ML021270006
| ML021270006 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 04/24/2002 |
| From: | Izyk C Entergy Nuclear Northeast |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| Download: ML021270006 (203) | |
Text
ENTERGY NUCLEAR NORTHEAST JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT P.O. BOX 110 LYCOMINGI NY 13093 DOCUMENT TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGEMENT FORM DATE: April 24, 2002 CONTROLLED COPY NUMBER: 34 TO: U.S.N.R.C. Document Center/Washington, DC FROM: CATHY IZYK - EMERGENCY PLANNING DEPARTMENT
SUBJECT:
EMERGENCY PLAN AND IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Enclosed are revisions to your assigned copy of the JAFNPP Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures. Please remove and DISCARD the old pages. Insert the attached, initial and date this routing sheet and return the completed routing sheet to Cathy Izyk in the Emergency Planning Department within 15 days. If this transmittal is not returned within 15 days, your name will be removed from the controlled list.
VOLUME 1 UVDdate List Dated N/A DOCUMENT PAGES REV. # INITIALS/DATE N/A VOLUME 2 Update List Dated April 24. 002 DOCUMENT PAGES REV. # INITIALS/DATE Replace all but the 2 colored pull out charts EAP-4 please place the attached stickers over the old 30 information on the sheets.
EAP-12 REPLACE ALL 11 EAP-14.1 REPLACE ALL 22 EAP-1 4.2 REPLACE ALL 20
____________VOLUME 3 Update List Dated April 24. 2002______
DOCUMENT PAGES REV. # INITIALS/DATE EAP-42 REPLACE ALL 17 SAP-1 REPLACE ALL 16 SAP-6 REPLACE ALL 17 SAP-10 REPLACE PAGE 20/21 11 AI
EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES/VOLUME 2 UPDATE LIST I CONTROLLED COPY #
Date of Issue: Avril 24. 2002 Procedure Procedure Revision Date of Use of Number Title Number Last Procedure
_ __ _. .... _Review N/A TABLE OF CONTENTS REV. 19 02/98 N/A IAP-I EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTATION REV. 25 09/01 Continuous CHECKLIST IAP-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY REV. 22 04/02 Continuous CONDITIONS EAP- 1.1 OFFSITE NOTIFICATIONS REV. 45 09/01 Informational EAP-2 PERSONNEL INJURY REV. 24 01/01 Informational EAP-3 FIRE REV. 22 10/01 Informational EAP-4 DOSE ASSESSMENT CALCULATIONS REV. 30 04/02 Reference EAP-4.1 RELEASE RATE DETERMINATION REV. 13 09/01 Reference EAP-5.1 DELETED (02/94)
EAP-5.2 DELETED (04/91)
EAP-5.3 ONSITE/OFFSITE DOWNWIND SURVEYS REV. 7 07/00 Informational AND ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING EAP-6 IN-PLANT EMERGENCY SURVEY/ENTRY REV. 15 02/98 Informational EAP-7.1 DELETED (02/94)
EAP-7.2 DELETED (02/94)
EAP-8 PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY REV. 55 02/02 Reference EAP-9 SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATIONS REV. 9 02/98 Informational EAP-10 PROTECTED AREA EVACUATION REV. 15 02/02 Informational EAP- 11 SITE EVACUATION REV. 17 02/02 Informational DOSE ESTIMATED FROM AN ACCIDENTAL EAP-12 RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL TO REV. 11 04/02 Reference LAKE ONTARIO EAP-13 DAMAGE CONTROL REV. 13 12/98 Informational EAP- 14.1 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER REV. 22 04/02 Informational ACTIVATION EAP- 14.2 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY REV. 20 04/02 Informational ACTIVATION EAP-14.5 OPERATIONAL SUPPORT CENTER REV. 14 03/00 Informational EAP-14.5 ACTIVATION AND OPERATION Page 1 of 2
EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES/VOLUME 2 UPDATE LIST Date of Issue: April 24, 2002 Procedure Procedure Revision Date of Use of Number Title Number Review Procedure EAP-14.6 HABITABILITY OF THE EMERGENCY REV. 14 10/98 Informational FACILITIES EAP-15 EMERGENCY RADIATION EXPOSURE REV. 10 02/00 Informational CRITERIA AND CONTROL R.020 nrta EAP-16 PUBLIC INFORMATION PROCEDURE REV. 6 02/98 Informational EAP-16.2 JOINT NEWS CENTER OPERATION REV. 0 02/02 Informational EAP-17 EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION STAFFING REV. 99 02/02 Informational EAP-18 DELETED (12/93)
EAP-19 EMERGENCY USE OF POTASSIUM IODINE REV. 21 04/01 Informational (KI)
EAP-20 POST ACCIDENT SAMPLE, OFFSITE REV. 8 02/98 Reference SHIPMENT AND ANALYSIS RV809Rern EAP-21 DELETED (12/85)
EAP-22 DELETED (02/98)
EAP-23 EMERGENCY ACCESS CONTROL REV. 10 02/98 Informational EAP-24 EOF VEHICLE AND PERSONNEL REV. 8 02/98 Informational DECONTAMINATION EAP-25 DELETED (02/94)
II Page 2 of 2
EAP-4 Attachment 1 EAP-4 Attachment 2 Rev. No. 30 Page 14 of 18 Rev. No. 30 Page 15 of 18
ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC.
JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE DOSE ASSESSMENT CALCULATIONS EAP-4 REVISION 30 REVIEWED BY: PLANT OPERATING REVIEW COMMITTEE MEETING NO. N/A DATE: N/A DATE:
APPROVED BY:
RESPONSIBLE PROCEDURE OWNER EFFECTIVE DATE: J/; 'tAi £,
FIRST ISSUE 0l FULL REVISION 9 LIMITED REVISION El
- * *k
- INFORMATIONAL USE *
- TSR *
- ADMINISTRATIVE *ICONTROLLED COPY #
PERIODIC REVIEW DUE DATE: Q (),0 -7 I
DOSE ASSESSMENT CALCULATIONS EAP-4 REVISION
SUMMARY
SHEET REV. NO.
30
- Added 5.5.2 D, to turn on modem.
29 2 Section 5.2.1 delete reference to manufacturer (DG) in hardware column.
- Changed name of dose model from RADDOSE IV TO RADDOSE V throughout procedure due to windows upgrade.
- Section 5.2.2.A added "the EDAMS menu from the" and the word "icon".
- Section 5.2.3.B deleted "vax" and added (B).
- Section 5.2.3.C - H changed steps to reflect revised windows model.
- Added reference to using "mouse" throughout procedure.
- Section 5.2.3.N.6 - deleted "press F9 key" replaced with "select OK".
- Attachment 3 - changed RFA numbers Kr 83m from 3.550 E-04 to 3.552E -04 and XE133 from 5.370E+01 to 5.379E+01 - editorial changes.
- Tab - Attachment 1 EDAMS RADDOSE V Operators Manual Rev. 3.2 complete revision to reflect windows version of EDAMS. The previous revision was titled EDAMS/RADDOSE-IV Rev. 3, dated May 1995.
- Tab - Attachment 2 Appendix C for EDAMS Sys Design Manual.
- 1. Deleted date from cover sheet - editorial
- 2. Page C-6: CDBA total Ci/sec release rate corrected to 0.812 to correspond with default inventories in EAP-4 page 15.
- 3. Page C-9: Normal flow rates for low range stack monitor and high range stack monitor and high range stack monitor with ISBGT train corrected from 6800 to 6600.
- Tab - Attachment 3 EDAMS - Default Isotopic Release Rates to the Atmosphere
- 1. Changed CS 137 at Decay time 0.0 from 3.621 E-03 to 3.360 E-03 - editorial.
- 2. EDAMS Inventory Replacement Files sheet - corrected XE 133 from 6.379 E+01 to 5.379 E+01 - editorial.
Rev. No. 30 Page 2 of 18
DOSE ASSESSMENT CALCULATIONS EAP- 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTI ON PAGE 1.0 PURPOSE ............................................
.... 4
2.0 REFERENCES
...4 3.0 INITIATING EVENTS ..................................
o, o4 4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES ...................................
5.0 PROCEDURE .......................................... ., ,5 6.0 ATTACHMENTS ........................................ ... 13
- 1. INITIAL PROTECTIVE ACTIONS ......................... ... 14
- 2. AUGMENTED DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTIONS ... ... 15
- 3. ANALYZED ACCIDENT TYPES ............................ ... 16
- 4. 1991 POPULATION ESTIMATES EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNII 4G AREAS .............................................. 17
- 5. DOWNWIND SURVEY WORKSHEET .......................... ... 18 Rev. No. 30 Page 3 ot 18
DOSE ASSESSMENT CALCULATIONS EAP-4 1.0 PURPOSE To provide the methods for performing dose assessment and determining protective actions during accident conditions at James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant.
2.0 REFERENCES
2.1 Performance References 2.1.1 EAP-4.1, RELEASE RATE DETERMINATION 2.1.2 EAP-5.3, ONSITE/OFFSITE DOWNWIND SURVEYS AND ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING 2.1.3 EAP-42, OBTAINING METEOROLOGICAL DATA 2.2 Developmental References 2.2.1 EAP-4.1, RELEASE RATE DETERMINATION 2.2.2 EAP-5.3, ONSITE/OFFSITE DOWNWIND SURVEYS AND ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING 2.2.3 EAP-42, OBTAINING METEOROLOGICAL DATA 3.0 INITIATING EVENTS 3.1 A General Emergency has been declared OR 3.2 A vented gaseous release exceeds alarm setpoints OR 3.3 An unmonitored gaseous release is suspected or underway.
4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 4.1 Shift Manager/Emergency Director (SM/ED)
The SM/ED is responsible for ensuring that Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) are developed in accordance with this procedure.
Rev. No. 30 Page 4 of 18
DOSE ASSESSMENT CALCULATIONS EAP-4 4.2 TSC Rad Support Coordinator (TSC RSC)
The TSC RSC is responsible to the Emergency Director for managing the radiological monitoring and assessment aspects of the plant during an emergency and of those functions specified in Step 4.3 until relieved of those functions by the EOF.
4.3 EOF Rad Support Coordinator (EOF/RSC)
The EOF/RSC is responsible to the Emergency Director for managing the radiological monitoring and assessment aspects offsite during an emergency.
4.4 Dose Assessment Coordinator (DAC)
The DAC is responsible for managing the offsite dose aspects of an emergency, in order to assess the radiological consequences to the public.
4.5 Chemistry Technician/Rad Protection Technician The on-shift chemistry technician is responsible to the Emergency Director for conducting dose assessment from the control room and assisting the SM/ED with information related to offsite notification and protective action recommendations. The on-shift radiation protection technician is responsible to the SM/ED for conducting surveys as directed.
5.0 PROCEDURE 5.1 Control Room Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations Utilize Attachment 1, Initial Protective Actions, for control room dose assessment and protective action recommendations.
Rev. No. 30 Page 5 of 18
DOSE ASSESSMENT CALCULATIONS EAP-4 5.2 Augmented Dose Assessment Dose projection shall be completed using the EDAMS computer located in the Control Room, Technical Support Center or Emergency Operations Facility as follows:
5.2.1 General Information A. Locations EDAMS software and hardware is located as follows:
LOCATION HARDWARE PRINTERS METE DATA CONNECTION Control Room Personal HP LaserJet Direct Connect Computer and Monitor Technical Personal Seiko D-Scan, Direct Connect Support Center Computer and HP LaserJet Monitor Emergency Personal Seiko D-Scan, Dial-up Modem Operations Computer and HP LaserJet Facility #1 Monitor Emergency Personal HP LaserJet Dial-up Modem Operations Computer and Facility #2 Monitor B. Computer problems IF at any time problems are experienced with the computer, MOVE to another location that has the EDAMS software and continue.
C. The dose assessment program is called RADDOSE V and is part of the EDAMS package.
D. Meteorological data is automatically sent (via direct connect or modem) to RADDOSE V and EDAMS by the Meteorological Monitoring System (MMS).
The user can use this data or manually input meteorological data.
E. Source term and release rate determination is discussed in procedure EAP-4.1.
Rev. No. 30 Page 6 of 18
DOSE ASSESSMENT CALCULATIONS EAP- 4 F. Software documentation is available for the EDAMS code and is maintained by the Emergency Planning Coordinator.
5.2.2 EDAMS Dose Model Limitations A. The EDAMS menu from the EDAMS icon only allows the operation of one DOS application at a time.
B. Dose rates and deposition rates reported by the model are the maximum for the sector; not necessarily the dose rate or deposition rate at the center of the sector. This avoids the situation of a narrow (stable) plume slipping between receptor points and being missed.
C. Deposition data reported is not intended for an environmental evaluation; its intent is to indicate areas of potentially high ground level concentrations.
D. Forecast mode results may at times exceed real time results; this is due to the forecast mode having a greater internal time step.
E. A calculation limitation of the dose assessment model occurs when an extreme wind (direction) shift takes place. The model may not calculate doses in sectors that the plume skips over entirely within a single 15 minute interval advection step.
5.2.3 Dose Assessment Using EDAMS Computer NOTE: The dose assessment model has many capabilities beyond those used in this procedure. Utilize the "EDAMS Operators Manual" for further reference.
CAUTION: Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) must be transmitted to the State and County within 15 minutes of declaring an Emergency or changing emergency classification.
A. Use Attachment 2 Augmented Dose Assessment Protective Actions, for guidance when performing dose assessment activities at the TSC or EOF.
Rev. No. 30 Page 7 of 18
DOSE ASSESSMENT CALCULATIONS EAP- 4 B. Ensure that the black switch on the CR and TSC meteorological panels is positioned to the Niagara Mohawk (B) position.
C. Energize the EDAMS computer power strip to provide power to the computer, monitor, and printer.
D. Ensure the modem is ON (powered on).
E. Select the "Login" icon from the EDAMS icons and select "Continue" at the plant picture screen.
F. Select the appropriate menu item based on your location as follows:
Location: Menu Choice:
CR Direct connect to Met Data TSC Direct connect to Met Data EOF Automatic Dial-in to Met Data G. When the login routine finishes, close the login window screen by selecting "OK".
H. From the EDAMS icons, select JAF Raddose-V.
I. Select "Continue" at the plant picture screen.
J. From the Raddose-V start up menu, select "Begin New Incident."
K. At the Raddose-V Accident Scenario Definition screen, enter the following information:
- 1. Reactor Trip Date - date the reactor was scrammed or shutdown.
- 2. Reactor Trip Time (24-hour format) - time the reactor was scrammed or shutdown.
- 3. Release Date - date the release to atmosphere began, or is projected to begin.
Rev. No. 30 Page 8 of 18
DOSE ASSESSMENT CALCULATIONS EAP-4
- 4. Release Time (24-hour format) - time the release to atmosphere began, or is projected to begin.
- 5. Lake Surface Temp (Degrees F) - Enter the known lake surface temperature, or use the historical default value provided.
- 6. Operator Initials - Enter 2 or 3 initials, then press ENTER.
- 7. Select "Accept" to accept and continue.
L. At the Raddose-V main menu, select "Enter/Edit Source Term Data."
M. At the Raddose-V Source Term Data Entry Screen, proceed as follows:
- 1. Select "Accident Type" by pressing the "F2" key, or by using the mouse, then choosing the accident type which most closely matches current conditions. Your selection determines which default isotopic mix is used for upcoming calculations (refer to Attachment 3, Analyzed Accident Types).
- 2. When asked, "Is this release Elevated?"
select "Yes" for elevated releases or "No" for ground releases. (A stack release is elevated; all other releases are ground releases.)
NOTE: Back calculation cannot be used on first time step.
- 3. Select the "Method" used to determine the release rate by pressing the "F2" key, or by using the mouse, then choosing the appropriate method based on available information.
- 4. Select the Iodine release rate "Method" by hitting the "F2" key, or by using the mouse. Enter the "Monitor Reading" and "Release Rate" if required.
Rev. No. 30 Page 9 of 18
DOSE ASSESSMENT CALCULATIONS EAP- 4
- 5. Up to three Accident Types (three release paths) can be entered by using the down arrow key (1) to select type 2 and 3.
- 6. When the source term data entry screen has been completed, select "Accept" to accept data and return to the Raddose-V main menu.
N. At the Raddose-V main menu, the menu bar will highlight the appropriate elevated and/or ground meteorological data choices based on your input in step M.2.
- 1. If direct met data input is being used, the appropriate ground and/or elevated met data will automatically be displayed for the current time step.
- 3. IF met data is not available via the MMS, THEN enter met data obtained from alternate sources, as outlined in EAP-42, OBTAINING METEOROLOGICAL DATA.
- 0. At the Raddose-V main menu, select "Perform Calculations."
- 1. The map of the 10 mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) will appear with centerline dose rates after the model has calculated the actual model doses.
NOTE: This data SHOULD NOT be used for PARs.
PARs should be based on forecast data, which will be the dose to be avoided by the protective action.
- 2. Select "Continue" to continue.
- 3. At the Raddose-V output menu, select "Continue Calculations".
- 4. At the Raddose-V main menu, select "Perform a Forecast".
Rev. No. 30 Page 10 of 18
DOSE ASSESSMENT CALCULATIONS EAP- 4 NOTE: A new time step must be added to perform a forecast.
- 5. Verify meteorology and source term data as required. Select "Accept" to accept.
- 6. Enter "Forecast Period" (i.e. release duration). Use 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> as a default value.
Select "OK".
- 7. When asked "Has a General Emergency been declared?" enter "Yes" or "No".
- 8. The forecast mode map will be displayed, including TEDE and CDE thyroid doses, and PARs. Select "Continue" to continue.
- 9. Select "Go to Report Menu".
- 10. Select "Print Complete Dose/Dose Rate Report".
NOTE: If during the course of dose assessment, the dose to the population is projected to exceed 1 Rem TEDE or 5 Rem CDE Thyroid, immediately advise the ED that the General Emergency criteria has been met.
NOTE: Since the Nine Mile Point/J.A. FitzPatrick (NMP/JAF) Site is contained in ERPA 1, any recommendation made for ERPA 1 must also apply to all NMP/JAF personnel not required to be onsite for the emergency.
NOTE: County and State Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) take many factors into account that NMP/JAF procedures do not (i.e.,
road conditions, special population needs, Evacuation Travel Time Estimates, evacuation scenarios, and shelter vs. evacuation doses).
Therefore, differences in PARs may occur. The Rad Support Coordinator must account for differences in Protective Action Recommendations when those exist. PARs should not be modified to match County or State PARs without justification.
Rev. No. 30 Page 11 of 18
DOSE ASSESSMENT CALCULATIONS EAP- 4 P. Protective Action Recommendations (PARs)
- 1. The EDAMS RADDOSE V program will recommend PARs for each ERPA, based upon the dose assessment (in forecast mode).
- 2. Initiate or revise PARs based upon this recommendation (and previous recommendations, if made).
Q. Notification
- 1. Record the revised PAR for each ERPA on the Part 1 Notification Form (EAP-I.I, Attachment 1) and give to the ED for approval.
R. Update the RADDOSE-V Model at 15 minute intervals or as directed by the Dose Assessment Coordinator.
5.3 Downwind Survey Dose Estimates 5.3.1 Use Attachment 5, Downwind Survey Worksheet, to record field data transmitted to the dispatch center.
5.3.2 Projected Deep Dose Equivalent (DDE) is approximately equal to TEDE Projected Dose A. Use field information recorded on the Downwind Survey Worksheet, Attachment 5, to perform projected dose calculations.
B. Obtain the estimated duration of release from the Emergency Director and record it on Attachment 5. If it is unknown, use 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> as a first estimate.
C. Complete the calculations, as shown, on Attachment 5 to determine DDE projected doses for each sampling location.
Rev. No. 30 Page 12 of 18
DOSE ASSESSMENT CALCULATIONS EAP- 4 5.3.3 CDE Thyroid Projected Dose A. Use field information recorded on the Downwind Survey Worksheet, Attachment 5, to perform CDE Thyroid Projected Dose.
B. Obtain the estimated duration of release from the Emergency Director and record it on Attachment 5.
C. Calculate the 1-131 concentration in accordance with Attachment 5.
D. Complete the calculations, as shown, on Attachment 5 to determine thyroid rate and CDE thyroid projected doses for each location for which data has been recorded.
5.3.4 Results A. Provide the results of the DDE and CDE thyroid projected dose calculations from steps 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 to the individual tasked with calculating protective action recommendations.
6.0 ATTACHMENTS
- 1. INITIAL PROTECTIVE ACTIONS - Pull out color map
- 2. AUGMENTED DOSE ASSESSMENT AND PROTECTIVE ACTIONS Pull out color map
- 3. ANALYZED ACCIDENT TYPES
- 4. 1991 POPULATION ESTIMATES EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING AREAS
- 5. DOWNWIND SURVEY WORKSHEET Rev. No. 30 Page 13 of 18
ANALYZED ACCIDENT TYPES Page 1 of 1 New Accident Names/Analyzed Accidents Loss of Coolant Ro rp Refueling Steamn Line BreakStaLieBak' Control Rod Drop Accident Two Phase Steam Line Break per Attachment A of EAP-4 Accident
,oca.jaf crd.jaf rfa.jaf slb2.jaf slb2.jaf esf.jaf Loss of Coolant Controlorop RefuelgAcientSteam Line Break Two Containment Design Basis OLD EDAMS Accident Name Used Accident Phase Accident Ground Elevated Ground Ground Elevated Analyzed Release Point Elevated Nuclide 7 LOCA CRD RFA -SLB1 SLB2 CDBA Kr83M 1.353E+00 1,577E-03 3.552E-04 1.517E-05 1.517E-05 1.154E-02*
Kr 85M 2.906E+00 3.386E-03 1.657E-01 2.725E-05 2.725E-05 1.508E-04 Kr85 1.301E-01 1.156E-04 9.144E-01 8.917E-08 8.917E-08 3.658E-09 Kr 87 5.572E+00 6.494E-03 2.695E-05 8.917E-05 8.917E-05 0.000E+00 Kr 88 7.894E+00 9.200E-03 5.252E-02 8.917E-05 8.917E-05 0.000E+00 Kr 89 9.817E+00 1.144E-02 0.000E+00 5.800E-04 5.800E-04 0.000E+00
-- Kr subtotal 2.767E+01 3.221E-02 1.133E+00 8.008E-04 8.008E-04 1.508E-04 Xel31m 6.825E-02 7.953E-05 1.669E-01 6.692E-08 6.692E-08 7.994E-05' W
i Xe133m 9.942E-01 1.159E-03 1.991E+00 1.292E-06 1.292E-06 1.934E-03 0 2.386E+01 2.781E-02 5.379E+01 3.658E-05 3.658E-05 2.769E-02 z Xe133 Xe135 3.081E+00 3.589E-03 1.238E+01 9.833E-05 9.833E-05 1.952E-01 Xe135m 4.494E+00 5.239E-03 6.803E-01 1.158E-04 1.158E-04 5.686E-01 Xe137 2.094E+01 2.440E-02 0.000E+00 6.692E-04 6.692E-04 0.000E+00 Xe138 1.988E+01 2.316E-02 0.000E+00 3.975E-04 3.975E-04 0.000E+00 Xe subtotal 7.332E+01 8.544E-02 6.901E+01 1.319E-03 1.319E-03 7.934E-01 1.010E+02 1.176E-01 7.014E+01 2.120E-03 2.120E-03 7.936E-01 Noble Gas (NG) subtotal 1131 3.406E-02 1.323E-04 2.439E-02 9.808E-04 9.808E-04 1.918E-03 1132 4.975E-02 1.933E-04 2.794E-05 7.628E-03 7.628E-03 2.803E-03 S1133 7.119E-02 2.766E-04 2.498E-02 6.536E-03 6.536E-03 4.011E-03
.- 11134 7.839E-02 3.044E-04 3.467E-10 1.380E-02 1.380E-02 4.417E-03 0 1135 6.725E-02 2.612E-04 4.233E-03 9.075E-03 9.075E-03 3.789E-03 Iodine subtotal 3.006E-01 1.168E-03 5.363E-02 3.802E-02 3.802E-02 1.694E-02 "CS137 3.583E-03 1.671E-05 3.360E-03 1.198E-05 1.198E-05 2.019E-04 i TE132 8.178E-03 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 6.900E-04 6.900E-04 4.606E-04 SR 89 2.132E-03 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 1.489E-04 1.489E-04 1.201E-04 U) u SR 90 2.228E-04 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 1.126E-05 1.126E-05 1.255E-05 Bal40 4.094E-03 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 4.358E-04 4.358E-04 2.306E-04 O La140 4.336E-05 0.000+E00 0.000E+00 0.000E+00 0.OOOE+00 2.443E-06
. Particulatesubtotal 1.83E-02 1.67E-05 3.36E-03 1.30E-03 1.30E-03 1.03E-03 RELEASE RATE TOTALS (Ci/sec) 1.01 E+02 1.1 9E-01 7.02E+01 4.14E-02 4.14E-02 8.12E-01 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Accident Duration Used for EDAMS 2.92E+06 1.71E+03 5.05E+05 2.98E+02 2.98E+02 5.84E+03 TOTAL Release Assumed (Ci)
LOCA - Engineered Saf er Steam Line Break Steam Line Break Feature Component Loss of Coolant Refueling Control Rod Drop Accident Two Phase Leature Accident Leakage RATIOS 2.98E-03 9.93E-03 7.65E-04 1.79E+01 1.79E+01 2.13E-02 O Iodine I Noble Gas Ratio I. 5.58E-02 4.69E+01
< Noble gas / Iodine Ratio 3.36E+02 1.01 E+02 1.31E+03 5.58E-02 5.53E+03 7.04E+03 2.09E+04 1.63E+00 1.63E+00 7.72E+02 Noble Gas IParticulate Ratio 1.65E+01 6.99E+01 1.60E+01 2.93E+01 2.93E+01 1.65E+01 Iodine / Particulate Ratio 3.17E+02 9.93E+01 1.23E+03 5.39E-02 5.39E-02 4.42E+01 NG IParticulate + Iodine Ratio EAP-4 DOSE ASSESSMENT ATTACHMENT 3 Rev. No. 30 CALCULATIONS Page 16 of 18
1991 POPULATION ESTIMATES EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING AREAS Page 1 of 1 Ficure 2.4 LEGEND 1ERPA Number IM ERPA Populaton 1991 Population Estimates J.A. FitzPatrick/Nine Mile Point Emergency Response Radiological Emergency Response Planning Areas (ERPAs) Plan and Procedures EAP-4 DOSE ASSESSMENT ATTACHMENT 4 Rev. No. 30 CALCULATIONS Page 17 of 18
DOWNWIND SURVEY WORKSHEET Page 1 of 1 Team Number Sample Date Sample Time Map Location Description Miles Downwind Degrees Sector Dose Survey Results Calculation Open Dose Rate Dose Rate Closed Window Release Conversion Projected DDE Window 3 inches 3 feet Dose Rate Duration mrem to rem (DDE = TEDE)
(mrem/hour)( 4 ) (hours) 1 x 10- Rem Closed 1 x 10-1 Window x x Sample Volume AiF Sample Results Iodine Bkg cpm Iodine Net(')
(gross - bkg)
I 1
Iodine Gross _ cpm 1 Particulate Bkg __ cpm Particulate Net Particulate (gross - bkg) Concentration Particulate Gross cpm (pCi/cc) or (Ci/m 3 )
(1)If iodine net cpm is >8500, iodine cartridge should be returned for isotopic analysis on a priority basis.
(2)K factors assume 25 ft 3 sample volume.
(3)Child Thyroid DCF reflects correction (1.3 x 106 x 2) based on EPA-400-R-92-001, May 1992.
(4)Closed window dose rate equals DDE rate.
Completed by I /
Print Initial Date Time Time EAP-4 DOSE ASSESSMENT ATTACHMENT 5 Rev. No. 30 CALCULATIONS Page 18 of 18
ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC.
JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE DOSE ESTIMATED FROM AN ACCIDENTAL RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL TO LAKE ONTARIO EAP-12 REVISION 11 REVIEWED BY: PLANT OPERATING REVIEW COMMITTEE MEETING NO. N/A DATE: N/A APPROVED BY:
4*1' a14L' DATE: (S cZ-I T I *
.RESPONSIBLE PROCEDURE ER EFFECTIVE DATE: #
FIRST ISSUE 0 FULL REVISION 0 LIMITED REVISION 0
- INFORMATIONAL USE *
- TSR *
- * *3q
- ;ADMINISTRATIVE . CONTROLLED COPY #
PERIODIC REVIEW DUE DATE:
DOSE ESTIMATED FROM AN ACCIDENTAL RELEASE EAP - 12 OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL TO LAKE ONTARIO j
REVISION
SUMMARY
SHEET REV. NO.
11
- Updated company name change.
- Updated CAI-13 to CA-03.02 in section 2.1.2 and 4.1.
- Changed Ref. Numbers in section 4.4.NOTE from 2.2.3 to 2.2.2 and changed 2.2.4 to 2.2.3.
10
- Step 4.4, references to DCF are listed as (REF. 2.3 and 2.4), Change to 2.2.3 and 2.2.4.
- Relocated Developmental References (EAP 1.1, CAI-13, SP-01.05)to Performance References,in Sections 2.1 and 2.2.
9 Changed "PSP-4" to "SP-01.05" to reflect new procedure number in reference 2.2.5 - RES upgrade program.
- Reformat per AP-02.01, Rev. 5.
- Change level of use to "reference" per AP-02.04.
Rev. No. 11 Page 2 of 7
DOSE ESTIMATED FROM AN ACCIDENTAL RELEASE EAP- 12 OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL TO LAKE ONTARIO TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE SECTION oo4 1.0 PURPOSE .............................................
oo4
2.0 REFERENCES
oo4 3.0 INITIATING EVENTS ...................................
oo s 4.0 PROCEDURE ...........................................
..6 5.0 ATTACHMENTS .........................................
.. 7
- 1. LIQUID RELEASE PROJECTED DOSE WORKSHEET ......
Rev. No. 11 Page 3 of 7
EAP-12 DOSE ESTIMATED FROM AN ACCIDENTAL RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL TO LAKE ONTARIO 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure provides instructions for the calculation of projected TEDE and CDE skin doses received while swimming in or boating upon Lake Ontario after the lake has been contaminated due to an accidental release of radioactive liquid, and the Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) based upon that dose.
2.0 REFERENCES
2.1 Performance References 2.1.1 EAP-I.I, OFFSITE NOTIFICATIONS 2.1.2 CA-03.02, LIQUID RADWASTE DISCHARGE HIGH ACTIVITY*
2.1.3 SP-01.05, WASTEWATER SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS*
2.2 Developmental References 2.2.1 Final Safety Analysis Report, James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, Volume IV and V 2.2.2 FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT CONCERNING PROPOSED RULE MAKING ACTION: Numerical Guides for Design Objectives and Limiting Conditions for Operating to Meet the Criterion "As Low As Practicable" for Radioactive Material in Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Reactor Effluents, Volume 2, Analytical Models and Calculations, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, July 1973 2.2.3 EPA-400-R-92-001, May 1992, Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents 3.0 INITIATING EVENTS 3.1 Any one or more of the following:
3.1.1 Hi/Hi alarm service water monitor or closed loop cooling monitor 3.1.2 Hi/Hi alarm liquid radwaste monitors 3.1.3 Hi/Hi alarm RHR service water effluent monitor Rev. No. 11 Page 4 of 7
EAP-12 DOSE ESTIMATED FROM AN ACCIDENTAL RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL TO LAKE ONTARIO Rapid loss of level in a storage tank, surge tank, 3.1.4 Rapid loss of level in a storage tank, surge tank, waste storage tank, etc.
3.1.5 Rapid loss of level in condensate storage tank.
4.0 PROCEDURE Emergency Director, Radiological Support Coordinator or designee shall:
4.1 Dispatch Chemistry Technician or other knowledgeable personnel to draw grab samples from the discharge canal, lake water, storm drain system, any affected systems such as local floor drain sumps, sample tanks, etc. and perform analysis on them to determine the release concentration (pCi/ml) in accordance with CA-03.02, LIQUID RADWASTE DISCHARGE HIGH ACTIVITY* and SP-01.05, WASTEWATER SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS*.
4.2 Record the calculated release concentration determined in step 4.1 on Attachment 1, Liquid Release Projected Dose Worksheet.
4.3 Determine and record the projected duration of exposure on Attachment 1, Liquid Release Projected Dose Worksheet.
This may be conservatively estimated to be equal to the projected duration of release. IF it is unknown, THEN use 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> as a first estimate.
Rev. No. 11 Page 5 of 7
DOSE ESTIMATED FROM AN ACCIDENTAL RELEASE EAP-12 OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL TO LAKE ONTARIO 4.4 Calculate swimming TEDE and CDE skin and boating TEDE projected doses using the following equation:
Projected Dose (rem) = Q x T x CF where: Q = concentration of radioactivity in release (4Ci/ml)
T = projected duration of exposure (hrs)
CF = conversion factors of dose rate per radioactive concentration in water (rem/hr/4Ci/ml) for swimming, whole body or skin and boating, whole body only.
NOTE: CF (rem/hr/J.Ci/ml) = G x M x DCF where: G = geometry of exposure (unitless) = 1.0 for swimming 0.5 for boating M = dilution of release (unitless) = 1/12 REF. 2.2 DCF = dose rate conversion factor (mrem/hr/pCi/l)
DCF WB* = 7.8 REF. 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 DCF skin* = 9.3 REF. 2.2.2 and 2.2.3
4.5 Record the results of step 4.4 above on Attachment 1, Liquid Release Projected Dose Worksheet.
4.6 Compare projected swimming and boating doses recorded, with Waterborne Protective Action Guides on the worksheet and determine the recommended action.
4.7 Once the Emergency Director or Recovery Manager has reviewed and approved the protective action recommendations, inform the appropriate agencies in accordance with EAP-l.I, OFFSITE NOTIFICATIONS.
5.0 ATTACHMENTS 1.LIQUID RELEASE PROJECTED DOSE WORKSHEET Rev. No. 12 Page 6 of 7
LIQUID RELEASE PROJECTED DOSE WORKSHEET Page 1 of 1
ýMPLE POINT TIME/DATE RELEASE CONCENTRATION ( pCi/ml)
RELEASE DURATION (hrs.)
INDIVIDUAL COMPLETING FORM RECOMMEND EVACUATION ERPA (circle): 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 ACTIVITY DOSE OF RELEASE DURATION CONVERSION PROJECTED UNDER CONCERN CONCENTRATION OF FACTOR DOSE CONSIDERATION (RCi/ml) EXPOSURE (rem/hr/pCi/ml) (rem)
(hrs.)
TEDE 6.5 x 10-7 SWIMMING CDE 7.8 x 10-7 SKIN BOATING TEDE 3.3 x 10-7 PD = (Q) X (T) X (CF)
WATERBORNE PROTECTIVE ACTION GUIDES (.)
Projected Dose (rem) Recommended Actions Projected TEDE or CDE skin dose due Request the U.S. Coast Guard to evacuate all to swimming is equal to or greater swimmers within the 10 mile Emergency Planning than 1 rem. Zone of the plant.
Projected TEDE dose due to boating Request the U.S. Coast Guard to evacuate all is equal to or greater than 1 rem. boats and vessels within the 10 mile Emergency Planning Zone of the plant.
(I) EPA-400-R-92-001, May 1992, Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents EAP-12 DOSE ESTIMATED FROM AN ACCIDENTAL ATTACHMENT 1 Rev. No 11 RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Page 7 of 7 TO LAKE ONTARIO*
ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC.
JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER ACTIVATION EAP-14.1 REVISION 22 REVIEWED BY: PLANT OPERATING REVIEW COMMITTEE MEETING NO. N/A DATE: N/A APPROVED BY: k4 aiL-RESPONSIBLE PROCEDURE OWNER DATE: /-X
( I '-
EFFECTIVE DATE: ;)L/ 90'K)
FIRST ISSUE 0 FULL REVISION 0 LIMITED REVISION 0
- INFORMATIONAL USE *
- TSR *
- O P #
- ADMINISTRATIVE
- CONTROLLED COPY#
PERIODIC REVIEW DUE DATE:
EAP-!14. 1 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER ACTIVATION REVISION
SUMMARY
SHEET REV. NO.
22
- Changed coversheet and section 4.3.6 to reflect company's name change.
0 In section 4.2.4 - deleted Parameter Assessment Advisor and System Assessment Advisor as they now report to the Control Room, and also changed M. from Pub...Liaison and Assistant to Pub ...... Technical Assistant.
0 In section 4.3.4 changed reference from attachment 3 to attachment 4.
0 Changed section 4.3.6 to reflect Niagara Mohawk's name change to Constellation, and deleted Entergy Information Center.
- In section 4.3.7 - replaced Authority Headquarters with WPO 0 On attachment 2 #8, updated computer terminals to be activated.
- On attachment 3 added a #1 in front of 700 number.
21
- Added instructions for relocating the TSC to other areas (Sections 4.2.1, new 4.4, new attachment 5).
20 0 Changes to 4.2.4 - added Parameter Assessment Advisor* and System Assessment Advisor*.
- Section 4.2.5 - added Accident Management Team description.
9 Section 4.3.7, page 8: revised "corporate ERC" to read "Authority Headquarters". HQ Response/Recovery Organization is being realigned as part of this revision. HQ ERC is being eliminated as part of this revision. EAP-l.l notifications will continue to be made to the Authority Headquarters as needed for information only.
- ATTACHMENT 3, UNDER "COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS COORDINATOR & STAFF", PAGE 11: DELETED "ERC" FROM "TSC-WPO ERC HOTLINE". HQ ERC IS BEING ELIMINATED AS PART OF THIS REVISION. A SPECIAL TELEPHONE LINE WILL CONTINUE TO EXIST BETWEEN JAF AND HQ.
Rev. No. 22 Page 2 of 16
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER ACTIVATION EAP - 14. 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE 1.0 PURPOSE ................................................ 4
2.0 REFERENCES
............................................. 4 3.0 INITIATING EVENTS ...................................... 5 4.0 PROCEDUR E .............................................. 5 4.1 Procedural Responsibilities .............................. 5 4.2 TSC Activation ......................................... 6 4.3 TSC Activities ....... . ................................... 9 4.4 Alternate Technical Support Center Activation ......... 10 5.0 ATTACHMENTS ............................................ 11
- 1. FACILITY STATUS GUIDELINES ......................... 12
- 2. TSC ACTIVATION CHECKLIST ......................... 13
- 3. TSC TELEPHONE LIST ............................... 14
- 4. TSC BRIEFING CHECKLIST ........................... 15
- 5. ALTERNATE TSC ACTIVATION CHECKLIST ................. 16 Rev. No. 22 Page 3 of 16
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER ACTIVATION EAP- 14.. I 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure provides instructions necessary to activate the Technical Support Center (TSC) located on the second floor of the Old Administration Building and includes the adjacent office area.
2.0 REFERENCES
2.1 Performance References 2.1.1 EAP-17, EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION STAFFING 2.1.2 OP-55B, CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION AND COOLING 2.1.3 F-OP-59B, ADMINISTRATION BUILDING VENTILATION AND COOLING; SYSTEM NO. 72 2.1.4 EAP-14.6, HABITABILITY OF THE EMERGENCY FACILITIES 2.1.5 EAP-8, PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY 2.1.6 IAP-I, EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTATION CHECKLIST 2.1.7 EAP-4, DOSE ASSESSMENT CALCULATIONS 2.1.8 EAP-1.I, OFFSITE NOTIFICATIONS 2.1.9 EAP-10, PROTECTED AREA CALCULATION 2.1.10 EAP-lI, SITE EVACUATION 2.1.11 EAP-5.3, ONSITE/OFFSITE DOWNWIND SURVEYS AND ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING 2.1.12 EAP-28, EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM (ERDS)
ACTIVATION 2.2 Developmental References 2.2.1 IAP-2, CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS 2.2.2 EAP-17, EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION STAFFING 2.2.3 F-OP-59B, ADMINISTRATION BUILDING VENTILATION AND COOLING; SYSTEM NO. 72 2.2.4 EAP-14.6, HABITABILITY OF THE EMERGENCY FACILITIES Rev. No. 22 Page 4 of 16
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER ACTIVATION EAP -14. 1 2.2.5 JAF-CALC-RAD-00023, Power Uprate Program Technical Support Center Post-Accident Radiological Habitability Study 3.0 INITIATING EVENTS 3.1 An emergency has been declared in accordance with IAP-2, Classification of Emergency Conditions, and 3.2 A decision has been made by the Emergency Director to activate the TSC.
4.0 PROCEDURE 4.1 Procedural Responsibilities 4.1.1 The Emergency Director is responsible for facility activation. This procedure describes a method to activate the TSC, Attachment 1, Facility Status Guidelines. Individual TSC team members can be designated to complete the listed procedural items.
NOTE: The ED need not be present in the TSC for the facility to be considered "Staffed".
NOTE: The TSC, under certain accident conditions, may require the restriction of use of certain TSC office areas. EAP-14.6, HABITABILITY OF THE EMERGENCY FACILITIES, should be instituted to insure TSC habitability. Based on the information from these habitability surveys, a decision shall be made by the Emergency Director or TSC Manager regarding access to certain TSC areas.
Rev. No. 22 Page 5 of 16
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER ACTIVATION EAP- 14 .1 4.2 TSC Activation 4.2.1 The TSC shall provide the necessary area, outside the Control Room to accomplish the technical support necessary for the command and control of the emergency situation. These functions include furnishing in-depth diagnostic and corrective engineering assistance to Control Room emergency personnel. The TSC functions may initially be performed in the Control Room but should be shifted to the TSC as soon as it is operational.
If the Emergency Director determines the TSC is uninhabitable or continued occupation of the TSC is undesirable, TSC functions may be shifted to any appropriate area giving first consideration to the Control Room or the remainder of the Old Administration building within the TSC ventilation pressure boundary. Refer to section 4.4 for instructions.
4.2.2 As TSC staff arrive, they should assume the responsibilities of their emergency assignments and activate the TSC. A checklist is provided to aid in facility activation, see Attachment 2, TSC Activation Checklist.
4.2.3 The first TSC staff members to arrive shall unlock the TSC using a key obtained from the Control Room and verify TSC set-up. If radiological conditions warrant, contact the Control Room to request for and verify activation of the Control Room and TSC filtered ventilation systems in accordance with OP-55B and F-OP-59B, and request the OSC ensure the TSC pressure boundaries are intact.
Rev. No. 22 Page 6 of 16
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER ACTIVATION EAP - 14. 1 4.2.4 The normal positions to staff an operational TSC will include (see EAP-17, EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION STAFFING):
A. Emergency Director*
B. TSC Manager*
C. Emergency Director Aide D. Emergency Security Coordinator*
E. Security Staff (as needed)
F. Technical Coordinator*
G. Plant Engineers (as needed)*
H. Communication and Records Coordinator*
I. Communicators (as needed)*
J. Emergency Maintenance Coordinator*
K. Radiological Support Coordinator*
L. Radiological Support staff (as needed)*
M. Public Information Technical Assistant
- indicates functions that should be staffed prior to declaring the TSC operational. However, the Emergency Director may change the staff required based upon the event at hand.
Functionally, the TSC should be able to provide direction for onsite response, technical engineering assistance, assist with communications, coordinate the OSC and onsite security, and coordinate the onsite radiological actions.
Rev. No. 22 Page 7 of 16
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER ACTIVATION EAP-14 .1 NOTE: Prior to the TSC being declared operational, the Emergency Director may decide to relieve the Control Room staff of the responsibility for offsite notifications if those notifications can be handled effectively from the TSC with a minimum number of communicators.
4.2.5 To assure proper activation of the TSC the following tasks are necessary:
Emergency Security Coordinator and Staff - assure accountability logs are established once the Emergency Director calls for accountability. (Use Attachment 3 in procedure EAP-8, PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY.) In addition, assure that after initial accountability is completed, continuous accountability is maintained.
Rad Support Coordinator and Staff - habitability shall be determined in accordance with EAP-14.6, HABITABILITY OF THE EMERGENCY FACILITIES. Make a plant announcement prohibiting smoking, eating and drinking if abnormal radiological conditions exist or are suspected. Activate radio system and Meteorological/Dose Assessment capabilities.
Verify equipment listed in EAP-14.6, HABITABILITY OF THE EMERGENCY FACILITIES, Section 3.0 (Initiating Events) is operational so indicators of abnormal radiological conditions can be monitored.
Technical Coordinator and Plant Engineer - update status boards using EPIC information and provide engineering support to Control Room.
Communications and Records Coordinator and Staff ensure hotlines, telecopiers and other communications equipment are ready for service.
Attachments 2 and 3 (TSC Activation Checklist and TSC Telephone List, respectively) may be referred to as a guide.
Accident Management Team - Obtain relevant information about plant parameter and system information and current EOP legs and prognosis.
Rev. No. 22 Page 8 of 16
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER ACTIVATION EAP-14.1 4.3 TSC Activities 4.3.1 The Licensed SRO communicator maintains continuous communications with Control Room, EOF and OSC on emergency facility hotline for status reporting.
4.3.2 Implement appropriate portions of the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures using IAP-I, EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTATION CHECKLIST, as a guide.
4.3.3 Direct the Control Room to sound appropriate alarms (i.e. station, evacuation, fire) and make announcements as necessary.
4.3.4 Announce plant status updates over TSC and/or plant public address system. Attachment 4, TSC Briefing Checklist, provides guidance.
4.3.5 Determine protective actions to be recommended to state and local officials using EAP-4, DOSE ASSESSMENT CALCULATIONS, and transmit them in accordance with EAP-I.I, OFFSITE NOTIFICATIONS.
4.3.6 Determine onsite protective actions to be implemented. Consider notification of:
- Security
- Nine Mile Point Units I and II
- Constellation's Training Center
- JAF Training Center 4.3.7 Perform initial and update notifications to WPO, INPO, ANI, etc. as required using TSC/EOF checklist Attachment 8 of EAP-I.l, OFFSITE NOTIFICATIONS.
4.3.8 Coordinate accountability of personnel via EAP-8, PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY, whenever a protected area or site evacuation is required as outlined in EAP-10, PROTECTED AREA EVACUATION, and EAP-II, SITE EVACUATION, respectively.
4.3.9 Assign engineers to act as data plotters and assistants to Technical Coordinator in developing corrective actions which will minimize accident consequences. Ensure, if possible, an engineer attends the OSC Repair Team briefings.
Rev. No. 22 Page 9 of 16
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER ACTIVATION EAP -14.i1 4.3.10 Brief and dispatch downwind survey/sample teams in accordance with EAP-4, DOSE ASSESSMENT CALCULATIONS, and EAP-5.3, ONSITE/OFFSITE DOWNWIND SURVEYS AND ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING.
4.3.11 Continue to evaluate and re-evaluate plant status and effectiveness of emergency actions. As appropriate, re-classify the emergency.
4.3.12 Coordinate the development, review and PORC approval of any ad hoc procedures for damage control (i.e. equipment modifications, tech. spec.
violations, etc.).
NOTE: Attachment 5, Alternate TSC Activation Checklist, maybe used as a guide during TSC relocation.
4.4 Alternate Technical Support Center Activation The Alternate TSC will be utilized if the primary TSC becomes uninhabitable or continued occupation of the TSC is undesirable. When directed by the Emergency Director, the alternate TSC may be located in any appropriate area giving first consideration to the Control Room or the remainder of the Old Administration building within the TSC ventilation pressure boundary.
4.4.1 If it is determined the primary TSC is uninhabitable or continued occupation of the TSC is undesirable, the Emergency Director will direct the TSC Manager to relocate to the Alternate TSC.
4.4.2 The TSC Manager will select appropriate personnel to relocate based on staffing needs outlined in step 4.2.4. Other personnel will be relocated to habitable areas or offsite.
4.4.3 The TSC Manager will take the following equipment to the Alternate TSC: (and any other equipment/supplies that he deems necessary.)
A. Necessary Emergency procedures B. Telephone lists C. Appropriate communications equipment (eg Cell phones, portable radios, etc) 4.4.4 The Emergency Director, TSC Manager, or designee will announce on the public address system the TSC relocation to affected personnel, as well as the new telephone number for the TSC Manager.
Rev. No. 22 Page 10 of 16
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER ACTIVATION EAP-14 .1 5.0 ATTACHMENTS
- 1. FACILITY STATUS GUIDELINES
- 2. TSC ACTIVATION CHECKLIST
- 3. TSC TELEPHONE LIST
- 4. TSC BRIEFING CHECKLIST
- 5. ALTERNATE TSC ACTIVATION CHECKLIST Rev. No. 22 Page 11 of 16
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER ACTIVATION EAP -14. 1 ATTACHMENT 1 Page 1 of 1 FACILITY STATUS GUIDELINES These three conditions describe the various stages of facility readiness:
Activated - An order has been made to activate an emergency response facility, and the facility is in the process of being staffed.
Staffed - The emergency response facility has been activated and sufficient personnel are available to perform the required functions as determined by the facility manager.
Operational - The emergency facility has been activated and staffed, and has assumed responsibilities for performing its intended functions.
Rev. No. 22 Page 12 of 16
TSC ACTIVATION CHECKLIST Page I of I Requirements for TSC Activation:
Verified By Time
- 2. Activation of the TSC and Control Room ventilation system (as radiological conditions warrant)
- 3. Positions listed in Step 4.2.4 are staffed, as appropriate
- 4. Prohibit Smoking, eating and drinking if abnormal radiological conditions exist or are suspected (see EAP-14.6)
- 5. Ensure communications equipment ready
- Gaitronics volume turned up
- Podium P.A. system on and operable
- Satellite phone power turned on
- 6. Dose Assessment capability available
- 7. Status Boards updated
- 11. Emergency Director shall make an announcement over the P.A. system declaring the facility operational
- 12. If EOF ACTIVATED during normal working hours, ensure Environmental Lab notified EA-1.1ATTACHMENT EAP-14.1 OFFSITE NOTIFICATIONS* Page 13 of 16 2 Rev. No. 22 Page 13_f1
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER ACTIVATION EAP - 14. 1 ATTACHMENT 3 Page 1 of 1 TSC TELEPHONE LIST Emergency Director ....................... .......... JAF Ext. 6710 or 782-6477
.......... JAF Ext. 6711 TSC Manager ..............................
Emergency Director Aide .................. .......... JAF Ext. 6772 Emergency Security Coordinator and Staff. .......... JAF Ext. 6121 Technical Coordinator and Plant Engineers .......... JAF Ext. 6778 Communication & Records Coordinator & Staf f ........ JAF Ext. 6780 or 342-5120 TSC-WPO Hotline Emergency Log Keeper ..................... .......... JAF Ext. 6711 Emergency Maintenance Coordinator ........ .......... JAF Ext. 6771 or 342-1183 Fax (Receiving) ........ .......... JAF Ext. 6053 Fax (Sending) .......... ............... 342-4268 Fax (Verification) ..... .......... JAF Ext. 6052 Rad Support Coordinator and Staff .......... JAF Ext. 6719 Rad Engineer ........... .......... JAF Ext. 6770 TSC-EOF Hotline or 342-2367 Radio Dispatcher ....... .......... JAF Ext. 6707 Public Information ..... .......... JAF Ext. 6776 Communicators .......... .......... JAF Ext. 6778 NRC Communicator ....... .......... JAF Ext. 6779 RECS Communicator ...... .......... JAF Ext. 6170 Emergency Notification System (ENS) .... FTS: 1-700-371-5321 Health Physics Network (HPN) . .... FTS: 1-700-371-6773 EPIC Computer Room ...... .......... JAF Ext. 6164 Computer Room .......... .......... JAF Ext. 6165 Tie Lines: TSC to EOF - 85 CELLULAR PHONES TSC to JNC - 81 TSC Manager: 591-0479 Dispatcher: 591-0476 Near RECS: 591-0473 Watertown Lines: 315-782-6477 315-782-6478 315-782-6479 Rev. No. 22 Page 14 of 16
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER ACTIVATION EAP - 14. 1 ATTACHMENT 4 Page 1 of 1 TSC BRIEFING CHECKLIST TSC Manager should brief the facility EVERY 60 MINUTES or sooner if plant conditions change.
TSC Manager should call on group leaders to provide briefing information in their area of expertise.
I. Emergency Classification and Reason for Classification II. Plant Conditions A. Plant Status (stable, improving, degrading)
B. Equipment Failures (inoperative, malfunctioning)
C. Status of Restorative Activities D. Offsite Assistance Requested, if any III. Is a Release in Progress?
A. Source of Release B. Release Characteristics (source: PASS, Stack Sample, Reactor Sample, Default)
C. Expected Release Duration D. General Wind Direction and Speed E. Release Rate F. Actions Underway to Stop or Reduce Releases G. Maximum Offsite and Onsite Doses and Location
- 1. Measured, or
- 2. Calculated IV. Protective Action Recommendations A. JAFNPP Protective Action Recommendations B. Oswego County or New York State Protective Actions Implemented V. Facility Habitability: CR, TSC and OSC VI. Accountability Status (if necessary) and Missing Persons VII. Engineering Projects Assigned and Their Priorities VIII. Solicit Reports from Group Leaders (as necessary)
IX. Solicit Questions from Staff Rev. No. 22 Page 15 of 16
EAP- 14 .1 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER ACTIVATION ATTACHMENT 5 Page 1 of 1 ALTERNATE TSC ACTIVATION CHECKLIST I
VERIFIED DESCRIPTION Notify Control Room and OSC Manager that Alternate TSC is Operational.
Verify that the Alternate TSC location is habitable per EAP-14.6.
Select appropriate personnel to relocate to the Alternate TSC per 4.2.4 Direct remaining personnel to go to:
(identify location)
NOTE: TSC personnel may be staged in any habitable area such as the TSC and CR ventilation boundaries, remote buildings not affected by the incident, or they may be directed off-site.
Take/obtain the following equipment:
"* Emergency procedures
"* Telephone lists
"* Communication equipment
"* Other equipment as needed WHEN established, notify the Control Room and OSC Manager of phone numbers at TSC location.
Utilize TSC Activation Checklist, Attachment 3 , to complete Alternate TSC activation EAP-14.J. of 16]5 ATTACLHMENT REvP.1 Rev. No.
No. 22OFFSITE 22 NOTIFICATIONS* Age 16 ACof Page 1
ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC.
JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY ACTIVATION EAP-14.2 REVISION 20 REVIEWED BY: PLANT OPERATING REVIEW COMMITTEE MEETING NO. N/A DATE: N/A APPROVED BY: A 1 RESPONS IBLE PROCEDURE OWNER DATE: (S '&-
EFFECTIVE DATE: if cA ;q 9(yq FIRST ISSUE 0 FULL REVISION Z LIMITED REVISION 0
- INFORMATIONAL USE **TSR*
- CONTROLLED COPY#
- ~ADMINISTRATIVE*
PERIODIC REVIEW DUE DATE:
( /I 20I7
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY ACTIVATION EAP-14.2 REVISION
SUMMARY
SHEET REV. NO.
20 0 Changed title page and section 4.5.1 to reflect company's new name.
0 In section 4.2.9 and on Attachment 3 VIII.F.
changed title of position from Liaison to technical.
0 In section 4.3.3 - changed Authority Headquarters and replaced it with WPO.
0 In section 4.5 - added Auburn Armature.
- On attachment 2 changed Niagara Mohawk to Constellation and updated WPO Authority Headquarters numbers.
& On Attachment 4 #6. deleted NYPA.
