ML21167A327

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301 ADAMS 2A-2
ML21167A327
Person / Time
Site: Harris Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 06/16/2021
From:
Progress Energy Carolinas
To:
NRC/RGN-II
References
IR 2021301
Download: ML21167A327 (67)
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Text

ML21167A327 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2021 NRC SCENARIO 1 Facility: Harris Nuclear Plant Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: 05000400/2021301 Examiners: Operators: SRO:

RO:

BOP:

Initial Conditions: IC-26 MOL, 53% power

  • B-SB MDAFW Pump is under clearance for pump packing repairs
  • 1SI-3, BIT Outlet Valve, is Out Of Service for breaker repairs
  • B DEH Pump is Out of Service for motor repairs The plant is at 53% power, middle of core life. GP-006 is in progress. The next Turnover:

step (13.b) is to stop one Main Feedwater Pump per OP-134.01, Section 7.1

  • Isolate faulted SG to minimize RCS cooldown in order to minimize the RCS cooldown rate before a severe challenge (ORANGE path) develops to the integrity CSF preventing a Cold Leg Temperature less than 240°F Critical Task:
  • Control AFW flow to minimize RCS cooldown in order to minimize the RCS cooldown rate before a severe challenge (ORANGE path) develops to the integrity CSF preventing a Cold Leg Temperature less than 240°F Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description R - SRO 1 N/A Stop the B Main Feedwater Pump, continue reducing power N - SRO C - SRO Trip of running AH-2 SA, Containment Fan Cooler 2 hva01b (APP-ALB-027)

TS - SRO I - SRO Failure of RWST Level LT-990 to 100% (APP-ALB-004) 3 lt:112 TS - SRO Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment (AOP-042, 4 mss11 M - SRO EOP-E-0 and EOP-E-2) mss05a 5 mss05b C - SRO Main Steam Line Break Isolation Failure (EOP-ECA-2.1) mss05c Relay K603b failure on SI signal - B Train, CR HVAC 6 zrpk603b C - SRO components fail to realign, 1CS-235 and 1SP-216 fail to close

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2021 NRC SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

2021 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 The plant is at 53% power, middle of core life. Due to the B MDAFW pump LCO expiring, a normal shutdown in accordance with GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown From Power Operation To Hot Standby (Mode 1 To Mode 3) is in progress as directed by plant management. The crew is to stop the B Main Feedwater Pump and continue the down power at 4 MW / minute after shift turnover.

The following equipment is under clearance:

  • MDAFW Pump B-SB is under clearance for pump packing repairs. The pump has been inoperable for 66 hours7.638889e-4 days <br />0.0183 hours <br />1.09127e-4 weeks <br />2.5113e-5 months <br /> and cannot be restored to operable status. Tech Spec 3.7.1.2 Action a and Tech Spec 3.3.3.5.b Action c applies.

Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2021 NRC SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

2021 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 continued The following equipment is under clearance (continued):
  • B DEH Pump is under clearance for motor repairs. The pump has been unavailable for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. Repairs are expected to be completed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
  • 1SI-3, Boron Injection Tank Outlet valve has been under clearance the last 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for breaker repairs. The repairs are in progress and the valve is expected to be returned to service within the next shift. The valve is currently shut with power removed. OWP-SI-01 has been completed. Tech Specs 3.5.2 Action a and Tech Specs 3.6.3 applies.

Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2021 NRC SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

2021 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 (Continued)

Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2021 NRC SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

2021 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 (Continued)

Event 1: Stop the B Main Feedwater Pump, continue reducing power. Turnover takes place with the unit at 53% Reactor power. The crew will be given credit for a normal evolution prior to starting the down power (reactivity manipulation) by stopping the B Main Feedwater Pump.

Verifiable Action: It is expected that the SRO will conduct a reactivity brief, the RO will borate and monitor auto rod insertion per the reactivity plan. The BOP will coordinate with the Auxiliary Operator in the field and operate the control switch for the B Main Feedwater Pump to secure the pump.

Event 2: Trip of running AH-2 SA, Containment Fan Cooler (APP-ALB-027). This will cause a trip of the running Containment Fan Cooler AH-2 1A-SA. ALB 027-7-2, Containment Fan Coolers AH-2 Low Flow - O/L, will alarm.

Verifiable Action: The BOP should identify that the standby containment fan coolers DO NOT have an auto start feature for the trip of the running fan and must be manually started in accordance with OP-169, Containment Cooling and Ventilation. APP-ALB-027 window 7-2 will direct this action to be performed.

The SRO should evaluate Tech Spec 3.6.2.3, Containment Systems - Containment Cooling Systems Action: a will apply.

The SRO should refer to AD-OP-ALL-1000 Attachment 4, Emergent Issue Checklists for the failure and request assistance from the WCC.

Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2021 NRC SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

2021 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 (Continued)

Event 3: Failure of RWST LT-990 to 100%. RWST level instrument LI-990 will fail high (100%)

which will cause annunciator ALB 004-2-1, Refueling Water Storage Tank High Level to alarm.

Verifiable Action: The SRO will direct the RO to perform APP-ALB- 004 window 2-1 alarm response actions and contact I&C to compete OWP-ESF-05. NO credit will be given to the RO.

The SRO should evaluate Tech Spec 3.3.2, Instrumentation - Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation and 3.3.3.6, Instrumentation - Accident Monitoring Instrumentation. Tech Spec 3.3.2 and 3.3.3.3 Action:16 and a. will apply respectively.

Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2021 NRC SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

2021 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 (Continued)

Event 3: Tech Spec Evaluation (Continued)

The SRO should refer to AD-OP-ALL-1000 Attachment 4, Emergent Issue Checklists for the failure and request assistance from the WCC.

Event 4: Main Steam Line Break outside of Containment (AOP-042, EOP-E-0 and EOP-E-2).

The major event is a MSL break upstream of the HP Turbine Throttle valves which will require the crew to implement the actions for AOP-042, Secondary Steam Leak/ Efficiency Loss. Major changes in Pressurizer Level and Charging flow will occur. RCS temperature and Steam Generator Pressure will lower to provide indication that the Secondary is faulted and the RCS remains intact.

Verifiable Action: The RO will manually trip the Reactor in accordance with AOP-042 or AD-OP-ALL-1000, then following verification of the Reactor trip the BOP will attempt to manually shut the MSIVs from the MCB and the crew will continue with EOP-E-0. The MSIVs will NOT close from this action. The crew will then transition from EOP-E-0 and go to EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2021 NRC SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

2021 NRC EXAM SCENARIO 1 (Continued)

Event 5: MSIV's fail to close (EOP-ECA-2.1). The crew will transition from EOP-E-2 to EOP-ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators.

