR cooidown).

Any SO pressure DROPS EN AN UNCONTROLLED MANN I-lAS ER THAT SO BEEN ISOLATED Amy SO DOMPLETELY DEPRESSURIIZED TRAT SO I-lAS JQT BEEN ISOLATED

E-3 TRANSITION CRITERIA IF any intact SO level uses in an uneorolEed mannerR any intact rdlatlon levels THEN stop ftCS depre.ssunzatio and cocildo SO has abnormal wn AND GO TO E-3 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE, Step 1.

COLT) LEG RECIRCUIJTION SWITCHOVER CRITE RIA IF RWST level 6ropB to less than 23A% (214 Low-Low alarm)

ES-13, 9IRANSFERTO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION , THEN GO TO

, Step 1.

AEW SLiP FLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA CST level drops to less than 1fl, ThEN switch the AFW water sipply to the ESW system usIng OP-i 37, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM, Seetiai 8.1.

a RIIR RESTART CRtTERIA IE ROS pressure drops to less than 230 P510 in an uncontrolled manne restart RHR pumps to supply water to the RCS. r, IHE1 Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 51 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 9 Page 52 of 77 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line Isolation Signal Fails, C MSIV fails to shut Time Position AIicants Actions or Behavior RO Reset SI.

BOP Manually Realign Safeguards Equipment Following A Loss Of Offsite Power. (Refer to E-0 GUIDE, Attachment 6.)

RO Reset Phase A AND Phase B Isolation Signals (Phase B has not actuated).

Establish Instrument Air AND Nitrogen To CNMT:

Open the following valves:

RO

. 1 IA-81 9 (locates MCB control switch and opens valve)

. 1 Sl-287 (locates MCB control switch and opens valve)

Monitor AC Buses:

Check AC emergency buses 1A-SA AND I B-SB ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER:

BOP

. Check bus voltages

Check breakers 105 AND 125 CLOSED NO 1A bus is energized by A EDG Check AC emergency buses 1A-SA OR I B-SB ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER:

. Check bus voltages

. Check breakers 105 OR 125 CLOSED SRO YES lB bus is energized by Offsite power and breaker 125 is closed

. Align AND monitor plant equipment referring to AOP-025, LOSS OF ONE EMERGENCY AC BUS (6.9KV) OR ONE EMERGENCY DC BUS (125V).

Already performed BOP Check all non-emergency AC buses ENERGIZED (YES)

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 52 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 9 Page 53 of 77 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line Isolation Signal Fails, C MSIV fails to shut Time I Position Aoolicants Actions or Behavior BOP Check Ruptured SG(s) Level LESS THAN 78% [60%] (High-High alarm) (YES)

PRZ heaters should NOT be energized until PRZ water Procedure Caution: level indicates greater than minimum recommended by plant operations staff to ensure heaters are covered.

Secure PRZ Heaters:

. Place backup heaters in the OFF position.

Verify control heaters OFF -

RO

Consult plant operations staff for a recommended minimum indicated PRZ water level that will ensure heaters are covered. (Refer to ERG. Executive Volume, Generic Issue: Evaluations by the Plant Engineering Staff.)

Check CNMT Spray Status:

RO

Check any CNMT spray pump RUNNING (NO)

IF ruptured SG is faulted AND is NOT need for RCS Procedure Caution: cooldown, THEN feed flow to that SG should remain isolated.

Monitor Ruptured SG Level:

Ruptured SG FAULTED (YES)

Ruptured SG NEEDED FOR RCS COOLDOWN (NO) o Verify feed flow isolated to ruptured SG (YES)

Check RHR Pump Status:

Check RHR pump suction ALIGNED TO RWST (YES)

RCS pressure GREATER THAN 230 PSIG (YES)

RCS pressure STABLE OR INCREASING (YES) o Stop RHR pumps (locates MCB controls and stops both RHR pumps)

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 53 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 9 Page 54 of 77 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line Isolation Signal Fails, C MSIV fails to shut Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior (NOTE: The SRO should opt to circle this step and move on, BUT, if candidate directs this step it is written out below)

Consult plant operations staff for a recommended minimum SRO indicated PRZ water level that will ensure heaters are covered.

Coordinate With Plant Operations Staff AND Chemistry To Perform The Following To Obtain Primary And Secondary Samples:

RO Operate the primary AND secondary sample panels.

Open CCW to sample HX valves:

RO . 1CC-114

. 1CC-115 Open CCW to GFFD valves:

RO . ICC-304

. 1CC-305 Align AND obtain activity, hydrogen AND boron samples of the following:

RO . RCS hot legs

. PRZ liquid space

. All SGs Initiate Evaluation Of Plant Status:

Check auxiliary building radiation NORMAL SRO Consult plant operations staff to evaluate plant equipment needed for recovery.

Start additional plant equipment needed to assist in recovery as determined by the plant operations staff.

Procedure Note: When SG level decreases to 25%, AFW actuation occu rs and the AFW flow control valves receive a full open signal.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 54 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 9 Page 55 of 77 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line Isolation Signal Fails, C MSIV fails to shut Time I Position Aoolicants Actions or Behavior Check Intact SG Levels: Any Level GREATER THAN 25%

[40%] (YES)

BOP AFW flow AT LEAST 210 KPPH AVAILABLE (YES)

Control feed flow to maintain intact SG levels between 30% and 50% [40% and 50%]

After the low steam pressure SI signal is blocked, main Procedure Note: steamline isolation will occur if the high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.

Check PRZ Pressure:

RO . Pressure LESS THAN 2000 PSIG (YES)

. Block low steam pressure SI. (Locates MCB block switches and blocks SI)

If all RCPs are stopped, steps to depressurize the RCS and Procedure Caution: terminate SI should be performed as quickly as possible after the cooldown has started to minimize potential pressurized thermal shock of the reactor vessel.

Even if the lowest RCS cold leg temperature has dropped Procedure Note: by 100°F in the last 60 minutes, steam may be released from intact SGs with pressure higher than the saturation pressure for lowest cold leg temperature.

Initiate RCS Cooldown To Cold Shutdown:

BOP . Maintain RCS cooldown rate less than 100°F/HR (NOTE: Cooldown rate has been> 100°FI1-IR in last hour therefore a Cooldown will not be required.)

RO Check RHR system - OPERATING IN SHUTDOWN COOLING MODE (NO)

BOP Check if steam dump to condenser AVAILABLE (NO)

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 55 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 9 Page 56 of 77 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line Isolation Signal Fails, C MSIV fails to shut Time I Position AoIicants Actions or Behavior Check SG Status For Cooldown:

BOP . Check SGs AT LEAST ONE INTACT SG AVAILABLE (YES)

Dump steam from intact SGs using any of the following (listed in order of preference):

. Condenser steam dump (Not Available)

BOP . SG PORVs

. Checks Cooldown rate in all RCS cold legs and adjusts SG PORV positions to achieve maximum rate while not exceedinc 1 00°F/HR SIGs can be depressurized even if the Cooldown rate has Evaluators Note: exceeded IOOFIHR as long as the SIG pressure does not not cause a cooldown of the RCS.

Monitor Shutdown Margin While Continuing RCS Cooldown:

Determine boron required for shutdown margin for anticipated RCS temperatures.

SRO (Refer to OST-1036, SHUTDOWN MARGIN CALCULATION.)

Check RCS boron GREATER THAN BORON REQUIRED FOR SHUTDOWN MARGIN Check RCS boron -> Boron reciuired for SDM SRO Monitor Subcooled Recovery Criteria:

Check RWST level GREATER THAN 70% (YES)

SRO Check ruptured SG level LESS THAN 95% [80%] (YES)

Check RCS Subcooling GREATER THAN 10°F [40°F] C SRO -

20°F [50°F] M (YES)

SRO Check SI Status: SI flow GREATER THAN 200 GPM (YES)

. Voiding may occur in the vessel upper head during RCS depressurization if RCPs are NOT in service.

Procedure Note: This will result in a rapidly increasing PRZ level.

. RCS depressurization should NOT be stopped if RCS subcooling is lost. Subcooling should be restored_as_the_cooldown_continues.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 56 -

Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 9 Page 57 of 77 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line Isolation Signal Fails, C MSIV fails to shut Time I Position ApIicants Actions or Behavior Depressurize RCS To Refill PRZ: PRZ level LESS THAN 25%

SRO [40%] (YES depressurize / NO do not depressurize time dependant)

With Depressurize using one PRZ PORV.

PRZ . Locates MCB PRZ PORV switch and OPENS one Level RO PORV until PRZ level is >25%

< 25% . Reports PRZ level to CRS and closes the open PORV to stop the RCS deoressu rization

. Following a complete loss of normal seal cooling, the affected RCP(s) should NOT be started prior to a status evaluation.

Procedure Caution: . To prevent inadvertent criticality following natural circulation cooldown AND initiation of backfill, the RCP in the ruptured loop should NOT be the first RCP restarted.

RCPs should be run in order of priority (B only, A AND C, A only, C only) to provide normal PRZ spray. (IF the Procedure Note: preferred RCP is in the loop with the ruptured SG, THEN a different RCP should be started prior to starting the preferred one.)

The SRO should direct the RO to prepare to start B RCP but should not wait until the pump is started to continue Evaluators Note: with ECA-3.1. The SRO should circle these steps and move on in the procedure. The Pressurizer is continuing

I to fill due to the SI flow from the 2 running CSIPs.

Check If An RCP Should Be Started:

Check ALL RCPs Stopped (NO)

SRO IF RCP B running, THEN stop RCPs A AND C.

Observe NOTE prior to Step 23 AND GO TO Step 23.

After stopping one CSIP, RCS pressure should be allowed Procedure Note: to stabilize OR increase before checking SI termination criteria.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 57 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 9 Page 58 of 77 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line Isolation Signal Fails, C MSIV fails to shut Time Position Aoolicants Actions or Behavior SRO Check SI Reduction Criteria:

Check both CSIPs RUNNING (YES)

Check RCS subcooling based on RCP status:

Any RCP running (YES): Any RCP running: RCS SRO subcooling GREATER THAN 49F [94F] C-64F [109F] M -

SRO PRZ level GREATER THAN 25% [40%] (YES)

Stop one CSIP RO Locates MCB switch for a CSIP and places switch to STOP SRO Check SI Termination Criteria:

SI flow GREATER THAN 200 GPM (YES)

Check RCS subcooling based on RCP status:

Any RCP running: (YES) RCS subcooling GREATER THAN SRO -

49F[94F]-C 64F [109F1 M -

SRO PRZ level GREATER THAN 25% [40%] (YES)

SRO Isolate High Head SI Flow:

Check CSIP suction ALIGNED TO RWST (YES)

Open normal miniflow isolation valves 1CS-182 RO 1CS-196 1CS-210 1CS-214 Shut BIT outlet valves:

RO 1SI-3 I Sl-4 Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 58 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event #

Event

Description:

9 Page Main Steam Line Isolation Signal Fails, C MSIV 59 of 77 1 fails to shut Time 1 Position Aphcants Actions or Behavior Terminate the scenario once the crew has isola ted high head SI flow and the Pressurizer has gone solid and the PORVs are lifting.

Lead Evaluator: Direct the Simulator Operator to place the Simu lator to FREEZE Announce CREW UPDATE The NRC has the shift.

Inform the crew to remain seated at their desk and to not discuss the scenario.

Simulator Operator: When directed by the Lead Examiner go to FRE EZE.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 59 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event.# NIA Page 60 of 77 OMM-004 Attachment 12 Loss of Off-site Power Sequencer Operation Verification Attachment 12 Loss of Off-site Power Sequencer Operat ion Verification Sheet I of 5 TRAIN A on,pc,nents REQ P05 TRAIN S Conpcrn P05 REQ P03 C I P05 OK MW IA-SA MLB lB-SB 1-2 CHRG SIPUMPA t1 1-2 RUNN NO CHRGSIFJMPS (2)

RUNNING i-S CHRG Si PUMP C-A (1)

RUNNING 1-3 CHRGS1 F1JMPC-3 (21 RUNNING 14 CCW PUMP A RUNNI?4G 11 1-4 CCW PUMP B RUNNING [2 2-4 CCW PUMP C-A RUNNING (1) 2-4 CCW PUMP C-B (2 RUNNING 7-1 EMER SW PUMP A LIT 7-4 RUNNING EMER SW PUMP B LIT RUNNING 7-2 SW BSTR PUMP .A LIT 7-2 RUNNING SW BSTR PUi.cP B LIT RUNNING

-1 SO A SMPL [SOL SHUT UT -i 1 3P-217 SO A SMPL IS-OL SMUT UT i3P-21421

-2 SO S SMPL ISOL SHUT UT -2 1 SP-222 SO B SMPL IS-CL SHUT LIT i3P-219221 0-3 SOC SMPL ISOL SHUT UT -3 SO C SMPL [SOL SHUT LIT 1 SP-227 1SR224i22 10-I SO A BLON ISOL SHUT UT 10-I:l 10-1 50 A BLDN [SQL SHUT LIT 150-i 10-2 SO B BLON ISOL SHUT UT 10-2 1 BD-30 SO B BLDN [SQL SHUT LIT IBD-20 10-3 600 BLON [SQL SHUT UT 10-3 I BO-4 30 C SLON ISOL 31-SiT LIT lED-SO MAIN OONTROL ARD BOP -

AUX FW MOTOR PUMP A-SA START AUX FW MOTOR PUMP B-SB START SO-A IAF-49 (FcV-2051A)

OPEN AcTUATED BY EITHER TR4INI A so-s lAP-SI (FCV-2051B) OPEN IAF-50 (FC-2CS1C)

L OPEN (I) ither A or C rmst be LIT; mark the other N!A (2) Either orC nist be LIT; mark the other N/A OMM-004 Rev. 35 Page 7 of 69 Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. 2

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 r° Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # N/A Page 61 of 77 H OMM-004 Attachment 12 Loss of Off-site Power Sequen cer Operation Verification Attachment 12 Loss of Off-site Power Sequencer Operit ion Verification Sheet2ot 5 TRAIN ACornponent REQ P08 TRAIN B

- ompont REQ P03 P08 OK P08 OK MAIN CONTROL BOARD SOP-IMS-70 BA MAIN STEAM BAUX OPEN IMS-72 SB MAIN STEAtvI C TO P TURBINE OPEN AUX FW TURBINE ACTUATED BY EITHER TRAIN A IX BAB T&T AUX PI TURBINE TRIP & THROTTLE OR B OPEN

\/LV Al A-SA EMERGENCY BUS IA-GA Si S-SB EMERGENCY BUS lB-SB TO XFMER Al BREAKER {O84 FL) TRIP TO XFMR 81 BREAKER 1Q81 P1) TRIP MCR) EMERGENCY BUS A-BA TO (MCR) EMERGENCY BUS B-SB TO XFMERM BREAKERAI A-BA XFMER SI-SB BREAKER El A-SB DIESEL c-EN A BA BREAKER 108 CLOSE DIESEL c-EN B SB BREAKER 128 BA CtOSE 83 EMERGEI4CY BUS A SATO AUX TRIP EMERGENCY BUS B SB TO AUX TRIP BUS 0 TIE BREAKER 105 BA BUS 8 TIE BREAKER 12585 A-BA DIESEL GENERATOR START B-SB DIESEL GENERATOR START E-86 A-BA DIESEL GENERATOR START E-8 C-SB DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM EXHAUST FAN START ROOM EXHAUST FAN AI-I-8A-SA ELEC EQUIP ROOM START AH-B5 C-SB ELEC EQUIP ROOM START SUPPLY FAN SUPPLY FAN B-SI A-BA DAY TANK & START SILENCER ROOM EXHAUST FAN E-81 C-SB DAY TANK & START SILENCER ROOM EXHAUST FAN AK-2 A-SA FAN COOLER (1 HI SF AH-i B-SB FAN COOLER 11.1 HI SP AR-S A-SA FAN COOLER I) HI SF AI-1-4 B-SB FAN COOLER (1) HI SR 8-4 A-SA REACTOR SUPPORT START 8-4 B-SB REACTOR SUPPORT COOLING FAN START COOLING FAN 8-2 A-BA PRIMARY SHIELD START COOLING FAN 8-2 B-SB PRIMARY SHIELD START COOLING FAN R-2 A-SA EMERGENCY START R-2 B-SB EMERGENCY START FILTRATION FAN FWTRATION FAN AK-ISA-BA NORMAL SUPPLY START AI-I-15 B-SB NORMALSUPRX START FAN = FAN (1) LEAD FAN SELECTOR switch will :dmlifle wNch fan in each cooler will start OMM-004 Rev. 35 Page 58 oBB Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 -61 -

Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # N/A Page 62 of 77 OMM-004 Attachment 12 Loss of Off-site Power Sequencer Operat ion Verification Attachment 12 - Loss of Off-site Power Sequencer Operation Verification Shet3ofS TRAIN A Components REQ FOB TRAIN- B cpnents REQ P03 pos oK P05 CK ASP-i WC-2A-SA WATER CHILLER START WC-2 B-SB WATER CHILLER START 0MPRES30R corcREssOR P.4A-SA CHILLED WATER START P-4 8.S8 £NILLED WATER PUMP PUMP START AHI-7 A-SA, COW PUMP AREA START AH-7 B-SB CCW PU AREA FAN START FAN COOLER COOLER A14-IDA-SA CSIP SAS AREA START AN-iD B-SB 05W SAS AREA FAN FAN COOLER START COOLER AHI-6 ASA COW PUMP AREA START AH4 B-SB COW PUMP AREA FAN FAN COLER START COOLER AHI- A-GA OOIP SA AREA START AN-D S-SB CSIP SE AREA FAN FAN COOLER START COOLER AFD-25A--SA 2i&RA31,tECH START AN-28 B-SB BIT AREAFAN START PENET AREA. FAN COOLER COOLER AH.24 X-BA SAAREA FAN START AI-l-25 X-SB SB AREA FAN COOLER START COOLER AI-i-5A-SA CSP & RKR START AH-.5 B-SB CSP & RHR PUMP FAN START P)JMPS FAN COOLER COOLER M-IIA--SA 23(RSECK START AN-il B-SB 236RAEMCN PENET AREA. FAN COOLER START PENET AREA FAN COOLER AI4-2 A-BA MOO A35 FAN START AH42 B-SB MOO 855 FAN COOLER START COOLER Ai-2O A-BA AFWR & NVAC START AH-20 B-SB AFW & iVAC CHILLER FAN COOLER START CH[LLER FAN COOLER AI4-iA-SA AFWP&HVAC START AN-lB B-SB AFVP &HV.AC START CHILLER FAN COOLER CNFt.LER FAN COOLER AI-13.23 X-SA Rl-T AREA FAN START AN-B )SB SW BSTR PUMP AREA COOLER START FAN COOLER OMM-004 Rev. 35 Page 59 of Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # N/A Page 63 of 77 OMM-004 Attachment 12 Loss of Off-site Power Sequencer Operation Verification Attachment 12 - Loss of Off-site Power SequeRcer Operation VerifIcation Sheet4 of 5 TAIN-Acornponnts RG1 P05 TRAtN-ciponrI REO P05 P05 P0:5 (

ASP-I N-MO X-SA ROD CONTROL START AH-2 X-SB WPB & iNST RACK START CP8INE1 FAN COOLER FAN COOLER S-4 X-SA SUPPLY FAN START S- XSB SUFPL FAI4 START Ali-2A-3A EQUPMEN1 ROOM START AN-2e U-SB EQU[PMENT RQVM START 2 FAN COOLER I FAN COOLER AR-12A-SA RiB SWGR ROOM START SUPPLY FAN AH-i3 A-SB RAS SWOR ROOM START SUPPLY FAN AF41 A-SA SUPPLY FAN START AH-I8 5-SB SUPPLY FAN START E-8 A-BA EXHAUST FAN START E-35 A-SB EXHAUST FAN START ESS LB 1A-SA ESS LB B-SB B-i EMERO INTKTRAV SC START B-I EMERG INTJ< TRAV SCRN START (Mair Reser1r Scrn)

Main Reser Seen) (3)

&-2 EMERG INTKTRAV SC-RN START WASH PUMP 8-2 EMERO NTKTRAV SCRN START WASH PU?

(3) Screen operation is dependent on ESW suction allgnment; mark the unused screen N!A.

QMM-004 Reu 35 Page 60 of 69 Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 63 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # N/A Page 64 of 77 OMM-004 Attachment 12 Loss of Off-site Power Sequencer Operation Verification Attachment. 12 Loss of Off-site Power Sequencer Operation Verification Sheet 5 of 5 TRAIN AComponers REQ P03 TRAiN B Componenis REQ POS P03 OK P03 OK COMPUTER OR LOCAL INDICATION A ESW AUX RSVR TRAVELING START 6 ESW AUX RSVRTRA.VELING START (3)

SCREEN COMPUTER POINT 10 (3) SCREEN COMPUTER POINT ID ZSC226A ZSC23c4A A ESW PUMP DISCH STRJNER START S ESW PUMP DISCH STRAINER START (4) 1A32-SA-IE (4) 1B32-SB4E WATER HAMMER CHECKS COMPLETED If eyidence f water hanirner has been found or a water hammer was heard during ihe plant tp then perform wallduns and inspeiona per PLP-631, Attachment

1. (NUREG CR-5220) (Referere CR ESR g7-00008, EC 6O14)

(3) Screen operation is dependent Ofl ESW suction allonment; mark the unused screen N/A.

(4) The strainer is slave to pump start. Function is acceptable if ALS-2 1-i is not lit.

Conlment No. Description Signature: Time Date OMM-004 Rev 35 Page 61 of 69 Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 64 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # N/A Page 65 of 77 E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Attachm ent 3 I REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION I

Attachment 3 Sheet I of Safeguards Actuation Verification NOTE General guidance for verification of safeguards Attachment 4 of this procedure. equipment is contained in ERFIS displays of safeguards equipment status me not reiiable wNie any associated safety-related eectrical buses ace de-energizecL Q I. Verify Two CSIPs RUNPING

[I 2 Verify Two RHR Pumps RUNNING -

[I :3. Verify Two CCW Pumps RUNNING-

[I 4. Verify AU ESW ESW Booster Pumps RUNN ING Q 5. Verily SI V1ves PROPERLY ALIGNEO (Refer to Attachment 1.)

0 6. Verify CNMT Phase A Isolation Valves SHUT -

(Refer to OMM-004, ?OST TRIP/SAFEGUARD S ACTUATION REViEW, ttachment 4.)

EOP-E-4 I Rev. I I Pane 55 of 78 Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 65 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # N/A Page 66 of 77 E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Attachment 3 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJEC11QN A1tachmen 3 Sheet2of8 Safeguard Actuation Vert1icatin U 7. .iertfy SG Slowdown O SO Sample lsolatior Vates In Table I

- SHUT Table 1 SG 1owv Ad Saaie Isolation Valves CE5S Outse C4T Inside CNMT Lips -IA-S) (N-i--SB)

SG Saiple ISP-217 P-Zl/2l SG B Sanple I$P-222 IP-2.I9(Z2l SG C Ssple ISP -227 lsP-Z2il22

çw4owu SG Blowdowu IBD-30 lD-2O SG C wdown 1-4 D-39

8. IE Main Steam Line IQIatiQn Actuated QR 1 Required y Any Of TI-TEN Vefify MSIVs The FQflwing, MSIV Bypass Valves SHUT Cl

Steam Fine p:ressure LESS TI-IAN 601 P510 U]

CNMT presswe - GREATER Ti-TAN 31) P510

. JE CNMT Spray ActaDon $ignal Actuated OR l Required, IllEll Ye rify The FolIoving:

Referto OMM-DO4 POST TRLPISAFEGUARDS ACTUATION REV1EA/

Attachment .)

U]

CNMT spray pwnp RUNNING -

U]

CNMT spray valvee PROPERLY ALIGNED U

Phase ioIatiQn valvea SHUT U] a AI RCPs-STOPPED EQP-E-O I Rev. 1 I PaQe 56 of 78 Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 66 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # NIA Page 67 of 77 E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Attachment 3 REACTOR TRIP OR SAIEIY INJECI1ON Attachment 3 SRieet3 o18 Sateguards Actuation Verification C] 10. Verify Both J1ain FW Pumps TRIPPED-C] 11. Verify FW isolation Valves SHUT-(Refer to OMM-Ci04, POST TRIPISAFEGUARDS ACTUAT[ON REVIEW, Attachment 6.)

C 12. Verify both MDAFW pumps RUNNING -

13. IF any of the fol1owir conditiona exist, THEN verify the TDAFW pump -

RUNNING C a Undervoltage on either 6.9 KV emergency bus C a Level in two SOs LESS THAN 25%

C Manial actuation to control SG level

14. Verify AFW Valves PROPERLY ALIGNED C a IL no AFW Isolation Signal 1 THEN verify isolation and flow contsol valves -

OPEN NOTE An AFW Isolation signal signal requires a Main Steam Line Isolation coincident with one SG pressure 100 PSIG below the other two SGs.

C a !EAFW Isolation Signal present, THEN verily MDAFW and TDAFW isolation and how control valves to affected SG SHUT C 15. Verify Both !EDGs RUNNING C] 16. Verify CNMT Fan Coolers - ONE FAIN PER UNIT RUNN ING IN SLOW SPEED EQP-E-Q I Rev. 1 Page 7 ot 78 Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # N/A Page 68 of 77 E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Attachment 3 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTIO!I Aitachnint 3 Sheet4 of 8 Safeguards Actuation Verification D 1?. Verify CNMT Ventilation Isolation Valves SHUT -

(Referto OMM-004, VOSTTRIPISAFEGUARDS ACTUATION REVIE W,

Attachment 7) fl 18. Verify ControI Room Area Ventilation MAIN CONTROL ROOM AUGNED FOR EMERGENCY OPERATION (Referto OMM-004, POST TRIPISAFEGtJARDS ACTUATION REViE Aftachment 5, Sheets 1 arid 2, Sections for MAIN CONTROL BOAR W, D, SLB-5 arid 518-6.)

19. Verify Essential Service Chilled Water System Operation:

Verify both WC-2 chillers RUNNING D . Verify both P-4 pumps - RUNNING L] (Refer to AQP-026, LOSS OF ESSENTIAL SERVICE CHILLED WATE R

SYSTEM for loss of any WC-2 chiller.)

2G. Verify CSIP Fan Coolers - RUNNING D AN-S ASA lJ AH-99S8 Q AH-IDASA D AH-ItH3S8 NOIE Security systems are powered by bus 1AI (normal supply) or bus 191 (alternate supply).

Backup power will be available for approximately 30 MINUTES after de-energized. (Refer to OP-I I5 CENTRAL ALARM STATION ELECT The su;pplyirig bus is RICAL SYSTEMS, Section 8.9 and &1O.)

D 21. Verify AC buses IAI AIWI 151 -ENERGIZED U 22 Place Air Compressor IA AND 18 In The LOCAL CONTROL Mode.

(Refer to Attachment 7)

EOP-E-0 I Rev. 1 I Page 58 of 78 Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # N/A Page 69 of 77 E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Attachment 3 Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 69 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # N/A Page 70 of 77 E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Attachment 3 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Attachment 3 Sheet 5 of 8 Safeguards Acluation Verification CAUTION The maximum calculated dose rate in the vicinity of MCC 1A35-SA is between 10 MREM!1-IR and 150 MREMII-IR.

and MCCI 835-SB D 23. Dpatch An OperatorTo Unlock AND Turn oN The Breakers For The CSIP Suction AND Dchage Cross-Connect Valves:

(Refer to Attachment 2) co 1A35-SA l(GC 135-SE VMVE tJ8ICLE VALVE GLJIQLE 1CS-i7C 4A US-I71 iD ICS-if9 4 CS-1B 7D jCS-218 141 ICS-220 ICS-2L9 14E ICS-217 12C

24. Check If C CSIP Shoulde Placed In Service:

U

lFtwo charging pumpscan NOtbeverified to be running, AND CCSIPIs available TI-lEN place C CSIP in service in piece of the non-ru using OP-107, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEnning CSI?

