Similar Documents at Salem |
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Category:Letter type:LR
MONTHYEARLR-N23-0079, Special Report 23-02-00 Pursuant to the Requirements of Salem Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.3.3.7, Action 10, for the Unit 1 Main Steam Line Rad Monitor Inoperable for Greater than Seven Days2023-12-0707 December 2023 Special Report 23-02-00 Pursuant to the Requirements of Salem Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.3.3.7, Action 10, for the Unit 1 Main Steam Line Rad Monitor Inoperable for Greater than Seven Days LR-N23-0077, Loss of Coolant Accident Peak Cladding Temperature Margin Tracking - Annual Report 2023 & 30 Day Report for Salem Unit 1 Upflow Conversion2023-11-29029 November 2023 Loss of Coolant Accident Peak Cladding Temperature Margin Tracking - Annual Report 2023 & 30 Day Report for Salem Unit 1 Upflow Conversion LR-N23-0072, Core Operating Limits Report Cycle 302023-11-0101 November 2023 Core Operating Limits Report Cycle 30 LR-N23-0045, and Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3 - Notice of Proposed Amendment to Decommissioning Trust Agreement2023-09-0808 September 2023 and Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3 - Notice of Proposed Amendment to Decommissioning Trust Agreement LR-N23-0055, Special Report 272/23-01-00, Pursuant to the Requirements of Technical Specification 3.3.3.1, Action 23, for the Vent Noble Gas Rad Monitor Inoperable for Greater than Seven Days2023-08-0303 August 2023 Special Report 272/23-01-00, Pursuant to the Requirements of Technical Specification 3.3.3.1, Action 23, for the Vent Noble Gas Rad Monitor Inoperable for Greater than Seven Days LR-N23-0054, In-Service Inspection Activities2023-07-26026 July 2023 In-Service Inspection Activities LR-N23-0046, Emergency Plan Document Revisions Implemented June 28, 20232023-07-10010 July 2023 Emergency Plan Document Revisions Implemented June 28, 2023 LR-N23-0005, License Amendment Request to Amend Technical Specifications (TS) 6.8.4.f for Permanent Extension of Type a and Type C Leak Rate Test Frequencies2023-06-23023 June 2023 License Amendment Request to Amend Technical Specifications (TS) 6.8.4.f for Permanent Extension of Type a and Type C Leak Rate Test Frequencies LR-N23-0035, 2022 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report (ARERR)2023-04-27027 April 2023 2022 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report (ARERR) LR-N23-0034, 2022 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report (AREOR) - Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 and Hope Creek Generating Station2023-04-27027 April 2023 2022 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report (AREOR) - Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 and Hope Creek Generating Station LR-N23-0033, Core Operating Limits Report Cycle 272023-04-26026 April 2023 Core Operating Limits Report Cycle 27 LR-N23-0010, License Amendment Request Revision of Technical Specification (TS) to Delete TS Section 5.5 - Meteorological Tower Location2023-04-21021 April 2023 License Amendment Request Revision of Technical Specification (TS) to Delete TS Section 5.5 - Meteorological Tower Location LR-N23-0006, Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Reactors and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations2023-03-24024 March 2023 Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Reactors and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations LR-N23-0019, and Salem Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 - Guarantees of Payment of Deferred Premiums2023-03-21021 March 2023 and Salem Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 - Guarantees of Payment of Deferred Premiums LR-N23-0016, and Salem Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 - Report of Changes, Tests, and Experiments2023-02-28028 February 2023 and Salem Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 - Report of Changes, Tests, and Experiments LR-N23-0012, Annual Property Insurance Status Report2023-02-24024 February 2023 Annual Property Insurance Status Report LR-N23-0014, Stations Submittal of 2022 Annual Report of Fitness for Duty Performance Data Per 10 CFR 26.203(e) and 10 CFR 26.7172023-02-23023 February 2023 Stations Submittal of 2022 Annual Report of Fitness for Duty Performance Data Per 10 CFR 26.203(e) and 10 CFR 26.717 LR-N23-0003, Response to Requests for Additional Information Salem Unit 2 Relief Request S2-I4R-2112023-02-0101 February 2023 Response to Requests for Additional Information Salem Unit 2 Relief Request S2-I4R-211 LR-N22-0096, and Salem Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 - Request for Threshold Determination2023-01-0505 January 2023 and Salem Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 - Request for Threshold Determination LR-N22-0095, Loss of Coolant Accident Peak Cladding Temperature Margin Tracking - Annual Report 20222022-12-20020 December 2022 Loss of Coolant Accident Peak Cladding Temperature Margin Tracking - Annual Report 2022 LR-N22-0094, Emergency Plan Document Revisions Implemented November 21, 20222022-12-14014 December 2022 Emergency Plan Document Revisions Implemented November 21, 2022 LR-N22-0092, Response to Final Iolb Request for Additional Information for Salem LAR to Revise TS to Extend Allowed Outage Time for Inoperable EDG2022-12-0909 December 2022 Response to Final Iolb Request for Additional Information for Salem LAR to Revise TS to Extend Allowed Outage Time for Inoperable EDG LR-N22-0091, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, Report of 10 CFR 72.48 Changes, Tests, and Experiments2022-12-0202 December 2022 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, Report of 10 CFR 72.48 Changes, Tests, and Experiments LR-N22-0084, Response to Final Request for Additional Information for Salem LAR to Revise TS to Extend Allowed Outage Time for Inoperable EDG (EPID L- 2022-LLA-0095)2022-11-17017 November 2022 Response to Final Request for Additional Information for Salem LAR to Revise TS to Extend Allowed Outage Time for Inoperable EDG (EPID L- 2022-LLA-0095) LR-N22-0090, Supplement to Submittal of Salem Generating Station Updated FSAR, Revision 33, 10 CFR 71.106 Review Results and 10 CFR 54.37(b) Review Results for Salem2022-11-10010 November 2022 Supplement to Submittal of Salem Generating Station Updated FSAR, Revision 33, 10 CFR 71.106 Review Results and 10 CFR 54.37(b) Review Results for Salem LR-N22-0065, Submittal of Relief Request Associated with the Fourth Inservice Inspection (ISI) Interval Limited Examinations2022-09-27027 September 2022 Submittal of Relief Request Associated with the Fourth Inservice Inspection (ISI) Interval Limited Examinations LR-N22-0074, Emergency Plan Evacuation Time Estimate2022-09-15015 September 2022 Emergency Plan Evacuation Time Estimate LR-N22-0066, License Amendment Request (LAR) to Relocate Technical Specifications (TS) Requirements for Reactor Head Vents to the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM)2022-08-31031 August 2022 License Amendment Request (LAR) to Relocate Technical Specifications (TS) Requirements for Reactor Head Vents to the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) LR-N22-0063, Spent Fuel Cask Registration2022-08-10010 August 2022 Spent Fuel Cask Registration LR-N22-0068, In-Service Inspection Activities - 90-Day Report2022-08-10010 August 2022 In-Service Inspection Activities - 90-Day Report LR-N22-0012, License Amendment Request to Amend the Technical Specifications to Revise and Relocate the Reactor Coolant System Pressure and Temperature Limits and Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System Limits to a Pressure and Temperature2022-08-0707 August 2022 License Amendment Request to Amend the Technical Specifications to Revise and Relocate