ML13070A399
| ML13070A399 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 03/11/2013 |
| From: | Hay M NRC/RGN-IV/DRP |
| To: | Cortopassi L Omaha Public Power District |
| References | |
| EA-13-043 IR-13-011 | |
| Download: ML13070A399 (20) | |
See also: IR 05000285/2013011
Text
UNITE D S TATE S
NUC LEAR RE GULATOR Y C OMMI S SI ON
RE G IO N I V
1600 EAST LAMAR BLVD
AR L INGTON , TEXAS 7 601 1 - 4511
March 11, 2013
Louis P. Cortopassi, Site Vice President
Omaha Public Power District
Fort Calhoun Station FC-2-4
P.O. Box 550
Fort Calhoun, NE 68023-0550
Subject: FORT CALHOUN - NRC INSPECTION REPORT NUMBER 05000285/2013011
AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION
Dear Mr. Cortopassi:
On February 28, 2013, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an
inspection at your Fort Calhoun Station. The enclosed inspection report documents the
inspection results which were discussed on March 1, 2013, with you and other members of your
staff.
During the inspections performed between November 18, 2012 and February 28, 2013, the
NRC staff examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and
compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed
personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, a finding was identified involving the failure to classify
the river sluice gates as Safety Class 3. This finding was determined to involve a violation of
NRC requirements and related to a previously issued Yellow finding regarding the ability to
mitigate an external flooding event (Inspection Reports 05000285/2010007 and
05000285/2010008; ML101970547 and ML102800342, respectively). The significance of this
finding was bounded by the Yellow finding and therefore was not characterized by color
significance.
The NRC determined that a violation is associated with this finding and was evaluated in
accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The violation is being cited in the enclosed
Notice of Violation (Notice) and the circumstances surrounding it are described in detail in the
subject inspection report. The violation is being treated as a cited violation, consistent with
Section 2.3.2(a)(2) of the NRC Enforcement Policy. Specifically, Fort Calhoun Station has not
restored compliance in a timeframe commensurate with the significance of this violation (EA-13-
043).
L. Cortopassi -2-
You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the
enclosed Notice when preparing your response. If you have additional information that you
believe the NRC should consider, you may provide it in your response to the Notice. The NRC
review of your response to the Notice will also determine whether further enforcement action is
necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.
Also, the NRC identified another finding during this inspection. This finding was determined to
involve a violation of NRC requirements. The finding was of more than minor significance
because the two licensee evaluations performed under 10 CFR 50.59, "Change, Tests, and
Experiments" would require NRC's review and approval prior to implementation. Because this
issue affected the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function, the inspectors evaluated it
using the traditional enforcement process and assessed the significance of the underlying issue
using the SDP. The violation associated with this finding was determined to be a Severity
Level IV violation consistent with Section 6.1.d of the Enforcement Policy. However, the NRC is
treating this violation as non-cited violation consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement
Policy.
The NRC views adherence to 10 CFR 50.59 as critical to the regulatory process. These two
examples of violations of this requirement are concerning, because they directly support the
efforts by the facility to address the resolution of the previously issued Yellow finding for
flooding. The NRC views proper resolution of the flooding finding as key to the long term safety
of Fort Calhoun Station.
If you contest these violations, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this
inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional
Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Fort Calhoun
Station.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspects assignment in this report, you should provide a
response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your
disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at
Fort Calhoun Station.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its
enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the
NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of
NRC's Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS).