M. Section 8.5 or 8.7.

EOP-E-O I Rev. I Page 59 of 78 Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 70 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # N/A Page 71 of 77 E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Inlection Attachment 3 Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 -71 -

Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 FZ0p Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # N/A Page 72 of 77 E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Attachment 3 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Attachment 3 Sheet6 of8 Safeguarth Actuation Verification

25. Start The Spent Fuel Pump Room Ventilation System:

a. At AEP-1, verify the following ESCWS isolation vves OPEN

1) SLB-11 (Train A)

[J

AH-17 SUP CH 100 (Window 9-1)

C]

AH-I7RTNCHIO5(Windowlo-1)

2) SLB-9 (Train fl C]

AH-17 SUP Cl-f 171 (Window 9-1)

C]

AI-f-17 RTN CF-I 182 (Window 10-1)

b. At AEP-1, start one SFP PUMP ROOM FAN COOLER:

C] e AH-171-4ASA C]

AH17 1-45 SB EOP-E-.0 I Rev. I I Page 60 of 78 Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 72-Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 rTestNo.: NRC Scenario# 3 Event# N/A Page 73 of 77 E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Attachment 3 Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 r° f

Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event #

E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Attachment N/A 3

Page 74 of 77 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Attachnent 3 Sheet7 of 8 Safeguards Actuation Veritication NOTE

Fuel pool levels AND temperatures should be monito red approxkntel every ito 2 HOURS.

Followthg the initial check of fuel pool levels and ternperature monitoring responsibilities may be assumed by the plant op&at ions staff (including the TSC or STA).

Only fuel pools containing fuel are required to be monito red.

2& Check Status Of Fuel Pools:

D a. Operate spent fuel coding pumps to maintain fuel pool temperatures between 8S F and 1050 F.

b. Monitor fuel pool levels AND temperatures:

0

Refer to AOP-041, SPENT FUEL POOL EVENT Attach and 11 for SFP parameter monitoin rnethod& ments 7,8, 9, 10 0

Refer to Curies H-X-24, l-l-X..25 and H-X-25 for 5FF time to 20Q F.

Levels GREATER ThAN LO ALARM (284 Ft DIN)

O

Temperatures LESS TI-IAN HI TEMP ALAH (1050 M F)

I Rev. I I Paqe 1 af 78 Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 74 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # NIA Page 75 of 77 E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Attachment 3 Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 -75 -

Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 3 Event # N/A Page 76 of 77 L E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Attachment 3 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Attachment 3 Sheet 8 of 8 Safeguards Actuation Verification NOTE IF control room ventilation was previously aligned to an emerge post-accident operations, Th. follow-up actions will 1e requirency outside air intake for d to restore the alignment.

27. ConsuLt Plant Operations Staff Regarding Alignment Of The Control Room Ventilation System:

[] e Site Emergency Co-ordinator Control Room

Site Emergency Co-ordinator Technical Support Center (Refer to PEP-230, CONTROL ROOM OPERATIONS.)

- END -

EOP-E-O I Rev. I I Page 62 of 78 Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 76 Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC Exam SCENARIO 3 L Revision Summary Rev. I Revised per NRC comments provided on 75 day outline submittal.

Archie Lucky 6/1 7/2013 Rev. 2 Revised per Operations validation comments.

Archie Lucky 7/01/2013 Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 4 Facility: SHEARON-HARRIS Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: 05000400/201 3301 Examiners: Operators: SRO:

RO:

BOP:

Initial Conditions:

IC-19, MOL, 100% power

. B MD AFW Pump is under clearance for pump packing replacement

. 1 Sl-3, Boron Injection Tank Outlet valve is under clearance for breaker repairs

. B Condenser Vacuum Pump is under clearance for makeup water supply valve problems

. Boric Acid Transfer Pump B-SB is under clearance for motor replacement Turnover:

A plant shutdown is required due to problems encountered during the repairs on the B MDAFW Pump. Repairs will not be able to be completed prior to the LCO expiring.

The plant is operating at 1 00% power in MOL. When turnover is complete a power reduction at 4 DEH units/mm must be started to support being in Mode 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . All required notifications have been made to individuals concerning the reason for the shutdown.

Critical Task:

Open 1 MS-70 or I MS-72 to establish a minimum of 210 KPPH AFW flow to the Steam Generators prior to exiting ECA-0.0

Emergency Stop the A and B Charging Safety Injection Pump prior to the B CSIP failure due to overheating

Emergency Stop the A and B Emergency Diesel Generator prior to the BEDG failure due to overheating Energize A AC emergency bus when offsite power becomes available prior to aligning equipment for extended power loss (step 1 1 of ECA-0.0)

Event No. MaIf. No.

lt:459

[ Event Type*

I RO/SRO Event Description Controlling Pressurizer Level Channel, LT-459, fails HIGH 1

cvcl7 TS SRO (APP-ALB-009), with only manual control of FK-1 22.1 available RRO/SRO 2 N/A Plant Shutdown (GP-006)

N BOP/SRO 3 I RO/SRO nis08b PR NIS Channel N-42 fails HIGH (AOP-001)

TS-SRO 4 genOl C BOP/SRO Generator Voltage Regulator Failure (APP-ALB-022) 5 hva04 C BOP/SRO A Emergency Services Chilled Water Pump Trip (AOP-026) 6 cfwl 6b C RO/SRO Main Feedwater Pump 1 B Breaker Trips 7 epsOla M ALL Loss of Offsite Power, Reactor Trip dsg42 zdsq2:6a C BOP/SRO 8

Loss of ALL AC power jpb9lOla C RO/SRO xalil 46 Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 jj 1 Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ESD-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 4 SCENARIO 4 continued SCENARIO

SUMMARY

2013 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 A plant shutdown is required due to problems encountered during the repairs on the B MDAFW Pump. Repairs will not be able to be completed prior to the LCO expiring. The plant is operating at 1 00% power in MDL. When turnover is complete a power reducti on at 4 DEH units/mm must be started to support being in Mode 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . All required notifications have been made to individuals concerning the reason for the shutdo wn.

The following equipment is under clearance:

B MDAFW Pump is under clearance for pump packing repairs. The pump has been inoperable for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and will be restored to operable status within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

Tech Spec 3.7.1.2 LCD Action a and Tech Spec 3.3.3.5.b Action c applies. 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months LCD or HSB within the next 60 hours6.944444e-4 days 0.0167 hours 9.920635e-5 weeks 2.283e-5 months , HSD following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

AU1.IAi3( ED TER SSJEM LH]TI4G ONDI[( FO1 OPERAIJOrI

3. 7J 2 t least three inieend@nt. s:eam gieraior au iry f4r&

piwps uii1 .ssoctated flc prths shi I he ORR1.[ with: er fwc wotordri en u>1 ii iiry j Ld ter pinps. ch copih1e o beiiij poered riri sCpardt enierency buses. nd

b. One stm turbno tri ien d1i. ii I ry feedater pu cipir1 e of be I rig povred hoi 9 OPERABLE tern suppy systin.

APPIECABIL] MDOE I. 2. and 3.

ACTION

. WIt one auxiHary feater puri incerah1e, restore dU1 har feeddte inos ru OPERABLE sttts wtIin the rourei 72 how s 1 1 t 1 east cr NJB i r t h 10 the r rt 6 ours F4flT SI-IUTTQN wthI ri Ihe fri 1einq t hours.

HSTRJMTATtgN 1TE SLfFDO1 Ss OPRATIOM Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 -2 Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 4 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

2013 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 continued 1.33.b All tra%fer ew1tch.. idliary rtrl C tTh *n4 A{i*

1rasfer Panel Controli for the OPA8UTY of ho: ponnt. requiied by the SHH?P Safe Shutoown ktalyis to (1) rcve daiy hea.: via flov and taaa en.ratr pow.roø.rata ral lit aIve axilIary fe.ater A e.d 6, (2) eontrol RCS inventory thro4 the nora1 iow fos stun enerator

() control RCS prtaww, (4) contr1 raatlvity char1ng fi path 1 and (5) remove decay eat vl the RIIR 5J*1i be QPERZLE.

1 Z Lnd 3.

ACTION:

C. With n. or sore inoparal. hoti Stown Systi ti&nsfir e1tnes.

pawer, or eontrol circwtti required by ,3.3..5.b. r.tore the lnupei aDle swtth(1)/C1rcuit(%) t OPERA8L *tat*s wIthin 7 d*ys, or b. in HOT STANOIY with1t the next 1.2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ,

B Condenser Vacuum Pump is under clearance for makeup water supply valve problems. Has been under clearance for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . Repairs are expected to be completed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

I Sl-3, Boron Injection Tank Outlet valve is under clearance for breaker repairs. The valve is shut with power removed. The valve has been under clearance for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

OWP-Sl-01 has been completed. Repairs are expected to be completed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . Tech Specs 3.5.2 and 3.6.3 apply.

EMER3ENCY.COE COOLING SYST 314. E. 2 ECS SUBSSTES - GREATER 1PM OR EQUAL TO 350?F IINI1ING CODJTIO4 FOR OPERiTION lw ipcrt Ernrgncy Core Coliri 3yLem (CCCS) ubytern hii be OFERA8LE with each subsysteni ccpri sed of

a. One OPERA&E Charin/safety injvcton pi.np.

b. One UPR?31E RH heat xchanr.

(. O OJ(A&LE HR. Yunp, dud d, Ar OIERAL flow path capab1 of :akirg suctioi fron t[ rf&ng water torge tank cn a Safety inection sna1 and ixp beri irianuafly- aiiqne4, transfErring suctiar to the fl:tamJ}eflt SUI durihg the recirculation phase of operation.

PUCBI_ITY: MOOES 3, 2. dnd 3,

!GT 10N

a. tth one ECCS subsysteii hmprable. restore the inoperable stbsysteoi to OPERABLE st3Liis within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months or be in at least HCT STANOB( within he rext 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and ir HOT SHU1DWN within the fc]4ina h [oiits.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 - 3 - Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 4 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

2013 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 continued 1 SI-3, Boron Injection Tank Outlet valve, Tech Specs... continued 3/4 6.3 C0TAJMENT JSQ1AUQLYALYE UiITIHG COtIDITION F0 OPERJT10N Eath contlinent a1atn valvw pec1fed in the Technic Sçiecficatior Equiprnent list Proran, plant procedure PLP 106 h1l bi.

OPA& with 1tIon tir ls than o equl tu rquird ilatio n tinies,

$4JCM3i,1jX MOS 1, 3 and 4 ACI ION:

With one or mare of the containnient isolation valve(s nopera least oro isolation vae OPERABII in each afficted penetratIon h1o, maitaIi at and that Is. ope-n a, Restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE or status witnn 4- houns,

b. isolate each affectd pnetratlon wIthin 4 haurs b use least one deactivated auto tic valve secured In the of at isltion p0sitIon, 01.

Boric Acid Transfer Pump B-SB is under clearance for motor replacement. Has been under clearance for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . Repairs are expected to be completed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

Tech Spec 3.3.3.3.5.b which is a 7 day LCO and 3.1.2.2 applies (3.1.2.2 is for tracking only). OWP-CS-05 has been completed.

T1 SU1DON SYT

!ThtTtNGO ZITCN F o.*ri -

3,3,3.5. a The Reot. Shutdn Systtø otorb In Table 3.3-1 sl,aU be OPERMLE. tç nstrrnitaton :hann4is 5hawi 3.3.i$,b A1 tansfer stche Ailli4ry Ttanwfer Pani Cantr&s for tles,OPER Caritrol Panet Controls and Au*lUary SHN?R Safe Shutdon Analrsis to CI) i MILIT of those oantts required by tfle we decay heat via auxfl1ry 1*edwatar fi ow and staa larator poweroperated rtl I ef valve 11 A g, (Z) control RCS In tory throtigli the riori1 thar1n froi steam en.rators (3) cn-tri1 RCS pressure, (4) contrl rvactiv q flew path tbe RIIR IYt5 Sh&fl t QPiZLE. lty and (5) rencve decay lint via APPtICATV: 4QDES 1, 2, IM 3.

ACITON:

a. With the nurnbe of QPRABLE rata sh*tdo thai tie $1nlr!u Channels OPRAaLE as requtrd wn oMtoring channels Tess rstori the by Tatle 3. 39 operable channel(s) to CPERA3LE status tth-ia 7 days or be in I-tOT SHUtl)ch4N wIthin the next tZ hours.

b. with the nXer of iJ $1Ut oflitarng Channels lass than the total Nbar of Channels require d by lahle 3 3-9, restore the !rioperabl. channels to OPERAU status wIthin CJ days or sutit a Special Report n accordance with Specification S,9.Z within 14 ad1tional days. -

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 4 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

2013 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 continued Event 1: Controlling Pressurizer Level Channel LT-459 fails HIGH and FK-122.1 auto failure.

The crew should respond to the level transmitter failure in accordance with alarm response procedure APP-ALB-09-4-2 and window 2-1. The crew will take Charging FCV-1 22 to Manual and maintain pressurizer level within the control bands and trip limits of OMM-001 Attachment

13. The crew will shift level control to an alternate channel. When FK-1 22.1, Chargi ng Flow control valve, is taken to manual the automatic control of the valve will fail. When the RO pushes the Automatic button on the control nothing will occur and the control will remain in manual. This will require the crew to remain in manual control to maintain PZR level for the remainder of the scenario. The SRO will evaluate Tech. Spec 3.3.1 for any impact due to the failed instrument and complete OMM-001 Attachment 5.

TS 3.3.1 As a minimum the Reactor Trip System instrumentation channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE Table 3.3-1 TAL[ 3. I RcTon TRf. SST11JJ4SJRNFATJON 4tN rMUll ThT6t Nil N1INWI S CHANNELS APPL1CLE FUNCTWN1 UNi 112!P cEERA8LE ACT[ilI 11, Pressurizer Water Level--High (Abeve P-7) 3 2 2 6 ACTIOf 6 W1.h ha nwmbr q ABt. chrtte1. one jgi tle totat o Ch*ntie, STARtUP d?or GWER OPRATI()N tn-ay proceed provLded tbe fo4lowing nd.tion ar sisLed:

. The ofabW hicte1. is pLed itt the tripped on4iin

- wi.thit 6 biour anti I,. Thm flLnIrnm Ch.an*I OPZRABLE qLzeent i! met hcwev, cbe ci*rnei may be bypasse for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months tm irvei.iinc taiting of :Oter hate.s per Spec Lain 4.3. 1,L, Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 5 Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 4 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

2013 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 continued Event 2: Plant Shutdown (GP-006). Crew performs a power reduction lAW GP-006. For this reactivity manipulation it is expected that the SRO will conduct a reactivity brief, the RD will borate per the reactivity plan and the BOP will operate the DEH Contro ls as necessary to lower power.

Event 3: PRNIS Channel N-42 fails HiGH (AOP-001). This malfunction will cause rods to start stepping in at maximum speed (72 steps per minute). The crew should respond by entering AOP-001, Malfunction of Rod Control and Indication System and perform the immediate actions which will be placing the Rod Control selector switch to MANUAL. The crew will then perform the follow up actions of AOP-001, implement OWP-RP-24 and OP-104 Section 5.5 in order to restore Rod Control to automatic. The evaluator should wait until the Simula tor Operator runs OWP-RP-024TST before inserting event 4. The SRO will evaluate Tech.

Spec 3.3.1 for any impact due to the failed instrument.

MINIMUM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICALE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS IJB1E OPERABLE _p_ ACTION I. Nanual Reactor Trip 2 1 2 i 2 1 2 1 2 3,4,5 9

2. Power Range, Neutron Flux

a. Nigh Setpoint 4 2

b. Low Setpoint 3 1, 2 2 4 2 3 1L4#, 2 2

3. Power Range Neutron Flux 4 High Positive Rate 2 3 1, 2 2

4. Power Range, Neutron Flux, 4 Nigh Negative Rate 2 i, 2 2 ACTION 2 - WI th the number of OPERABLE channels one lesS thai the To:tl Nuniber of Channels STARTUP endlor PcY,tER OPERATION rniy proceed provided the rollowin9 conditions ace satisfied;

a. The inoperable channel is placed in th tripped condition within hours,

b. The Miniw4jni Channels OPERABLE requirernt is met; heer ttw inoperable chnncl may be bjpassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.31.L. and

c. Either. TKERMfL POWER is restricted to tess then or equal to 75 of RATED ThERMAL POWER end the Power Range Neutron flux Trip Setpoirit is reduced to less than or equal to SI of RATFD ThERMAl. POWER within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ; or. the UADNT POWER TILT RATIO is monitored at least once per L2 hours pcr Specification 42,42, Event 4: Generator Voltage Regulator Failure (APP-ALB-022). The voltage regulator failure will cause generator MVARS to rise above the normal control band. ALB-2 2-9-4, ALB-22-4-5 and ERFIS indications will alert the operators to this condition if not detecte d earlier by changes in generator MVARS. Annunciator guidance will have the BOP operato r attempting to control voltage with the voltage regulator in MANUAL, but attempts for this type of control will fail requiring the base adjuster to be used to reduce MVARs to a value within normal operational limits (75 to 175 MVARs). This failure will also require the crew to notify the Load Dispatcher that the voltage regulator is in Manual control within 30 minutes. The SRO will complete 0MM-001 Attachment 5.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 6 Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 4 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

2013 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 continued Event 5: A Emergency Services Chilled Water Pump Trip (AOP-026). The crew will respon d

to various alarms on ALB-023, diagnose the event, and enter AOP-026, Loss of Essential Chill Water System (no immediate actions). The SRO will direct the BOP to start the B Train ESCWS Chiller lAW OP-i 48, Essential Service Chilled Water System. The crew should implement OWP-ECW-0i for the ESCW Chiller IA-SA failure. The SRO should evalua te Tech Spec 3.7.13, Essential Services Chilled Water System and PLP-114, Relocated Techni cal Specifications and Design Basis Requirements Attachment 4 for Area Temperature Monitoring. Note that the A Chiller will be inoperable for the remainder of the scenar io and this will impact plant response during the Major Event in that this failure will prevent Load Block 9 on sequencer Train A from energizing. The SRO will complete OMM-00i Attachment 5 for the failure.

TS 3.7.13 Pt AkT SS1SS 3/1 I FSSFNfIA S*RiJJrJ& CN FL LAfFR VSfl*1 LIN! T1N3 LOtiDflWN OR CPIRAflO4 313 4t let tij indx1ent sntii] erires ChifleI Water Systcqi locp sh 11 b 0ERAI3L E, JftJLLTX: 1Q{S 1. 2. 3. n}

,. lh ci / unP hflc lsl SystP cp )r[r3Ii esote t ps [ tj loixc o fjlfkA[LL IJs i tit fl nour or ne ip 1 is IDBy nthin He iet & n c nd in ZJLD SHJ IDOIN ithw the ft 1nna 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months Event 6: Main Feedwater Pump I B Recirculation Valve (1 FW-39) fails OPEN The - crew should identify that the I B FW pump recirc valve has failed open by MCB light change s from green to red, FW discharge pressure changes, SG Feedflow/Steam flow changes, SG level trends on the ERFIS computer screen displays and by level trends on the WR and NR level recorders. The BOP may attempt to close the valve when the incorrect position is observ ed but the valve will not close from the MCB. The crew may dispatch the Turbine Building AO immediately or when directed by AOP-010, Feedwater Malfunctions. When the crew enters AOP-010 they will initially perform the immediate action to verify that a FW pump has not tripped. The SRO work through procedure steps to have the recirc valve manually closed

. The AO will not be successful with shutting the recirc valve and all SG levels will reach OMM-001 and AOP-01 0 trip limits of 30% within approximately 5 minutes. When the Reactor trip is activated event 7 will be automatically inserted. The SRO will complete OMM-001 .

Event 7 (Major): Loss of Offsite Power, Reactor Trip Once the crew has activat ed the Reactor trip switch and the Reactor trip breakers open a loss of Offsite Power will occur. The crew will enter EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. While implementing the actions of E-0 for the loss of Offsite power/Reactor Trip Event 8 is occurring. The BOP maybe directed to implement AOP-025 during E-0 implementation.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 4 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

2013 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 continued Event 8: Loss of ALL AC power: With the loss of offsite power both Emergency Busses will lose power which will auto start both EDGs on under voltage signals. The sequen cers will run in program A. B EDG output breaker 126 will trip prior to the sequencer reaching Load Block 9

(<60 seconds from breaker 126 closing). This will cause a complete loss of power to the B Emergency Bus. Additionally, during A EDG sequencer operation the A ESW pump start signal will fail. The SOP should be monitoring sequencer operation and identify that in Load Block 2 the A ESW pump failed to start or the SRO or RO could discover the failure based on MCB SW annunciators. A second A ESW pump auto start signal generated on SW low pressure will also not occur due to an isolated Service Water transmitter.

Since the A Emergency Services Chilled Water Pump tripped during event 5 the A sequencer will not complete its cycle and load block 9 will not occur. The crew would have waited until AFTER load block 9 then attempted to manually start the A ESW pump from the MCB switch.

A successful start of the A ESW pump may have occurred if not for the additional failure s

associated with this event.

Since load block 9 is NOT actuated a timer to manually actuate load block 9 will run. This timer runs for 150 seconds before the manual load block permissive can be initiated. IF the crew waits for the 150 second timer to time out and allows the A CSIP and A EDG to continue to run without ESW cooling both the CSIP and the EDG could potentially overheat and fail. If at any time the crew attempts to manually start the A ESW pump from the MCS switch they will find that it will NOT start (switch is failed). The crew should identify that AOP-022, Loss of Service Water, entry is required. The immediate actions of AOP-022 require that the A CSIP and A EDG be secured if ESW is lost for more than 1 minute. Securing the A EDG will stop both the EDG and CSIP. To secure the EDG the crew will have to use the Emerg ency Stop controls since an emergency start on bus under voltage started the EDG. Prior to securing the EDG the crew should discuss that when the A EDG is stopped both Emergency Busses will be without power and a Loss of ALL AC power event will occur which will require entry into ECA 0.0. The BOP should locate the A EDG Emergency Stop switch and take the switch to the stop position then verify that the EDG has stopped and at this time the SRO should transit ion from E 0 to ECA-0.0. The RO and BOP should perform the immediate actions of ECA-0

.0 and the crew should then implement ECA-0.0 until power is available. Prior to evaluating extend ed power loss conditions in ECA-0.0 (step 9) the load dispatcher will inform the crew that the source of the offsite fault has been identified and corrected and give permission to restore power to the station from offsite. The crew will use Attachment I and restore power to the A bus.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 8 Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 4 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

2013 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 4 continued Event 9: 1 MS-70 and 1 MS-72 fail to auto open (Loss of all AFW until operator opens MS-70 1 or 72). B MD AFW Pump is under clearance and A MD AFW Pump will lose power. The Turbine Driven AFW pump should start on either a loss of power to the Emergency Bus or low level in 2 of 3 SGs. Both conditions will be blocked preventing the auto opening of both I MS-70 and I MS-72. If the crew does not respond by opening either I MS7O or 1 MS-72 then a loss of all FW to the Steam Generators will create a RED path on Heat Sink (FR-H.1). Since a loss of ALL AC Power will occur the crew will be implementing ECA-0.0. A caution prior to step I of ECA-0.0 states: Critical Safety Function Status Trees should be monitored for information only.

Function Restoration Procedures should NOT be implemented unless directed by this procedure. The crew should remain in ECA-0.0 and NOT transition to FR-H.1 if there is a time when a RED path exists. The crew should identify that there is no Feedwater flow to the SGs and open either 1 MS-70 or I MS-72 to establish a motive force to run the Turbine Driven AFW pump. Additionally, after opening either I MS-70 or 1 MS-72 to establish flow to the SG the TDAFW pump speed controller should be manually increased to obtain a minimum of 210 KPPH AFW flow.

Scenario termination will occur after the crew restores power from offsite sources to the A

Emergency bus lAW ECA-0.0 Attachment I then transitions from ECA-0.0 to E-0, Reacto r Trip or Safety Injection. After completing steps 1-4 of E-0 the crew will transition to ES-0.1

, Reactor Trip Response. When the crew demonstrates that they can implement step 4 to stabiliz e and maintain RCS temperature between 555° F and 559°F the scenario will end.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 4 CRITICAL TASK JUSTIFICATION:

1. Open 1 MS-70 or 1 MS-72 to establish a minimum of 210 KPPH AFW flow to the Steam Generators prior to exiting ECA-0.0 Failure to establish the minimum required AFW flow results in adverse conseq uences or significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant. This critical task requires the crew to recognize an automatic actuation of an ESF system or compo nent should have occurred but has not and then take manual operator actions to restore the required flow.

2. Emergency Stop the A and B Emergency Diesel Generator prior to the A EDG failure due to overheating The running CSIP or running EDG are considered essential loads of the ESW system lAW AOP-022 both components are required to be stopped if ESW flow is lost for greater than one minute. This is done to protect against equipment damag

e. Failure to stop these ESF components increases the probability that they will not be available to support long term efforts to cool the core and place the plant in a safe condition.

3. Stop the A and B Charging Safety Injection Pump prior to the A CSIP failure due to overheating (NOTE: if the EDG is Emergency stopped then the A CSIP will not have power and it will be stopped also)

The running CSIP or running EDG are considered essential loads of the ESW system lAW AOP-022 both components are required to be stopped if ESW flow is lost for greater than one minute. This is done to protect against equipment damag

e. Failure to stop these ESF components increases the probability that they will not be available to support long term efforts to cool the core and place the plant in a safe condition.

4. Energize A AC emergency bus when offsite power becomes availab le prior to aligning equipment for extended power loss (step 11 of ECA-0.0).

Failure to energize an AC emergency bus constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to degraded emergency power capacity.

Failure to perform this task also results in the needless degradation of a barrier to fission product release via the RCP seals. Energize at least one AC emergency bus before transition out of E-0, unless the transition is to ECA-0.0, in which case the critical task must be performed before placing safeguards equipment hand switches in the pull-to-lock position. For Harris station safeguards equipment cannot be placed in pull-to-lock so the task would be to energize the emergency bus prior to aligning equipm ent for extended power loss and locally de-energizing control power to the ESF pumps Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 10-Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 4 SIMULATOR SETUP For the 2013 NRC Exam Simulator Scenario #4 Reset to IC-i 64 password dinner Go to RUN Silence and Acknowledge annunciators GO TO FREEZE and inform the lead examiner the Simulator is ready. DO NOT GO TO RUN until directed by the lead examiner.

Set ERFIS screens (The examiner has provided to the candidate with initial conditions and the initiating cues prior to placing the simulator in RUN.)

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS Provide a Reactivity Plan to candidates for shutting down the plant Provide a copy of the following procedures:

GP-006, NORMAL PLANT SHUTDOWN FROM POWER OPERATION TO HOT STANDBY (MODE 1 TO MODE 3) marked up through section 5.2 step 3 with step 3 signed off and step 4 circled Press START on Counter Scaler Post conditions for status board from IC-i 9 Reactor Power 100% steady state Control Bank D at 218 steps RCS boron 1034 ppm B MDAFW Pump is OOS for pump packing problems Pump has been OOS for 12 total hours and is expected back within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Tech Spec 3.7.1.2, 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months LCO or HSB within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , HSD following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months lSl-3, Boron Injection Tank Outlet valve has been under clearance for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . Tech Spec 3.5.2 applies 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months LCO or HSB within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and HSD within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . Tech Spec 3.6.3 also applies but is met by removing power and having the valve shut.

Boric Acid Transfer Pump B-SB has been under clearance for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . Tech Spec 3.3.3.5.b Action a applies, restore to operable within 7 days or HSD within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . Tech Spec 3.1 .2.2 also applies (tracking only).

Align equipment for repairs:

Hang CIT on B MDAFW Pump MCB switch then place protected train placards per OMM-001 6 on A MDAFW Pump, MS-70 and 72, B ESW Pump, B RHR Pump and B CCW Pump Boron Injection Pump B-SB, place pump switch to STOP, and hang CIT on MCB switch Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 - ii -

Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 4 SIMULATOR SETUP (continued)

Condenser Vacuum Pump 1 B, place pump switch to STOP, and hang CIT on MCB switch I SI-3, Boron Injection Tank Outlet valve, and hang CIT on MCB switch Place filled out copies of OWPs into the OWP book ensure they are removed at end of day

OWP-Sl-01 and place in MCR OWP book for 1SI-3 clearance

OWP-CS-05 and place in MCR OWP book for B BA Transfer Pump clearance Hang restricted access signs on MCR entry swing gates Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 4 Event# 1 Page 13 of Event

Description:

Controlling Pressurizer Level Channel, LT-459, fails HIGH Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When the crew has completed their board walk down and are ready to take the shift inform the Simulator Operator to place the Simulator in Run. When the Simulator is in run Lead Evaluator:

announóe:

CREW UPDATE (SROs Name) Your crew has the shift.