the Reactor Coolant System Pressure and Temperature Limits and Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System Limits to a Pressure and Temperature LR-N22-0062, Spent Fuel Cask Registration2022-07-21021 July 2022 Spent Fuel Cask Registration LR-N22-0006, License Amendment Request (LAR) to Amend Salem Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) to Extend the Allowed Outage Time for an Inoperable Emergency Diesel Generator from 72 Hours to 14 Days2022-06-29029 June 2022 License Amendment Request (LAR) to Amend Salem Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) to Extend the Allowed Outage Time for an Inoperable Emergency Diesel Generator from 72 Hours to 14 Days LR-N22-0051, License Amendment Request to Relocate Technical Specification Facility/Unit Staff Qualification Requirements to Quality Assurance Topical Report2022-06-22022 June 2022 License Amendment Request to Relocate Technical Specification Facility/Unit Staff Qualification Requirements to Quality Assurance Topical Report LR-N22-0044, Emergency Plan Document Revisions Implemented November, 20212022-05-19019 May 2022 Emergency Plan Document Revisions Implemented November, 2021 LR-N22-0043, Core Operating Limits Report - Cycle 292022-05-0909 May 2022 Core Operating Limits Report - Cycle 29 LR-N22-0041, 2021 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report (Rerr)2022-04-28028 April 2022 2021 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report (Rerr) LR-N22-0040, 2021 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report2022-04-28028 April 2022 2021 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report LR-N22-0039, Emergency Plan Document Revisions Implemented March 24, 20222022-04-21021 April 2022 Emergency Plan Document Revisions Implemented March 24, 2022 LR-N21-0052, Request for Relief from ASME Code Defect Removal for Service Water Buried Piping2022-04-0707 April 2022 Request for Relief from ASME Code Defect Removal for Service Water Buried Piping LR-N22-0023, Guarantees of Payment of Deferred Premiums2022-03-21021 March 2022 Guarantees of Payment of Deferred Premiums LR-N22-0022, Response to Request for Additional Information Relief Request S1-14R-210, Alternative Examination of Welds2022-03-21021 March 2022 Response to Request for Additional Information Relief Request S1-14R-210, Alternative Examination of Welds LR-N22-0017, Submittal of 2021 Annual Report of Fitness for Duty (FFD) Performance Data2022-02-25025 February 2022 Submittal of 2021 Annual Report of Fitness for Duty (FFD) Performance Data LR-N22-0016, Radiological Survey of Site Property to Be Used for Offshore Wind Port Facility2022-02-24024 February 2022 Radiological Survey of Site Property to Be Used for Offshore Wind Port Facility LR-N22-0013, In-Service Inspection Activities - 90-Day Report2022-02-10010 February 2022 In-Service Inspection Activities - 90-Day Report LR-N22-0007, Request for Exemption from Specific Requirements of 10 CFR Part 26, Fitness for Duty Programs2022-01-0505 January 2022 Request for Exemption from Specific Requirements of 10 CFR Part 26, Fitness for Duty Programs LR-N21-0061, Annual Report of Specific Activity Analysis - TS 6.9.1.5c2021-12-0909 December 2021 Annual Report of Specific Activity Analysis - TS 6.9.1.5c LR-N21-0083, Loss of Coolant Accident Peak Cladding Temperature Margin Tracking - Annual Report 2021 & 30 Day Report for Salem Unit 2 Upflow Conversion2021-11-24024 November 2021 Loss of Coolant Accident Peak Cladding Temperature Margin Tracking - Annual Report 2021 & 30 Day Report for Salem Unit 2 Upflow Conversion LR-N21-0078, Hope and Creek Generating Station, Supplement to License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications (TS) to Delete Definitions Found in 10 CFR Part 20 and Delete Figures of the Site and Surrounding Areas from TS2021-11-18018 November 2021 Hope and Creek Generating Station, Supplement to License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications (TS) to Delete Definitions Found in 10 CFR Part 20 and Delete Figures of the Site and Surrounding Areas from TS LR-N21-0066, Submittal of Relief Request Associated with the Fourth Inservice Inspection (ISI) Interval Limited Examinations2021-11-10010 November 2021 Submittal of Relief Request Associated with the Fourth Inservice Inspection (ISI) Interval Limited Examinations 2023-09-08
[Table view] Category:Technical Specification
MONTHYEARLR-N23-0005, License Amendment Request to Amend Technical Specifications (TS) 6.8.4.f for Permanent Extension of Type a and Type C Leak Rate Test Frequencies2023-06-23023 June 2023 License Amendment Request to Amend Technical Specifications (TS) 6.8.4.f for Permanent Extension of Type a and Type C Leak Rate Test Frequencies ML22270A3172022-09-27027 September 2022 Submittal of Technical Specification Bases Changes, Amendment No. 201 LR-N22-0078, Submittal of Technical Specification Bases Changes, Amendment No. 2152022-09-27027 September 2022 Submittal of Technical Specification Bases Changes, Amendment No. 215 LR-N21-0078, Hope and Creek Generating Station, Supplement to License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications (TS) to Delete Definitions Found in 10 CFR Part 20 and Delete Figures of the Site and Surrounding Areas from TS2021-11-18018 November 2021 Hope and Creek Generating Station, Supplement to License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications (TS) to Delete Definitions Found in 10 CFR Part 20 and Delete Figures of the Site and Surrounding Areas from TS LR-N21-0048, One-Time License Amendment Request to Revise Unit 2 Technical Specification Action for Rod Position Indicators2021-06-18018 June 2021 One-Time License Amendment Request to Revise Unit 2 Technical Specification Action for Rod Position Indicators LR-N21-0045, Submittal of Changes to Technical Specifications Bases2021-06-16016 June 2021 Submittal of Changes to Technical Specifications Bases LR-N21-0006, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-569 Revision of Response Time Testing Definitions2021-02-16016 February 2021 Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-569 Revision of Response Time Testing Definitions LR-N20-0072, License Amendment Request to Amend Tech Specs to Revise and Relocate the Reactor Coolant System Pressure & Temperature Limits & Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System Limits to a Pressure & Temperature Limits Report2020-12-0606 December 2020 License Amendment Request to Amend Tech Specs to Revise and Relocate the Reactor Coolant System Pressure & Temperature Limits & Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System Limits to a Pressure & Temperature Limits Report LR-N20-0003, License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-490, Deletion of E-Bar Definition and Revision to RCS Specific Activity Tech Spec2020-09-17017 September 2020 License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-490, Deletion of E-Bar Definition and Revision to RCS Specific Activity Tech Spec ML17157B2652017-05-0909 May 2017 Submittal of Hope Creek Generating Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 22, Hope Creek Technical Specification Bases Changes, 10CFR54.37(b) Review Results for Hope Creek and PSEG Nuclear LLC Quality Assurance Topical Repor LR-N17-0088, Submittal of Hope Creek Generating Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 22, Hope Creek Technical Specification Bases Changes, 10CFR54.37(b) Review Results for Hope Creek and Pseg Nuclear LLC Quality Assurance Topical Re2017-05-0909 May 2017 Submittal of Hope Creek Generating Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 22, Hope Creek Technical Specification Bases Changes, 10CFR54.37(b) Review Results for Hope Creek and Pseg Nuclear LLC Quality Assurance Topical Repor LR-N17-0034, Salem Generating Station, Units 1 & 