Verifiable Action: EOP-E-2 and EOP-ECA-2.1 will direct shutting air to RAB 261 elevation in order to fail the MSIVs into the shut position (Critical Task #1). EOP-ECA-2.1 will direct that feed flow is lowered to 12.5 KPPH to each SG. This will cause a RED PATH for EOP-FR-H.1 and require the crew to transition into the Loss Of Heat Sink procedure. Since the low flow (< 200 KPPH) was initiated by the operators and a flow rate of > 200 KPPH is available the crew will transition back into EOP-ECA-2.1. After returning into EOP-ECA-2.1 a cue will be provided to the Simulator Booth Operator to shut the A and C MSIVs. This action will simulate that the air isolation was successful and 2 of the 3 MSIVs shut. Based on EOP-ECA-2.1 foldout back to EOP-E-2 IF any SG pressure rises at any time, THEN GO TO E-2, Step 1. With 2 MSIVs shut the crew will observe a pressure rise in the 2 SGs and return to EOP-E-2.

Event 6: Relay failure on resultant SI signal - relay K603B. The failure of K603B will result in the failure of three (3) B Train SI signals: 1CS-235 and 1SP-216 fail to close and B Train Control Room Isolation (CRIS) fails to actuate.

Verifiable Action: The RO will manually shut 1CS-235 in accordance with EOP-E-0, Attachment 1, SI Emergency Alignment. The BOP will manually shut 1SP-216, and should identify the B train Control Room Area Ventilation are not properly aligned and will manually align the components in accordance with EOP-E-0, Attachment 3, Safeguards Actuation Verification or AD-OP-ALL-1000, Conduct of Operations, (5.6.3.8) for Equipment Manipulation and Status Control.

The criteria to terminate the scenario is met in EOP-E-2 after the crew is able to control AFW flow to minimize RCS cooldown - (Critical Task #2) prior to a severe challenge (ORANGE path) to the Integrity Critical Safety Function when all but one CSIP is secured.

Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2021 NRC SCENARIO 1 CRITICAL TASK JUSTIFICATION:

1. Isolate faulted SG to minimize RCS cooldown in order to minimize the RCS cooldown rate before a severe challenge (ORANGE path) develops to the integrity CSF preventing a Cold Leg Temperature less than 240°F.

Failure to isolate a faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Also, depending upon the plant conditions, it could constitute a failure by the crew to demonstrate the ability to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.

2. Control AFW flow to minimize RCS cooldown in order to minimize the RCS cooldown rate before a severe challenge (ORANGE path) develops to the integrity CSF preventing a Cold Leg Temperature less than 240°F.

Failure to control the AFW flow rate to the SGs leads to an unnecessary and avoidable severe challenge to the integrity CSF. Also, failure to perform the critical task increases the challenges to the subcriticality and the containment CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated plant conditions. Thus, failure to perform the critical task constitutes a demonstrated inability by the crew to take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety. It also fails to prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.

Note: Causing an unnecessary plant trip or ESF actuation may constitute a CT failure. Actions taken by the applicant(s) will be validated using the methodology for critical tasks in Appendix D to NUREG-1021.

Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2021 NRC SCENARIO 1 Simulator Setup Reset to IC-143 password TheonlySRO Go to RUN Silence and Acknowledge annunciators GO TO FREEZE and inform the lead examiner the Simulator is ready. DO NOT GO TO RUN until directed by the lead examiner.

Set ERFIS screens for normal full power conditions (The examiner has provided to the candidate with initial conditions and the initiating cues prior to placing the simulator in RUN.)

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS Provide a Reactivity Plan to candidates for shutting down the plant Provide a copy of the following procedures:

  • GP-006, NORMAL PLANT SHUTDOWN FROM POWER OPERATION TO HOT STANDBY (MODE 1 TO MODE 3) marked up through section 6.2 step 13.a Press START on Counter Scaler Post conditions for status board from IC-26 Reactor Power 53%

Control Bank D at 154 steps RCS boron 1030 ppm Turnover: The plant is at 53% power, middle of core life. Due to the B-SB MDAFW pump LCO expiring, a normal shutdown in accordance with GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown From Power Operation To Hot Standby (Mode 1 To Mode 3) is in progress as directed by plant management.

The crew is to stop the B Main Feedwater Pump and continue the down power at 4 MW / minute after shift turnover.

Equipment Under Clearance:

  • MDAFW Pump B-SB is under clearance for motor high vibrations. The pump has been inoperable for 66 hours7.638889e-4 days <br />0.0183 hours <br />1.09127e-4 weeks <br />2.5113e-5 months <br /> and cannot be restored to operable status. Tech Spec 3.7.1.2 LCO Action a and Tech Spec 3.3.3.5.b Action c applies.
  • B DEH Pump is under clearance for motor repairs. The pump has been unavailable for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. Repairs are expected to be completed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
  • 1SI-3, Boron Injection Tank Outlet valve has been under clearance the last 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for breaker repairs. The repairs are in progress and the valve is expected to be returned to service within the next shift. The valve is currently shut with power removed. OWP-SI-01 has been completed. Tech Specs 3.5.2 Action a and Tech Specs 3.6.3 applies.

Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 HARRIS 2021 NRC SCENARIO 1 Simulator Setup (continued)

Align equipment for repairs:

Place CIT on 'B-SB' MDAFW pump MCB Switch Place protected train placards IAW OMM-001 Attachment 5

  • Protected Train placards on 'A-SA' MDAFW pump, TDAFW Pump, B-SB RHR Pump 1MS-70 and 1MS-72, B-SB CCW Pump and B-SB ESW Pump Place the B DEH Pump in PTL and then hang a CIT on MCB switch Place a CIT on the switch for 1SI-3.

Place filled out copies of OWPs into the OWP book - ensure they are removed at end of day

  • OWP-SI-01 and place in MCR OWP book for 1SI-3 clearance Hang restricted access signs on MCR entry swing gates Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 12 of 65 Event

Description:

Stop the B Main Feedwater Pump, continue reducing power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The crew has been directed to re-commence a power reduction from 53% to the unit is off line. The power reduction is on hold for turnover. The SRO is expected to conduct a reactivity brief prior to commencing the power reduction. This brief may be conducted outside the simulator prior to starting the scenario.

Lead Evaluator:

When the crew has completed their board walk down and are ready to take the shift inform the Simulator Operator to place the Simulator in Run. When the Simulator is in run announce:

CREW UPDATE - (SROs Name) Your crew has the shift.

END OF UPDATE When directed by the Lead Evaluator, ensure that the Simulator Operator:

annunciator horns are on and place the Simulator in RUN.

The crew should elect to secure the B MFP prior to Evaluator Note: performing any boration or lowering turbine load based on the turnover directions.

BOP OP-134.01, Section 7.1 This Section assumes Main FW Pump B is to be stopped.