END OF UPDATE When directed by the Lead Evaluator, ensure that the Simulator Operator:

annunciator horns are on and place the Simulator in RUN.

Event I is PRZ LT-459, failing high. The crew should respond lAW APP-ALB-009. The crew will be required to Evaluator Note: take Charging FCV-122 to manual and maintain PRZ level within the control band. There is also an additional failure when the RO attempts to return FCV-I 22 to AUTO the controller will be failed to Manual.

Simulator Operator On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger I (Controlling PRZ Level Instrument, LT-459, fails high),

. ALB-009-2-I, PRZ CONT HIGH LEVEL DEV & HTRS ON Indications Available

. ALB-009-4-2, PRESSURIZER HIGH LEVEL ALERT

. Lowering Pressurizer level RO IDENTIFY a failed Pressurizer Level Channel Directs the actions of APP-ALB-009-4-2 or use OPS-NGGC SRO 1000 for guidance RO PLACE FCV-122, Charging Flow Control Valve, in manual.

Closing FCV-122 too far will reduce Regen Hx flow, and Evaluator Note:

result in a Regen Hx High Temperature alarm.

OPERATE FCV-122 as necessary to restore Pressurizer Level RO to the normal band Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 13-Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 4 Event# j Page 14 f Event

Description:

Controlling Pressurizer Level Channel, LT-459, fails HIGH Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Provides level bands and trip limits lAW OMM-001 Att. 13 0MM-aOl Attach 13 Control Bands and - PRZ Level- Control Band 5% of Reference Level, Trip limits Trip Limits 10% low and 90% high RD SELECT 460/461 on Pressurizer Level Controller Selector

. ALB-009-2-1, PRZ CONT HIGH LEVEL DEV & HTRS ON Evaluator Note:

Clears At the MCB recorder panel, ensure that the failed channel is BOP / RD not selected.

- Selects NON failed channel for recording Evaluator Note.* (Any Tech Spec evaluation can be conducted with a follow up question after the scenario).

Evaluate T.S.

3.3.1 Action 6, With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and

b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 SRO hours for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1.

3.3.3.5.a minimum number of operable channels met 3.3.3.6 minimum number of operable channels met IF the letdown line relief lifts the SRO should evaluate this TS:

3.4.6.2, action (b). With any RCS operational leakage greater than limits (RCS Identified leakage greater than 10 gpm),

reduce the leakage rate to within limits within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or be in HOT STANDBY w/in the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 14 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 15 of 65 Event

Description:

Controlling Pressurizer Level Channel, LT-459, fails HIGH Time Position H Applicants Actions or Behavior Restore Charging to Automatic lAW OP-I 07 section 5.4 steps RO 14 and 15 (Requires shifting Master Controller to Manual and then back to Auto in order to remove integration. (May use instructions from CE database to restore charging to auto).

Identifies that FK-I 22.1 will not shift into AUTOMATIC control RO and informs the SRO Acknowledges communications with RC and directs RO to continue to operate FK-122.1 in manual. Contacts WCC for assistance.

Completes an Equipment Problem Checklist, CMM-001 SRO Attachment 5 Contacts WCC for assistance. (WR, EIR and Maintenance support)

Directs BOP to implement CWP-RP-03 When contacted for failure of FK-1 22.1 acknowledge request for assistance and state that you will contact Maintenance and develop a troubleshooting plan.

Simulator Communicator:

When contacted for implementation of OWP-RP-03 state that you are still getting a crew together for OWP implementation and they will be there as soon as possible.

There is no intention to allow the crew to complete OWP-RP-03 prior to continuing with next event.

Lead Evaluator:

When the plant has been stabilized and the crew has Pressurizer Level within 5% of control band Cue Event 2 Plant Shutdown Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 - 15 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 16 of 65 Event

Description:

Plant Shutdown (GP-006)

Time Position [ Applicants Actions or Behavior When the plant has been stabilized and the crew has Pressurizer Level within 5% of control band the crew Evaluator Note: should precede with Event 2 Plant Shutdown. If not, Cue Communicator to contact SRO as MSO and direct crew to commence a Plant Shutdown due to the expiring LCO for the B MDAFW Pump.

If directed by the Lead Evaluator, contact SRO as MSO and Communicator: direct crew to commence a Plant Shutdown due to the expiring LCO for the B MDAFW Pump.

Normal Plant Shutdown From Power Operation to Hot Standby GP-006 (MODE I to MODE 3)

SRO GP-006, Section 5.2 Step 4 When PRZ backup heaters are energized in manual, PK 444A1, PRZ Master Pressure Controller (a P1 controller) will integrate up to a greater than normal output, opening PRZ Spray Valves to return and maintain RCS pressure at setpoint.

The result is as follows:

. PORV PCV-444B will open at a lower than expected Procedure Note: pressure.

. ALB-009-3-2, PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESS DEVIATION CONTROL, will activate at a lower than expected pressure.

. Increased probability for exceeding Tech Spec DNB limit for RCS pressure.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 -16 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # Page 17 of 65 Event

Description:

Plant Shutdown (GP-006)

Time Position I Applicants Atio or ehaor Evaluator Note: Crew may refer to OP-I 00 P&L 4.0.31 or Section 8.15 ENERGIZE all available Pressurizer Backup Heaters.

OP-IOU. Reactor Coolant Svstem Precaution and Limitations:

4.0.31. When energizing the Pressurizer Backup Heaters RD Groups A or B, the following sequence should minimize the pressure increase and subsequent power transient. Place PK 444A in manual and raise the output to between 40% and 45%

and then place PK-444A back in AUTO. Then promptly turn on the backup heaters.

Indicated PRNI power may increase >100% if the Turbine ramp is not started after energizing all Pressurizer Heaters.

Evaluator Note:

The crew may elect to begin boration prior to lowering turbine load.

Procedure Note: Routine load changes should be coordinated with the Load Dispatcher to meet system load demands.

OP-I 07.01 RD OP-I 07.01, Section 5.2 and then 5.1

DETERMINE the reactor coolant boron concentration from chemistry OR the Main Control Room status board.

. DETERMINE the magnitude of boron concentration RD increase required.

DETERMINE the volume of boric acid to be added using the reactivity plan associated with the IC.

FIS-1 13, BORIC ACID BATCH COUNTER, has a tenths Procedure Note:

position.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 - 17 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: NRC Scenario# 4 Event# Page j f Event

Description:

Plant Shutdown (GP-006)

Time Position Applicants Acfions or Behavior If the translucent covers associated with the Boric Acid and

. Total Makeup Batch counters FIS-113 and FIS-114, located on Procedure Caution:

the MOB, are not closed, the system will not automatically stop at the preset value.

SET FIS-1 13, BORIC ACID BATCH COUNTER, to obtain the RO desired quantity.

SRO Directs boration Boration of the RCS will be dependent on charging and letdown Procedure Note: flow rate. Placing additional letdown orifices in service will increase the boric acid delivery rate to the RCS.

. SET controller ICS-283, FK-113 BORIC ACID FLOW, for the desired flow rate.

. VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch has been placed in RO the STOP position.

. VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch green light is lit.

. PLACE control switch RMW MODE SELECTOR to the BOR position.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 65 Event

Description:

Plant Shutdown (GP-006)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When PRZ backup heaters are energized in manual, PK 444A1 PRZ Master Pressure Controller (a P1 controller) will integrate up to a greater than normal output, opening PRZ Spray Valves to return and maintain RCS pressure at setpoint.

The result is as follows:

. PORV PCV-444B will open at a lower than expected Procedure Note:

pressure.

. ALB-009.-3.2, PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESS DEVIATION CONTROL, will activate at a lower than expected pressure.

. Increased probability for exceeding Tech Spec DNB limit for RCS pressure.

OPERATE the pressurizer backup heaters as required to limit the difference between the pressurizer and RCS boron RO concentration to less than 10 ppm.

o MAKE boron concentration adjustments as dictated from sample results.

Procedure Note: At least 10 minutes should be allowed for mixing before a sample is taken.

For large boron changes, PERFORM the following:

o DIRECT Chemistry to sample the RCS for boron RO concentration.

o MAKE boron concentration adjustments as dictated from sample results.

Procedure Note: Boration may be manually stopped at any time by turning control switch RMW CONTROL to STOP.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 19 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page Qi Event

Description:

Plant Shutdown (GP-006)

Time Position L Applicants Actions or Behavior During makeup operations following an alternate dilution, Procedure Note: approximately 10 gallons of dilution should be expected due to dilution water remaining in the primary makeup lines.

. START the makeup system as follows:

o TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily.

RO o VERIFY the RED indicator light is LIT.

. VERIFY boration automatically terminates when the desired quantity of boron has been added.

The operation should be stopped if an unanticipated reactivity Procedure Caution: effect is seen. Do not resume the operation until the cause has been corrected.

During downpower with rods in automatic Control Bank 0 Evaluator Note:

will insert into the reactor.

. VERIFY Tavg responds as desired.

. IF rod control is in AUTO, THEN VERIFY the control rods are responding correctly.

RO

VERIFY boration automatically terminates when the desired quantity of boron has been added.

PLACE Reactor Makeup in Auto per Section 5.1.

Additional steps are included in section 5.1 but not all will Evaluator Note: be applicable since the system just came out of Automatic.

The only steps included here are the ones associated with .

switch manipulations.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 20 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: NRC Scenario# 4 Event# 2 Page 65 Event

Description:

Plant Shutdown (GP-006)

Time Position Ainlicants Actions or Behavior

. VERIFY the RMW CONTROL switch:

o Is in the STOP position.

o The GREEN light is LIT.

. PLACE the RMW MODE SELECTOR to AUTO.

RO . START the makeup system as follows:

o TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily.

o VERIFY the RED indicator light is LIT.

Reports to CRS that boration is complete and Makeup is back in AUTO

. START the makeup system as follows:

o TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START RO momentarily.

o VERIFY the RED indicator light is LIT.

. Verifies proper valve and pump alignment The operation should be stopped if an unanticipated Procedure Caution: reactivity effect is seen. Do not resume the operation until the cause has been corrected.

. VERIFY Tavg responds as desired.

. IF rod control is in AUTO, THEN VERIFY the control rods are responding correctly.

RO

VERIFY boration automatically terminates when the desired quantity of boron has been added.

PLACE Reactor Makeup in Auto per Section 5.1.

The following steps will initiate turbine load reduction lAW Evaluator Note:

GP..006.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 - 21 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # Page 22 f 65 Event

Description:

Plant Shutdown (GP-006)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior A failure of the Vidar in the DEH computer has resulted in a plant trip in the past. This failure would affect operation in Operator Auto, and can be detected in either of the follow ing ways:

If OSI-PI is available, the process book PLANTSTATUS.PIW, DEH Trends function of the Plant Process Computer: DEH (menu) contains a point for DEH MEGAWATTS. With a failure of the Vidar, this point will not be updating.

If OSI-PI is NOT available, accessing the ANALOG INPUTS screen on the Graphics display computer (in the Termination Cabinet room near the ATWS panel) will show several points, most of which should be updating if the Vidar is functioning properly.

Procedure Caution:

If the DEH graphics computer is out of seriice, VIDAR can be checked as updating on the operator panel as follows:

1) DEPRESS TURBINE PROGRAM display button.

2) CHECK TURBINE PROGRAM display button is illuminated.

3) CHECK REFERENCE and DEMAND displays indicat e

0000.

4) DEPRESS 1577.

5) DEPRESS T1 ENTER

6) If the DEMAND display indicates 0000 then VIDAR is updating.

7) If the DEMAND display indicates 0001 then VIDAR is not updating.

There is no procedural guidance directing when the Evaluator Note: boration to lower power is required. The crew may elect to perform the boration prior to placing the Turbine in GO.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # Page 23 of 65 Event

Description:

Plant Shutdown (GP-006)

Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior DIRECTS BOP to start power reduction at 4 DEH Units/Mm.

SRO May direct initiation of a boration before the power reduction begins.

BOP Requests PEER check prior to manipulations of DEH Control

. DEPRESS the LOAD RATE MW/MIN push-button.

. ENTER the desired rate, NOT to exceed 5 MW/MIN, in the DEMAND display. (4 DEH Units/minute)

. DEPRESS the ENTER push-button.

BOP . DEPRESS the REF push-button.

. ENTER the desired load (120 MW per CRS) in the DEMAND display.

. DEPRESS the ENTER push-button. The HOLD push-button should illuminate.

The unloading of the unit can be stopped at any time by depressing the HOLD push-button. The HOLD lamp will Procedure Note: illuminate and the GO lamp will extinguish. The load reduction can be resumed by depressing the GO push-button. The HOLD lamp will extinguish and the GO lamp will illuminate.

. DEPRESS the GO push-button to start the load reduction and inform crew through Crew Update Turbine in GO.

. VERIFY the number in the REFERENCE display decreases.

BOP

. VERIFY Generator load is decreasing.

. WHEN Turbine load is less than 95%, THEN VERIFY the 3A and 3B Feedwater Vents have been opened per OP 136, Section 7.2 Acknowledge direction. No simulator response actions Communicator:

are required.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 - 23 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 4 Event# Page 24 of 65 Event

Description:

Plant Shutdown (GP-006)

Time :

I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior A good initiation point for Event 3 is following the return of Makeup to AUTO.

PRIOR to the crew reaching 95% power and once satisfied with observation of the power reduction, cue the Simulator Lead Evaluator: . .

Operator to insert Trigger 2. This will allow the Reactor power to remain able 90% for Event 6, the Major event initiator.

Event 3 PR NIS Channel N-42 fails HIGH (AOP-0O1)

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 - 24 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 25 of 65 Event

Description:

PR NIS Channel N-42 fails High (AOP-OO1)

Time I Position I Aoplicants Actions or Behavior On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 3:

Simulator Operator:

Power Range NIS Channel 42 failure HIGH

. Uncontrolled rod motionlbistable trips.

. ALB-013-4-1, Power Range High Neutron Flux High SP Alert

. ALB-013-4-2, Power Range High Neutron Flux Rate Alert Indications Available

. ALB-013-4-5, Power Range Channel Deviation

. ALB-013-5-1, Overpower Rod Stop

. ALB-013-8-5, Computer Alarm Rod DEVISEQ NIS PWR Range Tilts RD RESPONDS to alarms/uncontrolled rod motion.

ENTERS and directs actions of AOP-O01, Malfunction of Rod Control and Indication System.

AOP-00 1 SRO Makes PA announcement for AOP entry Holds an Alignment Brief RD PERFORMS AOP-001 Immediate Actions.

Rods cannot be withdrawn until AOP-OO1 actions have been implemented to clear the overpower rod stop.

Evaluator Note:

OWP-RP-24 provides the same actions as AOP-OO1 to clear the overpower rod stop.

Immediate CHECK that LESS THAN TWO control rods are dropped.

Action RD (YES)

Immediate RD POSITION Rod Bank Selector Switch to MAN.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 - 25 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 26 of 65 Event

Description:

PR NIS Channel N-42 fails High (AOP-OO1)

Time Position AoolicanVs Actions or Behavior Immediate Action RO CHECK Control Bank motion STOPPED. (YES)

Directs OAC to maintain OMM-DOl, Attachment 13 limits for SRO control rods AND directs BOP to place the Turbine ramp on HOLD PROCEEDS to Section 3.2.

BOP Places Turbine DEH control to HOLD and informs CRS ramp on HOLD CHECK that instrument channel failure has NOT OCCURRED by observing the following:

. RCS Tavg (YES)

RO

. RCSTref(YES)

. POWER Range NI channels (NO, Nl-42 Failed)

. TURBINE first stage pressure (YES)

RNO Actions:

PERFORM the following:

. IF a power supply is lost, THEN GO TO AOP-024, Loss

, of Uninterruptible Power Supply. (NO)

SRO . IF an individual instrument failed, THEN MAINTAIN manual rod control until corrective action is complete.

(YES)

. IF a Power Range NI Channel failed, THEN PLACE the affected NI Rod Stop Bypass switch to BYPASS at the Detector Current Comparator Drawer. (YES)

Proceeds to the Detector Current Comparator Drawer and BOP / RO places N 1-42 Rod Stop Bypass switch to BYPASS

. Reports completion of task to the SRO.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 26 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 27 of 65 Event

Description:

PR NIS Channel N-42 fails High (AOP-OO1)

Time Position Aoolicants Actions or Behavior Manually OPERATE affected control bank to restore the following:

. Equilibrium power and temperature conditions RO . Rods above the insertion limits of Tech Spec 3.1.3.6 and PLP-106, Technical Specification Equipment List Program and Core Operating Limits Report.

. Withdraws Control Bank D to restore Tave with Tref.

VERIFY proper operation of the following: (YES) o CVCS demineralizers RO oBTRS o Reactor Makeup Control System CHECK that this section was entered due to control banks SRO MOVING OUT. (NO)

GO TO Step 6.

CHECK that NEITHER of the following OCCURRED: (NO)

SRO o Unexplained RCS Boration o Unplanned RCS dilution CHECK that an automatic Rod Control malfunction SRO OCCURRED. (NO)

GOTO Step 9.

SRO EXIT this procedure.

. Informs crew the downpower with control rods in Manual

. Refer to OWP-RP-24 to remove channel from service.

Direct operator and l&C to perform OWP-RP-24 SRO

Reviews/prepares OMM-OO1, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist for the failure of N 1-42

Contacts WCC for assistance I generation of Work Request Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 4 Event# 3 Page 28 of 65 Event

Description:

PR NIS Channel N-42 fails High (AOP-OO1)

Time : Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Any Tech Spec evaluation may be completed with a Evaluator Note:

follow-up question after the scenario.

Enters Instrumentation TS 3.3.1 Functional Unit 2, 3, and 4 ACTION 2 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels.

STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1. and

c. Either, THERMAL POWER is restricted to less than or equal to 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER and the Power Range Neutron Flux Trip Setpoint is SRO reduced to less than or equal to 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ; or,. the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is monitored at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months per Specification 4.2.4.2.3.3.1 Reference the below T.S. but it will not apply for this conditions because 3 instruments is the Minimum Number required 3.3.1 Functional Unit 19 b, c, and d.

ACTION 7 With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months determine by observation of the associated permissive annunciator window(s) that the interlock is in its required state for the existing plant condition, or apply Specification 3.0.3.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 - 28 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # Page 29 of 65 Event

Description:

PR NIS Channel N-42 fails High (AOP-OO1)

Time Position j Applicants Actions or Behavior Acknowledge request and reports from SRO.

Simulator Communicator: IF asked to report to MCR to perform OWP-RP-24 state that you will report as soon as possible.

Evaluator Note: Rod Control will remain in Manual the remainder of the scenario Rod Control will remain in Manual it is not required to Simulator Operator:

implement the OWP prior to continuing with the scenario.

Note: Any Tech Spec evaluation may be completed with a follow-up question after the scenario.

Note: l&C field activities are not required to be completed before continuing with the next event.

Lead Evaluator: Note: It is not required for Tave to match Tref or Rod Control to be placed in Automatic before continuing with the next event.

After Control Bank D have been withdrawn to restore Tave with Tref, cue Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 4 Event 4 Main Generator Voltage Regulator Failure Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 30 of 65 Event

Description:

Main Generator Voltage Regulator Failure Time I Position U Apphcants Actions or Behavior When directed by Lead Evaluator: Actuate Trigger 4 Simulator Operator:

Main Generator Voltage Regulator failure The first indication of this malfunction is changing MVARS Evaluator Note: on the ERFIS computer screen. This indication will change approximately 3 minutes before the associated alarm indications are received

. MVARS increasing on ERFIS

. ALB-22-9-4 COMPUTER ALARM GENIEXCITER SYSTEMS Indications . ALB-22-6-3 GENERATOR EXCITER MAX Available: EXCITATION TIMING

. ALB-22-4-5 GENERATOR EXCITER FIELD FORCING

. ALB-22-6-5 GENERATOR EXCITER MAX EXCITATION & LIMITING

. ALB-20-5-5 COMPUTER ALARM MSITURBINE SYSTEMS BOP RESPONDS to alarms ALB-022-9-4 and 6-3.

ENTERS APP-ALB-022-9-4 then 6-3.

ALB-022 BOP NOTE: Guidance for also exists in APP-ALB-022-4-3 and OPS-NGGC-1 000 for manual voltage regulator operation.

Alarm ALB-022-9-4 is a computer alarm. ALB-022-6-3 will initiate corrective actions.

Evaluators Note:

The crew may refer to AOP-006, Turbine Generator Trouble but no actions will result.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # Page 31 of 65 Event

Description:

Main Generator Voltage Regulator Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CONFIRM alarm using:

AT MCB:

. EI-525, Generator Frequency.

. EI-520, Generator Phase Volts. (YES-Reports voltage regulation problem)

. El-540, Gen Exciter Field Volts.

BOP

. El-541, Gen Exciter Field Current.

VERIFY Automatic Functions:

. VOLTAGE Regulator Limiter decreases Generator excitation.

. IF Voltage Limiter is unable to control excitation increase, a Generator Lockout occurs.

PERFORM Corrective Actions:

. CHECK for the following at MCB:

. EI-525, Generator Frequency, stable at 60 Hz. (YES)

BOP

. EI-520, Generator Phase Volts, stable at 22 KV. (NO)

. El-540, Gen Exciter Field Volts stable. (Slowly rising)

. El-541, Gen Exciter Field Current stable. (Slowly rising)

An automatic transfer to manual Generator voltage control is Procedure Note: indicated by GENERATOR VOLTAGE REGULATOR switch ON and the GREEN light LIT. Both the AMBER light and RED light will be OFF.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: NRC Scenario# 4 Event# 4 Page of 65 Event

Description:

Main Generator Voltage Regulator Failure.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ALB-022-6-3

. OPERATE GENERATOR VOLTAGE ADJUSTER switch to restore Generator voltage to 22 KV and reduce MVARS.

. IF GENERATOR VOLTAGE ADJUSTER switch is ineffective THEN PERFORM the following to transfer and maintain voltage manually:

. OPERATE the GENERATOR VOLTAGE ADJUSTER to attempt to zero the REGULATOR OUTPUT BAL VOLT meter.

. PLACE GENERATOR VOLTAGE REGULATOR switch in the TEST position and observe AMBER light LIT and BOP RED light OFF.

. OPERATE GENERATOR BASE ADJUSTER switch to restore Generator voltage to 22 KV.

. NOTIFY Load Dispatcher within 30 minutes of an Automatic Voltage Regulator status change. (The notification shall include an explanation of the status change and an estimate of expected duration.)

. VERIFY Generator is operating per the Generator Capability Curve.

. DISPATCH an operator to 286 TB Switchgear Room to check WTA Exciter Switchgear Maximum Excitation Limiter voltage.

If dispatched to 286 Switchgear to inspect WTA Exciter Simulator Switchgear voltage regulator locally, wait approximately 2 Communicator: minutes and report that there are no abnormal indications at the WTA Exciter Switchgear voltage regulator.

REFERENCE AOP-028, Grid Instability. (N/A the problem is SRO not on the grid)

VERIFY Main Generator is operating per the Generator BOP Capability Curve.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Rev. 2

ppendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 33 f Event

Description:

Main Generator Voltage Regulator Failure Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Contacts Load Dispatcher and provides information that the Voltage regulator is in manual SRO/BOP

. 30 minute requirement per ALB-022-4-5

. 60 minute requirement per OMM-001, Att. 12 Simulator Communicator: Acknowledge report from Control Room Contacts WCC for support and fills out Equipment Problem Checklist Provides control band to BOP for MVAR control based on OP SRO 153.01 normal limits

. 75 to 175 MVAR if above 750 MWe

. 65 to 175 MVAR if 550 to 750 MWe Simulator Communicator:

. Acknowledge request and reports from SRO.

After the Generator Voltage Regulator is stabilized insert Evaluators Note: Event 5 Trip of the running ESCWS Chiller WC-2 A-SA Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 33 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 34 of 65 Event

Description:

A Essential Services Chilled Water Pump Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: When directed by Lead Evaluator: Actuate Trigger 5 Trip of the running ESCWS Chiller WC-2 A-SA Indications Available: . ALB-23-1-18 CHILLER WC2-A TROUBLE

. RESPONDS to alarm on ALB-23 (1-18).

BOP . REPORTS WC-2A-SA tripped.

AOP-026 I OF OF FSSFNTIAI SFR\/IC.P (i-Ill I Ffl \NATPR $WSTPM ENTERS AOP-026, LOSS OF ESSENTIAL SERVICE SRO CHILLED WATER SYSTEM Makes PA announcement for AOP entry Procedure Note: This procedure contains no immediate actions.

BOP CHECK the in-service chiller RUNNING. (NO)

CREW DISPATCH an operator to determine the cause of the chiller trip.

When contacted, wait 2 minutes and then the TB AO report Simulator that the breaker for the chiller has tripped on overcurrent Communicator: and as the RAB AO report that there are no visible problems locally at the chiller.

PERFORM the following using OP-148, Essential Service BOP Chilled Water System: START the Standby chiller i_(Start P-4B and B Chiller) section 5.1 or 5.2 of OP-i 48.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: NRC Scenario# 4 Event# Page 35 of 65 Event

Description:

A Essential Services Chilled Water Pump Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Evaluator Note: OP-I 48 and OP-I 72 can be found at the end of the guide in Attachment I.

Section 5.2 of OP-I 48 may be used if crew determines that loss will be short term.

Simulator If contacted, report Pre-start checks on P-4B arid B Chiller are complete. No simulator booth operations are Communicator:

required.

OP-148, Section 5.1 NOTE: Due to crew preference the OP-148 sections are or Section 5.2 located at the end of this guide in Attachment 1. The BOP will perform the actions of the OP procedure.

IF contacted by the BOP to RESET the Low Chilled Water Simulator Flow alarm, wait 15 seconds and then report The Low Communicator: Chilled Water No Flow Alarm has been reset, and there are no other alarms. There are NO simulator operations required.

CONTACT Maintenance as necessary for troubleshooting and CREW appropriate corrective actions.

CREW Makes a PA announcement prior to starting chiller.

Evaluator NOTE: Chiller start is delayed for 30 seconds after switch is placed in start.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: NRC Scenario# 4 Event# Page 2f Event

Description:

A Essential Services Chilled Water Pump Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CHECK EITHER chiller STARTED. (YES)

VERIFY the following AH units for the operating train chiller are RUNNING:

. AH-15, Control Room Normal Supply BOP . AH-17, Fuel Vent FP Pump Room Fan Cooler

. AH-16, Elec Equip Prot Rm Supply VERIFY the following alarm is CLEAR for the running chiller

. ALB-23-1-20, Expansion TK A LO-LO Level

. ALB-23-2-20, Expansion TK B LO-LO Level REFER TO Tech Spec 3.7.13.

At least two independent Essential Services Chilled Water System loops shall be OPERABLE.

SRO . ACTION: With only one ESCW System loop OPERABLE, restore at least two loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HSB within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in CSD within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

. Contacts WCC for Work Request and EIR. Contacts Maintenance to investigate and fills out an Equipment SRO Problem Checklist.

. Obtains OWP-ECW

. Direct BOP to perform Train Swap BOP Start the corresponding air handlers lAW OP-i 72 section 5.6 SRO EXIT this procedure.