2, Submittal of Revision 29 to Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, and Technical Specification Bases Changes and Quality Assurance Topical Report, NO-AA-10, Rev. 852017-01-30030 January 2017 Salem Generating Station, Units 1 & 2, Submittal of Revision 29 to Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, and Technical Specification Bases Changes and Quality Assurance Topical Report, NO-AA-10, Rev. 85 ML17046A2292017-01-30030 January 2017 Submittal of Revision 29 to Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, and Technical Specification Bases Changes and Quality Assurance Topical Report, NO-AA-10, Rev. 85 LR-N16-0003, License Amendment Request to Amend the Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Technical Specifications2016-11-17017 November 2016 License Amendment Request to Amend the Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Technical Specifications LR-N16-0114, License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-545, Revision 3, TS Lnservice Testing Program Removal & Clarify SR Usage Rule Application to Section 5.5 Testing Using the Consolidated Line .2016-08-30030 August 2016 License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-545, Revision 3, TS Lnservice Testing Program Removal & Clarify SR Usage Rule Application to Section 5.5 Testing Using the Consolidated Line . LR-N15-0187, Emergency License Amendment Request to Remove Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Position Indication Instrumentation from the Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Technical Specifications2015-08-31031 August 2015 Emergency License Amendment Request to Remove Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Position Indication Instrumentation from the Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Technical Specifications LR-N15-0021, License Amendment Request Regarding Replacement of Source Range and Intermediate Range Neutron Monitoring Systems2015-04-0303 April 2015 License Amendment Request Regarding Replacement of Source Range and Intermediate Range Neutron Monitoring Systems LR-N15-0020, License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3/4.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation2015-03-27027 March 2015 License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3/4.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation ML14210A4842014-07-28028 July 2014 License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-510, Revision 2, Revision to Steam Generator Program Inspection Frequencies and Tube Sample Selection Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process ML1118615602011-07-28028 July 2011 and Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, License Amendment, Issuance of Amendments Approval of Cyber Security Plan LR-N11-0056, Supplement to Application for Technical Specification Change Regarding Risk-Informed Justification for the Relocation of Specific Surveillance Frequency Requirements to a Licensee Controlled Program2011-02-23023 February 2011 Supplement to Application for Technical Specification Change Regarding Risk-Informed Justification for the Relocation of Specific Surveillance Frequency Requirements to a Licensee Controlled Program LR-N10-0355, Attachment 3 to LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek Generating Station, Emergency Action Level Comparison Matrix2010-10-14014 October 2010 Attachment 3 to LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek Generating Station, Emergency Action Level Comparison Matrix LR-N10-0355, Attachment 1 to LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek Generating Station, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Document (Strike-out Version)2010-10-14014 October 2010 Attachment 1 to LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek Generating Station, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Document (Strike-out Version) ML1100503982010-10-14014 October 2010 Attachment 3 to LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek Generating Station, Emergency Action Level Comparison Matrix LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek, CY-AA-170-500, Revision 0, Meteorological Monitoring System Calibration and Maintenance2010-10-14014 October 2010 Hope Creek, CY-AA-170-500, Revision 0, Meteorological Monitoring System Calibration and Maintenance ML1100504152010-10-14014 October 2010 Hope Creek, CY-AA-170-500, Revision 0, Meteorological Monitoring System Calibration and Maintenance LR-N10-0355, Attachment 2 to LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek Generating Station, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Document (Clean Version)2010-10-14014 October 2010 Attachment 2 to LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek Generating Station, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Document (Clean Version) LR-N10-0355, Attachment 4 to LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek Generating Station, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Supporting Documents (Cd with Paper Index)2010-10-14014 October 2010 Attachment 4 to LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek Generating Station, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Supporting Documents (Cd with Paper Index) ML1100503992010-10-14014 October 2010 Attachment 4 to LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek Generating Station, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Supporting Documents (Cd with Paper Index) ML1100503752010-10-14014 October 2010 Attachment 1 to LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek Generating Station, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Document (Strike-out Version) ML1100504022010-10-14014 October 2010 Attachment 2 to LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek Generating Station, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Document (Clean Version) ML1025802412010-09-0808 September 2010 License Amendment Request S10-01 Application for Technical Specification Change Regarding Risk-Informed Justification for the Relocation of Specific Surveillance Frequency Requirements to a Licensee Controlled Program ML1100505182010-08-24024 August 2010 Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0150(Q), Rev. 6, 125VDC System Malfunction LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0150(Q), Rev. 6, 125VDC System Malfunction2010-08-24024 August 2010 Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0150(Q), Rev. 6, 125VDC System Malfunction LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.HVAC-0002(Q), Rev. 7, Control Room Environment2010-07-13013 July 2010 Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.HVAC-0002(Q), Rev. 7, Control Room Environment ML1100505002010-07-13013 July 2010 Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.HVAC-0002(Q), Rev. 7, Control Room Environment LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.RPV-0009(Q), Rev. 7, Shutdown Cooling2010-06-24024 June 2010 Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.RPV-0009(Q), Rev. 7, Shutdown Cooling ML1100505162010-06-24024 June 2010 Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.RPV-0009(Q), Rev. 7, Shutdown Cooling LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.CONT-0002(Q), Rev. 9, Containment2010-05-0303 May 2010 Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.CONT-0002(Q), Rev. 9, Containment ML1100504772010-05-0303 May 2010 Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.CONT-0002(Q), Rev. 9, Containment LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.RPV-0003(Q), Rev. 21, Recirculation System/Power Oscillations2010-04-21021 April 2010 Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.RPV-0003(Q), Rev. 21, Recirculation System/Power Oscillations ML1100505052010-04-21021 April 