Procedure Note: Equipment designations for stopping Main FW Pump A are in parentheses.

  • Total Feed Flow is less than 7.0 mpph. (If available, ERFIS point FFW9000 can be used for feedwater flow).
  • An Operator is standing by to check the Auxiliary Oil BOP Pump starts after the Main FW Pump is stopped.
  • GP-006 or an AOP directs removing first Main FW Pump from service.

SRO Directs B MFP removed from service.

Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 13 of 65 Event

Description:

Stop the B Main Feedwater Pump, continue reducing power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

  • NOTIFY TB Operator that a Main FW Pump is being BOP stopped to allow them to take necessary actions at the Condensate Polishers.

Simulator When contacted acknowledge direction to monitor Communicator Condensate Polishers.

During low flow conditions, such as after a Unit trip, ALB-016-1-3 FW PUMP A/B LOW FLOW alarm may be received Procedure Caution: when the recirc valve is shut. In this case, the Main FW pump should be stopped within 5 seconds to prevent damage.

  • PERFORM the following:

o MOMENTARILY PLACE MAIN FW PUMP B (A)

Control Switch to STOP.

o CHECK MAIN FW PUMP B (A) stops.

o MONITOR Condensate Booster Pumps controllers and flows to ensure proper operation after the Main FW BOP Pump is stopped. IF expected system response is not obtained, THEN TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to STOP.

o IF any SG level drops below 52%, THEN PERFORM the following: (N/A) o LOCALLY ENSURE the associated Auxiliary Oil Pump starts at 11 psig oil pressure.

Simulator When contacted report good start on the Auxiliary Oil Communicator Pump at 11 psig.

Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 14 of 65 Event

Description:

Stop the B Main Feedwater Pump, continue reducing power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The crew may elect to begin boration prior to lowering Evaluator Note:

turbine load.

RO OP-107.01, Section 5.2 DETERMINE the volume of boric acid to be added. (Current RO OPT-1536 data or approved reactivity plan from Engineering may be used.)

SRO Directs boration FIS-113, BORIC ACID BATCH COUNTER, has a tenths Procedure Note:

position.

Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 15 of 65 Event

Description:

Stop the B Main Feedwater Pump, continue reducing power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior If the translucent covers associated with the Boric Acid and Total Makeup Batch counters FIS-113 and FIS-114, Procedure Caution:

located on the MCB, are not closed, the system will not automatically stop at the preset value.

  • SET FIS-113, BORIC ACID BATCH COUNTER, to obtain the desired quantity.

RO

  • ENSURE the RMW CONTROL switch has been placed in the STOP position.
  • ENSURE the RMW CONTROL switch green light is lit.
  • Boric Acid flow controller must be set between 0.2 and 6 (1 and 30 gpm.).
  • Performing small borations at high flow rates may Procedure Note: result in an overboration based on equipment response times. Boration flow should be set such that the time required to reach the desired setpoint will happen after release of the control switch.

IF the current potentiometer setpoint of controller 1CS-283, RO FK-113 BORIC ACID FLOW, needs to be changed to obtain makeup flow, THEN: (N/A)

PLACE control switch RMW MODE SELECTOR to the BOR RO position.

Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 16 of 65 Event

Description:

Stop the B Main Feedwater Pump, continue reducing power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

  • Boration may be manually stopped at any time by turning control switch RMW CONTROL to STOP.
  • During makeup operations following an alternate Procedure Note:

dilution, approximately 10 gallons of dilution should be expected due to dilution water remaining in the primary makeup lines.

  • START the makeup system as follows:

o TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily.

o ENSURE the RED indicator light is LIT.

RO o IF expected system response is not obtained, THEN TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to STOP.

  • ENSURE boration automatically terminates when the desired quantity of boron has been added.

IF controller 1CS-283, FK-113 BORIC ACID FLOW, was RO changed in Step 5.2.2.5, THEN: (N/A)

  • Monitor Tavg and rod control for proper operation.
  • Establish VCT pressure between 20-30 psig.
  • Turn control switch RMW MODE SELECTOR to AUTO.
  • START the makeup system as follows:

RO o TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to START momentarily.

o ENSURE the RED indicator light is LIT.

o IF expected system response is not obtained, THEN TURN control switch RMW CONTROL to STOP. (Ref.

4.0.31)

Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 17 of 65 Event

Description:

Stop the B Main Feedwater Pump, continue reducing power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior The following steps have been completed to achieve the current power level. The crew should validate status of the Evaluator Note:

turbine load reduction IAW GP-006 section 6.2 step 5 before re-initiating the turbine load reduction.

Routine load changes must be coordinated with the Load Dispatcher to meet system load demands GVPC is the preferred method of Load Control. Megawatt Control is normally used only during GV and TV testing Procedure Note: Controls and indications in following steps are on the TCS Load Control screen If Oper Entry is selected with the Turbine in GO, the value currently in the Ramp Rate Entry Window will become the load rate in effect. It may be desirable to place the turbine in HOLD to avoid undesirable ramp rates There is no procedural guidance directing when the Evaluator Note: boration to lower power is required. The crew may elect to perform the boration prior to placing the Turbine in GO.

DIRECTS BOP to start power reduction at 4 MW/Min. May SRO direct initiation of a boration before the power reduction begins.

Requests PEER check prior to manipulations of TCS Load BOP Control screen Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 18 of 65 Event

Description:

Stop the B Main Feedwater Pump, continue reducing power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

a. IF GVPC indicator is TRUE, THEN go to Step 5.c
c. Select Ramp Rate Selection, Select button
d. Select the desired ramp rate OR Oper Entry on Load Ramp Rate Selection menu
  • ENTER the desired rate, NOT to exceed 5 MW/MIN, in the DEMAND display. (4 DEH Units/minute)

BOP

e. IF Oper Entry is selected, THEN enter the desired loading rate in the Ramp Rate Entry window and depress Enter.
  • ENTER the desired rate, NOT to exceed 5 MW/MIN, in the DEMAND display. (4 DEH Units/minute)
  • DEPRESS the ENTER push-button.

The unloading of the unit can be stopped at any time by Procedure Note: selecting the Hold button. The load reduction can be resumed by selecting the Go button Reduce turbine load as follows:

a. Enter desired Target Load (120 MW if shutting down) in Target Entry window and depress Enter BOP b. Select the Go button
c. Check that Demand window indication counts down towards desired Target Load
d. Check that load ramps towards desired Target Load Once a raise/lower command button is activated, it will remain in the visually depressed state as an indication the button cannot be activated again for approximately two Procedure Note:

seconds. After two seconds, command buttons automatically return to their default visual state indicating the button may be activated again IF AT ANY TIME, a small incremental change of Target Load value (1 or 5 megawatts) is desired, THEN select any of the following buttons:

BOP

  • 5 MW Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 19 of 65 Event

Description:

Stop the B Main Feedwater Pump, continue reducing power Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Ensure Generator load is lowering When the crew demonstrates a satisfactory load reduction cue Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 2 Evaluator Note:

Event 2: Trip of running AH-2 SA, Containment Fan Cooler (APP-ALB-027).

Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 20 of 65 Trip of running AH-2 SA, Containment Fan Cooler Event

Description:

(APP-ALB-027)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 2 Simulator Operator: Trip of running AH-2 SA, Containment Fan Cooler (APP-ALB-027)

  • ALB 027-7-2, CONTAINMENT FAN COOLERS AH-2 LOW Indications FLOW - O/L Available:
  • ALB 001-6-5, ESF SYS TRN A BYPASSED OR INOPERABLE ALB-027 BOP RESPONDS to alarm on APP-ALB-027-7-2 BOP IDENTIFIES the tripped fan, AH-2 1A-SA
  • PERFORM Corrective Actions:

o CHECK the fan status indication.

BOP o STARTS standby AH-1 SB and AH-4 SB per OP-169 o Contacts AOs to investigate breaker failure The BOP OP-169 actions are provided in Attachment 3 and Evaluator Note:

Attachment 4 at the back of this simulator guide.

Breaker failure was overcurrent - IF requested to take Simulator breaker to OFF acknowledge the request.

Communicator: Simulator Operator - do not take breaker off - not required to continue with scenario REFER TO the following Technical Specifications:

SRO

  • Tech Spec 3.6.1.5 and 3.6.2.3 Any Tech Spec evaluation may be completed with a Evaluator Note:

follow-up question after the scenario.

Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 21 of 65 Trip of running AH-2 SA, Containment Fan Cooler Event

Description:

(APP-ALB-027)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Enters Technical Specification 3.6.1.5 (Air Temperature) (N/A) 3.6.2.3 (Containment Cooling Systems)

ACTION a. - With one train of the above required SRO containment fan coolers inoperable and both Containment Spray Systems OPERABLE, restore the inoperable train of fan coolers to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

Completes an Emergent Issue Checklist and contacts WCC for SRO assistance. (WR, LCOTR, and Maintenance support)

Simulator Acknowledge requests for assistance.

Communicator:

When the actions for the loss of AH-2 A-SA are complete, cue Simulator Booth Operator to insert Trigger 3 Evaluator Note:

Event 3: Failure of RWST Level LT-990 to 100%

(APP-ALB-004)

Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 22 of 65 Failure of RWST Level LT-990 to 100%

Event

Description:

(APP-ALB-004)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Simulator On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 3 Operator: Failure of RWST Level LT-990 to 100% (APP-ALB-004)

Indications

  • ALB 004-2-1, REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK Available: HIGH LEVEL ALB-004 RO RESPONDS to alarm on APP-ALB-004-2-1 CONFIRM alarm using RWST level indicators LI-990, LI-991, RO LI-992, and/or LI-993 (IDENTIFIES RWST Level indicator LI-990 indicates 100%)

PERFORM Corrective Actions:

o Determines RWST filling is not in progress o Contacts AOs to verify the following SHUT:

  • 1SF-187, Fuel Pool Purif Return To RWST o Determines cause of alarm is due to Instrument or alarm circuit malfunction When contacted acknowledge direction to verify 1CS-164, Simulator 1CS-160 and 1SF-187 shut.

Communicator: Wait two minutes and using time compression report 1CS-164, 1CS-160 and 1SF-187 have been verified shut.

Any Tech Spec evaluation may be completed with a Evaluator Note:

follow-up question after the scenario.

REFER TO the following Technical Specifications:

SRO

  • Tech Spec 3.1.2.5, 3.1.2.6, 3.3.2, 3.3.3.6, and 3.5.4 Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 23 of 65 Failure of RWST Level LT-990 to 100%

Event

Description:

(APP-ALB-004)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Enters Technical Specification 3.1.2.5 (Borated Water Source - Shutdown) (N/A) 3.1.2.6 (Borated Water Source - Operating) (N/A) 3.3.2 (Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation)

Functional Unit 7.b ACTION 16 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels.

operation may proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met. One additional channel may be SRO bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1.

3.3.3.6 (Accident Monitoring Instrumentation)

ACTION a. - With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels except In Core Thermocouples and Reactor Vessel Level, less than the Total Required Number of Channels requirements shown in Table 3.3-10 restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days. or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

3.5.4 (Refueling Water Storage Tank) (N/A)

Completes an Emergent Issue Checklist and contacts WCC for SRO assistance. (WR, LCOTR, and Maintenance support)

Simulator Acknowledge requests for assistance.

Communicator:

Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 24 of 65 Failure of RWST Level LT-990 to 100%

Event

Description:

(APP-ALB-004)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Channel does NOT have to be removed from service using OWP-ESF-05 to continue the scenario. Once the TS has been identified, cue Simulator Booth Operator to insert Evaluator Note: Trigger 4 Event 4: Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment (AOP-042, EOP-E-0 and EOP-E-2)

Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 25 of 65 Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment Event

Description:

(AOP-042)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior On cue from the Lead Evaluator actuate Trigger 4 Simulator Operator: Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment (AOP-042, EOP-E-0 and EOP-E-2)

  • ALB-009-3-3, PRZ CONT LOW PRESS AND HEATERS ON
  • ALB-009-5-1 PRESSURIZER HIGH-LOW PRESS Indications
  • Rising Reactor power Available:
  • RCS pressure lowering
  • Charging flow rising
  • SG pressures lowering AOP-042 Secondary Steam Leak/ Efficiency Loss ENTERS and directs actions of AOP-042, SRO Conducts a Crew Update Makes PA announcement for AOP entry Procedure Note: This procedure contains no immediate actions.

BOP CHECK that the plant can be operated safely:

  • CHECK the Turbine Building and Steam Tunnel (YES) are safe for personnel entry.
  • CHECK Reactor Power has changed by LESS (YES)

THAN 5%.

BOP CHECK a steam leak exists:

SOUND local evacuation alarm.

ANNOUNCE on the PA:

BOP Attention all personnel. There is a steam leak (give location).

All personnel stand clear of (give location).

ESTABLISH a boundary to prevent unauthorized personnel entry.

Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 26 of 65 Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment Event

Description:

(AOP-042)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Initial target reduction may be up to 100 MW/GVPC Units less than current Load value on the Control Mode display Procedure Note:

on the TCS Load Control screen and may be changed as necessary to reduce power to less than 100%.

DETERMINE the required megawatt change needed (NO) for the power reduction.

SRO NO -RNO IF no power reduction is required, THEN GO TO Step 16 to determine leak location.