L. Cortopassi -3-
ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the
Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Michael Hay, Chief
Project Branch F
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket No. 50-285
License No. DPR-40
Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report 05000285/2013011
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
cc w/ encl: Electronic Distribution
L. Cortopassi -4-
Electronic Distribution by RIV:
Regional Administrator (Elmo.Collins@nrc.gov)
Acting Deputy Regional Administrator (Robert.Lewis@nrc.gov)
MC0350 Chairman (Anton.Vegel@nrc.gov)
MC0350 Vice Chairman (Louise.Lund@nrc.gov)
DRP Director (Kriss.Kennedy@nrc.gov)
Acting DRP Deputy Director (Michael.Scott@nrc.gov)
Acting DRS Director (Tom.Blount@nrc.gov)
Acting DRS Deputy Director (Jeff.Clark@nrc.gov)
Senior Resident Inspector (John.Kirkland@nrc.gov)
Resident Inspector (Jacob.Wingebach@nrc.gov)
Branch Chief, DRP/F (Michael.Hay@nrc.gov)
Senior Project Engineer, DRP/F (Rick.Deese@nrc.gov)
Project Engineer, DRP/F (Chris.Smith@nrc.gov)
Public Affairs Officer (Victor.Dricks@nrc.gov)
Public Affairs Officer (Lara.Uselding@nrc.gov)
Chief, DRS/TSB (Ray.Kellar@nrc.gov)
Project Manager (Lynnea.Wilkins@nrc.gov)
RITS Coordinator (Marisa.Herrera@nrc.gov)
Regional Counsel (Karla.Fuller@nrc.gov)
Congressional Affairs Officer (Jenny.Weil@nrc.gov)
OE Specialist (Carolyn.Faria-Ocasio@nrc.gov)
ROPreports
RIV/ETA: OEDO (John.Cassidy@nrc.gov)
DRS/TSB STA (Dale.Powers@nrc.gov)
MC 0350 Panel Member (Micheal.Markley@nrc.gov)
MC 0350 Panel Member (Joseph.Sebrosky@nrc.gov)
MC 0350 Panel Member (Michael.Balazik@nrc.gov)
ROPreports
File Located: S:\DRP\DRPDIR\_FCS Accession No.ML13070A399
SUNSI Rev Compl. Yes No ADAMS Yes No Reviewer Initials MCH
Publicly Avail. Yes No Sensitive Yes No Sens. Type Initials MCH
RI:DRP/F RI:DRP/RIII SPE:DRP/F ACES:SES BC:DRP/F
JFWingebach FRamirez RWDeese RBrowder MCHay
/RA via Email/ /RA via Email/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/
3/8/13 3/8/13 3/6/13 3/7/13 3/11/13
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
NOTICE OF VIOLATION
Omaha Public Power District Docket No. 05000285
Fort Calhoun Station License No. DPR-40
During an NRC inspection conducted from November 18, 2012 to February 28, 2013, a violation
of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the
violation is listed below:
Title 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, requires, in part that
measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the
design basis, as defined in 10 CFR 50.2, for those structures, systems, and components
are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions.
Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to establish measures to assure that
applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis for those components were
correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions.
Specifically, the licensee failed to classify the six intake structure exterior sluice gates
and their motor operators as Safety Class 3 as defined in the Updated Safety Analysis
Report, Appendix N.
This violation is associated with and is bounded by a Yellow Significance Determination Process
finding.
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Omaha Public Power District is hereby required to
submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001 with a copy to the Regional
Administrator, Region IV, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector - Fort Calhoun Station,
within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply
should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation; EA-13-043" and should include for
each violation: (1) the reason for the violation or, if contested, the basis for disputing the
violation or severity level, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results
achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken, and (4) the date when full compliance will
be achieved. Your response may reference or include previous docketed correspondence, if
the correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not
received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be
issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why such other
action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will
be given to extending the response time.
If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response with the
basis for your denial, to the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
Because your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC
Public Document Room or from the NRCs document system (ADAMS), accessible from the
A-1 Attachment
NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html, to the extent possible, it should not
include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made
available to the public without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is
necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your
response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your
response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you must
specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in
detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will
create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by
10 CFR 2.390(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial
information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please
provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.
In accordance with 10 CFR 19.11, you may be required to post this Notice within two working
days of receipt.
Dated this 11th day of March 2013.
A-2
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket: 05000285
License: DPR-40
Report: 05000285/2013011
Licensee: Omaha Public Power District
Facility: Fort Calhoun Station
Location: 9610 Power Lane
Blair, NE 68008
Dates: November 18, 2012 through February 28, 2013
Inspectors: R. Deese, Senior Project Engineer
F. Ramirez, Resident Inspector, LaSalle
J. Wingebach, Resident Inspector, Fort Calhoun
Approved By: Michael Hay, Chief
Project Branch F
Division of Reactor Projects
A-3
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000285/2013011; 11/18/2012 - 2/28/2013; Fort Calhoun Station (FCS); Changes, Tests
and Experiments (10 CFR 50.59).