2010 Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.MISC-0002(Q), Rev. 10, Crids/Overhead Annunciators/Ppc Computer LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.MISC-0002(Q), Rev. 10, Crids/Overhead Annunciators/Ppc Computer2010-04-21021 April 2010 Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.MISC-0002(Q), Rev. 10, Crids/Overhead Annunciators/Ppc Computer ML1100505062010-04-21021 April 2010 Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.RPV-0003(Q), Rev. 21, Recirculation System/Power Oscillations LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual, Revision 252010-04-16016 April 2010 Hope Creek, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual, Revision 25 ML1100504172010-04-16016 April 2010 Hope Creek, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual, Revision 25 ML1100504742010-03-17017 March 2010 Hope Creek, HC.IC-GP.BB-0003(Q) - Rev. 17, Nuclear Boiler - Nondivisional Channel L-11683/B21-N027 Rx Cavity Flood Up Level/Rx Shutdown Range Level Setup LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek, HC.IC-GP.BB-0003(Q) - Rev. 17, Nuclear Boiler - Nondivisional Channel L-11683/B21-N027 Rx Cavity Flood Up Level/Rx Shutdown Range Level Setup2010-03-17017 March 2010 Hope Creek, HC.IC-GP.BB-0003(Q) - Rev. 17, Nuclear Boiler - Nondivisional Channel L-11683/B21-N027 Rx Cavity Flood Up Level/Rx Shutdown Range Level Setup LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.MISC-0001(Q), Rev. 15, Acts of Nature2010-03-0505 March 2010 Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.MISC-0001(Q), Rev. 15, Acts of Nature ML1100505022010-03-0505 March 2010 Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.MISC-0001(Q), Rev. 15, Acts of Nature 2023-06-23
[Table view] Category:Bases Change
MONTHYEARML22270A3172022-09-27027 September 2022 Submittal of Technical Specification Bases Changes, Amendment No. 201 LR-N22-0078, Submittal of Technical Specification Bases Changes, Amendment No. 2152022-09-27027 September 2022 Submittal of Technical Specification Bases Changes, Amendment No. 215 LR-N21-0078, Hope and Creek Generating Station, Supplement to License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications (TS) to Delete Definitions Found in 10 CFR Part 20 and Delete Figures of the Site and Surrounding Areas from TS2021-11-18018 November 2021 Hope and Creek Generating Station, Supplement to License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications (TS) to Delete Definitions Found in 10 CFR Part 20 and Delete Figures of the Site and Surrounding Areas from TS LR-N21-0045, Submittal of Changes to Technical Specifications Bases2021-06-16016 June 2021 Submittal of Changes to Technical Specifications Bases LR-N20-0003, License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-490, Deletion of E-Bar Definition and Revision to RCS Specific Activity Tech Spec2020-09-17017 September 2020 License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-490, Deletion of E-Bar Definition and Revision to RCS Specific Activity Tech Spec ML17157B2652017-05-0909 May 2017 Submittal of Hope Creek Generating Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 22, Hope Creek Technical Specification Bases Changes, 10CFR54.37(b) Review Results for Hope Creek and PSEG Nuclear LLC Quality Assurance Topical Repor LR-N17-0088, Submittal of Hope Creek Generating Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 22, Hope Creek Technical Specification Bases Changes, 10CFR54.37(b) Review Results for Hope Creek and Pseg Nuclear LLC Quality Assurance Topical Re2017-05-0909 May 2017 Submittal of Hope Creek Generating Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 22, Hope Creek Technical Specification Bases Changes, 10CFR54.37(b) Review Results for Hope Creek and Pseg Nuclear LLC Quality Assurance Topical Repor LR-N17-0034, Salem Generating Station, Units 1 & 2, Submittal of Revision 29 to Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, and Technical Specification Bases Changes and Quality Assurance Topical Report, NO-AA-10, Rev. 852017-01-30030 January 2017 Salem Generating Station, Units 1 & 2, Submittal of Revision 29 to Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, and Technical Specification Bases Changes and Quality Assurance Topical Report, NO-AA-10, Rev. 85 ML17046A2292017-01-30030 January 2017 Submittal of Revision 29 to Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, and Technical Specification Bases Changes and Quality Assurance Topical Report, NO-AA-10, Rev. 85 LR-N16-0003, License Amendment Request to Amend the Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Technical Specifications2016-11-17017 November 2016 License Amendment Request to Amend the Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Technical Specifications LR-N16-0114, License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-545, Revision 3, TS Lnservice Testing Program Removal & Clarify SR Usage Rule Application to Section 5.5 Testing Using the Consolidated Line .2016-08-30030 August 2016 License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-545, Revision 3, TS Lnservice Testing Program Removal & Clarify SR Usage Rule Application to Section 5.5 Testing Using the Consolidated Line . LR-N15-0187, Emergency License Amendment Request to Remove Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Position Indication Instrumentation from the Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Technical Specifications2015-08-31031 August 2015 Emergency License Amendment Request to Remove Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Position Indication Instrumentation from the Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Technical Specifications LR-N15-0021, License Amendment Request Regarding Replacement of Source Range and Intermediate Range Neutron Monitoring Systems2015-04-0303 April 2015 License Amendment Request Regarding Replacement of Source Range and Intermediate Range Neutron Monitoring Systems ML14210A4842014-07-28028 July 2014 License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-510, Revision 2, Revision to Steam Generator Program Inspection Frequencies and Tube Sample Selection Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process LR-N11-0056, Supplement to Application for Technical Specification Change Regarding Risk-Informed Justification for the Relocation of Specific Surveillance Frequency Requirements to a Licensee Controlled Program2011-02-23023 February 2011 Supplement to Application for Technical Specification Change Regarding Risk-Informed Justification for the Relocation of Specific Surveillance Frequency Requirements to a Licensee Controlled Program ML1100503982010-10-14014 October 2010 Attachment 3 to LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek Generating Station, Emergency Action Level Comparison Matrix LR-N10-0355, Attachment 3 to LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek Generating Station, Emergency Action Level Comparison Matrix2010-10-14014 October 2010 Attachment 3 to LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek Generating Station, Emergency Action Level Comparison Matrix ML1100503992010-10-14014 October 2010 Attachment 4 to LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek Generating Station, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Supporting Documents (Cd with Paper Index) LR-N10-0355, Attachment 4 to LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek Generating Station, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Supporting Documents (Cd with Paper Index)2010-10-14014 October 2010 Attachment 4 to LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek Generating Station, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Supporting Documents (Cd with Paper Index) LR-N10-0355, Attachment 2 to LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek Generating Station, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Document (Clean Version)2010-10-14014 October 2010 Attachment 2 to LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek Generating Station, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Document (Clean Version) ML1100504152010-10-14014 October 2010 Hope Creek, CY-AA-170-500, Revision 0, Meteorological Monitoring System Calibration and Maintenance LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek, CY-AA-170-500, Revision 0, Meteorological Monitoring System Calibration and Maintenance2010-10-14014 October 2010 Hope Creek, CY-AA-170-500, Revision 0, Meteorological Monitoring System Calibration and Maintenance LR-N10-0355, Attachment 1 to LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek Generating Station, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Document (Strike-out Version)2010-10-14014 October 2010 Attachment 1 to LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek Generating Station, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Document (Strike-out Version) ML1100503752010-10-14014 October 2010 Attachment 1 to LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek Generating Station, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Document (Strike-out Version) ML1100504022010-10-14014 October 2010 Attachment 2 to LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek Generating Station, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Document (Clean Version) ML1025802412010-09-0808 September 2010 License Amendment Request S10-01 Application for Technical Specification Change Regarding Risk-Informed Justification for the Relocation of Specific Surveillance Frequency Requirements to a Licensee Controlled Program ML1100505182010-08-24024 August 2010 Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0150(Q), Rev. 6, 125VDC System Malfunction LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0150(Q), Rev. 6, 125VDC System Malfunction2010-08-24024 August 2010 Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0150(Q), Rev. 6, 125VDC System Malfunction LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.HVAC-0002(Q), Rev. 7, Control Room Environment2010-07-13013 July 2010 Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.HVAC-0002(Q), Rev. 7, Control Room Environment ML1100505002010-07-13013 July 2010 Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.HVAC-0002(Q), Rev. 7, Control Room Environment LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.RPV-0009(Q), Rev. 7, Shutdown Cooling2010-06-24024 June 2010 Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.RPV-0009(Q), Rev. 7, Shutdown Cooling ML1100505162010-06-24024 June 2010 Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.RPV-0009(Q), Rev. 7, Shutdown Cooling LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.CONT-0002(Q), Rev. 9, Containment2010-05-0303 May 2010 Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.CONT-0002(Q), Rev. 9, Containment ML1100504772010-05-0303 May 2010 Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.CONT-0002(Q), Rev. 9, Containment ML1100505052010-04-21021 April 2010 Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.MISC-0002(Q), Rev. 10, Crids/Overhead Annunciators/Ppc Computer LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.RPV-0003(Q), Rev. 21, Recirculation System/Power Oscillations2010-04-21021 April 2010 Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.RPV-0003(Q), Rev. 21, Recirculation System/Power Oscillations LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.MISC-0002(Q), Rev. 10, Crids/Overhead Annunciators/Ppc Computer2010-04-21021 April 2010 Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.MISC-0002(Q), Rev. 10, Crids/Overhead Annunciators/Ppc Computer ML1100505062010-04-21021 April 2010 Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.RPV-0003(Q), Rev. 21, Recirculation System/Power Oscillations LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual, Revision 252010-04-16016 April 2010 Hope Creek, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual, Revision 25 ML1100504172010-04-16016 April 2010 Hope Creek, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual, Revision 25 ML1100504742010-03-17017 March 2010 Hope Creek, HC.IC-GP.BB-0003(Q) - Rev. 17, Nuclear Boiler - Nondivisional Channel L-11683/B21-N027 Rx Cavity Flood Up Level/Rx Shutdown Range Level Setup LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek, HC.IC-GP.BB-0003(Q) - Rev. 17, Nuclear Boiler - Nondivisional Channel L-11683/B21-N027 Rx Cavity Flood Up Level/Rx Shutdown Range Level Setup2010-03-17017 March 2010 Hope Creek, HC.IC-GP.BB-0003(Q) - Rev. 17, Nuclear Boiler - Nondivisional Channel L-11683/B21-N027 Rx Cavity Flood Up Level/Rx Shutdown Range Level Setup LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.MISC-0001(Q), Rev. 15, Acts of Nature2010-03-0505 March 2010 Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.MISC-0001(Q), Rev. 15, Acts of Nature ML1100505022010-03-0505 March 2010 Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.MISC-0001(Q), Rev. 15, Acts of Nature ML1100504992009-09-0909 September 2009 Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.COOL-0004(Q), Rev. 4, Fuel Pool Cooling LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.COOL-0004(Q), Rev. 4, Fuel Pool Cooling2009-09-0909 September 2009 Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.COOL-0004(Q), Rev. 4, Fuel Pool Cooling LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.IC-0003(Q), Rev. 3, Reactor Protection System2009-04-25025 April 2009 Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.IC-0003(Q), Rev. 3, Reactor Protection System ML1100505012009-04-25025 April 2009 Hope Creek, HC.OP-AB.IC-0003(Q), Rev. 3, Reactor Protection System ML1100504312009-03-0909 March 2009 Hope Creek, HC.lC-CC.SE-0001(Q), Rev. 28, Nuclear Instrumentation System - Channel a Source Range Monitor C51-K6OOA LR-N10-0355, Hope Creek, HC.lC-CC.SE-0001(Q), Rev. 28, Nuclear Instrumentation System - Channel a Source Range Monitor C51-K6OOA2009-03-0909 March 2009 Hope Creek, HC.lC-CC.SE-0001(Q), Rev. 28, Nuclear Instrumentation System - Channel a Source Range Monitor C51-K6OOA 2022-09-27
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k PSEG Nuclear LLC P.O Box 236, Hancocks Bndge, New Jersey 08038-0236 0 PSEG Nu clearJLC MAR 2 0 2003 LR-N03-0126 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 CORRECTION OF BASES PAGES ISSUED WITH AMENDMENTS 251 AND 232 SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT NOS. I AND 2 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-70 AND DPR-75 DOCKET NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311 On October 10, 2002, the NRC issued Amendments 251 and 232 for Salem Units 1 and 2, respectively. These amendments revised the fuel decay time at Salem. In the original amendment request submitted on June 28, 2002, PSEG Nuclear included changes to Bases section 3/4.9.3. The marked-up pages provided in this submittal had identified the changes to Bases section 3/4.9.3 as being contained on page B3/4 9-3 instead of page B3/4 9-1. As a result of this error, the Bases pages issued with Amendment 251 and 232 included instructions to remove and replace bases page B3/4 9-3 instead of page B3/4 9-1. In addition, the revised page included a substantial amount of new information that was inserted into the page, however, the existing information that was contained on the page was not moved to the next page. This submittal corrects the Bases pages issued with Amendments 251 and 232. To ensure that all copies of the Salem Unit I and Unit 2 Technical Specifications are completely corrected, attachments 1 and 2 of this submittal include all pages of Bases section 3/4.9 with the corrections identified above.