19 0 On page 13, added number 4 "Ensure portal monitor and portable frisker are setup and ready for use.
18 0 Add Attachment 4 to provide instructions for use of video equipment at the EOF. (ACT-98-33547) 0 Add Attachment 5 to provide a checklist as an aid in ensuring EOF readiness.
17 I lSection 4.3.3, page 7: revised "headquarters EOC" to read "Authority Headquarters". HQ Response/Recovery Organization is being realigned as part of this revision. HQ ERC is being eliminated as part of this revision. EAP-1.1 notifications will continue to be made to the Authority Headquarters as needed for information only.
- Attachment 2, page 10: revised "WPO IP-3 Alternate EOF" to read WPO (Authority Headquarters)". HQ ERC is being eliminated as part of this revision.
Telephone communications will continue to exist between JAF and HQ.
Rev. No. 20 Page 2 of 13
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY ACTIVATION EAP-14.2 TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE 1.0 PURPOSE ................................................ 4
2.0 REFERENCES
............................................. 4 3.0 INITIATING EVENTS ...................................... 4 4.0 PROCEDURE .............................................. 5 4.1 Procedural Responsibilities ............................ 5 4.2 EOF Activation ......................................... 5 4.3 EOF Activities (when operational): ..................... 7 5.0 ATTACHMENTS ............................................ 8
- 1. FACILITY STATUS GUIDELINES ......................... 9
- 2. EOF TELEPHONE LIST ................................ 10
- 3. EOF BRIEFING CHECKLIST ............................ 11
- 4. EOF VIDEO SYSTEM OPERATION ........................ 12
- 5. EOF ACTIVATION CHECKLIST .......................... 13 Rev. No. 20 Page 3 of 13
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY ACTIVATION EAP - 14 . 2 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure provides instructions necessary to activate the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) located next to the Oswego County Airport near Fulton (Volney), N.Y.
2.0 REFERENCES
2.1 Performance References 2.1.1 EAP-l.I, Offsite Notifications 2.1.2 EAP-4, Dose Assessment Calculations 2.1.3 EAP-5.3, Onsite/Offsite Downwind Surveys and Environmental Monitoring 2.1.4 EAP-17, Emergency Organization Staffing 2.1.5 EAP-29, EOF Ventilation Isolation Durnig an Emergency 2.1.6 EAP-37, Security of the EOF and EL During Drills, Exercises and Actual Events 2.1.7 SAP-13, EOF Security and Fire Alarm Systems During Normal Operations 2.2 Developmental References 2.2.1 IAP-2, Classification of Emergency Conditions 3.0 INITIATING EVENTS 3.1 Both of the following conditions exist:
3.1.1 An emergency has been declared per IAP-2.
3.1.2 A decision has been made by the Emergency Director to activate the EOF.
Rev. No. 20 Page 4 of 13
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY ACTIVATION EAP - 14. 2 4.0 PROCEDURE 4.1 Procedural Responsibilities 4.1.1 EOF Manager Responsible for facility activation. This procedure describes a method to activate the EOF (Attachment 1, Facility Status Guidelines). The EOF Manager can vary this procedure to accommodate ad hoc changes that may be necessary. Individual EOF team members can be designated to complete the listed procedural items.
4.1.2 EOF Personnel Responsibilities As EOF staff arrive at the EOF, they shall ascertain if the EOF is being activated per this procedure. If not, they should attempt EOF activation per this procedure until arrival of the EOF Manager.
4.2 EOF Activation 4.2.1 JAFNPP employees designated as EOF Manager are supplied with keys to the EOF.
4.2.2 Upon arrival at the facility, personnel access shall be in accordance with EAP-37, along with any needed reference to SAP-13.
4.2.3 Follow appropriate instructions regarding the use of monitoring instruments inside the entrance to the EOF and ensure their use by entering personnel. (Materials/equipment are in the decon room area).
4.2.4 The Rad Support Coordinator shall determine if at any time the need exists for an EOF Radiation Protection Technician to perform habitability surveys, distribution of personnel dosimetry, and necessity to implement EAP-29.
4.2.5 Assure log sheets, message forms, in (and out) baskets, pads and pens, and phone books are at the appropriate desks.
4.2.6 Turn the volume up on the radios and RECS speaker and assign an individual to monitor them.
Rev. No. 20 Page 5 of 13
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY ACTIVATION EAP - 14. 2 4.2.7 Verify all necessary communications equipment is present and test for proper operation. Attachment 2, EOF Telephone List, may be referred as a guide.
4.2.8 Ensure the Radiological Emergency Communications System (RECS) and other communications links are staffed by appropriate personnel (technical/non technical).
4.2.9 The EOF Manager, in consultation with the Staffing Coordinator, if necessary, shall inform the ED when the EOF is STAFFED. The normal positions to staff the EOF will include (see EAP-17):
A. Emergency Director/Recovery Manager**
B. EOF Manager*
C. Emergency Director Aide D. Rad Support Coordinator*
E. Rad Support Staff (as needed)*
F. Public Information Technical Assistant G. Technical Liaison*
H. Staffing Coordinator I. Communicators (as needed)*
- indicates functions that should be able to be performed prior to declaring EOF staffed or operational. However, the Emergency Director may change the staff required based upon the event at hand.
Functionally, the EOF should be able to provide direction for offsite response, including dose assessment and protective action recommendations, assist with communications, coordinate offsite security and provide in depth information to offsite authorities and the JNC.
- The EMERGENCY DIRECTOR does not need to be present in order to declare the EOF STAFFED.
NOTE: Prior to the EOF being declared operational, the Emergency Director may decide to relieve the TSC staff of the responsibility for dose assessment if that activity can be handled effectively. Once the ED has assumed responsibilities at the EOF, it may be declared operational.
Rev. No. 20 Page 6 of 13
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY ACTIVATION EAP-14.2 4.2.10 Assign clerk to assist State/County liaisons if requested.
4.2.11 Synchronize clock with TSC.
4.2.12 Ensure video equipment is ready for use per Attachment 4.
4.2.13 Verify EOF readiness using Attachment 5.
4.3 EOF Activities (when operational):
4.3.1 Technical liaison maintains continuous communications with Control Room, TSC, and OSC on emergency facility hotline for status reporting.
4.3.2 Determine protective actions to be recommended to state, local, and federal officials using EAP-4, and transmit them in accordance with EAP-1.1.
4.3.3 Perform initial and update notifications to WPO, INPO, ANI, etc. as required using TSC/EOF checklist, Attachment 8 of EAP-1.1.
4.3.4 Brief, dispatch, and control downwind survey/sample teams per EAP-5.3.
4.3.5 Review press releases to be used at the Joint News Center.
4.3.6 Coordinate availability of staffing for 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> coverage.
4.3.7 Coordinate requests for assistance from outside agencies.
4.3.8 Emergency Director or EOF Manager periodically brief staff using Attachment 3, EOF Briefing Checklist, for guidance.
Rev. No. 20 Page 7 of 13
- 1.
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY ACTIVATION EAP-14.2 4.4 The Oswego County Liaison should report to the EOF for a plant status briefing from the EOF Manager or designee prior to being dispatched to the Oswego County Emergency Operations Center.
4.4.1 The Oswego County Liaison shall be dispatched at a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency, and may be dispatched at other classifications if necessary.
4.5 If an emergency generator is required, call Auburn Armature at 1-800-333-0519 with the following information. Ensure an EOF call-back number is provided:
NOTE: Cable for generator connection is in loading dock area.
4.5.1 Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. has an emergency situation and needs to rent a generator.
4.5.2 Minimum generator requirements are:
- 175 KW
- 277/480 volt 0 3-phase 4.5.3 EOF location is Route 176 at the Oswego County Airport.
4.6 EOF personnel will secure the EOF to normal status, as directed by the Emergency Director, when the EOF is no longer needed for the control of the situation with reference to EAP-37.
5.0 ATTACHKMENTS
- 1. FACILITY STATUS GUIDELINES
- 2. EOF TELEPHONE LIST
- 3. EOF BRIEFING CHECKLIST
- 4. EOF VIDEO SYSTEM OPERATION
- 5. EOF ACTIVATION CHECKLIST Rev. No. 20 Page 8 of 13
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY ACTIVATION EAP-14.2 ATTACHMENT 1 Page 1 of 1 FACILITY STATUS GUIDELINES These three conditions describe the various stages of facility readiness:
Activated - An order has been made to activate an emergency response facility, and the facility is in the process of being staffed.
Staffed - The emergency response facility has been activated and sufficient personnel are available to perform the required functions as determined by the facility manager.
Operational - The emergency facility has been activated and staffed, and has assumed responsibilities for performing its intended functions.
Rev. No. 20 Page 9 of 13
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY ACTIVATION EAP - 14 . 2 ATTACHMENT 2 Page 1 of 1 EOF TELEPHONE LIST All extensions are prefixed with 593 To activate paging system - dial "5899" Position Extension Position Extension Clerks 5955 Constellation ED 5864 5960 5874 Communicators 5830 Oswego Co. Liaison 5970 Computer Operator 5923 Public Information 5700 Public Information Fax 5834 Conference Room Speaker Phone Technical Assistance Conference Room Wall Phone 5802 Purchasing/Account 5885 Dose Assessment Clerk 5993 Rad Data Coordinator 5996 Dose Assessment Coordinator 5995 Rad Support Coordinator 5850 Downwind Survey Team 5991 Radio Operator RECS Communicator 5875 Cellular Phone 593-4183 Emergency Director Aide 5844 Security Entrance 5716 Emergency Director 5840 5845 Security Office 5715 Cellular Phone 439-6879 EOF Manager 5835 Staffing Coordinator 5880 Fax (receiving #1) 5951 Technical Liaison 5825 Fax (receiving #2) 5953 Fax (sending) 5952 Telephone.Mech Room 5721 Fax (verification) 5955 5960 TIE LINES Kitchen 5801 86 - SYRACUSE 87 - WATERTOWN Loading Dock 5780 82 - JAF PLANT Main Switchboard Number 5700 TIES LINES OFF JAF SWITCH Meteorologist 5994 711-NYO 718 -WPO New York State Liaison 5972 714-IP3 New York State Liaison Fax 5975 WPO TIE LINE 82-719-XXXX Rev. No. 20 Page 10 of 13
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY ACTIVATION EAP - 14. 2 ATTACHMENT 3 Page 1 of 1 EOF BRIEFING CHECKLIST EOF Manager should brief the facility EVERY 60 MINUTES or sooner if plant conditions change.
I. Emergency Classification II. Plant Conditions A. Plant Status (stable, improving, degrading)
B. Major Equipment Failures or Problems Encountered (inoperative, malfunctioning)
C. Other Changes in Plant Condition since last briefing D. Maintenance Work in Plant E. Offsite Assistance called for II1. Radiological Conditions A. Source of Release if occurred, potential for or releasing B. Expected Release Duration C. General Wind Direction and Speed D. Release Rate E. Maximum Offsite Doses and Location
- 1. Measured, or
- 2. Calculated IV. Protective Action Recommendations A. JAFNPP Building Evacuations or Site Evacuation B. JAFNPP Protective Action Recommendations V. Governmental and Media Actions A. County Implemented Protective Actions B. Prompt Notification System Use C. Joint News Center Status D. Law Enforcement Actions E. Reception Center Status F. Press Releases VI. JAFNPP Accountability Status A. Missing Persons B. Injured Personnel VII. Status of Other Facilities VIII. Solicit Additional Information from EOF Staff A. Technical Coordinators B. Rad Assessment Coordinator C. Oswego County D. New York State E. Federal Agencies F. Public Information Technical Assistant Rev. No. 20 Page 11 of 13
4L I EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY ACTIVATION EAP-14.2 ATTACHMENT 4 Page 1 of 1 EOF VIDEO SYSTEM OPERATION NOTE: The following table shows use of EOF displays:
DISPLAY SOURCE Left Monitor EPIC Right Monitor Technical Liason Computer Left Screen SONY Projector Right Screen EPIC
- 1. Turn on track lighting using dimmer switches on east wall of entrance hallway.
- 2. Turn off fluorescent lights in the front portion of the EOF using the top row of dimmer switches on the west wall of entrance Hallway.
- 3. Lower both overhead projection screens using the UP/DOWN switches on the east wall of the entrance hallway.
- 4. Turn on each of the two 42 inch Mitsubishi monitors as follows:
- a. Depress the power switch on front of the unit and verify the Red power light is on.
- b. Depress the pushout panel to the right of the power button to slide the control panel out.
- c. Depress the power button on the control panel and verify the power light turns Green.
- 5. At the audio/video communications rack in the Communications Room, ensure the Black Box selector switch is in the EPIC position.
6 Turn on the Technical Liaison PC and monitor.
- 7. Turn on each of the two overhead projectors as follows:
- a. Turn on power using the switch next to the power cord (rear of unit, upper right). Verify status light is Orange or Green.
NOTE: Orange light indicates unit is in standby mode.
Green light indicates unit is in projection mode.
- b. Depress POWER button on bottom of unit as necessary until status light is Green.
- 8. Turn on Sony projector using power switch.
Rev. No. 20 Page 12 of 13
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY ACTIVATION EAP-14.2 ATTACHMENT 5 Page 1 of 1 EOF ACTIVATION CHECKLIST DESCRIPTION VERIFIED INIT TIME
- 3. Ensure communications equipment ready for use:
" RECS speaker volume turned up
"*Radio speaker volume turned up
"*FAX machines on
"*Telephones have dial tone
- 4. Ensure portal monitor and portable frisker are setup and ready for use.
- 5. Status boards updated
- 7. Environmental Lab notified if EOF actived during normaliworking hours
- 8. Video display equipment ready for use per Attachment 4
- 9. Rad Support Coordinator has taken the following actions if abnormal radiological conditions exist or are suspected, as necessary:
"*Assigned a Rad Tech to conduct habitability surveys (EAP-14.6)
"*Distributed dosimetry to EOF personnel (EAP-35)
"*Isolated EOF ventilation (EAP-29)
Rev. No. 20 Page 13 of 13
EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES/OLUME 3 UPDATE LIST I CONTROLLED COPY Date of Issue: April 24, 2002 Procedure Procedure Revision Date of Use of Number Title Number Last Procedure Review N/A TABLE OF CONTENTS REV. 23 12/98 N/A EAP-26 PLANT DATA ACQUISITION SYSTEM REV. 11 02/98 Informational ACCESS ESTIMATION OF POPULATION DOSE EAP-27 WITHIN 10 MILE EMERGENCY PLANNING REV. 9 02/98 Informational ZONE EAP-28 EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM REV.6 07/00 Reference (ERDS) ACTIVATION EAP-29 EOF VENTILATION ISOLATION DURING REV.5 02/98 Informational AN EMERGENCY EAP-30 EMERGENCY TERMINATION AND REV. 0 12/98 Informational TRANSITION TO RECOVERY*
EAP-31 RECOVERY MANAGER* REV. 1 07/01 Informational EAP-32 RECOVERY SUPPORT GROUP* REV. 8 02/02 Informational EAP-33 DEVELOPMENT OF A RECOVERY ACTION REV. 0 12/98 Informational PLAN*
ACCEPTANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL EAP-34 SAMPLES AT THE EOF/EL DURING AN 02/98 Informational EMERGENCY EAP-35 EOF TLD ISSUANCE DURING AN REV.6 02/98 Informational EMERGENCY EAP-36 ENVIRONMENTAL DRNANEEGCY02/98 LABORATORY USE REV. 4 Informational DURING AN EMERGENCY SECURITY OF THE EOF AND EL DURING REV.6 EAP-37 DRILLS, EXERCISES AND ACTUAL 07/01 Informational EVENTS EAP-39 DELETED (02/95)
EAP-40 DELETED (02/98)
EAP-41 DELETED (12/85)
EAP-42 OBTAINING METEOROLOGICAL DATA REV. 17 04/02 Informational EAP-43 EMERGENCY FACILITIES LONG TERM REV. 55 02/02 Informational STAFFING EAP-44 CORE DAMAGE ESTIMATION REV. 4 02/98 Informational EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM EAP-45 (ERDS CONFIGURATION CONTROL REV. 6 07/00 Informational PROGRAM)
MAINTAINING EMERGENCY REV. 16 04/02 Informational PREPAREDNESS SAP-2 EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT INVENTORY REV. 33 10/01 Reference 5AP-3 EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS REV. 70 09/01 Reference TESTING Page 1 of 2
EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES/VOLUME 3 UPDATE LIST Date of Issue: April 24, 2002 Date of Ueo Procedure Procedure Revision atUseof Number Title Number Reie Review Procedure SAP-4 NYS/OSWEGO COUNTY EMERGENCY Informational PREPAREDNESS PHOTO IDENTIFICATION REV. 8 03/00 CARDS SAP-5 DELETED (3/98)
SAP-6 DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT REV. 17 04/02 Informational SAP-7 MONTHLY SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURE Informational FOR ON-CALL EMPLOYEES REV. 35 11/00 SAP-8 PROMPT NOTIFICATION SYSTEM Informational FAILURE/SIREN SYSTEM FALSE REV. 12 10/01 ACTIVATION SAP-9 DELETED (02/94)
SAP-10 METEOROLOGICAL MONITORING REV.11 03/02 Informational SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE SAP-11 EOF DOCUMENT CONTROL REV. 10 08/00 Informational SAP-13 EOF SECURITY AND FIRE ALARM Informational SYSTEMS DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS REV. 3 03/98 SAP- 14 DELETED (02/95)
SAP-15 DELETED (11/92)
SAP- 16 UTILIZING EPIC IDT TERMINALS FROM Informational DESTINY SYSTEM REV. 3 02/98 SAP-17 EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM Continuous (ERDS) QUARTERLY TESTING REV. 7 07/00 SAP-19 SEVERE WEATHER REV. 4 01/01 Informational SAP-20 EMERGENCY PLAN ASSIGNMENTS REV. 20 03/02 Informational SAP-21 DELETED (04/01)
SAP-22 EMERGENCY PLANNING PROGRAM SELF 10/98 Informational ASSESSMENT Page 2 of 2
ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC.
JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE OBTAINING METEOROLOGICAL DATA EAP-42 REVISION 17 REVIEWED BY: PLANT OPERATING REVIEW COMMITTEE MEETING NO. N/A DATE: N/A APPROVED BY: DATE: -(c&
RESPONSI LE PROCEDURE R EFFECTIVE DATE:
FIRST ISSUE El FULL REVISION 0 LIMITED REVISION S
- INFORMATIONAL USE *
- TSR *
- P #
- ADMINISTRATIVE
- CONTROLLED COPY#
PERIODIC REVIEW DUE DATE: FEBRUARY 2 00 3
OBTAINING METEOROLOGICAL DATA EAP-42 REVISION
SUMMARY
SHEET REV. NO.
17
- In section 4.4.1, 4.4.5, 4.4.6.A, 4.4.7 & 8.A-D updated the channels with numbers rather than letters.
- Replaced attachments 4, 5 and 7 with updated pictures.
- Made Attachment 7 posted attachment A.
- Added note in section 4.4.7 to make user aware that they may use posted attachment A for notification requirements.
16 0 Deleted the words Niagara Mohawk due to their company change.
0 In section 4.4.2 - updated the information to check when attempting to obtain data from the strip chart recorders and deleted the section following 4.4.3.
- Added Attachment 7 that shows atmospheric stability.
15 0 Added NIMO Mete contact information to sections 4.6.1 and 4.5.3.
- An adjustment was made to the cover sheet to reflect the company name change.
14 0 Added the TSC as an alternate location for performing forecasting of mete data.
- In section 4.2.2., deleted step G, and changed its test to a NOTE prior to step 4.2.2.
13 0 On Attachment 1, in the EDAMS box, changed "F4" for requery to select "Requery" with the mouse. Also in same box deleted If "locked up" or stalled, Attachment 3 for recovery.
12 0 Section 4.2 is changed to incorporate the new windows design of EDAMS and the method to obtain Met data.
- Original Attachment 3 was deleted, this attachment is no longer needed with the windows version. It is being replaced with a new Attachment 3 titled "Guide For Using EDAMS Computer To Obtain Meteorology Data".
Rev. No. 17 Page 2 of 20
OBTAINING METEOROLOGICAL DATA EAP-42 TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE 1.0 PURPOSE ................................................ 4
2.0 REFERENCES
............................................. 4 3.0 INITIATING EVENTS ...................................... 4 4.0 PROCEDURE .............................................. 4 4.1 Description of Available Methods ....................... 4 4.2 Obtaining Meteorological Data from EDAMS ................. 5 4.3 Obtaining Meteorological Data from Nine Mile ............ 6 4.4 Obtaining Meteorological Data from Analog Strip Charts . 7 4.5 Obtaining Meteorological Information From Other Sourcesl2 5.0 ATTACHMENTS ........................................... 13
- 1. MET DATA ACQUISITION QUICK REFERENCE FLOWCHART ..... 14
- 2. OBTAINING METEOROLOGICAL DATA FOR MANUAL COMPUTER INPUT .............................. 15
- 3. GUIDE FOR USING EDAMS COMPUTER TO OBTAIN METEOROLOGY DATA ............................ 16
- 4. ANALOG WIND SPEED AND DIRECTION RECORDERS D, G AND J ............................... 17
- 5. RECORDER "K"...... ................................ 18
- 6. CLASSIFICATION OF ATMOSPHERIC STABILITY ............ 19 A. EAP-42 POSTED ATTACHMENT A - EXAMPLES OF ATMOSPHERIC STABILITY .......................................... 20 Rev. No. 17 Page 3 of 20
OBTAINING METEOROLOGICAL DATA EAP-42 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure provides instructions for accessing meteorological data in the Control Room, Technical Support Center, or Emergency Operations Facility and includes provisions for long-term forecasting.
2.0 REFERENCES
None 2.1 Developmental References 2.1.1 EAP-4, DOSE ASSESSMENT CALCULATIONS*
2.1.2 Emergency Dose Assessment Model System (EDAMS) System Design Specification 3.0 INITIATING EVENTS 3.1.1 An emergency has been declared in accordance with IAP 2, CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY Conditions, or 3.1.2 EAP-4, DOSE ASSESSMENT CALCULATIONS, has been implemented.
4.0 PROCEDURE 4.1 Description of Available Methods Meteorological data is available from the following sources:
A. Emergency Dose Assessment Modeling System (EDAMS)
B. Nine Mile Point Units 1 or 2 Control Rooms C. Analog strip charts in Control Room or Technical Support Center D. Any JAF Networked PC E. National Weather Service Rev. No. 17 Page 4 of 20
OBTAINING METEOROLOGICAL DATA EAP-42 The general methodology involved would concern providing meteorological data dependent on type of release. An elevated release (stack) would utilize 200' level data; and if unavailable, would progress in decreasing order to 100', 30' and backup tower data (90'). Likewise, a ground release (any other than stack) would utilize 30' level data, and if unavailable, would progress in increasing order to 100', 200' and backup tower data (90').
This list does not delineate a required order of priority but provides a listing of resources based on accessibility timeliness and accuracy of 15 minute averaged data.
NOTE: Flowchart (Attachment 1) is provided as a quick reference and may be utilized by the operator familiar with the body of this procedure.
It is optional to record met data on Attachment 2, Obtaining Meteorological Data for Manual Computer Input; this may provide some convenience.
4.2 Obtaining Meteorological Data from EDAMS 4.2.1 If the EDAMS computer is on-line:
A. The computer will automatically requery the met system and update the data every 15 minutes on the quarter hour (eg. 1300, 1315, 1330, etc.). A beep may be heard when the update occurs.
B. When recording data, the operator should confirm the time and date displayed are the most current (ie. within the last 15 minutes of the current time).
C. The operator may select "Requery" to ensure the most current data is displayed.
4.2.2 If EDAMS is NOT on-line, log onto the system as follows:
NOTE: Attachment 3 may be used to guide the operator through the steps to activate the EDAMS computer and obtain meteorological data.
A. Ensure black switch on CR or TSC meteorological panels is positioned to the Niagara Mohawk ("B")
position.
Rev. No. 17 Page 5 of 20
OBTAINING METEOROLOGICAL DATA EAP-42 NOTE: Select "Continue" at the plant picture screen.
B. Energize the EDAMS computer power strip to provide power to the computer, monitor and printer.
C. Select the "Login" icon from the EDAMS icons and select "Continue" at the plant picture screen.
D. Select the appropriate menu item based on your location as follows:
Location: Menu Choice CR Direct Connect to Met Data TSC Direct Connect to Met Data EOF Automatic Dial-in to Met Data E. When the login routine finishes, close the login screen by selecting "OK".
F. From the EDAMS icons, select "Emergency Met Report".
G. Select "James A. FitzPatrick" and "Both" for unit and release height, then select "OK". The emergency meteorology data will be displayed.
H. Ensure that "Continuous Requery?" is enabled.
I. The computer will automatically requery the met system and update the data every 15 minutes on the quarter hour (eg. 1300, 1315, 1330, etc.). A beep may be heard when the update occurs.
4.3 Obtaining Meteorological Data from Nine Mile 4.3.1 From the Control Room, use the direct line phone to Unit 1 or 2 Control Room and request latest 15 minute averaged data.
4.3.2 If for some reason direct line unavailable, from TSC or EOF, use a commercial phone with one of the following numbers:
A. NMPl: 349-2841, 349-2842 or 349-2843 B. NMP2: 349-2168, 349-2169 or 349-2170 Rev. No. 17 Page 6 of 20
OBTAINING METEOROLOGICAL DATA EAP-42 4.4 Obtaining Meteorological Data from Analog Strip Charts 4.4.1 Description of analog strip charts and information available.
There are four (4) analog strip chart recorders available in the Control room and TSC to provide meteorological data.
Each of the three recorders (D, G, J) have two channels (1 and 2) to provide wind speed and direction.
Channel 1= wind speed in mph (0-100 mph) traced on left Channel 2 = wind direction in degrees(arc) (5400 range) traced on right Recorders used for wind speed and direction D Main Tower 200' level G JAF Backup Tower 90' level J Main Tower 30' or 100' level (selector switch provided)
Recorder K is provided for stability class determination.
Recorder K has the following four traces:
1 Provides temperature in OF at 30' level 2 Provides AT in OF from 30' to 100' level 3 Provides AT in OF from 30' to 200' level 4 Selectable sigma theta (wind direction variation)
Trace 4 has four selectable channels to trace for:
A High main tower (200')
B Mid main tower (100')
C Low main tower (30')
D Backup tower (90')
Rev. No. 17 Page 7 of 20
1.
OBTAINING METEOROLOGICAL DATA EAP-42 4.4.2 Before attempting to obtain data from any of the strip chart recorders, ensure they are functioning by verifying the date and time on the display is correct.
The strip chart runs at l"/hr. Time indicated is Eastern Standard Time.
4.4.3 When manually retrieving meteorological data, primary concern is given to wind speed and direction, and to the stability class at particular elevations, dependent on the type of release.
4.4.4 In order to properly estimate the last 15 minutes on the strip chart, measure the last 1/41 of data for each parameter, if not readily visible, and/or the chart has not already been advanced, do so in order to average the last 15 minutes of data properly. Obtain a minimum of 4 data points within that 1/4" of chart and average.
4.4.5 Meteorological data for a Ground or both a Ground and Elevated release are to be determined as follows:
A. There are 3 recorders, which record wind speed and direction (Recorders D, G, and J) . For each chart, wind speed (the left trace) is labeled Channel 1 and is in MPH (the range is 0 to 100 MPH and spans the left side of the chart) and wind direction (the right trace) is labeled Channel 2 and is in degrees arc (the range is 0 to 540 degrees and spans the right side of the chart). Consult Attachment 4.
To obtain wind direction and speed for a ground or ground and elevated release, you must first determine whether the Recorder "J" toggle switch is set for 30 or 100 foot (Main Tower) . If it is set for 30 foot (Main), average the wind speed and direction as per step 4.4.5.