After the ESCWS Chiller is running and the BOP has Evaluators Note: returned to monitor the MCB then Initiate Event 6 L MFWPumpIB BreakerTrips Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 36 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D.-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # Page 37 of Event

Description:

MFW pump I B Trips Time Position Aonlicants Actions or Behavior When directed by Lead Evaluator: Actuate Trigger 6 Simulator Operator:

MEW Pump IB Breaker Trips

. All SG NR levels decrease, then start to return to program level as FRVs respond to level deviation The following alarms may come in:

Indications Available: . ALB-016-I-4, FW Pump NB 0/C Trip- Gnd Or Bkr Fail To Close

. ALB-014-1(2)(3)-IB SG A(B)(C) NR LEVEL! SP HI / LO 0EV

. ALB-014-8-5 COMPUTER ALARM SG

. RESPONDS to changing SG NR levels and identifies MFW BOP Pump 1 B Breaker has Tripped

. Notifies SRO CREW Identifies AOP-010 entry condtions AOP-01 0 Feedwater Malfunctions Immediate Action BOP CHECK ANY Main Feedwater Pump TRIPPED. (YES)

Immediate Action BOP CHECK initial Reactor Power less than 90%. (NO)

Immediate Action BOP RNO TRIP the Reactor AND GO To EOP-E-0 Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 - 37 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # Page 38 of Event

Description:

MEW pump lB Trips Time :I Position I Aooicants Actions or Behavior SRO Directs the OAC to manually trip the Reactor per AOP-01 0 RO Manually Trips the Reactor Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 - 38 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 39 of 65 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power, Reactor Trip Time I Position Aoølicants Actions or Behavior E-O Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection Steps through immediate actions with crew SRO Makes plant PA announcement Verifies Reactor is Tripped (YES)

REMTG R? CONITI$

Immediate RO Eactoz Lp ypa BKR Action Ro4 otto t4Sh1t (Zero Step.s) -

Nto iiix ROI$G Verifies Turbine is Tripped All throttle valves shut (YES)

UR SOP VLV 1 TSZ-fl-i Immediate BOP 2 2-11-2 Action LJR StOP V3V TSI. fl-3 FURB StOP VLV 4 TSL2-2-11-4 Either the BOP or RO should identify that A ESP pump did not start from the sequencer operation or on low pressure.

BOP- Identifies that Load block 2 for the A ESW pump did not start the A ESW pump.

Evaluator Note: RO Identifies control board misalignment AFTER the immediate actions AND Load Block 9 is reached the RO should attempt to start the A ESW pump.

Since the pump will not start the crew should take the immediate actions of AOP-022 and secure the A EDG and the A CSIP (securing the A CSIP will be accomplished if the A EDG is secured first.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 - 39 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 7 Page 40 of 65 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power, Reactor Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Verify Power To AC Emergency Buses (YES)

AC emergency buses AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED (YES A Emergency Bus B Emergency Bus NO)

Immediate BOP Identifies that the B EDG output breaker 126 has tripped prior Action to the sequencer reaching Load Block 9 Identifies that Load block 2 for the A ESW pump did not start the A ESW pump Emergency bus restoration is NOT considered an immediate Procedure Note:

action.

As time allows restore power to de-energized emergency bus.

SRO I (Refer to AOP-025, LOSS OF ONE EMERGENCY AC BUS BOP (6.9KV) OR ONE EMERGENCY DC BUS (125V).)

Safety Injection Activated (NO)

RNQ action:

Perform the following:

a) Check Safety Injection REQUIRED (NO)

SI ACTUATION CRITERIA PRZ ?raaure - LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO RESO PSIG Immediate RO CIMT Preseure GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 3.0 PSIG Action Any SO Preeeure - LESS TEAN OR EQUAL TO t)1 P510 i4anuai - DEGRADATIOW TOWARflS AUTOMATIC ACIVATION Abnori.a1 Operating Preeduze - DIRECTS wrniAL ACTtJATION Oe ST Train - PAILED CsPtP 4-i PLASHiWG b) IF Safety Injection actuation is NOT required, THEN GO TO ES-0.1, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE, Step 1.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 - 40 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 8 Page 41 of 65 Event

Description:

Loss of ALL AC power Time Position [ Applicants Actions or Behavior EOP Reactor Trip Response ES-O.1 Procedure Note: Foldout applies Assigns foldout items of E-O to both the RO and BOP

. RO:

SRO o SI Actuation criteria

. BOP o AFW supply switchover criteria Evaluator Aide:

FOLDOUT

. SIACTUATION CRtTEHIA any of the fltowin occurs, THIEN actuate SI AND GO TO Ei), REACTOR TRIP OI SAFETY lNCTlQN, Stup 1:

ROS ubcling WSS THAN 106 F C 206 F M

. PRZ level - CAN NOT BE MAINTAiNED GREATER THAN 5%

. AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRIFERIA IE CST level drops to less than 10%, Ifl1 switch the AFW water supply to The ESW system u.sng OP-137, AUXIL[ARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM, Section 8.1.

SRO Evaluate EAL Matrix.

Contacts AOs to investigate problem with B EDG and WCC SRO for assistance on A ESW pump and B EDG Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 - 41 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 8 Page 42 of 65 Event

Description:

Loss of ALL AC power Time Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Acknowledge any requests from the crew may request for assistance and AO support.

Simulator IF pressed for report on failures state that you dont see Communicator: any indications of problems but both Maintenance and Engineering are looking into the failures. If anything is determined you will report back to the MCR with the findings.

The critical task of stopping the A and B CSIP may be Evaluator Note: . .

accomplished by Emergency stopping the A and B EDG.

Identifies that A ESW pump is NOT running, attempts to start the A ESW pump and identifies that the pump has failed to Auto start and will NOT start manually by the MCB switch.

Identifies that B ESW pump is NOT running, does NOT attempt to start the B ESW pump and identifies that the pump has NO power due to Breaker 126 tripping open.

Critical Task #2 Crew They then perform the Immediate actions of AOP-022 and

.. 1. Secures the A and B EDG by taking it to Emergency Trip Critical

2. Stops the A and B CSIP Task #3 Critical to Stop the A CSIP and Emergency Stop the A Emergency Diesel Generator prior to failure due to overheating Critical to Stop the B CSIP and Emergency Stop the B Emergency Diesel Generator prior to failure due to overheating Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 8 Page 43 of 65 Event

Description:

Loss of ALL AC power Time - I Position Appicants Actions or Behavior IF the crew request that you MANUALLY close the breaker for A ESW pump acknowledge the request wait approximately 2 minutes and communicate that the Simulator breaker will NOT close. You have tried to rack out and Communicator:

rack in the breaker but it is stuck in the cabinet. You called WCC who is getting assistance from the Electrical Maintenance and Engineering.

AFTER Emergency Stopping the A EDG Crew Transition to ECA-O.O for loss of ALL AC power EOP Loss of All AC Power ECA-O.O Steps I AND 2 are immediate action steps.

. Critical Safety Function Status Trees should be monitored Procedure Note: for information only.

. Function Restoration procedures should NOT be implemented unless directed by this procedure.

Enter ECA-O.O SRO Makes PA announcement for EOP entry Crew performs immediate actions (Steps I and 2)

Verify Reactor Trip:

j R2WLOR TRIP CQNtRMkTION

[eactor rrip -

Immediate Action RD NeUtzon flux - DROPflNG o Trip breakers RTA AND BYA OPEN (YES) o Trip breakers RTB AND BYB OPEN (YES) o Neutron flux DECREASING (YES)

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 8 Page 44 of 65 Event

Description:

Loss of ALL AC power Time I Position Aoolicants Actions or Behavior The BOP is required to check Turbine throttle valve Evaluator Note: positions using status light indications. With a loss of power all other MCB indications for the Turbine throttle and governor valves have no indication.

Verify Turbine Trip ALL THROTTLE VALVES SHUT TURR STOP VLV 1. rsLB-2-11-1 Immediate Action BOP TURD SW? VLV 2 rsLB-2-1iZ TURB SW? VET 3 TSIR-2-113 TURD STOP VET TSLTh2-I1-4

. All turbine throttle valves SHUT (YES)

Check If RCS Isolated Check letdown isolation valves SHUT: -

. 1CS-1 (LCV-460) (YES)

. ICS-2 (LCV-459) (YES)

RO Check PRZ PORVs SHUT (YES)

Verify excess letdown valves SHUT:-

. 1 CS-460 (YES)

. 1CS-461 (YES)

A caution prior to step I of ECA-O.O states that Function Restoration Procedures should be monitored but not Evaluator Note: implemented unless directed by ECA-O.O. The loss of all Feedwater will cause a RED path for Heat Sink (FR-H.I) but the SRO should NOT transition to this procedure.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 - 44 -

Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # Page 45 of 65 Event

Description:

I MS-70 and I MS-72 fail to auto open Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Verify AFW Flow AND Control SG Levels:

. Verify AFW Flow GREATER THAN 210 KPPH (NO)

BOP

. Reports to SRO (or identifies IMS-70 and IMS-72 are not open and OPENS one or both valves)

Directs BOP to verify the TDAFW pump is running (NO)

SRO Directs BOP to open either I MS-70 or 1 MS-72 Opens IMS-70 or 1MS-72 and establishes a minimum of 210 KPPH to the Steam Generators by adjusting TD AFW pump Event 9 speed.

Critical to open either valve and establish flow to the Steam BOP (2 nn n rn+n

_,l II c4I.J rc.

Critical Task #1 Any level GREATER THAN 25% [40%] (NO)

Control AFW flow to maintain all intact levels between 25% and 50% [40% and 50%]

SRO Evaluate EAL Matrix Verify AC Emergency Bus Cross-Ties to Non-Emergency AC BOP Buses OPEN-Verify any cross tie to Bus IA-SA OPEN -

o Breaker 104 o Breaker 105 BOP Verify Any cross tie to Bus I B-SB OPEN -

o Breaker 124 o Breaker 125 Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 -45 - Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario# 4 Event# Page 4 of Event

Description:

I MS-70 and I MS-72 fail to auto open Time J Positior Applicants Actions or Behavior Call the MCR as the Load Dispatcher. Inform the crew that a major grid transient caused the loss of the HNP switch Simulator yard. The fault has been isolated and the switch yard has Communicator: been restored. Harris Station has permission to restore offsite power to 6.9 KV buses and to reset any tripped Start Up Transformer lockout relays.

Simulator Operator: Run Trigger 13 NOW this deletes loss of offsite power

. Emergency stopping an EDG will deenergize the field flashing circuit and prevent a fire in the GCP control section.

Procedure Caution:

Do NOT start any EDG that is emergency stopped OR close any tripped EDG output breaker until problem corrected.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 - 46 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # Page 47 of 65 Event

Description:

I MS-70 and I MS-72 fail to auto open Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ECA-0.0 Step 7 Check EDGs IA-SA AND I B-SB AVAILABLE (FOR START FROM MCB)

Check all of the following for EDG 1A-SA:

DIESEL GENERATOR A TRIP annunciator

[ALB-024-3-1] CLEAR (NOT PRESENT) NO

DIESEL GENERATOR A START FAILURE annunciator

[ALB-024-3-3] CLEAR (NOT PRESENT) YES

Breaker 106 NORMAL (NOT TRIPPED) YES RNOforA EDG:

Place the EDG 1A-SA emergency stop switch to EMERG STOP. (Already done from failure of A ESW pump)

Check all of the following for EDG I B-SB:

BOP

DIESEL GENERATOR B TRIP annunciator

[ALB-025-3-.1] CLEAR (NOT PRESENT) (NO)

DIESEL GENERATOR B START FAILURE annunciator

[ALB-025-3-3] CLEAR (NOT PRESENT) (NO B EDG has failed to start)

Breaker 126 NORMAL (NOT TRIPPED) (NO)

RNOforB EDG:

Place the EDG 1 B-SB emergency stop switch to EMERG STOP. (LocatesEmergency Stop MCB switch and places switch to EMERG STOP position)

Check any EDG AVAILABLE (NOT Emergency Stopped)

(NO Neither EDG is available)

IF NO EDG available, THEN GO To Step 9 Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 9 Page 48 of 65 Event

Description:

IMS-70 and IMS-72 fail to auto open Time I Position I ApIicants Actions or Behavior The crew should NOT make any attempts to close the B EDG output breaker from the MCR. IF they do the breaker WILL close BUT they would have dismissed the procedure Caution AND would have energized a bus without knowing what faults mightexist on the bus. This would be a dangerous and non conservative decision.

Evaluator Note:

The crew should ALSO make a decision to ONLY restore power to the A Emergency bus until what caused the B EDG output breaker trip is determined. The cause could be something is wrong on the B bus (a bus fault) and re-energizing the bus would be dangerous and non conservative as well.

BOP Energize AC Emergency Buses From Offsite Power:

Perform Attachment 1, RESTORATION OF OFFSITE POWER Critical Task #4 BOP TO EMERGENCY BUSES (Critical to restore power to I Emergency Bus)

Attachment I Restoration of Offsite Power to Emergency Buses Tripping of a Start Up XFMR lockout relay indicates a Procedure Caution: major fault on the XFMR. Re-energizing the XFMR may cause additional damage and should NOT be done without dispatchers permission.

Obtain Load Dispatchers permission prior to performing the following:

BOP Restoring offsite power to 6.9 KV buses (YES)

Resetting any tripped Start Up XFMR lockout relays (YES)

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 9 Page 49 of 65 Event

Description:

I MS-70 and I MS-72 fail to auto open Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Procedure Note: Steps 2 through 8 restore power to Bus A-SA and Steps 9 through 15 restore power to Bus B-SB.

Determine power should ONLY be restored to Bus A-SA CREW therefore the BOP should perform steps 2 through 8 SOP Performs actions of EOP-EPP-001 Attachment 1 steps 2-8 Att. I Step 2 On Start Up XFMR Protective Relay Panel 1A, verify off-site power to Start Up Aux XFMR A by performing the following:

BOP Verify the Start Up XFMR IA Lockout SU 1A Relay is reset.

Verify any of the following switch yard tie breakers are closed to energize Start Up XFMR A:

. Breaker 52-2

. Breaker 52-3 Restore offsite power to 6.9 KV Aux Bus D:

Place Start Up XFMR To Aux Buses A & D Synchronizer control switch to BREAKER 101 position.

BOP Step 3 Close Start Up XFMR B To Aux Bus E Breaker 101.

Place Start Up XFMR To Aux Buses A & D Synchronizer control switch to OFF.

BOP Verify Aux Bus D To Emergency Bus A-SA Breaker 104 Step 4 CLOSED BOP Verify Diesel Generator A-SA Breaker 106 A SA OPEN Step5 Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 - 49 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # Page .Q Event

Description:

I MS-70 and I MS-72 fail to auto open Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior j Energize 6.9 KV Bus A-SA:

Place Emergency Bus A-Sa To Aux Bus D Synchronizer control switch to SYNC.

BOP Step 6 Close Emergency Bus A-SA To Aux Bus D Tie Breaker 105.

Place Emergency Bus A-SA To Aux Bus D Synchronizer control switch to OFF.

Close the following 6.9 KV breakers:

BOP

. Emergency Bus B-SB To XFMR B1-SB Breaker Bi A-SB Step 7

. Emergency Bus B-SB To XFMR B3-SB Breaker B3 A-SB Verify 6.9 KV Emergency Bus B-SB To XFMR B2-SB Breaker B2A-SBCLOSED BOP Report to SRO that Attachment I is completed for B-SB Step 8 emergency bus and power is restored to bus from offsite.

Report to CRS that A Emergency bus power has been restored from offsite source.

Acknowledges restoration of power to the A Emergency Bus SRO and continues with ECA-0.0 step 9.b This is where the scenario would end IF the crew does not Evaluator Note: continue and energized the B Emergency bus. IF they continue with energizing the B Emergency bus let them complete the actions then end the scenario.

Step 9.b Check any AC emergency bus ENERGIZED SRO

IA-SA bus voltage (YES)

. 1 B-SB bus voltage (NO)

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # Page j of Event

Description:

IMS-70 and IMS-72 fail to auto open Time Position Aoolicants Actions or Behavior SRO Initiate monitoring of Critical Safety Function Status Trees.

RETURN TO procedure and step in effect.

SRO Returns to ES-0.1 Terminate the scenario upon exit from ECA-O.O Lead Evaluator: Announce Crew Update End of Evaluation Have crew remain in the Simulator without discussing the exam. Examiners will formulate any follow-up questions.

Simulator Operator: When directed by the Lead Examiner place the Simulator in FREEZE.

IF the crew did NOT determine that they should NOT have Evaluator Note: energized the B Emergency bus the following steps have been included to follow the actions of the BOP.

Att. 1 Step 9 On Start Up XFMR Protective Relay Panel I B, verify off-site power to Start Up Aux XFMR B by performing the following:

Verify the Start Up XFMR 1 B Lockout SU 1 B Relay is reset.

Verify any of the following switch yard tie breakers are closed to energize Start Up XFMR B:

Breaker 52-13

Breaker 52-14 Restore offsite power to 6.9 KV Aux Bus E:

Place Start Up XFMR To Aux Buses B & E Synchronizer control switch to BREAKER 121 position.

Close Start Up XFMR B To Aux Bus E Breaker 121.

Place Start Up XFMR To Aux Buses B & E Synchronizer control switch to OFF.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: NRC Scenario# 4 Event# Page Event

Description:

I MS-70 and I MS-72 fail to auto open Time Position A,Iicants Actions or Behavior BOP Verify Aux Bus E To Emergency Bus B-SB Breaker 124 -

Step 11 CLOSED BOP Verify Diesel Generator B-SB Breaker 126 B SB OPEN Step 12 -

Energize 6.9 KV Bus B-SB:

Place Emergency Bus B-SB To Aux Bus E Synchronizer control switch to SYNC.

BOP Step 13 Close Emergency Bus B-SB To Aux Bus E Tie Breaker 125.

Place Emergency Bus B-SB To Aux Bus E Synchronizer control switch to OFF.

Close the following 6.9 KV breakers:

BOP

. Emergency Bus B-SB To XFMR B1-SB Breaker BI A-SB Step 14

. Emergency Bus B-SB To XFMR B3-SB Breaker B3 A-SB Verify 6.9 KV Emergency Bus B-SB To XFMR B2-SB Breaker BOP B2 A-SB CLOSED Step 15 Report to SRO that Attachment I is completed for B-SB emerencv bus and iower is restored to bus from offsite.

Step9.b Check any AC emergency bus ENERGIZED SRO

. 1A-SA bus voltage (YES)

. 1 B-SB bus voltage (YES) Should not have...

SRO Initiate monitoring of Critical Safety Function Status Trees.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Rev. 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 4 Event # Page 53 of 65 Event

Description:

I MS-70 and I MS-72 fail to auto open Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO RETURN TO procedure and step in effect. ES-O.1 Terminate the scenario upon exit from ECA-O.O Announce Crew Update End of Evaluation Lead Evaluator:

Have crew remain in the Simulator without discussing the exam. Examiners will formulate any follow-up questions.

Simulator Operator:

F When directed by the Lead Examiner place the Simulator I in FREEZE.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Rev. 2 OP148 Sections 5.1 or 5.2 Form ES-D-2 Pages4of 65 5.0 STARTUP 5,1. Startup Train ASA (B-SB) from Main Control Room or Local Panel 5.1.1 Initial Conditions NOTE: Section 5.2, Placing Standby Train in Operation, should be used when swapping Trains of ESCWS.

1. No Chiller Train is

2. System filled and vented per Section 8.1.

3. System Lineup Attachments 1 and 2 are complete.

4. For non-emergency starts the prestart checks of Attachment 5 have been perlomied and an operator should be present to observe start of chiller.

5. Section 8.12 Manual Chiller Reset has been performed. if necessary due to chiller trip.

6. The L.a. heaters have been in service for twelve hours, (See Precaution and Limitation 4.0.3 for applicability of this Initial Condition)

NOTE: If service water header temperature is greater than 85F and the ESW pump is available startup of E.SW is required. The pump should run for approximately 30 minutes before chiller start. ESW proides additional flow at typically lower temperatures when used for service water supply, Starting ESW prior to a chiller start minimizes condenser pressure. Historically. High Condenser Pressure alarns have been received during summer months due to high service water temperatures and high chilled water loads.

7. IF desired due to Service Water temperatures being high.

THEN VERIFY a same train ESW Pump is running. Pump should run for approximately 30 minutes before chiller start.

OP-148 Rev. 63 PagelOof 1641 Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 - 54 -

Rev. 2

Attachment I OP-148 Sections 5.1 or 5.2 Form ES-D-2 Page 55 of 5.12. Procedural Steps NOTE: Whenever an A Train component is referred to in the body of this procedure iVs B Train counlerpart will immediately follow, enclosed by parentheses.

NOTE: ESR 99-00142 has evaluated and determined that long-term closure of the supply and return valves to the NNS AH units will not affect operability of the EssenUa[ Services Chiller system. The next two steps will align the NNS AH uns however if it is desired to maii itam the NNS isol 9tlon valves shut then steps 5121 an .5.122 may 1e sKipped.

ISOLATE the supply and return valves to the NNS AH units from the train that will riot, be placed in service by shutting the following valves:

1CH-125SB.(1CH-196.SB) CHILLED WATER FROM NESSR FAN CLRS ISOL.

ICH-1.26 SA(1CH-197 SA) CHILLED WATER FROM NESSR FAN CLRS ISOL.

1CH-1 Is SA (1CH-148 SB CHILLED WATER TO NES.SR FANS CELR ISOL ICH-1I6SB(1CH-149 SA) Ci-IILLED WATER TO NESSR FAN CLRS 1501

2. ALIGN the supply and return valves to the NNS .AH units associated with the train that will he placed in service by opening the following valves:

1CH-125 SB (1CH-196 SB) CHILLED WATER FROM NESSR FAN CLRS ISOL.

1CH-126 SA(1CH-197 SA) CHILLED WATER FROM NESSR FAN CLRS ISOL.

1CH-115SA(1CH-14&SB) CHILLED WATERTO NESSR FANS CLR ISOL 1CH-1 16 SB (1CH-149 SA) CHILLED WATER TO NESSR FAN CIRS 1501 OP-148 Rev. 63 I Page 1 1. of 164 I Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Rev. 2 OP-148 Sections 5.1 or 5.2 Form ES-D-2 Pageof 5.1,2 Procdural (continuG1)

NOTE: The ccai alarm indication or low chfld water flow and low chilled waler temperature wW Ioci in unlil manually reset :t th WC-2 ContrOl panel.

3. START WC-2 Chiller IA-SA (iBSB)CN[led water punp P-4 to estabh chiliec water flow.

1. Atth Loca Conrol panel, RESET th Low DNlId WtGr Flow airrn using the CHILLED WATER NO FLOW TRIP INDICATION RESET ishhuttcr

5. IF startincl the chiller for the first time followin maintenance where the chiller lube oil heater drcuit was under clearance.

THEN PERFORM the rollowing:

a. Locally START the oil pump on the 1ASA (lB-SB) cOmpre:3Sor by taking trie cono switch on me local panel to the MAN position.

I;. RUN pump rur 5 miiiute&

STOP th9Gil pump on thG tA-SA (lB-SB) chllIr eomprsor by takin the control switch on the local panel to the AUTO position.

6. At the Loca Conirol Panel CHECK that all alarm lights are NOT lit.

7. IF any alarn llgh(s) is lit, THEN PERFORM the rollov:ing:

& IF the Local Select switch is in the LOCAL position, I HhN locally L)hPKSS tre S I D pusflbutton.

Ii. IF U Loc1 Select switcli is iii the MOB 1-WAG puitiui, THEN place the IA-SA (lB-SB) compressor control switch Dfl ACP-1 to STOf.

c. IF ary alarm [ight is still [it THEN PERFORM the folb1ng:

(1) DECLARE th chiller inoperabie.

(2) INmATE corrective actions.

OP*-148 Rev. 63 I Page 12o1 164 I Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Rev. 2 OP-148 Sections 5.1 or 5.2 Form ES-D-2 Pagegf 65

£1 2 Procedural Steps (conthued)

NOTE: If the unit cycles off due to low chilled water flow or low chilled water tenperature, me unit will automacally restart if*all stan permissive conditions exist.

NOTE: Ar anti-recycle feature prevents more thai one normal start within a 3U minute period. I his anti-recycle Teature is lyasse upon any aLtornatiD start signal from the ESF sequencer.

NOTE: Alter golly to TARTon the Ciiill Contiul $witth, the uil punrip will iit td bang oil oressure up to normal operating pressure prior to chiller start.

NOTE: QPT-t!2 Foi1es the Tempiture Coritwi FoirrLpoteiiLkirietei to ii t[i sLrfaces. While OPT-1512 restores the potentionieter h its original position, it is riossible that due to th.e surface cleanin the characteristics of tile potentiometer have chang.e suficientlyto require a manual temperature adjustment per Section &14 of this procedure This will be de:ermined by mnitoring tenerature alter diillerstairt in the following atep.

NOTE: ALB-021-14 -i4), NC-2.CH 1A(IB) CNDSR REFRIG HI PRESS, may alarm during startup of the Chillers.. 1 11gb chiller conderer pressure is caused by inadequate cooling of the refrigerant. Causal factors for high condenser pressure include high chiller service water inlet temperature.

condenser tube fouling, condensersheil air binding, or reduction of service water flow.

8. START the chiller by perforni[ng one of the following:

a. At AEP-1, PLACE Water Chiller Coniressor WC-2 A-SA (W-2 B-SB) control swtch to the START position and release.

OR

b. DEPRESS the START push-button at the loal cortrol panel witn the Local Select switch in the LOCAL. positicn.

NOTE: Engineering recommends running E3W for about 5-10 minutes after the chiller starts to ensure it reaches steady state operation. Operator judgment should l:ie used to determine it conlinuingto run the ESW pump to prevent the High Condenser Fressure alarn is warranted. There is no operability irrpact, hut a nuisance alarm can be prevented.

Q IF dGir:d, THEN STOP the ESW Pump started in Step 5.1 .1.7.

I OP-14 Rev. 3 Page 13 of 154.

Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Rev. 2 OP-148 Sections 5.1 or 5.2 Form ES-D-2 Page58of 65 5.2. Placing Standby Train in Operation NOTE: It is necessary to shift associated trains of HVAC units when shifting trains of Essential Services Chilled Water.

NOTE: This Section is written for swapping from Train B ESCW to Train A ESCW.

th components for swapping from Train A ES.CW to Train B ESGW in parentheses.

5.21. Iflitial Conditions

1. Service water is being supplied to the non-operating chiller WC-2 IA-SA WC-2 1 B-SB).

2. One train of ESW is already in operation.

3. For non-emergency starts the pre.start checks of Attadment 5 have been performed and an operator should be present to observe start of chiller.

4. Section 8.12, Manual Chiller Reset performed if necessary for non-operating chiller

5. The L.O. heaters have been in service foriweive hours.. (See Precaution and Limitation 4.0.3 for applicability of this Initial Condition)

NOTE: If service water header temperature is greater than 85F an.d the ESW pump is available startup of E.SW is required. The pump should run for approximately 30 minutes. before chiller start. ESW provides additional flow at typically lower temperatures when used for service water supply. Starting ESW prior to a chiller start minimizes condenser pressure. Historically. High Condenser Pressure alarms have been received during summer months due to high service. water temperatures and high chilled water loads.

6. IF desired due to Service Water temperatures being high, THEN VERIFY a same train ESW Pump is running. Pump should run for approximately 30 minutes before chiller start.

I OP-148 I Rev. 63 I Page 14 of 164 I Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 - 58 - Rev. 2 OP-148 Sections 5.1 or 5.2 Form ES-D-2 Pageof 5,2.2. Procedural Steps NOTE: The local alarm indication for low chilled water tlow and low chilled water temperature will lock in jntiI manually reset at the: WC-2 control panel.

NOTE: If startin the chiller compressor is delayed following the start of the P-4 Pump in the next Step. :he compressor oil could cool down to the point that the :COfflPICSSOT will trip an low oil pressure.

NOTE: Step 5.227 can he performed anytime after Step 52.2.1. It is preferable to start the fans before the chiller in Winter months. This allows the chili water to heat up and prevents the chiller cycling on and off on low temperature.

I At AEP-1, START the non-operating Chiller WC-2 A-SA (B-SB) Chilled Water Pump P-4 A-SA (B-SB) to establish chilled water flow in the non-operating traift.

2. At the Local Control panel, RESET the Low Chilled Water Flow alarm using the CHILLED WATER NO FLOW TRIP iNDICATION RESET push-hutton.

3.. IF starting the chiller for the first Lime following maintenance where the chiller lube oil heater circuit was under clearance, THEN PERFORM the following;

a. Locally START the oil pump on the standby chiller compressor by taking the control switch on the local panel to the MAN position.

h. RUN pump for 5 minLlte&

c.. STOP the standby chiller compressor oil purn by taking the control switch on the local panel to the AUTO positIon.