Ifyou have any questions concerning this submittal please contact Brian Thomas at 856-339-2022.
Sincerely, G. Salamon Nuclear Safety and Licensing Manager Attachments (2)
Soo1 95-2168 REV 7/99
Document Control Desk 2 MAR 2 0 2003 LR-N03-0126 C Mr. H. J. Miller, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region I 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Mr. R. Fretz, Licensing Project Manager - Salem Mail Stop 08B2 Washington, DC 20555 USNRC Senior Resident Inspector - Salem (X24)
Mr. K. Tosch, Manager, IV Bureau of Nuclear Engineering P.O. Box 415 Trenton, NJ 08625
Attachment 1 LR-N03-0126 Corrected Bases Pages Salem Unit 1 Section B 3/4.9
3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION The limitations on minimum boron concentration (2000 ppm) ensure that:
- 1) the reactor will remain subcritical during CORE ALTERATIONS, and 2) a uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volume having direct access to the reactor vessel. The limitation on Keff of no greater than 0.95 which includes a conservative allowance for uncertainties, is sufficient to prevent reactor criticality during refueling operations.
The sampling and analysis required by surveillance requirement 4.9.1.2 ensures the boron concentration required by Limiting Condition of Operation 3.9.1 is met. Sampling and analysis of the refueling canal is required if water exists in the refueling canal, regardless of the amount.
3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the source range neutron flux monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core.
3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME The minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor pressure vessel ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short lived fission products. The 100-hour decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the fuel handling accident analyses and the resulting dose calculations using the Alternative Source Term described in Reg. Guide 1.183.
The minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality also ensures that the decay time is consistent with that assumed in the Spent Fuel Pool cooling analysis. Delaware River water average temperature between October 1 5 th and May 1 5 th is determined from historical data taken over 30 years. The use of 30 years of data to select maximum temperature is consistent with Reg. Guide 1.27, "Ultimate Heat Sink for Nuclear Power Plants".
A core offload has the potential to occur during both applicability time frames. In order not to exceed the analyzed Spent Fuel Pool cooling capability to maintain the water temperature below 180'F, two decay time limits are provided. In addition, PSEG has developed and implemented a Spent Fuel Pool Integrated Decay Heat Management Program as part of the Salem Outage Risk Assessment. This program requires a pre-outage assessment of the Spent Fuel Pool heat loads and heatup rates to assure available Spent Fuel Pool cooling capability prior to offloading fuel.
3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment the requirements for containment building penetration closure and OPERABILITY ensure that a release of fission product radioactivity within containment will be restricted from leaking to the environment. In MODE 6, the potential for containment pressurization as a result of an accident is not likely. Therefore, the requirements to isolate the containment from the outside atmosphere can be less stringent. The LCO requirements during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment are referred to as "containment closure" rather than containment OPERABILITY. For the containment to be OPERABLE, CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY must be maintained.
Containment closure means that all potential release paths are closed or capable of being closed. Closure restrictions must be sufficient to provide an atmospheric ventilation barrier to restrict radioactive material released from a fuel element rupture during refueling operations.
SALEM - UNIT 1 B 3/4 9-1 Corrected by Letter dated
REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES The containment serves to limit the fission product radioactivity that may be released from the reactor core following an accident, such that offsite radiation exposures are maintained well within the requirements of 10CFRI00.
Additionally, the containment provides radiation shielding from the fission products that may be present in the containment atmosphere following accident conditions.
The Containment Equipment Hatch, which is part of the containment pressure boundary, provides a means for moving large equipment and components into or out of containment. During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment, the Containment Equipment Hatch inside door must be held in place by at least four bolts. Good engineering practice dictates that the bolts required by the LCO are approximately equally spaced.
An equivalent closure device may be installed as an alternative to installing the Containment Equipment Hatch inside door with a minimum of four bolts. Such a closure device may provide penetrations for temporary services used to support maintenance activities inside containment at times when containment closure is required; and may be installed in place of the Containment Equipment Hatch inside door or outside door. Penetrations incorporated into the design of an equivalent closure device will be considered a part of the containment boundary and as such will be subject to the requirements of Technical Specification 3/4.9.4. Any equivalent closure device used to satisfy the requirements of Technical Specification 3/4.9.4.a will be designed, fabricated, installed, tested, and utilized in accordance with established procedures to ensure that the design requirements for the mitigation of a fuel handling accident during refueling operations are met.
The containment air locks, which are also part of the containment pressure boundary, provide a means for personnel access during operation in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 as specified in LCO 3.6.1.3, "Containment Air Locks".
Each air lock has a door at both ends. The doors are normally interlocked to prevent simultaneous opening when containment OPERABILITY is required. During periods of unit shutdown, when containment closure is not required and frequent containment entry is necessary, the air lock interlock mechanism may be disabled. This allows both doors of an airlock to remain open for extended periods. During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment, containment closure is required; therefore, the door interlock mechanism may remain disabled, but one air lock door must always remain closed.
The other containment penetrations that provide direct access from containment atmosphere to outside atmosphere must be isolated on at least one side. Isolation may be achieved by an OPERABLE automatic isolation valve, or by a manual isolation valve, blind flange, or equivalent. Equivalent isolation methods may include the use of a material that can provide a temporary atmospheric pressure, ventilation barrier. Any equivalent method used to satisfy the requirements of Technical Specification 3/4.9.4.c.1 will be designed, fabricated, installed, tested, and utilized in accordance with established procedures to ensure that the design requirements for the mitigation of a fuel handling accident during refueling operations are met.
SALEM - UNIT 1 B 3/4 9-2 Corrected by Letter dated
REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS The requirement for communications capability ensures that refueling station personnel can be promptly informed of significant changes in the facility status or core reactivity conditions during CORE ALTERATIONS.
3/4.9.6 MANIPULATOR CRANE The OPERABILITY requirements for the manipulator cranes ensure that:
- 1) manipulator cranes will be used for movement of control rods and fuel assemblies, 2) each crane has sufficient load capacity to lift a control rod or fuel assembly, and 3) the core internals and pressure vessel are protected from excessive lifting force in the event they are inadvertently engaged during lifting operations.