If the Recorder "J" toggle switch is set for 100 foot (Main Tower) and/or there is no 30 foot data, adhere to the following hierarchy of substeps:
- 1. Average the wind speed and direction as per step 4.4.5 for Recorder "G", which is meteorological data for the JAF Back-up Tower 90 foot level.
Rev. No. 17 Page 8 of 20
OBTAINING METEOROLOGICAL DATA EAP -4 2
- 2. If Recorder "G" is inoperable average the wind speed and direction as per step 4.4.5 for Recorder 'D", which is meteorological data for the Main Tower 200 foot level.
- 3. If both Recorder "G & D" are inoperable average the wind speed and direction as per step 4.4.5 for Recorder "IJ"I which is meteorological data for either the 30 or 100 foot Main Tower levels, as determined by the toggle switch position.
- 4. If NO strip chart wind speed and direction data is available, proceed to section 4.5 after completing 4.4.8.
4.4.6 Meteorological data for an elevated release is to be determined as follows:
A. There are 3 recorders, which record wind speed and direction (Recorders D, G and J). For each chart, wind speed (the left trace) is in MPH (the range is 0 to 100 MPH, and spans the left side of the chart) and wind direction (the right trace) is in degrees arc (the range is 0 to 540 degrees and spans the right side of the chart). Consult Attachment 4.
To obtain wind speed and direction for an elevated release, adhere to the following substeps:
- 1. Average the wind speed and direction as per step 4.4.5 for Recorder "D", which is meteorological data for the Main Tower 200 foot level.
Rev. No. 17 Page 9 of 20
OBTAINING METEOROLOGICAL DATA EAP-42
- 2. If Recorder "D" is inoperable average the wind speed and direction as per step 4.4.5 for Recorder "G", which is meteorological data for the JAF Back-up Tower 90 foot level.
- 3. If both Recorder 'D & G" are inoperable average the wind speed and direction as per step 4.4.5 for Recorder "J" which is meteorological data for either the 30 or 100 foot Main Tower levels, as determined by the toggle switch position.
- 4. If NO strip chart wind speed and direction data is available, proceed to section 4.5 after completing 4.4.8.
4.4.7 To determine stability class for either a ground or elevated release, you must utilize Recorder "K" information, which contains 4 channels that span the full chart:
NOTE: Prior to declaring the TSC Operational, POSTED ATTACHMENT A, EXAMPLES OF ATMOSPHERIC STABILITY may be used in the Control Room and/or TSC to provide quick stability class estimation to meet offsite agency notification requirements.
A. Trace labeled "I" provides ambient temperature, on a -40 to +110 scale and indicates the current temperature in degrees F at the Main Tower 30 foot level.
B. Trace "2" provides temperature difference (delta T) between the 30 and 100 foot level on the Main Tower, and is on the -8 to +20 scale in degrees F.
C. Trace "3" provides temperature difference between the 30 and 200 foot level on the Main Tower, and is on the same -8 to +20 scale in degrees F.
Rev. No. 17 Page 10 of 20
OBTAINING METEOROLOGICAL DATA EAP-42 D. Trace "4" provides sigma theta (wind direction variation), on a scale of 0 to 30 degrees, at a level dependant on the switch position on the front of the TIGRAPH recording panel:
Switch Position Level Tower A 200 ft. Main (Primary)
B 100 ft. Main (Primary)
C 30 ft. Main (Primary)
D 90 ft. JAF (Back-up)
Consult Attachment 5.
4.4.8 To derive stability class for either a ground or elevated release, or both, utilize Attachment 4 and adhere to the following hierarchy of substeps:
A. Average the trace "4" (sigma theta) on Recorder "K", utilizing the 0 to 30 scale, as per step 4.4.5, noting the switch position, and consulting Attachment 6 to determine letter stability class.
NOTE: If data is invalid, you may want to switch another switch position to get the most representative data (for the next 15 minute average). For example, for an elevated release you should utilize switch position A, then B, D and finally C, and for a ground release, the progression is C, B, D and then A.
B. If Trace "4" is unavailable, average the Trace "3" (temperature difference 30 - 200 foot) on Recorder "K", utilizing the -8 to +20 degree F scale as per step 4.4.5 and consulting Attachment 6 to determine letter stability class.
C. If Traces "4" and "3" are unavailable, average the Trace "2" (temperature difference 30 - 100 foot) on Recorder "K", utilizing the -8 to +20 degree F scale as per step 4.4.5 and consulting Attachment 6 to determine letter stability class.
Rev. No. 17 Page 11 of 20
OBTAINING METEOROLOGICAL DATA EAP-42 D. If Traces "4"',"3", and "2"" are unavailable, estimate stability by comparing wind direction and speed traces to the samples posted on the side of the TIGRAPH 200 housing and/or utilizing the "Atmospheric Stability Characterization" table on Attachment 6.
E. If All Recorders are unavailable for meteorological data, proceed to section 4.5.
4.5 Obtaining Meteorological Information From Other Sources 4.5.1 If meteorological data is not obtained via the primary method (digital) or secondary method (analog strip charts) information on local wind speed and direction, and stability class can be obtained through other sources.
4.5.2 Meteorological data is also available from any JAF networked PC.
4.5.3 Nine Mile Meteorological Data A. Telephone the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station #1 Control Room via the "hot line" or dial phone, and request pertinent meteorological data needed.
B. In addition, supplemental information may be obtained through Nine Mile via their Meteorological Building. Contact one of the following people for assistance:
Tom Galetta - 349-2715 (Office) *Pager # 1193 Joe Blakeley - 349-1179 (Office) *Pager # 1040
- To access the NIMO pager call 1-800-732-4365 4.5.4 National Weather Service Meteorological Data Data may be obtained via telephone on 716-565-0014.
Indicate what meteorological data is needed and note the source of the information.
4.5.5 Stability Estimation Consult Attachment 6 and estimate stability class via a characterization of the local meteorological conditions.
Rev. No. 17 Page 12 of 20
OBTAINING METEOROLOGICAL DATA EAP-42 4.6 Meteorological Forecasting Meteorological forecasting capabilities during an emergency at JAF will be handled from the EOF (primary) or TSC (alternate) by assigned personnel using the Internet or an on-line service.
4.6.1 For assistance in forecasting, contact one of the following people:
Tom Galetta - 349-2715 (Office) *Pager # 1193 Joe Blakeley - 349-1179 (Office) *Pager # 1040
- To access the NIMO pager call 1-800-732-4365 4.6.2 Assigned personnel will establish a connection with the Internet or on-line service to become familiar with the current and forecast weather situation.
4.6.3 Assigned personnel will provide JAF Dose Assessment Group a weather forecast.
4.6.4 Provide weather condition and forecast updates until the event requiring support is formally terminated.
The frequency of updates will be based upon factors such as the variability of weather conditions and the needs of JAF emergency personnel.
5.0 ATTACHMENTS
- 1. MET DATA ACQUISITION QUICK REFERENCE FLOWCHART
- 2. OBTAINING METEOROLOGICAL DATA FOR MANUAL COMPUTER INPUT
- 3. GUIDE FOR USING EDAMS COMPUTER TO OBTAIN METEOROLOGY DATA
- 4. ANALOG WIND SPEED AND DIRECTION, RECORDERS D, G AND J
- 5. RECORDER "K"
- 6. CLASSIFICATION OF ATMOSPHERIC STABILITY A. POSTED ATTACHMENT A - EXAMPLES OF ATMOSPHERIC STABILITY Rev. No. 17 Page 13 of 20
OBTAINING METEOROLOGICAL DATA EAP-42 ATTACHMENT 1 MET DATA ACQUISITION QUICK REFERENCE FLOWCHART EDAMS
- Select "Requery" with the mouse.
I Nine Mile
- Direct phone line to Unit 1 CR: 349-2841 Unit 1 or 2 Control Room 349-2842 349-2843 Commercial phone Unit 2 CR: 349-2168 349-2169 349-2170 j
Analog Strip Charts I
Any JAF Networked PC Other Resources Nine Mile Meteorological Building National Weather Service (716-565-0014)
Rev. No. 17 Page 14 of 20
OBTAINING METEOROLOGICAL DATA FOR MANUAL COMPUTER INPUT Page 1 of 1 Date: Time:
Release Type:
Meteorology Wind Speed: MPH @ ft. level on Tower Other (Specify)
Wind DirectioIn: deg. @ ft level on ToYver Other (Specify)
Stability Cla .ss: (A - G)
Meth Lod: (Sigma Theta - wind variation)
(Temp. Difference 200 ft)
(Temp. Difference 100 ft)
Estimation Other (Specify)
Additional information EAP-42 OBTAINING METEOROLOGICAL ATTACHMENT 2 Rev. No. 17 DATA* Page 15 of 20
1 -
OBTAINING METEOROLOGICAL DATA EAP-42 ATTACHMENT 3 Page 1 of 1 GUIDE FOR USING EDAMS COMPUTER TO OBTAIN METEOROLOGY DATA
- 1. If in the CR or TSC, then ensure black switch on met panels is set to Niagara Mohawk "B " position.
- 2. Ensure power to computer, monitor, and printer.
- 3. Select the "Login" icon from the EDAMS icons.
- 4. Select "Continue" at the plant picture screen.
- 5. For the CR or TSC select "Direct Connect to Met Data". For EOF select "Automatic Dial-in to Met Data".
- 6. When prompted, following login, select " Ok".
- 7. From the EDAMS icons select "E mergency Met Report".
- 8. Select "Continue" at the plant picture screen.
- 9. Select "Jam es A. FitzPatrick" and "Both ", then select "Ok".
- 10. If a stack release is occurring, or projected, then utilize Elevated data.
- 11. If a release from any source other than the stack is occurring, or projected, then utilize Ground data.
- 12. If no release is occurring, or projected, then utilize Elevated data.
- 13. If no data is available from the EDAMS computer, then utilize EAP-42 to obtain meteorological data from other sources.
Rev. No. 17 Page 16 of 20
OBTAINING METEOROLOGICAL DATA EAP-42 ATTACHMENT 4 Page 1 of 1 ANALOG WIND SPEED AND DIRECTION RECORDERS D, G AND J
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I A I-ATTACHMENT 5 Page 1 of 1 RECORDER "K" 12 18 24 38 14 :ee :0e
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ATTACHMENT 6 Page 1 of 1 CLASSIFICATION OF ATMOSPHERIC STABILITY CLASSIFICATION OF ATMOSPHERIC STABILITY BY THE VERTICAL TEMPERATURE DIFFERENCE
_ND BY THE STANDARD DEVIATION OF THE HORIZONTAL WIND DIRECTION TYPING SCHEMES STABILITY PASQUILL Temperature Change with 'e degrees CLASSIFICATION CATEGORIES height Oc/100m* '0 degrees Median Value Extremely unstable A AT/Az _*-1.9 aO > 22.5 25.0 Moderately unstable B -1.9 < AT/Az :5 -1.7 22.5 > aO > 17.5 20.0 Slightly unstable C -1.7 < AT/Az _*-1.5 17.5 > 00 Z! 12.5 15.0 Neutral D -1.5 < AT/Az _*-0.5 12.5 > aO > 7.5 10.0 Slightly stable E -0.5 < AT/Az < 1.5 7.5 > aO - 3.8 5.0 Moderately stable F 1.5 < AT/Az 5 4.0 3.8 > CO > 2.1 2.5 Extremely stable G 4.0 < AT/Az 2.1 > e0 1.7 STABILITY PASQUILL Temperature Change with Temperature Change with CLASSIFICATION CATEGORIES height 0F/70 Feet** height 0 F/170 Feet t Extremely unstable A AT/Az < -0.73 AT/AZ !5 -1.77 Moderately unstable B -0.73 < AT/Az < -0.65 -1.77 < AT/Az < -1.59 Slightly unstable C -0.65 < AT/AZ < -0.58 -1.59 < AT/Az _<-1.40 Neutral D -0.58 < AT/AZ < -0.19 -1.40 < AT/Az _<-0.47 Slightly stable E -0.19 < AT/Az < 0.58 -0.47 < AT/Az < 1.40 Moderately stable F 0.58 < AT/AZ _< 1.53 1.40 < AT/Az 3.73 Extremely stable G 1.53 < AT/Az 3.73 < AT/AZ ATMOSPHERIC TABILITY CHARACTERIZATION A MID-AFTERNOON ONLY, WITH CLEAR SKIES OR SKIES WITH VERY FEW THIN CLOUDS; LATE SPRING TO EARLY FALL, WINDS USUALLY ARE BELOW 6 MILES PER HOUR.
B LATE MORNING TO MID-AFTERNOON ONLY, WITH CLEAR OR PARTLY CLOUDY SKIES; MID-SPRING TO MID-FALL, WINDS ARE USUALLY BELOW 9 MILES PER HOUR.
C LATE MORNING TO LATE AFTERNOON ONLY , WITH PARTLY CLOUDY SKIES; SPRING THROUGH FALL, WINDS ARE USUALLY BELOW 11 MILES PER HOUR.
D ALL DAYTIME, WITH OVERCAST OR PARTLY CLOUDY SKIES OR EARLY MORNING AND LATE AFTERNOON WITH CLEAR OR PARTLY CLOUDY SKIES, ALL NIGHT TIME WITH OVERCAST SKIES OR PARTLY CLOUDY, YEAR AROUND, WINDS ARE MODERATE TO HIGH (GREATER THAN 6 MILES PER HOUR).
E NIGHT TIME ONLY, WITH THIN OVERCAST OR PARTLY CLOUDY SKIES ALL YEAR AROUND, WINDS LESS THAN 10 MILES PER HOUR.
F NIGHT TIME ONLY, WITH CLEAR TO PARTLY CLOUDY SKIES, ALL YEAR AROUND, WINDS LESS THAN 7 MILES PER HOUR.
G NIGHT TIME ONLY, WITH CLEAR SKIES OR VERY FEW THIN CLOUDS, ALL YEAR AROUND, WINDS LESS THAN 5 MILES PER HOUR.
- PER NRC REGULATORY GUIDE 1.123
- ADJUSTED TO CORRESPOND TO THE AT MEASURED BETWEEN THE 30-FOOT AND 100 FOOT LEVELS.
t ADJUSTED TO CORRESPOND TO THE AT MEASURED BETWEEN THE 30-FOOT AND 200 FOOT LEVELS.
Rev. No. 17 Page 19 of 20
EAP-42 POSTED ATTACHMEINT A - EXAMPLES OF ATMOSrHERiC STABILITY PASQUILL: A PASQUILL: B,C VERY UNSTABLE UNSTABLE BROOKHAVEN ClASS I BROOKHAVEN CLASS 2 March 20. 2002 March 20. 2002 360 go 188' 99 8 278 368 5E 18V
- 220 MPH 1e8 I
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Recorders D, G, J:
Wind speed increments---- (trace 1, left side) Each dot () = 2 units, Each vertical line (I)= 4 units Wind direction increment-(trace 2, right side) Each dot = 99)units, Each vertical line (1)= 18 units Recorder K:
Air temperature increment- (trace 1) Each dot ') 1.5 units, Each vertical line (1) = 3 units Delta T increment---(Trace 2 and 3) Each dot () 0.28 units, Each vertical line (1) = 0.56 units Sigma Theta 60 increment---(Trace 4)Each dot C) 0.3 units, Each vertical line(I) = 0.6 units Rev. No. A Page 20 of 20
ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC.
JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS SAP-i REVISION 16 REVIEWED BY: PLANT OPERATING REVIEW COMMITTEE MEETING NO. N/A DATE N/A APPROVED BY: DATE: X* c~
RES ONISIBLE PROCED OWNER EFFECTIVE DATE: 5' -,;kA- oa FIRST ISSUE 0 FULL REVISION 0 LIMITED REVISION 0 PERIODIC REVIEW DUE DATE: Jj Q0(21
MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS SAP- 1 SJ REVISION
SUMMARY
SHEET REV. NO.
DERs 16 e In section 4.1.1 - deleted "with ACTS item, lesson learned or other corrective actions." This is due to the new paperless PCRS System.
"*Updated company name change on title page and in section 4.1.5.
"*In section 4.1.6 deleted Training Manager and replaced it with Emergency Planning Coordinator or designee.
"*In section 4.1.7, 4.4.4, 4.5.2.E, & Attachment 1 deleted "observation" and replaced it with "Evaluation".
"* In section 4.3.1 - changed the Emergency planning zones to be tested monthly instead of annually and deleted communications related to type of drill.
Deleted "via the observer" dealing with messages being delivered by.
"* In section 4.3.3 & Attachment 1 page 3- updated SUNY Health Science Center to Upstate Medical Center.
"* In section 4.4.2 added the word scenario after exercise.
"*In section 4.5.1 - updated Radiological and Environmental Services with Radiation Protection.
"*In section 4.5.1 C-E & on attachment 1 updated the titles from various department.
"*In section 4.5.1.F - designated specific plant personnel to review scenario packages.
"* In section 4.5.2.E- removed reference to PORC representative.
"* In section 4.5.3 - deleted observer.
15
- Added step 4.5.2.c to include performance indicator data in Drill and Exercise Scenario Documentation package.
Rev. No. 16 Page 2 of 18
MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS SAP- 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PA*GE 1.0 PURPOSE ......................................... .4
2.0 REFERENCES
...................................... .4 3.0 INITIATING EVENTS ............................... .5
.5 4.0 PROCEDURE .......................................
.5 4.1 General .........................................
4.2 Training ........................................ .6 4.3 Drills .......................................... .7 4.4 Exercises ....................................... .9 4.5 Drill and Exercise Development and Documentation 11 5.0 ATTACHMENTS ..................................... 14
- 1. DRILL SUBJECT REPORT ........................ 15 Rev. No. 16 Page 3 of 18
MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS SAP- 1 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure details the actions to be taken to maintain emergency preparedness at the JAFNPP site. The procedure establishes a method for the conduct and evaluation of a drill or exercise at the JAFNPP. This procedure also outlines the management controls used to ensure that corrective actions are implemented.
2.0 REFERENCES
2.1 Performance References None 2.2 Developmental References 2.2.1 NUREG-0654, Criteria for the Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in support of Nuclear Power Plants 2.2.2 JAFNPP Emergency Plan, Volume #1 2.2.3 TP-1.01, TRAINING RECORDS 2.2.4 TP-4.01, GENERAL EMPLOYEE TRAINING 2.2.5 ITP-12, EMERGENCY RESPONSE TRAINING 2.2.6 AP-02.01, PROCEDURE WRITING MANUAL 2.2.7 AP-02.03, EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 2.2.8 AP-02.04, CONTROL OF PROCEDURES 2.2.9 QA-18.1-J, QUALITY ASSURANCE AUDIT PROGRAM-PLANT 2.2.10 SAP-6, DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT 2.2.11 SAP-3, EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS TESTING 2.2.12 IAP-2, CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS 2.2.13 JAFNPP EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES, VOLUMES 2 and 3 2.2.14 10CFR50.54(t) 2.2.15 Volume 10 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50.55 2.2.16 TP-4.02, FIRE AND RESCUE TRAINING Rev. No. 16 Page 4 of 18
MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS SAP- 1 3.0 INITIATING EVENTS None 4.0 PROCEDURE 4.1 General Emergency preparedness at JAFNPP is maintained through an integrated program of training, drills, exercises, plan and procedure maintenance, and audits.
4.1.1 Training - Plant staff and outside support agencies are given formal classroom training in accordance with ITP-12, EMERGENCY RESPONSE TRAINING. Formal training consists of classroom instruction and examinations. Drills and exercises are utilized to evaluate emergency preparedness, and the results of these are input to a formalized drill report.
4.1.2 Drills - A drill is a hands on, supervised instruction period aimed at developing, testing and maintaining skills in a particular operation.
Drills at JAFNPP are conducted in accordance with the schedule and guidelines of section 4.3 of this procedure.
4.1.3 Exercises - As defined in NUREG-0654, an exercise is an event that tests the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements existing within emergency plans and organizations.
Exercises at JAFNPP are conducted in accordance with the schedule and guidelines of section 4.4 of this procedure.
4.1.4 Plan and Procedure Maintenance - Maintenance of the JAFNPP Emergency Plan and Implementing procedures consists of document control activities including distribution control, change control, procedure review, and cross reference review.
Plan and procedure maintenance is in accordance with AP-02.03, EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS and AP 02.04, CONTROL OF PROCEDURES.
Rev. No. 16 Page 5 of 18
MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS SAP-i 4.1.5 Reviews - Entergy Q.A. will conduct a review of the emergency preparedness program at least once every 12 months in accordance with Section 8 of the Emergency Plan. Findings and corrective action records shall be maintained by the QA department in accordance with their procedures.
4.1.6 Drill/Exercise Documentation - Documentation for drills and exercises shall be maintained by the Emergency Planning Coordinator or designee.
Documentation shall be developed in accordance with section 4.5.
4.1.7 Drill/Exercise Conduct, Evaluation, Critiques and Deficiencies - A formalized method for evaluating a drill or exercise has been established. SAP-6, DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT, details the method for conducting the Drill/Exercise Evaluation Program, Critique, and Deficiency action.
4.2 Training The responsibility for training is shared by the Training Manager and the Emergency Planning Coordinator.
4.2.1 Training Manager - The Training Manager is responsible for the formal classroom training of individuals who have duties in the emergency response organization. The Training Manager is also responsible for specialized training services such as fire fighting, first aid and search/rescue. The Training Manager is responsible for all documentation of fire brigade drills.
4.2.2 Emergency Planning Coordinator - The Emergency Planning Coordinator is responsible for communications, medical emergency (contaminated injury), radiological monitoring and radiation protection drills.
4.2.3 Initial training and periodic retraining shall be conducted in accordance with TP-I.01, TRAINING RECORDS, TP-4.01, GENERAL EMPLOYEE TRAINING and ITP-12, EMERGENCY RESPONSE TRAINING.
Rev. No. 16 Page 6 of 18
MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS SAP- 1 4.2.4 Formal training shall be documented using a Training Report (as defined by Training procedures).
4.2.5 The Training Manager shall be responsible for maintaining all Emergency Plan training records.
This shall include records of all formal training sessions, drills and exercises.
4.3 Drills Responsibility for the conduct of drills is divided between the Emergency Planning Coordinator (EPC) and the Fire Protection Supervisor (FPS)/Fire Protection Training Specialist. There are five drill areas:
4.3.1 Communication Drills - Emergency Planning Coordinator.
Communications with Federal, State and local governments within the Emergency Planning Zones shall be tested monthly. Communications between the nuclear facility, State and local emergency operations centers, and field assessment teams shall be tested annually. These drills shall also include the aspect of understanding the content of messages. Documentation for communication drills shall be in accordance with procedure SAP-3, EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS TESTING. Communication drills shall be reviewed by the Emergency Planning Coordinator or the Assistant Emergency Planning Coordinator.
4.3.2 Fire Drills - Fire Protection Supervisor/Fire Protection Training Specialist.
Fire drills shall be conducted in accordance with the plant administrative procedures, Fire Protection Procedures and Training Procedures.
Fire Brigade drills are the responsibility of the Fire Protection Supervisor. Response to an actual fire may be counted as a drill. Documentation of Fire Drills shall be done by the Training Manager in accordance with TP-4.02, FIRE AND RESCUE TRAINING.
Rev. No. 16 Page 7 of 18
MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS SAP-1 4.3.3 Medical Emergency Drills - Emergency Planning Coordinator.
A medical emergency drill involving a simulated contaminated individual and contains provisions for participation by the local support services agencies (i.e., Oswego Hospital, Upstate Medical Center and the Oswego Fire Department Ambulance) shall be conducted annually. The medical drill may be performed as part of the required exercise.
Response to an actual medical emergency may be counted as a drill. Documentation of Medical Emergency Drills shall be done by completing Attachment 1, Drill Subject Report, with a drill scenario and providing a completed copy in accordance with the JAF Records Retention Turnover Schedule.
Radiological Monitoring Drills - Emergency Planning Coordinator.
Plant environs and radiological monitoring drills (onsite and offsite) shall be conducted annually.
These drills shall include collection and analysis of sample media (e.g., water, vegetation, soil and air), and provisions for communications and record keeping. This drill may be conducted as part of the JAFNPP Biennial Exercise. Documentation for Radiological Monitoring Drills shall be done by completing Attachment 1, Drill Subject Report, with a drill scenario and providing a completed copy in accordance with the JAF Records Retention Turnover Schedule.
4.3.4 Radiation Protection Drills - Emergency Planning Coordinator.
A. Radiation Protection drills shall be conducted semi-annually which involve response to, and analysis of, simulated elevated airborne and liquid samples and direct radiation measurements in the environment.
Rev. No. 16 Page 8 of 18
MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS SAP- 1 B. Analysis of in-plant liquid samples with actual or simulated elevated radiation levels including use of the post-accident sampling system shall be included in Radiation Protection drills. This drill may be conducted as part of the JAFNPP Biennial Exercise.
Documentation of Radiation Protection Drills shall be done by completing Attachment 1, Drill Subject Report, with drill scenario and providing a completed copy in accordance with the JAF Records Retention Turnover Schedule.
Response to an incident involving elevated airborne or liquid activity or elevated radiation levels may be counted as a drill.
4.3.5 Drill Scheduling - The Emergency Planning Coordinator shall be responsible for the scheduling of all drills with the exception of Fire Drills, which is the responsibility of the Fire Protection Supervisor/Fire Protection Training Specialist. To the greatest extent possible drills should be scheduled in conjunction with each other to minimize interference with plant operating schedules. (Example: Exercising fire, medical and communications aspects of the emergency plan in conjunction with the JAFNPP Biennial Exercise.).
4.4 Exercises An emergency response exercise is an event that tests the integrated capability of a major portion of the basic elements contained in the JAFNPP Emergency Plan. An exercise can be comprised of numerous drills conducted simultaneously.
The purpose of the exercise, as described in NUREG-0654, is to test the full-scale response capabilities of the Plant, State, Local and Federal agencies. The Plant is directly involved and is evaluated on its response to the simulated emergency situation.
The JAFNPP is required to conduct an exercise biennially.
The exercise shall either be a full-scale exercise which will include full participation by State and Local agencies or a small scale exercise that shall include only limited participation of State and Local agencies.
Rev. No. 16 Page 9 of 18
MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS SAP-I 4.4.1 All personnel at JAFNPP may participate in an emergency exercise. (Note: Only Fire Brigade personnel may participate in a fire drill.)
4.4.2 An exercise scenario shall be developed and should include the Alert, Site Area or General Emergency.
4.4.3 The scenario should be varied from year to year such that all major elements of the plans and preparedness organizations are tested within a five-year period. Once every six years an exercise shall be off-hours. Some exercises should be unannounced. The EPC shall maintain a five-year schedule of all major elements to be tested.
4.4.4 Offsite support groups should be contacted and included in the development of a JAFNPP Exercise, and requested to supply.evaluators 4.4.5 Some exercises of emergency preparedness should simulate an emergency that results in offsite radiological releases, which would require responses by offsite authorities.
4.4.6 Exercises should be conducted under various weather conditions. To facilitate this, since the Emergency Planning Coordinator cannot reliably schedule drills in advance to coincide with adverse weather, it is advisable not to cancel or postpone drills based on unexpected in clemencies unless continuation would constitute undue risk to the participants or to the plant.
4.4.7 The biennial exercises shall be planned in advance via a formal scenario incorporating simulated plant, environmental, and personnel related events (input by controllers) to guide the action and allow for free play.
4.4.8 Documentation of the exercise shall be conducted in a manner consistent with section 4.5 of this procedure.
Rev. No. 16 Page 10 of 18
MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS SAP- 1 4.5 Drill and Exercise Development and Documentation 4.5.1 Development Responsibilities - The Emergency Planning Coordinator shall insure the development, planning, scheduling and coordination of all drills/exercises involving the JAFNPP Emergency Plan.