The report covered a period of inspection by resident and regional inspectors. One Severity
Level IV NCV was identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color
(Green, White, Yellow, or Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance
Determination Process. The cross-cutting aspect is determined using Inspection Manual
Chapter 0310, Components Within the Cross-Cutting Areas. Findings for which the
significance determination process does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level
after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of
commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process,
Revision 4, dated December 2006.
A. NRC-Identified Findings and Self-Revealing Findings
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
- N/A. The inspectors identified a cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B,
Criterion III, Design Control, for licensees failure to classify the six intake structure
exterior sluice gates and their motor operators as Safety Class 3 as defined in the
Updated Safety Analysis Report, Appendix N. This violation was first presented in
Inspection Report 05000285/2012002 and the licensee has remained in non-
compliance.
The inspectors determined that the continued failure to classify the intake structure
exterior sluice gates and their motor operators as Safety Class 3 was a performance
deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it adversely impacted the
protection against external events attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone
objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond
to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The significance of this
finding is bounded by the significance of a related Yellow finding regarding the ability
to mitigate an external flooding event (Inspection Report 05000285/2010008). This
finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution,
corrective action program, for failure to thoroughly evaluate problems such that the
resolutions address causes and extent of conditions. This also includes conducting
effectiveness reviews of corrective actions to ensure that the problems are resolved
P.1(c) (EA-13-043) (Section 4OA4.1).
- SL-IV. The inspectors identified two examples of a Severity Level IV violation of
10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests and Experiments, and associated Green findings for
the licensees failure to appropriately perform written evaluations for two changes for
flooding mitigation strategies. In the first example, the licensee changed the
Updated Safety Analysis Report and Abnormal Operating Procedure 01 (AOP-01),
Acts of Nature, to incorporate use of backflow through the circulating water system
for a flow path for raw water. In the second example, the licensee was implementing
A-4
a flooding mitigation modification which would have used components which did not
meet full quality requirements for their Safety Class 3 designated function. Had the
licensee appropriately evaluated these two changes, they would have determined
that a license amendment was required for implementation of both changes since
both resulted in more than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a
malfunction of a system, structure, or component important to safety.
The failure to perform adequate written evaluations of changes in accordance with
10 CFR 50.59(d)(1) was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was
of more than minor safety significance because it was associated with the human
performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and it adversely affected
the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of
systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the inspectors used MC 0609,
Significance Determination Process, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, to determine the final
significance of the finding. For the back flow through the circulating water system
example, the finding represented a potential loss of the intake structure due to
flooding; therefore, a Phase 3 evaluation by a senior reactor analyst was necessary.
The senior reactor analyst evaluated a bounding risk analysis case which assumed
that the raw water system and offsite power were lost. This bounding case had an
incremental conditional core damage probability of 5.0 x 10-7, and therefore the
finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green). For the trash
rack blowdown modification example, the inspectors determined the finding was of
very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a design deficiency that
did not result in the loss of functionality. The NRCs significance determination
process (SDP) considers the safety significance of findings by evaluating their
potential safety consequences. The traditional enforcement process separately
considers the significance of willful violations, violations that impact the regulatory
process, and violations that result in actual safety consequences. Traditional
enforcement applied to this finding because it involved a violation that impacted the
regulatory process. Assessing the violation in accordance with Enforcement Policy,
the inspectors determined it to be of Severity Level IV because it resulted in a
condition evaluated by the SDP as having very low safety significance (Example
6.1.d.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy). The inspectors determined the Green
finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution
because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate problems such that resolutions
address the causes and extent of condition specifically associated with deficiencies
involving the Acts of Nature procedural guidance P.1(c) (Section 4OA4.3).
B. Licensee-Identified Violations
None
A-5
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
The station remained in Mode 5 with the fuel in the spent fuel pool for the entire inspection
period.
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency
Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and
4OA4 IMC 0350 Inspection Activities (92702)
Inspectors continued the IMC 0350 inspection activities, which include follow-up on the
restart checklist contained in Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) EA-13-020 issued
February 26, 2013. The purpose of the beginning phase of this inspection is to assess
the licensees performance and progress in addressing its implementation and
effectiveness of FCSs Integrated Performance Improvement Plan (IPIP), significant
performance issues, weaknesses in programs and processes, and flood restoration
activities. This phase of inspection determines whether the depth and breadth of
performance concerns are understood.