DISPATCH personnel to identify the leak location using all BOP necessary safety practices.

Simulator Acknowledge requests to identify the leak location.

Communicator: Wait 1 minute and report:

Steam is billowing from the TB 314 near the HP Turbine down on to the TB 286. I am NOT able to determine a leak location as the steam has made the TB 286 North inaccessible.

ISOLATE the steam leak. (NO)

NO -RNO SRO GO TO ONE of the following, as applicable:

  • GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown From Power Operation to Hot Standby (Mode 1 To Mode 3), for normal plant shutdown
  • AOP-038, Rapid Downpower Based on the AO report and change of Reactor power Evaluator Note: greater than 5% the SRO should return to step 3.0.1 and now perform the RNO actions Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 27 of 65 Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment Event

Description:

(EOP-E-0)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP CHECK that the plant can be operated safely:

  • CHECK the Turbine Building and Steam Tunnel (NO) are safe for personnel entry.
  • CHECK Reactor Power has changed by LESS (NO)

THAN 5%.

RNO actions PERFORM the following:

SRO a. TRIP the Reactor, AND GO TO EOP-E-0. (Continue with RNO Steps 1.b.)

(Actuates Manually Rx Trip using MCB switch)

EOP-E-0 Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection Enters EOP-E-0 SRO Conducts a Crew Update RO/BOP Performs E-0 Immediate Actions.

VERIFY Reactor Trip:

Immediate (YES)

Actions RO (YES)

(YES)

Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 28 of 65 Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment Event

Description:

(EOP-E-0)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check Turbine Trip - ALL THROTTLE VALVES SHUT (YES)

(YES)

Immediate Actions BOP (YES)

(YES)

AOP-042 Secondary Steam Leak/ Efficiency Loss The Reactor should be ensured tripped in EOP-E-0 before Procedure Note:

shutting MSIVs.

IF the Reactor was tripped due to a steam leak, THEN SHUT the following:

BOP (1) All MSIVs (2) All MSIV Bypass Valves (Attempts to manually shut MSIVs from the MCB)

SRO EXIT this procedure.

EOP-E-0 SRO E-0, Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection Perform The Following:

Immediate

  • AC Emergency Buses - AT LEAST ONE (YES)

Actions BOP ENERGIZED (YES)

  • AC Emergency Buses - BOTH ENERGIZED Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 29 of 65 Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment Event

Description:

(EOP-E-0)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Safety Injection - ACTUCATED (BOTH TRAINS) (YES)

Immediate Actions RO Steps 1 through 4 are immediate action steps Procedure Note:

Foldout applies. (Immediate actions should be completed prior implementing Foldout Page items.)

SRO Reviews Foldout page Evaluator Note:

RCPs should be tripped based on RCP trip criteria being met at this time Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 30 of 65 Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment Event

Description:

(EOP-E-0)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Assigns Foldout items:

RCP Trip Criteria, Alternate Miniflow Open/Shut Criteria, RHR SRO Restart Criteria, Ruptured SG AFW Isolation criteria, AFW Supply Switchover Criteria Directs Shift Manager to Evaluate EAL Matrix SRO Evaluate EAL Matrix (Refer to PEP-110)

RO Ensure CSIPs - ALL RUNNING (YES)

RO Ensure RHR pumps - ALL RUNNING (YES)

Safety Injection flow - GREATER THAN 200 GPM (YES)

(Identifies 1CS-235 failed to shut and manually Event 6 RO shuts valve in accordance with EOP-E-0 Attachment 1)

RO RCS pressure - LESS THAN 230 PSIG (NO)

SRO RNO: GO TO Step 12.

BOP MAIN Steam isolation - ACTUATED. (NO)

SRO RNO: Perform the following:

BOP Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 31 of 65 Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment Event

Description:

(EOP-E-0)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

  • IF Main Steam Isolation is required , THEN perform the following:

BOP o Manually actuate Main Steam Line Isolation.

(Attempts to manually actuate MSL Isolation from the MCB)

SRO GO TO Step 13 Ensure All MSIVs AND Bypass Valves - SHUT BOP (Attempts to shut MSIVs from the MCB should be previously performed per AOP-042)

Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 32 of 65 Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment Event

Description:

(EOP-E-0)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Any SG pressure - 100 PSIG LOWER THAN (NO)

BOP PRESSURE IN TWO OTHER SGs RNO: Perform the following:

SRO

  • GO TO Step 16.

CHECK CNMT Pressure - HAS REMAINED LESS (YES)

RO THAN 10 PSIG Verify AFW flow - AT LEAST 200 KPPH BOP (YES)

ESTABLISHED Sequencer Load Block 9 (Manual Loading Permissive)

BOP (YES)

- ACTUATED (BOTH TRAINS)

BOP Energize AC buses 1A1 AND 1B1 The RO will perform all board actions until the BOP completes Attachment 3. The BOP is permitted to properly align plant equipment in accordance with Attachment 3 without SRO approval. The Scenario Guide still identifies Evaluator Note: tasks by board position because the time frame for completion of Attachment 3 is not predictable.

To follow BOP actions E-0 Attachment 3 is located in the back of this guide.

VERIFY Alignment of Components From Actuation of ESFAS Signals Using Attachment 3, Safeguards Actuation Event 6 BOP Verification, While Continuing with this Procedure.

(Identifies 1SP-216 failed to shut and manually shuts valve in accordance with EOP-E-0 Attachment 3)

Directs TB AO - Place air compressor 1A and 1B in the Local Control mode.

BOP Directs RAB AO - Locally unlock and turn on the breakers for the CSIP Suction and Discharge Cross-Connect valves Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 33 of 65 Event

Description:

Failure of Control Room Isolation to actuate Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Simulator Booth When contacted to place A/B air compressors in Local Operator: Control mode, run CAEP :\air\ACs_to_local.txt.

Simulator When CAEP is complete, report that the air compressors Communicator: are running in local control mode.

When contacted to Unlock and Turn ON the breakers for Simulator Booth the CSIP suction and discharge cross-connect valves, run Operator:

CAEP :\cvc\E-0 Att 2 CSIP suct & disc valve power.txt.

Simulator When the CAEP is complete, report task to the MCR.

Communicator:

Ensure Control Room Area Ventilation - Main Control Room Aligned For Emergency Operation (Refer to OMM-004, "Post Trip/Safeguards Actuation Review", Attachment 5, Sheets 1 and 2, Sections for Main Control Board, SLB-5 and SLB-6.)

BOP Identifies that the Control Room Area Ventilation is NOT Event 6 aligned for Emergency Operation and aligns the ventilation system correctly.

OMM-004 Attachment 5 is located in the back of this guide.