3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - SPENT FUEL STORAGE BUILDING The restriction on movement of loads in excess of the nominal weight of a fuel and control rod assembly and associated handling tool over other fuel assemblies in the storage pool ensures that in the event this load is dropped (1) the activity release will be limited to that contained in a single fuel assembly, and (2) any possible distortion of fuel in the storage racks will not result in a critical array. This assumption is consistent with the activity release assumed in the accident analyses.
3/4.9.8 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION The requirements that at least one residual heat removal loop be in operation ensures that (1) sufficient cooling capacity is available to remove decay heat and maintain the water in the reactor pressure vessel below 140'F as required during the REFUELING MODE, and (2) sufficient coolant circulation is maintained through the reactor core to minimize the effects of a boron dilution incident and prevent boron stratification. A minimum flow rate of 1000 gpm is required. Additional flow limitations are specified in plant procedures, with the design basis documented in the Salem UFSAR. These flow limitations address the concerns related to vortexing and air entrapment in the Residual Heat Removal system, and provide operational flexibility by adjusting the flow limitations based on time after shutdown. The requirement to have two RHR loops OPERABLE when there is less than 23 feet of water above the reactor vessel flange ensures that a single failure of the operating RHR loop will not result in a complete loss of residual heat removal capability.
For support systems: Service Water (SW) and Component Cooling (CC),
component redundancy is necessary to ensure no single active component failure will cause the loss of Decay Heat Removal. One piping path of SW and CC is adequate when it supports both RHR loops. The support systems needed before entering into the desired configuration (e.g., one service water loop out for maintenance in Modes 5 and 6) are controlled by procedures, and include the following:
A requirement that the two RHR, two CC and two SW pumps, powered from two different vital buses be kept operable SALEM - UNIT 1 B 3/4 9-3 Corrected by Letter dated
REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES A listing of the active (air/motor operated) valves in the affected flow path to be locked open or disabled.
Note that four filled reactor coolant loops, with at least two steam generators with at least their secondary side water level greater than or equal to 5% (narrow range), may be substituted for one residual heat removal loop. This ensures that a single failure does not cause a loss of decay heat removal.
With the reactor vessel head removed and 23 feet of water above the reactor pressure vessel flange, a large heat sink is available for core cooling. Thus, in the event of a failure of the operating RHR loop, adequate time is provided to initiate emergency procedures to cool the core.
3/4.9.9 CONTAINMENT PURGE AND PRESSURE-VACUUM RELIEF ISOLATION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of this system ensures that the containment vent and purge penetrations will be automatically isolated upon detection of high radiation levels within the containment. The OPERABILITY of this system is required to restrict the release of radioactive material from the containment atmosphere to the environment.
3/4.9.10 and 3/4/9/11 WATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL AND STORAGE POOL The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth is available to remove 99% of the assumed 10% iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly. The minimum water depth is consistent with the assumptions of the accident analysis.
3/4.9.12 FUEL HANDLING AREA VENTILATION SYSTEM The limitations on the fuel handling area ventilation system ensure that all radioactive material released from a dropped irradiated fuel assembly will be filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber prior to discharge to the atmosphere. The OPERABILITY of this system is consistent with the assumptions of the accident analyses. Laboratory testing of the carbon adsorber is performed in accordance with ASTM D3803-1989 with an acceptance criteria that is determined by applying a minimum safety factor of 2 to the charcoal filter removal efficiency credited in the design basis dose analysis as specified in Generic Letter 99-02.
The operability of the Fuel Handling Area Ventilation System during movement of irradiated fuel ensures all building exhaust flow is processed through the HEPA/charcoal filter train whenever a Fuel Handling Accident is possible. This will minimize offsite doses following the postulated Fuel Handling Accident.
SALEM - UNIT I B 3/4 9-4 Amendment No. 245
Attachment 2 LR-N03-0126 Corrected Bases Pages Salem Unit 2 Section B 3/4.9
3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION The limitations on minimum boron concentration (2000 ppm) ensure that: 1) the reactor will remain subcritical during CORE ALTERATIONS, and 2) a uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volume having direct access to the reactor vessel. The limitation on Kef of no greater than 0.95 which includes a conservative allowance for uncertainties, is sufficient to prevent reactor criticality during refueling operations.
The sampling and analysis required by surveillance requirement 4.9.1.2 ensures the boron concentration required by Limiting Condition of Operation 3.9.1 is met. Sampling and analysis of the refueling canal is required if water exists in the refueling canal, regardless of the amount.
3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the source range neutron flux monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core.
3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME The minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor pressure vessel ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short lived fission products. The 100-hour decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the fuel handling accident analyses and the resulting dose calculations using the Alternative Source Term described in Reg. Guide 1.183.
The minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality also ensures that the decay time is consistent with that assumed in the Spent Fuel Pool cooling analysis. Delaware River water average temperature between October 1 5 th and May 1 5 th is determined from historical data taken over 30 years. The use of 30 years of data to select maximum temperature is consistent with Reg. Guide 1.27, "Ultimate Heat Sink for Nuclear Power Plants".
A core offload has the potential to occur during both applicability time frames. In order not to exceed the analyzed Spent Fuel Pool cooling capability to maintain the water temperature below 180*F, two decay time limits are provided. In addition, PSEG has developed and implemented a Spent Fuel Pool Integrated Decay Heat Management Program as part of the Salem Outage Risk Assessment. This program requires a pre-outage assessment of the Spent Fuel Pool heat loads and heatup rates to assure available Spent Fuel Pool cooling capability prior to offloading fuel.
3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment the requirements for containment building penetration closure and OPERABILITY ensure that a release of fission product radioactivity within containment will be restricted from leaking to the environment. In MODE 6, the potential for containment pressurization as a result of an accident is not likely. Therefore, the requirements to isolate the containment from the outside atmosphere can be less stringent. The LCO requirements during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment are referred to as "containment closure" rather than containment OPERABILITY. For the containment to be OPERABLE, CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY must be maintained.
Containment closure means that all potential release paths are closed or capable of being closed. Closure restrictions must be sufficient to provide an atmospheric ventilation barrier to restrict radioactive material released from a fuel element rupture during refueling operations.
SAkLEM - UNIT 2 B 3/4 9-1 Corrected by Letter dated
REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES The containment serves to limit the fission product radioactivity that may be released from the reactor core following an accident, such that offsite radiation exposures are maintained well within the requirements of 10CFRI00.