Inspectors used the criteria described in baseline and supplemental inspection
procedures, various programmatic NRC inspection procedures, and IMC 0350 to assess
the licensees performance and progress in implementing its performance improvement
initiatives. Inspectors performed on-site and in-office activities, which are described in
more detail in the following sections of this report. This report covers inspection
activities from November 18, 2012, through February 28, 2013. Specific documents
reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
The following inspection scope, assessments, observations, and findings are
documented by CAL restart checklist item number.
.1 Causes of Significant Performance Deficiencies and Assessment of
Organizational Effectiveness
Section 1 of the restart checklist contains those items necessary to develop a
comprehensive understanding of the root causes of safety-significant performance
deficiencies identified at FCS. In addition, Section 1 includes the independent safety
culture assessment with the associated root causes and findings.
A-6
.a Flooding Issue - Yellow Finding
Item 1.a is included in the restart checklist for the failure of FCS to maintain procedures
and equipment that protects the plant from the effects of a design basis flood. These
deficiencies resulted in a Yellow (substantial safety significance) finding.
(1) Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the progress of resolution of VIO 05000285/2012002-02.
This review included interviewing licensee engineers and reviewing associated
licensee change packages.
(2) Assessment
The inspectors noted that the licensee had not yet resolved VIO 05000285/2012002-02.
The resolution was planned as part of the trash rack blowdown modification described in
Section 4OA4.3 of this report. Because the inspectors concluded that NRC approval
would be needed to implement this change, the licensee was evaluating its desired path
for resolving this issue. The inspectors noted the continued non-compliance with the
violation in the Findings section below. This violation and its ultimate resolution will be
considered in the future assessment of whether the licensee has adequately addressed
the Yellow flooding finding.
(3) Findings
Continued Failure to Classify Intake Structure Sluice Gates as Safety Class 3
Introduction. The inspectors identified a cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B,
Criterion III, Design Control, for licensees failure to classify the six intake structure
exterior sluice gates and their motor operators as Safety Class 3 as defined in the
Updated Safety Analysis Report, Appendix N. This violation was first presented in
Inspection Report 05000285/2012002 and the licensee has remained in non-
compliance.
Description. The inspectors initially discovered that this finding had been originally
identified by licensee personnel in February 2011, as Action Item No. 34 to Condition
Report 2010-2387. However, this action item was closed in August 2011, without action
taken to classify the sluice gates as safety related. In preparation for the NRC flooding
inspection in February 2012, licensee personnel conducted a review of Condition Report
2010-2387 Action Item No. 34 that revealed the quality classification of each
penetration/flood barrier had not been verified. Condition Report 2011-10302 was
initiated in December 2011, to identify that the quality classification of the intake
structure cell level control and level monitoring equipment may be incorrect. Because of
the failure of the corrective action program to resolve the issue after initially being
identified, and the significant value added by further inspection effort, the finding was
documented as NRC-identified violation VIO 05000285/2012002-02.
A-7
Upon further inspection of this sluice gate safety classification issue, inspectors learned
that the licensee planned to implement a new modification for flooding mitigation. This
modification would employ the trash rack blowdown portion of the circulating water
system to allow river water to flow into four of those pipes and then through four newly
installed safety class valves for control of cell level (raw water pump suction level) using
river level as the driving force. The licensee concluded that implementing this strategy
would eliminate the need for the exterior sluice gates to be safety class, thereby
resolving the previous violation.
Inspectors reviewed this modification strategy and in Section 4OA4.3 of this report
questioned whether the modification would require NRC approval prior to
implementation. The inspectors determined that prior NRC approval was required and
until that time, the river sluice gates would need to be classified and treated as Safety
Class 3. Since the licensee had not yet accomplished this classification, the inspectors
considered the licensee to still be in non-compliance with design controls.
Analysis. The inspectors determined that the continued failure to classify the intake
structure exterior sluice gates and their motor operators as Safety Class 3 was a
performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it adversely
impacted the protection against external events attribute of the Mitigating Systems
Cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems
that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The significance
of this finding is bounded by the significance of a related Yellow finding regarding the
ability to mitigate an external flooding event (Inspection Report 05000285/2010008).