4. At the Local Control Panel, CHECK that all alarm lights. .re NOT lit.

5. IF any alarm light(s) is lit, THEN PERFORM the following:

a. IF the Local Select switch is in the LOCAL potion, THEN locally DEPRESS the STOP p.ush-huttc4i

b. If the Local: Select switch is in the MCB HVAC position, THEN place the standby chil[er compressor control switch on AEP-l to STOP.

OP-148 Rev. 63 Pagel5of 1641 Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 - 59 -

Rev. 2 OP-148 Sections 5.1 or 5.2 Form ES-D-2 Pagegp 5.2.2 Procedural Steps (connued)

c. IF any alarm light is stilt Ut, THEN PERFORM the following:

(1) DECLARE the chiller noperabla (2) N mATE corrective actions.

NOTE: OPT-1512 rotts th Tnpratur Control Point potetionmtr tci cim th surfaces. While OPT-i 512 restores the potefl:tiorfleterto its original position, it is possible that due to the surface c1eanin the characteristics of the potentiometer have changed sufficJently to reqUire a manual temperature adjustmen: per Section 8.14 ot this procedure. This will be determined by monItoring temperatwe alter cfllller start in ins Tol1oMr step.

NOTE: ALB023i1i4(2-14),WC2 CH IA (IB) CN:DSR REFRIG Hi PRESS 1 n1Y alarm during startup of the Chillers. High chiller condenser pressure is caused by inadequate cooling of the reffigeant. Causal factors for high condenser pressure lncude ttlgfl chiller service water MIet temperature, condenser tube fouling, condenser shell air binding. or reduction of service water flow.

o. START th.e chiller by performing ONE :Qf the following:

a. At AEP-1, PLACE Water Chiller Compressor WC-2 ASA (WC-2 B-SB control switch to the START positiol, AND RELEASE.

OR b, DEPRESS the START p:ushbuLn at the local control pane] with lli [ui.il selet swi(Ii: k th LOCAL puitiuu*.

7* START Train A (B) ESF Equipment Cooling System per OP-172, SectionS 5.6.

OP-148 Rev. 63 Page 16 of 164 Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Rev. 2

Attachment I OP-148 Sections 5.1 or 5.2 Form ES-D-2 Pagef 65 5,2,2 Procedural Steps (continued)

NOTE: ESR 99-0i$2 has evaluated and determined that long-term clcsure of the supply and return vaIesto the NNS AH units wilt notaffectoperahilltyofthe Esntal 9riic Cn[TIr syst. Th next two Stp will align :h NN A-units however, it it is desired to maintain the NNS isolation valves shut, then steps 5.2.18 and 5.229 may he skipped.

8. ISOLAI h The supply an. return valves to the NN AH unrts trom inc train that was aireadyoperating by shutting the following valves:

1 CH-196 SB (1 CH-125 SB) CHILLED WATER FROM NESSR FAN CLRS ISOL 1 CH-197 SA (1 CH-1 26 SA) CHILLED WATER FROM N ESSR FAN CLRS ISOL ICH-148 SB (1CH-115 SA) CHILLED WATERTO NESSR:FANS CLR ISOL ICH-149 SA1CH-1i8 SB) CHILLED WATER TO NESS FAN CLRS ISOL 9.. ALIGN NNS Al-i units to the train, that will remain operating by opening the following valves:

1CH-125 SB (1CH-19 SB) CHILLED WATER FROM NESSR FAN CLRS ISOL 1 CH-*126 SA (1 CH-197 SA) CHILLED WATER FROM NESSR FAN CLRS ISOL.

1CH-*115 SA(1CH-148 SB) CHILLED WATERTO NESSR: FANS CLR ISOL iCH118 SB (1CH-149 SA) CHILLED WATERTO NESSR FAN CLRS ISOL

10. IF shiftinc chillers to support Iacinc tile standby 3afety equipment train in service.

THEN PERFORM AttachmentS.

OP-148 Rev. 63 I Page 17 of 154 Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Rev. 2 OP-148 Sections 5.1 or 5.2 Form ES-D-2 Page62of 65 5,2.2 Procedural Steps (continued)

NOTE: Serice water to the chiller condenser will isolate 90 seconds after the chi((er has stopped SW FROM WC-2 B-SB (A.-SA) CONDENSER 1S-1208 SB (1 SW-i 055 SA) will c[ose.

NOTE: ALB-23/i-15 and ALB-2311-16 fALB-2312-15 and ALB-2312-16) are expected alarms wflen securing A (b Uiiler.

CAUTION Failure of equipment to secure in the following step wilt result in the associated EDG l:eing inoperable. Tech Spec 18.1.1 is applicable until the breaker for the affected load is opened.

ii STOP the chiller by performing one of the following:

a At AEP-i, PLACE Water Chiller compressor WC-2 B-SB (A-BA) control switch to the STOP position and release.

OR b DEPRESS the STOP push-button at the local control panel with the local sefect switch in the LOCAL position.

ii At AEP-1, STOP the Chiller WC-2 B-SB A-SA) Chilled Water Pump P-4 B-SB c48A) in The train jLiS secureth NOTE: Engineering recommends running ESW for about 5-10 minutes after the chiller starts to ensure it reaches steady state operation. Operator judgment should be used to determine if continuing to run the ESW pump to prevent the High Condenser Pressure alarm is warranted. There is no operability impact, but a nuisance alarm can be prevented.

11 IF desired, THEN STOP the ESW Pump started in Step 521.6.

1& NOTIFY the following to update the protected train placards:

Security

WCC

Maintenance Shop

Operations (Update The Protected Train placard in the Operaions Turnover area)

I OP-148 I Rev. :63 I Page 18 of 164 I Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Rev. 2 OP-i 72 Sections 5.6 Form ES-D-2 Page63of 65 5.6. ESF Equiprneit Cooling Systeni Startup 5.6.1. Initial Conditions

1. Attachments I and 2 have been completed.

2. Essentia Services Chilled Water is lined up per OP-14a 5.&2. Proceclurai Steps NOTE: If th power to the fcAloMng Air 1-inndling Units is availbIe rand the area tenperaure us above the setpont, then The fan will start.

1.. IF A Train is being started, THEN PLACE the tolbvirici Air Handling Units control switches to START AND VERIFY proper damper and valve aperaFon if they start):

MOO A35 FAN COOLER AH-92 A SA

COW PUMP AREA FAN COOLER AWl A SA

COW PUMP AREA FAN COOLER AW6 A SA

CSIP SAB AREA FAN COOLER AH-IO A SA (it aligned as A)

CSIP SA AREA FAN COOLER AH-9 A SA

AFWP & KVAC CHILLER FAN COOLER AH-20 A SA

AFWP & HVAC CHILLER FAN COOLER AH-1 9 A BA

216 RAB MECH PENET AREA FAN COOLER AH-2 A SA

:ELEC PEN FT AREA BA AREA FAN COOLER AH24 XSA AH-24 RTN OH 422, SLB-i1iI-3

RI-T AREA. FAN COOLER AH-23 X-SA AH-22 RTN OH 400, SL-i1i1-2

CP & R[-IR FUNP A SA FAN CGLFR AH-5 .A-SA

MECH PENET AREA FAN COOLER Al-I-li A-BA AH-l1 RTN CH 485, SLB-i1/1-i j OP-172 I Rv.57 I Pacie24of9l Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 - 63 -

Rev. 2 OP-i 72 Sections 5.6 Form ES-D-2 Page4 65 5.62 Procedural Steps (continued)

EQUIPMENT ROOM 2 FAN COOLER AH-26 A-SA AH-26 RTN CH 434, SLB-11/1-4 CR0 ROD CONTROL CABINET FAN COOLER AH-93 X-SA

2. IF B Train is beinO started, THEN PLC[ the 1olIcin Air Hand[ing Units control switche to START AND VERIFY proper damper and valve operation (if they start):

MOC B35 FAN COOLER AH-92 B SB

COW PUMP AREA FAN COOLER AH-7 B SB

COW PUMP AREA FAN COOLER AH-6 B SB

CSIP SAB AREA FAN COOLER AR-iC B SB (if aIgned as B)

CSIP SB AREA FAN COOLER AH-9 B SB AFWP & HVC CHILLER FAN COOLER AH-20 B SB

AFWP & HVAC CHILLER FAN COOLER AH-19 B SB

BIT AREA FAN COOLER AH-28 B-SE ELEC PENET AREA SB AREA FAN COOLER AH-25 X-SB AH-25 RTN CH 7Cj3, SLB-9It-3 a EVAP LSLE WPE MCC & INST RACK FAN COOLER AH-29 X-SB AH29 RTN CH 833, 5LB-l2-i

SW BSTR FAN COOLER AHCB X-SB Al-I-S RTN OH 1303, SLB-911-1

CSP & RHR PUMPS B SB FAN COOLER AR-5 B-SB 4 MECH PENET AREA FAN COOLER Al-I-li B-SB AH-il RTN CH 843, SLB-9I1-2 4 EQUIPMENT ROOM I FAN COOLER AH-26 B-SB AH-213 RTN CH 807, SLB-91I-4

3. IF thrs is for initial system startup THEN Locally PLACE 8-68 IX-SA Control Switch in AUTO.

j QP-172 Rv.7 Pacj25of1 Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC Exam SCENARIO 4 Revision Summary Rev. I Revised per NRC comments provided on 75 day outline submittal.

Archie Lucky 6/22/2013 Rev. 2 Revised per Operations validation comments.

JR Horton 7/03/2013 Harris 2013 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 5 Facility: SHEARON-HARRIS Scenario No.: 5 Op Test No.: 05000400/2013301 Examiners: Operators: SRO:

RO:

BOP:

Initial Conditions: lC-27, MOL, -3% power

. Plant startup to full power on HOLD until B Condensate Booster Pump is service in

. B Condenser Vacuum Pump is under clearance for makeup water supply valve problems

. 1 Sl-3, Boron Injection Tank Outlet valve is under clearance for breaker repairs

. Boric Acid Transfer Pump B-SB is under clearance for motor replacement

. GP-005, Power Operation, step 95.c

. Power ascension is on hold for B Condensate Booster pump oil system repairs Turnover: Repairs are now completed and the pump is ready for service.

. Start the Second B Condensate Booster Pump lAW OP-I 34 Section 5.6.

. Establish SI flow of >200 gpm using alternate high head safety injection to cold Critical Tasks: legs prior to securing RCPs

. With RCS pressure < 1400 psig, and SI flow of >200 gpm, RCP Trip Foldout Criteria, once is met and prior to exiting E-0 Event No. MaIf. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 N/A N BOP/SRO Start the B Condensate Booster Pump 2 tt:144 Letdown Temperature Controller fails LID/Diversion Valve fails to I RO/SRO jtbl43b bypass demineralizers C

lt:486 Controlling B Steam Generator Level Transmitter, LT-486, fails low T:°Zc° 4 JFB7579 AH-39 Containment Fan Coil Unit fan trip with back up auto start C-BOP/SRO Z2715TIC failure (C RCP cooling fan) ccw08a C RO/SRO Component Cooling Water system leak requiring AOP-014 entry and manual makeup to maintain level 6 lt:990 TS SRO Failure of RWST level channel I, Ll-990 fails high 7 RCP A rising vibration requires manual Reactor trip and securing A rcs09a C RO/SRO RCP and associated PRZ spray valve after E-0 immediate actions are completed 8 rcsl8a M ALL SBLOCA inside containment (100% severity) 9 sisOl Failure of BIT outlet valve I Sl-4 to open requiring alternate high head C RO/SRO sisOl 8 injection flow path use 10 Manually trip B and C RCP when RCP trip criteria are met lAW E-0 N/A C RO/SRO foldout 11 zrpk5o4a Failure of automatic Main Steam Line Isolation to occur when C BOP/SRO zrpk504b Containment pressure exceeds 3 psig (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 \

Rev. 2 A

[Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-l f HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 5 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

2013 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 Low power scenario Turnover to crew is the unit startup on hold. The plant is in Mode 2 with Reactor power less than 5%. Power ascension was on hold for B Condensate Booster pump oil system leak repairs. The repairs and PMT have been completed and the pump is ready to be returned to service. When the crew takes the shift the expectation is to start the B Condensate Booster pump lAW OP1 34, Condensate System, Section 5.6. After the pump is running they will continue with GP 005, Power Operation, to obtain rated power conditions.

The following equipment is under clearance:

B Condenser Vacuum Pump is under clearance for makeup water supply valve problems. Has been under clearance for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . Repairs are expected to be completed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

1SI-3, Boron Injection Tank Outlet valve is under clearance for breaker repairs The valve is shut with power removed. The valve has been under clearance for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . OWP-Sl-01 has been completed. Repairs are expected to be completed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . Tech Specs 3.5.2 and 3.6.3 apply.

çc pyJ 314.5 2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T REATER TKN OR EQUAL TO aSO°F LIMTTrNO COO1TIO FOR OPERATION 3B.2 independent Emeeny £rCooHn Sytetn (ECS) subytis h11 be OPERABLE with each 5ubsytni ni 5td

a. One 0PERLE Chrgiri/safety i:fljtion pnp.

b, One 0PER1E RHR heat exchan9er,

c. One OPERABLE RHR pvrnp, and ci. An OPERABLE how paith capb)e of tking suction frcii the refueli water storage tnk on a Safety 1rjetion sina1 and LOfl beir n9 maniafly- a1ined, transferrn suction to the coitanment durin9 the rec rcui ati on phase of operati on. sunp API cABILrrY: MODES I, . and ,

ACT IOl1

a. oie ECES ubytei nopr-ab1e, retore t)e inopeab subsystem LO OPERABLE status ithi 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months be STANU8Y within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and rn HOT SHtJ[t>CMN inwithin at least HOT fni 1 twi rirr f thG Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Pci 2 nf 7$

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 5

1 SI-3, Boron Injection Tank Outlet valve, Tech Specs... continued 314: 5.3 COIIFAINMENT ISQLATjVJY LiMITiNg CGlOIi!0N FCR OPERATION 363 Etch contaffinlEnt so1atkin va1v specified in the Tchnict Spifictior Equipnirit 1t Porarn 1 pkt pro dur PLP)O6, h11 b OPERABLE with isolation tines 1es than or equal 1o eq4iird isolatin Uns.

4P1tCPRIij.]Z MODES 1, 2, 3. nd 4.

ACTIO1; With ne or more cf the containnent isohtin 1vc(:&) inopera1e, maintaim lat. orp 1atiai ale OPERADIt ir each affected penetratic that a

l. opefl and;

a. Rtor th inaprb vaive() to OPL £tatu thin I ba or

h. Icelate aeh firt.M prtvtion .jlth1r 4 oirs , mce of t ledst one deactivated automatic a1ve securEd in the is1ation poiti.oi or

Boric Acid Transfer Pump B-SB is under clearance for motor replacement. Has been under clearance for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . Repairs are expected to be completed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . Tech Spec 3.3.3.3.5.b which is a 7 day LCO and 3.1.2.2 applies (3.1.2.2 is for tracking only). OWP-CS-05 has been completed.

R!?4OtESJtwN.

Lr4ITINGcNnmcNFGq OPERMION 3.3.5.a The Ret.. Shut4r,m 5ysta n torlrtg n Table 3.31 shill be aPRMLE. instantatton channels shown 3.3.5b All transfrn sItches. Auxiliary Cntro1 transfer Panel Cnts for the OPERAStUTY of ntroI and AuxlUy SHNP Sal. Shutdown Analysis to (1) rcvt decaythose coponent reqirtd by the

iia au liary ftwa4 flow and st.ea2 Inarttc p .roparatad ru tef hflt A and a, (2) ontrl RCS Inventory hrout time rora1 valve flow froet staa gat.rater

() contrl RCS rassuri (4) cøntrol riactivity, and (5) rtcveflog 1ng path, decay hut via the RNR sstan shall b OPThLE.

APPucASrLrr: GQES 1. 2 and 3.

ACTION:

a. WftI, ttiq number of PASLE reati shutdown monitoring channels than the NIniet C1ia.nrmels QPERASIE as requtrid by Table 3.3-9 less ristor the tnoera1e cha al(s) to OPEAaL status wf thin or be in NOT SNUTtIaWW ittfrI n the next U ho*.rs. 7 days,

b. 1tl the nter of QP!RABLE rete shutdw eon1trtng channels than the Total Nzbar of CianneTs required by Table 3.39 re*tøre less the tnoparahi. channels ta OPEMU status wtthfn days or *tI1t a Special Raort In accordance 1th Specification L9.Z wIthin 14.

a4dttlonal days.

Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5

.- 70 Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 L HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 5 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

2013 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 continued Event 1: Start the B Condensate Booster Pump. Upon turnover and assum ing the shift the crew will start the B Condensate Booster pump lAW OP-i 34, Conde nsate System, Section 5.6 Second Condensate Booster Pump Start up. After the pump is in operation the crew will discuss raising power lAW GP-005 to prepare to place the Main Feedwater Regulating valves in service. Prior to the power increase event 2 will occur.

Event 2: Letdown Temperature Controller fails LD/Diversion Valve fails to bypass demineralizers. This failure will cause temperature controller TK-144 output to decrease to zero. Without cooling to the letdown heat exchanger, temperatures observ ed on TI-143 will increase. At 135°F annunciator ALB-07-3-2, Demin Flow Diversion High Temp will alarm. The crew should respond lAW the alarm procedure. The RO should identify that the divert valve to the VCT has failed to respond. The RO should report the failure to the SRO. The SRO should direct manually bypassing the CVCS Demineralize rs, and should also provide directions to the RO to restore letdown temperature to normal utilizing MANUAL control of TK-i44. The SRO should provide a temperature band to the RO lAW 0MM-CO 1, Conduct of Operations, for operation of components in manual.

The SRO can find this temperature band guidance in OP-107. With TK-144 contro ller not in auto the temperature band should be from 110 120°F. The CVCS Demineralizers should remain bypassed pending an evaluation for continued resin use.

Soon after stabilizing from this temperature controller failure event 3 will occur.

The SRO will complete OMM-001 Attachment 5 and request assistance from the WCC center.

Event 3: Controlling B Steam Generator Level Transmitter, LT-486, fails low. The BOP should respond to multiple B Steam Generator alarms on ALB-O14 and take manual control of the B FRV Bypass valve in accordance with the alarm respon se procedures and 0MM-CO 1, Conduct of Operations. The SRO will have the crew implement OWP-RP-06, complete OMM-OO1 Attachment 5 and request assista nce from the WCC center. The SRO should evaluate the following Tech Specs for failure of LT-486:

T.S. 3.3.1: As a minimum, the Reactor Trip System instrumentation channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-i shall be OPERABLE REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE KOOES ACTION

13. Steam Generator Water 3/stm. yen. 2/stm. yen. in Level--Low-Low 2/stm. yen, each 1, 2 6(1) any operating operating stm.

stm. yen. yen.

14. Steam Generator Water Level--Low 2 stm. yen. 1 stm. yen.

Coincident With Steam! I ste. gen. level 1, 2 6 level and level coincident and 2 stm./feed Feedwater Flow Mismatch 2 stm./feed- with 1 water flow water flow stm./feedwater mismatch in same mismatch in flow mismatch in ste. gen. or 2 each ste. yen. same stm. yen. stm. yen. level and 1 stm./feedwater flow mismatch in same ste. yen.

(1)The applicable MODES for these channels noted in Table 3.3-3 are restrictive and, therefore, applicable. more Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 A ,c 7o

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 L HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 5 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

2013 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 continued ACTION 6 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel. is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and

b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1.

T.S. 3.3.2: The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation channels and interlocks shown in Table 3.3-3 shall be OPERABLE with their Trip Setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3-4.

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION WIN It1UM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL uNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION

5. iurbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation

b. Steam Generator Water 4/ste. gen. 2/ste. gen. 3/stm. gen. 1. 2 Level--High-High (P-14) 19 in any ste. in each oen. ste. oen.

6. Auxiliary Feedwater

c. Steam Generator Water Level--Low-Low

1) Start Motor- 3/ste. gen. 2/ste. gen. 2/ste. 1. 2. 3 Driven Pumps 19 in any stm. gen. in gen. each ste.

gen.

2) Start Turbine- 3/ste. gen. 2/ste. gen. 2/ste. 1, 2. 3 Driven Pump 19 in any 2 gen. in ste. gen. each ste.

gen.

ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued)

ACTION 19 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and I

b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met: however.

the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.2.1.

The OWP is not required to be implemented in order to continue with the scenar io. If the crew allows SG levels to decrease to <30% they will be required to perform a manual Reactor Trip.

Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 rf7

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 5 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

2013 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 (continued)

Event 4: Trip of AH-39 Containment Fan Coil Unit fan with back up auto start failure.

The failure will cause annunciator ALB-029 4-5 Containment Fan Coolers AH-39 Low Flow-O/L to alarm. The crew should identify that the standby fan did not auto start and start the standby fan. The SRO will complete OMM-001 Attachment 5 and request assistance from the WCC center.

Event 5: Component Cooling Water system leak requiring AOP-014 entry and manual makeup to maintain level. A CCW leak in the running pump suction header will develop.

The leak will be within CCW Surge Tank makeup capability. The crew should identify the leak by observation of MOB indications for COW Surge Tank level or MCB annunciators based on COW Surge Tank low level. The crew should respond to the CCW Surge Tank level change and/or alarm and enter AOP-014, LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER. The RAB RO will be dispatched to investigate the leak. The crew will maintain CCW Surge Tank level in the normal operating range by opening the demin water make up valve IDW-15, on the MOB. Shortly after being dispatched the leak will be identified as a leak in the suction header near the pump. The leak can be manually isolated by closing local isolation valves. The crew will then be required to start the standby B COW pump and secure the running A COW pump lAW OP-145. The SRO will complete OMM-O01 Attachment 5 and request assistance from the WOO center. The SRO should evaluate TS 3.7.3.

PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.3 At least two component cooling water (CCW) pumps*, heat exchangers and essential flow paths shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With only one component cooling water flow path OPERABLE, restore at least flow paths to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY two within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

The breaker for CCW pump 1C-SAB shall not be racked into either power source (SA or SB) unless the breaker from the applicable CCW pump (1A-SA or lB-SB) is racked out.

Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 rf 7

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 5 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

2013 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 (continued)

Event 6: Failure of RWST level channel I, Ll990 fails high. RWST level instrument LI-990 will fail high (100%) which will cause annunciator ALB-04-2-1, Refueling Water Storage Tank High Level to alarm. The RD will respond by reviewing the alarm response in the APP.

(NOTE: The RD will not receive credit a competency for an instrument failure since there are not any evaluative actions taken).

The SRO will direct the crew to implement OWP-ESF-05. The SRO will complete 0MM-001Attachment 5 and request assistance from the WCC center. Then evaluate Tech Spec 3.3.2 and 3.3.3.6 Tech Spec 3.3.2 INSTRUMENTAT IFI 34 3.2 ENGiNEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTHAT1ON SYSTEM SiRUMWC&T1flN L1MITI C0JT JON R4 OPERATiON 2 The Engineered Safety Features Actuti on System ESFAS) inst rurnentati on nannl. and nTcrloc shown in Tabie 3 3 3 snaIl be OPERABLE with Their Trip epuinls set crsistent ith t.he vljes sh n the Trio Setpoint column of Table 3.3-4.

APPlICABILITY: A shcn in Table 33-3.

FABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ENGiDSAFETLFETURE]UATION STEM3IRUMENTAT1ON MINIMUM TOTAL NO. CR&NNEL.S CINNE1S PPL ICABLE FUNCTiONAl. UNIT UECHANNELS TO TRIP_ OPERABLE MODES ACTION 7- afeLy Inject ion Switchove to ContanIerit Sump

a. Autcrna tic Actuation Logic and 2 1 2 1. 2. 3, 4 14 Actuation Relays

b. RWST LeveI4ow-Low 4 2 3 1. 2. 3. 4 16 Coincident With Safety Injection See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection initiating functions and requirements.

ACTIOR 16 With th nuithr of OPERABLE channels one less than th Total ttnaber cyr Channels gpcrLion nay proceed pro. idd th inoperable channcl is piacrd in he bypassed condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and the Mininitito Channels OPERABLE require-meet is met. One addtiona ciannel may e by3aed ror up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for surveiflance testiwj per Spccitication &J21.

Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 7 .-.f Va

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 5 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

2013 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 (continued)

Event 6: Failure of RWST level channel I, Ll-990 fails high. (Tech Spec evaluation continued)

Tech Spec 3.3.3.6 Action a (RWST Level Ll-990 is an accident monitoring instrument based on OST-1021 Attachment 6 Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Log, Item

9)

INSTRUMENTATION JJEFL IWLt4 $T1ATII LIM1TIN( CONOIFION FOR OPERAT3ON 33.36 The accident nionitrinq instru2rtation dhannels shot in Tabie 3.3IO shall b 0PERBLE.

APPLICABILITY: ItOOES 1, 2. and 3 ACTION:

a. With the nuer of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrurnent,.atio:n channels. except In Core Thernocoup1es arid Reactor vessel Le1.

less than the Total Requm red Numr*er or Channels requm reuents shown in Table 3 3 10 restore th inoperable chanreIs) to OPERAP.LE status within 7 days, or be i:n at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 Iiours and in at least HOT SHUTDN wthin the folloinq 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

TABLE 3.3.1.0 CC WENT MQNITQRtNC 1tSTPJ.R(ENTAT1O TOTAL REQUIFWt MINI1WR NO. 01 C[ANELS INSTRIJI{ENt CHAN,S GPERAELE

1. Containment Pressure.

a. N&rrow Range 2 1.

b. Wide Range 2 1.

2. Reaocor oo1.ant liot.Leg Temperature--Wide Range 2 1.

. .eacto CooLant Cnld-Leg Tmperatin-UidR Rang 2 1

4. Kacor Gootant Tressre-.Wid Ran 2 1

5. fressurizer Water LeveL 6., Steam Line Pressure 2/steam generator 1/steam generator 7, , Steam Generator aCer Level.*Narrow Range N.A. i/steam generator

8. Steam Geaeratot Water LevelWide Range N.A. i/steam generator 9, Reuo1in 1Jtor Stora o Thn1 Water 6 toys]. 2 1 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 r)_,...-. 0 ...C70 Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 I HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 5 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

2013 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 (continued)

Event 7: RCP A rising vibration requires manual Reactor trip and securing A RCP and associated PRZ spray valve after E-0 immediate actions are completed. During this event the A RCP vibrations will begin to increase and over 3 minutes peak at 28 mils shaft. Note: the shaft vibration instrumentation reads up to 30 mils. The crew will respond to the A RCP malfunction by either identifying rising vibrations or when ALB 010-1-5, RCP-A Trouble alarms. The crew should see the A RCP vibration probe readings are increasing. The crew should enter AOP-01 8, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions and perform the immediate actions of checking any CSIP running (YES). Vibrations will continue to increase and exceed AOP-018 Attachment I RCP trip criteria of 20 mils shaft. Since the RCP is NOT operating within the trip limits and the Reactor is NOT tripped, the crew will have to Trip the Reactor, GO TO EOP-E-0, perform the immediate actions of E-0 and return to AOP-018 follow up actions of steps 5-8 when time permits. The SRO should address steps 5-8, stopping the affected RCP and shutting the associated PZR spray valve prior to the manual Reactor trip.

Note: AOP-01 8 recent revisions now direct Tripping the Reactor prior to tripping a running RCP. ALL RCPs must be operating whenever the Reactor trip breakers are closed. Previously two loop power operation was allowed after securing one RCP if the initial power level was <49%.

The crew will then transition from EOP E-0 to ES-0. 1, Reactor Trip Response. The Lead Examiner can allow the crew to stabilize the plant then insert the major event.

Event 8: Major SBLOCA inside containment (100% severity). The major event is a SBLOCA (100% severity) on A Loop. The crew should recognize a rapid decrease in Pressurizer level and RCS pressure. If the crew responds quickly to the event they may manually actuate a Safety Injection based, on ES-0.1 foldout criteria of not being able to maintain Pressurizer level > 5% or RCS subcooling < 10°F. If they do not respond quickly an Automatic Safety Injection will occur. The crew will then transition from ES-0.1 back to E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. They will again carry out immediate actions of E-0.

