Text

Emergency Preparedness Plan and Implementing Procedures (Volumes 1, 2 & 3)
	ML023250538
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	11/16/2002
From:	Bezilla M; FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	L-02-108
	Download: ML023250538 (164)
	v • d • e

FENOC Beaver Valley Power Station Route 168 P.O Box 4 FirstEnergyNuclearOperatingCompany Shippingport, PA 15077-0004 Mark B. Bezilla 724-682-5234 Site Vice President Fax- 724-643-8069 November 16, 2002 L-02-108 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject:

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 and No. 2 BV-1 Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 BV-2 Docket No. 50-412, License No. NPF-73 Beaver Valley Power Station Emergency Preparedness Plan and Implementing Procedures (Volumes 1, 2 and 3)

In accordance with 10 CFR Part 50.4, this letter forwards recent revisions of the Beaver Valley Power Station Emergency Preparedness Plan (Volume 1) and Implementing Procedures (Volumes 2 and 3) to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the Plan and the Plan, as changed, continues to meet the requirements of Appendix E of 10 CFR 50. Therefore, 10 CFR Part 50.54(q) requires that these changes be submitted for information only.

There are no regulatory commitments contained in this letter. If there are any questions concerning this submittal, please contact Ms. Susan L. Vicinie, Manager, Emergency Preparedness at 724-682-5767.

Sincerely, Mark B. Bezilla j Enclosure 1 - Summary of Changes Enclosure 2 - Plan/Procedure revisions c: Mr. D. S. Collins, NRR Project Manager (w/o Enclosure 2)

Mr. D. M. Kern, NRC Sr. Resident Inspector (w/o Enclosure 2)

Mr. H. J. Miller, NRC Region I Administrator (2 copies)

Enclosure 1 Summary of Changes Revisions to Beaver Valley Power Station Emergency Preparedness Plan and Implementing Procedures (Volumes 1, 2 and 3)

The following is a brief summary of the changes made to the Emergency Preparedness Plan/Implementing Procedures.

Emergency Preparedness Plan (Volume 1):

EPP-TOC "Emergency Preparedness Plan Table of Contents" Appendix C "Emergency Implementing Procedure Listing" Revision 13 updated the procedure listing with the proper procedure titles.

EPP/Implementing Procedures:

EPP/I-la "Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions" (Unit 1)

Revision 3 updated the ODCM values in Table 7-1 due to the addition of Zn-65 to the Reactor Coolant System.

EPP/I-lb "Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions" (Unit 2)

Revision 3 updated the ODCM values in Table 7-1 due to the addition of Zn-65 to the Reactor Coolant System.

EPP/IP 2.2 "Onsite Monitoring for Airborne Release" Revision 11 resulted in a total reformatting of this procedure. Section A was renamed "PURPOSE" and had several minor changes. Section B was replaced with the former section E, "REFERENCES," which had a new Condition Report reference added. A new section "RESPONSIBILITIES" was added as Section C.

The "PRECAUTIONS" section was renamed "ACTION LEVELS/

PRECAUTIONS" and is now Section D. The steps in this section were rearranged and renumbered, with new steps (under D.5.0) added for monitoring team vehicles. Section E (formerly section D) "PROCEDURE" was also rearranged and renumbered, with two new notes added (under E.5.0) regarding airborne activity. A new section "FINAL CONDITIONS" was added and will now be Section F. The previous section F "ATTACHMENTS" is now Section G.

Attachment 3 was updated with a new site map. Minor clarifications were also made to Attachments 4 and 5.

EPP/IP 9.4 "Activation, Operation and Deactivation of the Joint Public Information Center (JPIC)"

Revision 9 made a change in Attachment 1, clarifying Step 2 on page 10 (of 17) of the attachment, to note that the Media Monitor position reports to the Information Coordinator "through the Rumor Control Coordinator."

A5.735B EPPIIMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES - EFFECTIVE INDEX INSTRUCTIONS' EPP/I-la -'Recognition and Classification Revision 3 of Emergency Conditions EPP/I-lb Recognition and Classification Revision 3 of Emergency Conditions .

EPP/I-2 Unusual Event - L, "Revision18 EPP/I-3 Alert Revision 17 EPP/I-4 Site Area Emergency Revision 17 EPP/I-5 General Emergency Revision 18 IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES 1 Series - Activation EPPJIP 1.1 Notification Revision 30 1.2 Communications and-- Revision 17 Dissemination of Information

:1.:3 Turnover Status Checklist ED/ERM -

Revision 9 1.4 Technical Support Center (TSC) Revision 17 Activation, Operation and Deactivation L5.--- Operations Support Center (OSC) Revision 14 Activation, Operation and Deactivation :1 1.6 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) ,-' Revision 15 Activation, Operation and Deactivation "

1.7 Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Revision 9 Teams - - .

CONTROLLED" BVPS-UNIT3- REVISION 53

A5.735B "

EPP/IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES,- EFFECTIVE INDEX-_1 EPP/IIP 2 Series'- Assessment'

'2.1 Emergency Radiological Monitoring Revision 10 2.2 Onsite Monitoring for Airborne Release Revision 11 2.3 Offsite Monitoring for Airborne Release Revision 12 2.4 Offsite Monitoring for Liquid Release Revision 81

- -. :2.5 Emergency Environmental Monitoring Revision 10

- 2.6 Environmental Assessment and Dose ' S. Revision 14 Projection Controlling Procedure 2.6.1 Dose Projection - Backup Methods "Revision 10 2.6.2 Dose Projection - ARERAS/MIDAS Revision 12 With FSAR Defaults 2.6.3 Dose Projection - ARERAS/MIDAS Revision 12 With Real-Time Inputs 2.6.4 Dose Projection - ARERAS/MIDAS: -- '

Revision 13 With Manual Inputs "2.6.5 Alternate Meteorological Parameters,, " Revision 10 2.6.6 Dose Projections By Hand Calculatiofi - ," '. Revision 6 Known Isotopic Release, 2.6.7 Dose Assessment Based on Revision 7 Field Measurements' 2.6.8 Dose Assessment Based on Revision 6 Environmental Measurements and Samples 2.6.9 Integrated Dose Assessment Revision 5 2.6.10 Ground Contamination Assessment Revision 7 and Protective Action f-.--

REVISION 53

A5.735B EPP/IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES - EFFECTIVE INDEX EPPIIP 2 Series - Assessment 2.6.11 Dose Projection- Miscellaneous Data 'Revision 10 2.6.12 Dose Projection -ARERAS/MIDAS Revision 9 With Severe Accident Assessment 2.7 Liquid Release Estimate Revision 6 2.7.1 Liquid Release Estimate Revision 9 Computer Method EPPIIP 3 Series - Onsite Protective Actions 3.1 Evacuation Revision 8 3.2 Site Assembly and Personnel Accountability Revision 12

.3.3 Emergency Contamination Control Revision 7 3.4 Emergency Respiratory Protection Revision 8 3.5 Traffic and Access Control :Revision 9 EPPJLP 4 Series - Offsite Protective Actions

-4.1 Offsite Protective Actions Revision 16 EPP/IP 5 Series - Aid to Personnel S5.1 Search and Rescue Revision 7 5.2 RESERVED 5.3 Emergency Exposure Criteria and Control Revision 8 5.4 Emergency Personnel Monitoring- Revision 7 REVISION 53

A5.735B '

EPPAIMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EFFECTIVE INDEX_"

EPP/IP 6 Series - Re-entrY/Recveri-

.6.1 Re-entry to Affected Areas Revision 9 Criteria and Guidance 6.2 Termination of the Emergency and Recovery*'

Revision 10 EPP/IP 7 Series - Maintaining Emergency Pieparedness' 7.1 Emergency Equipment Inventory Revision 13 and Maintenance Procedure 7.2 Administration of Emergency Preparedness Revision 9 Plan, Drills and Exercises EPP/IP 8 Series - Fire Fighting 8.1 Fires in Radiologically Controlled Areas -Revision 10 EPP/IP 9 Series - Nuclear Communications 9.1 Emergency Public Information Revision 11 Emergency Response Organization Controlling Procedure 9.2 Reserved 9.3 Activation, Operation and Deactivation-', "* "Revision4 of the Emergency Public Information Organization Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) 9.4 Activation, Operation and Deactivation Revision 9 of the Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) 9.5 Activation, Operation and Deactivation Revision 6 of the Penn Power Customer Account Services Department ,

EPP/IP 10 Series - Corporate Response 10.1 Emergency Response Organization Revision 3 Corporate Support K

- REVISION 53

A5.735B EPP/IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES - EFFECTIVE INDEX EPP/IP ANNEXES Annex A - Westinghouse Emergency Response Plan Revision 8 Annex B - DELETED Annex C - Major Injury Involving Radioactive Contamination For The Medical Center, Beaver Revision 9 Annex D - Procedure for Transferring Radiation Casualties to the Radiation Emergency Response Program (UPMC Presbyterian) Revision 8 Annex E - Reserved REVISION 53

Emergency Preparedness Plan TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE

1. DEFINITIONS -Revision 13 . "-1

2. SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY- Revision 12 - '- ,. .2-1

3.

SUMMARY

OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PLAN - Revision 13 3-1 3.1 ONSITE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION ,- . . 3-1 3.2 OFFSITE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION . 3-2 3.3 EMERGENCY MEASURES - . - , 3-4 3.4 EMERGENCY FACILITIES . 3-7 3.5 MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 3-7

4. EMERGENCY CONDITIONS - Revision 15 4.0 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL BASES 4-1 4.1 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES - - 4-1 4.2 EAL BASES . . . 4-7 4.3 EALMATRIX , . .. "4-10 4.4 INDIVIDUAL EAL BASIS DESCRIPTIONS ,, -- 4-15

- 4.5 SPECTRUM OF POSTULATED ACCIDENTS . - 4-17

5. EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION - Revision 17- .- - . 5-1

.5.1- NORMAL OPERATING ORGANIZATION _- :. - 5-1 5.2 BVPS EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION "- 5-1

--5.3 NUCLEAR COMMUNICATIONS - -:- -, - - - - , 5-18

-. CONTROLLED REVISION23 BVPS UNIT 3

Emergency Preparedness Plan TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE

.- 5.4 EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION STAFFING - 5-23

-5.5 AUGMENTATION OF THE ONSITE EMERGENCY- '

ORGANIZATION 5-25 5.6 COORDINATION WITH PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENT AGENCIES , 5-27

6. *-EMERGENCY MEASURES -Revision 16'-,.- - 6-1 6.1 EMERGENCY INITIATION 6-1 6.2 ACTIVATION OF THE ONSITE EMERGENCY

ORGANIZATION 6-1 6.3 ACTIVATION OF THE EMERGENCY SUPPORT GROUPS 6-7 6.4 ACTIVATION OF OFFSITE EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS " 6-9 6.5 ASSESSMENT ACTIONS 12 7 6.6 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 23

- 6.7 PROTECTIVE ACTIONS 6-24 6.8 AIDTOAFFECTED PERSONNEL 6-40 r1 6.9 EMERGENCY PUBLIC INFORMATION 6-43

7. EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT - Revision 17 7-1 7.1 ONSITE EMERGENCY CENTERS - -- - 7-1 7.2 EMERGENCY SUPPLIES ". - ' - 7.-6

-7.3 COUNTY AND STATE EMERGENCY CENTERS - 7-7

. Z REVISION 23

'Si * ..

" Emergency Preparedness Plan TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE 7.4 ASSESSMENT FACILITIES 7-8 7.5 PROTECTIVE FACILITIES 7-15 7.6 COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS 7-17 7.7 ONSITE FIRST AID AND MEDICAL FACILITIES 7-22 7.8 DAMAGE CONTROL EQUIPMENT 7-23

8. MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS - Revision 17 8-1 8.1 ORGANIZATIONAL PREPAREDNESS 8-1 8.2 MANAGER, EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 8-10 8.3 REVIEW AND UPDATING 8-11 8.4 MAINTENANCE AND INVENTORY OF EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES 8-13 8.5 NUCLEAR COMMUNICATIONS 8-14 8.6 NRC/FEMA 8-15

9. RE-ENTRY AND RECOVERY - Revision 12 9-1 9.1 TRANSITION FROM RESPONSE TO TERMINATION AND/OR RECOVERY 9-1 9.2 TERMINATION CRITERIA 9-2 9.3 RE-ENTRY 9-2 9.4 RECOVERY 9-3 9.5 RECOVERY OPERATIONS 9-3 9.6 POST-ACCIDENT EVALUATION 9-4 111 REVISION 23

Emergency Preparedness Plan TABLE OF CONTENTS":

10. APPENDICES A. Letters of Agreement - Revision 12 B. Demography and Evacuation Evaluation - Revision 12 C. Emergency Implementing Procedures - Revision 13 I

D. Equipment Listings - Revision 12 E. Corporate Policy Statement - Revision 12 F. Warning Sirens - Revision 14 G. References - Revision 8 LI iv REVISION 23 I,

Emergency Preparedness Plan A5.735A Appendix C Emermencv ImMlementine Procedure Listing CONTROLLED BVPS UNIT 3 App-C-i Rev. 13

Emergency Preparedness Plan EPPIIMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES INSTRUCTIONS EPP/I

-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions:

2 Unusual Event 3 Alert 4 Site Area Emergency 5 General Emergency . . .

IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES EPP/IP .ISeries-Activation 1.1 Notification 1.2 Communication'and Dissemination of Information "

1.3 Turnover Status Checklist - ED/ERM 1.4 Technical Support Center'(TSC) Activation, Operation and Deactivation 1.5 Operations Support Center (OSC)Xctivation, Operation and Deactivation 1.6 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Activation, Operation and Deactivation 1.7 Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Teams App-C-i Rev. 13

4 Emergency Preparedness Plan I

I EPPIP 2 Seiies-Assessment k-I 2.1 Emergency Radiological Monitoring I,

2.2 Onsite Monitoring for Airborne Release I I j 2.3 Offsite Monitoring foriAirborne Release 2.4 Offsite Monitoring for Liquid Release 2.5 Emergency Environmental Monitoring 2.6 Environmental Assessment and Dose Projection Controlling Procedure 1:

2.6.1 Dose Projection - Backup Methods 2.6.2 Dose Projections - ARERAS/MIDAS With FSAR Defaults 2.6.3 Dose Projection - ARERAS/MIDAS With Real-Time Inputs II 2.6.4 Dose Projection - ARERAS/MIDAS, With Manual Inputs 2.6.5 Alternate Meteorological Parameters I

2.6.6 Dose Projection by Hand Calculation-- Known Isotopic Release V 2.6.7 Dose Assessment Based on Field Measurements, 2.6.8 Dose Assessment Based on Environmental Measurements and Samples 2.6.9 Integrated Dose Assessment,_

2.6.10 Ground Contamination Assessment and Protective Actions I'

2.6.11 Dose Projection Miscellaneous Data I'

2.6.12 Dose Projection - ARERAS/MIDAS With Severe Accident

.1 Management 2.7 Liquid Release Estimate 2.7.1 Liquid Release Estimate - Computer Method i

App-C-2 Rev. 13 I,

4'

Emergency Preparedness Plan EPP/IP 3 Series-Onsite Protective Actions 3.1 Evacuation 3.2 Site Assembly and Personnel Accountability 3.3 Emergency Contamination Coiitrol 3.4 Emergency Respiratory Protection 3.5 Traffic and Access Control - .

EPPAIP 4 Series-Offsite Protective Actions 4.1 Offsite Protective Actions I EPPIIP 5 Sc ries-Aid to Personnel 5.1 Search and Rescue 5.2 Reserved 5.3 Emergency Exposure Crite*ria and Control I 5.4 Emergency Personnel Mor litoring

.. EPP/IP 6 Se ries-Re-Re-entrl/Recovery 6.1 Re-entry to Affected Areas;-Criteria and Guidance - -

6.2 Termination of the Emergeency and Recovery EPPAIP 7 S.-S Hes-Maintaininei Emergency Preparedness 7.1 Emergency Equipment mv'entory and Maintenance Procedure ,

7.2 Administrition of Emergeiicy Prreparedness Plan, Drillsand Exercises App-C-3 Rev. 13

A:

Emergency Preparedness Plan EPP/1I P 8 Series-Fire Fighting 8.1 Fires in Radiologically Controlled Areas EPP/II P 9 Series-Nuclear Communications*

9.1 Emergency Public Information Emergency Response Orgaxiization' "

Controlling Procedure 9.2 Reserved 9.3 Activation, Operation and Deactivation of the Emergeriny'Pubi'lic' Informatioini Organization Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) 9.4 Activation, Operation and Deactiraion of th~Joint Public Information Center' (JPIC) 9.5 Activation, Operation and Deactivation of the Penn Power Customer Account Services Department Ip EPP/IP 10 Series-Corporate Response-10.1 Emergency Response Organization Corporate Support V

EPPIP iAnnexeis-' .

Annex A - Westinghouse Emreirgency Respo'n Plan - -

Annex B - DELETED r j,,

1 Annex C - Major Injury Involving Radioactive Contamination For The Medical .

Center, Beav'er! I- :_..i Annex D - Procedures for Transferring Rdiation Casualties to he Radiation Emergency Response Program (UPMC Presbyterian)

Annex E - Reserved ii.

App-CA4 Rev. 13 1*

EPP/I-la Unit 1 A5.735B RECOGNITION AND CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS CONTROLLED BVPS UNIT 1 Revision 3

-EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-1a Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 EFFECTIVE INDEX Issue 8 Rev. 0 OSC Approved 3-12-87 1 OSC Approved 8-13-87 2 OSC Approved 10-8-87 3 OSC Approved 2-9-88 4 OSC Approved 2-9-89 5 Non-Safety Related 3-15-89 6 OSC Approved 4-18-89 7 OSC Approved 4-12-90 Issue 9 Rev. 0 Non-Intent Revision 10-9-90 1 OSC Approved 4-4-91 2 Non-Intent Revision 12-29-92 3 OSC Approved 1-27-93 Rev. 5 OSC Approved 12-9-93 6 OSC Approved 10-7-94 7 OSC Approved 7-22-98 8 Non-Intent Revision 12-31-99 Rev. 0 OSC Approved 4-17-01 Rev. 1 Non-Intent Revision 12-12-01 Rev. 2 Simple Change 8-28-02 Rev. 3 Simple Change 11-8-02 i Revision 3

EPPI/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS A. Purpose B. References C. Responsibilities D. Action Levels/Precautions E. Procedure F. Final Condition G. Attachments ii Revision 3

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 A. PURPOSE "1.0 This procedure describes the immediate actions to be taken to recognize and classify an emergency condition.

2.0 This procedure identifies the four emergency classifications and emergency action levels.

3.0 Reporting requirements for non-emergency abnormal events are provided.

B. REFERENCES 1.0 Beaver Valley Power Station Emergency Preparedness Plan and 'Implementing Procedures.

2.0 Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix E.

3.0 NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness inf Support of Nuclear Power Plants 4.0 Beaver Valley Power Station Operating Manual 5.0 NUMARC/NESP-007, Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels 6.0 ERS-SFL-91-041-REV 1 (U1/U2 Containment Monitor Readings due to LOCA's with various Source Terms).

7.0 Condition Report #992522 8.0 Condition Report #991327-1 ,

9.0 Unit 1 Technical Specification- Amendment 204 and Unit 2 Technical Specification Amendment 101.,

10.0 EPPOS #2 "Emergency Preparedness Position (EPPOS) on Timeliness of Classification of Emergency Conditions".

11.0 NEI 99-02 "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline" 12.0 Condition Report #00-3939.

13.0 Condition Report #99-1234 14.0 Condition Report #02-02125-02 15.0 Condition Report #02-05069 16.0 Unit 1 Technical Specification Amendment 244

/

I Revision 3

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I.-a Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 17.0 Calculation Package No. ERS-ATL-93-021 18.0 ODCM Procedure 1/2-ODC-2.01 19.0 Calculation Package No. ERS-HHM-87-014 20.0 Calculation Package No. ERS-SFL-86-005 21.0 Calculation Package No. ERS-SFL-99-014 C. RESPONSIBILITY The Emergency Director (Shift Manager, until properly relieved by a designated alternate) has the responsibility and authority for the performance of the actions prescribed in this procedure.

D. ACTION LEVELS/PRECAUTIONS/GUIDANCE 1.0 ACTION LEVELS 1.1 An off-normal event has occurred.

1.2 An action step in a plant operating or emergency operating procedure refers to this procedure for classification of the indicated plant condition.

2.0 PRECAUTIONS 2.1 The Emergency Director must review all applicable EALs to ensure that the event is properly classified since a given INDICATOR may be associated with more than one CRITERION. A particular INDICATOR omitted from the fission product barrier matrix may be addressed as an event-based EAL in one of the other tabs. Event-based EALs may escalate to the fission product barrier matrix. The Emergency Director may need to consider related events (e.g., fire and explosion) or the possible consequences of the event (e.g., fire in an MCC resulting in loss of AC) in classifying an event.

2.2 Continued surveillance and assessment of plant conditions are necessary to ensure that the emergency classification is appropriately revised as conditions change, or as more definitive information is obtained.

2.3 If there is any doubt with regard to assessment of a particular EAL, the EAL Basis Document (i.e., Chapter4 of the EPP) entry for that EAL can be reviewed. Classifications shall be consistent with the fundamental definitions of the four emergency classifications (tabulated in Tab 4.7).

2.4 The Emergency Director shall take whatever mitigative or restoration actions are necessary to protect public health and safety. The Emergency Director shall not reject courses of action solely on the basis that the action would result in escalation of the emergency classification.

2 Revision 3

EPPlImplementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 3.0 GUIDANCE 3.1 Structure of the EALs 3.1.1 There are two types of Emergency Action Levels included in this procedure:

3.1.1.1 Barrier-Based EALs: These EALs address conditions that represent pbtential losses, or losses, of one or more of the Fuel Clad, RCS, or Containment fission product barriers. INDICATORs of these conditions include CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION status, fundamental indications such as subcooling or reactor vessel water level; or -auxiliary indications such as containment radiation monitor readings. Classifications are based on the number of barriers lost or potentially lost.

3.1.1.2 Event-Based EALs: These EALs address discrete conditions or events that are generally precursors to fission 'product barrier degradation, or are otherwise degradations in the level of safety of the plant. Events may be external (e.g., severe weather, earthquakes, loss of offsiie power) internal (e.g., fires, explosions, instrumentation failure) or may involve radioactivity releases.

3.1.2 The EALs are grouped by recognition category as follows:

Tab 1 Fission Product Barrier Matrix Tab 2 , System Degradation Tab 3 Loss of Power Tab 4" Hazards and ED Judgement Tab 5 Destructive Phenomena Tab 6 Shutdown Systems Degradation Tab 7 Radiological 3.1.3 -Each of the EAL tabs includes one or more columns that address one initiating condition (e.g., fires). Each column provides EALs for each of the .four emergency classifications, as applicable. A notation adjacent" to each EAL identifies the plant operating mode(s) for which the EAL is applicable.

3 Revision 3

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 3.1.4 Each EAL is comprised of a CRITERION, printed in bold type, and one or more INDICATORs. The purpose of each is as follows:

3.1.4.1 CRITERION: identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration) All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., detennination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

3.1.4.2 INDICATOR: is available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.),

operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Upon occurrence of one or more indicators, the Emergency Director performs an assessment against the criterion. Depending on the particular condition, this assessment may be as simple as a review of the criterion, an instrument channel check, or a detailed calculation as in the case of a radioactivity release.

3.1.4.3 Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

3.1.4.4 The INDICATORs were selected with the objective of providing unambiguous guidance to assist with assessment of the CRITERION. There may be other INDICATORs not envisioned by the writers of this procedure that, in the judgment of the Emergency Director, correspond to the CRITERION. In these cases, the Emergency Director should base the declaration on engineering judgment, using the supplied INDICATORs as examples of the severity of the condition.

4 Revision 3

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 3.2 Common Plant Conditions

>3.2.1 IF an event occurs such that both reactor units are affected, e.g.,

tornado, toxic gas offsite, etc., THEN the senior Shift Manager shall make the appropriate classification and assume the role of

-Emergency Director..,

3.2.2 IF the common plant condition results in a higher emergency classification at one reactor unit, THEN the Shift Manager from that unit shall make the.appropriate classification and assume the role of Emergency Director.

3.3 Mode Applicability 3.3.1 The plant operating mode that existed at the time that the event occurred,-prior to any protective' system or "operator action initiated in response to the condition, is compared to the mode applicability of the EALs.

3.3.2 IF an event occurs, and a.lower or higher plant operating mode is reached 'before the clIassification can be made, THEN the classificati6n shall be'baed on the mode that existed at the time that the event occurred.

3.3.3 The fission -product barrier matrix is applicable only to those events that occur at 'node 4 or higher. An event that occurs in modes 5 or 6 shall not be' classified using the fission product barrier matrix, even if mode 4 is entered due to subsequent heatup.

In thesel cases,- Tab 6, .Shutdowr Systems Degradation, shall be used for classification.'

3.4 Transient Events 3.4.1 For some EALs -the existence of the event, without regard to duration, is sufficient to warrant classification. In these cases, the appropriate emergency' classification is declared as soon as the Emergency Director assessment concludes that the CRITERION is met.

3.4.2 Some EALs specify a duration of occurrence. For these EALs the classification -is 'made iwhen- Emnergency Director assessment concludes ,that Ithe' specified -duration 'is 'exceeded or will be bxie-ded (i.e.' condition can not be redsonzbly rectified before the "du-ation`elapses), whichever-is soorie'r.

5 Revision 3

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 3.4.3 IF a plant condition meeting an EAL CRITERION is rectified before the specified duration time is exceeded, THEN the event is NOT classified by that EAL. Lower severity EALs, if any, shall be reviewed for possible applicability in these cases.

3.4.4 IF a plant condition meeting an EAL CRITERION is NOT classified at the time of occurrence, but is identified well after the condition has occurred (e.g., as a result of routine log or record review) AND the condition no longer exists, THEN an emergency shall NOT be declared. However, reporting under 10 CFR 50.72 may be required. Such a condition could occur, for example, if a followup evaluation of an abnormal condition uncovers evidence that the condition was more severe than earlier believed.

3.4.5 IF an emergency classification was warranted, but the plant condition has been rectified (such that the CRITERION is no longer met) prior to declaration and notification, THEN the following guidance applies:

3.4.5.1 For transient events that would have been declared as UNUSUAL EVENTS, no emergency is declared.

However, the event shall be reported to those local, state, and Federal agencies designated to receive the initial notification form. These agencies shall be told that the UNUSUAL EVENT condition was rectified upon detection and no emergency is being declared.

3.4.5.2 For transient events that would have been declared as an ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY, or GENERAL EMERGENCY, the event shall be declared and the emergency response organization activated. The EAL CRITERIA for these events has been set at a threshold that warrants declaration even if the initiating condition has been rectified. Termination can occur when the criteria of EPP/IP-6.2, Termination of the Emergency and Recovery can be satisified.

3.5 Declaration Timing and Assessment Emergency conditions shall be classified as soon as the Emergency Director assessment of the INDICATORs shows that the CRITERION is met. IF the EAL specifies a duration, THEN the event shall be declared as soon as it is determined that the condition cannot be corrected within the specified period. In either case, the assessment time starts from the indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

6 Revision 3

EPPlImplementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 3.5.1 The assessment time is limited to 15 minutes, except as follows:

3.5.1.1 IF the EAL specifies a duration (e.g., release exceeds 2x TIS for one hour), THEN the assessment time runs concurrently with the required duration AND is the same length (e.g., in this examtple, one hour).

3.5.1.2 The assessment time and any required duration are NOT additive., - .:

3.5.2 IF the assessment cannot be completed within the specified period, THEN the event must be, declared on the -basis of INDICATORs that cannot be reasonably discounted.

3.6 Bases 3.6.1 Chapter 4 of the BVPS EPP provides the bases for these EALs.

The bases can be used for guidance to assist the Emergency Director in classifying events for which the classification is not immediately apparent.

3.7 Defined Terms 3.7.1 In the EALs, words written in bold uppercase letters are defined terms having specific meanings as they relate to this procedure.

Definitions of these terms are provided on the reverse side of most pages in the EAL section of this procedure.- Such terms shall be interpreted as provided in the definitions.

E. PROCEDURE 1.0 DETERMINE OPERATING MODE THAT EXISTED AT THE TIME THAT THE EVENT OCCURRED PRIOR TO ANY PROTECTION SYSTEM OR OPERATOR ACTION INITIATED IN RESPONSE TO THE EVENT.

2.0 DETERMINE 'IF THE CONDITION AFFECTS FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS AND, IF SO, PROCEED TO TAB 1.

2.1 IF the condition inivolves any of the following AND the initial mode was 1-4 THEN proceed to Tab 1 and follow instructions provided AND continue with Step 2.2.

2.1.1 CSF status tree ORANGE PATH or RED PATH conditions 2.1.2 Core exit thermocouple readings above 719 F 7 Revision 3

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 2.1.3 Reactor vessel full range water level less than 40% (no RCPs) 2.1.4 Elevated RCS activity >300 iCil/gm 2.1.5 Elevated Containment High Range Area Radiation Monitor reading 2.1.6 RCS leakrate large enough to require a 2nd charging pump 2 1.7 Loss of RCS subcooling 2.1.8 Steam Generator Tube Rupture 2.1.9 Containment bypass or loss of integrity 2.1.10 Rise in containment pressure or hydrogen concentration 2.2 Consider other related event-based EALs. IF other EALs are applicable, THEN perform Steps 3.0 and 4.0 if necessary. Otherwise, go to Step 5.0 3.0 CATEGORIZE THE EVENT INTO ONE OF THE INITIATING CONDITIONS AND LOCATE THE TAB.

3.1 Locate one of the EAL indices provided at the start of each tab.

3.2 Review the index to identify the tab that addresses the event that has occurred.

3.3 Turn to the appropriate tab.

NOTE:

The assessment of an emergency condition shall be completed as soon as possible and within 15 minutes of the occurance of one or more INDICATORs. IF the assessment cannot be completed within the specified period, THEN the event must be declared on the basis of INDICATORs that cannot be reasonably discounted.

NOTE:

IF the EAL specifies a duration (e.g., release exceeds 2x TISfor one hour),

THEN the assessment time runs concurrently with the required duration AND is the same length.

8 Revision 3

EPP/Implementing Procedure -EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 4.0 ASSESS THE EVENT AND COMPARE TO THE EALS 4.1 Locate the EAL for the highest severity emergency classification that is applicable for the initiating condition and operating mode 4.2 Review the INDICATORs and CRITERION for that EAL 4.3 IF the specified INDICATORs are not observed, THEN:

4.3.1 Proceed to the next lower severity EAL and re-perform step 4.2

& 4.3.

4.3.2 IF none of the EALs for an initiating condition are met, THEN re perform steps 3.0 and 4.0 for related initiating conditions.

4.3.3 IF the actions above do not identify an applicable EAL, THEN review -the observed conditions against Tab 4.7, Hazards and Emergency Director Judgment.