This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and
resolution, corrective action program, for failure to thoroughly evaluate problems such
that the resolutions address causes and extent of conditions. This also includes
conducting effectiveness reviews of corrective actions to ensure that the problems are
resolved P.1(c).
Enforcement. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, requires, in part,
that measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements
and the design basis for those structures, systems, and components are correctly
translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Contrary to this
requirement, the licensee failed to establish measures to assure that applicable
regulatory requirements and the design basis for those components were correctly
translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, the
licensee failed to classify the six intake structure exterior sluice gates and their motor
operators as Safety Class 3 as defined in the Updated Safety Analysis Report, Appendix
N. This violation is not being treated as a new violation. Instead, it is considered as a
related violation to the Yellow finding issued in October 2010, which, in general, dealt
with issues related to mitigating a significant external flooding event. This violation is
being treated as a cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2(a)(2) of the NRC
Enforcement Policy: VIO 05000285/2013011-01, Continued Failure to Classify Intake
Structure Sluice Gates as Safety Class 3, (EA-13-043).
A-8
.3 Adequacy of Significant Programs and Processes
Section 3 of the Restart Checklist addresses major programs and processes in place at
FCS.
.a Corrective Action Program
(1) Inspection Scope
For the period covered by this inspection report, activities related to the corrective
action program included a review of any aspects of the corrective action program
which could have prevented or were contributing factors in the violations detailed in
this report.
(2) Assessment
The inspectors made two corrective action program observations in the two
violations in this report.
In VIO 05000285/2013011-01, Continued Failure to Classify Intake Structure Sluice
Gates as Safety Class 3, the inspectors noted the failure to thoroughly evaluate
problems such that the resolutions address causes and extent of conditions. This
also included conducting effectiveness reviews of corrective actions to ensure that
the problems were resolved.
In NCV 5000285/2013011-02, Two Examples of Failure to Obtain Prior NRC
Approval for Flooding Mitigation Strategies, the inspectors noted the licensee failed
to thoroughly evaluate problems such that resolutions address the causes and extent
of condition specifically associated with deficiencies involving the Acts of Nature
procedural guidance.
(3) Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.c Design Changes and Modifications
(1) Inspection Scope
i. Design Changes and Modifications
The inspectors reviewed the two modifications associated with the licensees
mitigating strategies for maintaining cell level control, Packages EC 55394 and
.ii 10 CFR 50.59 Screening and Safety Evaluations
A-9
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the licensees 10 CFR 50.59
process to ensure proper treatment of changes to the facility as it was applied to
Packages EC 55394 and EC 53392.
(2) Assessment
The inspectors observed two instances of changes which were made in accordance
with the licensees 10 CFR 50.59 process which, when evaluated, determined that
prior NRC approval was not required for the changes. The inspectors took exception
with these conclusions and have described them in the Findings section below.
These two examples will be considered in the future assessment of the health of the
licensees 10 CFR 50.59 program. Of note, the change associated with the trash
rack blowdown modification was a recent change.
(3) Findings
Two Examples of Failure to Obtain Prior NRC Approval for Flooding Mitigation Strategies
Introduction. The inspectors identified two examples of a Severity Level IV violation of
10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests and Experiments, and associated Green findings for the
licensees failure to appropriately perform written evaluations for two changes associated
with flooding mitigation strategies. In the first example, the licensee changed the
Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) and Abnormal Operating Procedure 01 (AOP-
01), Acts of Nature, to incorporate use of backflow through the circulating water system
for a flow path for raw water. In the second example, the licensee was implementing a
flooding mitigation modification which would have used components which did not meet
full quality requirements for their Safety Class 3 designated function. Had the licensee
appropriately evaluated these two changes, they would have determined that a license
amendment was required for implementation of both changes, since both resulted in
more than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of a
system, structure, or component important to safety.