Event 9: Failure of BIT outlet valve 1 SI-4 to open requiring alternate high head injection flow path use. lSl-4 will fail to automatically open with the Safety Injection signal and cannot be manually opened from the MCB switch. Additionally, 1SI-3 was under clearance and cannot be opened from the MCB due to control power being removed from the breaker. In order to obtain Safety Injection flow the crew will have to use the alternate high head injection flow path as directed by E-0 RNO actions. They should OPEN alternate high head Safety Injection to cold legs valve lSl-52 SA and then identify Safety Injection flow exceeding 200 gpm.

Event 10: Manually trip B and C RCP when RCP trip criteria are met lAW E-0 foldout.

Shortly after entering E-0, the crew should recognize that the RCS pressure is low enough to meet Foldout Criteria for securing all RCPs but there is no flow indicated on Fl-943 (normal SI flow indication). The crew will have to establish SI flow by opening the alternate high head Safety Injection to cold legs valve 1SI-52 SA. After opening 1 Sl-52A adequate flow (> 200 gpm) will be indicated on FI-940 (alternate SI flow indication) to STOP the B and C RCPs.

Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 5 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

2013 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 5 (continued)

Event II: Failure of automatic Main Steam Line Isolation to occur when Containment pressure exceeds 3 psig. As the Small Break LOCA continues to flow RCS to the Containment the pressure in the Containment will continue to rise. An automatic Main Steam Isolation signal is generated when Containment pressure is > 3.0 psig. The crew will have shut the MSIVs due to the cooldown encountered from securing the A RCP but the MSIV before seat drain valves (1 MS-231, I MS-266, I MS-301) will remain OPEN. The MCB switch for manual actuation of MSLI will NOT function therefore each drain valve will have to be manually shut from the individual MCB switches.

The crew will transition from E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection at step 30 when Containment pressure is checked and found to be NOT normal to E-I, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant step I. The crew will progress through E-1 based on crew performance they will reach a decision point at step 13.

They will transition from in E-1 to ES-i .2, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization, based on RCS pressure > 230 psig and RHR HX header flow < 1000 gpm.

While in ES-i .2 based on RCS cooldown rate exceeding 100°F/HR they will have to wait prior to reducing RCS temperature further.

The scenario ends when the crew has determined that the 100°F/HR cooldown rate has been exceed.

Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 n_%___% .ln ._C7fl

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 j HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 5 CRITICAL TASK JUSTIFICATION:

1. Establish SI flow of >200 gpm using alternate high head safety injection to cold legs prior to securing RCPs Failure of the crew to manually align Safety Injection flow through the alternate high head injection flow path results in a degradation of the capacity of the ECCS systems. The only available makeup water source during this event is the high pressure safety injection from the CSIPs. Until the alternate high head safety injection flow is aligned the safety margin of the plant is significantly reduced and may result in irreparable damage to the reactor core.

2. With RCS pressure < 1400 psig, and SI flow of >200 gpm, RCP Trip Foldout Criteria, once is met and prior to exiting E-0 Securing RCPs during a SB LOCA event will prevent depleting the RCS to a critical inventory by pumping more mass through the break than would occur if the RCP operation were ceased. (Critical inventory is defined as the amount of inventory remaining in the RCS when the break completely uncovers and the break flow changes from a mixture of liquid and steam to all steam.) The LOCA event in this scenario is a SB LOCA that requires the RCPs to be secured when E-0 foldout conditions are met. IF the crew continues to allow the RCPs to operate due to lack of establishment of SI flow of> 200 gpm then RCS inventory will continue to depTete. Manually tripping the RCPs before depletion below the critical inventory conservatively ensures that Peak Clad Temperature remains below 2200°F.

Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 5 SIMULATOR SETUP For the 2013 NRC Exam Simulator Scenario # 5 Reset to IC-I 65 password dinner Goto RUN Silence and Acknowledge annunciators GO TO FREEZE and inform the lead examiner the Simulator is ready. DO NOT GO TO RUN until directed by the lead examiner.

Set ERFIS screens (The examiner has provided to the candidate with initial conditions and the initiating cues prior to placing the simulator in RUN.)

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS Scenario will have ONLY the A Condensate/Condensate Booster Pump running.

Turnover information for starting the B Condensate/Condensate Booster pump: will be that the Condensate Booster Pump B Lock-Out Relays are reset. The crew will need to start the B pump PRIOR to exceeding 5% Reactor Power. OP-134 Section 5.6.1 Initial condition #3 requires Rx Power to be >5% and should be N/Ad for this start.

Post conditions for status board from IC-I65 Mode 2 <5% Reactor power Startup on HOLD due to B C/CB pump. Last shift repaired an oil leak and B C/CB pump is now ready to be started. After pump is verified running w/o leakage continue preparations to Mode 1.

Provide a marked up copy of GP-005 Rev 70 through Step 95.b Control Bank D at 96 steps RCS boron 1600 ppm BA pot set to 5.26 RCS press 2220 2250 all PZR heaters ON SG level maintained with A MEW pump and FW Reg Bypass Vlvs in Auto RCS temp 558.8°F, stable on Steam Dumps RCS temp band from step 52 is 555°F 561°F-Main Turbine at 1800 rpm Hang CIT on B Condenser Vacuum Pump Hang CIT on ISI-3, Boron Injection Tank Outlet valve Place completed copy of OWP-Sl-01 in OWP book Hang CIT on Boric Acid Transfer Pump B-SB Hang restricted access signs on all 3 Simulator entry swing gates Hang STAR placard on Rod Control In/Out Switch Hang STAR placard on Steam Dump controller M/A station Set CRT screen 3 to QP POAH Update the status board:

1 SI-3 Tech Spec 3.4.2 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months LCO, OOS for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months BA Transfer pump B Tech Spec 3.3.3.5.b 7 day LCO, OOS for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 fl._ An ,

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page of 78 j

Event

Description:

Start B Condensate Booster Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior When the crew has completed their board walk down and are ready to take the shift inform the Simulator Operator to place the Simulator in Run. When the Simulator is in run Lead Evaluator:

announce:

CREW UPDATE (SROs Name) Your crew has the shift.

END OF UPDATE When directed by the Lead Evaluator, ensure that the Simulator Operator:

annunciator horns are on and place the Simulator in RUN.

Lead Evaluator: After the crew has taken the shift the BOP will place B Condensate Booster Pump in service.

Before inserting the first failure wait for the B Evaluator Note: Condensate Booster Pump alignment to be completed AND the BOP to return to the at the controls area.

Directs BOP to start the B Condensate Booster pump in SRO accordance with OP-i 34 section 5.6 Performs OP-I 34 Reviews Section 5.6, Starting Second Condensate /

BOP Condensate Booster Pump

. Contacts Turbine Building.AO to observe start Simulator I printed out a copy of OP-I 34 Section 5.6 and have the Communicator: procedure in hand.

Informs AO that they are about to start B Condensate Booster BOP Pump and

. Makes PA announcement prior to starting_pump Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 13 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 1.4 of 7 Event

Description:

Start B Condensate Booster Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior OP-I 34 Condensate System, Section 5.6, Second Condensate Step 1: PERFORM prestart checks on Condensate Booster Pump B(A) per Attachment 6.

BOP Contacts Aux Operator to perform prestart checks per Attachment 6 Simulator I walked down the B Condensate Booster Pump and Communicator: completed the prestart checks. The pump is ready to be started.

Step 2: VERIFY CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP B-(c)

BOP RECIRC, 1CE-261 41-G22O) in MODU and shut.

. Checks 1CE-261 in MODU and shut. (YES)

Procedure Caution: There are no Condensate Booster Pump trips to protect the pump from running without seal water.

Step 3: PLACE PK-2308-(P-k237) CNDST BSTR PUMP B-(A)

BOP SPEED CONTROLLER to MAN and zero the demand signal.

. Checks PK-2308 in MAN with zero demand signal Step 4: VERIFY OPEN 1CE-268 (1GE227), CONDENSATE BOP BOOSTER PUMP B4DISCHARGE.

. OPENS 1CE-268

Computer points listed in Section 6.0 of this procedure may be monitored for information.

. When the Condensate.Booster Pump control switch is Procedure Note placed to the START position, the Aux Lube Oil Pump will start and supply the VSF Coupling with oil until oil pressure is greater than or equal to 10 psig as indicated on Pl-O1LO-2304B(A), at which time the Condensate Booster Pump starts.

Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 14 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 5 Event # I Page 15 of 78 Event

Description:

Start B Condensate Booster Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The amount of time the associated recirc valve, I CE-261 (1 CE-Procedure Caution: 220) is open, should be minimized due to lack of lubrication without Condensate Booster Pump running.

PLACE the control switch CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP B 4RECIRC, 1CE-261 (tC-223in the OPEN position BOP immediately prior to starting Condensate Booster Pump B-(A.

. Places control switch for B Condensate Booster Pump recirc valve 1 CE-261 to OPEN Starting the second Condensate Booster Pump may cause the previously running pump controller to reject to Manual. This is due to the speed sensor on the pump being started initially Procedure Note: providing a speed input signal that is based on electrical noise.

If the running CBP controller rejects to manual, it is permissible to return the controller to Auto once the CBP being started reaches the no-load speed. If the controller again rejects to manual, then further investigation would be required.

Step 6: START B (A) Condensate Booster Pump.

. Places B Condensate Booster Pump start switch to START BOP . Verifies indications that the pump has started and running as expected

. Checks I Monitors Normal Operating parameters per section 6.0 Simulator Report that the B Condensate Booster pump has a good Communicator: start Step 7: Locally VERIFY Condensate Booster Pump B (A) Aux Lube Oil Pump has stopped.

. Contacts Aux Operator to verify Aux Lube Oil Pump has stopped Simulator B Condensate Booster Pump Aux Lube Oil Pump has Communicator: STOPPED Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 15 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: if Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 16 of 78 Event

Description:

Start B Condensate Booster Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Step 8: CHECK differential pressure across the Pall Replaceable Duplex Filter, as indicated between P1-01 LO 2304B1 and Pl-O1LO-2304B2 (P1-Cl L3-23C4A1 J P-CILC BOP 2304A2) is less than 15 PSI (less than 9 PSI when oil temperature has warmed up to normal).

. Contacts Aux Operator to check differential pressure across the filter The differential pressure across the Duplex Filter, as Simulator indicated between P1-01 LO-2304B1 and P1-01 LO-2304B2 is Communicator: less than 11 PSI. I will continue to monitor as the oil warmsup to ensure that when the oil temperature is at the normal temperature the differential pressure is < 9 psig.

Step 9: N/A Step 10: SLOWLY INCREASE the demand signal on PK-2308 (PK-2307) CNDST BSTR PUMP B A5 SPEED CONTROLLER to match the demand signal on the previously running BOP Condensate Booster Pump Speed Controller.

. Slowly increases demand signal on PK-2308 and matches the demand signal on the A Condensate Booster Pump Speed Controller.

Step 1 1: WHEN the demand signals are matched, THEN PLACE PK-2308 (PK-2307) CNDST BSTR PUMP B..(A3 BOP SPEED CONTROLLER to AUTO.

. Verifies demand signals are matched and places PK 2308 in AUTO Step 12: PLACE the control switch for CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP B (1RECIRC, ICE-261 (ICE-220) in the BOP MODU position.

. Places control switch for B Condesate Booster Pump recirc valve 1CE-261 to MODU position.

Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 16 of78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page of z Event

Description:

Start B Condensate Booster Pump Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Step 13: After 5 to 10 minutes of running, VERIFY the VSF coupling oil level is in the normal operating range.

BOP . Contacts Aux Operator to verify the VSF coupling oil level is in the normal operating range after 5 to 10 minutes from when the pump was started.

Acknowledge request to verify the VSF coupling oil level is Simulator normal in 5 to 10 more minutes.

Communicator:

I will call you back if there is something abnormal.

.r fr, A.A ,__.i_.__i_ I IU When the BOP has completed starting the B Condensate Booster pump, returns to the MCB at the controls area, informs the CRS that the B Condensate Booster Pump is Evaluator Cue: running, continue with the scenario.

Cue Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 2:

Event 2 Letdown Temperature Controller fails LDlDiversion Valve fails to bypass demineralizers.

Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 17 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario 5 Event # 2 Page of 78 Event

Description:

Letdown Temperature Control Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 2:

Simulator Operator: Letdown Temperature Controller fails with LDlDiversion Valve fail to bypass deminineralizers.

. ALB-007-3-2, DEMIN FLOW DIVERSION HIGH TEMP

. ALB-007-5-5, COMPUTER ALARM CHEM & VOL SYSTEMS Indications Available: .

TK-144 output decreases to 0

. TI-144.1 HX Out Temp decreases to 0

. TI.-143 temperature increasing If the crew catches this failure early and temperature does not increase above 135°F then they may NOT identify that I CS-50 is failed since there well be no reason for the valve to change position.

Evaluator Note: Changes in Letdown temperature can have an affect on the demineralizers resins. During high input temperature a boron release can occur (effects similar to a boration) and during low input temperatures a boron absorption can occur (effects similar to a dilution).

RO Responds to alarm and enters APP-ALB-007-3-2.

. CONFIRM alarm using:

o TI-143, LP Letdown Temperature.

o Reports Tl-143 reading or trending high.

RO

. VERIFY Automatic Functions:

o Manuallypositions 1CS-50, Letdown to VCT/Demin, to divert flow to the VCT.

Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 18 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NBP Scenario # 5 Event # 2 Page 19 of 78 Event

Description:

Letdown Temperature Control Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior PERFORM Corrective actions:

o VERIFY that ICS-50 diverts flow to the VCT, bypassing the BTRS and Purification Demineralizers.

o PERFORM the following as. needed to lower letdown temperature:

RO

VERIFY proper charging flow is established. (YES)

LOWER letdown flow. (N/A CCW Problem) o IF CCW flow to the Letdown Heat Exchanger appears 1 THEN:

low

TAKE manual control of TK-144.

OPEN 1CC-337, to raise CCW flow.

. Provide a temperature band lAW OMM-001 for operation of components in manual. OP-107 page 31 with TK-144 controller in auto directions is to maintain temperature from 1 10 120°F. (NOTE this is not the only procedure that provides temperature guidance)

SRO . The CVCS Demineralizers will remain bypassed pending an evaluation.

. Reviews/prepares OMM-001, Attachment 5 Equipment Problem Checklist

. Contacts Work Control and/or System Engineer for assistance.

If contacted as WCC, System Engineer or Chemistry:

Simulator Communicator: Maintain flow bypassing the demineralizers until a resin damage assessment is cornpleted After crew has restored CCW flow to the Letdown Heat Exchanger, cue Simulator Operator to insert Trigger3.

Evaluator Cue:

Event 3 Controlling B Steam Generator Level Transmitter, LT-486, fails low Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 19 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES.D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 5 Event # 3 Page 20 of 7.

Event

Description:

SG B Controlling Level Channel Failure (Low)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 3:

Simulator Operator:

SG B Controlling Level Channel Failure (Low)

. ALB-014-2-IB SG B NR LEVEL! SP HI! LO DEV Indications Available:

. ALB-014-5-4B SG B LOW LOW LEVEL RO RESPONDS to multiple B SG alarms The APP-ALB-014-2-IB and 14-5-4B actions are similar.

Evaluator Note: lAW OPS-NGGC-1 000, the operator may take MANUAL control of a malfunctioning controller before being directed by a procedure or the SRO.

. CONFIRM alarm using:

o Ll-484 SA, Ll-485 SB, or Ll-486 SA, Steam Generator B level indicators.

o Reports Ll-486 reading or failed low.

. VERIFY Automatic Functions: NONE

. PERFORM Corrective Actions:

BOP o CHECK Steam Flow (Fl-484, Fl-485) AND Feed Flow (Fl 486, 487) for deviation. (YES) o IF FCV-489, SG B Bypass valve auto level controller, is NOT sufficiently correcting level, THEN: (YES)

SWITCH to MANUAL.

RESTORE level to normal (57% NR).

. Provides level band and trip guidance for B SG level while in manual control lAW OMM-OO1, Attachment 13 SRO o SG Level Control Band 52% to 62%

o Trip limit Low 30% Trip limit High 73%

. Refer to OWP-RP-06 to remove channel from service.

Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 20 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 5 Event # 3 Page 21 of 78 Event

Description:

SG B Controlling Level Channel Failure (Low)

Time Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior OWP-RP-06 has been included on page 64 of this scenario guide.

Evaluator Note: Implementation of the OWP or removal of the failed channel from service does not have to be completed to continuewith the scenario.

Enters Instrumentation TS 3.3.1 Functional Unit 13 ACTION 6 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and

b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for surveillance testing SRO of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1 3.3.2 Functional Unit 5.b, 6.c Action 19 With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and

b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up t o 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.2.1.

Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 21 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 5 Event# 3 Page 22 of Event

Description:

SG B Controlling Level Channel Failure (Low)

Time

. Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior

. Requests extra operator for dedicated feedwater operation

. Direct operator and I&C to perform OWP-RP-06

. Reviews/prepares OMM-OO1, Attachment 5 Equipment SRO Problem Checklist.

Contacts WCC for assistance / generation of EIR and Work Request

. Contacts support personnel for repairs.

Acknowledge request and reports from SRO.

IF an extra operator is requested, state that no one is Simulator available right now and someone will be sent when Communicator: available.

IF asked to report to MCR to perform OWP-RP-06 state that you will report as soon as possible.

It is not required to implement the OWP prior to continuing Evaluator Note:

with the scenario.

After Tech Spec evaluation is performed, cue the Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 4.

Evaluator Cue: Event 4 Trip of AH-39 (Note: there is a 18 second delay from the initiation of the trigger to actuation of fan trip and alarm)

Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 22 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OP Test No.: N Scenario # 5 Event # 4 Page 23 of 78 Event

Description:

AH-39 Containment Fan Coil Unit fan trip With back up auto start failure (C RCP coolinci fan)

Time Position j Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 4:

AH-39 Containment Fan Coil Unit Fan trip Simulator Operator:

(Note: there is a 18 second delay from the initiation of the trigger to actuation of fan trip and alarm)

. ALB-029-4-5 CONTAINMENT FAN COOLERS AH-39 LOW Indications Available FLOW O/L -

. Increasing C RCP stator winding temperatures SOP RESPONDS to alarms and ENTERS APP-ALB-029-4-5 CONFIRM alarm using:

o AH-39 fans running indication (NO) o Damper position indication (YES)

. VERIFY Automatic Functions:

o Running fan trips (YES) o Backup fan starts (NO) (BOP starts the standby fan when directed by SRO, may utilize OP-I 69 section 5.2 or the BOP APP for guidance)

PERFORM Corrective Actions:

o CHECK standby fan STARTS AND lead fan STOPS.

o DISPATCH an operator to check status of the following breakers:

1DI-1A, AH-39 (IA-NNS) CNMT Fan Cooler

1E1-7C, AH-39 (IB-NNS) CNMT Fan Cooler Directs BOP to start standby Air Handler (this may take place SRO prior to getting the report of the breaker condition)

Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 23 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-.D-2 Op Test No.: !1B Scenario # 5 Event # 4 Page 24 of 78 Event

Description:

AH-39 Containment Fan Coil Unit fan trip With back up auto start failure (C RCP cooling fan)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior After approximately 1 minute from being dispatched to check the breaker for IDI-IA, AH-39 (IA-NNS) CNMT Fan Simulator cooler breaker, report that:

Communicator: The indications on the Static Trip Unit show that an Overload Condition occurred for AH-39 A fan. There are no abnormalities on the AH-39B breaker o IF any breaker has tripped on OVERLOAD or SHORT CIRCUIT as indicated on the Static Trip Unit, THEN PERFORM the following: (Directs AO to perform based on report from communicator)

BOP

DEPRESS the breaker Alarm Reset.

RACK OUT the breaker using OP-I 56.02, AC Electrical Distribution.

VERIFY cause of the over current trip is determined prior to returning the breaker to service.

Simulator Acknowledge request to perform directed actions Communicator: at IDI-IA Rack out breaker IDI-IA for AH-39 and clear alarm

. Activate Trg 15 Trigger 15 will clear the alarm then 30 seconds later it will Simulator Operator: override the switch to STOP and turn off the RED and GREEN MCB switch lights.

Have communicator report back 30 seconds after running the trigger.

RO Monitors RCP C parameters on ERFIS and or OSI P1 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 24 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: fi. Scenario # 5 Event # 4 Page 25 of 78 Event

Description:

AH-39 Containment Fan Coil Unit fan trip With back up auto start failure (C RCP cooling fan)

Time j Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Reviewslprepares OMM-QOl, Attachment 5 Equipment SRO Problem Checklist for the failure of AH-39.

Contacts WCC and EMs for assistance with repairs.

When breaker racking is completed, cue Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 5 Evaluator Cue: (Note: After the trigger is inserted it will take 2 minutes for the CCW alarm to occurs)

Event 5 Component Cooling Water system leak Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 25 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NR. Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 26 of 78 Event

Description:

Component Cooling Water system leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 5:

Simulator Operator: Component Cooling Water system leak (Note: After the trigger is inserted it will take - 2 minutes for the CCW alarm to occurs)

Indications Available . ALB-005-8-5, COMPUTER ALARM CCW SYSTEM The crew may enter AOP-014, LOSS OF COMPONENT Evaluator Note:

COOLING WATER, when the first alarm is confirmed.

RESPONDS to alarm ALB-005-8-5, COMPUTER ALARM CCW RO SYSTEM.

BOP REPORTS CCW Surge Tank level alarm on alarm screen.

Actions from the APP are below but crew will most likely APP perform a direct entry into AOP-014.

ALP-05-6-1 Go to page 28 if AOP-014 is entered Procedure Note The CCW Surge Tank baffle plate separates Side A and Side B up to the 38% level.

CONFIRM alarm using:

RO

Ll-670A.1, CCW Surge Tank Level (Side A)

Ll-676A.1, CCW Surge Tank Level (Side B)

Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 26 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 5 Event# 5 Page 2 of 7 Event

Description:

Component Cooling Water system leak Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior VERIFY Automatic Functions:

. COW flow to the GFFD and Primary Sample Panel will isolate on a low CCW Surge Tank level (40%).

RO (Level should remain > 40%)

. COW Holdup Tank Transfer Pump and the CCW Drain Tank Transfer Pump will trip on a high COW Surge Tank level (75%). (N/A)

PERFORM Corrective Actions:

. IF surge tank level is high AND rising. (N/A)

. IF radiation activity level is increasing, THEN GO TO AOP-016, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage. (NO)

RO

. IF the alarm is due to plant heatup, THEN DRAIN the surge tank to normal level. (NO)

. IF surge tank level is low, THEN GO TO AOP-014, Loss of Component Cooling Water. (YES)

Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 27 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 28 of 78 Event

Description:

Component Cooling Water system leak Time Position j Applicants Actions or Behavior I

ENTERS and directs actions of AOP-014, LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER.

SRO Makes PA announcement for AOP entry Holds a crew alignment brief AOP-Ol 4 Loss Of Component Cooling Water Procedure Note: . This procedure contains no immediate actions.

. Loss of CCW may require implementation of the SHNPP Emergency Plan.

REFER TO PEP-Il 0, Emergency Classification And Protective SRO Action Recommendations, AND ENTER the EAL Matrix.

EVALUATE plant conditions AND GO TO the appropriate section:

Maifunctior Section 1 Racie Leakage into COW System 31 SRO Leakage from CCW System 32 15 Loss 01 a COW Pump 3.3 34

. Determines section 3.2 is appropriate CONTACTS AC to check RAB for CCW leaks.

SRO (This action is not procedurally directed but should happen during the course of implementing this AOP.)

Acknowledge request.

Simulator Communicator: Wait 1 minute then report a leak in the suction header between ICC-27 and CCW Pump A.

Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 28 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 29 of 78 Event

Description:

Component Cooling Water system leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The crew should begin to trace out where the leakage is and what to do to isolate the leakage using the MCR Evaluator Note: Simplified Flow Diagrams (SFDs). They should identify that closing ICC-27 and ICC-36 will isolate the leak. They will also see that isolating the leak will require them to secure the A CCW pump and start the standby pump.

Identifies leak location on SFDs and determines method to isolate the leakage Crew . Shut I CC-27

. Shut 1 CC-36

. Secure A CCW pump and start B CCW pump After you are directed to close ICC-27 and ICC-36, wait Simulator one minute then have Simulator Operator delete Communicator:

MF CCWO8A then report the valves closed.

Simulator If a report is requested:

Communicator: RadWaste reports increased RAB floor drain in-leakage.

. CCW Pump startlstop actions are provided in the Scenario Guide.

. The path through the procedure may be different for Evaluators Note: each crew since it depends on when the leak location is known and how certain questions are answered. However, each crew should initiate

. makeup, swap running pumps, isolate the leak, and address the Tech Spec.

Procedure Note: The GFFD and RCS sample panel will isolate on low CCW Surge Tank level of less than or equal to 40%.

RO MAINTAIN CCW Surge Tank level between 45% and 75%

using I DW-1 5, CCW Make Up.

Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 29 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 30 of 7 Event

Description:

Component Cooling_Water system leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior An affected COW Pump is one to which any of the following apply:

Less than 4% level indicated on the COW Surge Tank Procedure Note:

Exhibits abnormal flow

IF non-essential header isolation valves are open, less than 4% level indicated on either CCW Surge Tank affects both COW Pumps.

CHECK BOTH of the following conditions exist:

. ALL CCW Surge Tank level indicators are greater than 4%

RD (YES)

. COW Pump flow indication is NORMAL (YES)

SRO CHECK EITHER RHR Train in Shutdown Cooling Mode. (NO)

RO/SRO CHECK RCS temperature greater than 200°F. (YES)

RD CHECK CCW Surge tank level is> 40% (YES)

CHECK that COW loads from the Non-Essential header require RO/SRO isolation by ANY of the following: (NO)

RO/SRO CHECK COW lost to ANY operating RHR Train: (NO)

The steps highlighted below may not be performed IF the Evaluator Note: crew starts the 2 CCW pump and has isolated the leak before reaching these steps.

Operation of ROPs for greater than 10 minutes without COW Procedure Caution: cooling to the motor oil coolers may result inRCP bearing damage.

CHECK COW expected to be lost for greater than 10 minutes.

SRO (NO)

Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 30 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page j. of Event

Description:

Component Cooling Water system leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Reactor Makeup Water Tank contains potentiafly tritiated water Making up to the CCW System from the Reactor Makeup Procedure Caution: Water Tank could result in CCW System contamination.

Operation of the system while t is contaminated requires an evaluation per IOCFR5O.59.

RO CHECK CCW Surge Tank level STABLE OR RISING (YES)

If the leak location is known, non-applicable steps (Steps 15 through 21) are not required to be performed.

If the leak location is not known, the CRS may direct performance of Steps 15 through 21 in any order. Steps 22 and 23 directing diagnostic and walkdown may be useful in determining leak location and may be performed prior to or Procedure Note: in parallel with Steps 15 through 21.

Elevated leakage may be indicated by higher indicated levels, higher level controller setpoints, annunciators, evolutions in progress, notification by personnel, Chemistry sample results or other means.

RCDT in-leakage is indicated by elevated level controller output.

From the note above since the leak location is known from the Aux Operator report steps 1521 are NOT required to be performed.

PERFORM a walkdown of CCW piping looking for leaks.

. Walkdown was performed and leak location identified and isolated Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 31 of78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 32 of 78 Event

Description:

Component Cooling Water system leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Leakage in excess of 15.8 gph per train (unanticipated makeup Procedure Note: greater than twice per shift) could exceed surge tank makeup capacity under design basis conditions.

WHEN the leak is LOCATED, THEN PERFORM the following:

. CHECK that CCW System leakage can be isolated.

(YES)

. INITIATE corrective actions to restore system to service.

. DIRECT Chemistry to sample CCW for proper corrosion inhibitor concentration. Contacts Chemistry Simulator Communicator: Acknowledge request for CCW sample RESTORE CCW flow to the following, as needed:

Sample Heat Exchangers SRO

GFFD

Excess Letdown

RCDT Heat Exchangers The SRO will complete OMM-001 Attachment 5 and request assistance from the WCC center to repair system leakage.

The SRO should evaluate TS 3.7.3 SRO TS 3.7.3 Action:

With only I COW pump flow path OPERABLE, restore at least two flow paths to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HSB within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in CSD within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

DOCUMENT component manipulations per OPS-NGGC-l 308, SRO Plant Status Control.

Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 32 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NJ Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page of Z Event

Description:

Component Cooling Water system leak Time Position Appicants Actions or Behavior DIRECTS RD to start the B CCW pump and stop the A CCW SRO Pump per OP-145.

Simulator Operator: If requested to remove control power from A CCW Pump: Remote Function CCWO75 CP_OFF OP-I 45 Component Cooling Water VERIFIES Initial Conditions and contacts Aux Operator to RD perform pre-start checks on the B CCW pump Simulator When contacted by RO B CCW pump checks are Communicator: completed and the pump is ready to be started.

NOTE: Starting the second pump could cause iP fluctuations across REM-O1CC-35OIASA (BSB) which may shut solenoid valves I CC-23 and I CC-40.

Procedure Note: NOTE: Starting the second pump may cause flow oscillations which could shut ICC-252. Re-opening of ICC-252 should not be attempted until the second pump is secured.

NOTE: APP-ALB-005 Windows 1-3, 2-1, and 3-2 are expected alarms when starting the second CCW Pump.

With one CCW pump running and the standby pump capable of an automatic start, ensure a minimum flow rate of 7850 gpm exists as indicated on Fl-652.I (FI-653.1). If both CCW pumps Procedure Caution: are running OR the CCW trains are separated, a minimum of 3850 gpm per pump is required. This lower flowrate should only be allowed for short durations to accomplish pump swapping or system realignment.

Makes PA announcement that B COW pump is about to be started. Stand clear of the pump and breaker.

Step 1: At the MCB, START CCW Pump Train B-SB.

RD

. Locates MOB start switch for B CCW pump and starts pump

. Verifies that indications are normal for the started pump.

Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 33 of78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N1Q Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 4 of 78 Event

Description:

Component Cooling Water system leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Communicator: Inform RO that B CCW pump has a good start.

Step 2: VERIFY flow is greater than or equal to 3850 gpm on RO Fl-653.1 and FI-652.1.

Step 3: VERIFY OPEN, ICC-23 and ICC-40, REM 3501 A CCW Inlet Solenoid Valve and REM 3501 B COW Inlet RO Solenoid Valve respectively.

. Contacts Aux Operator to verify Acknowledge request and report back in 1 minute Simulator Communicator: ICC-23 and ICC-40, REM 3501 A CCW Inlet Solenoid Valve and REM 3501 B CCW Inlet Solenoid Valves are OPEN PERFORM one of the following:

RO

. SECURE a second COW Pump using Section 7.1.

OP-.145 Component Cooling Water Section 7.1 RO VERIFIES Initial Conditions.

The following Steps are written assuming shutdown of Train B-Procedure Note: SB CCW pump. If shutting down Train A-SA CCW pump, use components in parenthesis.

Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 34 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NJ Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 35 of 78 Event

Description:

Component Cooling Water system leak Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Step 1: VERIFY OPEN, the following valves:

. I CC-99, CCW HEAT EXCHANGER A TO NONESSENTIAL SUP (YES)

. ICC-113, CCW HEAT EXCHANGER BTO RO NONESSENTIAL SUP (YES)

. 1CC-i 27, CCW NONESSENTIAL RETURN TO HEADER B (YES)

. 1CC-i 28, CCW NONESSENTIAL RETURN TO HEADER A (YES>

Step 2: VERIFY SHUT, ICC-147 and 1CC-167, CCW FROM RO RHR HEAT EXCHANGER B-SB AND A-SA (YES)

Procedure Note: If pressure falls below 52 psig, the CCW pump will restart.

Failure of equipment to secure in the following step will result in Procedure Caution: the associated EDG being inoperable. Tech Spec 3.8.1.1 is applicable until the breaker for the affected load is opened.

Step 3: At the MCB, PLACE the control switch for CCW Pump Train A-SA to STOP AND HOLD until system pressure RO stabilizes above 52 psig.

Stops A CCW pump (may have been completed previously)

Step 4: VERIFY the following for Train A:

. FLOW stops using Fl-653.1 (Fl-652.i)

RO

. PRESSURE remains greater than 75 psig suing P1-650 (P1-649).

RO Step 5: CHECK Train B flow rate between 10,000 and 11,000 gpm on MCB indicator Fl-663.i. (YES)

When the leak is isolated, the B CCW Pump has been Evaluators Note: started, and the TS declaration is complete, cue Event 6 Failure of RWST level channel I, LI-990 fails high.

Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 35 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NB Scenario # 5 Event # 6 Page 36 of 78 Event

Description:

Failure of RWST level channel I, Ll-990 fails high Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 6:

Simulator Operator:

Failure of RWST level channel I, Ll-990 fails high Indications Available . ALB-04-2-1, Refueling Water Storange Tank High Level

. Ll-990 reads 100%

Responds to annunciator Identifies Ll-990 failed high reports information to SRO RO Reviews the APP response Directs SRO to OWP-ESF and provides list of possible applicable Tech Specs from APP response Directs the crew to implement OWP-ESF-05 Complete OMM-001 Attachment 5 and requests assistance from the WCC center Evaluates Tech Specs for the failed channel

. Tech Spec 3.3.2 Requires ESF Actuation system instrumentation channels to be OPERABLE Action 16 would apply ACTlO US . With the nurbr of OPEPIBLE channels one less than the Total Nuciber üí Channels, operation say proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and the Ilinirnuin Channels OPEBLE requirewent is set. One additional channel nay be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for SRO surveIlance testing per Spedlication 4,3,2,1,

. Tech Spec 3.3.3.6 Action a (RWST Level LI-990 is an accident monitoring instrument based on OST-1021 Attachment 6 Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Log, Item # 9)

Action a applies:

lOh:

a. With the nuner of OPERAELE accident monitoring instrusentation channels, except In Core Thersoouples and Reactor Vessel level.

1CS than the Total Rui rOd Nuur of Channel requi refrents howii in Table 33-10 restore the inoperb1ehannel(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or be in at least HOT STND8Y within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in a least HOT 5frJTD0d?I within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

Simulator Acknowledge any requests for assistance including Communicator: implementation of the OWP.

Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 36 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: iJJ Scenario # 5 Event # 6 Page 37 of Z Event

Description:

Failure of RWST level channel I, Ll-990 fails high Time Position L Applicants Actions or Behavior Evaluator Note: Implementation of the OWP does not have to be completed to continue with the scenario.

When the Tech Spec evaluation is complete continue scenario cue Event 7 Evaluator Note:

RCP A rising vibration requiring a manual Reactor trip Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 37 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 5 Event # 7 Page 38 of 78 Event

Description:

A RCP High Vibrations Time 1 Position

[ Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from the Lead Evaluator insert Trigger 7:

Simulator Operator:

A RCP high vibration

. ALB-O1O-1-5, RCP-A TROUBLE Indications Available:

A RCP vibration monitors increasing and red high vibration lights lit RO Responds to alarm ALBO10-1-5.

Eva I uator N ote. Crew may review ALB-O1O-1-5 but will likely go directly to AOP-018 when high vibration is recognized.

ENTERS and directs actions of AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Operations AOP-O1 S SRO Makes PA announcement for AOP entry Holds a crew alignment brief RO Perform AOP-018 Immediate Action Imdiate Check any CSIP running (YES)

SRO Inform SM to refer to PEP-lb and enter the EAL Matrix.

EVALUATE plant conditions AND GO TO the appropriate section:

MALFUNCTtON I SECTiON Page Loss of CCW andior Normal Seal Injection 3.1 5 to RCPs SRO High Reactor Coolant Pump Vibration 3.2 8 Reactor Coolant Purn Seal Malfunction 3.3 10 Reactor Coolant Pum Motor Trouble 3.4 18 Proceeds to Section 3.2, RCP High Vibration.

Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 38 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nf Scenario # 5 Event # 7 Page of 78 Event

Description:

A RCP High Vibrations Time Position

[ Applicants Actions or Behavior The answer to the following question may be YES at this time but the limit will be exceeded in short order. This is a Evaluator Note: continuous action step that should be implemented when the limit is exceeded. The scenario guide is therefore written as if the limit is exceeded when the step is read.

Check all RCPs operating within limits of Att 1. (NO)

Q5. RCP vibration in excess of the following: A.11

2omilsshaft

15 mils shaft and increasing greater than I miUhr SRO/RO

Smilsframe

For A and C RCPs ONLY: 3 mils frame and increasing greater than 0.2 milmr

For B RCP ONLY: 3.5 mils frame and increasing greater than 0.2 rnils/hr When answer is YES follow below:

SRO CHECK the Reactor is TRIPPED. (NO)

TRIP the Reactor AND GO TO EOP-E-O. (Perform Steps 4 SRO through 7 as time permits.)

Directs RO to manually trip the Reactor.

Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 39 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 5 Event # 7 Page 40 of 78 Event

Description:

A RCP High Vibrations Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Steps through immediate actions with crew Makes plant PA announcement E-O SRO Makes PA announcement for EOP entry Holds a crew alignment brief Verifies Reactor is Tripped (YES)

REACT&R TRIP OOHflRKATON Immediate Action RO Ratot TLp fl KR - OZK Rod otto LLEtvt (Ze,o Step) LIT Nutror flux DROPPING Verifies Turbine is Tripped All throttle valves shut (YES)

TURD STOP VLV 1 TSLB-Z 1 Immediate Action BOP UR P VLIF 2 L-41 2 UR srop Vi 3 TSLZ113 TURB SXOP VLV SZ114 Immediate Verify Power To AC Emergency Buses (YES)

BOP Action AC emergency buses BOTH energized Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 40 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1] Scenario # 5 Event # 7 Page 41 of 78 Event

Description:

A RCP High Vibrations Time 1 Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Safety Injection Activated (NO)

RNO action:

Perform the following:

a) Check Safety Injection REQUIRED (NO)

SI MTUATION CRITRIA Z reUre - LESS WN OR EQOAL 10 185 ?SIG CNW1 Pre&sure - GREER THAN OR EQUAl. It) 3O PSI Any SG Preeue - LESS TEAR OR XtiAL TO 601 PSIG MnuaI - DEGRA1)MI0W TOWARDS A0A1IC ACTUATLON Abnoiza1 OpestIng Pcce4ure - DIRECTS KANUAL ACTUATI(W Oe SI Tri - AIt.ED (EPLP 4-1 l.ASRIKG) b) IF Safety Injection actuation is NOT required, THEN GO TO ES-0.1, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE, Step 1.

Directs RO/BOP to secure the A RCP and continue with AOP-018 steps 4-7 STOPS A RCP and places PK-444C.1 to manual then shuts valve with demand at 0%

Transitions to ES-0.1, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE, Step 1.

Holds a crew alignment brief Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 41 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NQ Scenario # 5 Event # 7 Page 42 of Event

Description:

, A RCP High Vibrations Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EOP Reactor Trip Response ES-O.1 Procedure Note: Foldout applies Assigns foldout items of E-O to both the RO and BOP

. RO:

SRO o SI Actuation criteria

. BOP o AFW supply switchover criteria Evaluator Aide:

FOLDOtIT

. SI ACTtJATION Cfl[TEIUA IF y of the f1lwin eeur, THEN actuate SI AND GO TO EMr REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY I NJECTION, Step 1:

. RCS subcool LESS THAN 1Q F C 2O F- M

. PRZ level CAN NOT BE MAtNTAIINED GREATER ThAN 5%

. AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA 1[ OST level drops to less than 10%, IflEli switch the AFW water supply 1 the ESW system usn OP-137, AUX1UARY FEED WATER SYSTEM, Section 8.1.

SRO Initiate Monitoring Of Critical Safety Function Status Trees.

. SRO Evaluate EAL Matrix.

Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 42 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: NJ Scenario # 5 Event # 7 Page 43 of 78 Event

Description:

A RCP High Vibrations Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check RCS Temperature:

a. Check RCPs ANY RUNNING (YES B and C SROI b. Check SG blowdown isolation valves shut (NO)

Shut SG blowdown FCVs:

BOP

. IBD-18 (FCV-8405A) (SHUTS)

. 1 BD-37 (FCV-8405B) (SHUTS)

. 1 BD-56 (FCV-8405C) (SHUTS)

Since the A was secured RCS temperature will continue Evaluator Note: to drop. The crew will most likely shut the MSIVs here.

After the MSIVs are shut RCS temperature will recover.

Stabilize AND Maintain Temperature Between 555°F AND 559° F using Table 1.

TABLE I RCS TERPERATURE CONTROL GUIDELINBS POLLOiING RE TRIP

. Guidattee Is appflcahle until another procedure dIrcta otherwise.

. f no ROPS running. ue wIde range cold leg teperatttre.

RCS TH$PgRJWRE TRBNV LESS THAN GREATER THAN STABLE At OR.

557! AND 557 ANU TRENDING T(

DROPPING RISING 557P

Stop duaping.

condenser Control feed atea avflable flow and 5tea IE tranefer duap to B Qp

Control feed atea d.uiap to eataliiab and ilow SPKA)( PRESSURE eaintain ROS o4e uein tezperature

Maintain total O?-126, btwean 555P feed flow Section 5.3 AND 559P OPERATOR greater than AND dwap SteeR AcTION 210 KPPH to condenser until level greater than - OR -

25% at least one intact

Dnp Steen SO using intact SO PORts

IR cooldown continues.

Control feed THEN. shut flow to MSIY AND .aintain SQ RYPASS valvea laval s Informs CRS of cooldown then shuts ALL MSIVs While the crew is stabilizing the plant after the MSIVs are shut and the crew sees that RCS temperature is stable or Evaluator Note:

increasing then insert event 8 Small Break LOCA inside Containment Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 43 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 5 Event # 8 Page 44 of 78 Event

Description:

Small Break LOCA Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior I Simulator Operator:

On cue from the Lead Evaluator insert Trigger 8:

Small Break LOCA Identifies changing Primary plant conditions and recommends SI based on fold out criteria of ES-O.1 for rapidly decreasing RO/BOP Subcooling approaching the setpoint and Pressurizer level will not being able to be maintained> 5%

SRO Directs RD to actuate Safety Injection RD Manually actuates Safety Injection Re-enters E-O - performs a crew alignment brief then has crew verify:

. Reactor Trip (YES)

. Turbine Trip (YES)

E-O SRO . AC emergency buses energized (YES)

. Safety Injection Actuated (Both Trains) (YES)

RPLP 4-1,Si ArrLJATED -

IJT ONTINUOUL()

Assigns foldout items of E-O to both the RD and BOP

. RO:

o RCP Trip criteria o Alternate Miniflow Open/Shut criteria SRO RHR restart criteria o

. BOP o Ruptured SG AFW Isolation criteria o AFW supply switchover criteria Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 44 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1B Scenario # 5 Event # 8 Page 45 of 78 Event

Description:

Small Break LOCA Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior I

Evaluator Aide:

I REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJETIOM FOWOUT a RCP TRIP CRITERIA buUi ut (he rQlIuwiuj uwcui, ThEN st tIt RGPs.

. SI flow GREATER THAN 200 GPM

. ROS pressure LESS THAN 1404) PSIG a ALTERNATE NINWLOW OPENIS[IUT CRITEfflA

. F RCS pressure drops to less than 1800 PS[G, THEN verify aiternate niiniftow iaoltiøn OR miniflw ilck the -Si IUT

. F RCS pressure rises to greater th 2200 P51G. THEN verify ltemate minifbw ioticn AND rninif1ow bloGk vlvea OPEN a RHR RESTART CRIFERIA IF RCS pressure drabs to res than 230 PSIG in an unontro1le marner, THEN reart RHR pumps to supply waler to te RC&

a RuPTURED SG AFW ISOLATION CRTTERIA IT all of the fOllowing ocwrto SG, 11 lEN stop iced fbw by shutting the ioIelian vatees (preferred) ORilaw control valves to that SG:

. Arty SC k.cl risc in uncontrrlLcd mrtnricr OR haa a1noml ceondarv rndistion a Narrcw rare 1el GREATER ThAN 25% [41)%J a AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITE1iA IT ST level drop t Ie n ID% THEN witch the AfW water supplyto ffi ESW system using OP-I 37, AUX((URY FEELWATER SYSTEM

Sectioi 1.

Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 45 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N1EQ Scenario # 5 Event # 8 Page 4 of z Event

Description:

Small Break LOCA Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Identifies Containment Adverse Conditions CREW Containment Pressure > 3pg SRO Evaluate EAL Matrix.

Verifiy CSIPs all running (YES)

RO A and B running Verify RHR Pumps all running (YES)

RD A and B running RO Safety Injection flow> 200 gpm (NO)

Perform the following:

a) Verify high head safety injection alignment:

(1) CSIP suction from RWST valves OPEN -

ICS-291 (LCV-115B) (YES) 1 CS-292 (LCV-1 I 5D) (YES)

(2) VCT outlet valves SHUT -

ICS-165 (LCV-115C) (YES)

RD 1CS-166 (LCV-115E) (YES)

(3) Charging line isolation valves SHUT -

1 CS-235 1CS-238 (4) BIT outlet valves OPEN I SI-3 (NO- under clearance) 1 Sl-4 (NO unknown why)

ATTEMPTS TO OPEN 181-4 (valve will NOT open)

Informs SRO 1 Sl-4 will not OPEN Directs RD actions when high head safety injection flow path can NOT be aligned. Establish any other high head injection SRO flow path (listed in order of preference):

. Directs RD to OPEN 1SI-52 SA Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 46 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: Scenario# 5 Event# 9, 10, 11 Page 4 of 78 Event

Description:

SI-4 failure, RCP B and C manual Trip, MSLI failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Locates MOB control for 1SI-52 SA and takes switch to OPEN Event 9 Informs SRO that 1 SI-52 SA is OPEN RD Critical to establish SI flow of> 200 gpm using alternate high Critical head safety injection to cold legs prior to securing RCPs Task #1 Identifies that Safety Injection flow is now exceeding 200 gpm RCS pressure may be < 1400 psig by this point in the scenario. It may not be yet depending on the crews Evaluators Note: progression through the scenario. When the crew identifies that SI flow is> 200 gpm and RCS pressure is

< 1400 psig they will secure RCPs lAW E-0 RCP trip criteria.

Event 10 Identifies that RCP trip criteria is met based on RCS pressure

< 1400 psig and SI flow> 200 gpm informs the SRO that RCP trip criteria is met and secures bothRCP B and RCP C RD Critical Critical to secure RCPs with RCS pressure 1400 psig and SI Task #2 <

flow> 200 gpm prior to exiting E-0 SRO RCS Pressure LESS THAN 230 PSIG (NO)

The crew may have identified that Containment pressure Evaluator Note: was rising and established a Containment pressure setpoint < 3 psig and actuated MSLI earlier in the scenario.

Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 47 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 5 Event # 9, 101 1 1 Page 4 of 7 Event

Description:

Sl-4 failure, RCP B and C manual Trip, MSLI failure Time Position 1 Applicants Actions or Behavior Main Steam Line Isolation ACTUATED

. NO automatic MSLI is failed MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION ACTUATION CRITERIA SRO CNWT presaure - GREATER TBA OR EQUAL TO 3.0 1SIG iy SG preasure - LESS IRAN OR EQUAl, TO 601 REIG MANEL - OEGRADATION TOWARDS AUTOMATIC ACTUATIOI Directs crew to actuate MSLI Actuates MSLI Verifies MSIVs and Bypass Valves are SHUT Event 11 RO/BOP The crew should identify that the MSIV before seat drain valves IMS-231, IMS-266 and 1MS-301 have failed to shut and SHUT each valve.

BOP Any SG pressure 100 PSIG LOWER THAN PRESSURE IN TWO OTHER SGs (NO)

With Containment pressure approaching 10 psig the SRO may assign a pressure value to the RO to manually actuate Containment Spray prior to Auto actuation.

When Containment Spray is actuated a Phase B Evaluator Note: actuation signal will also be generated. Depending on the crews pace through the procedures they may reach this point with RCPs still in operation and RCS pressure above the E-0 fold out criteria for tripping RCPs. IF the crew has not secured RCPs at this point they will now.

Directs RO to manually actuate Containment Spray at a SRO Containment pressure below 10 psig to prevent auto Containment Spray actuation.

Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 48 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Nf Scenario# 5 Event# 9, 10, 11 Page 49 of 78 Event

Description:

Sl-4 failure, RCP B and C manual Trip, MSLI failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check CNMT Pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 PSIG (YES I NO it will exceed 10 psig)

RO . Verify CNMT spray ACTUATED (YES)

. Stop all RCPs o Locates MCB switches for RCPs and STOPS B and C RCP BOP Verify AFW flow AT LEAST 210 KPPH ESTABLISHED (YES)

Sequencer Load Block 9 (Manual Loading Permissive)

BOP ACTUATED (BOTH TRAINS) (YES)

BOP Energize AC buses IAI AND IBI Evaluator Note: E-O, Attachment 3 is located in the back of this guide.

E-O Attachment 3 is included in the back of this scenario.

The RO will perform all board actions until the BOP completes Attachment 3. The BOP is permitted to properly Evaluator Note: align plant equipment lAW E-O Attachment 3 without SRO approval.

The Scenario Guide still identifies tasks by board position because the time frame for completion of Attachment 3 is not predictable.

Verify Alignment Of Components From Actuation Of ESFAS BOP Signals Using Attachment 3, Safeguards Actuation Verification, While Continuing With This Procedure.

Directs AO to place IA and lB Air Compressor in the local BOP control mode per E-0 Attachment 3 step 22 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 49 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 5 Event# 9, 10, 11 Page 50 of 78 Event

Description:

Sl-4 failure, RCP B and C manual Trip, MSLI failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Acknowledge the request to place IA and I B Air imu a or Compressor in the local control mode per E-O Attachment Communicator 3 step 22 When directed to place the IA and lB Air Compressor in Simulator Operator the local control mode:

Run APP\airacs_to_local

. When the APP for IA and lB Air Compressor has Simulator

. completed running call the MCR and inform them that the Communicator air compressors are running in local control.

Directs AO to locally unlock AND turn ON the breakers for the CSIP suction AND discharge cross-connect valves, referring to E-0, Attachment 3, step 23.

HOC 1A35-SA MGC 1B35-SB BOP VALVE CUBICLE VALVE CuBICLE IGS-170 4A lC$-171 41) 1CS-169 4B 1GS-168 70 ICS-218 140 1CS-220 91) 1CS-219 lB 1.CS-217 120 Acknowledge request to unlock and turn on the breakers Communicator: for the CSIP suction and discharge cross-connect valves E-0, Attachment 3, step 23.

When requested to unlock and turn on CSIP suction and discharge cross-connect valves: Run APPcvcPath-I Att. 6 Simulator Operator:

When the APP has completed running inform MCR that E-O, Attachment 3, step 23 is complete.

Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 50 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Ni Scenario # 5 Event# 9, 10, 11 Page 51 of 78 Event

Description:

Sl-4 failure, RCP B and C manual Trip, MSLI failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RCPs are secure therefore WR CL temperatures should be used when checking RCS temperature. RCS temp trend Examiners Note:

will be < 557 and dropping control FF, maintain total FF

> 210 KPPH until SG level > 40% (all MSIVs are shut)

Stabilize AND Maintain Temperature Between 555°F AND 559°F Using Table 1.

TABLE I RCS TERPERATURZ CONTROL GUIDELINES FOLLOWING RX TRIP

Guidance is applicable until another procedure directs othecwise.

no RV?s rnng IIE1 use wide rsng,e cold leg temper atua RC3 TEMPERATURE TREND LESS mAN GREATER mAN STARI.E AT OR S7P AND 7°F AND TRENDING TO DROPRING RISING

. Stop duing

condenser

Cantiol feed Steele avai3able flaw an4 Steam RO iiEi transfer dump to

. Control fee4 Steam duRp to establith and flow STEAM PRESSURE maintata RCS mode using tempetatuce

Naintain total OP-12d. between 55P feed flow Section S3 AND 5E9P OPERATOR greater that AWl) dump steam ACTION 110 EPPE to condenser until lere1 greater that - GE -

25% E*VE it at least one

Dump atea*

on intact SG using intact SG P0RV

. IF cooldown conrinues

Control feed shut flow to NSIVs AND tatain SO EYPASS iialea levela PRZ PORVs SHUT (YES)

RO PRZ Spray Valves SHUT (YES RCPs are secured)

PRZ PORV Block Valves AT LEAST ONE OPEN (YES)

. Any SG pressure DROPPING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER OR COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED (NO)

. Any SG ABNORMAL RADIATION (NO)

SRO OR UNCONTROLLED LEVEL RISE (NO)

. CNMT Pressure NORMAL NO GO TO E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 1.

Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 51 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 fOp Test No.: Scenario # 5 Event # 9, 10, 1 1 Page 52 of 78 f Event

Description:

Sl-4 failure, RCP B and C manual Trip, MSLI failure f Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior E-1 Loss Of Reactor or Secondary Coolant Procedure Note: Foldout applies Performs alignment brief with crew Assigns foldout items of E-1 to crew (may assign both to the RO if the BOP is still performing Attachment 3)

. RO:

o RCP Trip criteria o RHR restart criteria SRO o Alternate Miniflow Open/Shut criteria o Cold Leg Recirculation Switchover criteria

. BOP o AFW supply switchover criteria o Secondary Integrity criteria o E-3 Transition criteria Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 52 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 5 Event # 9, 10, 11 3 of Page 78 Event

Description:

Sl-4 failure, RCP B and C manual Trip, MSLI failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Evaluator Aide: E-1 Foldout FOLDOUT RCP TRIP CRITERIA IF both of the folIowin o.cur 11-lEN stc,ç ll RCPs.

51 flow- GREATER THAN 200 GPM

RCS pressure LESS THAN 1400 PSIG AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA IE CST eet dxops to less than 1 0% jjj{ switch the AFW water supplj to the ESW syatees using OP-I 37, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM, Section 8+/-

RHR RESTART CR11 tRIA IF RCS pressure drops to less than 230 P510 in an uncontiNled manner, THEN restart RHR wnps t supp[ywaer to the ROS.

ALTERNATE MItIIFLOW OPENISIIIJT CRITERIA IF RCS pressure drop.s to less than 1800 P510, jverff alternate miniflew lactation OR rniniflow block valves SHUT RCS pressui-e nses to greater than 2200 P510, III4 verify alternate minitlow isolation AND nsnillow block vatves OPEN

SECONDARY IMTEGRIT( CRITERIA IF any at the foflowinD occurs, fl GO TO E-Z, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATIOW, Step 1.

nySG pressure- DROPS [NAN UNCONTROLLED MANNE ThAT 50 HAS Qj BEEI4 ISOLATED

- Any SO COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZEDAJIfl THAT SC HASJt1O BEEM ISOLATED 4 E-3TRANSrTION CRITERIA any SC level rises in an uncontrolled manner any SC has abnormal radiation levels, 1HEN GO TO E3, STEAN GENERKTOR TUBE RUPTURE, Step 1.

4 COLD LEG RECI[tCULATION SWITCHOVER CP1TERIA IF RWST level drops to less than 23A% (214 Low-Low alaiin), THEN GO TO ES-L3, TflANSFER TO COLD LEG REC1RCJLA11ON, Step 1.

SRO Initiate Monitoring Of Critical Safety Function Status Trees.

Maintain RCP Seal Injection Flow Between 8 GPM And 13 RO GPM.

Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 53 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Ji Scenario # 5 Event # 9, 10, 1 1 Page 54 of 78 Event

Description:

Sl-4 failure, RCP B and C manual Trip, MSLI failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

. Check Intact SG Levels: Any level - > 25% [40%]

(YES I NO depends on monitoring and control should be YES IF NO then Maintain total FF> 210 KKPH until level > 40% in BP at least I intact SG)

. Control feed flow to maintain all intact levels betwee n 25%

And 50% [40% And 50%].

. Any level Risinq in an uncontrolled manner (NO)

Check PRZ PORV AND Block Valves:

. Verify AC buses IAI AND IBI ENERGIZED (YES)

RO . Check PRZ PORVs SHUT (YES)

. Check block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN (YES)

. IF a PRZ PORV opens on high pressure, THEN verify it shuts after pressure drops to less than opening setpoint.