4.3.4 IF, after performing the above, no EAL is identified, THEN proceed to step 6.0.

4.4 IF the specified INDICATORs are observed, THEN:

4.4.1 Perform necessary assessments to validate the instrument readings and/or confirm reported observations.

4.4.2 Initiate any sampling, inslections, or dose assessments specified by the EAL.

NOTE:

IF the CRITERION specifies-an -eventor condition duration, THEN the classification shall be -made'-as 'soon as the duration is exceeded, OR when it is apparent that the duration will be exceeded, whichever is earlier.

4.4.3 Compare the results of the assessments to the CRITERION.

NOTE A given INDICATOR may apply to more than one CRITERION.

The Emergency, Direct6r 'shall review 'other related EALs for applicability.

9 Revision 3

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/1-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 4.5 IF the assessment concludes that the CRITERION is met, THEN the classification shall be made. Proceed to Step 5.0 4.6 IF the assessment concludes that the CRITERION is not met, THEN re perform steps 3.0 and 4.0 for other related initiating conditions as applicable.

4.7 IF no classification results from the above, THEN proceed to step 6.0.

NOTE:

The declaration of the emergency classification shall be made as soon as the Emergency Director has assessed that the EAL has been met OR will be met, AND within 15 minutes of occurance of the INDICATOR. Once the emergency is classified, notifications to state and local governments shall be completed within 15 minutes of the declaration.

5.0 THE EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND TRANSITION TO DECLARE 5.0 DECLARE THE EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND TRANSITION TO RESPONSE PROCEDURES 5.1 IF an UNUSUAL EVENT is declared, THEN proceed to EPP/I-2 5.2 IF an ALERT is declared, THEN proceed to EPP/I-3 5.3 IF a SITE AREA EMERGENCY is declared, THEN proceed to EPP/I-4 5.4 IF a GENERAL EMERGENCY is declared, THEN proceed to EPP/I-5 NOTE:

The step below is implemented only if an emergency classification is NOT made. IF a classification is made, THEN the transition indicated in step 5.0 should have been made.

6.0 EVALUATE THE NEED FOR AND MAKE NON-EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS 6.1 IF the abnormal condition is reportable to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 and l/2-ADM-2202, THEN perform the following:

6.1.1 Complete the NRC Reactor Plant Event Notification Worksheet (located on the Regulatory Affairs web page).

10 Revision 3

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 6.1.2 Notify First Energy Communications of the event and provide the information on the NRC Reactor Plant Event Notification Worksheet.

6.2 IF directed by station management, THEN make courtesy calls to the following state and local agencies on a timely basis consistent with normal working hours.

6.2.1 BCEMA 6.2.2 PEMA 6.2.3 CCEMA 6.2.4 HCOES F. FINAL CONDITIONS 1.0 For emergency events, the transition to the appropriate response procedure has been made and actions pursuant to that procedure are in progress.

2.0 For non-emergency events, required notifications have been completed.

G. ATTACHMENTS 1.0 Tabs for Classification of Emergency Conditions H. FIGURES 1.0 Figures are identified on the EAL indices 11 Revision 3

EPP/I-la ELI= AttnC2chment I Modes: 1,2,3,4 INSTRUCTIONS NOTE. An INDICATOR is considered to be MET if the stated t C threshold has been, or is, reached or exceeded, on the basis of confirmed observation or VALID instrument readings. The Emergency Director must use judgement when classifying parameters that may be transitory (e.g.,

containment pressure).

NOTE: The INDICATOR should be considered MET if the parameter is indeterminate due to instruments that are not available or out of range and the existence of the condition H

Rapid unexplained drop I in CNMT pressure can not be reasonably discounted.'

LOS Potent " - P4P RCS leak results in loss of Unisolal NOTE: An INDICATOR is considered to be MET if in the RCS subcooling requires judgement of the Emergency Director, the INDICATOR will

charging be MET imminently (i e., within I to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months in the absence with letd of a viable success path). The classification shall be made as soon as this determination is made.

RCS le 1I.

Q injection

-77L l OS .;*,, i!i0 In the matrix to the left, review the LOSS INDICATORS in by direct each barrier column. If one or more INDICATORS are required met, check the LOSS block at the bottom of the column.

2. If no LOSS is identified for a particular barrier, review the 9z potential LOSS INDICATORS for that barrier. If one or more INDICATORS are met, check the potential LO GS block at the bottom of the barrier column. C)

Compare the blocks checked to the CRITERIA below and

+VALID reading above background exceeds:

]barrier.

Tine After RM-202 RM-201* OR S/D, hrs mR/hr nmR/hr LOSS of all three (3) barriers.

0-05 35 05 I 05-4 20 03 4-121, 1 01

SITEAREA EMERGENCY 12-24 6 N/A LOSS o- Potential LOSS of any Two (2) barriers.

+ Readings baseddn T/S RCS acet.vi OR SLOSS of one (1) barrier and a Potential LOSS of a second barrier. - -

os ALERT

Any LOSS or Potential LOSS of Fuel Clad barrier.

OR SAny LOSS or Potential LOSS of RCS barrier.

TW'lv f4;a AAýWi Ugmi4 UNUSUAL EVENT LOSS or Poteptial LOSS of CNMT barrier.

SEE ALSO EAL'S:

2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation (RCS Specific Activity >LCO) 2.5 RCS Unidentified or Pressure Boundry Leakage 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage Revision 3

)

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS Alt ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which i AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: Afused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards t CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Poti..,.,al protesting station operations or activities at the site. for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric contained therein.

values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration) All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the The PROTECTED AREA encompassesall owner controlled areas condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise ,noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Cor.trol Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function safety injection.

required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs. Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAR): A boundary surrounding the or more of the following: (I) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A.

The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the EXPLOSION: A rapid. violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to force. interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e.,

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reas" steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam inhalation or ,kin contact (e.g, chlorine).

generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it -s 'not the

,FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if abnormal or emergency procedures aie UNPLANNED.

large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), ,operator knowledge of plant unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g, alarm setpoints, received from plant personnel, %,hichever is most limiting, or other minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).

minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is improvement in the applicable parameters (e g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern r-garding the continued operability or vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, protected area without authorization. scratches) should not be included.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA wh combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failu,.

LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance public health and safety by exposure to radiation level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

I, ,4 :FeC.a DI'* i EPP/1-IaArt I 2 Criteo n IInIctor 22rIterionoI F ncion-', Mode -i-Cl I Mode Loss f Insrumenatio Criterion / Indicator Mode 4-Criterion/IIndicator Mode Criterion / Indicator Reactor power >5% after VALID trip signal(s)

Criterion I/ Indicator Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" I

Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Inability to cool the core and loss of core cooling capability and Tab 7 "RadiologicalEffluents" [I or 21] , , I [I and 21 I., Actions of FR-C.1 (RED PATH) are I. Ops personnel report FR-S.I has been INEFFECTIVE entered and subsequent actions do NOT 1 2. [a andb]' 2 result in reduction of power to <5% and

a. Five hottest core exit thermocouples 2 2 decreasing 3 >1200 F; or five hottest core exit 4 thermocouples'>719 F with NO RCPs 2. [aorb]

running and RVLIS full range level a Ops personnel report CSF status tree

<40% RED PATH terminus exists for core

b. Actions taken have NOT resulted in a cooling or heat sink rising trend in RVLIS full range level or b. Five hottest core exit thermocouples a dropping trend in core exit >1200 F; or five hottest core exit t* thermocouple temperatures within 15 thermocouples >719 F with NO RCPs minutes of initiation of restoration running and RVLIS full range level <40% CO actions I-t-

4. i Loss of function needed to achieve or maintain Reactor trip failure after VALID Trip signal(s) Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" Inability to monitor a SIGNIFICANT with reactor power >5% and attempts to cause TRANSIENT in progress, hot shutdown a manual trip from the control room are

[I and2 and3 and 4) [I or21 unsuccessful.

1.-Loss of 'most (>75%) annunciators or 1. Ops personnel report a CSF status tree RED indications PATH terminus for core cooling or heat sink exists 1 Ops personnel report FR-S.1 has been entered and manual reactor trip from control

>4 1 2. SIGNIFICANTTRANSIENT in progress 2 room did NOT result in reduction of power to

3. Loss of SER and SPDS 2 Five hottest core exit thermocouples >1200 2 1 <5% and decreasing 3 4. Inability to directly monitor any of the 2 F; or five hottest core exit thermocouples 4 followirigiCSFs: >719 F with NO RCPs running and RVLIS 3

full range level <40%

4

",Sulbcriticality Vessel Integrity Also Refer to Tab 2.3 "Failure of Reactor Core C6oling Containment Protection" and Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Heat Sink Matrix" 1 ,

Automatic reactor trip did not occur after Refer to Teb I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" UNPLANNED loss of most annunciators or Complete'loss of function needed to achieve VALID trip signal and manual trip from indications for >15, minutes with, either a Cold Shutdown when Shutdown required by control room ivas -uccessful SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress or a Tech Specs 1I and 2) loss of non-alarming compensatory indications 11 and 2 and 31 (1 and 2 and 31 1. VALID reacter trip signal received or I. Loss of decay heat removal capability (RHR, required.

I. UNPLANNED loss, of most (>75%) 1 CCR or RPRW) / (RHS, CCP, SWS) 2 2 annunciators or indications for >15 minutes " 2 2 Manual reactor trip from control room was 3 2. SM judgement that additional personnel 3 2. Inability to remove heat via the condenser successful and power is <5% and decreasing 4 (beyond normal shift complement) are required to monitor the safe operation of the 3. Shutdown to'mode 5 required by T/S unit 3.' [a6rb]

a. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress 4. 1.

Reactor coolant system specific activity exceeds

b. Loss of SER and SPDS Reactor(refer coolant to system BVPS specific activity technical exceeds specification LCO UNPLANNED loss ofrmost annunciators or UNPLANNED Loss of communications Not Applicable 3.4.8) indications for >15 minutes [I or2] 11or21

[I and2]J 1

1. In-plant [a and b and c] 1. VALID high alarm on RM-CH-101A or B

a. UNPLANNED Loss of All Pax Phones 2 reactor coolant letdown monitor

1. UNPLANNED loss of most (>7"5%)

b. UNPLANNED Loss of All Gaitronics annunciators or indications for >15 minutes 1 ALL (Page/Party) 4 2. Radiochemistry analysis exceeds Technical 2 c. UNPLANNED Loss of All Radios Specification 3.4 8

2. SM judgement that additional personnel 5 3 (Handie-Talkies)

(beyond normal shift complement) are 4 required to monitor the safe operation of the unit 2. Offsite[a and band ci

a. UNPLANNED Loss of ENS

b. UNPLANNED Loss of Bell Lines

c. UNPLANNED Loss of Radios to Offsite I

I ---------- - _____I Revision 3

I DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS fit ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ,ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE:IAn object ejected, thrown, or launched towards it CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Po .....ial for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding protesting station operations or activities at the site. the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric contained therein.

values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration) All classifications are based 'on an assessment (i.e., determination that the The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these RED PATII: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function safety injection required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result reactor power, (2) Electncal load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A.

The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastiophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to force.

interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reas "

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam inhalation or skin contact (e.g , chlorine) )

generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if

,result in coITective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

IIOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regardto radioactivityreleases, a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant unintentional releases. uninonitored releases, or planned releases that conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports exceed a ,condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints, received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other minimum dilution flow, minimum 'release times, maximum release rates, evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this and/oi discharge of incorrect tank).

protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) to Control Room Operators that an Emergenc, Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).

minutes from identification of the Core'Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses Damage is improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability, of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, INTRUSIONIINTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, protected area without authorization. sdratches) should not be included.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA wt combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failt. J LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as'specified in destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the

,the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance public health and safety by exposure to radiation level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

EPP/1- I a 2 RC 6' i Sp c ai Alt I

........... .......... Mode Criterion / Indicator Mode iI

.I---- Criterion /----------

Indicator -

i Refer to Tab I "Fission ProductBarrierMatrix" C, Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" Not Applicable Not Applicable

. -I -.-

- to -Tab i -Refer - - . - . -- .'..

"Fission Product BarrierMatrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix"

+

Not Applicable Not Applicable I .- ...-- . - 7 7 7 7 7 -

I i Refer to Tab I "'Fission ProductBarrierMatri'" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" Refer to Tab 2.2, "Loss of Function" Not Applhcable 4

Unidentified or pressure boundary RCS Identified RCS leakage >25 GPM Inability to Reach Required Shutdown Mode Safety Limit Has Been Exceeded leakage >10 GPM Within Technical Specification Time Limits [I or 21

1. Identified RCS leakage (as - defined by 11 and 21 L. Unidentified or'pressure boundary leakage Technical Specifications) ->25 GPM as 1. Technical Specification 2.1.1 specifies the 00 (as defined by Technical Specifications) >10 indicated below [a or b] I. A Technical Specification action statement, safety limits for the reactor cere which are GPM as indicated bel6w [a orb] requiring a mode reduction, has been entered applicable in Modes I and 2.

I 1 a. OST 1.6.2 or 1.6.2A Results 1 1 L 2 a. OST 1.6.2 results 2 2 2. The unit has NOT been placed in the 2 2. Technical Specification 2.1.2 specifies the e0 3 3 b. UNPLANNED le\vel rise in excess of 3 required mode within the time prescribed by 3 ;afety limit for the Reactor Coolant System 4 b. With RCS temp. and PZR level stable, 4 25 GPM total into PRT, DG-TK-1, and 4 the action statement 4 pressure which is applicable in Modes 1, 2, 3,

'5* VCT level dropping at a rate >10 GPM 5* DG-TK-2 5 4 and 5.

(>l%/min indicated on LI-CHI-115 with no VCT makeup in progress)

Applies to Mode 5 if RCS Pressurized

Applies to Mode 5 tfRCS Pressurized I -- I Revision 3

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS (! 6 iI I.

ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT,- GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs b , the EC5Ps which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A'fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE:- An-object-ejected, thrown, or launched towards a '-'

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or' more persons violently structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Pot )

protesting station operations or activities at the site. for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of ihe affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric contained therein.

values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i e., determination that the The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these RED PATh: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function safety injection.

required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

(Containment) and Inventory (RCS)

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100 Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A.

The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of BVPS or one of its vendors The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to force. interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e, TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason ,f' steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam inhalation or skin contact (e ge, chlorine).

generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. )

UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not thec FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not result in corrective o.- mitigative actions being taken in accordance with constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED large quantities of smokre and heat are observed.

tHOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints, received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment (i e., within 15 minutes).

minutes from identification of, the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily PATTI,.TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient towcause concern regarding the continued opcrability or vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability of affected safety stnicture, system, or component. Example thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, protected area without authorization. scratches) should not be included.

LOWVER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA whicl combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failu LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger th,.

the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance public health and safety by exposure to radiation level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

I, 1/4 2.9 TurineFaiure I *Sem edL 'e EPP/I-Ia I Mode Criterion / Indicator Mode Criterion I Indicator Attachment I L-1 Refer to Tab I "Fission ProductBarrierMatrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" I

z H

Refer to Tab I "Fission ProductBarrierMatrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" H

CI)

Table! 2-i CI)

Turbine failure generated missiles,- cause Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" Plant Areas Associated With Shield Wall penetration of a missile shield wall of any area Penetration EAL containing safety related equipment Plant personnel report missiles generated by Control Room Cable Tray Mezz tuibine failure with casing penetration also Electrical Switchgear Containment results in a through-wall penetration of a Safeguards Primary Aux. Building 1 "missile shield wall listed in Table 2-1 2 Diesel Generator Bldg IWT-TK- 10

,3 I

- i Turbine failure results in casing penetration UNPLANNED rapid depressurization of the Main Steam System resulting in a rapid RCS

1. Plant personnel report a turbine failure which cooldown and Safety Injection actuation results in penetration of the turbine casing or [1 and 21 damage to main generator seals with H evidence of significant hydrogen or seal oil I. Ops personnel report rapid depressurization 1 leakage 1

of Main Steam System that causes SLI (<500 0' 2 2 psig) 3 3 4 2. Ops personnel report Safety Injection has C' actuated I I Revision 3

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs byt the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 , indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

"BOMB: A fused explosive device (See6EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE:. An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a pilnt CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violentl, structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Pot protesting station operations or activities at the site.' y for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity o, affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numericc contained therein.

values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). Al classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that t/I ! The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION hasS within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these e RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) off indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. y RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function safety injection required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Ifeat plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

Sink, Vessel Integnty (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of BVPS ot one of its venddrs 'he STRIKE ACTION must threaten to force. interrupt normal plant operations to be considered FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e, TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam inhalation or skin contact (e g., chlorine).

generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not expected resolt of normal operations, testing, or maintenance: Events that such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with iconstitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED large quantities of smoke and heat are observed HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e g., alarm setpoints, received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this tank).

protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (I) an instrument channel check, or (2) to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).

minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.. Damage is improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping,

'protected area without authorization, scratches) should not be included.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which

combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the fail '>

LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger J the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance public health and safety by exposure to radiation level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

EPP/I-la

$) Attachment 1

.. I L s ( S uMode

°.

... . L s f ... o Mode Criterion II ----------

Indicator Criterion / Indicator I Mode I- All- I Criterion I lndicator .......... 4.

Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" Prolonged loss of offsite and onsite AC power i

Refer to Tab 6 "Shutdown System Degradation" and Tab 2.2 "Loss of Function", and Tab 6.1 1[ and 21 "Loss of Shutdown Systems" I.- AE and DF 4KV emergency buses NOT I energized from Unit I sources for >15 minutes I , ,

2. [a orb orc '

i2 3 a. Ops personnel report .CSF status tree 4 RED PATTI or ORANGE PATH terminus exists for core cooling b.' Restoration of either AE or DF 4KV emergency bus is NOT likely from any source within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months of loss

c. Five hottest core exit thermocouples

>1200 ,F or; five hottest core exit thermocouples >719 F with no RCPs Loss of all vital DC power for >15 minutes running and RVLIS full range <40% -L Iit- i Refer to Tab 6 "Shutdown System Degradation" Loss of offsite and onsite AC power for >15 I Voltage <II04VDC on DC buses 1-1 and 1 minutes 2 and 1-3 and 1-4 for >15 rmnutes I. AE and DF 4KV emergency buses NOT Also Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier energized, from Unit, I sources for">15 1 Matrix", Tab 2.2 "Loss of Function", and Tab 2.1

- minutes 2 "Loss of Instntmentation" and Tab 6.1 "Loss of I

'2 3 Shutdown Sys tems" 3 4 4

4-Refer to Tab I "Fission Prothdct BarrierMatrix",

1 i UNPLANNED loss of offsite and onsite AC Tab 2.2 "Loss of Fu'zction", and Tab 2.1 "Loss of i AC power to emergency buses reduced to a Instnrnentation" and Tab 6 1 "Lous of Shutdown single source of power such that any additional power for >15 minutes Systems" failure will result in the de-energization of both buses 1. AE and DF 4KV emergency buses NOT

[I and 21, energized from Unit I sources for >15 minutes

1. Either AE'or DF 4KV emergency bus is de Sneigized for >15 minu-tes 5 Also Refer to Tab 6 "Shutdown System 6 Degradation",

3 2. The energized'AE or DF 4KV emergency bus De

'4 has only one source of power fuel

[aorb]

a. Emergency diesel generator

b. 1A or ID 4KV normal bus UNPLANNED loss of one train of DC power for >15 minutes i Loss of offsite power for >15 minutes UNPLANNED loss of offsite power for >15 11 or21

.11 and2) minutes [I and 21 fn L. Voltage <1104 VDC on DC Buses 1-1 and

]A and ID 4KV normal buses de-energized 1. IA arid ID 4KV normal buses de-energized

,1. 1 1-3 for >15 miHates for >15 minutes for >15 minutes 2

5 3 2. Voltage <110.4 VDC on DC Buses 1-2 and

2. Each diesel generator'is supplying power to 2. Either diesel generator is supplying power to 2 6 4 1-4 for>15 minutes its respective emergency bus its respective emergency bus 3 De 4 Refer to Tab 6.4 "Loss of DC (Shutdown)" for fuel modes 5, 6, and defueled I I

______________________ Revision 3

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS SALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB:,A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) 1PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a ,'-,nrt station operations Aorgroup CIVIL DISTURBANCE:

protesting C of ten activities at the or more persons violently (10)site. structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Po for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity o, ..ie

)

affected structure or the 'operability or reliability of safety equipment Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric 'contained therein.

values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications arc based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has within the secunty perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. RUPTURED: (Steam Gcne.-ator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function "safetyinjection.

required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the or more of the following" (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result reactor power, (2) Electncal load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100 Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A.

The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shosan on Figure 4-A.

failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanert structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of BVPS or one of its vendors The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to force. interrupt normal plant operations to be considered FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam inhalation or skin contact (e g , chlorine).

generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not -,e FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if abnormal or emei gency procedures are UNPLANNED, large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station !o With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, Discharge Authorization (RWDA). ImpliLit in this definition are procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g.,. alarm setpoints, received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).

minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure'that is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor gufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core ieliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example thermocouple temperatures). damage includes" defohnation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration,'

'INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, protected area without authorization. scratches) should not be included.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. 6ontains equipment, systems, components, or material, the fail, LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endangerJ the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance public health and safety by exposure to radiation level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

EPP/I-la1 Attachment 1V4, , I '4. i 4 sI o I Mode Criterion / Indicator IIMnde IviV* Criterion / Indicator I I-.....I. .-. .I. .... TABLE 4-1 1

-JL FIRE in the ,control, room, cable tray Refer to Tab 4.1 "Fire" or Tab I "Fission Product ,1 PLANT AREAS ASSOCIATED WITH FIRE AND EXPLOSION EALS BarrierMatrix" C mezzanine, or process control room resulting in an evacuation of the control room per 1.56C.4 "Alternate Safe Shttdown" and loss of any Control Room Cable Tray Mezz.

Diesel Gen. Room Intake Str Cubicles Containment Building Prim. Auxiliary Building required equipment results in an uncontrolled Process Cntrol Rm UIUJ2 CV3 Cable Tunnel Safeguards Building RCS Heatup Relay Room AE/DF Switchgear Demin Water (lIWT-TK-10) 1 [I and2 and3]

Rod Drive/MG Rm Fuel Building C02 Storage/PG Pump Rm 2 D/G Fuel Oil RWST (IQS-TK-1) RW Valve Pit 3 1. 1.56C.4 "Alternate Safe Shutdown" entered 4 2. Ops personnel report inability to operate at least one of each of the following components of the available train: Figure 4-A PROTECTED AREA / SITE PERIMETER Charging pump AFW pump Diesel generator',

RPRW pump BIP, ,, Steam relief path

3. Uncontroii d RCS heatup lasting longer than 15 minutes i Refer to Tab 4.1 "Fire" or Tab I "Fission Product I

FIRE, in the control room,,, cable tray BarrierMatrix "

mezzanine, or process'contiol room resulting in an evacuation of thi control room per'l.56C.4 "Alternate Safe Shutdown" I

1. 1 .56C.4 "Altentate Safe Slutdown" entered

'3

.4

.L.

- .1 i EXPLOSION in any of the areas listed in Table FIRE in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is affecting safety related equipment 4-1 that is affecting safetyrelated equipment

[1 and2) [land 2]

1. FIRE in any of the listed areas in Table 4-1 I. EXPLOSION in any of the listed areas in Table 4-1

2. [aorb]

All, All 2. [a or b] .E)m

a. Ops personnel report VISIBLE

a. Ops personnel report' VISIBLE DAMAGE, to permanent structure or equipment in listed area due to FIRE DAMAGE to permanent structure or equipment in listed area

b. Control room indication of'degraded b.' Control room indication of degraded I

system or component (within listed system or component (within listed "areas) response due to FIRE areas) response due to EXPLOSION Refer to Tab 4.6 "Security".

_____ I Ii FIRE in or adjacent to those areas listed in UNPLANNED EXPLOSION in or adjacent to those areas listed in Table 4-1 Table 4-1 not extinguishied within 15'ninutes from the time of control room notification or verification of control room alarm 1. UNPLANNED EXPLOSION in or adjacent to any of the listed areas in Table 4-1 All All Refer to Tab 4.1 "Fire" or Tab I "Fission If Product BarrierMatrix" Refer to Tab 4.6 "Security" Revision 3 L

____________________ __________ .1.

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS "ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 Indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a '-it CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently structure.1 The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Po )

protesting station operations or activities at the site. for damaje is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity ot ,te affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric "contained therein.

values which define that condition (i e., the basts of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e, determination that the The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these RED PATII: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Cnntrol Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function safety injection.

required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment There are six CSFs: Subcnticality, Core Cooling, Heat SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the or more of the following. (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thernal BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load, (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A.

The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figuie 4-A.

failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to force. interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

inhalation or skin contact (e.g, chlorine). )

UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not twie FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance-. Eents that such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

IIOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to Wyth specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s): Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc ) in the Control Room, or reports exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints, received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other minimum dilution flow, minimmm release times, maximum release rates, evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An 'in:dication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment (i e., within 15 minutes).

minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding 'the continued operability or vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, INTRUSION/INTRUDER2: Suspected hostile individual present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, protected area without authorization. scratches) should not be included.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA whirh combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the fail LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger L I the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance public health and safety by exposure to radiation level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

EPP/I-la Attachment 1 flmabeGaS 4. T A Glg' I

F Mode I-Criterion / ..........

Indicator Mode IS.... . .

II -.. ... . . /. Indicator Criterion -

,p I TABLE 4-2 HAS BEEN DELETED Refer to Tab 4.1 "Fire", Tab 4.2 "Explosion, or Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix' C Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" I

0 4

Refer to Tab 4.1 "Fire", Tab 4.2 "Explosion", or Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Bamer Matrix" FIGURE 4-B HAS BEEN DELETED Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" N

4 C Release of flammable gas within, or contiguous to, a VITAL AREA' which jeopardizes operation of systems required to maintain safe Release of TOXIC GAS within, or contiguous to, a VITAL AREA which jeopardizes operation of systems required to maintain safe operations or to establish or maintain cold operations, or to establish or maintain cold shutdown (Mode 5). shutdown (Mode 5). (1 and 2)

1. Report or detection of a TOXIC GAS within,

1. Report or, detection of a flammable gas or contiguous to, a VITAL AREA or an area All All within, or contiguous to, a VITAL AREA in required for continued safe- operation in concentrations greater than explosive concentrations that will be life threatening to concentrations. plant personnel.

2. Plant personnel would be unable to perform actions necessary for continued safe operation or to establish and maintain cold shutdown (Mode 5) while utilizing appropriate personnel protection equipment.

4 i Release of flammable gas affecting the Release of TOXIC GAS affecting the PROTECTED AREA deemed detrimental to PROTECTED AREA deemed detrimental to the safe operation of the plant. the safe operation of the plant.

(1 or2) (Ior2)

1. (a and b)

1. (a and b) a. Report or detection of TOXIC GAS that All a. Report'or detection of flammable gas that All could enter the SITE PERIMETER in could enter the SITE PERIMETER in amounts that can affect normal operation amounts that can affect normal operation of of the plant (Refer to Figure 4-A).

the plant (Refer to Figure 4-A). b. Normal operation of the plant is impeded

b. Normal operation of the plant is impeded due to access restrictions implemented by due to access restrictions implemented by the Control Room within the 6 the Control Room within the PROTECTED PROTECTED AREA (Refer to AREA (Refer to Figure 4-A). Figure 4-A). 6

2. Report by local, county or State officials for a

2. Report by local, county or State officials potential evacuation of site personnel based 6 for a potential evacuation of site on an offsite event.

personnel based on an offsite event. Refer to AOP 1/2 44A I "Chlorine/toxic Gas Release", Attachment 3 for a list of chemicals stored, produced, or transported near BVPS and their toxicity limits. Revision 3 I

Figure 4-C EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY 4

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EPP/I-la Attachment 1 de MLVo Criterion / Indicator 4 -- - - - I Events are in process or have occurred which 1g : ot 4.

ol o m!E a'uainS I -I I Mode Criterion

.. .... .... . I..........

Indicator Mode Criterion I Indicator involve actual or imminent substantial core I Ll ý i Security event resulting in loss of control of the Refer to Tab 4.1 "FIRE" degradation or melting with potential for loss of systems necessary to establish or maintain cold containment integrity. Releases can be reasonably

.4 shutdown expected to exceed EPA protective action 11 or 21 I guidelines exposure levels outside the

1. Hostile armed force has taken control of the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY.

Figure 4-C on preceding page.)

(Refer to H d *q control room or the remote shutdown panel

2. Hostile armed force has taken control of plant All equipment such that Ops personnel report the All inability to operate equipment necessary to maintain the following functi6ns [a orb or c]

a Subcriticality

b. Core cooling

c. Heat Sink I Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant Evacuation of the control room has been Security event has or is occurring which results functions needed for the protection of the public.

initiated and control of all necessary equipment in actual or likely failures of plant functions Any releases are NOT expected to result in has not been established within 15 minutes of needed to protect the public I(I or 2) exposure levels which exceed EPA protective action manning the Shutdown Panel 11 and 21 guideline exposure levels outside the EXCLUSION

1. VITAL AREA, other than the control room, AREA BOUNDARY. (Refer to Figure 4-C on

1. AOP 1.33.1 "Control Room Inaccessibility" has been penetrated by a hostile armed force preceding page.)

has been entered

2. Suspected BOMB detonates within a VITAL AREA All

2. Inability to transfer and operate any single component listedin, Table 4-3 within 15 Table 4-3 All minutes of manning the shutdown panel All EQUIPMENT REQUIRED AT SHUTDOWN PANEL Also refer to Tab 4.1 "Fire"

V, , ,/* ** o One Auxiliary Feedwater Pump One Atmospheric Steam Dump Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial One Charging Pump Evacuation of the control room is required i Credible Security event 'which indicates an One Boric Acid Pump degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Any actual'or potential substantial degradation in releases are expected to be limited to small IFCV-CH-122

1. AOP 1.33.1 "Control Room Inaccessibility" the level of safety of the plant/11 or 2 or 31 fractions of the EPA protective action guideline has been entered exposure levels.

1. BOMB discovered within a VITAL AREA

2. CIVIL DISTURBANCE ongoing within the Table 4-4 PROTECTED AREA SECURITY EVENTS All Ali "-All 3. PROTECTED AREA has been penetrated a. SABOTAGE/INTRUSION has or is Occurring Within the by a hostile armed force PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A) 1 Refer to, Figure 4-A for a drawing of the i b. HOSTAGE/EXTORTION Situation That Threatens to PROTECTEDAREA Interrupt Plant Operations I Unusual events are in process or have occurred

c. CIVIL DISTURBANCE Ongoing Between the SITE i Credible Security event which indicates a which indicate a potential degradation of the level PERIMETER and PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A)

,potential degradation in the level of safety of of safety of the plant. No releases of radioactive Not Applicable material requiring offsite response or monitoring the plant[1 or 2] d. Hostile STRIKE ACTION Within the PROTECTED are expected unless further degradation of safety i' AREA Which Threatens to Interrupt Normal Plant Operations systems occurs.