The following items should be completed due to Control Room Ventilation not being aligned:

Opens CZ-D61 SB (Emergency Filtration Recirc)

BOP Starts R2 B-SB fan (Emergency Filtration)

Stops E-9B fan (Normal Exhaust)

Opens AC-D6 SB (Battery Room B Return Dampers)

Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 34 of 65 Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment Event

Description:

(EOP-E-0)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Stabilize AND maintain temperature between 555°F AND 559°F using Table 1.

BOP

  • Control feed flow and steam dump to stabilize temperature between 555F AND 559F RO PRZ PORVs - SHUT (YES)

RO PRZ spray valves - SHUT (YES)

PRZ PORV block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN (YES)

RO (All OPEN)

ANY SG pressures - DROPPING IN AN (YES)

UNCONTROLLED MANNER BOP/SRO OR COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED (NO)

Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 35 of 65 Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment Event

Description:

(EOP-E-2)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior GO TO E-2, "FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION ",

SRO Step 1.

EOP-E-2 SRO Enters E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation Conducts a Crew Update At least one SG must be maintained available for RCS cooldown.

Procedure Caution: Any faulted SG OR secondary break should remain isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless needed for RCS cooldown.

SRO Initiate Monitoring of Critical Safety Function Status Trees BOP Ensure ALL MSIVs - SHUT (NO)

SRO RNO: Perform the following:

  • Locally shut instrument air supply to RAB 261: 1IA-814 (north of AH-19 1A-SA)
  • Locally remove cap AND open drain valve: 1IA-1876 (located in corridor outside VCT valve gallery)

Critical (Directs the actions to be taken outside the MCR: Contacts BOP Aux Operator)

Task #1 Critical to direct the isolation and venting of IA to manually shut MSIVs and MSIV Bypass Valves to occur prior to a severe challenge (ORANGE path) develops to the Integrity Critical Safety Function.

Acknowledge request:

Simulator At RAB 261: Shut instrument air supply to 1IA-814 and Communicator:

Remove cap AND open drain valve on 1IA-1876 Simulator Booth DO NOT PERFORM ANY ACTIONS AT THIS TIME.

Operator: If contacted, youre having trouble getting 1IA-1876 open.

Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 36 of 65 Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment Event

Description:

(EOP-E-2)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Ensure all MSIV bypass valves - SHUT (YES)

Check Any SG Pressure - STABLE OR RISING (NO)

SRO (NOT FAULTED)

Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 37 of 65 Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment Event

Description:

(EOP-ECA-2.1)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RNO:

SRO Go to ECA-2.1, "UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM GENERATORS", Step 1.

EOP- Enters ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization Of All Steam SRO ECA-2.1 Generators Conducts a Crew Update SRO Foldout applies.

Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 38 of 65 Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment Event

Description:

(EOP-ECA-2.1)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Evaluator Note:

Foldout criteria for Minimum Feed Flow may apply at this time: IF level in any SG is less than 25% [40%], THEN maintain a minimum of 12.5 KPPH feed flow to that SG.

SRO CHECK MSIVs AND Bypass Valves:

Ensure ALL MSIVs - SHUT (NO)

BOP Ensure ALL MSIVs Bypass Valves - SHUT (YES)

SRO RNO: Perform the following:

Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 39 of 65 Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment Event

Description:

(EOP-ECA-2.1)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

  • Locally shut instrument air supply to RAB 261: 1IA-814 (north of AH-19 1A-SA)
  • Locally remove cap AND open drain valve: 1IA-1876 BOP (located in corridor outside VCT valve gallery)

(Directs the actions to be taken outside the MCR: Contacts Aux Operator)

Acknowledge request:

Simulator At RAB 261: Shut instrument air supply to 1IA-814 and Communicator:

Remove cap AND open drain valve on 1IA-1876 Simulator Booth DO NOT PERFORM ANY ACTIONS AT THIS TIME.

Operator: If contacted, say youre still working on it but are having trouble getting the cap off 1IA-1876.

BOP Ensure all MSIV bypass valves - SHUT (YES)

IF the TDAFW pump is the only available source of feed flow, Procedure Caution: THEN maintain steam supply to the TDAFW pump from one SG.

IF local actions are required, attempts to isolate all boundaries Procedure Note: of one SG should be completed prior to starting those for another SG.

Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 40 of 65 Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment Event

Description:

(EOP-ECA-2.1)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO CHECK Secondary Pressure Boundary for ALL SGs:

  • Ensure Main FW isolation valves - SHUT (YES)
  • SHUT steam supply valves to TDAFW pump:

o SG B: 1MS-70 (SHUT) o SG C: 1MS-72 (SHUT)

(SHUT during EOP-E-0 Temperature control step)

BOP

- SHUT:

o SG A: 1MS-231 o SG B: 1MS-266 o SG C: 1MS-301

  • Ensure SG Blowdown isolation valves - SHUT (YES)
  • Ensure MS Analyzer isolation valves - SHUT (YES)

As SG pressure and steam flow lower, RCS hot leg temperatures will eventually stabilize and may rise. Adjusting Procedure Note:

feed flow and steam dump will control RCS hot leg temperatures.

CONTROL RCS Temperature:

RO

  • CHECK RCS cooldown rate - LESS THAN (NO) 100°F/HR RNO:

Lower feed flow to 12.5 KPPH to each SG Critical BOP Task #2 Critical to lower AFW flow to 12.5 - 25 kpph prior to a severe challenge (ORANGE path) develops to the Integrity Critical Safety Function.

SRO Go to Step 3.c.

Identifies RED Path on Heat Sink and transitions to CREW EOP-FR-H.1 Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 41 of 65 Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment Event

Description:

(EOP-FR-H.1)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EOP- Enters EOP-FR-H.1, Response To Loss Of Secondary Heat SRO FR-H.1 Sink Conducts a Crew Update

  • This procedure should NOT be performed if total feed flow capability of 200 KPPH is available AND total feed flow has been reduced due to operator action as directed by the EOPs. The following EOPs direct feed flow to be reduced below 200 KPPH:

ECA-2.1, UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM GENERATORS" FR-S.1, "RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER Procedure Caution: GENERATION/ATWS" FR-P.1, "RESPONSE TO IMMINENT PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK" FR-P.2, "RESPONSE TO ANTICIPATED PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK" FR-Z.1, "RESPONSE TO HIGH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE"

  • Feed flow should NOT be established to any faulted SG while a non-faulted SG is available.

Reads Caution prior to step 1 and determines that EOP-FR-H.1 should not be implemented SRO EOP-ECA-2.1, UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM GENERATORS" EXITS EOP-FR-H.1 and returns to EOP-ECA-2.1 EOP- Enters EOP-ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization Of All SRO ECA-2.1 Steam Generators Conducts a Crew Update SRO Continues in procedure at step 3.c.