Description. At FCS, the raw water system draws water from the Missouri River, cools
plant components, and then returns water back to the discharge canal. The raw water
pumps draw water from the intake cell, which under normal river conditions is at
approximately the same level as the river. A set of six normally opened river sluice gates
are available to isolate portions of the intake cells from the river. Under flooded river
conditions above 1007.5 feet river level, the licensee must control intake cell level. If
intake cell level were to get too high, the intake structure would be flooded and the raw
water pumps would be adversely affected. If intake cell level were to get too low, the
raw water pumps would not meet pump suction requirements. Control of the intake level
would be accomplished by manipulating the river sluice gates such that the flow pumped
from the intake cell and through the raw water system would be made up by the same
amount of water being allowed into the intake cell. On two occasions, the licensee
improperly evaluated proposed methods to obtain the proper raw water flow balance in
the intake cells to mitigate a flooding event as described below.
A-10
Backflow Through the Circulating Water System via Sand Intrusion Mitigation Strategy
In this strategy, operators would be required to match the flow developed by the raw
water pumps with the flow past one partially opened river sluice gate and the leakage
past all of the other river sluice gates. Level in the intake cell by procedure was to be
controlled between 983 and 988 feet.
In February 2012, NRC inspectors identified that the motor operators for the river sluice
gates would start becoming submerged at 1010 feet of river level. In response, the
licensee changed their Procedure AOP-01 to instruct operators to de-energize the motor
operators for the river sluice gates at 1010 feet of river level. This change was made
even though it did not match the original intentions for control as described in Section
9.8.6 of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) which stated that, For water levels
above 1007.5 feet, the water level inside the intake structure is controlled by positioning
the exterior sluice gates to restrict the inflow into the wet wells to match the rate of
pumped outflow. The licensee changed the USAR (Revision 30) along with the AOP-01
change to state, The water level inside the intake cells can be controlled by positioning
the exterior sluice gates to restrict the inflow into the cells. If the cell intake through the
river sluice gates is blocked during flooding condition (possibly due to debris or other
failure mechanism) an alternate flow path to the cells can be provided by allowing flow
backward through one of the circulating pumps. Cell level would then be controlled
using either the circulating water pump discharge valve or suction gate. This flow path
may also be used during extreme flooding conditions if the river flow has a high debris
load to minimize sand/debris buildup in the cells.
The change to AOP-01 prescribed that any trends in intake cell level upward past 988
feet would be controlled by starting another raw water pump to lower level. Any trends in
intake cell level downward past 983 feet would be compensated for by aligning backflow
through the circulating water system.
The path would be from the discharge canal, through the circulating water discharge
piping, through the condensor water box, through more circulating water piping, through
the circulating water discharge check and discharge valves, through the circulating water
pumps, and through a circulating water sluice gate. The inspectors questioned the use
of the circulating water system in lieu of the safety related river sluice gates. Instead of
using a fully qualified, tested, designed, and constructed safety related system, the
licensee changed the operating scheme to rely on the non-safety related circulating
water system.
Section 4.3.2 of Nuclear Energy Institute Document 96-07, Guidelines For 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations, states in part, Departures from the design, fabrication, construction,
testing, and performance standards as outlined in the General Design Criteria (Appendix
A to Part 50) are not compatible with a no more than minimal increase standard. The
inspectors concluded that substituting the safety-related method with a non-safety
related system fit this description. This led inspectors to conclude the no more than
minimal standard was not met and the change constituted a more than minimal
increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of a system, structure, or
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component important to safety than previously evaluated, and therefore should have
required a license amendment.
Further, inspectors noted that the change package used to incorporate the change into
AOP-01 did not have its own evaluation. When questioned by inspectors, the licensee
stated that the change package to Procedure AOP-01 was based on EC 53392 which
was developed to change Procedure OI-CW-1. The licensee explained that the same
individual who performed that change was involved in the change to AOP-01 and was
knowledgeable of the evaluation, so the change to AOP-01 was made informed by EC 53392. The inspectors considered this oversight in documentation to be a smaller part
of the larger issue of not properly evaluating and incorporating the change.
Trash Rack Blowdown Backflow Modification Strategy
In this strategy, operators would be required to match the flow developed by the raw
water pumps with the flow allowed through manually throttled valves in the trash rack
blowdown lines. The throttle valves were being installed by modification and had been
formally evaluated by the licensee per 10 CFR 50.59. Level in the intake cell by
procedure was to be controlled between 983 and 988 feet.