1. BOMB discovered within the PROTECTED All (Judgement Based on Behavior of Strikers and/or Intelligence AREA Received) (Figure 4-A)

I, All 2. Secunty Shift Supervisor reports one or more e. A credible site-specific security threat notification.

of the events listed in Table 4-4 Refer to Figure 4-A for a drawing of the PROTECTEDAREA I I Revision 3

I.

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs bý the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 , 'indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused-explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: Antobject ejected, thrown, or launched towards a -'-it CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10))6r'more persons violet ntly structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Po )

protesting station operations or activitieg at the'sit&.' for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity o, ,we affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any nume tric contained therein.

values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). )

All The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner, controlled areas classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that has within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION h been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for theese RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emerger icy RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety functi ion safety injection required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to Ihe SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, fieeat of fity plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integr unavailable.

(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding Ithe or more of the following: (I) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not res ult reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A.

The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastropl hic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to force. interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e., TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steaam inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not tie FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smo ke expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do nnot result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED large quantities of smoke and heat are observed HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivityreleases, a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculatior ns, Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in thic definition are procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of pla atnintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that nt exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g.,- alarm setpoints, conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or repoi 'ts minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or oth her and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in thhis protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with I15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being availab ble when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) hvas indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within I a this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).

minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RE D VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses., Damage is improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactcor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on cor re reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example' thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, protected area without authorization. scratches) should not be included.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below whic ch "VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the fail LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified i n destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger 2' the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performano in, public health and safety by exposure to radiation level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

Figure 5-A I EPP/I-la Attachment 1 Site Perimeter S. rt _ - .. . I Criterion I Indicator Refer toT Criterion / Indicater I ISMode S...... I Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission ProductBlarrerMtatrix" C

H Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix"

,f K'I 7' i Earthquake greater than 0.06g acceleration Tornado or high wind strikes any structure listed in Table 5-1 and results in structural occurs damage [1 and 21

1. Analysis of Accelerograph Recording System 1. Tornado or high wind strikes any structure data indicate ground acceleration >0 06g in listed in Table 5-1 accordance "with AOP 1/2.75.3 "Acts of Natitre - Ea'thhquake", 2. laorb]

All 'a. Confirmed' report of any VISIBLE All DAMAGE to specified structures 7 7

b. Control room indications'of degraded safety 'system or component response within listed structures due to event Table 5-1 Plant Structures Associated With Ii Tornado within the SITE PERIMETER . Tornado/Hi Wind add Aircraft EALs Earthquake , detected by site seismic instrumentation, >0.01g acceleration [fand 21 1. Plant personnel report a tornado has been Containment Building sighted within the SITE PERIMETER

1. Ann. All-59 "Seismic Accelerograph Safeguards Bluilding (refer to Figure 5-A)

Operation" indicates initiation *of the Primary Auxl Building Accelerograph Recording System Fuel Handling Building

2. [ao'rbl]7 RWST (1QSTK-1)

All All C02 Storage/PG Pp Rm

a. 'Ground motion sensed by plant Service Building (incl. FW Reg Vlv Rm) personnel

b. Unit 2 reports seismic event dejected on Diesel Generator Building C unit instrumentation Main Intake Structure Demin. Water Sto. (IWT-TK-10)

I_________.

I Revision 3

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANG A E PATH: Monitoring of one'or more CSFs 1y the EoPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive d-evice (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An-object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a -"',t CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently structure. The source of the'projectile may be onsite or offsite. Po )

protesting station operations or activities at the site. for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity o, ntie affected structure or the operability or reliability of safeiy equipment Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric contained therein.

values which define that condition (i e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas' condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function safety injection.

required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs" Subcnticality, Core Cooling, Heat SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A.

The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to force. interrupt normal plant operations to be considered FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e., TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason ot steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine). )

UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not mie FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that' such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with constitute fires Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that

, conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports exceed a condition specified on the RWDA_ (e.g., alarm setpoints, received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates.

evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (I) an instrument channel check, or (2) to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).

minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without ,measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, protected area without authorization. scratches) should not be included.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA , is any area within the PROTECTED AREA whirh combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. contains equipment,, systems, components, or material, the fail LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger ,. 2 the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance public health and safety by exposure to radiation level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

EPP/I-la Att I I',j River Level HIGH 5 eOW* 0 1 Mode aecrifteCraoshIcao Mode Criterion / Indicator Mode Criterion / Indicator Mode Criterion I Indicator Mode ,Criterion / Indicator . . .. . . .. .. .

ý i

,1 Refer to Tab I "Fission ProductBarrierMatrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix, Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" C I z

z

+/-

Refer to Tab I "Fission ProductBarrierMatrix" i

Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" H

U H

CI)

Aircraft or PROJECTILE impacts (strikes) it River water level >705 Ft mean sea -level-

+ Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMat rh" 11 or 21 N River water level <648.6 Ft Mean Sea Level Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix'"

any plant structure listed in Table 5-1 resulting 11 or21 in structural damage

1. ILR-CW-101, ifaccessibie, indicates >705 N, [Iland21 N 1. ILR-CW-101 indicates < 648.6 Ft Mean Sea mean sea level Level

1. 'Plant personnel report aircraft or PROJECTILE has impacted any structure 2. National Weather Bureau (412-644-2882) or ALL 2. National Weather Bureau (412-644-2882) or ALL listed in Table 5-1 on previous page, Montgomery Lock (724-643-8400) reports Montgomery Lock (724-643-8400) Reports Montgomery Lower Pool stage height >52.48 Ft Montgomery Lower Pool stage height <-3.92 2.N[a or b] N , N ALL Ft N a., Confirmed report. of,' any VISIBLE N.N...DAMAGE to specified structures ,

b.

N N Control Room indications of degraded safety. system or component response Note: Mean Sea Level = stage height + 652.52 Ft (within listed structures) due to event Note: Mean Sea Level = stage height + 652.52 Ft Aircraft crash or PROJECTILE impact within River water level >700 Ft Mean Sea Level -- 4 Watercrart strikes primary intake structure the SITE PERIMETER [I or 21 Watercraft in strikes primaryof intake Reactor structure Plant or and results a reduction Not Applicable Turbine Plant River Water Flow

1. Plant' p~rsonnel report aircraft crash or I. ILR-CW-101 indicates > 700 Ft Mean Sea [I and 21 PROJECTILE' impact within the SITE Level

1. Plant personnel report a watercraft has struck

\D~

PERIMETER (refer to Figure 5-A on ALL, N previous page) ALL 2. National Weather Bureau (412-644-2882) or the primary intake structure vi Montgomery Lock (724-643-8400) reports 2. [aor b]

kl Montgomery Lower Pool stage height ALL a. RPRW flow reduction indicated by

>47.48 Ft sustained pressure reduction to <20 psig on IPI-RW-1I13A and/orI 113B

b. TPRW flow reduction indicated by sustained pressure reduction (Ann A6 Note: Mean Sea Level = stage height + 652.52 Ft 118 "RAW Water Pump Disch Press Low" <15 psig)

? I Revision 3

I, DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS 0 ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY,- STE - ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indi6ates thit a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plan, CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Potential protesting station operations or activities at the site. for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric contained therein.

values which define that condition (i e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (ie., determination that the The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these RED PATti: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function safety injection.

required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Hleat SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of Sink, Vessel Integnty (Pressurized Thennal Shock), Integrity plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the or more of the following:

(1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal BVPS units beyond which the postulated UPSAR accidents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) in population doses exceeding thecriteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A.

The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to force.

interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e.,

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

)

!I UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the FIRE:, Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints, received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other minimum diluti6n flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (I) an instrument channel check, or (2) to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).

minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily PATH- TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, INTRUSIONIINTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering Surface blemishes (e.g, paint chipping, protected area without authorization. scratches) should not be included.

LOWVER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.

VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, components, or , material, the failure, 9

LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance public health"and safety by exposure to radiation level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

EPP/I-Ia Lossof DII S ,ow): Art I Mod I Critery, I InS dior I Ls soIA I!IS lwn Mode Criterion/ Indicator Mode Criterion I Indicator Criterion I Indicator

., Mode Criterion / Indicator C !

I Refer to Tab Z1 ,"Gaseous Effluents" Refer Ito Tab 7.1 "Gaseous

. I Effluents" 1 1 1 ,

Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" I Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous EJJluents" i i - - - - --- .. ..

Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" Loss or water level in the reactor vessel that has Refer to Tab Z I "Gaseous Effluents" Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents""

or will uncover fuel in the reactor vessel.

1Iand21 .

I [a or b]

a. Loss of RHR or CCR or RPRW 5 b. Loss of RCS Inventory with inadequate 6 makeup

2. [a andb]

a Ops'personnel report LI-I RC-480, or LI-IRC-482C RCS level instrumentation (if available), in the I ,._'

Control Room indicates a level drop to 0 inches ,

b. Other confirmed indications of fuel uncovery-------- I

______________________ I I I I UNPLANNED loss of offsite and onsite AC Refer to Tab 6.1 "Loss of Shutdown Systems" Inability to maintain unit in cold shutdown' power for >15 minutes]

.. 1' " Not Applicable

[I and 2]) ..

1. UNPLANNED Loss of RHR or CCR or I. AE and DF 4KV emergency buses not RPRW energized from Unit I sources for >15 minutes

2. faorborc]

a. Core exit 'thermocouples .(CETC) (if 5 5-,** available) indicate-the temperature has 6 increased >10 F and has exceeded 200F. De "b. (wl RHR , in'service) RHR inlet Fuel temperature has increased >10 F and has Also refer to Tab 6.1 "Loss of Shutdown Systems"

,exceeded 200 F."

(wlo CETCs or RHR), loss has exceeded 30 minutes 'or there is evidence of boiling in'the Rx vessel.

I i - - - ---

UNPLANNED loss of all offsite power for >15 UNPLANNED loss of the required train of DC UNPLANNED loss of any function needed for Loss or Reactor Coolant System Inventory with minutes power for >15 minutes cold shutdown that results in a core exit inadequate make-up 11 and 21 [1 or21 temperature increase of more than 10 F [1 and 21

[I and 2) IA and ID 4KV normal buses de-energized 1. Voltage <110.4 VDC on DC buses 1-1 and 1 1.

I Ops %personnel 'report LI-IRC-480, or 3 for >15 minutes if train A is the priority for >15 minutes

1. UNPLANNED Loss of RIIR or CCR or LI-IRC-482C RCS level instrumentation in train 5 "RPRW 5 the Control Room indicates a level drop to 5',

6 6 5 2. Either diesel generator is supplying power to 2. Voltage <110.4 VDC on DC buses 1-2 and I less than 14 5 inches 6 6 4 for >15 minutes if train B is the priority its respective emergency bus

2. [aorb orcJ De De train

a. Core exit thermocouples (CETC) (if 2. Ops personnel report inability to make-up Fuel Fuel available) indicate the temperature has RCS inventory increased >I1OF

b. (WI RHR in service) RHR inlet temperature has increased >10 F

c. (w/o CETCs or RHR), loss has exceeded 15 minutes I I- _

I Revision 3

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSF9 by the 'EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A:fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards -' -'Ant CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. F )al protesting station operations or activities at the site. for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity ot (he affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric contained therein values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all ownei ,iontrolled areas classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary'to secondary Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function safety injection required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of environment. There are six CSFs. Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load, (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Reactor Trip, (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A.

The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTIONmust threaten to force interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e, TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason-of steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam inhalation or skin contact (e g , chlorine). )

generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressunzed.

UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED5 if it is not the FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints, received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other minimum dilution flow. minimum release times, maximum release rates, evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment (i e., within 15 minutes).

minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g, increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, protected area without authorization. scratches) should not be included.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA w'-h combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the fa LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger .. ,d the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance public health and safety by exposure to radiation level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

tp p EPP/I-la 11ý6,5`7,,;ý:FudHandlingi, Attachment 1 Criterion /Indicator Mode Criterion / Indicator IC I I - 11 Refer to Tab 7.1 Gaseous Effluents" I, Rejer to lab1.1 (aseous Jffluents" I

0 I

Refer to Tab 7.1 Gaseous Effluents" Refer to Tab 7.1 Gaseous Effluents" 0

CI)

INTENTIONALLY BLANK I',

C, - - - -- -

I CI)

CI)

Major damage to irradiated fuel;;or loss of i Inadvertent reactor criticality,

, I water level that has or will uncover irradiated, I. Nuclear instrumentati on indicate fuel outside the reactor vessel ntnnt tinI 1rt,,ed inenpA nrl*n tive startup rate I1 and 2] Una ii pallt te.Jttu stistanu u pJ sit

1. VALID Hi-Hi alarm on RM-RM-203 or RM RM-207 or RM-VS-103 A/B or RM-VS-104 0

3 MA/B t,, I 4 ALL

2. la orb] 5 a., Plant personnel report, damage of 6 irradiated fuel sufficient to rupture fuel rods "b. Plant'personnel repoit wafer level drop CI) has or will exceed available makeup capacity such that irradiated fuel will be "uncovered '- 1ýI "Referto Tab 6 2for In-vessel Uncovery ________ 4.

UNPLANNED loss of water level in spent fuel poolor reactor cavity or transfer canal with Not Applicable fuel remaining covered I

[I and2 and3] S

1. Plant persfonnel report 'water level drop in ALL spent fuel pool or reactor cavity, or transfer Rf canal S

2. VALID Hi-Hi alarm on RM-RM-203 or RM RM-207

3. Fuel remains covered with water

-'I.

Revision 33 Revision

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT,- GENERAL EMERGENCY, srT *'ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one ormore CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object'ejected, thrown, or launched towards a pla CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Potenti protesting station operations or activities at the site. for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity 6f the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric contained therein.

values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration) All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A:

been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function safety injection.

required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs" Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Hleat SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100 Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A.

The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

J! failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structure-, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA I by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of BVPS or one of its vendors The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to force interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e.,

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that 'S such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints, received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (I) an instrument channel check, or f2) to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).

minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the.continued operability or vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example thermocouple temperatures) damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, protected area without authorization. scratches) should not be included.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation 3 level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

TABLE 7-1k EPP/I-Ia 1 EFFLUENT RADIAITON MONITOR EAL'S Attachment

-I--

I[ eiv Efflu I '-Ts * - -

1 *Ir II Mode % a3ZUUa L AA %,11L

, Criterion / Indicator Criterion / Indicator, NOTE: The values below, if exceeded, indicate the need to perform the specified dose projection/assessment, as listed at the bottom of each column. If the assessment can not be completed within 15 minutes'(60 minutes per UE), the declarationshall be made based on the I

i EAB dose resulting from an actual or imminent rNot Applicable' VALID reading.

Release of gaseous radioactivity that exceeds 1000 the EAL' I mR TEDE or 5000 mR child thyroid CDE for the NOTE: These monitors have the ability to divert or terminate effluent flow. Ensure that a release is in progress priorto using actual or projected duration of the release r )M

[1 or 2 or 3] CoumI ColuIm 2 ColumnI1 Column 2 Solumn 3 Column 4

1. A VALID gas ,effluent rad monitor reading I fUE Alert Site General exceeds the values in Column 4 of Table 7-1 for I If a RWDA (Batch Release) is Applicable 2x the ODCM Limit 200x the ODCM Limit

>15 minutes, unless dose projections within this "* RM-ILW-104 7.06E+5 cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm time period confirms that the CRITERION is cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm

"* RM-ILW-116 n/a All NOT exceeded I ,

2. Field survey results indicate EAB dose >1000 mR

,I RM-1VS-101B (RBC Purge) 2.40E+03 2.86E+03 cpm cpm 2.40E+05 2.86E+05 cpm cpm n/a n/a cpm cpm n/a n/a cpm cpm z;

01-y' for the actual or projected duration of the RM-IVS-109 Channel 5 (RBC Purge)

" I"1 1 1.33E+04 cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm release RM-IVS-110 Channel 5 (RBC Purge) cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm

3. EPP dose projection results indicate EAB'dose "* RM-IGW-108B (GWDT) 7.86E+05

>1000 mR TEDE or >5000 mR child thyroid CDE RM-IGW-109 Channel 5 (GWDT) n/a cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm for the actual or proje~ted duration of the release' For All Other Unplanned Releases 2x the ODCM Limit 200x the ODCM Limit II 4

Q i1 EAB dose resulting from an actual or imminent Auxiliary Building Ventilation System release of gaseous radioactivity that exceeds 100 mR 1....Not Applicable, (also called Ventilation Vent)

TEDE or 500 mR child thyroid CDE for the actual or RM-IVS-101B 6.00E+03 cpm 60( E+05 cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm projected duration of the releise 2.94E+03 cpm 2.9e E+05 cpm 6 01E+05 cpm n/a cpm

[I or 2or231], -, , :,,.., RM-IVS-109 Channel 5 cpm n/a cpm 6 69E1+01 cpm 6 6c9E+02 cpm RM-IVS-109 Channel 7 n/a

1. A VALID gas effluent rad monitor reading RM-IVS-109 Channel 9 n/a cpin n/a cpm n/a cpm 1.32E+01 cpm exceeds the values in Column 3 of Table' 7-1 for RM-IVS-I 11 HR (SA-9) n/a cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm

>15 miriutis, unless dose projections within this RM-IVS-Ill LR (SA-10) n/a cpm n/a cpm 7.32E3+03 cpm 7.32E+04 cpm time period confirms that,the CRITERION, is cpm All NOT exceededI .....

Reactor Building/SLCRS Vent System

2. Field survey results indicate EAB dose >100 mR of the (also called Elevated Release)

P1-y'for the actual or projected 'duration '1 ýn/a cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm re le ase "I I I " 1 11 1 11 1 RM-IVS-107B 1.29E+04 cpm 6.76E+03 cpm 6.7 )E+05 cpm 9.08E+05 cpm n/a cpm

3. EPP, dose projection results indicate EAB dose RM-IVS-1 10 Channel 5 RM-1VS-110 Channel 7 n/a cpm n/a cpm 7.98E+01 cpm 7.98E3+02 cpm

>100 mR TEDE or >500 mR child thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release RM-IVS-1 0 Channel 9 n/a cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm 2.28E+02 cpm RM-IVS-112 HR (SA-9) n/a cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm 1.53E+01 cpm RM-IVS-112 LR(SA-10) n/a cpm n/a cpm 1.19E+04 cpm 1.19E+05 cpm Any, UNPLANNED, release of liquid radioactivity Any UNPLANNED release of gaseous radioactivity K

i Specification that exceeds 200 times Technical ,Specifications that exceeds 200 times Technical Limit for 15 6.8.6a/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Limit for 15 Gaseous Waste/Process Vent System 6.8.6a/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual minutes n/a cpm n/a cpm

' RM-IGW-108B n/a cpm n/a cpm minutes '[ or21 n/a cpm RM-IGW-109 Channel 5 n/a cpmrn/a cpm n/a cpm I[ orr2or 1 , ," I I, n/a cpm I. 6a4i monitor reading 1. A VALID liquid effluent rad monitor reading RM-IGW-109 Channel 7 4.80E+03 cpm 4 80E1+05 cpm 7.90E+05 cpm cpm N

A VALID gas effluent exceeds the values in Column 2 of Table 7-1 for RM-IGW-109 Channel 9 n/a cpm n/a cpm 1.83E+04 cpm 1.83E1+05

,exceeds thle values in Column 2 of Table 7-1 for 1.59E+05 cpm

>15 minutes, unless dose projections within this RM-IGW-I 10 HR (SA-9) n/a cpm n/a cpm 1.59E+04 cpm All >15 minutes,'u'nless dose projections within this All' n/a cpm time penod confirms that the CRITERION is RM-IGW-10LR(SA-l0) n/a cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm time pieriod confirms that the CRITERION is t4 NOT exceeded N O T exc ee ded . .. ..1,

2. Sample results exceed 200 times the Technical Main Steam Reliefs

2. Field survey results indicate >10 mR/hr Ii-' at the RM-IMS-101 n/a cpm n/a cpm n/a cpin 8.00E+01 cpm Specification 6 8 6a/Offsite Dose Calculation EAB for >15 minutes Manual Limit for an unmonitored release of liquid

3. EPP dose projection results indicate EAB dose >10 radioactivity >1!5 minutes in duration II* - Liquid Effluent Pathways 7.06E+5 cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm mR TEDE for the duration of the release

RM-ILW-104 RM-ILW-116 n/a cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm 5.14E+04 cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm

_________ I RM-IRW-100 T

Any UNPLANNED release of gaseous radioactivity Any UNPLANNED release of liquid radioactivity to cpm In/a cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm the environment that exceeds 2 times Technical

RM-IDA-100 2.44E+04 that exceeds 2 times Technical , Specification Specification 6.8.6a/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual 6.8.6a/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Limit for 60 Limit for 60 minutes 15 minutes 15 minutes 15 minutes !-.

minutesi ,I, Minimum Release Duration 60 minutes

[1 or2or3] [I or2]

I. A VALID liquid effluent rad monitor reading Assessment Method for Gaseous Release l/2-HPP-03.06 012 l/2-HPP-03.06.012 EPP/IP-2 6.x EPP/IP-2.6.x H:

1. A .VALID, gas effluent rad, monitor reading exceeds the values in Column 1 of Table 7-1 for "exceeds the values in Column 1 of Table 7-1 for I/2-HPP-03.06 013 1/2-HPP-03.06.013 All >60 minutes, unless dose projections within this All >60 minutes, unless dose projections within this EPP/IP-2.6.x erJ time period confirms that the CRITERION is time period confirms' that the CRITERION is NOT exceeded NOT exceeded Assessment Method for Liquid Release EPP/lP-2.7 EPP/IP-2.7

2. Sample, results exceed 2, times Technical EPP/IP-2.7.1 EPP/IP-2.7.1

2. Field survey results indicate >0 1 mR/hr 03- at the Specification 6 8 6a/Offsite Dose Calculation EAB for >60 minutes Manual Limit for an unmonitored release of liquid EPP dose projection results indicate EAB dose radioactivity >60 minutes in duration

>0 1 mR TEDE for the duration of the release

1. I Revision 3 I I

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS 0 ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERALý EMERGENCY, SITE - ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused ,explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejecjted, thrown, or launched towards a plant CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently structtre. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Potential protesting station operations or activities at the site. for damage 'is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or r'eliability of safety equipment Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric contained therein.

I values which define that condition (i e, the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary io secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function safety injection required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the or more of the following- (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of BVPS or one of its vendors The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to force.

interrupt normal plant operations to be considered FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressunzed. inhalation or skin contact (e g, chlorine)

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with large quantities of smoke and heat are observed. abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, Discharge Authorization (R\VDA). Implicit in this definition are procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releAses that conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g, alarm setpoints, received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this and/or discharge of incorrect tank) protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., witfiin 15 miriutes).

minutes from identification of the "Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE:

Damage to equipment or structure that is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g, increasing trend in reactor sufficient to or analyses. Damage is cause concern regarding the continued operability or vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability thermocouple temperatures). of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example damage includes:' deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, protected area %.ithout authorization. scratches) should not be included.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustible gases .ill not explode due to ignition.

VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, 'the failure, 3

destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the LCO, LIMITINGCONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance public health and safety by exposure to radiation level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

l

q I , r EPP/I-la1 Attachment Table 7-2

Areas Associated With EAL 7.3 C- I 73 I Mode,

'R I

I, I

1, g _ ....

Criterion / Indicator,......

Refer to Tab)I "Fission ProductBarmer Matrix" or Tab M So ejer_

eCriterion/Indicator Seer to Tab 7.1

1. uaeu to la :pe

-GaseousEffluents ILOCATION IINDICATOR!

READING 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" Chem Sample Panel (735' PAB) RM-RM-212 >100 mR/hr general area

'I

>100 mR/hr general area I PASS Sample Pnl (735' PAB) Survey Results Manual Valve Chg. Pump Survey Results >100 mR/hr general area Discharge (722' PAB)

Safeguards 752' Valves IHY-110. Survey Results >100 mR/hr general area IHY- 11, 1HY-196, IHY-197 767' PAB SA9/SAI0 Gas Monitors Survey Results >100 mR/hr general area 752' PAB SPING Monitor RM-RM-210 >100 mR/hr general area 752' Safeguards Valves IRS-157, Survey Results >100 mR/hr general area IRS- 159 1 735' West Cable Vault Valves, Survey Results >100 mR/hr general area IIA-90, IHY-101, IHY-102, IHY-103, IHY-104 1 4 Refer to Tab 7 1 *Ciaseous tjjtuents 735' Safeguards (IQSS, AFW) Survey Results >100 mR/hr general area Refer to Tab)I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix'"or Tab Refer to Tab 7 1 "'GaseousEffluents" 7 1 "Gaseous Effluents" Main Steam Valve Room (752' Survey Results >100 mR/hr general area Safeguards)

A Penetrations (722' Safeguards) Survey Results >5 R/hr general area East Cable Vault (735' Safeguards) Survey Results >100 mR/hr general area I ,ý I Normal 4kV Switchgear Survey Results >100 mR/hr general area 0 Process Instrm. Room Survey Results >100 mR/hr general area AE/DF Switchgear Survey Results >100 mR/hr general area

-. ; Irl I I I EDG 1-1, 1-2 Survey Results >100 mR/hr general area Q

{,

1' i Major damage to irradiated fuel; or loss of water I

UNPLANNED increases in radiation levels within the level that has or will uncover Irradiated fuel outside, facility that impedes safe operations or establishment I

the reactor vessel or maintenance of cold shutdown [1 and 21

[1 or 2]

1. VALID Mh-Hi alarm on RM-RM-203 or RM-RM

1. VALID area radiation monitor readings pr survey 207 or RM-VS-103 A/B or RM-VS-104 A/B results exceed 15 mR/hr in the Control Room or PAF (on U2 DRMS) for >15 minutes 2. [a orb]

2.; faandb] a. Plant personnel report damage of irradiated fuel Figure 7-A L.

sufficient to rupture fuel rods '

EXCLUSION AREA All a. VALID area radiation mmonitor readings or All b. Plant personnel report water level drop has or BOUNDARY survey results exceed values listed in Table will exceed available makeup capacity such 7-2 11 . .. .I I that irradiated fuel will be uncovered

b. Accessa restrictions impede operation of systems necessary, for safe operation or the Refer to Tab 6 "Shutdown Systems" for In-vessel ability to establish or maintain cold shutdown Uncovery See Note Below I

T Ii UNPLANNED loss of water level in spent fuel pool or UNPLANNED Increase in radiation levels within the reactor cavity or transfer canal with fuel remaining facilityI , - I covered

1. VALID area radiation monitor readings increase

[1 and 2 and 3] R by a factor of 1000 over n6rmial levels for >15 I 1. Plant personnel report water level drop in spent minutes All fuel pool or reactor cavity, or transfer canal R:

2. VALID Hi-Hi alarm on RM-RM-203 or RM-RM Note: In either the UE or ALERT EAL the ED must ALL determine the cause of increase in radiation levels and 207 or review other CRITERIAIINDICA TORS for applicability(e g, a dose rate of.15 mR/hr in the Control Fuel remains covered with water 3.

Room could be caused by a release associated with a more significantevent)

Revislofi 33

.1 Revislofi

DEFINITIONS/A CRONYMS ALERT; UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Potential protesting station operations or activities at the site. for damage is sufficient io cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric contained therein.

values which define that condition (i e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i e., determination that the The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these RED PATh: Monitonng of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of r indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function safety injection required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load, (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100 Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A.

The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of BVPS or one of its vendors The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to force.

interrupt normal plant operations to be considered FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. inhalation or skin contact (e g, chlorine).

UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke

such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with large quantities of smoke and heat are observed. abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s): Ar. available via instrumentation, calculations, Discharge Authorization .,(RWDA). Implicit in this definition are procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints, received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy, is removed. Implicit in reduciion in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e, within 15'minutes).

minutes from identification of the'Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.

improvement in the applicable parameters (e g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern Damage is regarding the continued operability or vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e g., paint chipping, protected area without authorization. scratches) should not be included.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure,

--I LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance public health and safety by exposure to radiation 4Level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

EPP/I-lb Unit 2 A5.735B "RECOGNITION AND CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS CONTROLLED Revision 3 BVPS UNIT 2 -- --- j

"EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 2 -

EFFECTIVE INDEX Issue 8 Rev. 0 OSC Approved 3-12-87 1 OSC Approved 8-13-87 2 OSC Approved 10-8-87 3 OSC Approved 2-9-88 4 OSC Approved 2-9-89 5 Non-Safety Related 3-15-89 6 OSC Approved 4-18-89 7 OSC Approved 4-12-90 Issue 9 Rev. 0 Non-Intent Revision 10-9-90 1 OSC Approved 4-4-91 2 Non-Intent Revision 12-29-92 3 OSC Approved 1-27-93 Rev. 5 OSC Approved 12-9-93 6 OSC Approved 10-7-94 7 OSC Approved 7-22-98 8 Non-Intent Revision 12-31-99 Rev. 0 OSC Approved 4-17-01 Rev. 1 Non-Intent Revision 12-12-01 Rev. 2 Simple Change 8-28-02 Rev. 3 Simple Change 11-8-02 Revision 3 i

EPIVImplementing Procedure EPP/I-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS A. Purpose B. References C. Responsibilities D. Action Levels/Precautions E. Procedure F. Final Condition G. Attachments Revision 3 ii

EPPJImplementing Procedure "EPP/I-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions S-Unit 2 A. PURPOSE 1.0 This procedure describes the immediate 'actions to beitaken to recognize and classify an emergency condition. . -

2.0 This procedure identifies the four emergency classificattions and emergency action levels.

3.0 Reporting requirements for non-emergency abnormal events are provided.

B. REFERENCES

,- -,-1.0 Beaver Valley Power Station"Emergency, Preparedness Plan and. Implementing

-Procedures. - .

2.0 Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix E.

3.0 NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Criteria for Preparation -and -Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants - , .. ..

4.0- Beaver Valley Power Station Opeirating Manual' 5.0 NUMARC/NESP-007, Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels .

6.0 ERS-SFL-91-04 1-REV 1 (U1/U2'Containffient Monitor Readings due to LOCA's with various Source Terms). r 7.0- Condition Report #992522

-8.0 Cdndition Report #991327-1 SJ9.0'1 Unit Tecluical Specficitirn -Amendment" 204 -and Unit 2 Technical Specification Amendment 101.

10.0 EPPOS #2 "EmergenfcyPreparednessi- Position (EPPOS) on'Timeliness of Classificationbof Emeigency Confditions".

11.0 NEI 99-02 "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline" 12.0, Condition Report #00-3939 Revision 3

- 1

EPP/Implementing Procedure ' EPP/I-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions '" Unit'2 13.0 Condition Report #99-1234 14.0 Condition Report #02-02125-02 ,

15.0 Calculation Package No. ERS-ATL-93-02i' 2 "

16.0 Calculation Package No. ERS-HHM:87-014 .

17.0 Calculation Package No. ERS-SFL-86-005 18.0 'Calculation Package No.' ERS-SFL-99-014 C. RESPONSIBILITY The Emergency Director (Shift Manager, until properly' relieved by a designated alternate) has the responsibility and authority for the performance- of the actions prescribed in this procedure.