Check RCS hot leg temperatures - STABLE OR (YES RO DROPPING / NO)

Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 42 of 65 Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment Event

Description:

(EOP-ECA-2.1)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Maintain RCP Seal Injection Flow Between 8 GPM And 13 RO GPM.

(Adjusts as needed)

Procedure Note: The RCP Trip Criteria is in effect until SI is terminated.

Check RCP Trip Criteria: (NO)

  • Check RCPs - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING RO (RCPS are stop previously for E-0 RCP Trip foldout)

SRO RNO: Go to Step 6 Check PRZ PORV AND Block Valves:

  • Ensure power to PORV block valves - AVAILABLE (YES)

RO

  • GO TO Step 6f.
  • Check block valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN (YES)
  • A SG may be suspected to be ruptured if it fails to dry out following isolation of feed flow. Local checks for radiation Procedure Note: can be used to confirm primary-to-secondary leakage.
  • Sampling of the RCS and SGs is directed in Step 29 Check Secondary Radiation:

Check for all of the following:

  • Condenser vacuum pump effluent rad - NORMAL (YES)

BOP

  • SG blowdown radiation - NORMAL (YES)
  • Main steamline radiation - NORMAL (YES)
  • SG activity sample - NORMAL (WHEN (N/A)

AVAILABLE)

Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 43 of 65 Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment Event

Description:

(EOP-ECA-2.1)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check is RHR Pumps Should Be Stoped

  • Check any RHR pumps - RUNNING WITH (YES)

SUCTION ALIGNED TO RWST

  • Check RCS pressure - GREATER THAN 230 (YES)

PSIG

  • Check RCS pressure - STABLE OR RISING (YES)
  • Reset SI RO (Manually reset SI from the MCB)
  • Manually Realign Safeguards Equipment Following A Loss Of Offsite Power.

(Refer to E-0, Attachment 6)

  • Stop RHR pumps. (YES)

(Stops RHR Pumps A and B)

Check CNMT Spray Status:

RO (NO)

  • Check any CNMT spray pump RUNNING SRO RNO: Go to step 10.

Reset SI (Previously reset SI from the MCB)

RO Manually Realign Safeguards Equipment Following A Loss Of Offsite Power. (Refer to E-0, Attachment 6)

SRO Reset Phase A AND Phase B Isolation Signals

  • Reset Phase A if actuated (YES)

(Manually reset Phase A from the MCB)

RO

  • Reset Phase B if actuated (N/A)

Open Instrument Air AND Nitrogen Valves To CNMT:

BOP (Opens 1IA-819 and 1SI-287 from MCB)

Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 44 of 65 Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment Event

Description:

(EOP-ECA-2.1)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Isolate SI Accumulators:

  • Check RCS hot leg temperatures AT LEAST (YES)

TWO LESS THAN 430°F (It is possible that this will be a NO depending on RO the amount of time to get here. If so, breakers for accumulator discharge valves will be directed closed and the valves shut.)

  • Check PRZ pressure - LESS THAN 2000 PSIG (YES)
  • Locally unlock and close both breakers for each SI RO accumulator discharge valve:

(Directs AO to perform local actions to energize SI Accumulator discharge valves)

Simulator Booth When contacted to energize SI accumulator discharge Operator: valves, run CAEP:\sis\accum_power_apply.txt.

Inform the MCR that both breakers for each SI accumulator Simulator discharge valve has been unlocked and closed Communicator:

(EOP-ECA-2.1 Step 14.c is complete)

(Shuts 1SI-246, 1SI-247 and 1SI-248 from MCB)

RO

  • Locally open and lock both breakers for each SI accumulator discharge valve:

(Directs AO to perform local actions to de-energize SI Accumulator discharge valves)

RO Simulator Booth When contacted to de-energize SI accumulator discharge Operator: valves, run CAEP:\sis\accum_power_remove.txt.

Inform the MCR that both breakers for each SI accumulator Simulator discharge valve has been open and locked Communicator:

(EOP-ECA-2.1 Step 14.e is complete)

Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 45 of 65 Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment Event

Description:

(EOP-ECA-2.1)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Monitor SI Termination Criteria:

  • Check for both of the following:

o RCS subcooling GREATER THAN 10°F (YES)

RO o RCS pressure STABLE OR RISING (YES)

  • PRZ level GREATER THAN 10% (YES)

Foldout items "SI REINITIATION CRITERIA" and "E2 TRANSITION CRITERIA" do not apply while performing SI Procedure Note:

termination in Steps 16 through 23.

Stop All But One CSIP.

(Stops the CSIP as directed by the SRO)

RO RCS Pressure STABLE OR RISING (YES)

B SG MSIV will not close in this scenario. After the MSIVs for A and C SGs are closed, pressures will rise and meet EOP-E-2 transition criteria. Transition criteria will not apply while the SI Termination sequence is in progress.

Evaluator Note:

Wait UNTIL AFTER SI is checked RESET and then DIRECT the Simulator Operator to insert Trigger 7 to close SG A and C MSIVs.

C SG MSIV will shut 10 seconds AFTER A MSIV shuts.

C SG MSIV will shut 10 seconds AFTER A MSIV shuts.

Simulator Booth Operator: When directed by the Lead Evaluator run Trigger 7 shut SG A and SG C MSIVs.

Simulator Inform the MCR that Instrument Air has been isolated and Communicator: vented to RAB 261 (EOP-E-2 Step 2 RNO is complete)

Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 46 of 65 Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment Event

Description:

(EOP-ECA-2.1)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Isolate High Head SI Flow:

  • Check CSIP suction ALIGNED TO RWST (YES)
  • Open normal miniflow isolation valves:

(Locates and opens CSIP Mini-Flow isolation valves)

RO

  • Shut BIT outlet valves:

(Closes 1SI-4)

  • Verify cold leg AND hot leg injection valves (YES)

SHUT SRO

  • Observe CAUTION prior to Step 20 and go to step 20 Procedure Caution: High head SI flow should be isolated before continuing.

SRO Establish Charging Lineup:

  • Shut charging flow control valve:

(Locates and places FK-122.1 in shut position)

RO

  • Open charging line isolation valves:

(Locates and opens 1CS-235 and 1CS-238)

Charging flow should NOT exceed 150 GPM to prevent Procedure Caution:

damage to the regenerative heat exchanger.

SRO Control Charging Flow To Maintain PRZ Level:

Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 47 of 65 Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment Event

Description:

(EOP-ECA-2.1)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

  • Control charging using charging flow control valve:

(no action required)

  • Maintain charging flow less than 150 GPM.

RO (no action required)

  • Check PRZ Level CAN BE MAINTAINED (YES)

STABLE OR RISING SRO Check If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped:

  • Check RHR pumps ANY RUNNING WITH SUCTION ALIGNED TO RWST RO
  • Stop RHR pumps.