Check SI Termination Criteria:

RO RCS subcooling -> 1OF [40F] - C 20F [50F] M (NO)

Check CNMT Spray Status:

. Check any CNMT spray pump RUNNING (NOT at this time but with increasing Containment pressure an automatic actuation will occur The SRO should direct SRO the crew to manually actuate Containment Spray at a conservative pressure below the automatic actuation setpoint of 10 psig)

. Consult plant operations staff to determine if CNMT spray should_be_placed_in_standby.

Simulator IF contacted for CNMT spray pump evaluation tell CRS that Communicator at this time leave the CNMT spray pumps running.

Harris 201 3 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 54 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 5 Event# 9, 10, 11 Page of Event

Description:

Sl-4 failure, RCP B and C manual Trip, MSLI failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check Source Range Detector Status:

Intermediate range flux - < 5x1 0-11 AMPS (YES)

RO Verify source range detectors ENERGIZED (YES)

Transfer nuclear recorder to source range scale.

(Transfers NR-45 to source range scale)

Check RHR Pump Status:

Check RHR pump suction ALIGNED TO RWST RWST Suction OPEN

. RHR A: lSl-322 (YES)

RO

. RHR B: ISI-322 (YES)

RCS Pressure -> 230 psig (YES)

RCS pressure STABLE OR RISING (YES)

Stop RHR pumps (STOPS BOTH RHR PUMPS)

Check RCS And SG Pressures:

SOP Check for both of the following:

IRO All SG pressures Stable or Rising (YES)

RCS pressure - Stable or Rising (YES)

Establish CCW Flow To The RHR Heat Exchangers:

. Verify both CCW pumps RUNNING (No only B CCW)

RO . Open 1CC-i 67

. Verify CCW flow to the RHR heat exchanger Check EDG Status: Check AC emergency buses 1A-SA AND I B-SB ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER (YES)

Check bus voltages BOP Check breakers 105 and 125 CLOSED (YES)

Check any EDG - RUNNING UNLOADED (YES)

RO Reset SI Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 55 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: NR Scenario# 5 Event# 9, 10, ii Page 56 of 78 Event

Description:

Sl-4 failure, RCP B and C manual Trip, MSLI failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Manually realign safeguards equipment following a loss of BOP offsite power Shutdown any unloaded EDGs using OP-i 55 section 7 Simulator Acknowledge the request, state that you are heading out to Communicator: the EDGs and will call back when you are there.

Initiate Evaluation Of Plant Status:

. RHR system CAPABLE OF COLD LEG RECIRCULATION (YES)

. Check auxiliary AND radwaste processing building radiation NORMAL (YES)

Check RCS Status:

Check for both of the following:

. RCS pressure LESS THAN 230 PSIG (NO)

. Any RHR HX header flow GREATER THAN 1000 GPM (NO)

GO TO ES-I .2, POST LOCA COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION, Step 1.

Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 56 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: Scenario# 5 Event# 9, 10, 11 Page of 78 Event

Description:

Sl-4 failure, RCP B and C manual Trip, MSLI failure Time [Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ES-I .2 POST LOCA COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION Implements ES-1.2 SRO Performs crew alignment brief

. Reset SI

. Manually Realign Safeguards Equipment Following A Loss Of Offsite Power.

. Reset Phase A AND Phase B Isolation Signals.

RO

. Open Instrument Air AND Nitrogen To CNMT:

o 1IA-819 o 181-287 Monitor AC Buses:

. Check AC emergency buses IA-SA AND 1 B-SB ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER (YES)

. Check bus voltages BOP

. Check breakers 105 and 125 CLOSED (YES)

. Check all non-emergency AC buses ENERGIZED (YES)

PRZ heaters should NOT be energized until PRZ water level Procedure Caution indicates greater than minimum recommended by plant operations staff to ensure heaters are covered.

Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 57 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 5 Event # 9, 10, 1 1 Page of 7 Event

Description:

Sl-4 failure, RCP B and C manual Trip, MSLI failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Secure PRZ Heaters:

. Place backup heaters in the OFF position.

. Verify control heaters OFF (YES)

. Consult Plant Ops Staff for recommended minimum PRZ water level to keep heaters covered Check RHR Pump Status: (OFF)

. Aligned to RWST (YES)

RO

. RCS Pressure > 230 psig (YES)

. RCS Pressure stable or increasing (YES)

. Check RHR pump suction aligned to RWST (YES)

. Stop RHR pumps a Previously Stopped At some point during the implementation of ES-I .2 the break will clear and the Safety Injection flow filling the RCS with cold RWST water will cause pressure and temperature reduction.

Soon afterward the pressure will decrease to < 650 psig Evaluator Note: allowing the Safety Injection Accumulators to inject into the RCS. The injection will cause further temperature and pressure reductions. The critical safety function status tree for RCS integrity will begin to toggle from Green to Yellow to Orange to Red. Eventually RCS Integrity will remain RED and the crew will transition to FR-P.I

. Check Intact SG Levels: Any level GREATER THAN 25%

[40%] (YES)

BOP

. Control feed flow to maintain all intact levels between 25%

and 50% [40% and 50%].

After the low steam pressure SI signal is blocked, main Procedure Note: steamline isolation will occur if the high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.

Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 58 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario# 5 Event# 9, 10, 11 Page . of 78 Event

Description:

Sl-4 failure, RCP B and C manual Trip, MSLI failure

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

. Check PRZ Pressure: Pressure LESS THAN 2000 PSIG (YES) o Block low steam pressure SI RO o Initiate RCS Cooldown To Cold Shutdown: Maintain cooldown rate in RCS cold legs LESS THAN 100°F/HR EOP Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock FR-P. 1 SRO Implements FR-P.1 Performs crew alignment brief Foldout applies Assigns RO and BOP foldout actions SRO

RONone

. BOP AFW Supply Switchover criteria, Cold Leg Recirculation Switchover criteria Evaluator Aide: FR-P.1 Foldout RESPONSE TO MMINENT PRESSURIZED ThERMAL SNOCK FOLDOUT

. MW SUPPLY SWLTCHOVEfl CRlTFTlA IF CST level iropsto less than 10%, THEM switch the AFW water sippIyto the ESwsystemusing OP-137, AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEW, Section8i.

. CCflLD LEG RECIRCLJLATION SWITCHOVER CRITERIA.

j[RWST level drops to less than 23A% (214 Low-Low alann), THEM GO TO ES-1.3, T1ANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION, Step 1.

Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 59 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: jjf Scenario # 5 Event # 9, 10, 1 1 Page Q of 78 Event

Description:

SI-4 failure, RCP B and C manual Trip, MSLI failure Time 1 Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check RCS Pressure:

Check for both of the following:

RD . RCS pressure - LESS THAN 230 PSIG (NO I YES it will be soon)

Any RHR HX header flow-> 1000 GPM (NO)

Check RCS Cold Leg Temperature Trend:

RD . Check RCS Cold Leg Temperatures STABLE OR -

RISING (NO)

Procedure Note: A faulted SG is any SG that is depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner or is completely depressurized.

Stop RCS Cooldown:

Verify SG PORVs SHUT (YES)

BOP Verify condenser steam dump valves SHUT (YES)

Check RHR system IN SHUTDOWN COOLING MODE (NO)

Any non-faulted SG level -> 25% [40%] (YES)

Control feed flow to non-faulted SG(s) to stop RCS cooldown.

IF the TDAFW pump is the only available source of feed flow, Procedure Caution: THEN maintain steam supply to the TDAFW pump from one SG.

BOP Minimize RCS Cooldown From Faulted SG(s):

Check any SG FAULTED (ND)

Check PRZ PORV Block Valves:

RD

Verify power to block valves AVAILABLE (YES)

Check block valves AT LEAST ONE OPEN (YES)

Procedure Note: IF PRZ PORV opens on high pressure, Step 6 should be repeated after pressure drops to less than PORV setpoint.

Check PRZ PORVs:

Check all of the following:

RD

Check LTOPS control switches IN NORMAL (NOT BLOCKED) (NO BLOCKED)

Check PRZ pressure - < 2335 psig (YES)

__Verify_PR Z_PORVs SHUT_(YES)

Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 60 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 5 Event # 9, 10, 1 1 Page of Event

Description:

Sl-4 failure, RCP B and C manual Trip, MSLI failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Check SI Flow - > 200 gpm (YES)

Check SI Termination Criteria:

SRO Check for both of the following:

RCS subcoolinci -> 60°F [90°Fl C (NO)

Procedure Caution Following a complete loss of normal seal cooling, the affected RCP(s) should NOT be started prior to a status evaluation.

Check If An RCP Should Be Started:

SRO RCS subcooling - GREATER THAN 10°F [40°F] C (NO)

Go to step 32 Following an excessive cooldown, reactor vessel stress must Procedure Caution: be relieved to enhance and maintain vessel integrity. Do NOT perform any actions that raise pressure OR cause an RCS cooldown until the soak is complete.

Even if a soak period is required, steam may be released from Procedure Note: intact SGs with pressure higher than the saturation pressure for lowest cold leg temperature.

Determine RCS Soak Requirements:

RCS cooldown rate -> 100°F in any 60 mm period Perform one hour RCS soak:

Maintain RCS temperature stable.

Maintain RCS pressure stable.

. Perform actions of other procedures that do NOT cause an_RCS_cooldown_OR_raise_pressure.

Examiners Note: END OF SCENARIO Direct the Simulator Operator to place the Simulator to FREEZE Lead Evaluator Announce CREW UPDATE The NRC has the shift.

Inform the crew to remain seated at their desk and to not discuss the scenario.

Simulator Operator When directed by the Lead Evaluator go to FREEZE Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 61 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NB Scenario # 5 Event # I Page 62 of 78 Event

Description:

OP-I 34 Section 5.6 Second Condensate Booster Pump Start Up r

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 5.6. Second Condensate Booster Pump Start Up 5.6.1. Initial Conditions

1. One Condensate Booster Pump is in service per Section 5.5.

2. Condensate Booster Pump B (A) Lock-Out Relay reset CAUTION To prevent damaging the CBP recire valves, do not operate the second Condensate Boaster Pump for more than 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months with MFP suction flow less than 4500 kpph.

3. Reactor Power is greater than 5%. (This initial Condition is N/A for short term starts, such as swapping pumps)

4. CPD Operator and Chemistry have been notified of potential flow and pressure changes in the Condensate System.

5.6.2. Procedural Steps

1. PERFORM prestart checks an Condensate Booster Pump B(A per Attachment 6.

2. VERIFY CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP B (A) RECIRC, 1CE-261 (1 CE-220) in MODU and shut.

CAUTION There are no Condensate Booster Pump trips to protect the pump from running without seal water.

3. PLACE PK-2308 (PK-2307) CNDST BSTR. PUMP B (A) SPEED CONTROLLER to MAN arid zero the demand signaL

4. VERIFY OPEN 1CE-266 (1CE-227), CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP B (A) DISCHARGE.

OP-134 Rev. 45 Pace 23 otilS Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 62 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page of Event

Description:

OP-I 34 Section 5.6 Second Condensate Booster Pump Start Up Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 5.6.2 Procedural Steps (continued)

NOTE: Computer points listed in Section 6.0 of this procedure may be monitored for information.

NOTE: When the Condensate Booster Pump control switch is placed to the STAR position, the Aux Lube Oil Pump will start and supply the \/SF Coupling withT oil until oil pressure is greater than or equal to 10 psig as indicated on P1-01 LO-2304E1(A), at which time the Condensate Booster Pump starts.

CAUTION The amount of time the associated recirc valve, ICE-261 (1 CE-220) is open, minimized due to lack of lubrication without Condensate Booster Pump should be running.

5. PLACE the control switch CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP B (A)

RECIRC, I CE26I (ICE-220 in the OPEN position in,rneditely prior to starting Condensate Booster Pump B (A).

NOTE: Starting the second Condensate Booster Pump may cause the previously running pump controller to reject to Manual. This is due to the speed sensor on the pump being started initially providing: a speed input signal that based on electrical noise. If the running CBP controller rejects to manua is l, it is permissible to return the controller to Auto once the CBP being started reaches the na-load speed. If the controller again rejects to manual, then further investigation would be required.

6. START B Condensate Booster Pump.

7. Locally VERiFY Condensate Booster Pump B (A) Aux Lube Oil Pump has stopped.

8. CHECK differential pressure across the Pall Replaceable Duplex Filter, indicated between Pl-O1LO-230481 and Pl-O1LO-230462 as (Pl-OiLO23O4A1 and Pl-O1LO-2304A2) is less than 15 PSI (less than 9 PSI when oil temperature has rned up to normal).

. IF differential pressure across the Pall Replaceable Duplex Filter is greater than or equal to 15 PSI, THEN SWAP to the idle/out of service filter per Section 8.15 (greate or equal to 9 PSI when oil temperature has warmed up to normal). r than OP-134 Rev. 45 Page 24 at 119 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 63 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NB Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 64 of 78 Event

Description:

OP-I 34 Section 5.6 Second Condensate Booster Pump Start Up Time Position 1 Applicants Actions or Behavior 5.6.2 Procedural Steps (continued)

10. SLOWLY INCREASE the demand signal on PK-2308 (PK-2307) CNDST BSTR PUMP B (A) SPEED CONTROLLER to match the demand signal on the previously running Condensate Booster Pump Speed Controller.

11. WHEN the demand sgna[s are matched, THEN PLACE PK-23QB (PK-2307) CNDST BSTR PUMP B (A) SPEED CONTROLLER to AUTO.

12. PLACE the control switch for CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP B (A)

RECIRC, ICE-261 (1 C*E-220) in the MODU position.

11 After S to 10 minutes of running. VERIIY the VSF coupling oil level is in the normal operating range.

j QP34 Rev. 45 Page 25 of 119 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 64 of 78

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Uts-- U U i CI CIrn t-4-I as Ii s-ti, (P ITS K w TI 0-I ID CD r.)

Appendix D Scenario Outne Form ES-D-l HARRIS 2011 NRC SCENARIO 5 Attachment I OWP-RP-06 Iit 2 c E imtabie/Status Mqht Lineup COnipneTIt 1D POSition fot Reetored 01 Urflb= Ittoperability Position mit Saijverif ted mit ial/Verif Led

£G LV2L PmOTCrIOW CHN1PL L LI-3G$)

mn PlC 1 on card Ci-61 Th MLEr Test Switch may b pcitiond to TEST for troubleshooting. It is not required to be in TPT to meet Tech specs. operating this switch before operating the histable switches aids In troubleshooting by maintaining system conditions the same as they were when the trouble occurred concurrent ver.Ificstion is preferred while tripping bistables.

5W6 (L/4P4D) rsster Test Switch for L/484 NOJ

___j_____

in PlC 1 on Card Ci-m29 sa (L/48 t Low Level RX Trip TEST (L/44P Low Level for SF/PP Nisinatch EX 2rip 1E ST NOML __/_____

mS (L/4S.C for P-i4. CR57 NOML On rSL-.2 (Check the following P LED LO LVL LP 494.

(Window 5-1) ETG1 ZED D2ENEEOIZD f_____

P LED LVL LB $StE (Window 2-1) EtGl zpn om -ENEGl zm P I P1 LVL LB (Window -1) ENGI lED DE-l

/_____ f_____

OWP-RP Rev. 16 ae 36 all 04 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 66 of 78

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2011 NRC SCENARIO 5 Attachment 1 OWP-RP-06 QP-PP- 06 Sheet 3 of S mistable/Status Light Lineup Position for Restored Tnoperability Position

!nitial/Verifled Initial/Verified SG LEVEL PROTECTIOW CMaNN2L II (LI..45)

In PlC 2 on card C2-861 The sster rest Switch may be positioned to TEST for troubleshcotimg It is not requ.ired to be in TEST to meet Specs. Tech operating this switch before operating the bistabl switches aids in troubleshooting by mainta e ining conditions the same as they were when the troublesyatem occurred.

concurrent verLficaticn is preferred while tripping bistables.

W6 (LS/4R58) l$aster Test Switch for LS/405 rEST In PlC 2 on Card C2-22P 851 (L8/45? Low Low Level RX Trip) TEST IORMr.L 852 (L8/458 Low Level for SF/Ps Mismatch 8X Trip) TEST NORM?.L 853 tLE/415C for P-1.i) TEST NORMnL On TSLP-2 (Check the following)

SQ LU LU LVL L 4S5 (Window -2) EGIZSD /_____ OE-EERGt2ED 50 2 LU LVL L8 858 (Window 2-2) Et.GIZED /_____ DE-ENERGIEED SQ P El It LVL L SSC (Window 1-23 Efl.GIZE /_____ DE-ENEROTEED On Main control Poardr ION 8rior to placLng the EG LVL aIVS panel bypass and P train trouble lights and the switch to normal, verify the .

and. B train trip lights are not lit on the ZNC panel.

SQ LVL aTWE PEL PYPSS Switch BYPS S /______

r°- Rev. 113 Page 37 of 104 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 67 of 78

/_____

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2011 NRC SCENARIO 5 Attachment I OWP-RP-06 CWP-R-5 sheet 4 of 5 stabie/Sttus Light LLneup Cofl1PflefltW positIon for estored 1uoperability Position nici al/Verified :ni tial/ Verified Q LVL PROTCtCN U&NL rir (Lr-6)

In PlC I card C3-1

- The taster Test Switch may be positioned to TEST troub1shccting. it is not rquIrd to t n TEiforto spec Qperatin this switch before operati mst Tch ng the bistabie side ii tr bi tag by nitstnng yfte conditions the same as they were when the trouble occurred concurrent verification is preferred while tripping bistables.

5W6 (LS/46 Master Test Switch for LS/$G6 Y40PJL Xfl IC 2 on Card Ca-29L 1 (L/46 Iow Low Level X Trip) TEST 2 (L/4GdC for P-ia) TEST RMJ

__j on TLm.-a (Check the foilowing)

P LO 10 t?JL L 456k (WIndow 5-3) £GIzmo m-worzs /

SO tt I LVL L 490C (Window p-i) MG3ZO DE-EMEVGtZED OtL Main Control Poard FK-42g (Main F Rep Valve E Controller)

T0/M3NUL F-$PP.l (t4ain Pypass

/_____

Jalve P Controller)

T0/14AN1J.L OWPRP Rev. 16 Fade 104 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 68 of 78

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D1 HARRIS 2011 NRC SCENARIO 5 Attachment I OWP-RP-06 Sheet 5 of istable/Status Lioht Lineup Com.onent ID Position for etored Inoperability Poaition Initial/Verified Initial/Verified SG LVL POTECTZCN c{NNL rv LI-43) n PlC 4 on Card C-S3 NO The raster Test Switch may be positioned to troubleshootin TEST for It is not required to be in TEST to meet Specs. Operatin this switch before operati Tech ng the bistable awitches aide in troubleshooting by mainta ining system conditions the game as they were when the trouble occurred.

- concurrent verification ia preferred while tripping Mstables.

gw2 LS/4lE) Master Test Switch for LS/$3 TEST NDRML In PlC 4 on Card -t4 551 (LE/45a for P-l4 TEST NORMSL ___/_____

cm TSt,5*- 2 (Check the following El l tiVL t5 4.e3A (Wittdo 5-4) 5GIZED DE-ENESGISED /_____

OWP-RP Rev. 113 39 of 104 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 69 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 E-O Attachment 3 TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION REACTOR Attachment Sheet I of 8 Feguards Actution Verificatiofi NOTh General gUidance for V fication of feguars equipment i conta1ne Fin Attachment 4 of this procedure.

ERFIS disprays ol safeguards equipment status are not rel[able whiFe any associated safety-related eIectuic1 bu3es sire deenergized.

O 1. [eriry Two CSIPs RUNNING 0 2. Veify Two RHR Pumps RUNNING -

oa Verify Two CCW Pumps - RUNNING O 4. Verify All ESW ESW Booster Pumps RUNN INC O 5. Verify SI Valves PROPE1LV !LlGN[f)

(Refer to Attsctirnent 1.)

O 6. Verify CNMT Phase A I1atkn Vaiwes SHUT -

(Referto OMM-lJ04, POSTTRIP!SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION REVIEW,

&actiment4)

EOP-E-O I Rev.I I Paqe55of7B Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 70 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 EQ Attachment 3 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTiON Altachment 3 Sheet2of8 Safeguards Actuation Verification Cl 7. Verify SG Slowdown SG Sample leolation Valteea In Table I - SHUT Table ), SG Blovdovii And Saa1e Iaolatkrn Vatves Wroc.e Outs4e CJW CNT Ljne (IiLE- 1A-5) (14LB-IB-53)

SG A Saniple ISP-UI 1Sfl4/2I SG B Sample ISP-222 ISP-219/221 SG 0 Santple ISP-Ui 1SP-224/22 SG A Blowdowu 130-il 130-I S 1 Biowdawa 130-30 130-20 SG C owdowu 130-49

8. IL Main Steam Une Isotalion Actuated R is Requ[red By Any Of The Foltow[ng, THEN Verify MSIVe ANL MSW ypas VeIve 5FIU1I -

C] w Steam fine p:ressure LESS TE-IAN 601 PSIG C]

CNMT pressure GREATER 11-LAN 3A) PSIG

9. IL CNMT Spray Ac(iuation Signal Actuated OR Is Required, Tht1 Verify Folloving; The Rfrto 1 QMM004 PQSTTRIP/SAFEGUARS ACTUATIQN :RVlI, Attachment 9.)

U e CLlMTsprar pumps RUNNING U . CNMT spray valves PROPERLY ALIGNED U

Phase B isoLation valves SHUT L1

RCPs-STOPPED EOP-E0 I Rev. I I Pae56 of 78 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 71 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 E-O Attachment 3 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Attachment 3 Slheet3of8 Safeguards Actuation Verification D 10. Verify Both tIain FW Pumps TRIPPED D 11. Verify FW Isolation Valves SHUT (Refer fo OMM-O(]4 POST TRIPISAFEGUARDS ACTUATION REVIEW, Attachment 6.)

D 12. Verify both MDAFW pumps-RUNNING

13. IF any at Itie foUowin conditions exist, N verifi the TDAFW pump -

RUNNING O

Undervoltage on eiltiei- 6.9 KV emergency bus 0 . Level in two SGs LESS THAN 26%

O

Manual actuation to control SG level

14. Verify AFW Valves PROPERLY ALIGNED 0

IE no AFW Isolation Signal, THEN verify isolation and flow control valves -

OPEN NOTE An AFW Isolation signal signal requires a Main Steam Line Isolation coincident with one SG pressure 100 PSIG below the olher two SGs.

IFAFW Isolation Signal present 1 THEN verify MDAFW and TDAFW isolation and 110w control valves to affected SG SHUT D 15. Verify Both EDGs - RUNNING Q 16. Verify CNMT Fan Coolers - ONE FAN PER UNiT RUNNING IN SLOW SPEED EOP-E-O I Rev 1 I Page 57 of 78 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 72 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 E-O Attachment 3 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY II1JECTIOM Attachment 3 Sheet4 of 8 Safeguards Actuation Verification C [7. Verify CNMT Ventilation Isolation Valves SHUT (Refer to 0MM-U 04, POST TRIP/SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION REViEW, Attachment 7.)

C 1. Verify Contnol Room Area Ventilation MAIN CONTROL ROOM

?LIGNED FOR EMERGENCY OPERATION (Referto OMM-004, POSTTRIPISAFEGUARDS ACTUATION REVIEW, Attachment 5, Sheets I and 2, Sections [or MAIN CONTROL BOARD, SLB5 arid SLB-6)

19. Verify Essential Service Chilled Water System Operation:

D

Verify both WC-2 cNllers RUNNING C

Verify both P.4 pumps - RUNNING C (Refer to AOP-026, LOSS OF ESSENTIAI SERVICE CHILLED WATER SYSTEMS for loss of any WC-2 chiller.)

2(L Verify CSIP Fan Coolers - RUNNING C AH-9ASA C AH-9BS8 C AH-IDASA o AH-i(BS NOTE Security systems are povered by bus IAI (normal supply) or bus 151 altemate supply).

ackup power will be available for approximately 30 MINU TES after the suplyin bus. is de-energized (Refer to OP-i 15, CENTRAL ALARM STATI ON ELECTRICAI SYSTEMSF Section 8.9 and 8.10.)

[]21. Verify AC buses tM ML 181 -. ENERGIIZED 0 22. Place Air Compressor IA AND 18 In The LOCAL CONTROL Mode.

(Refer to Attachment 7.)

EOP-E-O I Rev. I I Page 58 of 78 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 73 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 E-O Attachment 3 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Attachment 3 Sheet 5 of 8 Safeguards Actuation Verification CAUTION The maximum calculated dose rate in the vicinity of MCCI A35-SA and MCC I 035-SB is between 10 f1REMHR and 150 MREMII-IR.

-__.--I -:

D 23. Dispatch An Operator To Unlock AND Turn ON The Brealcers For The CSIP Suction AND Discharge Cross-Connect Valves:

(Refer to Attachment 2)

MOO 135-SA MOO VALVE OUlIOI.E VALVE CtJI0LK CS-UO 1CS171 105-169 45 105-168 7D 105-218 14D 105-220 99 ICS-219 14E ICS-21? 120

24. Check if C CSIP Sho.uld Be Placed in Service.:

[]

IF two charging pumps an QI Le verified to be running. MID C CSIP is availabte, ThEN place C CSIP in service in place of the non-mnning CSIi using OP-I 07, CHEMIGAL AND VOL UME CONTROL SYSTEMr 5tb0n 8.5 cr8.7.

EOP-E-0 I Rev. I I Pacie 59 of 78 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 74 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 E-O Attachment 3 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Attachment 3 Sheet 6 of B Safeguards Actuation Verification

25. Start The Spent Fuel Pump Room Venhlation System:

a. At AEP-1, ve!ify the following ESCWS isolation valves OPEN

1) SL-11 (Train A)

Q

AF-I-17 SUP CK 100 (Window 9-1) 11

AH.-17 RTN CH 105 (Window 10-1)

2) SLB-9 (Train B)

D

AH-17 SUP CH 171 (Window 9-1)

AFi-17 RTN CII 182 (Window 10-1) b At AEP-i, start one SFP PUMP ROOM FAN COOLER:

D

AH-171-4ASA

AH-17 1-4B SB EOP-E-0 I Rev. I I Page 60 of 78 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 75 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 E-O Attachment 3 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Attachment 3 Sheet7 of 8 Safeguards Ac uation Verification NOTE a Fuel pool levels ANt) temperatures should be rnorntored approx imately every Ito 2 HOURS.

a Following the initial check of fuel pool levels and temperature monitoring responsibilities may be assumed by he plant operations staff (including the TSC. or STA).

Only fuel pools containing fuel are required to be monitored.

26. Check Status Of Fuel Pools:

[] a. Operate spent fuel cooling pumps to maintain fuel pool temperatures between 850 F arid 105° F.

b. Monitor fuel pooi levels AND temperetures U

RefertoAOP-041.SPENT FUELPOOLEVENVAffa chrnents 7 8 9 1(1 and 11 for 5FF parameter nionitoing methods.

[J

Refer to Curves H-X-24, H-X-2& and H-.X-26 for SFP time to 2QC] F.

U

Levels GREATER THAN 10 AlfRM (284 FT. 0 IN)

U

Temperatures LESS THAN HI TEMP ALARM 0 (105 F )

EOP-E-O I Rev. I Pacie 61 of 7.8 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 76 of 78

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 E-O Attachment 3 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Attachment 3 SheetS of B Safeguards Actuation Verification NOTE IF control room ventilation was previously aligned to an emergency o&ttside air intake for post-accident operattens, THEN fol[ow-up actions wili be required to restore the alignment

27. Consu[t Plant Operations Staff Regarding Aignrnent Of The Cotro1 Room Ventitation System:

Li

Site Emergency Co-ordinator Control Room

[I

Site Emergency Co-rdinator Technical Support Center (Referto PEP-230, CONTROL ROOM OPERAT1ONS)

- END -

EOP-E--tJ I Rev. I I Page 62 of 78 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 77 of 78

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2013 NRC SCENARIO 1 Revision Summary Rev. I Revised per NRC comments provided on 75 day outline submittal.

Archie Lucky 6/23/2013 Rev. 2 Revised per Operations validation comments.

Archie Lucky 7/02/2013 Harris 2013 NRC Scenario 5 Rev. 2 Page 78 of 78

ML13325A939

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