D. ACTION LEVELS/PRECAUTIONS/GUIDANCE

",1.0 -ACTION LEVELS K

"1.1 An off-normal event has occurred. ' '

1.2 An action step in, a plant operating or. emergency operating procedure refers to this procedure for classification of the indicated plant condition. "-

"2.0 PRECAUTIONS 2.1 The EmergencyDirector must review all applicable EALs to ensure that the event is properly classified since a given INDICATOR may be associated with more than one CRITERION. A particular INDICATOR omitted from the fission product barrier matrix may be addressed as an event-based EAL in one of the other tabs. Event-based EALs may escalate to the fission product barrier matrix. The Emergency Director may need to consider related events (e.g., fire and explosion) or the possible consequences of the event (e.g., fire in an MCC resulting in loss of AC) in classifying an event. , .

2.2 Continued surveillance and assessment of plant conditions are necessary to ensure that the emergency classification is appropriately revised as conditions change, or as more definitive information is obtained.

2.3 If there is any doubt with regard to assessment of a particular EAL, the EAL Basis Document (i.e., Chapter 4 of the EPP) entry for that EAL can be reviewed. Classifications shall be consistent with the fundamental definitions of the four emergency classifications (tabulated in Tab 4.7).

Revision 3 2

EPPlImplementing Procedure EPPII-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 2

- 2.4- The Emergency Director .shall -take -whatever mitigative or restoration

. *. actions are necessary to protect public health and safety. The Emergency

- Director shall not reject courses of action solely on the basis that the action would result in escalation of the emergency classification.

3.0 GUIDANCE

.3.1 -Structure of the EALs I ::, : 3.1.1 There are two types'of Emergericy Action Levels included in this S: . .procedure:

3.1.1.1 Barrier-Based EALs: These EALs address conditions that represent potential losses, or losses, of one or more of the Fuel Clad, RCS, or Containment fission product

,-- - =bariers INDICATORs of these conditions include CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION status, fundamental indications such as subcooling or reactor vessel water

-level,- or auxiliary indications such as containment radiation monitor readings. Classifications are based on

- the number of barriers lost or potentially lost.

k_ 3.1.1.2 Event-Based EALs: These EALs address discrete

conditions, or events that are generally precursors to fission product barrier degradation, or are otherwise

.. , degradations in the level of safety of the plant. Events may be external (e.g., severe weather, earthquakes, loss of qoffsite -'power) internal (e.g., fires, explosions, instrumentation failure) or may involve radioactivity c releases..

3.1.21 The EALs ae grouped by 'recognition category as follows:

Tab 1 Fission Product Barrier Matrix Tab 2 System Degradation Tab 3 Loss of Power'

'Tab 4 "-Hazards and ED Judgement

-Tab 5 Destructii)e Phenomena Tab 6 -Shutdown Systems Degradation Tab 7 Radiological Revision 3 3

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions " Unit 2 3.1.3 Each of the EAL tabs includes one or more columns that address

, - one initiating condition, (e.g., fires). Each column provides EALs for each of the four emergency classifications, as applicable. A notation adjacent to each EAL identifies the plant operating mode(s) for which the EAL is applicable.

3.1.4 Each EAL is comprised of a CRITERION, printed in bold type, and one or more INDICATORs. The purpose of each is as follows:

3.1.4.1 CRITERION: identifies theeenierg~ncy condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration) All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the

. necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 S*-minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

3.1.4.2 INDICATOR:- is available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.),

operator knowledge of, plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from- plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Upon occurrence of one or more

- indicators, .- the Emergency Director performs an assessment against the criterion. Depending on the particular condition, this assessment may be as simple as a review of the criterion, an instrument channel check, or a detailed calculation as in the 'case of a radioactivity release.

3.1.4.3 Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control- Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

Revision 3 4

EPP/Implementing Procedure iEPP/I-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions ,Unit 2 3.1.4.4 The INDICATORs were selected with the objective of providing unambiguous guidance to assist with "assessment of'the CRITERION:- There may be other "INDICATORs not envisioned by the writers of this procedure that, 'in the judgment of the Emergency Director, correspond to the CRITERION. In these cases, the Emergency Directo-r should base the declaration on engineering judgment, using the supplied INDICATORs as examples of the severity of the condition.

S- _ ,'~

3.2 Common Plant C6hditiohs' 3.2.1 IF an evernt occurs such that both reactor units are affected, e.g.,

tornado, toxic gas offsite, etc., THEN the senior Shift Manager shall make'the,' appropriate classification and assume the role of

... *'Emergency' Director.- " -

3.2.2 -IF the common plani condition results in a higher emergency classification at one reactor unit, THEN the Shift Manager from

- that unit shall make 'the appropriate classification and assume the role of Emergency Director.

3.3 - Mode Applicability_

3.3.1 The plant olperating mode that existed at the time that the event occurred, prior toariy protective system or operator action initiated in response to the conrdition', iscompared to the mode applicability of the EALs.

3.3.2 IF an event occurs; and a low*er "6r higher plant operating mode is reached be-foree -the classification" "can be made, THEN the classificatiofnshall b6 based on'the 'mode that existed at the time that the event occurred.

3.3.3 The fissioniproductrbarrier matrix is applicable only to those events that occur at mode 4* or higher. An event that occurs in modes 5 or 6 "shall niotb be'classified using the fission product barrier matrix,

-even if mode 4 is entered due to subsequent heatup. In these cases,

'Tab' 6, Shutdown' Systems Degradation, shall be used for classificationi. m Revision 3 5

EPP/implementing Procedure "EPP/I-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions "Uunit 2 V

- - I 3.4 Transient Events .

3.4.1 For someý EALs -the existence of the event, without regard to duration, is sufficient to-warrant classification. In these cases, the appropriate emergency classification is declared as soon as the Emergency Director assessment concludes that the CRITERION is met.

3.4.2 *Some EALs specify a duration of occurrence. For these EALs the "classification is made when Emergency Director assessment concludes that the, specified duration is exceeded or will be exceeded (i.e., condition can not be reasonably rectified before the duration elapses), whichever is sooner.

3.4.3 IF a plant condition meeting an EAL CRITERION is rectified before "the specified duration time is exceeded, THEN the event is NOT classified by that EAL. Lower severity EALs, if any, shall be reviewed for possible applicability in these cases.

3.4.4 IF a ,plant condition meeting, an EAL CRITERION is NOT classified at the time of occurrence, but is identified well after the condition has occurred (e.g., as a result of routine log or record review) AND the condition no longer exists; THEN an emergency shall NOT be declared. However, reporting under 10 CFR 50.72 may be required. Such a condition could occur, for example, if a followup evaluation of an abnormal condition uncovers evidence that the condition was more severe than earlier believed.

3.4.5 IF an emergency classification was warranted, but the plant S..condition has been rectified (such that the CRITERION is no longer met) prior to declaration and notification, THEN the 1 applies:

following guidance 3.4.5.1 For transient events that would have been declared as UNUSUAL EVENTS,- no emergency is declared.

However, the event shall be reported to those local, state,

`,and Federal agencies :designated to receive the initial notification form. These agencies shall be told that the

-.. .UNUSUAL -EVENT, condition was rectified upon detection and no emergency is being declared.

K Revision 3 6

. EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions .-Unit 2 3.4.5.2 For transient events that would have been declared as an ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY, or GENERAL EMERGENCY,, the event shall be declared and the emergency response organization activated. The EAL

'CRITERIA for these 'events has been set at a threshold

-that Warrahts declaration even if the initiating condition has been rectified. Termination can occur when the "criteriaof EPP/IP-6.2, Termination of the Emergency and Recovery can be satisified.

3.5- Declaration Timing and Assessment, Emergency conditions shall be classified as soon -as,-the Emergency

Director of the INDICATORs shows that the CRITERION is

-ssessnent met. IF the EAL specifies a duration, THEN the event shall be declared as soon as it is determined thaet the cohditiori cinio'i be coirected within the specified tieriod. In -either case, the assessment time starts from the indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency

'Action Level (EAL) has beeii'exceeded."'- ,_

3.5.1 The assessment time islirnited to15 imiinutes, except as follows:

3.5.1:1- IF the EAL'spedifies a duration (e.g., release exceeds 2x TIS for. one hour),' THEN the6issessment time runs concurrently with the required duration AND is the same

.r length (e.g., in this example, one hour).

3.5.1.2 The assessment time'and any required duration are NOT aýdditive._

3.5.2 IF the assessment can~not be completed within the specified period, THEN the eient must be declared 'on the'basis of INDICATORs that cannot be reasonably discounted.

"-3.6 Bases 3.6.1 Chapter 4 of the BVPS EPP'pr6videsth&base* for these EAts.

The bases can be used for.'guidance t6 'ýissist "the Emergency Director in classifying events for which the classification is not

"- -immediately apparent. -'

Revision 3 7

EPPllmplementing Procedure Ei'P/I-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 2 .61

3. 7. Defined Terms.

"3.7.1 In the EALs, 'words written in bold uppercase letters are defined

'" ;* .Definitions terms havingof specific meanings as they relate to this procedure.

these termis" are provided on the reverse side of most pages in the EA.L section of this procedure. Such terms shall be interpreted as provided in the definitions.

E. PROCEDURE 1.0 DETERMINE OPERATING MODE THAT EXISTED AT THE TIME THAT THE EVENT OCCURRED PRIOR TO ANY PROTECTION SYSTEM OR OPERATOR ACTION INITIATED IN RESPONSE TO THE EVENT.

2.0 DETERMINE IF THE CONDITION- AFFECTS FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS AND, IF SO, PROCEED TO TAB 1..

2.1 IF the coiidition involves any of the fiowing AND the initial mode was 1-4 THEN proceed to' Tab 1 arid follow instructions provided AND continue with Step 2.2.

2.1.1 CSF status tree ORANGE PATH or RED PATH conditions "2.1.2 Core exit thermocouple readifigs above 729 F 2.1.3 Rleactor vessel full range water level less than 40% (no RCPs) 2.1'.4 Elevated RCS activity >300 p.Ci/gm 2.1.5 Elevated Containment High Range Area Radiation Monitor reading

-2.16 RCS Ieakrate large enough to require a 2nd charging pump 2.1.7 Loss of RCS subcooling 2.1.8 Steam Generator Tube Rupture 2.1.91. Containment bypass or loss of integrity 2.1.10 Rise in containment pressure or hydrogen concentration 2.2 Consider other related event-based EALs. IF other EALs are applicable, THEN perform Steps 3.0 and 4.0 if necessary. Otherwise, go to Step 5.0 3.0 CATEGORIZE THE EVENT INTO ONE OF THE INITIATING CONDITIONS AND LOCATE THE TAB.

-31Locate one of the EAL indices provided at the start of each tab.

3.2 Review the index to identify the tab that addresses the event that has occurred.

Revision 3 8

EPP/Implementing Procedure "EPP/I-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditionis - Unit 2 3.3 -Turnto the appropriate tab.-,

NOTE:

The assessment of an emergency condition shall be completed as soon as possible, and -within ,15 minutes of the occurance of one or more INDICATORs. IF -the -assessment cannot be completed within the specified, period, THEN the event -must be declared on the basis of INDICATORs that cannot be reasonably discounted.

- 'NOTE:'

IF the EL specifies a-duration-(e.g., release exceeds 2x TIS for one houi),

THEN the assessment time runs concurrently with the required duration AND is the same length.

4.0 ASSESS THE EVENT AND COMPARE TO THE EALS 4.1 Locate the EALfor the highest severity emergency classification that is applicabe for the initiating condition and operating mode 4.2 Review the INDICATORs and CRITERION for that EAL 4.3 IF the specified INDICATORs are not 6bserved, THEN:

4.3.1 Proceed to the next lower severity EAL and re-perform step 4.2

& 4.3.

4.3.2 IF none of the EALs for an initiating condition are met, THEN re perform steps 3.0 and 4.0 for related initiating conditions.

4.3.3 IF the actions-above do not identify-an applicable EAL, THEN

. review the observed conditions -against Tab 4.7, Hazards and Emergency Director Judgment.

"- '"" " * :

4.3.4" IF, aftertoperforming proceed step 6 0 * .the

'. ..-above,. no

. . EAL

. is.. identified,

" THEN 4.4 IF the specified INDICATORs are observed, THEN:M j6j 4.4.1 Perform necessary, assessments to validate the instrument readings

-"*anid/or confitrmreported observations.

Revision 3

~4 9

.. EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-lb

-Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 2 I

4.4.2 Initiate any sampling; inspections, or dose assessments specified by the EAL...

NOTE:

IF the CRITERION specifies an event or condition duration, THEN the classification shall be 'made is soon as the duration is exceeded, OR when it is apprenrtt'that the duration will be exceeded; whichever is earlier.- . ....

4.4.3 Compare the results of the assessments to the CRITERION'

. NOTE:

A given INDICATOR may- apply to more than one CRITERION.

The Emergency Director shall review other related EALs for "applicability .

-4.5 _E the assessment 'concludesý that-the" CRITIiON is met, THEN the classifid'ti6' shall be made. Proceed to Step 5.0 4.6 IF the'as'-essment concludes that the CRITERION is not met, THEN re perform steps 3.0 and 4.0 for other related initiating conditions as applicable.

"4.7 IF no classification results from the above, THEN proceed to step 6.0.

"NOTE The declaration of the emergency classification shall be made as soon as the Emergency Director has assessed that the EAL has been met OR will be met, AND within 15 minutes of occurance of the INDICATOR. Once

-' the emergency is classified, notifications to state and local governments shall be completed k,'itfiin 15minutes of'the declaration.

5.0 DECLARE THE EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND TRANSITION TO RESPONSE PROCEDURES 5.1 IF an UNUSUAL EVENT isdeclared, THEN proceed to EPP/[-2 5.2 IF an ALERT is delared, THEN proceed to EPP/I-3 5.3 IF a SITE AREA EMERGENCY is declared, THEN proceed to EPP/I-4 Revision 3 10

EPP/lmplementing Procedure EPP/I-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 2 5.4 IF a GENERAL EMERGENCY is declared, THEN proceed to EPPAI-5 NOTE The step below is implemented only if an emergency classification is NOT made. IF a classification is made, THEN the transition indicated in step 5.0 should have been made.

6.0 EVALUATE THE NEED FOR AND MAKE NON-EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS 6.1 IF the abnormal condition is reportable to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 and 1/2-ADM-2202, THEN perform the following:

6.1.1 Complete the NRC Reactor Plant Event Notification Worksheet (located on the Regulatory Affairs web page).

6.1.2 Notify First Energy Communications of the event and provide the information on the NRC Reactor Plant Event Notification Worksheet.

6.2 IF directed by station management, THEN make courtesy calls to the following state and local agencies on a timely basis consistent with normal working hours.

6.2.1 BCEMA 6.2.2 PEMA 6.2.3 CCEMA 6.2.4 HCOES F. FINAL CONDITIONS 1.0 For emergency events, the transition to the appropriate response procedure has been made and actions pursuant to that procedure are in progress.

2.0 For non-emergency events, required notifications have been completed.

G. ATTACHMENTS 1.0 Tabs for Classification of Emergency Conditions H. FIGURES 1.0 Figures are identified on the EAL indices Revision 3 11

EPP/1-Ib JI), , q Attachment I Modes: 1,2,3,4

.INSTRUCTIONS NOTE: An INDICATOR is considered to be MET if the stated threshold has, been, or is, reached or exceeded, on the basis of confirmed observation or VALID instrument readings. The Emergency Director must use judgement iw hen classifying parameters that may be transitory (e.g.,

containment pressure).

[NOTE: T/heINDICATOR 'should be considlered ,METif th~e

," parameteris indeterminate due to instrumen~ts tha: are notI available or'out of range and the existence of the conditioti can not be reasonablydiscounted. : "

SI. Potential LOSS NOtE: An INDICATOR is considered to be MET if in the RCS leak results in loss of Unisolable RCS leak that an additional judgement of the Emergency Director, the INDICATOR will RCS subcooling requires, charging pump be started 'be MET imminently (i e., within I to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months in the absence with letdown isolated. of a viable success path) The classification shall be made z

OR as soon as this determination iv made.

RCS leak! causes *safety injection actuation indicated by direct entry into EOP E-I 1 In the matrix to the left, review the LOSS INDICATORS in required byEOP E-0 each barrier column. If one or more INDICATORS are met, rQo check the LOSS block at the bottom of the column.

2. If no LOSS is identifieal foir a particular barrier, revicw the potential LOSS, INDICATORS fori that barrer., If one or more INDICATORS are met, check the potential LOSS block at the bottom of the bhrrier column.

3. Compare the blocks checked to the CRITERIA below and make the appropriate declaration.,

i . . . . . - . .

- .- 0;

,I -

1 ýiý Itl S GENERAL EMERGENCY LOSS of any Two (2) barriers and Potential loss of third barrier.

L 1

1

, .OR I. LOSS of all three (3) barriers.

i I L

SITE AREA EMERGENCY r1l h-r SSor Potential LOSS of any t',o (2) bar'riers. I L SS of one (1) barer and a Potential LOSS of a second barrier.

Jy LOSS r PotcntialALERT V ?itI I

L 'LOF"S of Fuel Clad barrier. V I "777"77 xAlt) LOSS o Potential LO-*-PtnilLSS'fR ['

LOSSofR-CS bider. ,z I., UNUSUAL EVENT LOSS or Potential Loss of CNMT barrier.

ff I SEEALSO EAL'S:

U *A 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation (RCS Specific Activity >ICO) 2.ý' RCS Unidentified or Preisure Boundry Leakage> 10 gpm.

2.6 RCS Identified Leakage > 25 gpm.

r47 r4 f

Revision 3

1 ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the E OPs indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plantti

._VILCVLITR DISTURBANCE: N1 A group of ten,(10) oror more me pros-ilnl . structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Potentialt.

protesting station operations or activities at the site.* esn~oety~~d ttoopainorcist eiuf~int~as 6 T di i~n~it i th s. affected structure or the bperability- or reliability of safety equipment

Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric contained therein.

o . al u es_ w hi ch d efi ne t hat_co nd it ion _(i.e.,_th _b asis of zt he -dec larati on )_ A U = _ ._ _ _ __.

'I l-asific-ations are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the, n. E. R.E n. aw n e a

'condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has within the securty penmeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

seen met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of' indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency' RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary "Alction Level (EAL) has been exceeded, leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function - safety injection.

required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the ink, Vessel There

-nvironment. Integrity are sixc(Pressfirized CSFs: Subcriticality, Thermal Core Cooling.

Shock), Heat Integrity SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of n nk, messelnt egritye (resiS sSu briThealty,ted Shoc C, oin tg rety plant equipm ent w ith the inteni to render the equipm ent unavailable.

Containment)and Inventory (RCS).

C NAE A SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one hXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the or more of the following- (1) Automatic tdrbine runback >25% thermal hVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3)

n population doses exceeding the criteria of 10'CFR Part 100. Refer to Reactororip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation g OSION-A. rThe SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in thc PLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic"'immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

aoilure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to

f -

potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by, I a body of workers to EXTORTION: An ittempt to cause an action 'at the station by threat of' or one of its vendors.enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt' force.

, - normal pmant operations to oe considered.

".AULTED: (Steam'Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to lfe or heath b' reason of 4team or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam TInhAlatonorsk tati(e agehouneb a

-< generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. event 'e actionn

, CobustionaSources characterized by heat and light. UNPLANNED: 'An event 'or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the of smoke expected reiult of normal operations, testing, or maintertance. Events that K) 4uch as slipping drive belts or oovrheated vhaeelcralqup electrical equipment ntdnodo not result in corrective or mitigative actions'being taken ih accordance with onstitute fires. Observation of flamie is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed. a 1IOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of.radioactivity is cnsure that demand, will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste ravailable "via i Discharge 'Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are Nrocedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, operator itc.), knowledge of plantios unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that onditions (pressure, temperatures,'etc.) in the Control Room, or reports exceed a condion specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints, eceived from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates,

,idence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

rotocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15, VALID:, An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) orf sufficient indications being available- when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument chainnel check, or (2) tb Control Room Operators that an' Emergency Action Level (EAL) has "indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation 1een exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, I'"

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in rduction k in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e.', within 15 minutes).

fIminutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree'RED VISIIiLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily P"ATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is

.improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, INTRUSION/INTRUDER:' Suspected hostile individual present in a- rupture, cracking, paint blistering.

Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, p.rotected area without authorizatio, scratches) should not be included.

IOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED, AREA which cbmbustible gases will not explode due to ignition. contains 'equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, I1CO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance public health and safety by exposure to radiation j11vel for equipment required for safe shutdown.

EPPII-lb

2. ' osso unto 2 'I P o c o 2A Ful ld egadton At l, Mode Criterion / Indicator Mode Criterion / Indicator Mode Criterion / Indicator Mode

.I.--- i Criterion

.. .... .... . Indicator Reactor power >5% after VALID trip .Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Inability to cool the core I signal(s) and loss of core cooling capability Matrix"

'Matrix" and Tab 7 "RadiologicalEffluents? [I or 21

1. Actions of FR-C.1 (RED PATH) are [I and 21 IINEFFECTIVE I. Ops personnel report FR-S.I has been,

2. [aandb] . entered and subsequent actions do NOT I

a, Three max core exit thermocouples 1 result in reduction of power to <5% and 2 2 decreasing I

>1200 F, or three max core exit 3 2; [aorb]

thermocouples >729 F with NO RCPs 4 a . Ops personnel report CSF status tree running and RVLIS full range level

<40% RED PATH terminus exists for core

b. Actions taken have NOT resulted in a cooling or heat sink rising trend in RVLIS full range level b. Three max core exit thermocouples or a dropping trend in core exit >1200 F; or three max core exit 2

thermocouple temperatures within 15 thermocouples >729 F with NO RCPs minutes of initiation of restoration running and RVLIS full range level actions <40% ii

1- Ii Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Inability to monitor a SIGNIFICANT Loss of function needed to achieve or Reactor trip failure after VALID Trip TRANSIENT in progress

[I and2 and3]

maintain hot shutdown

[I or2]

signal(s) with reactor power >5% and attempts to cause a manual trip from the Matrix" 0

I. Ops'personnel report a CSF status tree control room are unsuccessful.

1. Loss of most (>75%) annunciators or RED PATH terminus for core cooling or indications heat sink exists 1. Ops personnel report FR-S.1 has been I 1 entered and manual reactor trip from

2. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT -in 2. Three max core exit thermocouples >1200 2 1 2 control room did NOT result in reduction progress F; or three max core exit thermocouples 3 2 >729 F with NO RCPs running and of power to <5% and decreasing 4 3 RVLIS full range level <40%

3. Inability to directly monitor any of the following CSFs: 4 Also Refer to Tab 2.3 "Failure of Reactor Subcriticality Vessel Integrity Protection" and Tab I "Fission 'Product Core Cooling Containment BarrierMatrix"_

1Heat Sink i I i ii Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier UNPLANNED loss of most annunciators or Complete loss of function needed to'achieve Automatic reactor trip did not occur after indications for >15 minutes with either a Cold Shutdown when Shutdown required by VALID trip signal and manual trip from Matrix"

'SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress or Tech Specs control room was successful a loss of non-alarming compensatory [I and2 and 31 [1 and 2]

indications

[I and 2 and31 I. Loss of decay heat removal capability I. VALID reactor trip signal received or I

1 (RHR, CCR, or RPRW) / (RHS, CCP, required.

2 I. UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%) 2 1 SWS) 3, annunciators or indications for , >15 3 2 2. Manual reactor trip from control room 4, minutes 4 2. Inability to remove heat via the condenser was successful and power is <5% and

2. SM judgement that additional personnel decreasing (beyond normal shift complement) are 3. Shutdown to mode 5 required by T/S required to monitor the safe operation of the unit

3. [a orb]

a. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in

. progress i -- -

Reactor coolant system specific activity

b. Loss of SPDS Not Applicable exceeds LCO (refer to ,BVPS technical i

UNPLANNED loss of most annunciators or --

l* UNPLANNED Loss of communications specification 3.4.8) indications for >15 minutes [I or 21I 1 ._I I V1 or 21

[I and 21

1. In-plant [a and b and c] I. VALID high alarm on 2CHS-RQ1OIA/B 1

2 I. UNPLANNED loss of' most (>75%)

annunciators or, indications for >15 minuies' ALL

a. UNPLANNED Loss of All Pax Phones

b. UNPLANNED Loss of All Gaitronics (PagetParty),'

A 2 1

[3051 ] reactor coolant letdown monitor

2. Radiochemistry analysis exceeds Technical Specification 3.4.8 3 2.-' SM judgement that additional personnel c. UNPLANNED Loss of All Radios 3,:

(beyond normal shift complement) are (Handie-Talkies) 4, 4

required to monitor the safe operation of 5

2. Offsite [a and b and ci the unit

a. UNPLANNED Loss of ENS

b. UNPLANNED Loss of Bell Lines

c. UNPLANNED Loss of Radios to I Offsite Revision 3

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOP wtfiih REA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

OMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PRIOJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant "CIVILDISTURBANCE:_group.o.ten.(10).or.more s structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Potentialcj CIILDSTRBNE:A_______ ,1),rmoe esosviolently__via protesting station operationsproestngtatongpertios ractiviti henito ee.n for-damage-is-sufficient to-eauseconeem-regarding'the-intgrit o--th- .

or activities at the site.

affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment t

ach CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric contained therein.

'values which-define-that-condition (i.e.._the-basis of thedeclaration)-All-.. . . .

classifications are based on an assessment (i e., determination that the wtnte curityprie.tr fenc masshown on e4-A.

6*ondition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has within the secunty penmeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which tassessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency RUPTURED: (Steam' Generator) Existence of primary to secondary Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

I I leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and RIICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function safety injection.

required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the SABOTAGE: Deliberate damagd, Imis-alignment, or mis-operation of

'nvironment. There are six CSFs: Subcntieality, Core Cooling Heat pink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Iniegrity plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

(Containment)and Inventory (RCS) 1, SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% therinal n13VPS units beyond population doses which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100.'Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection S*,stem Activation Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

6ailure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to Hotbntially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A xork stoppage within the PROTECTEDIAREA by a body of workers to enforca compliance with demands made on the BVPS "6XTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt iorce.

normal plant operations to be considered.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e.,

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of

ýteam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

"generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

UNPLANNED:' An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the "FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke expected result of normal operations,'testing, or maintenance. Events that

' uch as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not result in corrective or mitigative action's being taken in accordance with

'onstitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

iarge quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is hnsure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s): Are available -via instrumentation, calculations, Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints,

ýonditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2)

'io Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or,(3) by direct observation

'been exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability,

'INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's. accuracy is removed. Implicit in reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely' asse~smnt (i.e., within 15 minutes).

mninutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily PATH, TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability, or vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. - Example thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a scratches) should not be included.

'jrotected area without authorization.

ILOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure,

- I LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the

- the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance public health and safety by exposure to radiation level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

EPP/I-Ib

.A Att I I -,

-0 RCSUn'dentfie

ý"2. Leaa'g 2. R S de-rid e'ka' A *i i Mode Criterion / ..........

Indicator Mkod]Criterion/Indicator7____

Mode Criterion / Indicator 'Mode I Criterion / Indicator - - - -- - -- -- -

I ........... ______________________

EQ Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Not Applicable Not Applicable Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Matrix" i

Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Not Applicable Not Applicable "Matrix" Matrix":

.I-i I Refer to Tab, I "Fission Product Barrier Refer to Tab 41 "Fission Product Bamer Refer to Tab 2.2, "Loss of Function" Not Applicable Matrix", Matrix" '

i Identified RCS leakage >25 GPM Safety Limit Has Been Exceeded Unidentified or pressure boundary RCS Inability to Reach Required Shutdown Mode leakage >10 GPM Within Technical Specification Time Limits [I or 21

1. Identified RCS leakage (as defined by [1 and 2]

Technical Specifications) >25 GPM as I. Technical Specification 2.1.1 specifies the 00 I. Unidentified or pressure boundary leakage (as defined by Technical Specifications) indicated below [a orb]

4-ý I. A Technical Specification action safety limits for the reactor core which are 'eli AO

>10 GPM as indicated below [a orb] statement, requiring a mode reduction, has applicable in Modes I and 2.

I 1 a. OST 2.6.2 or 2.6.2A Results ' 1 been entered 1

" 2 2 b. 2 2 2. Technical Specification 2.1.2 specifies the

a. OST 2.6.2A results UNPLANNED level rise in excess of 3 3 3 safety limit for the Reactor Coolant System 25 GPM total into PRT, 2. The unit has NOT been placed in the 4 4' 4t pressure which is applicable in Modes 1, 2, If)

b. With RCS temp. and PZR level stable, 2DGS-TK-21, and 2DGS-TK-22 4 required mode within the time prescribed 5* VCT level dropping at a rate >10 5* by the action statement 5' 3,4 and 5.

GPM (>1%/min indicated on 2CHS "*App!ies to Mode 5 if RCS Pressurized eRi LI-I15 with no VCT makeup in progress)

Applies to Mode 5 ifRCS Pressurized I -'-a Revision 3 i

t

! DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS i ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EbPiwhrch LREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant t I -,\

"CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A roup often (10) or more persons violently structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Potential "protesting station operations or activities at the site. fordamagens -sufficient-to-cause concern regarding-the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment i-ach CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric

ýaiewihdfn contained therein.

hn ndtn ; l

==I- Sy s wn_'_

iU_)t,.)-.e.,,Je- J ln U Le-aeclarauton)-All

.Th-*pPROTE C-TED*AREA-.encompasse.all-mwner-cntrolled . .

Slassitications are based on an assessment (i.e., detenmination that the within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

ondition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency

ý6tion Level (EAL) has been exceeded. RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and bRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function safety injection.

1equired to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the nvironment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling. Heat SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage; mis-alignment, or mis-operation of

"§mink, Vessel Indegrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

SContainment) and Inventory (RCS).

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal

"]3VPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A.

The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the

+EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

,failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS

""XTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of or one of its vendors. The STRIkE ACTION must threaten to intei'iip.t.

force.

normal plant operations to be considered.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e.,

steam or feed line ruptuire) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life br health by reasori of generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the

"-Auch as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with S6nstitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if Ilarge quantities of smoke and heat are observed abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED IIOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is

ýnsure that demands wi!l be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste i

INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releaseg that conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints, received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this and/or discharge of incorrect tank). '

protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID rmnutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (I) an instrument channel check, or (2) t6 Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).

irinutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE:, Damage to equipment or structure that is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements,- testing, or analyses. Damage is improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor !sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or bessel water level (RVLIS 'full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example thermocouple temperatures). " damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, INTRUSION/INTRUDER: rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization. scratches) should not be included.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, O, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

C, 11 S:urie~iur - I L in EPP/I-lb I Mode Criterion / ----------

Indicator Mode Criterion I Indicator Attachment 1' I ----------- Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Matrix" I,

0 2

I -- .

Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Matrix" 0r

'4

' I.-.