A. The Fire Protection Supervisor shall assist the Emergency Planning Coordinator in preparing drill/exercise scenarios, requiring use of the fire brigade. The Fire Protection Supervisor is responsible for the development and conduct of fire brigade drills.
B. The General Manager Plant Operations shall provide assistance to the Emergency Planning Coordinator in preparing drill/exercise scenarios.
C. The Health Physics Manager and Chemistry Superintendent shall provide assistance to the Emergency Planning Coordinator in preparing drill/exercise scenarios.
D. The Maintenance Manager and the Director of Safety and Assurance shall provide assistance to the Emergency Planning Coordinator in preparing drill/exercise scenarios.
E. The Manager of Communications shall provide assistance to the Emergency Planning Coordinator in preparing the drill/exercise scenarios.
F. At a minimum, the Emergency Planning Coordinator and a Licensed Operator shall review drill/exercise scenarios.
Rev. No. 16 Page 11 of 18
MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS SAP- 1 4.5.2 Drill and Exercise Scenario Development and Documentation.
A drill scenario shall be developed, organized and documented in a manner chosen by the Emergency Planning Coordinator. As a minimum, the scenario package will contain the following:
A. Drill
Title:
(e.g., Refueling accident, loss of coolant accident, etc.).
B. Objectives: The basic objective of the drill.
C. Performance Indicator Data: A narrative description of opportunities for personnel to demonstrate accurate event classification, notification and PARs appropriate to the event within specified time limits. The following information should be included:
- 1. Expected emergency classifications
- 2. Expected offsite notifications for initial classification and upgrade of classification
- 4. Expected offsite notification for initial PAR or any change D. Summary: A narrative summary describing the conduct of the events. This may include such things as simulated casualties, offsite department assistance, rescue of personnel, evacuation required, use of protective clothing, deployment of radiological monitoring teams, and public information activities.
E. Drill Subject Report: This report describes information pertinent to the understanding of the drill intent. The report also includes a sign-off sheet for the reviewers, as well as a list of evaluators and controllers. Evaluators and controllers may also be designated by memo or other manner included in the drill or exercise package.
Rev. No. 16 Page 12 of 18
MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS SAP- 1 4.5.3 The Emergency Planning Coordinator may include in the drill or exercise package any or all of the following information, or any additional information as required:
A. Scope: Date, time, duration, location, and participating onsite and offsite organizations.
B. Rules and Guidelines: Includes all ground rules, scope, safety precautions and procedure for exercise conduct, and the date, time and location of briefings and critiques.
C. Event Information: Including reactor vessel level and pressure graphs, dose assessment displays and meteorological forecasts, etc.
D. Safety Precautions: Safety precautions to be followed.
E. Time Schedule: A time schedule of initiating events including expected or simulated plant alarms, indications, or emergency classifications.
F. Meetings: A time schedule for training, badging, briefings, plant tours and critiques.
G. Timeline: A time schedule of major events and emergency classifications.
H. Messages: Includes completed sheets for use in the exercise detailing activities, events, time, and sequence.
I. Data: Includes Emergency and Plant Information Computer (EPIC), ARM's and In-plant Rad Maps, PASS data, Environmental Sample Data, and Offsite Rad Data.
J. Anticipated Actions: A timeline of anticipated actions that should be taken by emergency facilities.
K. Method of Evaluation: Contents should include the standard to which evaluation shall be made and supporting documentation.
Rev. No. 16 Page 13 of 18
MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS SAP-I L. EPIC Screens: An accurate list of EPIC screens I will be developed and displayed on the EPIC terminals.
5.0 ATTACHMENTS
- 1. DRILL SUBJECT REPORT Rev. No. 16 Page 14 of 18
DRILL SUBJECT REPORT Page 1 of 4 James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Plan Drill/Exercise Title Drill/Exercise Date The items checked in this drill or exercise package are expected to result from using the scenario that is attached.
Prepared By Date t.at e Licensed Operator Review Date Emergency Planning Coordinator - Approval Date Attach with copies of Evaluator/Controller List & Scenario and send to:
- 1. JAFNPP Emergency Planning Coordinator
- 2. JAFNPP Training Manager SAP -1 MAINTAINING EMERGENCY ATTACHMENT 11 Rev. No. 16 PREPAREDNESS* Page 15 of 18
Pacre 2 of 4 ELEMENTS THAT SHOULD BE EXERCISED EACH YEAR ELEMENT CHECK 1 Accident Detection and Assessment 2 Emergency Classification (LIST) 3 Personnel Notifications Notification of onsite responders Notification of offsite responders 4 Communications RECS NRC ENS Phone Other Special (LIST) 5 Radiological Exposure Control Inplant air/liquid samples Onsite air/liquid samples Offsite air/liquid samples (field monitoring)
Personnel exposure control 6 Protective Action Recomnmendations Initial Protective Actions Augmented Dose Assessment Protective Actions 7 Staff Augmentation Full facility activation Shift change 8 Shift Staffing Partial facility staffing (mini drill)
EAP-43 staffing review NOTES:
I SAP-I MAINTAINING EMERGENCY ATTACHMENT 11 Rev. No. 16 PREPAREDNESS* Page 16 of 18
Page 3 of 4 ELEMENTS THAT SHOULD BE EXERCISED OVER A 5 YEAR PERIOD ELEMENT CHECK 1 Off-hours Staffing (6pm-4am) 2 Activation of Joint News Center (JNC)
News release(s) will be prepared Media briefing(s) will be conducted Prompt Notification System/EBS 3 Use of Fire Brigade Onsite response Offsite Scriba Volunteer Fire Department Offsite other 4a Use of First Aid Team Contaminated medical injury Non-contaminated medical injury 4b Use of Search and Rescue Team 5 Use of Medical Support Team Onsite First Aid Team Offsite Oswego Hospital Offsite Upstate Medical Center Offsite City of Oswego Fire Department Ambulance Offsite other (LIST) 6 Use of security personnel to provide quick access for emergency equipment and support Emergency equipment access Sabotage/Bomb Intruder Accountability 7 Use of backup communications Radio (LIST)
Phone (LIST)
Other communication (LIST) 8 Rumor Control 9 Use of Emergency Power at Emergency Response Facility (ERF) 10 Evacuation of ERFs and relocation to backups 11 Ingestion Pathway Exercise (State site requirement) 12 Field monitoring including soil, vegetation and water sampling Collect environmental media Sampling station collections/including TLDs SAP-1 MAINTAINING EMERGENCY ATTACHMENT 11 Rev. No. 16 PREPAREDNESS* Page 17 of 18
Paqe 4 of 4 ELEMENTS THAT SHOULD BE EXERCISED OVER A 5 YEAR PERIOD ELEMENT 13 Capability for determining the magnitude and impact of the particular release components 14 Capability for post accident coolant sampling and analysis Stack iodine particulate sample Reactor coolant/gas sample 15 Use of Potassium Iodide 16 Assembly and Accountability 17 Recovery and Reentry NOTES:
I S
1 mm ,?tN1It¶f!' I I i-u iksa1IIrd'J1 .1.
SAP-1 MAINTAINING EMEKGENUX of 18 PREPAREDNES S* Page 18 Rev. No. 16
ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC.
JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT SAP-6 REVISION 17 REVIEWED BY: PLANT OPERATING REVIEW COMMITTEE MEETING NO. N/A DATE: N/A APPROVED BY: DATE: /
RESPONST*LE PROCEDURIEOWNER EFFECTIVE DATE:
Itt'd I
FIRST ISSUE 0 FULL REVISION 0 LIMITED REVISION El PERIODIC REVIEW DUE DATE: 9(907
DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT SAP- 6 REVISION
SUMMARY
SHEET REV. NO.
17 0 Changed Observer to Evaluator throughout the entire procedure.
0 In sections 5.2.5 updated the plant personnel's titles 0 In section 6.2 reworded information on lead controller being station in the CR.
0 Deleted 7.2 section that refers to observer being selected with the concurrence of the Site Ex.
Officer.
0 Deleted reference to DER's in section 8.2 and referred it to CRs.
- On attachment 1 changed responsibility for resenting the drill EPC rather than the Plant Management.
- Changed any reference to Niagara Mohawk with NMPC.
16 0 An adjustment was made to the cover sheet to reflect the Company name change.
- Added Section 9.0 to clarify acceptance criteria for NRC performance indicators.
0 In Section 2.2, two additional references were listed.
- Step 4.5 was added; referencing section 9 of this procedure.
0 Editorial corrections were made on page 6 acknowledging the resent company change.
15 0 Revised Observer Evaluation forms (Attachment 2) to collect NRC performance indicator data points for Drill/Exercise Performance.
0 Revised Attachment 1 Drill or Exercise Conduct Checklist, to tabulate and calculate NRC performance indicators for Drill/Exercise Performance.
14 0 Attachment 2, pages 46-48: deleted as these Observer Evaluation Forms are no longer required. HQ ERC is being eliminated as part of this revision.
- In section 8.1, 8.2, & 8.3 - added "or designee".
e Added "or designee" to sections 8.1, 8.2, & 8.3.
13 0 Reformat per AP-02.01, Rev. 5.
- Editorial changes.
- Reference change to reflect current APs.
Rev. No. 17 Page 2 of 54
DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT SAP- 6 TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE 1.0 PURPOSE ................................. .. ... .......... 4
...... ,........ 4
2.0 REFERENCES
.......... ..... 4 3.0 INITIATING EVENTS .......................
.. t............. 4 4.0 PROCEDURE ...............................
............... 5 5.0 DRILL CONDUCT ...........................
............... 7 6.0 EXERCISE CONDUCT ........................
7.0 EVALUATOR CONDUCT .......................
8.0 CRITIQUES AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ........ S.............. 14 9.0 DRILL AND EXERCISE PERFORMANCE INDICATOR (DEP)
EVALUATION .............................. S.............. is 9.3 Classification .......................... S.............. 16 9.4 Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) S.............. 16 9.5 Notifications ........................... S.............. 16 10.0 ATTACHMENTS ............................. S.............. 17
- 1. DRILL OR EXERCISE CONDUCT CHECKLIST S.............. 18
- 2. EVALUATOR EVALUATION FORM .......... S.............. 20 Rev. No. 17 Page 3 of 54
DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT SAP-6 1.0 PURPOSE To establish a procedure for the conduct and evaluation of all Emergency Plan Drills and Exercises at JAFNPP. This procedure also outlines the management controls used to ensure that corrective actions are implemented.
2.0 REFERENCES
2.1 Performance References None 2.2 Developmental References 2.2.1 NUREG-0654, Criteria for the Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants 2.2.2 JAFNPP Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures, Volumes 1, 2 and 3 2.2.3 SAP-l, MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS I
2.2.4 AP-02.03, EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 2.2.5 AP-02.04, CONTROL OF PROCEDURES 2.2.6 NEI 99-02, Revision 0, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline' 2.2.3 2.2.7 NUREG-0654, Criteria for the Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants 3.0 INITIATING EVENTS None 4.0 PROCEDURE 4.1 Drill conduct is discussed in Section 5 of this procedure.
This section delineates the minimum acceptable activity for a drill at JAFNPP.
Rev. No. 17 Page 4 of 54
DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT SAP- 6 4.2 Exercise conduct is discussed in section 6 of this procedure. This section delineates the minimum acceptable activity for an exercise at JAFNPP.
4.3 Evaluator conduct is discussed in Section 7 of this procedure. This section specifies the minimum acceptable, preparation, training and response required for an evaluator of a JAFNPP drill or exercise.
4.4 Critiques and corrective actions are discussed in Section 8 of this procedure. This section specifies the method in which problems with Emergency Preparedness at JAFNPP are handled.
4.5 Drill and Exercise Performance Indicator (PI) evaluation is discussed in Section 9 of this procedure. This section describes the minimum acceptable performance indicator evaluation criteria.
5.0 DRILL CONDUCT 5.1 Drills shall be directed with the frequency established by SAP-i, MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS.
5.2 Drills shall be directed by a lead controller who shall be responsible for conducting the drill in accordance with the drill scenario and the drill report.
5.2.1 The lead controller may conduct a briefing with drill participants. The intent of such a briefing would be to insure that drill participants understand their function and purpose in the drill. The control room briefing should be similar to a shift turnover briefing.
5.2.2 The lead controller may delegate controller responsibilities to other individuals.
Controllers and evaluators can be used for this purpose. A controller shall be called such when that individuals sole responsibility is to assist in the conduct of a drill. An evaluator can function as a controller when assigned the task of providing information or instruction during a certain aspect of a drill.
Rev. No. 17 Page 5 of 54
DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT SAP-6 5.2.3 The lead controller shall insure that plant safety is not compromised by a drill, and may stop a drill at any time if in his opinion plant safety may be affected.
5.2.4 The Lead Controller shall attempt to collect the signatures of as many participants as possible for training documentation. This responsibility can be delegated to other controllers, or evaluator.
5.2.5 The Lead Controller shall commence and end the Drill, upon approval from the JAFNPP Manager of Plant Operations.
5.2.6 The Lead Controller shall ensure that drill evaluators are stationed to properly observe and evaluate the drill.
5.2.7 The Lead Controller should distribute a fact sheet to the emergency response facilities describing plant conditions in effect approximately eight (8) hours prior to drill commencement.
5.3 During a drill, when (public address system) announcements are made, those announcements shall be prefaced or followed by the words "This is a Drill."
5.4 During a drill when contacting any offsite or non-JAF institution, the individual shall insure that the organization fully realizes that no emergency exists onsite and that it is a test of the JAFNPP Emergency Plan.
5.5 Drills shall be conducted using the guidance established by Attachment 1, Drill or Exercise Conduct Checklist.
5.6 The Emergency Planning Coordinator shall conduct an evaluator meeting prior to a drill. The meeting shall be to inform the evaluators of their specific tasks.
Rev. No. 17 Page 6 of 54
DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT SAP- 6 5.7 Radiological Emergency Medical Drills are limited in scope and participation by plant personnel. Therefore, only one lead controller is necessary in the Control Room, one evaluator/controller accompanying the victim and one controller at the destination hospital. Each evaluator/controller may be briefed individually. The Control Room controller must be an Entergy employee and the other controllers/evaluators may be medical consultant personnel. Drill documentation will be a combination of Entergy drill report and Control Room Evaluator Evaluation Form (Attachment 2) supplemented by the medical consultant's evaluation of performance.
6.0 EXERCISE CONDUCT An Exercise shall include all items specified for a drill with the following differences:
6.1 Exercises shall be conducted with the frequency established by SAP-l, MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS.
6.2 A Lead Controller shall be responsible for conducting the exercise in accordance with the written scenario. As a minimum, controllers shall be present in the Control Room, Technical Support Center, Operational Support Center, and the Emergency Operations Facility.
6.3 Every attempt should be made to include Federal, State and local input into the development of the exercise scenario.
6.3.1 The Exercise scenario shall be developed by a committee headed and organized by the Emergency Planning Coordinator at JAFNPP.
Rev. No. 17 Page 7 of 54
DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT SAP-6 7.0 EVALUATOR CONDUCT 7.1 Evaluators shall be used to record all significant events and the time at which they occur during a drill or exercise using Attachment 2, Evaluator Evaluation Form. The drill or exercise scenario shall state the objectives of the drill or exercise which will determine the major areas for the evaluators to concentrate their observation. Actions to be evaluated include: the ability to control the emergency, timely and proper notification, availability and use of equipment and personnel for control and recovery, assessment of consequences of the emergency actions taken by emergency personnel, and the necessity for off-shift notifications.
7.2 Evaluators and controllers will be assigned as determined by the Emergency Planning Coordinator. The degree of evaluation shall be made based on the extent of the drill or scenario. As a general rule, however, evaluators shall be stationed to observe all expected major actions of the drill expected and as listed in objectives statement of the drill or exercise scenario. At least two evaluators must be available for drills and at least eight evaluators for an exercise.
7.3 In plant evaluators shall be badged following normal plant badging procedures, and are required to participate during accountability drills.
7.4 Evaluators and/or controllers shall be visibly identified as evaluators or controllers, and they should take no part in the action of the drill or exercise except to:
7.4.1 Indicate simulated conditions to the exercise or drill participants, (e.g., survey meter readings, contamination levels, etc.), but only after instructions by the lead controller or individual acting on behalf of lead controller.
7.4.2 Observe poor communication techniques and procedures and note/correct such occurrences when they occur.
Rev. No. 17 Page 8 of 54
DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT SAP- 6 7.4.3 Prevent the communication of simulated emergency conditions as actual conditions outside of the exercise or drill area and to ensure that radio or telephone messages are preceded and ended by the statement "This is a Drill."
7.4.4 Prevent actions which might create a hazard to personnel or equipment. In such cases, evaluators shall require personnel participating in the exercise or drill to indicate the action verbally.
7.5 Evaluators shall be briefed as to their duties prior to the commencement of the drill or exercise. Drill evaluators should be briefed within 24-hours of the commencement of a drill. Exercise evaluators should be briefed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of the commencement of an exercise and written aids and procedures shall be provided for use by the evaluators.
This 24-hour time frame may be adjusted to compensate for unannounced exercises.
7.6 Training shall be provided to evaluators by the JAFNPP Training Department and/or drill/exercise lead controllers.
The training provided for evaluators will entail the briefing listed in Section 7.5. The briefing shall include a review of the drill or exercise scenario, the evaluator duties with regard to the assigned areas of evaluation, and the key points to be noted. The Emergency Planning Coordinator shall develop a list of evaluators to be trained. Exceptions to the qualified evaluators list may be made by the Emergency Planning Coordinator.
7.7 At the conclusion of the drill or exercise, the Emergency Planning Coordinator shall collect the completed Evaluation Forms (Attachment 2), compile a list of participants and conduct a critique with the evaluators and supervisors.
7.8 Evaluators shall familiarize themselves with the duties and action requirements of the personnel they are monitoring.
The Drill Subject Report, Attachment 1 of SAP-l, Maintaining Emergency Preparedness, shall list evaluator's Name, Organization, and Area of Responsibility. Evaluators shall review applicable procedures. Evaluators shall use the following as guidelines.
Rev. No. 17 Page 9 of 54
DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT SAP-6 7.8.1 Control Room and/or Simulator The evaluator shall observe the action of personnel assigned to the Control Room and personnel who report to the Control Room for assignment. In addition, special attention will be given to the following:
A. Notifications to onsite personnel and offsite agencies.
B. Request for the call-in of off duty personnel.
C. Operations handling of accident conditions.
D. Instructions given to Search and Rescue, Repair and Corrective Action Teams and H.P. Techs by the Shift Manager (SM), as applicable.
E. Does the SM handle the emergency by directing people or by trying to do the work himself?
F. Are the time frames of actions by the SM reasonable enough?
G. Actions of personnel in the Control Room.
H. Communications with the EOF.
I. Communications with the TSC.
7.8.2 Control Point It is to be noted that all normal practices such as sign out and use of frisker and the portal monitor are to be accomplished unless the H.P.
Technician gives other directions because of radiological conditions. The evaluator will pay special attention to the above along with the following.
A. No one is wearing radiological protection clothing when leaving.
B. All alarms from monitoring equipment are acknowledged.
Rev. No. 17 Page 10 of 54
DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT SAP-6 7.8.3 Assembly Area Observe the following for assembly area personnel:
A. They seek out their assembly area, generally stay together as a group and remain orderly.
B. Time of assembly and completed accountability.
7.8.4 Emergency Operation Facility This is the command post for the Emergency and it should seem so to the evaluator. Look for the following things:
A. The Emergency Director is in command of the EOF.
B. Any extra personnel, spectators and those awaiting orders, are quietly standing out of the way.
C. Has the Emergency Director contacted the TSC Manager?
D. The Radiation Protection or Support Personnel are performing duties in an efficient manner and reporting results to the Emergency Director.
E. Instrumentation/equipment in the EOF is placed as not to interfere with movement or cause a safety hazard.
F. How problems with the radio and telephone are handled.
G. Release rates, TEDE doses and CDE Thyroid doses to the offsite population are calculated quickly after the receipt of data from the Control Room or the Offsite Monitoring Team(s).
H. The time frame of updates to offsite agencies and the reporting of exposure data and changes to site meteorological conditions, to those same agencies.
Rev. No. 17 Page 11 of 54
DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT SAP-6 I. The Emergency Director assigns, where possible, the duty of making routine calls to someone else thereby leaving himself free to command the action.
J. How assessment teams make protective actions to offsite populations.
7.8.5 Off-Site Monitoring Teams The evaluators shall observe the following items:
A. Received KI dose, if necessary.
B. Operational check performed on survey instruments, sample counter and air sampler before leaving the site.
C. Equipment availability verified.
D. Assignment of TLDs and dosimeters before leaving the site.
E. Silver Zeolite Cartridges made available before leaving the site.
F. Survey instrument operationally checked out and turned on prior to leaving to take field readings.
G. Radio checked out by communicating to EOF or TSC before leaving.
H. Beta and gamma field surveys performed on the way to sample point.
I. Sampling and field surveys performed at sample location.
J. Instrument calibration performed and samples counted.
K. Work performed in a professional manner.
Rev. No. 17 Page 12 of 54
DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT SAP- 6 7.8.6 On-Site Monitoring Team On-site monitoring teams may be assigned field survey work along the perimeter of the site.
Check on the following items:
A. Where do they receive their instructions?
B. Dosimeter and TLD are being worn.
C. What type of survey instruments used.
D. Do they have radio/cellular phone available?
E. Radio/phone check performed.
F. Field readings taken along the route to the designated area.
G. Work performed in a professional manner.
7.8.7 Security Force A. Are all security personnel accounted for?
B. Does security direct people to the assembly area for accountability?
C. Are access and egress roads controlled?
7.8.8 Technical Support Center A. The area maintained as a controlled area.
B. Are communications initiated?
C. Are H.P. Surveys performed and by whom?
7.8.9 Operations Support Center A. How is it staffed?
B. What and how many teams are brought to the OSC?
C. Are phones continuously manned?
D. Are H.P. Surveys performed and by whom?
Rev. No. 17 Page 13 of 54
DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT SAP-6 E. Who are survey results reported to? (CR and or TSC)
F. Are accurate protective measures taken if an entry into the controlled area is required?
7.8.10 Fire Brigade A. Do they receive instructions and from whom?
B. Are protective measures taken if an entry into a controlled are is required?
C. Are Fire preplans consulted?
D. Is assistance requested from local support fire departments?
7.8.11 Immediately following the exercise/drill, evaluators/controllers should conduct a short critique for participants in their assigned area.
8.0 CRITIQUES AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 8.1 A post exercise/drill critique should be held for evaluators and plant supervision by the Emergency Planning Coordinator or designee. The critique should be held within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> of the drill/exercise, at a time and place specified by the Emergency Planning Coordinator or designee. This meeting shall be held to help resolve questions raised by various evaluators and plant supervisors and to develop a list of corrective actions as necessary. The observations should include those actions noted by the evaluators which were not in accordance with approved procedures. In addition, the exercise/drill evaluators should identify any areas which require clarification, development or revision of procedures.
Rev. No. 17 Page 14 of 54
DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT SAP-6 8.2 Emergency Plan Improvement Items/Lessons Learned Report Following the critique, the Emergency Planning Coordinator or designee shall develop a list of Condition Reports (CRs), improvement items and lessons learned as a result of the drill or exercise. These items may be generated as a result of comments made at the critique, comments made by evaluators and controllers, or comments made by drill/exercise participants. The Emergency Planning Coordinator or designee shall review these comments and categorize significant comments into "CRs", "Lessons Learned" or "Improvement Items." The Emergency Planning Coordinator shall decide which of these items warrant entry into the JAFNPP Paperless Condition Reporting system (PCRS) and/or Action Commitment Tracking System (ACTS) and assign a completion date.
8.3 The Emergency Planning Coordinator or designee shall, after the preparation and review of the Emergency Plan Improvement Items/Lessons Learned listing, present the listing to responsible plant management staff for correction.
8.4 Any items identified during the critique that pertain to the scenario package used for the drill/exercise shall also be used to improve the package for future use. Scenario packages do not need to be updated until subsequent use.
9.0 DRILL AND EXERCISE PERFORMANCE INDICATOR (DEP) EVALUATION 9.1 This indicator monitors timely and accurate JAF performance in drills, exercises and actual events when presented with opportunities for classification of emergencies, notification of offsite authorities, and development of protective action recommendations (PARs).
This section provides guidance to determine success of applicable emergency planning NRC Performance Indicator (PI) data points.
9.2 The following will be included in the DEP indicator:
9.2.1 Evaluated exercises; 9.2.2 Actual emergency declarations; Rev. No. 17 Page 15 of 54
DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT SAP-6 9.2.3 And/or selected performance enhancing drills as determined by the EPC. The selection must be made in advance and documented.
9.3 Classification 9.3.1 A classification opportunity exists when plant parameters (observable and verifiable indications) reach an Emergency Action Level (EAL). This includes changes in classifications.
9.3.2 Timely is when the classification is declared in 15 minutes or less from the time the opportunity existed.
9.3.3 Accurate is when the correct classification is declared per IAP-2.
9.4 Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) 9.4.1 A PAR opportunity exists when criteria in applicable EP procedures require a PAR to be developed and/or made. This includes initial PARs and any PAR changes.
9.4.2 Timely is when the PAR is developed/made in 15 minutes or less from the time the opportunity existed.
9.4.3 Accurate is when the correct PAR is developed as required by procedure, subject to information available at the time of the PAR.
9.5 Notifications 9.5.1 A classification notification opportunity exists when an emergency classification is declared.
9.5.2 A PAR notification opportunity exists when a PAR is required.
9.5.3 Timely is when offsite notification are initiated (contact) in 15 minutes or less from event classification and/or PAR development.
9.5.4 Accurate is when the following information is completed on the New York State Part I form and approved, as applicable:
Rev. No. 17 Page 16 of 54
DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT SAP-6 A. Item #2 - Designation of exercise or not; B. Item #3 - Facility; C. Item #4 - Event classification, as declared (e.g. NUE, Alert, SAE, GE);
D. Item #5 - Date and time of classification; E. Item #6 - Radioactive release status; F. Item #7 - PAR as determined (eg ERPAs, Sheltering) and effected population (ERPAs);
G. Item #8 - Applicable EAL #;
H. Item #1i and 12 - Wind speed and direction if PAR is made.
10.0 ATTACHMENTS
- 1. DRILL OR EXERCISE CONDUCT CHECKLIST
- 2. EVALUATOR FORM Rev. No. 17 Page 17 of 54
DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT SAP-6 ATTACHMENT 1 DRILL OR EXERCISE CONDUCT CHECKLIST
- 1. Prepare a drill or exercise scenario.
- 2. Prepare a drill or exercise report.
- 3. Present the drill or exercise to EPC for approval.
- 4. Brief evaluators on the entire drill or exercise.
- 5. Brief the individual evaluators on specified tasks.
- 6. Issue evaluator Aids and Drill/Exercise Observation Sheet.
- 7. Initiate the drill or exercise.
- 8. Ensure the "flow" of activity throughout the drill or exercise.
- 9. Terminate the drill or exercise when it's purpose is accomplished.
- 10. Conduct a critique with participants or evaluators.
- 11. Collect Drill/Exercise Observation Sheets.
- 12. Complete a list of all deficiencies and recommendations.
- 13. Tabulate PERFORMANCE INDICATOR (PI) data points for:
"* Number of successful emergency classifications
"* Number of timely notifications once classified/reclassified
"* Number of PARs (initial and PAR changes)
Rev. No. 17 Page 18 of 54
DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT* SAP- 6 ATTACHMENT 1 Page 2 of 2 DRILL OR EXERCISE CONDUCT CHECKLIST This information can be obtained from observation sheets, Shift Manager logs, Emergency Director logs, NRC event notification forms, etc.,
depending on extent of drill or exercise and participating facilities.
- 14. Complete action required on deficiencies.
Rev. No. 17 Page 19 of 54
EVALUATOR EVALUATION FORM DATE: LOCATION: CONTROL ROOM EVALUATOR: CONTROLLER:
YES NO
- 1. Did the Shift Manager/ED demonstrate he is in charge?