The trash rack blowdown piping used was part of the circulating water system. A portion
of the circulating water pump flow would be diverted to piping which penetrates the
intake structure near the trash racks to blow trash off the trash racks weekly. The piping
is isolated the rest of the time by an isolation valve. During a flood, this piping outside
the intake structure would be submerged. Water would fill it up to the isolation valve
inside the intake structure. The licensee was in the process of installing valves in the
intake structure between the intake structure wall and the isolation valve on 4 of the
trash rack cleaning piping to open to dump water into the cells.
By doing this, the licensee evaluated that they could fully shut all of the sluice gates and
make them limited critical quality equipment (LCQE) components, thus resolving their
safety class issue.
The licensee had classified the throttle valve as safety class. They had classified the
piping and the isolation valve as not fully safety qualified based on their definition of
LCQE. By the FCS Quality Assurance Plan, LCQE is defined as those structures,
systems, components or items whose satisfactory performance is required to prevent or
mitigate the failure of those structures, systems, components or items identified as
critical quality equipment (CQE). CQE is defined as those structures, systems,
components, or items whose satisfactory performance is required to prevent or mitigate
the consequences of postulated accidents that could cause undue risk to the health and
safety of the public. LCQE would contain enhanced safety qualifications, but not the
fully safety qualification of CQE.
The licensee determined that since all the piping would do would be to constitute a
barrier for flooding and prevent the failure of the valve by staying intact, it would be
LCQE.
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The inspectors questioned this classification. The inspectors considered that the
necessary components would be required to mitigate the consequences of flooding, and
not just serve as a flooding barrier, and would be necessary conduit for raw water flow to
the cell and eventually on to the raw water pumps. Between the intake structure wall
and the isolation valve, the piping would provide a flow path from the river to the intake
cells whose performance is needed to ensure flow only goes out the throttle valve. The
piping would have to satisfactorily perform to allow proper flow to the raw water pumps.
The inspectors noted that in Appendix N to the licensees USAR, the licensee stated that
Safety Class (SC) 3 shall apply to equipment, not included in SC-1 or -2, that is
designed and relied upon to accomplish the two following nuclear safety functions:
- Ensure required cooling for liquid-cooled stored fuel (e.g., spent fuel storage pool
and cooling system)
- Ensure nuclear safety functions provided by SC-1, -2, or -3 equipment (e.g.,
provide heat removal of SC-1, -2, or -3 heat exchangers, )
The inspectors concluded that those two definitions were met. The piping and isolation
valve would be required to ensure raw water cooling flowed such that it could be used
for spent fuel pool cooling and that it could be used to cool the shutdown cooling heat
exchanger (a SC-3 heat exchanger).
From this, the inspectors concluded that the licensee would have replaced a safety class
strategy (throttling sluice gates) with a strategy that uses non-safety class components
for a function that is required by the licensees licensing basis per Appendix N of their
USAR to be safety class (SC-3).
Section 4.3.2 of Nuclear Energy Institute Document 96-07, Guidelines For 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations, states that departures from the design, fabrication, construction,
testing, and performance standards as outlined in the General Design Criteria
(Appendix A to Part 50) are not compatible with a no more than minimal increase
standard. The inspectors concluded that substituting the safety-related method with a
non-safety related system fit this description. This led inspectors to conclude the no
more than minimal was not met and the change constituted a more than minimal
increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of a system, structure, or
component important to safety than previously evaluated, and therefore should have
required a license amendment.
Additionally, the inspectors identified another concern with the licensees evaluation.
The modification would introduce the possibility of a failure of the raw water pumps due
to draining of the intake cells. Flow through the circulating water system trash rack
blowdown supply header would be driven by river level alone and enter the Intake
Structure at a higher elevation than the normal path via the exterior sluice gates.
Following a flooding event, the river level would decrease to the point where there could
be insufficient flow through the backwash supply header and the exterior sluice gates
would need to be reopened. However, the motor operators for the exterior sluice gates
would likely be damaged which could impair the ability to reopen the sluice gates and
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establish sufficient flow to the intake bays. The inspectors and NRC staff noted that this
consideration had not been a part of the licensees 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation.
Analysis. The failure to perform adequate written evaluations of changes in accordance
with 10 CFR 50.59(d)(1) was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency
was more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of
the mitigating systems cornerstone and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective to
ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating
events to prevent undesirable consequences.