Additionally, the containment provides radiation shielding from the fission products that may be present in the containment atmosphere following accident conditions.
The Containment Equipment Hatch, which is part of the containment pressure boundary, provides a means for moving large equipment and components into or out of containment. During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment, the Containment Equipment Hatch inside door must be held in place by at least four bolts. Good engineering practice dictates that the bolts required by the LCO are approximately equally spaced.
An equivalent closure device may be installed as an alternative to installing the Containment Equipment Hatch inside door with a minimum of four bolts. Such a closure device may provide penetrations for temporary services used to support maintenance activities inside containment at times when containment closure is required; and may be installed in place of the Containment Equipment Hatch inside door or outside door. Penetrations incorporated into the design of an equivalent closure device will be considered a part of the containment boundary and as such will be subject to the requirements of Technical Specification 3/4.9.4. Any equivalent closure device used to satisfy the requirements of Technical Specification 3/4.9.4.a will be designed, fabricated, installed, tested, and utilized in accordance with established procedures to ensure that the design requirements for the mitigation of a fuel handling accident during refueling operations are met.
The containment air locks, which are also part of the containment pressure boundary, provide a means for personnel access during operation in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 as specified in LCO 3.6.1.3, "Containment Air Locks".
Each air lock has a door at both ends. The doors are normally interlocked to prevent simultaneous opening when containment OPERABILITY is required. During periods of unit shutdown, when containment closure is not required and frequent containment entry is necessary, the air lock interlock mechanism may be disabled. This allows both doors of an airlock to remain open for extended periods. During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment, containment closure is required; therefore, the door interlock mechanism may remain disabled, but one air lock door must always remain closed.
The other containment penetrations that provide direct access from containment atmosphere to outside atmosphere must be isolated on at least one side. Isolation may be achieved by an OPERABLE automatic isolation valve, or by a manual isolation valve, blind flange, or equivalent. Equivalent isolation methods may include the use of a material that can provide a temporary atmospheric pressure, ventilation barrier. Any equivalent method used to satisfy the requirements of Technical Specification 3/4.9.4.c.1 will be designed, fabricated, installed, tested, and utilized in accordance with established procedures to ensure that the design requirements for the mitigation of a fuel handling accident during refueling operations are met.
SALEM - UNIT 2 B 3/4 9-2 Corrected by Letter dated
REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS The requirement for communications capability ensures that refueling station personnel can be promptly informed of significant changes in the facility status or core reactivity conditions during CORE ALTERATIONS.
3/4.9.6 MANIPULATOR CRANE The OPERABILITY requirements for the manipulator cranes ensure that:
- 1) manipulator cranes will be used for movement of control rods and fuel assemblies, 2) each crane has sufficient load capacity to lift a control rod or fuel assembly, and 3) the core internals and pressure vessel are protected from excessive lifting force in the event they are inadvertently engaged during lifting operations.
3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - SPENT FUEL STORAGE BUILDING The restriction on movement of loads in excess of the nominal weight of a fuel and control rod assembly and associated handling tool over other fuel assemblies in the storage pool ensures that in the event this load is dropped (1) the activity release will be limited to that contained in a single fuel assembly, and (2) any possible distortion of fuel in the storage racks will not result in a critical array. This assumption is consistent with the activity release assumed in the accident analyses.
3/4.9.8 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION The requirements that at least one residual heat removal loop be in operation ensures that (1) sufficient cooling capacity is available to remove decay heat and maintain the water in the reactor pressure vessel below 140°F as required during the REFUELING MODE, and (2) sufficient coolant circulation is maintained through the reactor core to minimize the effects of a boron dilution incident and prevent boron stratification. A minimum flow rate of 1000 gpm is required. Additional flow limitations are specified in plant procedures, with the design basis documented in the Salem UFSAR. These flow limitations address the concerns related to vortexing and air entrapment in the Residual Heat Removal system, and provide operational flexibility by adjusting the flow limitations based on time after shutdown. The requirement to have two RHR loops OPERABLE when there is less than 23 feet of water above the reactor vessel flange ensures that a single failure of the operating RHR loop will not result in a complete loss of residual heat removal capability.
For support systems: Service Water (SW) and Component Cooling (CC),
component redundancy is necessary to ensure no single active component failure will cause the loss of Decay Heat Removal. One piping path of SW and CC is adequate when it supports both RHR loops. The support systems needed before entering into the desired configuration (e.g., one service water loop out for maintenance in Modes 5 and 6) are controlled by procedures, and include the following:
- A requirement that the two RHR, two CC and two SW pumps, powered from two different vital buses be kept operable SALEM - UNIT 2 B 3/4 9-3 Corrected by Letter dated
REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES A listing of the active (air/motor operated) valves in the affected flow path to be locked open or disable:
Note that four filled reactor coolant loops, with at least two steam generators with at least their secondary side water level greater than or equal to 5% (narrow range), may be substituted for one residual heat removal loop. This ensures that single failure does not cause a loss of decay heat removal.
With the reactor vessel head removed and 23 feet of water above the reactor pressure vessel flange, a large heat sink is available for core cooling. Thus, in the event of a failure of the operating RHR loop, adequate time is provided to initiate emergency procedures to cool the core.
3/4.9.9 CONTAINMENT PURGE AND PRESSURE-VACUUM RELIEF ISOLATION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of this system ensures that the containment vent and purge penetrations will be automatically isolated upon detection of high radiation levels within the containment. The OPERABILITY of this system is required to restrict the release of radioactive material from the containment atmosphere to the environment.
3/4.9.10 and 3/4/9/11 WATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL AND STORAGE POOL The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth is available to remove 99% of the assumed 10% iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly. The minimum water depth is consistent with the assumptions of the accident analysis.
3/4.9.12 FUEL HANDLING AREA VENTILATION SYSTEM The limitations on the fuel handling area ventilation system ensure that all radioactive material released from a dropped irradiated fuel assembly will be filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber prior to discharge to the atmosphere. The OPERABILITY of this system is consistent with the assumptions of the accident analyses. Laboratory testing of the carbon adsorber is performed in accordance with ASTM D3803 1989 with an acceptance criteria that is determined by applying a minimum safety factor of 2 to the charcoal filter removal efficiency credited in the design basis dose analysis as specified in Generic Letter 99-02.
The operability of the Fuel Handling Area Ventilation System during movement of irradiated fuel ensures all building exhaust flow is processed through the HEPA/charcoal filter train whenever a Fuel Handling Accident is possible. This will minimize offsite doses following the postulated Fuel Handling Accident.
SALEM - UNIT 2 B 3/4 9-4 Amendment No. 226