A CI) i

p TablW! 2-1 Turbine failure generated missiles cause Refer to Tab I "Fission, Product Barrier penetration of a missile shield wall of any Matrix" Plant Areas Associated With Shield Wall aiea containing safety related equipment Penetration EAL

1. Plant personnel report missiles' generated by turbine failure with casing penetration Diesel Generator Bldg. Service Bldg 745' and 760' also results in a through-wall penetration Electrical Switchgear 730' Containment 1 of a missile shield wall listed in Table 2-1 Main Steam Valve Room Primary Aux. Building 2

3 2FWE-TK210 I - - --

Turbine failure results in casing penetration UNPLANNED rapid depressurization of the Main Steam System resulting in a rapid RCS I., Plant personnel report a turbine failure cooldown Pnd Safety Injection actuation "NEI which results in penetration of the turbine [I and 2]

casing or damage to main generator seals with evidence of significant hydrogen or)r 1. Ops personnel ,, report rapid 1 seal oil leakage *1 depressurization of Main Steam System, 2 *, 2 that causes SLI (<500 psig) 3 3 4 2. Ops personnel report Safety Injection has actuated 4

Revision 3.

i

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS rlllJlll UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE l~ll ORANGE'PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOP; which 4ERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

kfused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant

_'_ln*_,lkll_*lll~ U NCAgpf (0 rostructure._The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Potential 11.

stati nCoperati station operations or rcptofthen activities at the (10)irtmore.

site. persons ,,for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the llIl affected structure or the operability oi reliability of safety equipment ld

[ERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric b contained therein. -

S..... . . aluesyhic .ueiinetnatconattion,(I.e.:ý:lhe.basts.-ol.thedectaration)=AiI I

dbi au . ... .. -. - n..

classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the ehi-KUPR.LrD AhA encompasses all owner controlled areas within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

tondition is VALID) by the Emergency Director'that the CRITERION has 6een met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these RED PATH: Monitorine of one or more CSFs by the EOPs -which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency RUPTURED: " (Steam Generator): Existence of primary to secondary Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function safety injection.

required to prevent significant ielease of core radioactivity to the SABOTAGE: Delibcrate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation' of "ehvironment. There are six CSFs:' Subcriticality, Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Core Shock),Cooling, Heat Integrity plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unav6lable.'

SContainment) and Inventory (RCS).

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A-boundary surrounding the or more of the following: (I) Automatic turbine runback 525% thermal BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Reactor Trip, (4) Safuty Injection System Activation F~igure 7-A. The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the' EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

Tailure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt force normal plant operations to be considered FAULTED:,(Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e, TOXIC GAS: A gas that i; dangerous to lfe br health by reason of steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

S RbUNPLANNED:

IRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke inhalation or skin contact (e g., chlorine).

An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance: Events that 0

s.ich as slipping drive belts'or overheated electrical equipment do not result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in acdordance with t donstitute fires..-Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if lrge

! quantities of smoke and heat are observed abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is

-- ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste 4Are available via instrumentation, calculations, Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are INDICA tr(s.o unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints, onditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum releasetrates, r.eeived from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other and/ormdilutiofoin imea te, xmals te e'vidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this r discharge ofincorret tank).

pIrotocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered-to be VALID inimutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) i6 Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, iNthe IN EF FE CT IVE : The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a t i condition's ei i i ni existence, h e d forrtthemreport's l s e accuracy s e t( . is. removed.

i h n I Implicit i u e ) in rýduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).

ninutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without, measurements, testing, or analyses. : Damage is improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or v'essel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, UID rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, INTRUSION/IN4TRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a scratches) should not be included.

protected area without authorization.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which ctmbustible gases will not explode due to ignition. contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, IOIMOdestruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in pulchatansfeybexoreordiin tlhe BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimunm functional-performance public health and safety by exposure to radiation level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

Fl

EPP/I-lb C)l , 3.gLss IofAC S 9on 303 Los f D Pwe Attachment 1 Mole Criterion / Indicator Mo-d-eCriterion / Indicator Mode Criterion I Indicator 9'

Prolonged loss of offsite and onsite, AC Refer to Tab 6 "Shutdown System Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" power Degradation" and Tab 2.2 "Loss of Function", and Tab 6.1 "Loss of Shutdown Systems" f[Iand21

1. AE and DF 4KV emergency buses NOT ' I energized from Unit 2 sources for >15 I 2 2.

minutes

[a orb orcJ

¥ 3 a. Ops personnel report CSF status tree 4 RED PATH or ORANGE PATH terminus exists for core cooling 0

b. Restoration of either AE or DF 4KV emergency bus is NOT likely from any source within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months of loss

c. Three max core exit thermocouples 0

>1200 F or three max core exit thermocouples >729 F with no RCPs Srunning and RVLIS full range <40% , Loss of all vital DC power for >15 minutes

,77-ý Loss of offsite and onsite AC power for >15 Refer to Tab 6 "Shutdown System I. Voltage <1104 VDC on DC buses 2-1 minutes Degradation" and 2-2 and 2-3 and_2-4 for>]15 minutes

1. AE and DF 4KV emergency buses NOT 1 Also Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier energized from Unit 2 sources for >15 2 Matrix", Tab 2.2 "Loss of Function"; and Tab minutes 3 2.1 "Loss of hIstrumentation" and Tab 6.1 4 "Loss of Shutdown Systems" 0

2 3

4ý Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier

+

AC power to emergency buses reduced to a UNPLANNED loss of offsite and onsite. AC Matrix", Tab 2.2 ','Loss of Function'", and Tab single source of power such tliat any 2.1 "Loss of Instrt,mentation" and Tab 6.1 power for >15 minutes "Loss of Shutdown Systems" additional failure will result in the de energization of both buses 1. AE and DF 4KV emergency buses NOT

[1 and 21 energized from Unit 2 sources for >15 minutes

1. Either AE or-DF 4KV emergency bus is de-energized for >15 minutes 5 Also Refer[ to Tab 6 "Shutdown System 2 6 Degradation" 3 2. The energized AE or DF 4KV emergency bus has only one source of power

[a orb] fuel

a. Emergency diesel generator

b. 2A or 2D 4KV normal bus UNPLANNED loss of one train of DC power 6' Loss of offsite power for >15 minutes

[1 and 21

1. 2A and 2D 4KV normal energized for >1I5 minutes buses de UNPLANNED loss of offsite power for >15 minutes!1) and 21 I. 2A, and 2D 4KV normal energized for >15 minutes buses de 1 for >15 minutes

[1 or 21

1. Voltage <110.4 VDC on DC Buses 2-1 and 2-3 for >15 minutes U.'

2

2. 'Each diesel generator is supplying power 5 3 2. Voltage <110.4 VDC on DC buses 2-2 and

2. Either diesel generator is supplying power 2 to its respective emergency bus 6 , to its respective emergency bus - ,I 4 2-4 for>15 minutes 3 De 4 fuel Refer to Tab 6.4 "Loss of DC (Shutdonn)" for modes 5, 6, and defueled Revision 3

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS LERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which.

REA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

OMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant

'.L DISTURBANCE:..A rotesti~ng station operations orgroup of ten activities (10)site.

at the or more persons e ,.structure.

Y ofr-dirramageThe source of the projectile tsuffricieht-to-*ause may regiardngth'eintegrity concern be onsite or offsite. Potential*

of the'-7, affected structure or the operability or reliability 6f safety equipment ach CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric contained therein.

lues which_define_that condition (i.e.,-the-basis of the declaration)=-MAIl_ __--

classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the - rrYK fn ,,,r ttjr ,---encompasses all owner controlieci areas 7-

'conditionis VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

,been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which "assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. RUPTURED: (Stdam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a ireactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function safety injection. I '

required to prevent significant release .of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or 'mis-operation of Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback>25% thermal' BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >2 5% full electrical load; (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A.

The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt force.

normal plant operations to be considered.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e.,

steam or feed line rupture) that resultb in an uncontrolled decrease in steam TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerotis to life or health' by reason of inhalation or skin contact (e g., chlorine).

generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the K-)

1' such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not expected result of n6rrmal operations, testing, or maintenanc6. Events that constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with large quantities of smoke and heat are observed. abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it- has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned Ireleases that conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports exceed a condition specified on the'RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints, received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other minimum dilution flow, minimum release tim;s, maximum release rates, evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2)

,been

,to Control exceeded.Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability,

,'INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in Ireduction in the level of severity of the RED this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).

PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reacter sufficient to cause-concem regarding the continued operability or

,essel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, *"

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping,

rotected area without authorization. scratches) should not be included.

OWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which .VITALAREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which

.ombustible gases will not explode due to ignition. contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, CO; LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the 1he IBVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance public health and safety by exposure to radiation Sevel for equipment required for safe shutdown.

Fir

t Mode Criterion / Indicator

,11 II Mode Criterion / Indicator I

TABLE 4-1 FIRE in the Instrument and Relay Room (CB Refer to Tab 4.1 "Fire" or Tab I 'Fission Product EPP/I-lb BarrierMatrix" PLANT AREAS ASSOCIATED WITH FIRE AND EXPLOSION EALS 1), Cable Spreading Room (CB-2), Control Attachment 1 Room (CB-3), West Communications Room (CB-6), or Cable Tunnel'(CB-I) resulting in an Control Room Diesel Gen. Bldgs Containment Buildi lng evacuation of the control room per 2.56C.4' Inst & Relay Rm 707 Intake Str Cubicles Prim. Auxiliary Bui ilding "Alternate Safe Shutdown" and loss of any' Emerg. Switchgear UI/U2 Cable Tunnel (CV-3) Rod Control Cable Vault Bldg.

1 required equipment results in an uncontrolled Relay Room Safeguards Building r Cable Spreading Reoom 725 I 2 RCS Heatup [1 and2 and3]., , Main Steam VIv Rm Fuel Building West Communicati, ons Room 707 3

1. 2.56C.4 "Alternate Safe Shutdown" entered Penetrations Area Service Building ERF Substa & ERF FDG Bldg 4

2. Ops personnel report inability to operate any' Cable Tunnel 712 Cable Tunnel 735 RWST 2QSS-TK21A of the following equipment required by 2.56C.4 "AlternateSafe Shutdown" Figure 4-A 2CHS-P2]A 2SWS-P21A 2FWE-P23A & 2FWE-P22 PROTECTED AREA/SITE PE IMETER EGS-EG2-1 Black DG Alternate S/D Panel 2SAS-C21A 2CCP-P21A 2RHS-P2IA

3. Uncontrolled RCS heatup lasting longer than 15 minutes i Refer to Tab 4.1 "Fire"or Tab I "Fission Product FIRE in the Instrument and Relay Room (CB 1), Cable- Spreading Room (CB-2), Control BarrierMatrix" Room (CB-3), West Communications Room (CB-6), or Cable Tunnel (CB-1) resulting in an, eiacuation or the control room 'per 2.56C.4 "Alternate Safe Shutdown" 1

2 1. 2.56C.4 "Alternate Safe Shutdoiwn" entered ýo 3

4.

u 0

FIRE in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that EXPLOSION in any of the areas listed in Table is affecting safety related equipment 4-1 that is affecting safetyrelated equipment "1[ and 2] [I and 21 I. FIRE in any of the listed areas in Table 4-1 1. EXPLOSION in'any' of the listed areas in Table 4-1

2. [aorb]J All All 2. [aorb] I

a. Ops personnel report VISIBLE DAMAGE to permanent structure or a. Ops personnel report VISIBLE I

equipment in listed area due to FIRE DAMAGE to permanent structure or equipment in listed area

b. Control room indication of degraded b. Control room indication of degraded system or component (within listed systeih or component (within listed areas) response due to FIRE, areas) response due to EXPLOSION Refer to Tab 4.6"Security" I ff s FIRE in or adjacent to those areas listed in UNPLANNED EXPLOSION in or adjacent to lmS Table 4-1 not extinguished within 15 minutes those areas listed in Table 4-1 from the time of control room notification or verification of control room ala-m 1. UNPLANNED EXPLOSION in or adjacent to any of the listed areas in Table 4-I 4 All All Refer to Tab 4.1,' "Fire" or Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" Refer to Tab 4.6 "Security" I -- - -- - --

Revision 3

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which,,

AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION), PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plantti CIVILL DISTURBANCE: A group..of ten DISTURBANCE:Ag6oractivities (10) ormore, at the 0) site ..................

Peth structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Potential )

is" ufficient-t us- n-c m i di-rthe- tiirf Iffordamageh-.f.I....

protesting stiation operations or activities at the site. affected structure or the 'operability or reliability of safety 'equipment Eacli CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric contained therein.

yalueswhich define that condition(-0e., the basis ofthedeclaration)-Al.,..

classiffatitons are based on an assessment (i.e., determination e4'-Th-e-PR that the OTECTED-AREA- -onassal-wl~Jarea within the secuity perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has o F

,been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extieme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room onratrsfr thaant mer, gemrnev __ '__

indications Action Level -6. n va.l..l. l t.... L........

IVAL U th,, ag-*.

pvJrItnrU l RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary (EAL) has been exceeded.

leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and I CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function safety injection.

required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of

'Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity "plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

'(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one

'EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidentswill not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A.

The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

failure of pressurized equipment that impart- energy, of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten- to interru*t force.

normal plant operations to be considered.

i FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage,(i.e.,

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uiicontrolled decrease in steam TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine). ' o tn

. FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke 'UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with large quantities of smoke and heat are observed. abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station 'UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are "procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports 'minimum exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g,' alarm setpoints, dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other release rates, evidence that the-associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 YALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise ioted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2)

)to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, IINEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in

-'reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within '15'hninutes).

Iminutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED 'VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily "1PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is "improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause corcern regarding the continued operability or

'vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core -reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example

.'thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration,

'iNTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping,

'protected area without authorization. scratches) should not be included.

I LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, K)

'LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance public health and safety by exposure to radiation l'evel for equipment required for safe shutdown.

ý -1 .. I a EPP/I-lb

4. lm al Attachment 1 I Mode ,Criterion / Indicator' Criterion / Indicator I i Refer to Tab 4.1 "Fire", Tab 4.2 "Explosion, or Refer to Tab)I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" TABLE 412 HAS BPEN DELETED Tab ) "Fission ProductBarrierMatrix" ,

I FIGURE 4-B-HAS BEEN DELETED I

Ii Refer to Tab 4.1 "Fire", Tab 4.2 "Explosion", or Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix'"

Tab I "Fission ProductBarrierMatrix" z

0

___________ L Release of flammable gas within, or contiguous Release of TOXIC GAS within, or contiguous to. a VITAL AREA which' jeopardizes to, a VITAL AREA .which jeopardizes operation of systems required to maintain safe operation of systems required to maintain safe operations or to establish or maintain cold operations or to establish or maintain cold shutdown (M-ode 5). shutdown (Mode 5). (1 and 2)

I. Report or detection of a TOXIC GAS I. Report or detection of a flammable gas within, or contiguous to, a VITAL AREA or All All within, or contiguous to, a VITAL AREA in an area required for continued safe operation concentrations- greater than . explosive in concentrations that will be life threatening concentrations. to plant personnel.

2. Plant personnel would be unable to perform actions necessary - for continued safe operation' or to establish and maintaiii cold shutdown (Mode 5) while utilizing I1 appropriate personnel protection equipment.

- I I I I m m i Release of flammable gas affecting the Release of TOXIC GAS affecting the PROTECTED AREA deemed detrimental to PROTECTED AREA deemed detrimental to the safe operation of the plant. the safe operation of the plant.

(1 or2) (1 or2)

I. (aandb) .1

a. Report or detection of TOXIC GAS that

1. (aandb)

All All could enter the SITE PERIMETER in

a. Report or detection of flammable gas that amounts that can affect normal operation could enter the SITE PERIMETER in of the plant (Refer to Figure 4-A).,,

amounts that can affect normal operation of

b. Normal operation of the plant is impedei the plant (Refer to Figure 4-A)."

due to access restrictions implemented by

b. Normal operation of the plant is impeded the Control Room' within the due to access restrictions implenmented by*

PROTECTED' AREA (Refer to I. the "Control Room within, PROTECTED AREA (Refer to Figure 4-1 A).

the Figure 4-A). i

2. Report by local, county or State officials for a potential evacuation of site personnel based I

I on an offsite event.

2. Report by local, county or State officials Refer to AOP 1/2 44A.] "Chlorine/toxic Gas for a potential evacuation of site personnel Release", Attachment 3 for a list of chemicals based on an offsite event.

stored, produced, or transported near BVPS and their toxicity limits. Revision 3

'Aiiiadoj I I P41t" LiNko

'All.VaNnoe A%

'V3MV: NO 1SMOX3 3-17 jain2!d

EPP/I-lb A. ecrt Attachment 1

'4* ,# f Coto RoomEvacatio IMode Criterion / Indicator I Mode Criterion II ..........

.......... Indicator I Mode Criterion / Indicator I Events are in process or have occurred which II I ---------- - ----------

I Refer to Tab 4.1 "FIRE" Security event resulting in loss of control of the involve actual or imminent substantial core systems necessary to establish or maintain cold degradation or melting with potential for loss of shutdown containment integrity. Releases can be reasonably 11 or 2]

expected to exceed EPA protective action guidelines exposure levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA

1. Hostile armed force has taken control of the All BOUNDARY. (Refer to Figure 4-C on preceding control room or the remote shutdown panel page.)

All 2. Hostile armed force has taken control of plant equipment such that Ops personnel report the inability to operate equipment a

necessary to maintain the following functions [a orb or c]:

Subcriticahty

b. Core cooling

c. Heat Sink I 4-Evacuation of the control room has been Security event has or is occurring which results Events are in process or have occurred which in actual or likely failures of plant functions involve actual or likely major failures of plant initiated and control of all necessary equipment has not been established within 15 minutes of needed to protect the public functions needed for the protection of the public.

manning the Shutdown Panel 11 and 21 Any releases, are NOT expected to result in 11 or 21 exposure levels which exceed EPA protective action

1. VITAL AREA, other than the control room, guideline exposure levels outside the EXCLUSION I. AOP 2.33.1 A "Control Room

,All AREA BOUNDARY. (Refer to Figure 4-C on Inaccessibility" has been entered has been penetrated by a hostile armed force All All preceding page.)

2. Inability to transfer and operate any single 2. Suspected BOMB detonates within a VITAL component listed in Table 4-3 within 15 AREA minutes of manning the shutdown panel Table 4-3 EQUIPMENT REQUIRED AT Also refer to Tab 4.1 "Fire" "I' SHUTDOWN PANEL One Auxiliary Feedwater Pump

, I ii One Atmospheric Steam Dump

+

Evacuation of the control room is required Credible Security event which indicates an Events are in process or have occurred which actual or potential substantial degradation in involve an actual or potential substantial One Charging Pump

1. AOP 2.33.1A "Control Room the level of safety of the plant degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Any One Boric Acid Pump and Bora!ion Valve Inaccessibility"has been entered 11 or2 or3] releases are expected to be limited to small fractions 2CHS*FCV 122 I. BOMB discovered within a VITAL AREA of the EPA protective action guideline exposure levels., I

2. CIVIL DISTURBANCE ongoing within the All All All PROTECTED AREA "Table4-4 SECURITY EVENTS

3. PROTECTED AREA has been penetrated by a hostile armed force a. SABOTAGE/INTRUSION has or is Occurring Within the PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A)

.Refer to Figure 4-A for a drawing of the b. HOSTAGE/EXTORTION Situation That Threatens' to PROTECTED AREA Interrupt Plant Operations 4 4 Credible Security event which indicates a Unusual events are in process or have occurred C. CIVIL DISTURBANCE Ongoing Between the SrITE Not Applicable potential degradation in the level of safety of which indicate a potential degradation of the level PERIMETER and PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A the plant of safety of the plant. No releases of radioactive

[I or 21 material requiring offsite response or monitoring

d. Hostile STRIKE ACTION Within the PROTECTED

1. BOMB discovered within the are expected unless further degradation of safety AREA Which Threatens to Interrupt Normal Plant PROTECTED AREA systems occurs. W Operations (Judgement Based on Behavior of Strikers and/or Intelligence Received) (Figure 4-A)

All 2. Security Shift Supervisor reports one or more of the events listed in Table 4-4 All A credible site-specific security threat notification.

e.

A 4.

Refer to Figure 4-A for a drawing of the PROTECTED AREA J.

Revi esion 3

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the 9bPs w ich AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant CIVILDISTURBANCE: A gopote(0structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Potential

_nstation rgrouprof** (10) .r..ore...............yfor Yte damage~is-sufficient-to-cause concemiregarding the-ntegrity-of-the protesting station opera or.activities at the site. affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric contained therein.

values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration).All c-assitications-are- ased- on-an assessment (F.e., determination that the . . * .8 1 condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary' Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded, leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function safety injection.

required to prevent significant release .of core radioactivity to the SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment~or n-ds-operation of environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat SI

'Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermnal" Shock), InteCgrityplant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.'

(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the or more of the following: (i) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result reactor:power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

failure of pressurired equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt force. normal plant operations to be considered.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam inhalation or skin contact (e g., chlorine).

generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the ,

FIRE Cobusionchaacteize byhea an ligt. oures f soke expected result of normal operations, testing, or'maintenance. Events that f

such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not eresult in corrective or mitigative actions being taken intacnordancet with constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

large' quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plan unintentional releases, unmotored releases, o planned 'releiises that exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints, conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports minimujm dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum releaise rates, received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other an c h evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this or discharge of incorrect tank).

protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation ny/) pilalit peronniUll, sucn maltllatount ritea hltUto tnIe IIaicatorU-s operabilit~y, INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in

'reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment'(i.e., within 15 minutes).

minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily t PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.., Damage is ".

improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping,

'INTRUSION/INTRUDER: -Suspected hostile individual present in a protected area without authorization. scratches) should not be included.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area *within the PROTECTED AREA which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional pe.rformance Ilevel for equipment required for safe shutdown.

EPP/I-lb

'., S Earthquake 5o I Figure 5-A 1ýý I Mode Criterion I Indicator Mode Criterion I Indicator Site Perimeter Attachment 1 Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" Refer to Tab)I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" C-,

-I Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" Refer to Tab 1."Fission Product Barrier Matrix" zoo I<

1(

eQ 2 6%

Earthquake greater than 0.06g acceleration' Tornado or high wind strikes any structure occurs [I and 21 listed in Table 5-1 and results in structural damage!)1 and 21 A. A seismic event has occurred as indicated by Ann AI0-5H "lnit of Seismic Exceed Preset I. Torfiado or high wind strikes any structure and/or Spectral Accelerations" listed in Table 5-I

2. [aandb]

a. One or more alarm lamps and horn 2. [a orb]

energized on the Seismic Warning panel

a. Confirmed report of any VISIBLE

[2ERS-ANN-1] S All All DAMAGE to specified structures b., Review of the printout on 2ERS-RSA-1

b. Control room indications of degraded Response Spectrum Analyzer reveals an safety system or componeht response acceleration >0.06g has occurred (see within listed structures due to event 20M-45.4F "Seismic Instrumentation Central Control Cabinet12ERS-CCC-11 Running")

Also refer to AOP 112.75.3 "Acts of Nature Earthquake" Table 5-1

- -I-Earthquake detected by site- seismic i Tornado within the SITE PERIMETER Plant Structures Associ Lted With instrumentation >O.Og acceleration [1 and 2]

'1 Tornado/Hi Wind and Ail craft EALs I. Plant personnel report a tornado has been

1. Ann AlO-5H "lnit of Seismic Exceed Preset sighted within the SITE PERIMETER Control B Idg and/or Spectral Accelerations" indicates' Containment Building (refer to Figure 5-A) initiation of the Accelerograph Recording Safeguards Building Cable Vai uit and Rod Control Bldg System Primary Aux. Building Main Ster m Valve Room All 2. ,[aorb] All Fuel Handling Building Main Inta ce Structure

a. Ground motion sensed by plant RWST (2QSS-TK2I) Demin.V* ater Sto. (2FWE-TK-210) 6 "personnel 24 ton C02 unit Diesel Ge nerator Building

b. Unit Lreports seismic event detected on, Service Building (incl. FW Reg Vlv Rm) unit instrumentation I1

.4 Revision 3

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERA"IV_ EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which, AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4:7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge....

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched'towardsPotential a plant CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A groupof ten (10) or~more persons LS BEg p t ( m pstructure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.

C-violently'frdlaessfiinq~aiecter~eadrgl* fl..t.%~h,.d ten-ingforndpmageetsisufficient-soorcatisevconacem teregardirisitheie.it-r th6 prote-sting-station operations or activities at the siteaffected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition values w hich define that condition-(i~e __the- hasis f ihe dand,ela to any rat;,onumeric

,,_ A ll contained therein. .. . .

values tht condiinn (i'm l~p ~nq~h f tj ,'-nnn, deinehich l

ý-Th*PROTEC"TEO-;:AREAig-g-enýmpa-ss-es-ll;,wer~ntrolled- ase ........

Classilications are btased on an assessment (i.e., deteremination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Comrol Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function safety injection required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, rms-alignment, or mis-operation of' Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity plant &quipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result or more of the following: (I) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activatioff, Figure 7-A.

The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to

potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS EXTOIiTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt force.

normal plant operations to be considered.

'FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of, ',

generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. inhalation or skin contact (e.g , chlorine).

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and lighi. Sources of smoke UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. "Events that constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT iequired if result in corrective or mitigative' actions being takern inaccotdance with large quantities of smoke and heat are observed. abnormal or emergency procedures arce UNPLANNED.

, HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are 1

procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, 'or planned releases 'that conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g, alarm setpoints, received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID "minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15,minutes).

minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or "vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component, Example thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penietration, INTRUSION/INTRUDER- Suspected hostile individual present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, protected area without authorization. scratches) should not be included.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance public health and safety by exposure to radiation level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

! 5 .... v r.. ..

EPP/I-Ib All I LiJ ,

IC i MoeCriterion / Indicator 5.

Mode lvxvuý ie LvlHG Criterion I Indicator Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" Mode Criterion /----------

i Refer to Tab I-----------

1 Indicator -

"Fission Product BarrierMatrix",

f t RMode Criterion PrIndicator Refer to Tab I "Fission Product,BarrierMatrix",

Refer to Tab I "Fission ProductBarrierMatrix" I I Ii 1' I I.

i - ýI Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" i

Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" I

i River water level <648.6 Ft Mean Sea Level Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" 4

Aircraft or PROJECTILE impacts (strikes) any River water level > 705 Ft mean sea level 11 or21 plant structure listed in Table 5-1 resulting in [1 or2]

structural damage I. ILR-CW-101 indicates <648.6 Ft Mean Sea 11 and 2] 1. ILR-CW-'101, if accessible, indicates >705 Level mean sea level

1. Plant personnel report aircraft or ALL .2. National Weather Bureau (412-644-2882)

PROJECTILE has impacted any structure 2. National Weather Bureau (412-644-2882) or or Montgomery Lock (724-643-8400)

ALL listed in Table 5-1 on previous page ALL Montgomery Lock (724-643-8400) reports Reports Montgomery, Lower Pool stage Montgomery Lower Pool stage height height < -3.92 Ft

2. [h orb] >52.48 Ft

a. Confirmed report-,of any VISIBLE DAMAGE to specified structures '

b. Control Room indications of degraded safety system or component response Note: Mean Sea Level = stagý height + 652.52 Ft (within listed structures) due to event

.1-Note: Mean Sea Level ='stage height + 652 52Ft Watercraft strikes primary intake structure i Aircraft crash or PROJECTILE impact within i m -

River water level >700 Ft Mean Sea Level Not Applicable and results in a reduction of Service Water flow the SITE PERIMETER [I or21 i[I and 21 I Plant personnel report a watercraft has struck 1I

1. Plant personnel report aircraft crash or I. ILR-CW-101 indicates > 700 Ft Mean Sea 'I PROJECTILE impact within the SITE Level the primary intake structure PERTIVIETER (refer to Figure 5-A on 1f ALL previous page) ALL 2. National Weather Bureau (412-644-2882) ALL 2. SWS flow reduction indicated by sustained q

or Montgomery Lock (724-643-8400) pressure reduction to <30 psig on 2SWS-PI reports Montgomery Lower Pool stage 113A and/or 113B height >47.48 Ft ir 6

J Note: Mean Sea Level = stage height + 652.52 Ft Refer to AOP 2.301 "Loss of Service Water"

.1. ..1.

Revision 3

[r DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which i

AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

[

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant CIVI DITURANCE A rou of en I 0 or oreperonsv...... 7*or-damage-is sufficient to-cause'eoncern-regardink'the-in-t*g=nty-tff-h* .

________________ 4-CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A groupof ten_(10) or more 4 pro testing station operations or ac-tivities at the site. e s n i il nt Y structure.

f r d a eThes source s f ic of nt the t cprojectile u e c nmay e mrbeg onsite d ng orheoffsite.

I i Potential f t h .., . .

pro n Iaffected structure or the operability or' reliability of safety equipment Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric contained therein.

values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of-the-declaration)-AUl...... ..... - . . ..

claSSilications-are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the =11ih.PROTE CT1EDý-A REA--i-eneo mipaisseiall,-.ownei,-.nt rolledn-1-varsg-----

condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.'

rindications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary

,I leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function safety injection.

required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A.

The SITE PERIMETER encompasseq all owner controlled areas in the EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt force.

normal plant operations to be considered.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e, steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous-to life or health'by" reason of )

generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. inhalation or skin contact (e.g.; chlorine).

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it 'is not the such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance.' Events that constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if result in corrective or mitigative 'actions being taken in accordance with large quantities of smoke and heat are observed. abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

I.-

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is "1 ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste

'INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or' planned releases that conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., ala*rm setpoints, Ireceived from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates,

ývidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID Iminutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) 0'toControl Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation

een exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, SNEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in

['eduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).

ininutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily

?ATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an olbservable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is 'I, improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or "6,essel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core "reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example thermocouple temperatures).

damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping,

'jrotected area without authorization, scratches) should not'be included.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL" AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which ombustible gases will not explode due to ignition. contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the t&e BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance public health and safety by exposure to radiation level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

LsSho Si S EPP/I-lb I . ), 6.1 Loss of hlUutdown Systems 602 kWRCSkSInvenory ShtISOSdow s S S Att I Criterion / IndicatorI Model Criterion/I Indicator Mode Criterion I Indicator Mode Criterion / Indicator II Mode -

Refer to Tab 7.) "Gaseous Effluents" Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" Refer to Tab 7.) "Gaseous Effluents" K

Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" Loss of water level in the reactor vessel that has Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" or will uncover fuel in the reactor vessel

[I and 2)

1. [aorb]

a., Loss of RHS or CCP or SWS 5 b. Loss of RCS Inventory with inadequate 6 makeup

2. [aandbj a., Ops personnel report 2RCS-LI-102, LR-102 RCS level instrumentation (if available) in the Control Room indicates a level drop to 0 inches b.- Other confirmed indications of fuel uncovery i Inability to maintain unit in cold shutdown 11 and 21 Not Applicable Tl i UNPLANNED loss of offsite and "power for >15 minutes onsite AC 4-Refer to Tab 6.1 "Loss of Shutdown Systems"

1. UNPLANNED Loss of RHS or CCP or SWS, 1. AE and DF 4KV emergency buses not energized from Unit 2 sources for >15

2. [a orb orc] minutes a.' Core exit thermocouples (CETC) (if' 5 available) indicate the temperature has, 5 6 6 increased >10 F and has exceeded 200F., De

b. (w/RHS in,., service) RHS inlet Fuel temperature has increased >10 F and Also refer to Tab 6.1 "Loss of Shutdown Systems" has exceeded 200 F.

c. (w/o CETCs or RHS), loss has 'exceeded 30 minutes or there is evidence of boiling in the Rx vessel.