- 2. Did the Control Room classify the emergency correctly in accordance with IAP-2? *
- 3. Were notifications made to NYS and Oswego County within 15 minutes of event classification?
- Were updates timely?
- 4. Were Protective Action Recommendations made to NYS and Oswego County?
- 5. Was timely notification made to the NRC (must be completed within one hour from event classification)? *
- 6. Were communications prefaced with "This is a drill?" _
- 7. Log the following times for event classification and notifications:
Class. RECS Plant Staff NRC EAL Time Time Time Time NUE .
ALERT .
SAE .
GE .
Did the SM/ED direct Security to initiate call outs?
(Not necessary during normal working hours.
- 8. Were timely briefings given to plant staff?
- 9. Was the ENS phone manned?
SAP-6 DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT ATTACHMENT 2 Rev. No. 17 Page 20 of 54
EVALUATOR EVALUATION FORM (Control Room Continued)
YES NO
- 10. Did the Control Room experience any emergency plan equipment failures?
If yes what were the failures and how was the problem addressed:
- 12. Was staffing level adequate?
- 13. Was Emergency Director turnover from the SM thorough?
Was plant staff advised of this transfer of responsibility?
- 14. Once initiated, was accountability conducted and maintained throughout the emergency?
- 15. Was shift turnover demonstrated?
- 16. Were logs properly maintained by key personnel?
- 17. Was the plant staff adequately informed regarding plant status?
- 18. Was data flow between facilities and teams accurate, timely and complete?
- 19. Was habitability performed in accordance with EAP-14.6?
SAP-6 ATTACHMENT 2 Rev. No. 17 DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT21 of 54
EVALUATOR EVALUATION FORM (Control Room Continued)
YES NO
- 20. Were all objectives met?
If not, explain:
- Performance Indicator Data Points I
SAP-6 DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT ATTACHMENT 2 Rev. No. 17 Page 22 of 54
EVALUATOR EVALUATION FORM (Control Room Continued)
- 21. Miscellaneous Comments and Notes:
SAP-6 ATTACHMENT 2 Rev. No. 17 DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT23 of 54
EVALUATOR EVALUATION FORM DATE: LOCATION: TSC I EVALUATOR: CONTROLLER:
YES NO
- 1. Was the TSC activation process timely?
Time TSC was called for activation Time TSC was staffed Time TSC declared themselves operational
- 3. Did the TSC Manager demonstrate he is in charge?
- 4. Were offsite notifications made in accordance with EAP-1.1?
- 5. Were onsite notifications made in accordance with EAP-I.1?
- 6. Were communications prefaced with "This is a drill?"
J
- 7. Log the following times for event classification and notifications (if applicable):
Class. RECS Plant Staff NRC EAL Time Time Time Time NUE ALERT SAE GE
- 8. Was staff familiar with their equipment and responsibilities?
- 9. Was the staffing level adequate?
- 10. Were periodic briefings held on plant status?
- 11. Were plant staff aware of changes in emergency classification?
- 12. Were status boards updated in a timely manner? I SAP-6 ATTACHMENT 2 DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT Rev. No. 17 Pag e 24 of 54
EVALUATOR EVALUATION FORM (TSC CONTINUED)
YES NO
- 13. Were logs properly maintained by key personnel?
- 14. Did the technical staff support the Control Room?
- 15. Were corrective actions/solutions well thought out?
- 16. Did the TSC experience any emergency plan equipment failures?
If yes, what were the failures and how was the problem addressed:
- 17. Did the Emergency Director classify/re-classify the emergency correctly?
If reclassified, were offsite notifications made to NYS/Oswego County within 15 minutes and NRC within one (1) hour?
- 18. Were protective action recommendations made to NYS/Oswego County?
- 19. Was a site evacuation called for?
If yes, were local authorities and NMPC notified?
- 20. Was the transfer of the Emergency Director and his responsibilities from the TSC to the EOF smooth and complete?
- 21. Once initiated, was accountability conducted and maintained throughout the emergency?
- 22. Was shift turnover demonstrated?
- 23. Was data flow between facilities and teams accurate, timely and complete?
- 24. Was habitability performed in accordance with EAP-14.6?
SAP-6 DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT ATTACHMENT 2 Rev. No. 17 Page 25 of 54
EVALUATOR EVALUATION FORM (TSC CONTINUED)
YES NO
- 25. Were all objectives met?
I If not, explain:
- Performance Indicator Data Points I
SAP- 6 ATTACHMENT 2 Rev.6 No. 17DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT P Age 2
Rev. No. 17 Page 26 of 54
EVALUATOR EVALUATION FORM (TSC CONTINUED)
- 26. Miscellaneous Comments and Notes:
SAP-6 DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT ATTACHMENT 2 Rev. No. 17 Page 27 of 54
EVALUATOR EVALUATION FORM DATE: LOCATION: OSC EVALUATOR: CONTROLLER:
YES NO
- 1. Was the OSC activation process timely?
- a. Time OSC was called for activation
- b. Time OSC was staffed
- c. Time OSC declared operational
- 3. Did the OSC Manager demonstrate he is in charge?
- 4. Was the staffing level adequate?
- 5. Was shift turnover demonstrated?
- 6. Were logs properly maintained by key personnel?
- 7. Were status boards updated in a timely manner?
- 8. Log the following times OSC became aware of event classification.
- 9. Were periodic briefings conducted in the OSC regarding plant status?
- 10. Was data flow between facilities and teams accurate, timely and complete?
- 11. Did the OSC experience any emergency plan equipment failures?
If yes, what were the failures and how was the problem addressed:
Rev.6 No. SAP-6ATTACHMENT 17DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT P Age 2 2 Rev. No. 17 Page 28 of 54
EVALUATOR EVALUATION FORM (OSC CONTINUED)
YES NO
- 12. Once initiated, was accountability conducted and maintained throughout the emergency?
- 13. Was habitability performed in accordance with EAP-14.6?
- 14. Were repair team briefings adequate and timely?
- 15. Were repair team debriefings adequate and timely?
- 16. Were emergency exposure authorizations necessary?
If yes, were actions consistent with procedures?
- 17. Were individual personnel exposure histories obtained in a timely manner for repair team personnel availability?
- 18. Was status of repair teams adequately maintained?
- 19. Were emergency tasks prioritized and acted upon in assigned priority?
- 20. Were all objectives met?
If not, explain:
SAP-6 ATTACHMENT 2 Rev. No. 17 DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT29 of 54
EVALUATOR EVALUATION FORM (OSC CONTINUED)
I
- 21. Miscellaneous Comments and Notes:
I SAP- 6 No.
Rev.6 J~7DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT P ATTACHMENT 2 Age 3
Rev. No. 17 Page 30 of 54
EVALUATOR EVALUATION FORM DATE: LOCATION: REPAIR & CORRECTIVE ACTION TEAMS EVALUATOR: CONTROLLER:
TEAM ACTIVITY:
YES NO
- 1. Did the team consist of a minimum of two individuals?
- 2. Was a briefing conducted?
If so, did it include:
- a. most direct route
- b. proper tools
- c. tasks understanding
- d. visual aids (maps, drawings, etc.)
- e. simulations
- f. radiation area dose rates
- 3. Were the OSC Manager and Emergency Maintenance Coordinator cognizant of all Repair and Corrective Action Team efforts?
- 4. Did SM approve work on safety related items?
- 5. Was TSC direction obtained for engineering repair work?
- 6. Was RWP or Emergency Plant Entry Form prepared?
(circle one)
- 7. Was dosimetry, protective clothing, etc. issued in accordance with the above form?
- 8. Were there any Emergency Plan equipment failures?
If so, what were they and how was problem addressed?
SAP-6 ATTACHMENT 2 Rev. No. 17 DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT31 of 54
EVALUATOR EVALUATION FORM (REPAIR & CORRECTIVE ACTION TEAMS CONTINUED)
I YES NO
- 9. Was a debrief conducted?
- 10. Were all objectives met?
If not, explain: __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
SAP-Rev.66 No. 17DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT P ATTACHMENT Age 3 2 Rev. No. 17 Page 32 of 54
EVALUATOR EVALUATION FORM (REPAIR & CORRECTIVE ACTION TEAMS CONTINUED)
- 11. Miscellaneous Comments and Notes:
SAP-6 ATTACHMENT 2 Rev. No. 17 DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT Page 33 of 54
EVALUATOR EVALUATION FORM DATE: LOCATION: FIRE BRIGADE EVALUATOR: CONTROLLER:__
YES NO
- 1. Time Control Room notified of fire Time fire alarm sounded Time fire brigade dispatched Time fire brigade responded to scene
- 2. Was fire alarm sounded and the announcement properly made over the plant page?
- 3. Was offsite assistance requested?
If yes, was Security directed to:
- a. allow immediate access
- b. provide dosimetry
- c. direct and escort fire company
- d. collect dosimetry upon exit
- 4. Were all unnecessary personnel evacuated from the fire area?
- 5. Was Rad Protection requested to perform a survey?
- 6. Were radiological conditions properly assessed?_-_
- 7. Was emergency exposure criteria addressed and implemented?
- 8. Were all communications preceded with "This is a Drill?"
- 9. Were fire brigade members familiar with their duties?
- 10. Was the emergency classified correctly?
- 11. If the OSC was activated, was the fire brigade dispatched from the OSC with a radiation protection technician?
- 12. Were all objectives met?
If not, explain:
SAP-6 DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT ATTACHMENT 2 Rev. No. 17 Page 34 of 54
EVALUATOR EVALUATION FORM (FIRE BRIGADE CONTINUED)
- 13. Miscellaneous Comments and Notes:
SAP-6 DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT ATTACHMENT 2 Rev. No. 17 Page 35 of 54
EVALUATOR EVALUATION FORM DATE: LOCATION: SECURITY/ACCOUNTABILITY EVALUATOR: CONTROLLER: _
YES NO
- 1. Was the emergency classification posted at main security?
- 2. Were call-outs performed as directed by the SM/ED?
(Not required during normal working hours.)
- 3. Was site access controlled?
- 4. Were guards dispatched to access roads?
- 5. If accountability was called for:
- a. Time site access/egress was restricted
- b. Time accountability was initiated
- c. Time accountability completed
- 6. Did accountability clerks report to their assigned assembly areas when directed?
- 7. Were accountability readers and sign-in sheets used?
- 8. Did accountability clerks experience any emergency plan equipment failures?
If yes, explain:
- 9. Was movement of personnel between onsite facilities adequately controlled?
- 10. Was movement of personnel badging offsite timely and orderly?
SAP-6 ATTACHMENT 2 Rev. No. 17 DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT36 of 54
EVALUATOR EVALUATION FORM (SECURITY/ACCOUNTABILITY CONTINUED)
YES NO
- 11. Was assembly in the Training Building auditorium controlled?
Were personnel updated regarding plant conditions?
- 12. Was continuous accountability maintained for the remainder of the emergency?
- 13. Was site evacuation called for?
If yes, were personnel directed to proceed to the Howard Road remote assembly area?
If yes, did the maps distributed to evacuating personnel coincide with the selected evacuation route?
- 14. Were all objectives met?
If not, explain:
SAP-Rev.66 No. 17DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT P ATTACHMENT Age 3 2 Rev. No. 17 Page 37 of 54
EVALUATOR EVALUATION FORM (SECURITY/ACCOUNTABILITY CONTINUED)
- 15. Miscellaneous Comments and Notes:
SAP-6 ATTACHMENT 2 Rev. No. 17 DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT P Age 3
Rev. No. 17 Page 38 of 54
EVALUATOR EVALUATION FORM DATE: LOCATION: CHEMISTRY TECHNICIAN EVALUATOR: CONTROLLER:
YES NO
- 1. Did he/she report to Control Room upon implementing the Emergency Plan?
- 2. What tasks were required by the ED for the Chemistry Technician?
- 3. Was the technician familiar with the procedures for the tasks?
- 4. What tasks were required by the Chemistry Supervisor for the technicians?
Were they familiar with the procedures for the tasks?
- 5. Did any emergency plan equipment fail to operate?
If yes, what were the failures and how was the problem addressed?
SAP-6 ATTACHMENT 2 Rev. No. 17 DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT39 of 54
EVALUATOR EVALUATION FORM (CHEMISTRY TECHNICIAN CONTINUED)
YES NO
- 6. If PASS was demonstrated, was the above 3-hour time commitment met?
- 7. Miscellaneous Comments and Notes:
SAP-6 DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT ATTACHMENT 2 Rev. No. 17 Page 40 of 54
EVALUATOR EVALUATION FORM DATE: LOCATION: FIELD MONITORING EVALUATOR: CONTROLLER:
YES NO
- 1. Were teams assembled in a timely manner?
- 2. Were teams familiar with procedures?
- 3. Time the team was dispatched:
Team was dispatched from OSC/EOF (circle one)
- 4. Did team obtain the proper equipment prior to leaving?
- 5. Were equipment checks performed prior to departure?
- 6. Were calibration dates current?
- 7. Were communication checks conducted prior to departure?
- 8. Was a vehicle/ll0V power supply check conducted?
- 9. Was the team briefing adequate?
- 10. Did the briefings include:
- a. Plant conditions/nature of release?
- b. Meteorological conditions?
- c. Projected dose rates/stay time
- d. Protective measures?
- e. Use of KI?
- f. Dosimetry recording?
- g. Types of readings/samples to be obtained?
- h. Means of communication?
- i. Emergency exposure limits?
- 11. Was the communications flow between team and dispatcher timely and accurate and complete?
- 12. Were teams briefed frequently by the dispatcher?
- 13. Were survey results properly relayed to the dispatcher?
SAP-6 ATTACHMENT 2 Rev. No. 17 DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT41 of 54
EVALUATOR EVALUATION FORM (FIELD MONITORING CONTINUED)
YES NO
- 14. Were communications prefaced with "This is a Drill?"
- 15. Were teams proficient in proper survey/sampling techniques?
- 16. Were proper plume traversing techniques demonstrated?
If no, explain:
- 17. Were vehicles and equipment checked for contamination upon return?
- 18. Was shift turnover demonstrated?
- 19. Did teams experience any Emergency Plan equipment failures?
If yes, explain: I
- 20. Were all objectives met?
If not, explain:
I SAP-6 DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT ATTACHMENT 2 Rev. No. 17 Page 42 of 54
EVALUATOR EVALUATION FORM (FIELD MONITORING CONTINUED)
- 21. Miscellaneous Comments and Notes:
SAP-6 ATTACHMENT 2 Rev. No. 17 DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT43 of 54
EVALUATOR EVALUATION FORM DATE: LOCATION:_ EOF I EVALUATOR: CONTROLLER:
YES NO
- 1. Was the EOF activation process timely?
- a. Time EOF was called for activation
- b. Time EOF was staffed
- c. Time EOF declared themselves operational
- 3. Did the EOF Manager demonstrate he is in charge?
Time ED assumed duties at the EOF
- 5. Were offsite notifications made in accordance with EAP-1.1?
(Note the time forms are issued in comments section.)
I
- 6. Were communications prefaced with "This is a Drill?"
- 7. Log the following times for event classification and notifications (if applicable):
Class. RECS Plant Staff NRC EAL Time Time Time Time NUE
- ALERT
- GE *
- 8. Was staff familiar with their equipment and responsibilities?
- 9. Was the staffing level adequate?
- 10. Were periodic briefings held on plant status?
I SAP- 6 DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT ATTACHMENT 2 Rev. No. 17 Page 44 of 54
EVALUATOR EVALUATION FORM (EOF CONTINUED)
YES NO
- 11. Was EOF staff aware of changes in emergency classification
- 12. Were EALs classified correctly?
- 13. Were status boards updated in a timely manner?
- 14. Were logs properly maintained by key personnel?
- 15. Did the EOF experience any emergency plan equipment failures:
If yes, what were the failures and how was the problem addressed:
- 16. Did the ED consult with state and county representatives regarding protective action recommendations?
- 17. Were protective action recommendations made to NYS/Oswego County?
- 18. Was long term facility staffing considered in accordance with EAP-43?
- 19. Was shift turnover demonstrated?
- 20. Was data flow between facilities accurate, timely and complete?
- 21. Was the ED aware of plant decisions?
- 22. Was access control adequate?
SAP-6 DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT ATTACHMENT 2 Rev. No. 17 Page 45 of 54
EVALUATOR EVALUATION FORM (EOF CONTINUED)
YES NO
- 23. If a release was in progress, were incoming personnel monitored to prevent spread of contamination?
- 24. Were all objectives met?
If not, explain:_________________________
- Performance Indicator Data Points I
SAP-6 Rev. No. 17 DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT ATCMN ATTACHMENT 2 Rev. NPage 46 of 54
EVALUATOR EVALUATION FORM (EOF CONTINUED)
- 25. Miscellaneous Comments and Notes:
SAP-6 ATTACHMENT 2 Rev. No. 17 DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT47 of 54
EVALUATOR EVALUATION FORM DATE: LOCATION: DOSE ASSESSMENT!
EVALUATOR: CONTROLLER:
YES NO
- 1. Did dose assessment personnel perform equipment checks upon arrival?
- 2. Were personnel familiar with the equipment?
- 4. Were meteorological forecasts obtained?
- 5. Were status boards updated and utilized?
- 6. Were Part II forms completed accurately and on time?
- 7. Were EAP-4 forms properly completed and utilized?
- 8. Was field survey data utilized for comparison with computer projected doses?
Were discrepancies resolved?
- 9. Were field teams briefed periodically regarding plant status?
- 10. Were dose calculations and the determination of protective action recommendations performed efficiently and in a timely manner?
- 11. Was the interface with TSC radiological personnel (re: effluent monitor readings, effluent sample results, PASS samples, etc.) adequate?
- 12. Were offsite liaisons utilized for the exchange and comparison of field survey data and dose projections?
- 13. Was there someone available to interface with and answer questions for offsite liaisons?
SAP-Rev.66 No. 17DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT P ATTACHMENT Age 4 2 Rev. No. 17 Page 48 of 54
EVALUATOR EVALUATION FORM (DOSE ASSESSMENT CONTINUED)
YES NO
- 14. Were offsite liaisons included in discussions regarding PARs?
- 15. Were the results of dose calculations and protective action recommendations correct and in accordance with established procedures?
- 16. Were all communications prefaced with "This is a Drill?"
- 17. Was shift turnover demonstrated?
- 18. Did any emergency plan equipment fail to operate?
If yes, what were the failures and how was the problem address?
- 19. Were all objectives met?
If not, explain:
SAP-6 ATTACHMENT 2 Rev. No. 17 DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT Page 49 of 54
EVALUATOR EVALUATION FORM (DOSE ASSESSMENT CONTINUED)
- 20. Miscellaneous Comments and Notes: I I
SAP-6 DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT ATTACHMENT 2 Rev. No. 17 Page 50 of 54
EVALUATOR EVALUATION FORM DATE: LOCATION: JNC EVALUATOR: CONTROLLER:
YES NO
- 1. Was the JNC activated in a timely manner?
- a. Time JNC was called for activation
- b. Time JNC was operational
- 4. Did the utility effectively share information with state and county public information staff?
- 5. If technical information was required, was the information obtained from appropriate personnel?
- 6. Were briefing notes reviewed by designated personnel prior to their release to the media?
- 7. Were news briefings and summary notes timely, accurate and complete?
- 8. Was county activation of the EAS system timely?
- 9. Were county EAS messages appropriate, timely, and complete?
- 10. Was information provided to the media consistent with the EAS messages?
- 11. Was information released understandable to the public?
- 12. If protective actions were implemented, were affected areas appropriately specified?
- 13. Were press briefings held frequently to give available information as conditions changed?
SAP-6 ATTACHMENT 2 Rev. No. 17 DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT Page 51 of 54
EVALUATOR EVALUATION FORM (JNC CONTINUED)
YES NO
- 14. When conditions were static, were briefings held frequently to keep the media updated?
- 15. Did the media spokesperson present material effectively?
- 16. Were questions by the media handled properly by the media spokesperson?
- 17. Were status boards and displays updated accurately and timely?
- 18. Was the JNC staff aware of changes in emergency classification?
- 19. Did the rumor control staff respond promptly and accurately to calls?
- 20. Were measures taken to control the spread of rumors that threaten to have an adverse effect on adherence to protective actions?
- 21. Were support functions such as registration and security performed effectively?
- 22. Did the JNC experience any emergency plan equipment failures?
If yes, explain:
- 23. Were communications prefaced with "This is a Drill?"
- 24. Was shift turnover demonstrated?
SAP-6 DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT ATTACHMENT 2 Rev. No. 17 Page 52 of 54
EVALUATOR EVALUATION FORM (JNC CONTINUED)
YES NO
- 25. Were all the objectives met?
If not, explain:
SAP-6 ATTACHMENT 2 Rev. No. 17 DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT Page 53 of 54
EVALUATOR EVALUATION FORM (JNC CONTINUED)
I
- 26. Miscellaneous Comments and Notes:
SAP-6 DRILL/EXERCISE CONDUCT ATTACHMENT 2 Rev. No. 17 Page 54 of 54
METEOROLOGICAL MONITORING SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE* SAP-10 5.1.18 Reinsert the Chart Magazine into the Recorder.
5.1.19 Turn the thumbwheel flange to ensure the paper is taut.
5.1.20 Close the Recorder door.
5.1.21 Turn the printer ON as follows:
"* Press the MENU key on the front panel;
"* Use Up or Down Arrow key to scroll to PRINTER ON/OFF and press the ENTER key;
"* Use the Up or Down Arrow key to scroll to ON and press the ENTER key.
5.1.22 Restore the recorder display as follows:
"* Press the MENU key until READY is displayed;
"* Press and hold the Up arrow button until a value is displayed, then release the button.
5.1.23 Initial, date and record the strip chart ID and location on the new strip chart roll just replaced.
5.1.24 Inspect the paper for print quality.
5.1.25 Label the spent paper roll with the following:
"* Date
"* Time
"* Recorder letter
"* Location of Recorder (CTRL Rm or TSC) 5.1.26 Return the spent paper to Emergency Planning.
6.0 ATTACHMENTS
- 1. METEOROLOGICAL MONITORING SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE
- 2. MDAS PC SURVEILLANCE Rev. No. 11 Page 19 of 22
METEOROLOGICAL MONITORING SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE* SAP-10 METEOROLOGICAL MONITORING SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE Page 1 of 2 I Location: Technical Support Center / Control Room (circle one)
Date: and hour chosen for comparison EST (am/pm)
RECORDER D As Sat Un-sat Recorder "D" Target Found +/- (,) (,)
200 ft. Wind Speed (MPH) 3.0 200 ft. Wind Direction (Degrees) 100o Strip Chart Paper Replaced?
- Date and Time Proper?.
Recorder D Returned to Norma; RECORDER G As Sat Un-sat Recorder "G" Target Found ÷/ V) ('
90 ft. Wind Speed (MPH) 3.0 90 ft. Wind Direction (Degrees) 100 Strip Chart Paper Replaced?
Date and Time Proper?
Recorder G Returned to Normal Remarks/Comments:
SAP-10 METEOROLOGICAL MONITORING ATTACHMENT 1 Rev. No. 11 SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE* Page 20 of 22
METEOROLOGICAL MONITORING SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE* SAP-10 METEOROLOGICAL MONITORING SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE Page 2 of 2 RECORDER J Toggle Switch Position: 30 ft 100 ft (circle one)
As Sat Un-sat Recorder "J" Target Found +/- (/) (')
Wind Speed (MPH) 3.0 Wind Direction (Degrees) 10 0
(
Strip Chart Paper Replaced? F Date and Time Proper?
Zecorder J Returned to Normal RECORDER K Switch Position: A-=200 B=100 C=30 D=JAF Backup (Circle One)
As Sat Un-sat Recorder "K" Target Found /-(,10('
Temperature (Degrees F) 20o 30-100 ft. Temp. Diff. (Degrees F) 10o 30-200 ft. Temp. Diff. (Degrees F) 10o Sigma Theta (Degree Arc) 20 Strip Chart Paper Replaced?
Date and Time Proper?
Recorder K Returned to Normal Remarks/Comments:
Date: Completed by:
Date: Review by:
SAP-10 METEOROLOGICAL MONITORING ATTACHMENT 1 Rev. No. 11 SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE* Page 21 of 22
METEOROLOGICAL MONITORING SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE* SAP-10 MDAS PC SURVEILLANCE PAGE 1 OF 1 Location: Technical Support Center / Control Room (circle one)
Date: and hour chosen for comparison EST (am/pm)
MDAS PC As Sat Un-sat MDAS PC Target Found +1- (/) (/)
200 ft. Wind Speed (MPH) 3.0 200 ft. Wind Direction (Degrees) 100 200 ft. Sigma Theata (Degrees) 20 30 ft. Wind Speed (MPH) 3.0 30 ft. Wind Direction (Degrees) 100 30 ft. Sigma Theata (Degrees) 20o 30 ft. Absolute Temperature 2 °F (Degrees F) I PWWý FF Agreement of EDAMS clock &
real time?
Remarks/Comments:
Date: Completed by:
Date: Reviewed by:
I SAP-10 METEOROLOGICAL MONITORING ATTACHMENT 2 Rev. No. 11 SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE* Page 22 of 22
ENTERGY NUCLEAR NORTHEAST JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT P.O. BOX 110 LYCOMING, NY 13093 DOCUMENT TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGEMENT FORM DATE: April 30, 2002 CONTROLLED COPY NUMBER: 34 TO: U.S.N.R.C. Document Center/Washington, DC FROM: CATHY IZYK - EMERGENCY PLANNING DEPARTMENT
SUBJECT:
EMERGENCY PLAN AND IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Enclosed are revisions to your assigned copy of the JAFNPP Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures. Please remove and DISCARD the old pages. Insert the attached, initial and date this routing sheet and return the completed routing sheet to Cathy Izyk in the Emergency Planning Department within 15 days. If this transmittal is not returned within 15 days, your name will be removed from the controlled list.
DOCUMENT PAGES REV. # INITIALS/DATE N/A VOLUME 2 Update List Dated N/A DOCUMENT PAGES REV. # INITIALS/DATE REPRO ERROR IAP-2 Replace all but the colored pull out maps. 22 Please place copies behind tabs accordingly VOLUME 3 Update List Dated N/A DOCUMENT PAGES REV. # INITIALS/DATE N/A
EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES/VOLUME 2 UPDATE LIST FCONTROLLED COPy#-Ai I
-- I Date of Issue: April 22, 2002 TABLE OF CONTENTS REV. 19 02/98 N/A I N/A REV. 25 09/01 Continuous IAPi EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTATION CHECKLIST CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY REV. 22 04/02 Continuous IAP-2 CONDITIONS REV. 45 09/01 Informational EAP-1.1 OFFSITE NOTIFICATIONS REV. 24 01/01 Informational EAP-2 PERSONNEL INJURY REV. 22 10/01 Informational EAP-3 FIRE REV. 29 12/98 Reference EAP-4 DOSE ASSESSMENT CALCULATIONS REV. 13 09/01 Reference EAP-4.1 RELEASE RATE DETERMINATION EAP-5.1 DELETED (02/94)
EAP-5.2 DELETED (04/91)
SURVEYS REV. 7 07/00 Informational EAP-5.3 ONSITE/OFFSITE DOWNWIND AND ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING REV. 15 02/98 Informational EAP-6 IN-PLANT EMERGENCY SURVEY/ENTRY EAP-7.1 DELETED (02/94)
EAP-7.2 DELETED (02/94)
REV. 55 02/02 Reference EAP-8 PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY REV. 9 02/98 Informational EAP-9 SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATIONS REV. 15 02/02 Informational EAP-10 PROTECTED AREA EVACUATION SITE EVACUATION REV. 17 02/02 Informational EAP-11 DOSE ESTIMATED FROM AN ACCIDENTAL REV. 10 08/99 Reference EAP-12 RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL TO LAKE ONTARIO REV. 13 12/98 Informational EAP-13 DAMAGE CONTROL REV. 21 08/00 Informational EAP-14.1 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER EAP-14.2 ACTIVATION REV. 19 07/00 Informational EAP-14.2 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY OPERATIONAL SUPPORT CENTER REV. 14 03/00 Informational EAP-14.5 ACTIVATION AND OPERATION Page 1 of 2
LLiL EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES/VOLUME 2 UPDATE LIST Date of Issue: April 22, 2002 HABITABILITY OF THE EN EAP-14.6 REV. 14 10/98 Informational FACILITIES EAP-15 EMERGENCY RADIATION EXPOSURE REV. 10 02/00 Informational CRITERIA AND CONTROL EAP-16 PUBLIC INFORMATION PROCEDURE REV. 6 02/98 Informational EAP-16.2 JOINT NEWS CENTER OPERATION REV. 0 02/02 Informational EAP-17 EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION STAFFING REV. 99 02/02 Informational EAP-18 DELETED (12/93)
EAP-19 EMERGENCY USE OF POTASSIUM IODINE REV. 21 04/01 Informational (KI)
EAP-20 POST ACCIDENT SAMPLE, OFFSITE REV. 8 02/98 Reference SHIPMENT AND ANALYSIS EAP-21 DELETED (12/85)
EAP-22 DELETED (02/98)
EAP-23 EMERGENCY ACCESS CONTROL REV. 10 02/98 Informational EA-P-24 EOF VEHICLE AND PERSONNEL REV. 8 02/98 Informational DECONTAMINATION EAP-25 DELETED (02/94)
Page 2 of 2
ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC.
JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS IAP-2 REVISION 22 REVIEWED BY: PLANT OPERATING REVIEW COMMITTEE MEETING NO. N/A DATE: N/A APPROVED BY: DATE: 2vo.
RESPONSIBLE PROCEDURE OWNER EFFECTIVE DATE:
(l:-d (
ý?C/lc/"ý FIRST ISSUE 0 FULL REVISION 0 LIMITED REVISION 0
- INFORMATIONAL USE *
- TSR *
- ADMINISTRATIVE
- CONTROLLED COPY #
PERIODIC REVIEW DUE DATE: SEPTEMBER 2006
CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS IAP- 2 REVISION
SUMMARY
SHEET REV. NO.
22 "* Revised section 5.0 to reflect the meteorology and release information that is represented in JAF-CALC MULTI-01162.
21 " Sections 1.1.1.1, 1.2.1 Basis and Basis Reference 3, 1.2.2 Basis and Basis Reference 1, 5.1.2 Basis Reference 4, 5.1 Basis Reference 4, 5.2. Basis Reference 1, 7.1.1 Basis Reference 1, 8.1.1 - entire section, 8.4.4 Basis Reference 1, have been revised to include Emergency Action Levels (EALs) related to the operation of the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI). Also added section 1.6.1 and 1.6.2.
Rev. No. 22 Page 2 of 146
CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS CONTENTS IAP- 2 OF TABLE TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE 1.0 PURPOSE ............................................ o... 4
2.0 REFERENCES
......................................... o* *4 3.0 INITIATING EVENTS ..................................
4.0 PROCEDURE ..........................................
4.1 CLASSIFICATION .....................................
4.2 Reclassification ................................... .... 6 5.0 FIGURES, FORMS AND ATTACHMENTS .....................
- 1. FIGURE IAP-2.1 - (POSTED) - EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL TABLES ....................................
- 2. FIGURE IAP-2.2 JAF EAL TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT, Rev . 1 .......................................... ... 10
- 3. ATTACHMENT A- FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER LOSS & POTENTIAL LOSS INDICATORS ................................... 135
- 4. ATTACHMENT B - Word List/Definitions ............ 139 Rev. No. 22 Page 3 of 146
CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS IAP- 2 1.0 PURPOSE The purpose of this document is to provide an explanation and rationale for each of the emergency action levels (EALs) included for the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAFNPP). This document may be utilized by those individuals responsible for implementation of the EALs as a technical reference and aid in EAL interpretation.
2.0 REFERENCES
NUMARC NESP-007, Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels 2.1 EPA-400-R-92-001, May 1992, "Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents" 2.2 BWR EAL Binning Document, OSSI 92-402A-3-BWR, Rev. 0, March 1994 2.3 Plant Specific EAL Guideline (PEG), OSSI, Rev. 1, February 25, 1995 2.4 NYPA Verification & Validation Report, OSSI 93-402A-10-JAF, Rev. 0, March 1994 2.5 EAL Matrix, Rev. 1, August 1995 2.6 NRC Letter, Request for Additional Information TAC No.
M89913, 2/9/95 2.7 JPN-95-026, Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding Proposed Emergency Action Levels (TAC No. M89913), 5/3/95 2.8 NRC Letter, Emergency Action Level Changes - James A.
FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (TAC No. M89913), June 1995 3.0 INITIATING EVENTS 3.1 An unusual occurrence has taken place at or near the station.
Rev. No. 22 Page 4 of 146
IAP-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS 4.0 PROCEDURE NOTE: Emergency conditions are divided into the following classes:
Unusual Event - An Unusual Event is a condition characterized by an event or events that are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.
Alert - An Alert is a condition characterized by an event or events which are occurring or have occurred that involve actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of plant safety.
Site Area Emergency - A Site Area Emergency is a condition characterized by events that are in process or have occurred involving actual or probable major failures of plant functions needed for the protection of the public.
General Emergency - A General Emergency is a condition characterized by events that have occurred or are occurring involving actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with a potential for loss of containment integrity.
4.1 CLASSIFICATION 4.1.1 The Shift Manager shall use the Emergency Action Level Table and Logic, Figure IAP-2.1, to select event categories related to plant events or conditions.
4.1.2 For each category selected, the Shift Manager should refer to the applicable tab of the Emergency Action Levels Bases Document, Figure IAP-2.2, and review the emergency action levels, and associated information for each emergency class.
22 Page 5 of 146 Rev. No.
CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS IAP-2 4.1.3 Based on results of the review in step 4.1.2, the Shift Manager shall determine the most severe emergency classification and should record this classification and time in Shift Manager's log.
A. The initial classification of an emergency condition shall be made as soon as possible following the event or combination of events to ensure that proper protective and corrective actions are taken. The initial classification of an emergency condition will normally be made by the Shift Manager. It is the primary responsibility of the Shift Manager, however, to act in accordance with applicable Operating Procedures, and Emergency Operating Procedures to assure that automatic plant response and Engineered Safety Features (including the Reactor Protection System) perform in their intended manner. The classification of emergency conditions shall not interfere with this primary responsibility.
B. An event that occurs and ends in a very short period of time, or an event that occurs and goes unnoticed until after the event has occurred, must have proper notifications made.
The Emergency Plan should be used as appropriate in these circumstances, however, all required notifications per EAP-I.I must be completed.
4.1.4 The Shift Manager should initiate IAP-I EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTATION.
4.2 Reclassification 4.2.1 If reclassification to a higher level is necessary, the Emergency Director (or Shift Manager when performing the Emergency Director functions) shall repeat the classification steps shown above and record in the Shift Manager's log.
4.2.2 De-escalation in an emergency classification would only be needed if the event had been over classified on the basis of its potential, which did not occur or an error in classification.
Otherwise, the classification should shift to Recovery or the event be terminated after the emergency phase has been mitigated.
Rev. No. 22 Page 6 of 146
CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS IAP-2 5.0 FIGURES, FORMS AND ATTACHMENTS
- 1. FIGURE IAP-2.1 - (POSTED) - EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL TABLES
- 3. ATTACHMENT A- FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER LOSS & POTENTIAL LOSS INDICATORS
- 4. ATTACHMENT B - WORD LIST/DEFINITIONS Rev. No. 22 Page 7 of 146
FIG-2.1 CLASSIFICATION FLOWCHART FIG-2.2 Emergency Action Levels CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS IAP-2 FIGURE IAP-2.2 JAF EAL TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT, Rev. 1 PURPOSE The purpose of this document is to provide an explanation and rationale for each of the emergency action levels (EALs) included in the EAL Upgrade Program for the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAFNPP). It is also intended to facilitate the review process of the JAFNPP EALs and provide historical documentation for future reference. This document is also intended to be utilized by those individuals responsible for implementation of IAP-2 "Classification of Emergency Conditions" as a technical reference and aid in EAL interpretation.
DISCUSSION EALs are the plant-specific indications, conditions or instrument readings which are utilized to classify emergency conditions defined in the JAFNPP Emergency Plan.
Subsequent to the acceptance by the NRC of NUMARC/NESP-007 "Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels" as an acceptable alternative to the NUREG 0654 EAL guidance, the four nuclear utilities in the State of New York decided to perform a joint implementation of the new methodology. This upgrade project involved the following plants:
"* Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (NMPC)
"* Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMPC)
"* James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (NYPA)
"* Indian Point Station 2 (ConEd)
. Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Station (NYPA)
- R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station (RG&E)
While the upgraded EALs are site specific, an objective of the upgrade project was to ensure conformity and consistency between the sites to the extent possible.
The revised EALs were derived from the Initiating Conditions and example EALs given in the JAFNPP Plant-Specific EAL Guideline (PEG). The PEG is the JAFNPP interpretation of the NUMARC methodology for developing EALs. The PEG identifies deletions from the NUMARC methodology by striking out words and phrases that are not applicable to JAFNPP; additions are identified by underlining new words and phrases.
The source of documents for PEG changes from NUMARC methodology are listed in the references section of the PEG.
Many of the EALs derived from the NUMARC methodology are fission product barrier based. That is, the conditions which define the EALs are based upon loss or potential loss of one or more of the three fission product barriers.
Rev. No. 22 Page 10 of 146
CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS IAP-2 FIGURE IAP-2.2 - JAF EAL TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT, Rev. 1 The primary fission product barriers are:
A. Reactor Fuel Cladding: The fuel cladding is comprised of the zirconium tubes which house the ceramic uranium oxide pellets along with the end plugs which are welded into each end of the fuel rods.
B. Reactor Coolant System (RCS): The RCS is comprised of the reactor vessel shell, vessel head, CRD housings, vessel nozzles and penetrations and all primary systems directly connected to the RPV up to the outermost primary containment isolation valve.
C. Primary Containment: The primary containment is comprised of the drywell, suppression chamber (torus), the interconnections between the two, and all isolation valves required to maintain primary containment integrity under accident conditions.
Although the secondary containment (reactor building) serves as an effective fission product barrier by minimizing ground level releases, it is not considered as a fission product barrier for the purpose of emergency classification.
The following criteria serves as the bases for event classification related to fission product barrier loss:
Notification of an Unusual Event A perceived or actual challenge to a primary fission product barrier.
Alert:
Any loss or any potential loss of either fuel clad or RCS Site Area Emergency:
Any loss of both fuel clad and RCS Or Any potential loss of both fuel clad and RCS Or Any potential loss of either fuel clad or RCS with a loss of any additional barrier General Emergency:
Loss of any two barriers with loss or potential loss of a third Those EALs which reference one or more of the fission product barrier IC designators (FC, RCS and PC) in the PEG Reference section of the technical bases are derived from the Fission Product Barrier Analysis. The analysis entailed an evaluation of every combination of the plant specific barrier loss/potential loss indicators applied to the above criteria.
Rev. No. 22 Page 11 of 146
CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS IAP-2 FIGURE IAP-2.2 - JAF EAL TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT, Rev. 1 Where possible, the EALs have been made consistent with and utilize the conditions defined in the JAFNPP symptom based Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs). While the symptoms that drive operator actions specified in the EOPs are not indicative of all possible conditions which warrant emergency classification, they do define the symptoms, independent of initiating events, for which reactor plant safety and/or fission product barrier integrity are threatened. Where these symptoms are clearly representative of one of the PEG Initiating Conditions, they have been utilized as an EAL.
This allows for rapid classification of emergency situations based on plant conditions without the need for additional evaluation or event diagnosis.
Although some of the EALs presented here are based on conditions defined in the EOPs, classification of emergencies using these EALs is not dependent upon EOP entry or execution. The EALs can be utilized independently or in conjunction with the EOPs.
To the extent possible, the EALs are symptom based. That is, the action level is defined by values of key plant operating parameters which identify emergency or potential emergency conditions. This approach is appropriate because it allows the full scope of variations in the types of events to be classified as emergencies. But, a purely symptom based approach is not sufficient to address all events for which emergency classification is appropriate.
Particular events to which no predetermined symptoms can be ascribed have also been utilized as EALs since they may be indicative of potentially more serious conditions not yet fully realized.
The EALs are grouped into nine categories to simplify their presentation and to promote a rapid understanding by their users. These categories are:
- 1. Reactor Fuel
- 5. Radioactivity Release
- 6. Electrical Failures
- 7. Equipment Failures
- 8. Hazards
- 9. Other Categories 1 through 5 are primarily symptom based. The symptoms are indicative of actual or potential degradation of either fission product barriers or personnel safety.
Categories 6, 7 and 8 are event based. Electrical Failures are those events associated with losses of either AC or vital DC electrical power. Equipment Failures are abnormal and emergency events associated with vital plant system failures, while Hazards are those non-plant system related events which have affected or may affect plant safety.
Rev. No. 22 Page 12 of 146
CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS IAP-2 FIGURE IAP-2.2 - JAF EAL TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT, Rev. 1 Category 9 provides the Emergency Director (Shift Manager) the latitude to classify and declare emergencies based on plant symptoms or events which in his judgment warrant classification. This judgment includes evaluation of loss or potential loss of one or more fission product barriers warranting emergency classification consistent with the NUMARC barrier loss criteria.
Categories are further divided into one or more subcategories depending on the types and number of plant conditions that dictate emergency classifications. For example, the Reactor Fuel category has five subcategories whose values can be indicative of fuel damage: coolant activity, off-gas activity, containment radiation, other radiation monitors and refueling accidents. An EAL may or may not exist for each sub category at all four classification levels. Similarly, more than one EAL may exist for a sub category in a given emergency classification when appropriate (i.
e., no EAL at the General Emergency level but three EALs at the Notification of an Unusual Event level).
For each EAL, the following information is provided:
"* Classification: Notification of an Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency
"* Operating Mode Applicability: One or more of the following plant operating conditions are listed: Power Operation, Startup/Hot Standby, Hot Shutdown, Cold Shutdown, Refuel and Defuel
"* EAL: Description of the condition or set of conditions which comprise the EAL
"* Basis: Description of the rationale for the EAL
"* PEG Reference(s): PEG IC(s) and example EAL(s) from which the EAL is derived
"* Basis Reference(s): Source documentation from which the EAL is derived The identified operating modes are defined as follows:
Power Operations Reactor is critical and the mode switch is in RUN.
Startup/Hot Standby The mode switch is in STARTUP/HOT STANDBY.
Hot Shutdown Mode switch is in SHUTDOWN and reactor coolant temperature is >212 ' F.
Cold Shutdown Mode switch in SHUTDOWN and reactor coolant temperature is : 212 OF.
Refuel Mode switch in REFUEL.
Defueled RPV contains no irradiated fuel.
Rev. No. 22 Page 13 of 146
CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS IAP-2 FIGURE IAP-2.2 - JAF EAL TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT, Rev. .
1.0 REACTOR FUEL The reactor fuel cladding serves as the primary fission product barrier.
should Over the useful life of a fuel bundle, the integrity of this barrier as fuel cladding integrity limits are not exceeded.
remain intact as long radioactive Should fuel damage occur (breach of the fuel cladding integrity)
The magnitude of such fission products are released to the reactor coolant.
damage as well as the mechanism a release is dependent upon the extent of the by which the damage occurred. Once released into the reactor coolant, the hazards highly radioactive fission products can pose significant radiological in plant from reactor coolant process streams. If other fission product barriers were to fail, these radioactive fission products can pose significant offsite radiological consequences.
The following parameters/indicators are indicative of possible fuel failures:
"* Coolant Activity: During normal operation, reactor coolant fission product activity is very low. Small concentrations of fission products in the coolant are primarily from either the fission of tramp uranium in the fuel cladding or minor perforations in the cladding itself. Any significant increase from these baseline levels is indicative of fuel failures.
"* Off-gas Activity: As with coolant activity, any fuel failures will release fission products to the reactor coolant. Those products which are gaseous or volatile in nature will be carried over with the steam and eventually be detected by the air ejector off-gas radiation monitors.
" Containment Radiation Monitors: Although not a direct indication or measurement of fuel damage, exceeding predetermined limits on containment high range radiation monitors under LOCA conditions is indicative of possible fuel failures. In addition, this indicator is utilized as an indicator of RCS loss and potential containment loss.
"* Other Radiation Monitors: Other process and area radiation monitoring systems are specifically designed to provide indication of possible fuel damage such as Area Radiation Monitoring Systems.
"* Refueling Accidents: Both area and process radiation monitoring systems designed to detect fission products during refueling conditions as well as visual observation can be utilized to indicate loss or potential loss of spent fuel cladding integrity Rev. No. 22 Page 14 of 146
CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS IAP-2 FIGURE IAP-2.2 - JAF EAL TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT, Rev. 1 1.0 Reactor Fuel 1.1 Coolant Activity 1.1.1 Notification of an Unusual Event Coolant activity > 2 juCi/gm 1-131 equiva lent NUMARC IC:
Fuel clad degradation FPB loss/potential loss:
N/A Mode Applicability:
All Basis:
Elevated reactor coolant activity represents a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant and a potential precursor of more serious problems. This EAL addresses reactor coolant samples exceeding coolant technical specifications for iodine spiking.
PEG Reference(s):
SU4.2 Basis Reference(s):
- 1. [CTS]Technical Specification 3.6.C [ITS]3.4.6 and fCTS] Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications 3.5 [ITS]3.7.5 Rev. No. 22 Page 15 of 146
CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS IAP-2 T(TT TA2P-2.2 - JAF EAL TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT, Rev. 1 PTr-TTRE IAP-2.2 - JAF B SES DOCUMENT, Rev.
1.0 Reactor Fuel 1.1 Coolant Activity 1.1.2 Alert Coolant activity > 300 uCi/gm 1-131 equi valent NUMARC IC:
N/A FPB loss/potential loss:
Fuel clad loss Mode Applicability:
Power operation, startup/hot standby, hot shutdown Basis:
Elevated reactor coolant activity represents a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant and a potential precursor of more serious problems. This amount of coolant activity is well above that expected for iodine spikes and corresponds to about 2% to 5% fuel clad damage. When reactor coolant activity reaches this level, significant clad heating has occurred and thus the fuel clad barrier is considered lost. Therefore, declaration of an Alert is warranted.
PEG Reference(s):
FCI.1 Basis Reference(s):
None Rev. No. 22 Page 16 of 146
IAP-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS FIGURE IAP-2.2 - JAF EAL TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT, Rev. 1 BASES DOCUMENT, Rev.
1.0 Reactor Fuel 1.2 Off-gas Activity 1.2.1 Notification of an Unusual Event off-gas radiation a hi-hi alarm for > 15 min.
NUMARC IC:
Fuel clad degradation FPB loss/potential loss:
N/A Mode Applicability:
All Basis:
Elevated off-gas radiation activity represents a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant and a potential precursor of more serious problems. The Technical Specification allowable limit is [CTS]500,000 gCi/sec [ITS]600,000 p Ci/sec(recombiner discharge gross noble gases beta and/or gamma). The hi-hi alarm setpoint is set at 50% of the instantaneous release limit. The hi-hi alarm setpoint has been conservatively selected because it is operationally significant and is readily recognizable by Control Room operating staff. 15 minutes is allotted for operator action to reduced the off-gas radiation levels and exclude transient conditions.
The hi-hi off-gas radiation alarm is set at 1000 mR/hr on 17RM-150 A and B.
PEG Reference(s):
SU4.1 Basis Reference(s):
- 1. PSP-14 Main Steam Line and SJAE Radiation Monitor Calibration
- 2. AOP-3 High Activity in Reactor Coolant or Off-gas
- 3. ICTS]Technical Specifications 3.6.C [ITS]3.4.6 Rev. No. 22 Page 17 of 146
IAP-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS
- JAF EAL TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT, Rev. 1 FIGURE IAP-2.2 1.0 Reactor Fuel 1.2 Off-gas Activity 1.2.2 Alert Off-gas radiation 2 10 x hi-hi alarm NUMARC IC:
N/A FPB loss/potential loss:
Fuel clad loss Mode Applicability:
Power operation, startup/hot standby, hot shutdown Basis:
or potential This EAL is to cover other indications that may indicate loss Air ejector off-gas radiation levels >10 loss of the fuel clad barrier.
times the nominal hi-hi setpoint is indicative of significant fuel cladding with the Alert EAL of 300 p Ci/gm 1-131 equivalent failure and is consistent coolant activity. The Technical Specification allowable limit is noble (CTS)500,000 uCi/sec (ITS)600,000 uCi/sec (recombiner discharge gross The hi-hi alarm setpoint is set at 50% of the gases beta and/or gamma).
of instantaneous release limit and, therefore, a conservative representation limits. The hi-hi alarm setpoint 10 times Technical Specification release and has been conservatively selected because it is operationally significant readily recognizable by the Control Room operating staff.
The hi-hi off-gas radiation alarm is set at 1000 mR/hr on 17RM-150A and B.
10 times the hi-hi alarm setpoint is therefore 10,000 mR/hr.
PEG Reference(s):
FC4.1 Basis Reference(s):
- 1. (CTS)Technical Specification 3.2.D and Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications 3.5 (ITS)3.7.5
- 2. PSP-14 Main Steam Line and SJAE Radiation Monitor Calibration
- 3. AOP-3 High Activity in Reactor Coolant or Off-gas Page 18 of 146
- 22
CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS IAP- 2 FIGURE IAP-2.2 - JAF EAL TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT, Rev. 1 1.0 Reactor Fuel 1.3 Containment Radiation 1.3.1 Alert Drywell radiation Ž 300 R/hr NUMARC IC:
N/A FPB loss/potential loss:
RCS loss Mode Applicability:
Power operation, startup/hot standby, hot shutdown Basis:
The drywell radiation reading is a value which indicates the release of reactor coolant to the drywell. The reading is calculated assuming the instantaneous release and dispersal of the reactor coolant noble gas and iodine inventory associated with normal operating concentrations (i. e.,
within Technical Specifications) into the drywell atmosphere. The 300 R/hr value is conservatively selected from EAP-44 Figures V-2 thru V-5 based on Case #5 (1/10th of 1% noble gas release) one hour after shutdown. The reading is less than that specified for EAL 1.3.2 because no damage to the fuel clad is assumed. Only leakage from the RCS is assumed in this EAL.
It is important to recognize that the radiation monitor may be sensitive to shine from the RPV or RCS piping. Drywell radiation monitors are 17-RE-104 A or B.
PEG Reference(s):
RCS3.1 Basis Reference(s):
- 1. EAP-44 Core Damage Estimation Figures V-2 thru V-5
- 2. Calculation SL-4370, Sargent & Lundy, May 1985 "High Range Containment Monitor Response to Post Accident Fission Product Barrier Releases JAFNPP" Rev. No. 22 Page 19 of 146
CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS IAP-2 FIGURE IAP-2.2 - JAF EAL TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT, Rev. 1 1.0 Reactor Fuel 1.3 Containment Radiation 1.3.2 Site Area Emergency Drywell radiation ? 3000 R/hr NUMARC IC:
N/A FPB loss/potential loss:
Fuel clad loss, RCS loss Mode Applicability:
Power operation, startup/hot standby, hot shutdown Basis:
The drywell radiation reading is a value which indicates the release of reactor coolant, with elevated activity indicative of fuel damage, into the drywell. The reading is calculated assuming the instantaneous release and dispersal of the reactor coolant noble gas and iodine inventory associated with a concentration of 300 p Ci/gm dose equivalent 1-131 into the drywell atmosphere. Reactor coolant concentrations of this magnitude are several times larger than the maximum concentrations allowed within Technical Specifications (including iodine spiking) and are therefore indicative of fuel damage (approximately 2% - 5% clad failure depending on core inventory and RCS volume). The 3000 R/hr value was conservatively selected from EAP 44 Figures V-2 thru V-5 based on Case #4 (1% noble gas release) one hour after shutdown. The reading is higher than that specified for EAL 1.3.1 and, thus, this EAL indicates a loss of both the fuel clad barrier and the RCS barrier.
It is important to recognize that the radiation monitor may be sensitive to shine from the RPV or RCS piping. Drywell radiation monitors are 17-RE-104 A or B.
PEG Reference(s):
FC3.1 Basis Reference(s):
- 1. EAP-44 Core Damage Estimation Figures V-2 thru V-5
- 2. Calculation SL-4370, Sargent & Lundy, May 1985 "High Range Containment Monitor Response to Post Accident Fission Product Barrier Releases JAFNPP" Rev. No. 22 Page 20 of 146
CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS IAP-2 FIGURE IAP-2.2 - JAF EAL TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT, Rev. .
1.0 Reactor Fuel 1.3 Containment Radiation 1.3.3 General Emergency Drywell radiation z 250,000 R/hr NUMARC IC:
N/A FPB loss/potential loss:
Fuel clad loss, RCS loss, Containment potential loss Mode Applicability:
Power operation, startup/hot standby, hot shutdown Basis:
The drywell radiation reading is a value which indicates significant fuel damage well in excess of that required for loss of the RCS barrier and the fuel clad barrier. NUREG-1228 "Source Estimations During Incident Response to Severe Nuclear Power Plant Accidents" states that such readings do not exist when the amount of clad damage is less than 20%. The 250,000 R/hr value was conservatively selected from EAP-44 Figures V-2 thru V-5 based on Case #3 (10% noble gas release) one hour after shutdown. A major release of radioactivity requiring offsite protective actions from core damage is not possible unless a major failure into the reactor coolant has occurred.
Regardless of whether the primary containment barrier itself is challenged, this amount of activity in containment could have severe consequences if released. It is, therefore, prudent to treat this as a potential loss of the containment barrier and upgrade the emergency classification to a General Emergency.
It is important to recognize that the radiation monitor may be sensitive to shine from the RPV or RCS piping. Drywell radiation monitors are 17-RE-104 A or B.
PEG Reference(s):
PC3.1 Basis Reference(s):
- 1. EAP-44 Core Damage Estimation Figures V-2 thru V-5
- 2. Calculation SL-4370, Sargent & Lundy, May 1985 "High Range Containment Monitor Response to Post Accident Fission Product Barrier Releases JAFNPP" Rev. No. 22 Page 21 of 146
CONDITIONS IAP-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY
- JAF EAL TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT, Rev. 1 FIGURE IAP-2.2 1.0 Reactor Fuel 1.4 Other Radiation Monitors 1.4.1 Notification of an Unusual Event Any sustained ARM reading > 100 x alarm or offscale hi resulting from an uncontrolled process NUMARC IC:
Unexpected increase in plant radiation or airborne concentration.
FPB loss/potential loss:
N/A Mode Applicability:
All Basis:
long lead times relative to Valid elevated area radiation levels usually have site boundary, thus impact the potential for radiological release beyond the to public health and safety is very low.
This EAL addresses unplanned increases in radiation levels inside the plant.
These radiation levels represent a degradation in the control of radioactive material and a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant.
Area radiation levels above 100 times the alarm setpoint have been selected because they are readily identifiable on ARM instrumentation. The ARM alarm setpoint is considered to be a bounding value above the maximum normal radiation level in an area. Since ARM setpoints are nominally set one decade over normal levels, 100 times the alarm setpoint provides an appropriate threshold for emergency classification. For those ARMS whose upper range limits are less than 100 times the alarm setpoint, a value of offscale high level is used. This EAL escalates to an Alert, if the increases impair the of safe plant operation.