(RHR pump will be secured if still running)

RNO: Go to Step 23.

  • Simultaneous flow through the charging and SI lines may cause CSIP runout (as indicated by oscillating discharge Procedure Caution: pressure).
  • Charging flow should NOT exceed 150 GPM to prevent damage to the regenerative heat exchanger.

SRO Check SI Reinitiation Criteria:

  • RCS subcooling GREATER THAN 10°F (YES)
  • PRZ level GREATER THAN 10% (YES)

RO

  • PRZ level CAN BE MAINTAINED GREATER (YES)

THAN 10%

Foldout items "SI REINITIATION CRITERIA" and "E2 Procedure Note:

TRANSITION CRITERIA" are applicable.

IDENTIFIES A and C MSIVs have shut and SG pressure CREW rising in both SGs Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 48 of 65 Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment Event

Description:

(EOP-E-2 continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior IF any SG pressure rises at any time, THEN go to E-2, "FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION", Step 1 (feed SRO flow may be restored to non-faulted SG prior to transition to restore heat sink).

After ensuring the actions for Event 6 are completed the Lead Evaluator scenario may be terminated at any point since the crew Discretion:

has re-entered EOP-E-2 EOP-E-2 SRO Enters E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation Conducts a Crew Update At least one SG must be maintained available for RCS cooldown.

Procedure Caution: Any faulted SG OR secondary break should remain isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless needed for RCS cooldown.

SRO Initiate Monitoring of Critical Safety Function Status Trees Ensure ALL MSIVs - SHUT (NO)

BOP (B MSIV is still OPEN)

SRO RNO: Actions complete BOP Ensure all MSIV bypass valves - SHUT (YES)

Check Any SG Pressure - STABLE OR RISING (YES)

BOP (NOT FAULTED)

Any SG Pressure - DROPPING IN AN (YES)

UNCONTROLLED MANNER BOP OR COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED (B SG is depressurized)

Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 49 of 65 Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment Event

Description:

(EOP-E-2 continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior IF the TDAFW pump is the only available source of feed flow, Procedure Caution: THEN maintain steam supply to the TDAFW pump from one SG.

SRO ISOLATE Faulted SG(s) (Identified In Step 5):

  • Ensure faulted SG(s) PORV - SHUT (YES)

BOP

  • Ensure Main FW isolation valves - SHUT (YES)

BOP valves to faulted SG(s) - SHUT.

  • Shut faulted SG(s) to steam supply valve to TDAFW pump - SHUT.

(SG B: 1MS-70 previously Shut)

  • Ensure MS drain isolation(s) before MSIVs (YES)

BOP 1MS-266 - SHUT

  • Ensure SG BD isolation valves 1BD-30 and (YES) 1BD SHUT
  • Ensure MS analyzer isolation valves - SHUT (YES)

BOP CHECK CST Level - GREATER THAN 10%. (YES)

A SG may be suspected to be ruptured if it fails to dry out Procedure Note: following isolation of feed flow. Local checks for radiation can be used to confirm primary-to-secondary leakage.

Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 50 of 65 Main Steam Line Break Outside Containment Event

Description:

(EOP-E-2 continued)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Any SG - ABNORMAL RADIATION (NO)

OR UNCONTROLLED LEVEL RISE- (NO)

SRO GO TO Step 10 Check If SI Has Been Terminated:

SRO

  • Check for all of the following:

o BIT outlet valves - SHUT OR ISOLATED (YES)

RO (YES) o Cold leg AND hot leg injection valves - SHUT Terminate the scenario after BIT outlet valves 1SI-3 and 1SI-4 are SHUT.

Announce Crew Update - End of Evaluation - I have the Lead Evaluator:

shift.

Have crew remain in the Simulator without discussing the exam. Examiners will formulate any follow-up questions.

Simulator Booth When directed by Lead Evaluator go to FREEZE Operator:

Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Form ES-D-2 E-0 Attachment 3 Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Form ES-D-2 E-0 Attachment 3 Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Form ES-D-2 E-0 Attachment 3 Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Form ES-D-2 E-0 Attachment 3 Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Form ES-D-2 E-0 Attachment 3 Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Form ES-D-2 E-0 Attachment 3 Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Form ES-D-2 E-0 Attachment 3 Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Form ES-D-2 OMM-004 Attachment 5 Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Form ES-D-2 OMM-004 Attachment 5 Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Form ES-D-2 OMM-004 Attachment 5 Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Form ES-D-2 OMM-004 Attachment 5 Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Form ES-D-2 OP-169 Section 5.1 Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Form ES-D-2 OP-169 Section 5.1 Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Form ES-D-2 OP-169 Section 5.1 Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

Appendix D Form ES-D-2 OP-169 Section 7.1 Harris 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Rev. FINAL

2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Turnover Plant Status

  • Normal shutdown is in progress at 4 MW / min IAW with GP-006, Normal Plant Shutdown, due to LCO expiring on B MDAFW pump.
  • Reactor power ~ 53% power. On hold through shift turnover.
  • GP-006 Section 6.2, Step 13.a was verified as complete by the FSRO.
  • Current rod position is CBD @ 154 steps
  • A RCS Boron sample taken 30 minutes ago was 1030 ppm
  • Middle of life conditions
  • A Train equipment is in service
  • Normal Dayshift
  • Status Board is updated
  • Additional Protected items are A ESW Pump, A CCW Pump, A SFP Hx, RWST, for Response to Industry Best Practices Equipment Out of Service:
  • B-SB MDAFW Pump, placed under clearance 62 hours7.175926e-4 days <br />0.0172 hours <br />1.025132e-4 weeks <br />2.3591e-5 months <br /> ago for pump seal repairs. Not expected to be returned to service in 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />. T.S. 3.7.1.2 action a (72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO). "A-SA" MDAFW Pump, TDAFW Pump, "B-SB" RHR Pump 1MS-70, and 72, "B-SB" CCW Pump, "B-SB" ESW Pump and 'A' Train PICs: 1, 3, 9, 13, and 17 are protected.
  • 1SI-3, Boron Injection Tank Outlet Valve has been under clearance the last 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for breaker repairs. The repairs are in progress and the valve is expected to be returned to service within the next shift. Tech Spec 3.6.3 LCO Action b and Tech Specs 3.5.2 Action a applies. OWP-SI-01 has been completed.
  • B DEH Pump is under clearance for motor repairs. The pump has been unavailable for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. Repairs are expected to be completed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

Reactivity Plan/Brief:

  • Use attached Reactivity Plan to take unit off line at 4 MW/Min.

Risk Assessment:

  • YELLOW 2021 NRC Exam Simulator Scenario 1 Turnover Rev. FINAL

2021 NRC Exam Simulator Scenario 1 Turnover Rev. FINAL

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