-t 1-UNPLANNED loss of any function needed for Loss of Reactor Coolant System Inventory with UNPLANNED loss of all offsite power for >15 UNPLANNED loss of the required train of DC cold shutdown that results in a core exit inadequate make-up minutes power for >15 minutes temperature increase of more than 10 F [I and 21 [1 and 21 [1 or 21 11 and 21 I'

1. Ops personnel report 2RCS-LI-102, LR-102 1. 2A and 2D 4KV normal buses de-energized 1. Voltage <110.4 VDC on DC buses 2-1 and 1'. UNPLANNED Loss of RHS or CCP or SWS RCS level instrumentation in the Control for >15 minutes 2-3 for >15 minutes if train A is the priority 5 ,5 Room indicates a level drop to less than 14 5 train 6 2. [aorborc, 6 inches 3 2. Either diesel generator is supplying power to 2., Yoltage <110.4 VDC on DC buses 2-2 and a."- Core ekit thermocouples (CETC) (if 6 its respective emergency bus 2-4 for >15 minutes if train B is the priority available) indicate the temperature has" 2. Ops personnel report inability to make-up De Dl train increased >I1OF RCS inventory Fuel Fu'el

) b. "(W/RHS in service) RHS inlet temperature has increased >10 F

c. (w/o CETCs or RHS), loss has exceeded 15 minutes

-4 Revision 3

"I DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which,,

AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant, C ILDSU ANE Agruoftn(10) or more persons violently fo aaeis CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group often(10)ormstructure. The suicetoeas-nemr-dn source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Potential ntatin s nt peationo r a-c livii t i *hesa e.

sh .. . ... . . . for- damage , cient to -cause -conce regarding".the.integrity flh'e

.is.ffi affected structure orthe operability or reliabiility of safety equipment Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric contained therein.

values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration)._All_......

........ ......... __. __6,w_6 clas'ifications-aebj "on-an -assessment -(i.e.,--eteihnatin--tha-l-he-- hnte s-ecty

,er-,te encompassshown condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has within the security penmeter fence as shown on oneFig uareas-Figure 4-A.

been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary io secondary Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function safety injection.

required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat

'Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one the or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine ,runback BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result >25% thermal reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to ReactorTrip; (4) Safety Injection System ActivatIon Figure 7-A.

The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areaq in the EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic i,.

immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by-......

Eoea EXTORTION:ce. body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of or one of its vendors.

normal plant operations The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt to be considered.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e., TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam inhalation or skin contact (e g., chlorine).

generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the such as spping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not expected result of normal operations, testing, or niain'enance. Events that in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accrdance with constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED large quantities of smoke and heat are observed. . ar HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by, a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, Discharge Authorization (RWDA) Implicit in this definition are procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned 'releases that cconditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints, rreceived from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, cevidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this andor discharge of incorrect tank).

,.-ýpprotocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID nminutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) tito S.. Control Room Operatnrs that an m e ren , Act, on I ve,Le l lFAIt ; .- ......

,1 t 1,: .. .. .- - .-- J-..... ,% . . .

been .-exceeded.

1.-.-... ...... " ... i'y ' -1 Actin . e .;* t jL*,'

, lld* induicatonson relaeu or reounuant inuicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability,

, INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in

- reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15minutes).

- minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure 1

that is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage, is improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or Cvessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, I,.

"TUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping,

rotected area without authorization. scratches) should not be included.

V

,OWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.

VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the K)

LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in

,-he BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance public health and safety by exposure to radiation jevel for equipment required for safe shutdown.

EPP/I-Ib Attachment 1

'I Fuel Handling In ver .

I Mode Criterion I Indicator Mode Criterion / Indicator i

Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" U I, zq 0

4-ii Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents"

H INTENTIONALLY BLANK1C 0

r©)

__________ -L Major damage to irradiated fuel; or loss of water level that has or will uncover irradiated Inadvertent reactor criticality H fuel outside the reactor vessel I. Nuclear instrumentation indicate

[1 and 21 unanticipated sustained positive startup rate I. VALID HIGH alarm on 2RMF-RQ202

[1031], 2HVR-RQI04A/B [1024, 1028], 3

'ALL 2RMF-RQ301AIB [1032, 2032], or 2RMR 4 RQ203 [10251 5ý

2. [a orb] 6

a. Plant personnel report damage 'of irradiated fuel sufficient to rupture fuel rods

b. Plant personnel report water level drop has or will exceed available makeup capacity such that iriadiated fuel will be uncovefed Refer to Tab 6.2 for it-vessel Uncovery 4 -,

UNPLANNED loss of water level in spent fuel pool or reactor cavity or transfer canal with Not Applicable fuel remaining covered

[1 and 2 and3]

1. Plant personnel report water level drop in ALL spent fuel pool or reactor cavity, or transfer kf canal

2. VALID HIGH ' alarm on 2RMR-RQ203

[1025] or 2RMF-RQ-202 [1031]

3. Fuel remains covered with water

- --- - I Revision 3'

J DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by &ie IOPD which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a pla-_

CII. ITUBNE..g.p..... .... r.en vstructure.

CtIVIL DISTURBAt NCE:o A ratvithn_(10)_priT~ persons..... ... . .lyfor-damageThe source of the projectile may be onsite or is-sufficient-to-cause-concern*regarding offsite. Poten t the-integrityof pt t on eratio.nsor activities at the site. affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric contained therein.

values which define that

. ~~condition

~~ ~ -(i.e.. ~ -the ~basis

_ ~of the~declaration).All

~ ~ ~ -.~ nýtKl~~ ýPOE

_ .. -*._- ~JAREA-encomt~assesý-all.Oiwnierzeoniroollid-re~as D.

Sclas$iricalions are basedon an assessment (i.e., determination that the within the security perimeter-fence as'shown on'Figure 4-A.*-

condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these RED PATH: - Monitoring of one or-more CSFs by the EOPs which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function safety injection.

required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operatibn of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A.

The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt force.

normal plant operations to be considered.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i e.,

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangeious to life or health by' reasbn steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

inhalation or skin contact (e g., chlorine). " J' UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of.radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s): Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition arc Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpointe, received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates.

evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).

minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is -I improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued -operability orV-,,

vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example'"

thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, z INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping,..,

protected area without authorization. scratches) should not be included.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA whic combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure>,.'

LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance public health and safety by exposure to radiation

--4 level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

TABLE 7-1 EPP/I-lb

'1 q Attachment 1 r EFFLUENT RADIATION MONI' 'OR EALS

,1ma 7

I Mode Criterion / Indicator Mode Criterion / Indicator NOTE: The values below, if exceeded, indicate the need to perform he specified dose projection/assessment, as EAB, dose resulting from an actual or Imminent listed at the bottom, of each column. If the assessment Snot be completed within 15 minutes (60 Release of gaseous radioactivity that exceeds 1000 Not'Applicable., minutuesfor UE), the declarationshall be made based on the VALID reading.

mR TEDE or 5000 mR child thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release NOTE: These monitors have the ability to divert or terminate effi lent flow. Ensure that a release is in progress prior

[I or2 or31 I. A VALID gas effluent md monitor reading to using the EAL's. I exceeds the values in Column 4 of Table 7-1 for Ail' _________________________ r r

>15 minutes, unless dose projections within this Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 time period confirms'that the CRITERION is liE Alert Site General NOT exceeded If a RWDA (Batch Release) is Applicable 2x the ODCM Limit 200x the ODCM Limit

2. Field survey results indicate EAB dose >1000 mR

2SGC-RQ 100 [10651 2.28E-03 uCi/hn a uCi/ml n/a uCi/ml n/a uCi/ml 0-y for the actual or projected duration' of the 2HVS-RQI01B [2039] RBC Purge 1.48E-04 uCt/cc 1.4 E-02 uCi/cc n/a uCi/cc n/a uCi/ec release 2HVS-RQI09B LR [2040] RBC Purge 6.36E-04 uCi/cc 6.36E-02 uCi/cc n/a uCi/cc n/a uCWcc

3. EPP dose projection results indicate EAB dose 2HVS-RQ109B Eff [5040] RBC Purge 2.26E+03 uCi/sec 2.2 E+05 uCifsec n/a uCi/sec n/a uCi/sec

>1000 mR TEDE or >5000 mR child thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release "* RM-IGW-108B (GWST) 7.86E+05 cpm a ,cpm n/a cpm n/a cpm RM-IGW-109 Channel 5 (GWST) n/a cpm, a cpm, n/a cpm n/a cpm i I EAB, dose resulting from an actual or imminent release of gaseous radioactivity that exceeds 100 mR Not Applicable For-All Other Unplanned Releases 2x the ODCM Limit 200x the ODCM Limit TEDE or 500 mR child thyroid CDE f6r the actual Er projected duration of the release SLCRS Unfiltered Pathway U1 or2 or3] (also called Ventilation Vent)

1. A VALID gas effluent rad monitor reading 2HVS-RQI01B [20391 6.02E-04 uCi/ce 6.02 B-02 uCi/cc 1.72E-01 uCi/cc n/a uCi/cc exceeds the values in Column 3 'of Table 7-1 for

>15 minutes, unless dose projections within this I',

SLCRS Filtered Pathway time period confirms that the ,CRITERION is All (also called Elevated Release)

NOT exceeded 2HVS.RQI09B LR [2040] 2.12E-04 uCi/cc 2.1 E-02 uCi/cc n/a uCi/cc n/a t Ci/cc

2. Field survey results indicate EAB dose >I100 mR 3 2HVS-RQI09B MR [30401 n/ala uCi/cc ra uCi/cc 3.88E-02 uCi/cc 3.88E-01 uCi/cc "y1 for the actual or projected 'duration of the release 2HVS-RQ109B HR [4040] n/a uCi/ce a uCi/cc 3.88E-02 iuCi/ce 3.94E-0I uCilcc

3. EPP dose projection results indicate EAB dose 211VS-RQ109B Eff [5040] 5.88E1+03 uCi/sec 5.8 E+05 uCi/sec I 04E+06 uCi/sec 1.04E+07 uCi/sec

'>100 mR TEDE or >500 mR child thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release Decontamination Buildirig Vent 2RMQ-RQ301B [20331 6.30E-03 uCi/cc i/a uCi/cc n/a uCi/cc n/a uCi/cc'

1 Any UNPLANNED release of gaseous radioactivity Any UNPLANNED release of liquid radioactivity that exceeds 200 times Technical Specification that exceeds 200 times Tedanical Specification Waste Gas Storage Vault Vent 6.8.6a/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Limit for 15 6.8.6a/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Limit for 15

2RMQ-RQ303B [20371 5.16E-02 uCi/cc a uCi/cc n/a uCi/cc n/a uCi/cc Pol minutes minutes

[I or2 or3J [I or21 Condensate Polishing Building Vent

2HVL-RQ1 12B [2013] 3.22E-03 uCi/cc 3 22E-01 uCi/cc n/a uCikcc n/a uCi/cc

1. A VALID liquid effluent rad monitor reading

1. A VALID. gas effluent rad monitor reading, exceeds the values in Column 2 of Table 7-1 for exceeds the values in Column 2 of Table 7-1 for "All >15 minutes, unless dose projections within this >15 minutes, unless dose projections within this Main Steam Reliefs time period confirms that the CRITERION is 2MSS-RQ101A/101B/101C n/a uCi/cc , a uCi/cc 1.77E-01 uCikcc 1.77E-01 uCi/cc time period confirms that the CRITERION is 2.

3.

NOT exceeded EAB for >15 minutes 3

Field survey results indicate >10 mR/hr j -" at the EPP dose projection results indicate EAB dose All 2.

NOT exceeded Sample results exceed 200 times Technical Specification 6 8.6a/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Limit for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity >15 minutes in duration

[10051300515005]

2MSS-RQI01A/101B/101CEff

[2005/4005/6005]

Liquid Effluent Pathways

2SGC-RQIO0 [1065]

n/a 2.28E-03 uCi/sec uCi/ml Va

' ia uCi/sec uCi/nmI 5.I1OE+05 n/a uCi/sec uCi/rnl 5.10E+06 n/a uCi/sec uCi/ml I

r*

To

>10 mR TEDE for the duration of the release 2SWS-RQI01 [1068] 8.59E-05 uCi/ml 8.5PE-03 uCi/ml n/a uCi/ml n/a uCi/ml Ii i Any UNPLANNED release of gaseous radioactivity Any UNPLANNED release of liquid radioactivity to 2SWS-RQ102 [1067] 8.59E-05 uCimIl 8.521E-03 uCi/ml n/a uCi/mi rn/a uCi/ml i-that exceeds 2 times Technical Specification the environment that exceeds 2 times Technical 6.8.6a/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Limit for 60 Specification 6.8.6a/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual minutes Limit for 60 minutes

[I or2 or3], 1) or2]

I. A VALID" gas effluent rad monitor reading I. A VALID liquid effluent rad monitor reading y AlI exceeds the values in Column I of Table 7-1 for

>60 minutes, unless dose projections within this time period confirms that the CRITERION is exceeds the values in Column I of Table 7-1 for

>60 minutes, unless dose projectionswithin this time period confirms that the CRITERION is NOT exceeded NOT exceeded

2. Field survey results indicate >0 1 mR/hr 1.-T at the 2. Sample results' exceed 2 times the Technical EAB for >60 minutes Specification 6.8 6a/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Limit for an unmonitored release of liquid

3. EPP dose projection results indicate EAR dose radioactivity >60 minutes in duration

>0.1 mR TEDE for the duration of the release Revision 3

I DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOIs which, AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4*7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant CIVILDISTURBANCE: A groupof ten (10) or-more persons ... structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Potentia )

protesting station operations or activities at the site. fordamageissuficienttocauseconce regarding th'integrityfthe protesing sttop t t. affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment I',

contained therein.

tLvalues-which Each CRITERION identifies define-that the emergency condition condition_(i.e.,_the-basis of and any numeric - Th**PR OTECTED*A REA'-ecnmpasses-all *--o--r-vsnt roll~ nr:,eas*

thedeclaration).-All-

_ T.

classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indicatioas being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function safety injection.

required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback

>25% thermal BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection

>25% full electrical load; (3) in population doses exceeding theý criteria of 10 CFR Part 100 Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A.

The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled area% in the EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt force. normal plant operations tobe considered.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of(,)

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam S inhalation or skin contact (e g., chlorine).

generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

UNPLANNED: An event or action is'UNPLANNED if it is not the FIRE: Combustion characterized by'beat and light. Sources of smoke f.

expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance.l Events that such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in 'accordance with constitute fires Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s): Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, br planned releases that conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., 'alarm setpoints, received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).

minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, ..

protected area without authorization. scratches) should not be included.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance public health and safety by exposure to radiation level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

4...~,

!H l

', 'V t 703 Radiation Levels ,.

Mode Criterion /Indicator Mode Criterion / Indicator EPP/I-lb I I D-41-- .- 'r-j. I "r.*..:-- P-J.". D i Refer to Tab 7.) "Gaseous Effluents" Attachment 1 Rejer 1t lao I 'tissiWn rroauct BarnerMatrtx or Table 7-2 IC)

Tab Z7 "Gaseous Effluents" I]'

Areas Associated With EAL 7.3 LOCATION ' 'INIIcATOR READING mR/hr general area I

730' Service Bldg (H2 Analyzers) Survey Results >100 PASS Cubicle (735' PAB) RMP-RQ-204 [10501 >100 mR/hr general area Chem Sample Panel (718' PAB) RMP-RQ-210 [10591 >100 mR/hr general area 737' Safeguards (H2 Control System RMP-RQ-205A,B >100 mR/hr general area

J Operations) [10491 1 741' Safeguards (Safe Shutdown Valves) Survey Results >100 mR/hr general area 738'Cable Vault (RHR Suction Valves) Survey Results >100 mR/hr general area t

773' PAB (WRGM Sampling) Survey Results >100 mR/hr general area 788' Main Steam & Cable Vault Survey Results >100 mR/hr general area Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrer Matmx" or 4.

Refer to Tab ZI "Gaseous Effluents" II Alternate Shutdown Panel Room Survey Results >100 mR/hr general area TaWs 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" West Cable Vault (730') Survey Results >100 mR/hr general area A Penetrations (713') Survey Results >5 R/hr general area C&D Penetrations (718') Survey Results >100 mR/hr general area Cable Vault (755') Survey Results >100 mR/hr general area CNMT Instr Air Room (773') Survey Results >100 mR/hr general area AE/DF Switchgear Survey Results >100 mR/hr general area Turbine Bldg 735' West Survey Results >100 mR/hr general area EDG 2-1, 2-2 Survey Results >5 R/hr general area 0

UNPLANNED increases in radiation levels within Major damage to irradiated fuel; or loss of water the facility, that' impedes safe operations or level that has or will uncover irradiated fuel outside Figure 7-A establish'ment or maintenance of cold shutdown the reactor Nessel EXCLUSION AREA

[1 or2] [1 and 21 BOUNDARY 0

1. VALID area radiation monitor readings or survey 1. VALID HIGH alarm on 2RMR-RQ203 [1025] or

, results exceed 15 mR/hr in ,the Control Room 2RMF-RQ202 [1031] or, 2RMF-RQ301 A/B

,2RMC-RQ201/202 [1069/1072] or PAF 2RMS [1032/2032] or 2HVR-RQI04A/B 1024/1028]

All RQ223 [1071] for >15 minutes

2. [a and b] 2. [a or b]

a. VALID area radiation monitor readings or All a Plant personnel report damage of irradiated fuel survey results exceed values listed in Table sufficient to rupture fuel rods 7-2 b. Plant personnel report water level drop has or

b. Access restrictions impede operation of will exceed available makeup capacity such systems necessary for safe operation or the that irradiated fuel will be uncovered ability to establish or maintain cold shutdown Refer to Tab 6 "Shutdown Systems" for In-vessel See Note Below Uncoverv UNPLANNED increase in radiation levels within the i UNPLANNED loss of water level in spent fuel pool facility or reactor cavity or transfer canal with fuel remaining covered

[1 and2 and31 'm.

1. VALID area radiation monitor readings increase 0l by a factor of 1000 over normal levels for >15 minutes I. Plant personnel report water level drop in spent 'a fuel pool or reactor cavity, or transfer canal All Note: In either the UE or ALERT'EAL the ED must determine the cause of increase in radiation levels and All 2. VALID HIGH alarm on 2RMR-RQ203 11025] or for 2RMF-RQ202 [1031]

review .other CRITERIAIINDICATORS, applicabilty (e.g., a dose rate'of 15 mR/hr in the I

Control Room could be caused by a release associated 3. Fuel remains"covered with water

) with a more significant event)

U

.1" Revision'3

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EO"P9 which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or-launched towards a plar CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A groupof ten (10) or more persostructure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Potenti, protestinggstation operations or activities at the site. frdamfageiis sufficient toause concn r ig e g o"the '

affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric contained therein.

Svalues which define that condition_(i.e..the-basisof the declaration).-All-.- .wner7co-... ...

classifications-are based on an assessment (iLe., determination that the tThe-PROTECTED-AREA-encompasser-ll-ower-rconerolle within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

sr condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

inrdications b .ingar v-ail.le in- rrntm*l . . . .. .. *^,n i. .... .......

I,,UIutfuns oingavanam to t-'.t I UUIII roperiaoist hata an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary' to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function safety injection.

required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100 Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A.

The SITE PERIMETER encompisses all owner controlled areas in -the EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS force. or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., 0 steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous '

to life or health by reasoli of",

generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not'the such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not expected result of normal operations. testin'g, or maintenance. Events that constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with large quantities of smoke and heat are observed. abnormal or emergency procedures arc UNPLANNED.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity r-lease3, a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been tuthorized by a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc), operator knowledge of plant unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints, received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates.

evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direLt observation been exceeded. by plant personnel. such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).

minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is' improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example.

thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, INTRUSIONIINTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, protected area without authorization. scratches) should not be included.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which combustible gases will not explode due td ignition. contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance public health and safety by exposure to radiation level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

A5.735B Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1/2 EPP-IP-2.2 ONSITE MONITORING FOR AIRBORNE RELEASE Document Owner Manager, Emergency Preparedness Revision Number II Level Of Use General Skill Referehce Safety Related Procedure Yes CONTROLLED BVPS UNIT 3

Beaver Valley Power Station ePumber .

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

1/2 General Skill Reference Page Number:

ONSITE MONITORING FOR AIRBORNE RELEASE Revision:

I1I i of ii EFFECTIVE INDEX Issue 8 Rev. 0 OSC Approved 3-12-87 Issue 9 Rev. 0 Non-Intent Revision 10-9-90 1 Non-Intent Revision 8-30-91 2 Non-Intent Revision 12-29-92 Rev. 5 Non-Intent Revision 1-1-94 Rev. 6 Non-Intent Revision 10-7-94 Rev. 7 Non-Intent Revision 3-27-97 Rev. 8 Non-Intent Revision 12-30-98 Rev. 9 Non-Intent Revision 12-31-99 Rev. 10 Non-Intent Revision 8-8-01 Rev. 11 Simple Change 10-17-02

Beaver Valley Power Station Procedure Number SEPP-I[P-2.2

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

1/2 General Skill Reference ONSITE MONITORING FOR AIRBORNE RELEASE Revision: Page Number:

I1I1 ii of ii TABLE OF CONTENTS A. Purpose B. References C. Responsibilities D. Action Levels/Precautions E. Procedure F. Final Conditions G. - Attachments

Beaver.Valley.ow.r.Stat.

B e-a-v Valle~y P6~ &Sfditioii ,,-EPP,-2.2 Procedure Number 1PP-,

Title. - - .... . Unit: Level Of Use:

FOR 1l/2 IGeneral Skill Reference ONSITE MONITORING FOAIRBORNE ,~~~~~~~ RELEASE "-'**""'I Revsion: Page Nmb.rof~~~

0f:

ýRON A. PURPOSE This procedure provides instructions to monitoring team personnel for -performing onsite radiological imonitoring in the event of an airborne release of radioactive material. In-plant

-*'radiological surveys are performed in accordance with the Radiation Protection procedures, and at the direction of the Radiological Controls C oordinator.

Onsite plume monitoring can be requested by either the Radiological Controls Coordinator (RCC), EA & DP Coordinator, or the Emergency Director. If onsite "monitoring is at the request of the RCC, these teams are directed by and communicate through the OSC. If onsite monitoring is at the request of the EA & DP Coordinator, the teams are directed by EA & DP and communicate thru those personnel at the TSC/EOF. Onsite plume monitoring teams may be directed to complete some or'all 'of the surveys -described herein. Monitoring teams need only perform the applicable steps of this procedure.

"B. -REFERENCES 1.0 Beaver Valley Power Station Emergency Implementing -Procedure EPP/IP 2.1, "Emergency Radiological Monitoring" 2.0 Beaver Valley Power Station Health Physics Procedures 3.0 BVPS Unit I Licensing Commitment 2.C (7) (CATS A970524P) 4.0 Condition Report #00-2202,

'Condition Report #02-03808 C. RESPONSIBILITIES ...

1.0 'OSC/TSC/EOF personnel (if activaied) will dete~rnine the general path of the plume and will provide nonitoring team embers with a briefing on specific instructions on areas

' to survey, types of surveys, and requirements for protective clothing and respirators.

2.0 Monitoring team members must remain alert to their own exposure and notify the OSC,

- i-TSC or EA&DP, and request relief if their cumulative exposure approaches a limit.

3.0 The Emergency Director' is the-only individual who may authorize exposure limit extensions in excess of I0CFR20.

- 4.0 - Monitoring team .members will ,ensure. appropriate monitoring equipment is operable and in'calibration." - - .-; -- " - .... . a a - J

-Beaver Valley PowerSt ation. P .edu re Numbrer,

Title:

UnitL Level Of Use.

. ..E... ITO N .. OR A ORNER LE E 1/2 General Skill Reference

. . .... . . RELEASE

. . AIRBORNE ONSITE MONITORING FOR t ; "Revision:- lPageNumber ,..... ,

. .. .1 . ~~~~~~~~~~~~2

.. of 20 D. ACTION LEVELS/PRECAUTIONS

, 1.0 Monitoring team members shall read their dosimeters'(p cket or'electronic - alarming dosimeter)"and report the readings io ihe ;OSC, TSC, or-EA&DP, at least every 30 "minutesor when dosimeters have increaýsed by 100 millirem or a dose 'alarm has been received.

2.0 Exposures are controlled in accordance with EPP/IP 5.3, "Emergency Exposure Criteria and Coitrol". -

2.1 The use of potassium iodide (KI) is controlled in accordance With EPP/IP 3.4, "Emergency Respirat6ry Protection", and EPP/LP 5.3, "Emergency Exposure Criteria and Control".'

3.0 Monitoring teams must remain alert to their own exposure and request relief if their C 4 cumulative exposure approaches a BVPS administrative control level- the Emergency Director is the only individual who may authorize exposure limit extensions in excess of "IOCFR20. "

4.0 All radio communications shall be done observing standard radio protocol (Attachment 5).

5.0 Vehicles -

5.1 Designated vehicles shall be used for monitoring team purposes. Personal vehicles shall generally not be used, unlessi no suitable vehicles are available.

Owners volunteering the use of their personal vehicles shall be alerted to the fact "that most insurance companies will deny any claim' for damage dfie to radioactive contamination. In addition, any personal vehicles shall have the same level of liability insurance as company vehicles. . .

5.2 All monitoring equipment'shall be stoved in the vehicie such that it will not effect the safe operation of the vehicle.

5.3 Monitoring'team vehicles shall be operated in compliance with all motor vehicle laws, including speed limits and the use of seat belts.

5.4 Monitoring team vehicles shall meet the followinig criteria':

5.4.1 Enclosed vehicle with sufficient room for the monitoring kit and fixed seating, with seat belts, for all team members, and, 5.4.2 Operable cigarette lighter receptacle, and, 5.4.3 At least 1/2 tank of gas, and

.Beaver Valley Power: Station E:PP-cd-2u2

Title:

, Unit: Level Of Use:

1/2 General Skill Reference ONSITE MONITORING FOR AIRBORNE RELEASE . Revision:

" " II "3 Page Number.

of 20 5.4.4 Current State motor vehicle inspection sticker (if applicable).

5.4.5 If personal vehicle, ensure insurance is in effect, per requirements ofý Step5.1.- -

6.0. During siren activation, Field Monitoring Teams will be instructed not to activate radio transmitters.

E. PROCEDURE

-1.0 Preliminary Actions -

1.1 If not already in their possession, team members shalil obtain and don personal dosimetry.

1.2 Prior to proceeding to perform surveys obtain a pre-job brief. Use three-way communication to ensure briefing is understood.

. -'NOTE:

The DC powered air-samplers require a 12-VDC source to 'operate. For this reason, a vehicle may be necessary, even though the distances involved are within walking distance.

1.3 If a vehicle is needed, ,obtdin vehicle, vehicle location, and keys from TSC/OSC/EOF, as appropriate.

1.3.1, The vehicle must meet the requirements of Section D.5.0.

1.3.2 If a company vehicle cannot be obtained, a volunteered vehicle may be used if it meets the requirements of Section D.5.0.

1.4 Obtain appropriate monitoring equipment from the storage" locations (Unit 1 Turbine Deck - 735' or Unit 2 SOSB West Stairwell - -730'). Equipment selected will depend on the type of survey assigned.

1.5. Perform operability checks on monitoring equipment-before leaving the site, in accordance with instrument use procedure provided in the kit.

Beaver Valley Power Station,- Procedure Number~

EPP-IP-2.2 Title. Unit: Level Of Use:

1/2 General Skill Reference ONSITE MONITORING FOR AIRBORNE RELEASE- ; Revision: Page Number

~~-

. I... .-l .4 of20 1.6 Obtain a Hi-band "Handie-Talkie" or a 60 Watt Monitoring Team Unit and check operation before leaving to start survey. Check radios away from the Control Room to minimize possible RF interference with instrument. Keep the radio operational at all times while'performing surveys in order to maintain communications with the OSC /TSC/EOF.

1.7 If the survey will be perforimed outside of the security fence; leave the station via the Primary Access Facility (PAF). Retain your personal dosimetry while performing radiological monitoring.

1.8 Record gas tank level. Ensure that there is at least a 1/2 tank of gas and a cigarette lighter which is in proper working condition. Obtain another vehicle if necessary.

1.9 Install radio equipment on the vehicle if vehicle is being used.

1.10 If OSC /TSC/EOF so direct, don protective clothing and/or respirators prior to going to survey location.

1.11 Proceed to first survey location, as assigned by the OSC/TSC/EOF as follows:

2.0 Continuing Actions NOTE:

Whenever, possible, an ion-chamber -instrument (such as the Eberline RO-series) should be used for making dose, rate measurements. An instrument with an energy compensated GM probe with the beta window closed (such as HP-270) is an acceptable substitute for gamma exposure measurements.

. During an Unusual Event, monitoring team data shall be reported to the Radiological Controls Coordinator. For higher emergencies the TSC will be activated and plume monitoring data shall be reported to the EA & DP Coordinator in the TSC/EOF or OSC H.P. Coordinator, as appropriate. , In-plant monitoring data shall be reported to the Radiological Controls Coordinator.

2.1 Periodically, read your pocket dosimeters, and have other personnel in the monitoring team read theirs. Report these readings at least every 30 minutes, or when accumulated dosimeter reading reaches 100 mrem.

2.2 Keep communication equipment on at all times.

2.3 Team members shall take appropriate actions to prevent the spread of detected contaminations to their skin, clothing, survey equipment and/or vehicle to the extent possible. ,

Procedure Number.

Beaver Valley Power Station " EPP-IP-2.2

Title:

Umt. Level Of Use 1/2 General Skill Reference ONSITE MONITORING FOR AIRBORNE RELEASE- Revsion 111 Page Number.

5 of 20 3.0 Moving Dose Rate 3.1 While enroute to the first assigned survey location, aand at any other time while moving about the site, have the survey instrument turned on. Frequently observe the survey meter and report readings to the OSC/TSC/EOF, as appropriate. If a "level of 1.0 millirem'lper hour (beta/gamma) or greater is observed, immediately notify the OSC/TSC/EOF. Note and record any readings significantly higher than the average and record these readings on the site map (Attachment 3). If in a vehicle," extend the instrument probe through an open window (weather permitting). , ..

4.0 Stationary Dose Rate Survey

,4.1 Hold the instrument probe parallel to, facing and about 3 feet (waist height) above the ground.