In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the inspectors used MC 0609,
Significance Determination Process, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, to determine the final
significance of the finding. For the back flow through the circulating water system
example, the finding represented a potential loss of the intake structure due to flooding;
therefore, a Phase 3 evaluation by a senior reactor analyst was necessary. The senior
reactor analyst evaluated a bounding risk analysis case which assumed that the raw
water system and offsite power were lost. This bounding case had an incremental
conditional core damage probability of 5.0 x 10-7, and therefore the finding was
determined to have very low safety significance (Green). For the trash rack blowdown
modification example, determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green)
because the finding was a design deficiency that did not result in the loss of functionality.
The NRCs significance determination process (SDP) considers the safety significance
of findings by evaluating their potential safety consequences. The traditional
enforcement process separately considers the significance of willful violations, violations
that impact the regulatory process, and violations that result in actual safety
consequences. Traditional enforcement applied to this finding because it involved a
violation that impacted the regulatory process. Assessing the violation in accordance
with Enforcement Policy, the inspectors determined it to be of Severity Level IV because
it resulted in a condition evaluated by the SDP as having very low safety significance
(Example 6.1.d.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy).
The inspectors determined the Green finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of
problem identification and resolution because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate
problems such that resolutions address the causes and extent of condition specifically
associated with deficiencies involving the Acts of Nature procedural guidance P.1(c).
Enforcement. 10 CFR 50.59(c)(2) states, in part, that a licensee shall obtain a license
amendment prior to implementing a proposed change if the change would result in more
than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of a structure,
system, or component important to safety previously evaluated in the final safety
analysis report.
Contrary to the above on two occasions, the licensee failed to obtain a license
amendment prior to implementing a change that resulted in a more than minimal
increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of a SSC important to safety
previously evaluated in the FSAR (as updated). Specifically:
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i. In May 2012, the licensee changed AOP-01, Acts of Nature, and their USAR,
which resulted in more than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of
a malfunction of a structure, system, or component important to safety previously
evaluated in the final safety analysis report. Specifically, Step 9.g of AOP-01 and
Section 9.8 of the USAR were included in the change to replace opening a
safety-related river sluice gate to increase river flow to the intake cell with
aligning circulating water flow through the non-safety related circulating water
system. This change introduced new failure mechanisms which constituted a
more than a minor change in the frequency of a malfunction and the
consequences of a previously evaluated accident in the USAR.
ii. On December 13, 2012, the licensee evaluated their trash rack blowdown
modification in EC 55394 and continued physical installation of the plant
modification in the intake structure. This modification would result in more than a
minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of a structure,
system, or component important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR.
Specifically, use of LCQE components in a Safety Class 3 function would
constitute a more than a minor change in the frequency of a malfunction and the
consequences of a previously evaluated accident in the USAR.
The licensee entered these issues into their corrective action program as Condition
Reports 2012-15293 and 2013-00545, and as of the end of this inspection, was planning
corrective action. Because this finding was determined to be of very low safety
significance (Green) and the associated examples of this violation have been entered
into the licensees corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a non-cited
consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NCV 5000285/2013011-
02, Two Examples of Failure to Obtain Prior NRC Approval for Flooding Mitigation
Strategies.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
Exit Meeting Summary
On March 1, 2013, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. L. Cortopassi,
Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee
acknowledged the issues presented. The inspector asked the licensee whether any
materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No
proprietary information was identified.
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SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
C. Cameron, Supervisor Regulatory Compliance
L. Cortopassi, Site Vice President
D. Ferraro, Attorney, Exelon Corporation
K. Ihnen, Manager, Site Nuclear Oversight
M. Prospero, Plant Manager
B. Rash, Recovery Manager
T. Simpkin, Manager, Site Regulatory Assurance
J. Wiegand, Manager, Operations Engineering
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
Continued Failure to Classify Intake Structure Sluice Gates as05000285/2013011-01 VIO
Safety Class 3 (Section 4OA4.1)
Opened and Closed
Two Examples of Failure to Obtain Prior NRC Approval for
Flooding Mitigation Strategies (Section 4OA4.3)
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
All documents which supported the inspection scope and determinations were identified in the
body of the report.
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