PEG Reference(s):
AU2.4 Basis Reference(s):
- 1. EOP-5 Secondary Containment Control Pit
- 2. AOP-53 Loss of Spent Fuel Pool, Reactor Cavity or Equipment Storage Water Level Rev. No. 22 Page 22 of 146
CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS IAP - 2 FIGURE IAP-2.2 - JAF EAL TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT, Rev. 1 1.0 Reactor Fuel 1.4 Other Radiation Monitors 1.4.2 Alert Sustained Refuel Floor Exhaust Radiation Monitors 17RM-456A or B Shi-hi alarm OR Any sustained refuel floor rad monitor > its Maximum Safe Operating Value, Table 1.1 Table 1.1 Refuel Floor Rad Monitors 18RM-021-12 Spent Fuel Pool (EPIC Pt. A-1229) 1000mR/hr 18RM-021-14 New Fuel Vault (EPIC Pt. A-1231) 1000 mR/hr 18RM-021-30 Refuel Floor West (EPIC Pt. A-1247) 200,000 mR/hr NUMARC IC:
Major damage to irradiated fuel or loss of water level that has or will result in the uncovering of irradiated fuel outside the reactor vessel.
FPB loss/potential loss:
N/A Mode Applicability:
All Basis:
This EAL is defined by the specific areas where irradiated fuel is located such as reactor cavity, reactor vessel, or spent fuel pool.
Sufficient time exists to take corrective actions for these conditions and there is little potential for substantial fuel damage. NUREG/CR-4982 "Severe Accident in Spent Fuel Pools in Support of Generic Safety Issue 82" indicates that even if corrective actions are not taken, no prompt fatalities are predicted and the risk of injury is low. In addition, NRC Information Notice No. 90-08, "KR-85 Hazards from Decayed Fuel" presents the following it its discussion:
"In the event of a serious accident involving decayed spent fuel, protective actions would be needed for personnel on site, while offsite doses (assuming an exclusion area radius of one mile from the plant site) would be well below the Environmental Protection Agency's Protective Action Guides. Accordingly, it is important to be able to properly survey and monitor for Kr-85 in the event of an accident with decayed spent fuel."
Rev. No. 22 Page 23 of 146
IAP-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS FIGURE IAP-2.2 - JAF EAL TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT, Rev. 1 1.0 Reactor Fuel 1.4 Other Radiation Monitors Thus, an Alert Classification for this event is appropriate. Escalation, if appropriate, would occur via Emergency Director judgment in EAL Category 9.0.
The basis for the reactor building ventilation monitor setpoint is a spent fuel handling accident and is, therefore, appropriate for this EAL.
Area radiation levels on the refuel floor at or above the Maximum Safe Operating value are indicative of radiation fields which may limit personnel access. Access to the refuel floor is required in order to visually observe water level in the spent fuel pool. Without access to the refuel floor, it would not be possible to determine the applicability of EAL 1.5.2. Area radiation levels on the refuel floor at or above the Maximum Safe Operating value could also adversely affect equipment whose operation may be needed to assure adequate core cooling or shutdown the reactor.
PEG Reference(s):
AA2.1 Basis Reference(s):
- 1. NUREG-0818, Emergency Action Levels for Light Water Reactors
- 2. NUREG/CR-4982, Severe Accident in Spent Fuel Pools in Support of Generic Safety Issue 82, July 1987
- 3. NRC Information Notice No. 90-08, KR-85 Hazards from Decayed Fuel
- 4. EOP-5 Secondary Containment Control
- 5. OP-32 Area Radiation Monitoring
- 6. JAFNPP EPG/SAG Rev. No. 22 Page 24 of 146
CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS IAP-2 FIGURE IAP-2.2 - JAF EAL TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT, Rev. 1 1.0 Reactor Fuel 1.4 Other Radiation Monitors 1.4.3 Alert Sustained area radiation levels > 15 mR/hr in either:
Control Room OR Central Alarm Station and Secondary Alarm Station (SAS)
NUMARC IC:
Release of radioactive material or increases in radiation levels within the facility that impedes operation of systems required to maintain safe operations or to establish or maintain cold shutdown.
FPB loss/potential loss:
N/A Mode Applicability:
All Basis:
This EAL addresses increased radiation levels that impede necessary access to operating stations requiring continuous occupancy to maintain safe plant operation or perform a safe plant shutdown. Areas requiring continuous occupancy include the Control Room, the central alarm station (CAS) and the secondary alarm station (SAS). The security alarm stations are included in this EAL because of their importance to permitting access to areas required to assure safe plant operations.
The value of 15 mR/hr is derived from the GDC 19 value of 5 rem in 30 days with adjustment for expected occupancy times. Although Section III.D.3 of NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements", provides that the 15 mR/hr value can be averaged over the 30 days, the value is used here without averaging. A 30 day duration implies an event potentially more significant than an Alert.
It is the impaired ability to operate the plant that results in the actual or potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. The cause or magnitude of the increase in radiation levels is not a concern of this EAL.
The Emergency Director must consider the source or cause of the increased radiation levels and determine if any other EALs may be involved. For example, a dose rate of 15 mR/hr in the Control Room may be a problem in itself.
Rev. No. 22 Page 25 of 146
CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS IAP - 2 FIGURE IAP-2.2 - JAF EAL TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT, Rev. 1 However, the increase may also be indicative of high dose rates in the containment due to a LOCA. In this latter case, a Site Area Emergency or a General Emergency may be indicated by other EAL categories.
This EAL could result in declaration of an Alert at JAFNPP due to a radioactivity release or radiation shine resulting from a major accident at the NMP-l or NMP-2. Such a declaration would be appropriate if the increase impairs safe plant operation.
This EAL is not intended to apply to anticipated temporary radiation increases due to planned events (e. g., radwaste container movement, depleted resin transfers, etc.).
PEG Reference(s):
AA3.1 Basis Reference(s):
- 1. GDC 19
- 2. NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements", Section III.D.3 Rev. No. 22 Page 26 of 146
. 1.
CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS IAP- 2 FIGURE IAP-2.2 - JAF EAL TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT, Rev. 1 1.0 Reactor Fuel 1.4 Other Radiation Monitors 1.4.4 Alert Sustained abnormal area radiation levels > 8 R/hr in any areas, Table 1.2 AND Access is required for safe operation or shutdown Table 1.2 Plant Safety Function Areas
- Reactor Building
- Turbine Building
- Screenwell/Pumphouse
- Diesel Generator Building
- Administration Building NOMARC IC:
Release of radioactive material or increases in radiation levels within the facility that impedes operation of systems required to maintain safe operations or to establish or maintain cold shutdown.
FPB loss/potential loss:
N/A Mode Applicability:
All Basis:
This EAL addresses increased radiation levels in areas requiring infrequent access in order to maintain safe plant operation or perform a safe plant shutdown. Area radiation levels at or above 8 R/hr are indicative of radiation fields which may limit personnel access or adversely affect equipment whose operation may be needed to assure adequate core cooling or shutdown the reactor. This basis of the value is described in NMPC memo File Code NMP31027 "Exposure Guidelines For Unusual/Accident Conditions".
The areas selected are consistent with those listed in other EALs and represent those structures which house systems and equipment necessary for the safe operation and shutdown of the plant.
It is the impaired ability to operate the plant that results in the actual or potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. The cause or magnitude of the increase in radiation levels is not a concern of this EAL.
The Emergency Director must consider the source or cause of the increased radiation levels and determine if any other EAL may be involved. For example, a dose rate of 8 R/hr may be a problem in itself.
Rev. No. 22 Page 27 of 146
IAP -2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS FIGURE IAP-2.2 - JAF EAL TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT, Rev. 1 in the However, the increase may also be indicative of high dose rates In this latter case, a site Area Emergency or a containment due to a LOCA.
General Emergency may be indicated by other EAL categories.
due to a This EAL could result in declaration of an Alert at JAFNPP a major accident at radioactivity release or radiation shine resulting from Such a declaration would be appropriate if the increase the NMP-I or NMP-2.
impairs safe plant operation.
radiation This EAL is not meant to apply to increases in the containment events which are addressed in other EALs. Nor is it monitors as these are due to planned intended to apply to anticipated temporary radiation increases resin transfers, etc.).
events (e. g., radwaste container movement, depleted PEG Reference(s):
AA3.2 Basis Reference(s):
"Exposure
- 1. Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation memo File Code NMP31027 For Unusual/Accident Conditions", Revision 1, 3/18/93 Guidelines 22 Page 28 of 146 Rev. No.
CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS IAP-2 FIGURE IAP-2.2 - JAF EAL TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT, Rev. 1
- 1. 0 Reactor Fuel 1.5 Refueling Accidents 1.5.1 Notification of an Unusual Event Spent fuel pool/ reactor cavity water level cannot be restored and maintained above the spent fuel pool low water level alarm NUMARC IC:
Unexpected increase in plant radiation or airborne concentration.
FPB loss/potential loss:
N/A Mode Applicability:
All Basis:
The above event has a long lead time relative to the potential for radiological release outside the site boundary, thus impact to public health and safety is very low. However, in light of recent industry events, classification as an Notification of an Unusual Event is warranted as a precursor to a more serious event.
The spent fuel pool low water level alarm setpoint is actuated by 19LS-60.
The definition of "'... cannot be restored and maintained above ... "' allows the operator to visually observe the low water level condition, if possible, and to attempt water level restoration instructions as long as water level remains above the top of irradiated fuel. Water level restoration instructions are performed in accordance with AOP-53.
When the fuel transfer canal is directly connected to the spent fuel pool and reactor cavity, there could exist the possibility of uncovering irradiated fuel in the fuel transfer canal. Therefore, this EAL is also applicable for conditions in which irradiated fuel is being transferred to and from the RPV and spent fuel pool.
PEG Reference(s):
AU2.1 Basis Reference(s):
- 1. AOP-53 Loss of Spent Fuel Pool, Reactor Cavity or Equipment Storage Pit Water Level Rev. No. 22 Page 29 of 146
IAP-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS
- JAF EAL TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT, Rev. 1 FIGURE IAP-2.2 1.0 Reactor Fuel 1.5 Refueling Accidents 1.5.2 Alert Report of visual observation of irradiated fuel uncovered NUMARC IC:
that has or will Major damage to irradiated fuel or loss of water level fuel outside the reactor vessel.
result in the uncovering of irradiated FPB loss/potential loss:
N/A Mode Applicability:
All Basis:
fuel is located This EAL is defined by the specific areas where irradiated vessel, or spent fuel pool.
such as reactor cavity, reactor these conditions and Sufficient time exists to take corrective actions for potential for substantial fuel damage. NUREG/CR-4982 "Severe there is little Safety Issue 82" Accident in Spent Fuel Pools in Support of Generic are not taken, no prompt fatalities indicates that even if corrective actions is low. In addition, NRC Information are predicted and the risk of injury from Decayed Fuel" presents the following it Notice No. 90-08, "KR-85 Hazards its discussion:
spent fuel, protective "In the event of a serious accident involving decayed offsite doses (assuming actions would be needed for personnel on site, while plant site) would be well below an exclusion area radius of one mile from the Protective Action Guides. Accordingly, the Environmental Protection Agency's in the properly survey and monitor for Kr-85 it is important to be able to event of an accident with decayed spent fuel."
Escalation, if Thus, an Alert Classification for this event is appropriate.
in EAL Category 9.0.
appropriate, would occur by Emergency Director judgment fuel pool has dropped to There is no indication that water level in the spent observation by personnel on the the level of the fuel other than by visual When the fuel transfer canal is directly connected to the refueling floor. of there could exist the possibility spent fuel pool and reactor cavity, this EAL Therefore, uncovering irradiated fuel in the fuel transfer canal. to is being transferred is applicable for conditions in which irradiated fuel and from the RPV and spent fuel pool.
Page 30 of 146 Rev. No. 22
CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS IAP- 2 FIGURE IAP-2.2 - JAF EAL TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT, Rev. 1 This EAL applies to spent fuel requiring water coverage and is not intended to address spent fuel which is licensed for dry storage.
PEG Reference(s):
AA2.2 Basis Reference(s):
- 1. NUREG-0818, Emergency Action Levels for Light Water Reactors
- 2. NUREG/CR-4982, Severe Accident in Spent Fuel Pools in Support of Generic Safety Issue 82, July 1987
- 3. NRC Information Notice No. 90-08, KR-85 Hazards from Decayed Fuel Rev. No. 22 Page 31 of 146
CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS
.IAP- 2 FIGURE IAP-2.2 - JAF EAL TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT, Rev. .
1.0 Reactor Fuel 1.6 ISPSI Events 1.6.1 Notification of an Unusual Event Sustained radiation reading for irradiated spent fuel in dry storage, Table 1.3 TABLE 1.3 OVERPACK TRANSFER CASK Average Surface Dose Rates Average Surface Dose Rates
>80 mrem/hour (neutron + gamma) on the >260 mrem/hour (neutron + gamma) on the side side
>20 mrem/hour (neutron + gamma) on the >B0 mrem/hour (neutron + gamma) on the top top
>32 mrem/hour (neutron + gamma) at the inlet and outlet vent ducts NEI IC:
Unexpected Increase in ISFSI Radiation.
Operating Mode Applicability: All Basis:
This EAL addresses the degradation of irradiated spent fuel stored onsite in dry storage casks or transfer casks. These casks are designed to standards identified in 10 CFR Part 72. The dry storage casks are routinely monitored by site Radiation Protection/Health Physics personnel, such that any degradation would be detected. Increases in radiation levels may indicate a potential criticality event. Readings in excess of [two times ISFSI Technical Specification limits] are indicative of degradation of the irradiated spent fuel or storage cask confinement boundary.
The JAF ISFSI employs use of HI-STORM 100 System casks for temporary onsite storage of JAF spent nuclear fuel. Degradation of the spent fuel cask radiation shield or degradation of the confinement boundary due to an operational event or environmental phenomena could result in dose rates and/or radionuclide releases that exceed normal doses.
Loss of water within the HI-TRAC transfer cask water jacket reduces shielding effectiveness and may result in dose rates that exceed normal levels.
However, the dose rate at 100 meters from the damaged transfer cask is estimated to be less than 1 mrem/hr.
Rev. No. 22 Page 32 of 146
CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS IAP- 2 FIGURE IAP-2.2 - JAF EAL TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT, Rev. I Basis
References:
- 1. Holtec International Inc. Report HT-2002444, Revision 0, , HI-STORM Cask System Final Safety Analysis Report, Docket 72-1014.
- 2. 10CFR72, Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste, October 25, 2000 NEI
Reference:
- 1. E-AUl Rev. No. 22 Page 33 of 146
IAP-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS Rev. 1 FIGURE IAP-2.2 - JAF EAL TEC1NICAL BASES DOCUMENT, 1.0 Reactor Fuel 1.6 ISFSI Events 1.6.2 Notification of an Unusual Event boundary resulting Damage or breach of ANY loaded spent fuel cask confinement from natural phenomena events or an accident OR that indicates loss Any condition, in the opinion of the Emergency Director, of loaded fuel storage cask confinement boundary.
NEI IC:
Damage to a loaded cask confinement boundary.
Operating Mode Applicability: All Basis:
of the occurrence An Unusual Event under this EAL is classified on the basis cask confinement boundary of an event of sufficient magnitude that a loaded fuel based on a loaded is damaged or violated. This includes classification the fuel leading to the degradation of storage cask confinement boundary loss to its safety problem with respect during storage or posing an operational removal from storage.
temporary onsite The JAF ISFSI employs use of HI-STORM System casks for Degradation of the spent fuel cask storage of JAF spent nuclear fuel.
boundary due to an radiation shield or degradation of the confinement could result in dose rates operational event or environmental phenomena and/or radionuclide releases that exceed normal doses.
in 10 CFR Part The dry storage modules are designed to standards identified Radiation
- 72. The dry storage casks are routinely monitored by site would be Protection/Health Physics personnel, such that any degradation levels may be indicative detected. Increases in area or surface contamination fuel or storage cask containment of degradation of the irradiated spent boundary.
damage to the A tip-over accident or a tornado missile could cause localized HI-STORM overpack shielding. This could cause overpack surface dose rates to be a in the affected area to increase, but there is not expected dose rates.
area boundary noticeable increase in the ISFSI site or controlled Report indicates that there are no Although the Cask System Safety Analysis confinement that could cause failure of the MPC man-made or natural phenomena events that may boundary, this EAL addresses all mechanistically possible occur.
Page 34 of 146 Rev. No. 22
CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS IAP- 2 FIGURE IAP-2.2 - JAF EAL TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT, Rev. I Basis
References:
- 1. Holtec International Inc. Report HT-2002444, Revision 0, HI-STORM Cask System Final Safety Analysis Report, Docket 72-1014.
- 2. 10CFR72, Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste, June 30, 1999 NEI
Reference:
- 1. E-HU1 Rev. No. 22 Page 35 of 146
IAP-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS FIGURE IAP-2.2 - JAF EAL TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT, Rev. 1 2.0 REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL (RPV)
The reactor pressure vessel provides a volume for the coolant which covers the reactor core. The RPV and associated pressure piping (reactor coolant system) together provide a barrier to limit the release of radioactive material should the reactor fuel cladding integrity fail.
There are two RPV parameters which are indicative of conditions which may pose a threat to RPV or fuel cladding integrity:
RPV Water Level: RPV water level is directly related to the status of adequate core cooling, and therefore fuel cladding integrity. Excessive
> Tech. Spec.) reactor coolant to drywell leakage indications are utilized to indicate potential pipe cracks which may propagate to an extent threatening fuel clad, RPV and primary containment integrity. Conditions under which all attempts at establishing adequate core cooling have failed require primary containment flooding.
- Reactor Power/Reactivity Control: The inability to control reactor power below certain levels can pose a direct threat to reactor fuel, RPV and primary containment integrity.
No. 22 Page 36 of 146 Rev.
CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS IAP-2 FIGURE IAP-2.2 - JAF EAL TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT, Rev. 1 2.0 Reactor Pressure Vessel 2.1 RPV Water Level 2.1.1 Notification of an Unusual Event Unidentified drywell leakage > 10 gpm OR Reactor coolant to drywell identified leakage > 25 gpm NUMARC IC:
RCS leakage FPB loss/potential loss:
N/A Mode Applicability:
Power operation, startup/hot standby, hot shutdown Basis:
The conditions of this EAL may be a precursor of more serious conditions and, as a result, is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. The 10 gpm value for the unidentified drywell leakage was selected because it is observable with normal Control Room indications.
Smaller values must be determined through time-consuming surveillance tests (e. g., mass balances). The 25 gpm value for identified reactor coolant to drywell leakage is set at a higher value because of the significance of identified leakage in comparison to unidentified or pressure boundary leakage.
Only operating modes in which there is fuel in the reactor coolant system and the system is pressurized are specified.
PEG Reference(s):
SU5.1 Basis Reference(s):
None Rev. No. 22 Page 37 of 146
CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS IAP- 2 FIGURE IAP-2.2 - JAF EAL TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT, Rev. 1 2.0 Reactor Pressure Vessel 2.1 RPV Water Level 2.1.2 Site Area Emergency RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained > 0 in. (TAF)
NUMARC IC:
Loss of reactor vessel water level has or will uncover fuel in the reactor vessel.
FPB loss/potential loss:
Fuel clad potential loss, RCS loss Mode Applicability:
Power operation, startup/hot standby, hot shutdown, cold shutdown, refuel Basis:
The RPV water level used in this EAL is the top of active fuel (TAF). This value corresponds to the level which is used to indicate challenge to core cooling and the potential loss of the fuel clad barrier.
Sustained uncovery of the fuel irrespective of the event that causes fuel uncovery is justification alone for declaring a Site Area Emergency. This includes events that could lead to fuel uncovery in any plant operating mode including cold shutdown and refuel. Escalation to a General Emergency occurs through radiological effluence addressed in EAL 1.3.3 for drywell radiation and in the EALs defined for Category 5.0, Radioactivity Release.
The terminology of "cannot be restored and maintained" is intended to be consistent with the interpretation that:
"The value of the identified parameter(s) is/is not able to be returned to above/below specified limits. This determination includes making an evaluation that considers both current and future systems performance in relation to the current value and trend of the parameter(s).
Rev. No. 22 Page 38 of 146
OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS IAP - 2 CLASSIFICATION FIGURE IAP-2.2 - JAF EAL TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT, Rev. I the Neither implies that the parameter must actually exceed the limit before be made before the classification is made nor that the classification must limit is reached. Does not imply any specific time interval but does not permit prolonged operation beyond a limit without making the specified classification."
This definition would require the emergency classification be made prior to water level dropping below TAF if, based on an evaluation of the current trend of RPV water level and in consideration of current and future injection system performance, that RPV water level will not likely be restored and maintained above TAF. This definition, however, also provides the latitude, based on that same evaluation, not to declare the SAE for those situations in which the RPV water level transiently drops below TAF in the process of RPV water level restoration.
PEG Reference(s):
SS5.1 FC2.1 RCS4.1 Basis Reference(s):
- 1. JAFNPP EPG/SAG Rev. No. 22 Page 39 of 146
IAP-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS Rev. 1 FIGURE IAP-2.2 - JAF EAL TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT, 2.0 Reactor Pressure Vessel 2.1 RPV Water Level 2.1.3 General Emergency Primary Containment Flooding required NUMARC IC:
N/A FPB loss/potential loss:
Fuel clad loss, RCS loss, Containment potential loss Mode Applicability:
Power operation, startup/hot standby, hot shutdown Basis:
which, if not The condition in this EAL represents imminent melt sequences potential for primary corrected, could lead to RPV failure and increased If the EOPs have been ineffective in restoring RPV containment failure.
clad barrier is imminent. Therefore, water level, loss of the fuel Primary Containment declaration of a General Emergency is appropriate when Flooding is required.
PEG Reference(s):
PC4.1 Basis Reference(s):
- 1. JAFNPP EPG/SAG Page 40 of 146 Rev. No. 22
CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS IAP-2 FIGURE IAP-2.2 - JAF EAL TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT, Rev. 1 2.0 Reactor Pressure Vessel 2.2 Reactor Power / Reactivity Control 2.2.1 Alert Any-RPS setpoint has been exceeded AND Automatic scram fails to result in a control rod pattern which assures reactor shutdown under all conditions without boron NUMARC IC:
Failure of Reactor Protection system instrumentation to complete or initiate an automatic reactor trip once a Reactor Protection system setpoint has been exceeded and manual trip was successful while in power operations or hot standby FPB loss/potential loss:
N/A Mode Applicability:
Power operation, startup/hot standby Basis:
This condition indicates failure of the automatic protection system to scram the reactor to the extent that reactor shutdown cannot be assured under all conditions without boron.
If a manual scram does not result in reactor power being reduced below the APRM downscale setpoint (2.5%) or torus temperature exceeds the Boron Injection Inititiation Temperature, escalation to a Site Area Emergency is required. A manual scram is any set of actions by the reactor operators at the reactor control console which causes control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core and brings the reactor subcritical including manual scram push buttons, ARI and mode switch.
In determining whether to declare an emergency based on this EAL the following guidance is provided by NUMARC:
Rev. No. 22 Page 41 of 146
IAP -2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS
- JAF EAL TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT, Rev. .
FIGURE IAP-2.2 reached with no Regarding the occurrence of an event in which the EAL is adverse consequences:
is no reason to declare an "If an emergency condition no longer exists, there meeting emergency. The NRC shall be notified after discovery within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, State and local authorities should also be 10CFR50.72 reporting criteria. in with arrangements made notified as soon as practical, or in accordance advance."
PEG Reference(s):
SA2.1 Basis Reference(s):
- 1. JAFNPP EPG/SAG
- 2. "Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels" NUMARC/NESP 007 Revision 2 - Questions and Answers, June 1993 Page 42 of 146 Rev. No. 22
CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS IAP- 2 FIGURE IAP-2.2 - JAF EAL TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT, Rev. 1 2.0 Reactor Pressure Vessel 2.2 Reactor Power / Reactivity Control 2.2.2 Site Area Emergency Any RPS setpoint has been exceeded AND Automatic and manual scrams fail to result in a control rod pattern which assures reactor shutdown under all conditions without boron AND Either:
Reactor power > 2.5%
OR Torus temperature > Boron Injection Initiation Temperature NUMARC IC:
Failure of Reactor Protection system instrumentation to complete or initiate an automatic reactor trip once a Reactor Protection system setpoint has been exceeded and manual scram trip was not successful.
FPB loss/potential loss:
N/A Mode Applicability:
Power operation, startup/hot standby Basis:
This condition indicates failure of the automatic and/or manual protection system to scram the reactor to the extent which precludes the reactor being made shutdown under all conditions without boron. Under these conditions, the reactor is producing more heat than the maximum decay heat load for which the safety systems are designed. A Site Area Emergency is indicated because conditions exist that lead to imminent loss or potential loss of both fuel clad and primary containment.
Rev. No. 22 Page 43 of 146
IAP-2 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS
- JAF EAL TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT, Rev. .
FIGURE IAP-2.2 scram followed by The failure of automatic initiation of a reactor unsuccessful manual initiation actions which can be rapidly taken at the by itself, lead to imminent loss of either reactor control console does not, fuel clad or primary containment barriers. It is the continued criticality a reactor scram along with the continued addition under conditions requiring to primary containment of heat to containment which poses the imminent threat In accordance with the EOPs, SLC is initiated based or fuel clad barriers.
of safety system capability under on heat addition to containment in excess V failure to scram conditions.
the reactor operator at An immediate manual scram is any set of actions by to be rapidly inserted the reactor control console which causes control rods manual scram push into the core and brings the reactor subcritical including buttons, ARI and mode switch.
PEG Reference(s):
SS2.1 Basis Reference(s):
- 1. JAFNPP EPG/SAG 7
NUMARC/NESP-00
- 2. "Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels" Revision 2 - Questions and Answers, June 1993 Page 44 of 146 Rev. No. 22
CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS IAP- 2 FIGURE IAP-2.2 - JAF EAL TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT, Rev. 1 2.0 Reactor Pressure Vessel 2.2 Reactor Power / Reactivity Control 2.2.3 General Emergency Any RPS setpoint has been exceeded AND Automatic and manual scrams fail to result in a control rod pattern which assures reactor shutdown under all conditions without boron AND Either:
RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained > -19 in.
OR Torus temperature and RPV pressure cannot be maintained < HCTL NUKARC IC:
Failure of the Reactor Protection System to complete an automatic trip and manual trip was not successful and there is indication of an extreme challenge to the ability to cool the core.
FPB loss/potential loss:
N/A Mode Applicability:
Power operation, startup/hot standby Basis:
Under the conditions of this EAL, the efforts to bring the reactor subcritical have been unsuccessful and, as a result, the reactor is producing more heat than the maximum decay heat load for which the safety systems were designed.
An extreme challenge to the ability to cool the core is indicated when RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained above the Minimum Steam Cooling RPV Water Level (-19 in.). This RPV water level is used in the EPG/SAG to define the lowest RPV water level in a failure-to-scram event above which adequate core cooling can be maintained. This situation could be precursor for a core melt sequence.
Rev. No. 22 Page 45 of 146
CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS IAP-2 FIGURE IAP-2.2 - JAF EAL TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT, Rev. .
An extreme challenge to the primary containment is indicated when the inability to remove heat during the early stages of this sequence results in heatup of the containment. The Heat Capacity Temperature Limit (HCTL) is a measure of the maximum heat load which the primary containment can withstand.
This situation could be precursor for a core melt sequence.
In this situation, core degradation can occur rapidly For this reason, the General Emergency declaration is intended to be anticipatory of the loss of two fission product barriers and a potential loss of a third thus permitting the maximum offsite intervention time.
An immediate manual scram is any set of actions by the reactor operator at the reactor control console which causes control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core and brings the reactor subcritical including manual scram push buttons, ARI and mode switch.
PEG Reference (s):
SG2.1 Basis Reference(U):
- 1. JAFNPP EPG/SAG Rev. No. 22 Page 46 of 146