4.2 Take a closed window (gamma) reading. Allow sufficient time for the meter response to stabilize. Document the reading, in mR/hr on the EPP Survey Log (Attachment 1). .

4.3 -Take an open window (beta plus gamma) readin g. Allow sufficient time for the meter response to stabilize. Document the reading, in mR/hr on the EPP Survey Log.

4.4 If there is no observable difference betweef the readings taken in 4.2 and 4.3 above, it should not be necessary: to -obtain an air sample at that particular location.

5.0 "AirborneActivity "

NOTE:

- OSC/T`SC personnel will determine twhich iodine sampling cartridge is appropriate.

0 -SC/TSC personnel may also change the sample volume from 10 0 to another Whiim.- Cnricn titnt with rnd;nlr oiA- conditions 4' -

-NOTE:

If the open window dose rate measurement is about equal to the closed window reading, the survey location is not submerged in the plume and air samples will underestimate the plume concentration. Notify EA & DP if this is the case and request instructions.

h o p f NOTE:

If using a silver zeolite cartridge, verify that the shelf life has not expired.

Beaver Valley Power Station Procedure

_...._EPP-IP-2.2 Title. Unit: Level Of Use:

1/2 General Skill Reference ONSITE MONITORINGS----IFOR AIRBORNE RELEASE Rcvision:. Page Number.,

I .. .. 6 of20 -

5.1 Prepare sampler:

,5.1.1 If not already present, mark a flow arrow on the side of the charcoal or silver zeolite cartridge.

5.1.1.1 OSC/TSC will direct which iodine sample media to use.

"5.L2 Place a clean7 particulate filter, and' the iodine sample cartridge, in the sample holder and install on the sampler.

5.1.2.1 Air flow shall pass through the particulate paper first and then the cartridge in the direction of the arrow marked on the cartridge..

5.1.3' Position the sampler so that th ifitake is not in close proximity to potentially contaminated surfaces. Protect th'e filter paper and iodine cartridge from rain.

5.1.4 If the air sampler has an integral battery, proceed to Step D.5.2.

S,- CAUTION:

In the steps to follow, use caution when connecting the air sampler power leads to the vehicle battery. Specifically:

"', .'. ..

ch t earnff if nnt n l' inn -

"* Put on eye protection.

"* Self check to determine positive and negative battery terminals.

"* Avoid the fan, fan belt, and other potentially engine moving parts when positioning and connecting power leads.

"* Avoid contact with battery acid corrosion residue.

"* To minimize the potential for hydrogen explosion; do NOT connect or disconnect the sampler power leads while the sampler is turned on.

"* Place the positive clamp of the air sampler 6nr the positive battery terminal, the negative clamp on the air sampler on the negative battery terminal making sure that proper connections are made.

5.1.5 Connect the sanipler to the 'Vehicle battery."

5.2 Obtain the simple: - ' .

5.2.1 Turn on the sampler 5.2.2 Record the saniple start timie on an-Air Sample Record Card (Attachment 41

-I'

Procedure Numberv .

Beaver Valley Power-Sttion- EPP-IP-2.2 Title. . ...- Unt:,

Uni.. Level Of Use "1/2 General Skill Reference ONSITE MONITORING FOR AIRBORNE RELEASE.. Revsio: Page Numb:

5.2.3 Read the flow rate, and determine the sampling time:

Desired Volume -f3 Sample Flow Rate, cfrn Sample Time, in minutes 5.2.3.1 The desired sample volume is normally 10 ft3 , unless direct'd "otherwiseby OSC/TSC.

CAUTION:

" Turn off air sampler prior to removing air sampler power leads.

" Disconnect negative clamp.

Disconnect positive clamp.

5.2.4 When the sample time has elapsed, stop the sampler and record the stop time on an Air Sample Record Card.

5.2.5 Complete other data requested on Air Sample Record Card.;

-(Attachment 4) 5.3 Using the E140N or equivalent with a HP210 probe,-obtain a background reading. . .

5.3.1 . Check that theRESPONSE control is set for the slowest response. If instrument has a speaker, ensure it is turned on.

.5.3.2. Position the ,probe over the location where the sample media will be counted. -.

,: 5.3.3 Evaluate background count rate.

5.3.3.1 If the background exceeds 30,000 cpm, notify OSC/TSC and request clearance to move to an area of lower background.

5.3.4 Note and record the background count rate in Column 7 (in cpm) on the EPP Survey Log.

_ o

Beaver Valley Power Station . .

Procdure Number.

- - EPP-IP-2.2

Title:

, Unit: Level Of Use:

. 1/2 General Skill Reference ONSITE MONITORING . . FOR S.... . . AIRBORNE

. .. RELEASE . .. . .. Resion:

.1 . .. PageNmbe.

. .. .8 of 20 5.4 ' Perform field screening of the-sample media.'

CAUTION Handle sample media in a manner that minimizes cross-contamination of sample media or the removal of activity from the sample media. As example:

Handle, all sample media by the edges.

Place, do not slide, sample media into sample bags.

Do not shake sample bags, or squeeze sample bags together.

- 5.4.1- Remove the sample media from the sample holder.

5.4.2 Count the filter paper and the iodine cartridge separately.

5.4.2.1 Place the filter paper on a clean surface.

5.4.2.2 Hold the HP21Oprobe about 0.5 inches above the filter paper.

5.4.2.3 Recbrd the' gr6ss instimmnt reading, in Column 5 (in cpm),

on the EPP Survey Log.

5.4.2.4 Place the iodine sample cartridtge on a clean surface, flow arrow pointing downward.

"* - 5.4.2.5 Hold the HP210 probe about 0.5 inches above the face of the sample cartridge.

5.4.2.6 Record the'gross instrument reading, in Column 6 (in cpm),

on the EPP Survey Log.,.

"5.5 On the EPP Survey Log, 5.5.1 Record the sample volume in Column 8 (in cu ft),.

5.5.2 Circle the iodine sample type, if applicable, in Column 9.

5.5.3 Record the team member SRD readings in Columns 10 and 11. (in mR) 5.6 Place the samples in a plastic bag with the Air Sample Record Card. At the end of the survey return all samples, and EPP Survey Logs to the Station, or to another location designated by the OSC/TSC/EOF, for laboratory counting.

Procedure Number.

-B-eavr ivalley Power Stationoo, ;: EPP-IP-2.2

Title:

. * . . . . . . .. . . Unit:--- Level Of Use:

'*1/2 IGeneral Skill Reference ONSITE MONITORING FOR AIRBORNE RELEASE, Revision: Page Number:

6.0 After all the required data have been collected at the first survey location, establish radio contact with the OSC/TSC/EOF and report the following data from the log sheet.

6.1 - Survey point and time.

6.2 Closed window gamma exposure rate.

6.3 Open window beta plus gamma exposure rate.

6.4 Air sample volume.

6.5 Rate meter background count rate.

6.6 Rate meter gross counts for particulate sample.

6.7 Rate meter gross counts for radioiodine cartridge & type of cartridge used.

6.8 Closed window gamma exposure rates observed between survey points.

7.0 After reporting the survey data from the last survey point, request further instructions from the OSC/TSC/EOF.

8.0 Proceed to the next survey point and repeat steps 7 and 8 for each survey location.

F. FINAL CONDITIONS 1.0 All sample media are properly bagged, labeled and have been returned to the station for possible analysis.

2.0 All survey logs are complete, signed and returned to OSC/TSC, as appropriate.

G. ATTACHMENTS 1.0 EPP Survey Log 2.0 Air Sampling, Field Evaluation and Sample Assessment 3.0 BVPS Site Map 4.0 Air Sample Record Card 5.0 Radio Protocol

--T-B eaver Valley Power'Station,. I Procedure Number.

S...

. ... pp _

Titl e M ONSrIm MoNITORIN,* FOR AIRBORNE RELEASE' I

INTENTIONALLY BLANK"

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4.

Procedure Number:

..... .Beaver Valley Pwe Sfaii .EPP-IP-2.2 Title. -..... Unit: Level Of Use.

1/2 General Skill Reference ONSITE MONITORING FOR AIRBORNE RELEASE Revision:--

I 11I': Page Number:

11 of 20 ATTACHMENT 1 (1 of 1)

EPP SURVEY LOG Field Fil loaitorlng Team L

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Beaver Valley Power

.- Station Power.Station Proedure Numbr,

..... . EPP-IP-2.2.

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

,1/2 General Skill Reference ONSITE MONITORING FOR AIRBORNE RELEASE Revision: Page Number-.'2 t

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-Bda'-v--er Valley P EPP-IP-2.2

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Title : . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . Un it: Le v e l O f U se :

1/2 General Skill Reference Revision: Page Number.

ONSITE MONITORING FOR AIRBORNE : ...

RELEASE - . "- 11 '

_ , *13 of 2ý0 ,.

I -_.- _

ATTACHMENT 2 (1 of 1)

AIR SAMPLING. FIELD EVALUATION AND SAMPLE ASSESSMENT Airborne Radioiodine Concentration vs. Net Count Rate (Charcoal or AgZe Cartridge) rk C

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10 4 100

. a . * ...... oo. ..

a s.....Q0,000 w 1000 a ,fho*

0,0 Senwrivity ULmit E 140N Meter Limit

,et Count gate (cpm)

Beaver Valley Power'Station: ProcdreoNmbE.i -.

Title:

Unit: Level OfUse.

,1/2 General Skill Reference ONSITE , ...MONITORING

. . AIRBORNE FOR . . .. RELEASE

. .. . . ." . . .. ...-Revision:

11 . .. Page

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Beaver Valley Proceure Nmb Statin SPower I EPP-IP-2.2

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use t 1/2 General Skill Reference ONSITE MONITORING I FOR . AIRBORNE RELEASE A. Revision:

'11 ',1" Page Number.

15 of 20 ATTACHMENT 3 (1 of 1)

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. .2--.EPP-I -2.2 Title- Unit: Level Of Use:

"1/2 General Skill Reference ONSITE MONITORING FOR AIRBORNE"- RELEASE

.. Revision Page Number:.

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BeaVerBeave a Valley P~er Station Powe taio .. "*,.*

edure

- EP]'-IP-2.2 Title .. .. .... Unit: Level Of Use:

1/2 General Skill Reference ONSITE MONITORING FOR AIRBORNE RELEASE* .5j *.!__ -}l"-

Revision: 1 Page Number. f2 ATTACHMENT 4 (1 of 1)

AIR SAMPLE RECORD CARD AIR SAMPLE RECORD CARD RTL# A5.715EA Air Sample locations:

Date: Surveyor:

Sampler ID#

Sampler flow rate ft3/min Sample time: (10 ft3 /Sampler Flow Rate cfm)

Sample Start Time: St op Time: _

Sample Volume:_____ ______

Title:

-::Beaver

_Unit:

Valley Power Station: " " ** - Level P Of Use:

2.

E

, ?

.1/2 General Skill Reference ONSITE MONITORING FOR AIRBORNE RELEASE Revisio.: Page Number.

S

.... ...__ ......... ... . . 18 of 20 S

t

-I INTENTIONALLY BLANK

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F I

ATTACHMENT 5 (1 of 2)

RADIO PROTOCOL Because radio communications is one way at a time (unlike a telephone), the use of a standard protocol is necessary to minimiie confusion, speed operation and insure accurate transfer of information.

1) Begin a transmission with the name of the receiving party followed by the name of the transmitting party: For example,' "Beav'er-ValleyEA & DP this is Field Monitoring Team One, over". Wait for the receiving party to acknowledge before relaying data. During a series of exchanges, terminate each transmissioni with "over" to indicate to the other person that they may transmit. End the final transmissioinof a series with an appropriate termination phrase.

For example, "Monitoring Team One out".

2) Controllinig group (EA & DP, OSC) communicators must avoid general statements such as, "Monitoring tea~ms report your dosimeter readings". This can result in confusion due to simultaneous transmissions by two -or 'more teams. Direct such inquiries to each team in sequence. The only exception to this is if no response is needed from the individual teams.

3) Certain letters of the alphabet can be confused when said (V and B, P and B, as examples).

When spelling words for clarity or giving alphabetic designators, use the standard International Phonetic Alphabet shown in Step 7. Monitoring locations D.2.1 becomes "Delta point two point one". For a word like bat., say "I spell-bravo, alpha, tango", giving the phonetics slowly.

4) Give numerical information as digits rather than reading it as a number. 2432 becomes two, four, three, two rather than two thousand four hundred thirty two. 35.7 becomes three, five, point, seven rather than thirty five and seven tenths.

5) Report data as specified in the Field Monitoring EPP/IPs - that is by block location on the forms and without units such as mR/hr., cubic ft., or cpm. If units must be given, say them out millirem per hour, counts per minute, etc. Avoid jargon and abbreviations.

6) Insure correct data transferal by obtaining repeat backs of all data sent and provide repeat back or acknowledgment of messages received (Three-way Communications).

I

. t

- Beaver Valley Power Station, -r' d'N"*

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use.

1/2 General Skill Reference ONSITE MONITORING FOR AIRBORNE RELEASE Revision: Page Number. ,

S. .. .11 -1 .....- 20 of 20 ATTACHMENT 5 (2 of 2)

RADIO PROTOCOL

7) Avoid exclamatory or alarming statements. When you press the microphone button, you are making a public announcement because of the many scanners that can' receive business band communications.

INTERNATIONAL PHONETIC ALPHABET A-ALPHA J-JULIETT S-SIERRA "B-BRAVO K-KILO T-TANGO C-CHARLIE L-LIMA U-UNIFORM D-DELTA M-MIKE "V-VICTOR E-ECHO N-NOVEMBER W-WHISKEY F-FOXTROT O-OSCAR X-XRAY G-GULF P-PAPA Y=YANKEE "H-HOTEL Q-QUEBEC Z-zuLLU.

I-INDIA I R-ROMEO f

A AA A* I A -

A5.735B Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1/2 EPP/IP 9.4 ACTIVATION, OPERATION AND DEACTIVATION OF THE JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION CENTER (JPIC)

Document Owner Manager, Emergency Preparedness Revision Number 9 Level Of Use General Skill Reference Safety Related Procedure Yes CONTROLLED BVPS UNIT 3

Procedure Number Beaver Valley Power Station EPP/IP 9.4

Title:

Unit. Level Of Use:

ACTIVATION, OPERATION AND DEACTIVATION OF THE 1/2 General Skill Reference JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION CENTER (JPIC) Revision

-1 9 Page Number:

1i of ii EFFECTIVE INDEX Rev. 0 OSC Approved 12-8-95 Rev. 1 Non-Intent Revision 10-23-96 Rev. 2 Non-Intent Revision 6-17-97 Rev. 3 OSC Approved 1-1-98

-Rev. 4 Non-Intent Revision 12-2-99 Rev. 5 Non-Intent Revision 7-12-00 Rev. 6 Non-Intent Revision 12-12-01 Rev. 7 Non-Intent Revision 6-14-02 Rev. 8 Simple Change 8-15-02 Rev. 9 Procedure Correction 10-17-02

Procedure Number:

Beaver Valley Power Station EPPIIP 9.4

Title:

Unit" Level Of Use:

ACTIVATION, OPERATION AND DEACTIVATION OF THE 1/2 General Skill Reference JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION CENTER (JPIC) Revision.

9 1 Page Number:

ii of ii TABLE OF CONTENTS A. PURPOSE B. RESPONSIBILITY C. ACTION LEVELS/PRECAUTIONS D. PROCEDURE E. FINAL CONDITIONS F. REFERENCES G. ATTACHMENTS

Procedure Number:

Beaver Valley Power Station EPP/IP 9.4 Title. 1 Unit: Level Of Use.

ACTIVATION, OPERATION AND DEACTIVATION OF THE,. - 1/2 General Skill Reference JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION CENTER ". -(JPIC) . ' ... Revision.

9 Page Number 1 of 39 A. PURPOSE This procedure provides guidance for the Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) staff in the activation, operation and deactivation ofthe JPIC.,

B. REFERENCES -

1.0 Beaver Valley Power Station Emergency Preparedness Plan:.

2.0 Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50. ,

3.0- NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-l "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants".*

4.0 NPDAP 5.3, News Release and Notification 5.0 EPP/IP 1.7, Emergency Response Organization Teams.

6.0 Condition Report #01-3198, 01-4230, 01-4236 7.0 Condition Report #02-03981, 02-03982, 02-03983, 02-03678, 02-03713 8.0 Condition Report #02-04004, 02-04855, 02-04905, 02-04919 C. RESPONSIBILITIES 1.0 The JPIC Manager has overall responsibility for the implementation of this procedure.

2.0 Job Guidelines for JPIC personinil are located in Attachnirlnt 1.

D. ACTION LEVELS/PRECAUTIONS - i 1.0 ACTION LEVELS S 1.1 JPIC activation is required at an emergency condition, classified as a Site Area or General Emergency at Beaver Valley Power Station Unit I, Unit 2, or as requested by the Emergency Director, or 1.2 As deemed necessary by the Senior Nuclear Communications Representative, or designee, in consultation with the Senior Vice President-Nuclear, or designee.

Tile ,Beaver Valley Power Station', PoAe niL P/I 9.4 .

H1

Title:

Unit: Level OfUse:

ACTIVATION, OPERATION AND DEACTIVATION (J-PI) OF THE-

.. . - .. 1/2 Revision: -General Skill Reference Page Num ber.,

JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION CENTER (JPIC) ' Rision 9 2 of 38 2.0 PRECAUTIONS 2.1 All news announcenients must be approved by either the designated Emergency Director (prior to Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) activation) or the Emergency/Recovery Manager (after EOF activation).' -. "

2.2 Any significant policy announcement, on subjects other- than plant conditions must be coordinated with First Energy Corporate Communications, in consultation with the Senior Vice President-Nuclear.

4 , ,2.3- Representatives of the State and the County'ýmergency response agencies are S" 4"encouraged to participate at'thie'news briefings.- BVPS may, issue joint news announcements with these agencies.

2.4 The County and the State emergency management agencies have been asked to advise the Senior- Nuclear Communications Representative of announcements issued to the news media or the Emergency Alert Stations.

E. PROCEDURE S- .... NOTE:

JPIC personnel are activated in acco'rdance with EPP/IP 1.7, "EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION TEAMS."

1.0 ACTIVATION .i' 4 4 4 NOTE:

Designated JPIC personnel (beeper holders) shall be notified and mobilized at an'Alert Emergency via beeper activation. Once the designated personnel arrive at the JPIC, additional personnel may be called-in, as necessary.

44 4 '44 4.

y Procedure Number.

Beaver Valley Power Station- EPP/IP 9.4

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

ACTIVATION, OPERATION AND DEACTIVATION OF THE C' -L /2 General Skill Reference JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION" CENTER (JPIC) -'" .. *'* Revision:

9 Page Number:

' ,3of39 "1.1 Upon'notification, JPIC personnel shall report to the JPIC and sign the staffing

- board..

1.2 The Information Coordinator shall notify the JPIC Manager when adequate staff has arrived. %

1.3 -. The Logistics -Coordinator -shall notify the JPIC Manager when sufficient equipment and supplies are available for operation of the JPIC.

"1.

4 . .The Security Coordinator shall establish and maintain adequate security in accordance with Attachment 4 of this procedure.

1.5 The JPIC Manager shall make a formal activation announcement of the JPIC

-over the JPIC public address system.

1.6 Via telephone, the Information Coordinator shall inform the EPIO staff at the

- . EOF and the Penn Power Customer Accounts Services Department that the JPIC has been activated.

2.0 OPERATION

-2.1- News Announcements 2.1.1 The Information Coordinator shall 'Collect all news announcements that were approved prior to JPIC activation.

2.1.2 Administrative Support personnel shall ensure the distribution of all news announcements as described in Attachmrent 2 of this procedure.

2.1.3 The Information 'Coordinatoi- shall' continue to obtain current news announcements from the EOF in accordance with the guidelines in Attachment 1. , .

2.1.4 The Information Coordinator shall ensure JPIC review and distribution of subsequent news announcements in accordance with the guidelines in Attachment,1.

_e6 r

Procedure Number.,

Beaver Valley Power Station "EPP/1P 9.4 Tile: U.mt: Level Of Use:

'-4 ACTIVATION, OPERATION AND DEACTIVATION OF THE --.°. 1/2 General Skill o Reference JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION CENTER (JPIC) JONP BI IF R ATOCN E (PCR: 1. 9 Revision:' Page Numbe

2.1.5. The Information Coordinator shall 'verbally'notify' the EOF Nuclear Communication Manager of the JPIC receiving and reviewing of news announcements.

2.2 News Briefings

-'2.2.1_ Via telephone; the JPIC Technical Advisor shall' contact the EOF S. , *-Technical Advisor to discuss plant related information.

2.2.2 Via telephone conferencing; the JPIC Technical Advisor shall ensure the participation,,of the Chief Company Spokesperson and Information Manager in discussions per 2.2.1, as appropriate.

2.2.3 Information gathered dutring the conference, call may be presented at news briefings by the Chief Company Spokesperson.

2.2.4' The JPIC Manager' shall arrange fori a:pre-briefing meeting with the governmental Public Information Officers, (PIOs) present at the JPIC, in preparation for the news briefing.

I,.

2.2.5 The Chief Company Spokesperson and the JPIC Manager, in consultation with the governmental PIOs, will-determine the frequency of news briefings at the JPIC.

1 2.2.6, The Media Relations Coordinator will inform the news media of the time of upcoming news briefings.

2.2.7.. The -JPIC Manager will preside over news briefings. The Chief Company Spokesperson and governmental PIOs will provide information

" .and answer news media questions iegarding the status of the emergency.:

2.2.8 JPIC personnel will record questions that could, not be answered and provide answers for subsequent news briefings.

- 2.2.9 .-The JPIC Technical Briefer will provide generic information regardin'g plant systems to the news media..-

- 4 A

Beaver Valley Power-Station Un:t: EPPIIP 9.4

Title:

AiUnit: Level Of Use:

K) ACTIVATION, OPERATION AND DEACTIVATION OF THE JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATIONS9) CENTER (JPIC) - -

1/2 Revision:

'Geneial Skill Referen-ce Page Number 5 of 38 2.3 Information Management and Control 2.3.1 The Media Contact Representatives shall -receive and respond to telephone calls from the news media in accordance with the guidelines in Attachment 1.

2.3.2 The Media Monitoring Representatives shall monitor-TV and radio news broadcasts in accordance with the guidelines in Attachment 1.

2.3.3 The Rumor Control Coordinator shall report any apparent misinformation received to the Information Coordinator in ,accordance with the guidelines in Attachment 1.

2.3.4 The EMA Contact Representatives shall provide information to and receive information from the -,governmental PIOs at the JPIC in accordance with the guidelines in Attachment 1.

3.0 DEACTIVATION K 3.1 Upon concurrence from the JPIC Manager, the Chief Company Spokesperson and governmental PIO's, the JPIC shall be deactivated.

3.2 Emergency equipment/supplies shall be restored to preactivation status, by the Logistics Coordinator.

F. FINAL CONDITIONS This procedure shall be terminated after the following conditions have been met:

1.0 Normal plant operations have been or are in the process of being restored.

2.0 News media interest has diminished to such an extent that pre-emergency media relations procedures can again be used.

3.0 The JPIC staff has been relieved of all duties associated with the development and presentation of news information.

Procedure Number: -

Title.

~Beaver

Valley,Umt: Power Station EPPIP 9.4 Level Of Use:,

ACTIVATION, OPERATION" AND DEACTIVATION OF THE'-

JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION CENTER (JPIC) ,

1/2 Resion: :

IGeneral Skill Reference Page.Number" 9 6 of 38

1. -: ,*

i G.- ATTACHMENTS 1.0 Job Guidelines 2.0 News Announcement Distribution; l

i 3.0 Rumor Inquiry Form I 4.0 -Security Procedures ' - I'l 5.0 JPIC Floor Plans 6.0 JPIC News Briefing Summary Sheet

5 S. -

I f

-t K

31

.5- 5]

5, 5

,.5.

- . S ,, -S A

As -

Beaver Valley _ Power Station -EPP/IP

Procedure Number. 9.4

Title:

Unit: Leel Of Use:

ACTIVATION; OPERATION AND DEACTIVATION OF THE '1/2 General Skill Reference JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION CENTER (JPIC)-. Re,,ision: Page Numnl.

S.

. .- 9 77of38 ATTACHMENT 1 (1 of 17)

- JOB GUIDELINES CHIEF COMPANY SPOKESPERSON

1. Reports to the JPIC and signs the staffing board.

2. Briefs and consults with the EPIO staff and governmental PlOs at the JPIC.

3. Presents regular, timely information at news briefings at the JPIC -regarding the 'status of the plant.

4. Announces plant status and actions being taken to achieve plant stability,-using current news announcements and information regarding plant status provided by the Technical Advisor.

5. Reviews news announcements.

6. Announces any company policy decisions coming from the EOF regarding the protection and safety of on-site personnel.

7. Announces any upgrading or termination of emergency classification of the plant and the reason for the change. - , .

8. :, Participates in interviews with the local, regional and national news media.

9. Frequently consults with the Emergency/Recovery Manager regarding present status of plant conditions and when possible participates in EOF briefings via phone.

Procedure Number Beaver Valley Power Stati6n .. EPPnIP 9.4 Titler Unit: Level Of Use.

ACTIVATION, OPERATION AND DEACTIVATION, OF.THE4 1I2' I General Skill Reference JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION CENTER (JPIC) Revision:

4; Page Nwnber.

9of 39 ATTACHMENT 1 (2 of 17)

JOB 'GUIDELINES

-JPIC MANAGER

1. Reports to the JPIC and signs the staffing board.' '

2. Mobilize the r'emainder of the-JPIC staff by'directing the Information Manager, Information Coordinator, Media Relations Coordinator and the Logistics Coordinator to begin the call out of additional personnel, as necessary.

3. Announces the activation of the JPIC via the public address system once sufficient staff and "equipmentis ini place as communicated by the Information and Logistics Coordinators.

4. Ensures JPIC logistical needs are met through interface with the Logistics Coordinator.

5. Continually observes the operation of the JPIC and recommends changes or improvements to facilitate media briefings. .

6. Reviews news announcements if Chief Company Spokesperson unavailable.

7. During news briefings, compiles a list of items that need to be followed'up'in subsequent briefings. This includes questions that need to be answered, evaluation of the effectiveness 'of each news briefing, and follow-up of incorrect information"that was released to the public from whatever source.

8. Advises The Chief Company Spokesperson and points out potential questions to be answered in upcoming news briefings.

9. Deactivates the JPIC as outlined in Section E, Deactivation and Section F, Final Conditions of this procedure.

4 -3

( 4!

3' 4 4-

Beaver Valley Power-Station EPProcedur

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

ACTIVATION, OPERATION AND DEACTIVATION OF THE 1/2 I General Skill Reference JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION CENTER : (JPIC) Revision: Page Number:

9 9of 38

"- ATTACHMENT 1 (3 of 17)

JOB GUIDELINES INFORMATION MANAGER

1. Reports to the JPIC and signs the staffing board.

2. As necessary, call-out additional personnel as follows:,

EMA Contact Reps. (3) Three,

Rumor Control Coordinator (2) Two

Media Monitoring Reps. (3) Three

3. In the absence or, unavailability of the Chief Company Spokesperson and JPIC Manager, reviews news announcements.

4. Participates in telephone discussions between the Chief Company- Spokesperson and the Technical Advisors at the JPIC and EOF.

5. Maintains communications with the Information Coordinator to assure that news announcement

-,approval, rumor control,, media monitoring, and news media-contact functions are being conducted properly and effectively. Also, reviews and signs, -"Rumor Inquiry Form" (Attachment 3).

6. Prior to any joint news briefings arranges a coordination meeting with the Chief Company

- *Spokesperson and the State and County officials located at the JPIC.

7. -Coordinates the issuing of news announcements with those of the State and County to ensure timeliness and consistency. -

8. Oversees the EMA Contact Representatives to assure that the needs of the State and County representatives at the JPIC are being met. - .

9. Provide -feedback to Media Monitoring Representatives, Media -Contact Representatives, or Rumor Control Coordinator concerning how rumors or mis-information is addressed.

10. Review and approve JPIC News Briefing Summary Sheet (Attachment 6) and give to the Rumor Control Coordinator for distribution. - ,

Beaver Valley " Power Station Procedure Number.,

- EPP/IP EPL9. 9.4 .

Title Unit: Level Of Use:

ACTIVATION, OPERATION AND DEACTIVATION OF-THE " 2 ' General Skill Reference JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION CENTER (JPIC) - Revision:,

L_9 Page N2 u 10of38 ATTACHMENT 1 (4 of 17)

JOB GUIDELINES INFORMATION COORDINATOR

1. Reports to the JPIC and signs the staffing board'

2. As necessary, call-out additional personnel as follows:

Information Coordinator Assistant :"

CASD Reps., Penn Power-New Castle' ° , ,,

a Media Contact Reps. (3) Three

3. Serves as Information Manager until the Information Manager arrives. '

Prior to JPIC activation:

1. Ensures staff has signed-in with Security. . - -o)

2. Ensures staff completes the staffing board.

3.; Notifies the JPIC Manager when the JPIC is fully stiffed and can be activated.

4. Requests that the EOF'transmit the Initial Notification- Form and all news announcements that have been approved'and distributed: : .

JPIC activation:

1. Informs the ERM or Assistant- Sr. Nuclear Communications Representative and EOF staffs via telephone that the JPIC is activated.

"2.,'*-' Obtains current news' announcements from the EOF: and verbally notifies' EOF Nuclear Communications Manager of JPIC receiving and reviewing'of news announcement.

3. Collects all news announcements that were approved prior to JPIC activation and ensures

-distribution to JPIC staff. .

4. Continually ensures that news announcements are being pro'vided to, the State, County and Federal agencies either through telephone communications or hard copy transmission.

'5. "Ensures that the status boards in the Government and Work Rooms are continuously updated "withemergency events.

6. Maintains ongoing communications with First Energy Corporate Communications informing them of emergency events."* ' :' , . ,

7. Continually directs rumor control activities and investigates rumors. Assures the Information Manager reviews and approves responses to rumors per Attachment 3. A

a. After review and approval by the Information Manager, provide a copy of approved A Rumor Inquiry form to the Rumor Control Coordinator.

Beaver Valley Powei' Station .... Ic 9 4 Title. Unit: Level Of Use ACTIVATION, OPERATION AND DEACTIVATION OF THE:- 1/2 General Skill Reference JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION

. .. CENTER (JPIC) .9 Revision: Page Number.

11 of 38 ATTACHMENT 1 (5 of 17)

JOB GUIDELINES

--INFORMATION COORDINATOR (CONTINUED)

JPIC activation:

8. Consults with the Information Manager and fulfills requests as needed.

9. If necessary, ensures-that a second shift is called-out, in conjunction- with Support Services (EOF).

10. Maintains an event log of all communications and activities and issues 'the log to the Emergency Preparedness Section at the conclusion of the emergency.

11. Collects event logs from JPIC at the conclusion of the emergency and forwards the logs to the Senior Nuclear Communications Represefitative.

12. Ensures distribution of news announcements to JPIC staff.

13. Via telephone, inform the EPIO staff-at the EOF and the Penn Power-Customer Services Department that the JPIC has been activated.

LII.davI4 . EPP/1P9.4

,-Bea erValley Power, Station--.

p -Pr.. --* ~Proedu= Number,.

cdr NumEr. 4

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

ACTIVATION, OPERATION AND DEACTIVATION OF THE . 1/2 - General Skill Reference JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION S ' CENTER (JPIC) - Revson: Page Number 9-12 olf 348 ATTACHMENT 1 (6 of 17)

- JOB GUIDELINES

-INFORMATION COORDINATOR --ASSISTANT

1. Reports to the JPIC and signs the staffing board.

2. Ensures the staff completes the staffing board and notifies the Information Coordinator when the JPIC is fully staffed. ,

3. Maintains and updates the status boards in the Government and Work Rooms with emergency events. ,

4. Maintains a log of the Information Coordinator's activities.

5. Ensures Media Monitors, Media Contact Representatives, and the Rumor Control Coordinator receive all news announcements.

6. Collects event logs from JPIC staff at the conclusion of the emergency and forwards the logs to

. the Information Coordinator.,

I'-

Beaver Valley Power Stati6n "EPP/1 94 "

Title. Unit: Level Of Use:

ACTIVATION, OPERATION AND DEACTIVATION OF THE' 1/2 I General Skill Reference JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION

-11 CENTER (JPIC):. Revision-9 Page Number: ,

13 of 38 ATTACHMENT 1 (7 of 17)

"JOBGUIDELINES

-- -JPIC TECHNICAL ADVISOR -.

1. Reports to the JPIC and signs the staffing board.

2. Maintains 'frequent &conitact-witlith-EOF Technicail "Advisor to obtain up-to-the-minute information on plant status. . - .

3. - Keeps the Chief Company Spokesperson, JPICManager and Information Manager informed 6f the plant status and actions being taken to achieve plant stability and recovery.

4. Ensures that the Chief Company Spokesperson and the Information Manager are included in telephone discussions of plant status information with the EOF, as appropriate.

5. Takes written notes as needed to accurately convey information from the EOF Technical Advisor to ,the Chief Company -Spokesperson, Information Manager or -Information Coordinator.

6., Seeks information from the EOF Technical Advisor, as requested by_ the Chief Company Spokesperson, JPIC Manager or Information Manager.

,7. Consults with JPIC staff, as requested,- in the interpretation and clarification of news announcements and other information regarding plant status and actions being taken to achieve plant stability and recovery.

- r.2 4

~

.0 Beaver Valley Power Station 9.4

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use: ,

ACTIVATION, OPERATION AND DEACTIVATION OF THE 1/2 . General Skill Reference JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION CENTER (JPIC). Revision: Page Numbe.

' 9 '"14 4 f39 ATTACHMENT 1 (8 of 17)

JOB GUIDELINES EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (EMA) CONTACT REPRESENTATIVE NOTE:

ONLY approved news announcements are to be available to the Media.

1. Reports to the JPIC and signs the staffing board.

S2.- - Contacts" the dsgnae EMA SttEPdCony "* -

2 desigated EMA State and County Public Information Officers,' listed in the EP Resource Manual, arid informs them that the Joint Public Information 'Center has been activated.

3. Provides a call-back number (use your phone number) for the EMA's use to6 obtain information regarding plant and on-site status.

-4. Provides plant status infornmation' -via news' announcements to the' Cohnty oi State Public Information Officers at the JPIC.

5. Keeps the Information Manager apprised of County' and State publid anno un1cements and news announcements. " - , '

6. Provides'liaison betwxeen C6mpany and County and State Public Inf6rmation Officers for.

logistical and ongoing administiative needs within th6 JPIC. "

7. Keeps EMA's apprised of relevant rumor control activity as directed by the Information Coordinator.

8. Maintains a log during an emergency of all contacts, time of contact, along with any other pertinent information.

9. Following an emergency, issues a report to the Information Manager regarding emergency response activities.

10. Ensures that News Announcements issued by the States are distributed at the JPIC. (Same distribution as FENOC News Announcements.

Beaver Valley Power Station, 9.4

Title:

_I - Unit Level Of Use:

ACTIVATION, OPERATION AND DEACTIVATION OF THE 1/2 - General Skill Reference JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION CENTER (JPIC) ! J T L "F ACE 9 "1f8 Page Number.

CRevision:

ATTACHMENT 1 (9 of 17)

"JOBGUIDELINES MEDIA CONTACT REPRESENTATIVES

1. Reports to the JPIC and signs the staffing board.

2. Provides logistical information (location of plant, lodging near plant, etc.) to the media.

3. Answers basicmedia inquiries related to the emergency.. Detailed inquiries are 'logged and given to the Information -Coordinator for 'follow-up. Information' regarding station events/activities should be given to the media only after it has been released via a news

-announcement or News Briefing.

4. Directs the-media on Where to obtain news announcements issued to the wire service.'

5. Reports rumor information to the Rumor Control Coordinator using the Rumor-Inquiry Form (Attachment 3).-1i

6. Maintains a log during an emergency of all contacts, time of contact, along with any other pertinent information. -,

7. Refers all inquiries regarding protective measures for public to appropriate County emergency management agency, per EPP/JP 9.5, Attachment 2.

8. Refers ail industry calls requesting news announcements to the INPO Nuclear Network (Attachment 2).

9. Rumor Control Coordinator to assign a number to form before processing.

-10. At the conclusion of the emergency,,provides recorded information and logs to the Information Coordinator.

,. , - . .. C - -

C t

-7. *

"A.

Beaver Valley Power Station, Pmcedure Number.

Title:

Tite:

. ,Umt:

Powe uEPP/IP 9.4 Level Of Use:

ACTIVATION, OPERATION AND DEACTIVATION OF THE 1/2 I General Skill Reference K-JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION I "1 CENTER (JPIC) .e.isioni 9 PageNumber.

6 of 38 ATTACHMENT 1 (10 of 17)

JOB GUIDELINES SMEDIA MONITORING GUIDELINES

1. Reports to the JPIC and signs the staffing board.

2. Monitors local radio and TV stations and reports to the Information Coordinator through the Rumor Control Coordinator any information; which appears to be misleading or incorrect.

Stations to be periodically monitored are:

RADIO TV.

KDKA - 1020 AM (Pittsburgh) KDKA-TV Channel 2 (Pgh, Pa)

WKQV - 1410 AM (Pittsburgh)' " WKBN - Chaimel 27 --

(Youngstown, OH)

WBVP - 1230 AM (Beaver Falls)

'CNN WMBA - 1460 AM (Ambridge) (Atlanta, GA).: -

WWVA- 1170 AM (Wheeling) .

WVNP - 89.9 FM (WV Public Radio),

WKBN - 570 AM (Youngstown, OH)

3. -' Completes Rumor Inquiry Form (Attachment 3) and submits- it to the Rumor Control Coordinator.

4. Receives rumor control information from the Information Coordinator, or designee, through the Rumor Control Coordinator, as appropriate, and monitors media accordingly.

5. Maintains a log of all incorrect information with time and source.

6. Receives information from written news announcements and from Media Relations Coordinator on upcoming interviews and coverage and monitors accordingly.

C-

7. At the conclusion of the emergency, provides recorded information and logs to the Information Coordinator.

Procedure Number Beaver Valley PowerStatiOn EPPIP 9.4

Title:

" - Unit: Level Of Use:

ACTIVATION, OPERATION AND DEACTIVATION OF THE -1/2 1 General Skill Reference JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION . .. CENTER (JPIC) Revision:

9 1 PageNumber, 17 of 38

- ATTACHMENT 1 (11 of 17)

--JOB GUIDELINES RUMOR CONTROL COORDINATOR-- JPIC

1. Reports to the JP1C and signs the staffing board.

2. Receives and records' all requests foi information, points of clarification, and rumored information and assigns a number to the Rumor Inquiry Form.

3. Reports information to the Information Coordinator using the Rumor Inquiry Form (Attachment

3) for follow-up.

4. Receives corrected, approved "Rumor Inquiry Forms",, (Attachment 3) from the Information Coordinator for distribution to the Media Contact Reps. and the Media Monitoring Reps.

5. Maintains a log of all rumors received and sources.

6. Records News Briefing Summary Sheets.

7. - Obtains Information Manager's approval on News Briefing Summary Sheets.

8. Provides the approved JPIC News Briefing ;Summary Sheet (Attachment 6) to the Media Contact Representatives and the Media Monitoring Representatives.

9. At the conclusion of the emergency, provides recorded information and logs to the Information Coordinator.

.1 - -

Procedure Number.

Beaver Valley Power Station. EPP/IP Tztle. Unit. Level Of Use:

ACTIVATION, OPERATION AND DEACTIVATION, OF THE 1/2 - General Skill Reference JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION ' CENTER (JPIC), Revision: Page Number.

" = 918 of 389 ATTACHMENT 1(12 of 17)

JOB GUIDELINES MEDIA RELATIONS COORDINATOR

1. Reports to the JPIC and signs the staffing board.

2., Calls out the Technical Briefer to report to the JPIC, if needed.

3. Continually observes the operation of the Joint Public Information Center and recommends changes or improvements to facilitate media briefings. - . ,

4, Advises Chief Company Spokesperson (through the JPIC Manager, if available) and points out potential questions to be answered in upcoming news briefings., j

5. Coordinates requests from news media. This may include:

a. Arranging media tours to designated locations near the plant for photographic and filming purposes;

b. Recommending spokespersons and arranging media interviews with company officials;

c. Coordinating special parking requirements for national network or other trailers, etc.

d. Obtaining permission from plant security for aerial photography; e.,, Providing press kits, photos, diagrams, etc., as requested. -,

6. Works with the Logistics Coordinator to ensure that the media briefing area at the JPIC is fully functional. *, .

7. Semi-annually reviews and updates press kits at the JPIC.

8. Ensures that news announcements and biographies are distributed in the JPIC media briefing area.

9. Maintains a log of all news announcements, (Federal, State, County and Utility) distributed to the mass media from the JPIC and maintains a copy of each news announcement.

10. Ensures that microphones are turned on prior to each news briefing.

11. Compiles and issues a report to the Information Coordinator at the conclusion of the emergency.

Procedure Number-.

BeaverTite:Unit:

Valley Power Station ' - EPP/IP 9.4 Level Of Use, ACTIVATIONOOPERATION AND DEACTIVATION OF THE -'-1/2, General Skill Reference JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION CENTER (JPIC) - eision: Page N9mb 9 o ATTACHMENT 1 (13 of 17)

?_ý-JOB GUIDELINES TECHNICAL BRIEFER

1. Reports to the JPIC and signs the staffing board.-:" ' --

2. Attends all news briefings to obtain informnation on the current stattis of various plant systems.;

3. Consults with the JPIC Technical Advisor as needed on questions and requests for information related to systems affected by an emergency.

4. Answers media questions between news briefings concerning descriptions of plant systems and operating characteristics of these systems.

NOTE:

INFORMATION GIVEN TO THE NEWS MEDIA IS LIMITED TO DESCRIPTIONS OF THE OPERATION.OF 'PLANT SYSTEMS.-- SINCE THE :DISCUSSION ON -ACTUAL PLANT CONDITIONS AND ACTIONS BEING TAKEN TO ACHIEVE PLANT STABILITY IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CHIEF COMPANY SPOKESPERSON, THE TECHNICAL 'BRIEFER WILL :NOT-I SPECULATE ON SUCH MATTERS OR POTENTIAL FUTURE EVENTS.

5. Explains plant systems by using the plant visual schematics that are available in the Media Presenta-tion Room. -

6. Serves as advisor to the JPIC Staff on any technical matter.

I..

I

Beaver Valley Power Station

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

ACTIVATION, OPERATION AND DEACTIVATION OF THE 1/2 I General Skill Reference JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION CENTER (JPIC), . Revision:

9 "" Page * °Number

'2 o 38 ATTACHMENT 1 (14 of 17)

JOB GUIDELINES LOGISTICS COORDINATOR

1. Reports to the JPIC and signs the staffing board.,: -. .... ,

2. As necessary, call out additional personnel as follows: ,

A dministrative Support (JPIC) .. ..

"* Engineering Communications Representative

"* Security Coordinator (JPIC)

3. Assures the timely delivery and set-up of. all equipnment, and display 'material required for emergency response operation, including equipment that is stored at other locations.

4., Notifies Security Coordinator to initiate security measures at the JPIC properties.

5. Arranges for the accommodation of news trailers,- and other media or'corporate, transportation equipment. , :

6. Assures the set-up of sufficient communications equipment at the JPIC..

7.' Maintains supervision of all logistics during an emergency at the JPIC properties and acts as a liaison with the_ -managementof the JPIC. .

8. Maintains a quarterly check and test of all JPIC equipment and reports any changes or problems to the Senior Nuclear Communications Representative.

9. Maintains up-to-date checklists and procedures for JPIC set-up and operation, revising quarterly. Also maintains current forms for JPIC use during emergency response.

10. Coordinates with the EOF Support Services Manager for JPIC clerical support and 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months staffing.

11. Coordinates synchronizing the JPIC clock with the EOF/TSC clocks.

12. Compiles and issues a report of all emergency response logistics to the JPIC Manager at the conclusion of the emergency.

- Procedure Number.

Beaver-Valley Power Station . EPP/IP 9.4 Title. Unit. Level Of Use:

ACTIVATION, OPERATION AND DEACTIVATION OF THE 1./2 General Skill Reference JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION

,'* CENTER (JPIC)' -

Revision.

9-Page Number.

21 of 38 ATTACHMENT 1 (15 of 17)

JOB GUIDELINES SECURITY COORDINATOR,".

1. Reports to the JPIC and signs the staffing board.

2.- : Implements security requirements for JPIC.

3. Assures that security officers are stationed at proper locations as outlined in Attachment 4 of this procedure. - - .

4. Assures that only individuals with proper credentials as outlined in the EPIO Emergency Preparedness Plan are admitted to the JPIC.-- :

5. Contacts local or State law enforcement officials should their assistance be required.

6., Maintains a log of personnel entering and leaving the JPIC. - - .

7. Compiles and issues a report to the Logistics Coordinator at the conclusion of the emergency. ,

Beaver Valley Power Station Title - Unit: Level Of Use:

ACTIVATION, OPERATION AND DEACTIVATION OF THE '"1/2 General Skill Reference JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION

"' CENTER (JPIC) RCnsSor-

~~9 Page I) Number, 220f 3 ATTACHMENT 1 (16 of 17)

JOB GUIDELINES ENGINEERING COMMUNICATIONS REPRESENTATIVE

1. Reports to the JPIC and signs the staffing board' ,P

2. Provides technical expertise and resolves telecommunication problems associated with "emergencyresponse operations.

3. Assists with the set-up, operation, and maintenance of all telecommunications equipment, is required.

4. Coordinates operation and maintenance of-the necessary telecommunications channels and equipment that is required between the JPIC and outside governmental facilities (i.e., PEMA, Harrisburg Office). " "

5. Assures the timely acquisition of additional emergency telecommunications, engineering support personnel, if necessary.

6. Compiles and issues a report to the Logistics Coordinator at the conclusion of the emergency..

I (

/J

"ProcedureNumber:

Beaver Valley Power-Station -EPP/IP 9.4 Title. Unit: Level Of Use:

ACTIVATION, OPERATION AND DEACTIVATION OF THE, - 1/2 - General Skill Reference JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION CENTER .' (JPIC) - Revison:

-: Page Number 23 of 39 ATTACHMENT 1 (17 of 17)

JOB GUIDELINES ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT NOTE:

ONLY approved news announcements are to be available or given to the media.

1. Reports to the JPIC and signs the staffing board.

2. Operates-facsimile and copy equipment.

3. Requests necessary materials, resources, personnel from Logistics Coordinator to ensure the smooth flow of information within and from the JPIC.

4. Distributes Company -news announcements to JPIC staff and external locations in accordance with Attachment 2.

5. Aid the State, County and NRC in distributing their news announcements at the JPIC.

6. Compiles and issues a report to the Logistics Coordinator at the conclusion of the emergency.

Beaver Valley Power Station- -ProedureNumber~,_

' EPP/P 9.4

Title:

Umnt: Level Of Use:

ACTIVATION, OPERATION AND DEACTIVATION OF THE - 1/2 General Skill Reference JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION CENTER (JPIC). Revision: Page Number 9R 24 of 38 S -

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

SProcedre Number.

Beaver Valley Power Station - roc":

e- EPPIP 9.4

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

ACTIVATION, OPERATION AND DEACTIVATION OF THE - 1/2 General Skill Reference JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION CENTER (JPIC) Revision:

"9 Page Number:

25 of 38

- NEWS ANNOUNCEMENT DISTRIBUTION - ATTACHMENT 2 (1 of 3)

FOR: JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION CENTER. - , -

--NOTE:

ONLY approved news announcements are to be available or given to the media.

Distribution checklist for all news announcements issued by BVPS, state, county and federal agencies as a result of an emergency at BVPS.

News Announcement # __-_______

Revision received Revision Distributed Time received Time Distributed FAX TO:

PR Newswire 888-568-0898 EOF Nuclear Communications Staff 724-682-5994 First Energy Corporate Communications S..- 330-384-4539 Beaver County EMA 724-775-1163 Columbiana County EMA 330-424-9267.

i:":'*

.*:*: 304-564-4031-Hancock County OES Pennsylvania EMA 717-651-2021L Ohio EMA 614-889-7183 West Virginia OES 304-344-4538 NRC (Region I, Public Affairs) 610-337-5241 NRC (Washington D.C.) " 301-415-2234 INPO "770-644-8549 Nuclear Energy Institute "202-739-8000

Beaver Valley Power Station-,

Titde.

ACTIVATION, OPERATION AND DEACTIVATION OF THE JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION CENTER (JPIC)

NEWS ANNOUNCEMENT DISTRIBUTION ATTACHMENT 2 (2 of 3)

FOR: JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION CENTER NOTE:

ONLY approved news announcements are to be available or given to the media.

Distribution checklist for all news'announcements issued by BVPS, state, countý and fedeiral agencies as a result of an emergency at BVPS.

News Announcement #_______

Revision received Revision Distributed Time received ___Time Distributed HAND CARRY TO:

-.Information Manager Information Coordinator Information Coordinator Assistant 4 -

Technical Advisor Chief Company Spokesperson Rumor Control Coordinator Media Relations Coordinator Media Monitoring Reps. (3)

Post in JPIC (1)

Copies For Reporters (as needed) _ ,

Technical Briefer 44 Emergency Management Contact Representatives (11)

- ,-Pennsylvania Rep. (5)

__ Ohio Rep. (3)

__ West Virginia Rep. (3)

Procedure Number:

Beaver Valley Power.Station EPP/IP 9.4 Title- Unit: Level Of Use:

0 ACTIVATION, OPERATION AND DEACTIVATION OF THE JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION CENTER (JPIC) -

' - 1/2 Revision:

,General Skill Page Number.

Reference Attachment 2 (3 of 3)

NEWS ANNOUNCEMENT DISTRIBUTION FOR: JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION CENTER TELEPHONE CONTACTS

1. NRC REGION 1 PUBLIC AFFAIRS .................... 610-337-5330 General Office number ................................................................... 610-337-5000 WASHINGTON D.C. PUBLIC AFFAIRS ........................................ 310-415-8200 Weekends ..................... 310-415-7000

2. PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY General Num ber ................................................................................. 717-651-2001

3. BEAVER COUNTY EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

........................................................................................................... 724-775-1049 or

............................................................... ......................................... 724-775-1700 Public Information (Site Area or General Emergency) ................ 724-775-0344

4. OHIO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY ...........

614-889-7153 Public Affairs Officer ........................................................................ 614-889-7000

5. COLUMBIANA COUNTY EMERGENCY MANAGMENT AGENCY

............................................................................................................. 330-4 24-9725 or

............................................................................................................ 330-424-7005 Public Information (Site Area or General Emergency) ................ 330-424-0861

6. WEST VIRGINIA OFFICE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES

........................................................ 304-558-5380

7. HANCOCK COUNTY OFFICE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES

....................................................... . . .... ......................................... 304-564-4 040

.................................................. ..... or 4041

8. FIRST ENERGY CORPORATE Todd Schneider, Mgr., FENOC Communications ............................. 330-315-7290 Pager ........................................................................................ 440-733-0728 Home ............................................................................ 330-659-6216 Ralph J. DiNicola, FE Corporate Public Relations ............................ 330-384-5939 H om e .......................................................................................... 330-896-3380 Fax ...................................................................................................... 330-384-4539 Corporate Communications On-Call Answering (Evenings and Weekends) ............................................... 888-900-5200

9. INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR POWER OPERATIONS (INPO)

Communications Division ................................................................. 770-644-8216 EP Command Center .......... ................. 1-800-321-0614

10. Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) ....... ....................................... 202-739-8000 Fax .......................................................... ........................................... 202-785-4113

11. EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE 24-hr. Press Hotline ................. 800-424-8897 General Switchboard .......................................................................... 202-778-6400

Title:

Valley Beaver Valley Power Station Procedure Number.

Umt n EPP/IP 9.4 Level Of Use.*

J 4

ACTIVATION, OPERATION AND DEACTIVATION OF THE 1/2 General Skill Reference 4, JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION' CENTER "0 (JPIC). Revision: Page Number. "

28 of 3d 11 4 .4 ,

4 4 .4

c 44 -

4 + 44 - 44 4 4 44 44 "INTENTIONALLY BLANK

- 44 i

t il I I

. (

- 44 4 4 44 - 4 4 4 44 -

444*

Procedure Number~

Beaver Valley Power Station -EPP/IPh 9.4

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

ACTIVATION, OPERATION AND DEACTIVATION OF THE 1/2 General Skill Reference JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION CENTER (JPIC) '-. Revision: Page Number.

A5.715GH ATTACHMENT 3 (1 of 1)

S. RUMOR INQUIRY FORM JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION CENTER Rumor Received by: Number:

Media Monitoring Rep.

-Media Contact Reps. Other Date: Time Received:_________________

Rumor Source: News Media -Employee Public Other Name of Source:

Affiliation, if any:

Nature of Rumor:

Person Recording Rumor:

Response

Source of Response:

Information Mgr. (or designee)

Approval Signature:

Forward copy to: Rumor Control Coordinator. Information Coordinator.

_Media Monitoring Reps. Media Contact Reps.

JPIC Mgr. Inform. Mgr.

SProcedure Number,,

SBeaver Valley Power Station' EPPIP 9.4

Title:

ACTIVATION, OPERATION AND DEACTIVATION OF THE JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION CENTER (JPIC)

Unit:

1/2 Revision:.

IGeneral Skill Reference L el Of Use:

Page Number:

930 of 38 _ý 1, 1 -1 INTENTIONALLY BLANK 4

4 ' 4' T , - ý j 1 *44 1

44)

Beaver Valley Power Station P edure

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

ACTIVATION, OPERATION AND DEACTIVATION OF THE 1/2 General Skill Reference JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION CENTER (JPIC) -. Revision:

9 Page Number-.

,31 of 39 "ATTACHMENT4 (1 of 2)

SECURITY PROCEDURES

"-A.1 PURPOSE:

This procedure provides guidance for controlling access and maintaining-order within the Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) in support of the BVPS Emergency Preparedness Plan.

B. SCOPE:

These procedures shall apply to all individuals, both employees and non-employees, who are present at the JPIC when that facility is operated in support of the BVPS Emergency Preparedness Plan. - -.

C. PROCEDURES:

1.0 The Security, Coordinator for the JPIC shall be directly responsible'for implementing and enforcing these procedures*when the JPIC is activated in -support of the BVPS Fi Emergency Preparedness Plan, as well as during appropriate periods immediately prior

- toi such activation when these -procedures are deemed -necessary to establish and maintain order at the JPIC. %

-2.0 To assist the Security Coordinator in implementing and enforcing these procedures, if needed, security officers will be positioned at various locations to control access and to help maintain order. --All personnel within the JPIC must adhere to these procedures, and must accept the authority of the security officers to restrict access in compliance with these procedures.

3.0

.3 Disorderly persons shall :'e removed from the.JPICif such-action is necessary to maintain proper order,- and the Security Coordinator'shall establish liaison with local law enforcement agencies to provide appropriate support for this purpose.

-4.0 Properly identified Beaver Valley Power Station employees will be allowed access to the JPIC as necessary for the performance of their duties, but all BVPS employees must wear their company ID cards in the chest area in a visible manner whenever they are inside the JPIC when these procedures are in effect. Any questions regarding employee access or the proper display of company ID cards should be referred to the Security Coordinator.

SBeaver Valley Power Station'. 9 94 I zlUC I I -

Unit: Level Of Use:

ACTIVATION, OPERATION AND DEACTIVATION OF THE 1/2 *,I General Skill Reference 411 JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION CENTER (JPIC) Revision:, PageNumber.

Idd W.Jil I ATTACHMENT 4 (2 of 2)

SECURITY PROCEDURES 5.0 All non-employees must enter through the marked doors at the fr6nt (North side) of the JPIC, and must be logged-in at the appropriate registration desk after presenting proper credentials from the organizations they represent. Any non-employees without proper credentials, mustlihave their access authorized: by an appropriate Beaver Valley Supervisor. Each non-employee will be issued one of the following types of access badges when he or she is logged-in, and must wear the badge in the chest area in a visible manner at all times while within the JPIC:

- ~a) News Media Representatives - pink cards b) Governmental Representatives - blue cards c) Visitors - white cards 6.0 Prior to departing the JPIC for any reason, all non-employees must return their access badges and be logged-out:'Aiiy lost- access badges must -be reported tod the Security "Coordinatoras soon' as the loss is fioticed.

7.0 Certain non-employees may be authorized limited access to, the -JPIC loading dock and adjacent Lunch Room for logistical purposes (i.e., delivery 'and -removal of food, supplies, trash, etc.), without being logged-in or issued access badges, but such access must be specifically authorized by the Security Coordinator. 'A security officer or other designated representative of the Security Coordinator must accompany such persons at "alltimes while they'are within' the JPIC.: Under no circumstances will such persons be admitted to any areas of the JPIC other than the loading dock'and adjacent Lunch Room.

8.0 If the Alternate EOF is activated, Alternate EOF personnel will enter the JPIC Building

"- per EPP/IP 1.6, Attachirient 2. BVPS Security Will send a representative to be stationed inside the JPIC Building, but:outside the Alterriate EOF door.' ýBVPS Security will control access to the Alternate EOF.-

- . 444,' A.

-4' '-4

4 'A A' 4 4 I . . -4 A -4

.4 . 4 -1 4 -4 . 4-4 i

Beaver Valley Power Station Pocedure "I I

-mbe u

EPP/IP 9.4 Title. Unit: Level Of Use ACTIVATION, OPERATION AND DEACTIVATION OF THE'-.-, 1/2 General Skill Reference JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION CENTER(JPIC) 1Revision:

9 Page Number:

-33of 3g ATTACHMENT 5 (1 of 4)

JPIC FLOOR PLANS Entrance

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-Unit:

Procedure Num Level Of Use:

[e ACTIVATION, OPERATION AND DEACTIVATION, OFTHE ,/2 General Skill Reference JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION CENTER (JPIC) . "" .'

.. . .., Revision:

9 Page Number:

34 of 39 ATTACHMENT 5 (2 of 4)

JPIC AEOF, tTo Lounge To Lunch Room

Procedure Number.

Beaver Valley Power Station, r- EPP/IP 9.4

Title:

Unit. Level Of Use:

ACTIVATION, OPERATION AND DEACTIVATION OF THE: , 1/2 ' General Skill Reference JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION CENTER (JPIC) -eisionl PageNumbe:

ATTACHMENT 5 (3 of 4)

-JPIC GOVERNMENT ROOM

Beaver Valli ACTIVATION, OPERATION AND DEACTIVATION OF THECK JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION CENTER (JPIC), I Revision:

ATTACHMENT 5 (4 of 4)

JPIC WORK ROOM, Door EMA EMA Administrative Contact Contact Support Representative Representative PA - OH1.... FAX FAX Media Relations Coordinator Assistant Rumor Information Control Coordinator Coordinator Logistics Coordinator i

Information JPIC Coordinator Manager.

Information Technical Chief Company Manager Briefer Spokesperson N. Door

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t 1 _ " Procedure Number:.

Beaver Valley Power Station - ' . EPP/IP 9.4

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

ACTIVATION, OPERATION AND DEACTIVATION OF THE 1/2 I General Skill Reference JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATIONS9d CENTER (JPIC)" Revision- Page Number.

37 of 39 ATTACHMENT 6 (1 of 2)

JPIC NEWS BRIEFING

SUMMARY

SHEET Beaver Valley Unit-No. I I UnitNo. 2 LI (Check one) .

Date: . .. Time: _ News Briefing Number: -.

Chief Company Spokesperson:

Event Classification: Category:,

Time Declared: -

Cause:

Radiation Being Released? El Yes LI No

"- -: Refer all 'questions regarding offsite radiation 'readings to respective Count y/State Emergency Operations Center." '

Injured Person: . Name: S.... -, : Time of Injury:

__*

Injury:

Where:

'Present Condition:

Why Occurred:

Where is Injured Taken Significant Plant Equipment Failure:

What/When/Why Significant Noteworthy Item:

Rumor Control Coordinator Preparer:

JPIC Information manager Approval:

J Procedure Number:

Title:

Tt:Beaver

, . .*'*Unit:

Valley Power Station, EPP/IP 9.4 Level Of Use: ***

ACTIVATION, OPERATION AND DEACTIVATION OF THE A/2 General Skill Reference JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION CENTER (JPIC)- Revisiot: PageNumber ;

9 39 of 38 ATTACHMENT 6 (2 of 2)

JPIC RUMOR CONTROL COORDINATOR FORM This form is to be used by the JPIC Rumor Control Cooridinator to documerit major or significant new information being provided by the JPIC Chief Company Spokesperson or JPIC Manager during a JPIC News Briefing that has changed since the last JPIC News Briefing. This information will be provided to the JPIC Media Contact Representative at the conclusion of a JPIC News Briefing for their use in disseminating event information over the telephones.

The information needs to be ACCURATE and CONCISE. If you are unsure of the information, either confirm the information or omit the information.

.Only fill out the applicable information. Don't include information, which you would not expect to see in a News Announcement.

This information is a secondary method to the written News Announcements as the way that Media Contact Representatives obtain information to be released over the telephones. This information may provide early summary notification to Media Contact Representatives before the issue is available on a written News Announcement. The written News Announcements will normally, provide the details or additional extent of condition information on issues for the Media Contact Representatives to use..

NOTE: -This is not intended to be a substitute for the News Release Infomiation, just an early warning of significant changes which you should see coming in. a future News Announcement.

o Information should-never be suipplied to the Media Cbntact Representatives for their use over a telephone UNTIL AFTER it has been released via a written-News Announcement or via a JPIC

-News Briefing.

Any questions on this form or on the information to be supplied with this form should be brought to the JPIC Manager or JPIC Information Manager.

S, , 7 ,. ' ,- *,*

L-02-108, Emergency Preparedness Plan and Implementing Procedures (Volumes 1, 2 & 3)

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