ML020150612

Part 1 of 2, Beaver Valley Units 1 & 2, Emergency Preparedness Implementing Procedures

ML020150612
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	01/07/2002
From:	FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML020150612 (190)

Text

EPP/I-la Unit 1 A5.735B RECOGNITION AND CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS Bye tiff I Revision 1

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-la Unit 1 Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions EFFECTIVE INDEX Issue 8 Rev. 0 OSC Approved 3-12-87 1 OSC Approved 8-13-87 2 OSC Approved 10-8-87 3 OSC Approved 2-9-88 4 OSC Approved 2-9-89 5 Non-Safety Related 3-15-89 6 OSC Approved 4-18-89 7 OSC Approved 4-12-90 Issue 9 Rev. 0 Non-Intent Revision 10-9-90 1 OSC Approved 4-4-91 2 Non-Intent Revision 12-29-92 3 OSC Approved 1-27-93 Rev. 5 OSC Approved 12-9-93 6 OSC Approved 10-7-94 7 OSC Approved 7-22-98 8 Non-Intent Revision 12-31-99 Rev. 0 OSC Approved 4-17-01 Rev. 1 Non-Intent Revision 12-12-01 i Revision 1

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS A. Purpose B. References C. Responsibilities D. Action Levels/Precautions E. Procedure F. Final Condition G. Attachments ii Revision 1

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 A. PURPOSE 1.0 This procedure describes the immediate actions to be taken to recognize and classify an emergency condition.

2.0 This procedure identifies the four emergency classifications and emergency action levels.

3.0 Reporting requirements for non-emergency abnormal events are provided.

B. REFERENCES 1.0 Beaver Valley Power Station Emergency Preparedness Plan and Implementing Procedures.

2.0 Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix E.

3.0 NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants 4.0 Beaver Valley Power Station Operating Manual 5.0 NUMARC/NESP-007, Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels 6.0 ERS-SFL-91-041-REV 1 (U1/U2 Containment Monitor Readings due to LOCA's with various Source Terms).

7.0 Condition Report #992522 8.0 Condition Report #991327-1 9.0 Unit 1 Technical Specification Amendment 205 and Unit 2 Technical Specification Amendment 101.

10.0 EPPOS #2 "Emergency Preparedness Position (EPPOS) on Timeliness of Classification of Emergency Conditions".

11.0 NEI 99-02 "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline" 12.0 Condition Report #00-3939 1 Revision 1

EPP/implementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 C. RESPONSIBILITY The Emergency Director (Shift Supervisor, until properly relieved by a designated alternate) has the responsibility and authority for the performance of the actions prescribed in this procedure.

D. ACTION LEVELS/PRECAUTIONS/GUIDANCE 1.0 ACTION LEVELS 1.1 An off-normal event has occurred.

1.2 An action step in a plant operating or emergency operating procedure refers to this procedure for classification of the indicated plant condition.

2.0 PRECAUTIONS 2.1 The Emergency Director must review all applicable EALs to ensure that the event is properly classified since a given INDICATOR may be associated with more than one CRITERION. A particular INDICATOR omitted from the fission product barrier matrix may be addressed as an event-based EAL in one of the other tabs. Event-based EALs may escalate to the fission product barrier matrix. The Emergency Director may need to consider related events (e.g., fire and explosion) or the possible consequences of the event (e.g., fire in an MCC resulting in loss of AC) in classifying an event.

2.2 Continued surveillance and assessment of plant conditions are necessary to ensure that the emergency classification is appropriately revised as conditions change, or as more definitive information is obtained.

2.3 If there is any doubt with regard to assessment of a particular EAL, the EAL Basis Document (i.e., Chapter 4 of the EPP)entry for that EAL can be reviewed. Classifications shall be consistent with the fundamental definitions of the four emergency classifications (tabulated in Tab 4.7).

2.4 The Emergency Director shall take whatever mitigative or restoration actions are necessary to protect public health and safety. The Emergency Director shall not reject courses of action solely on the basis that the action would result in escalation of the emergency classification.

2 Revision 1

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 3.0 GUIDANCE 3.1 Structure of the EALs 3.1.1 There are two types of Emergency Action Levels included in this procedure:

3.1.1.1 Barrier-Based EALs: These EALs address conditions that represent potential losses, or losses, of one or more of the Fuel Clad, RCS, or Containment fission product barriers. INDICATORs of these conditions include CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION status, fundamental indications such as subcooling or reactor vessel water level, or auxiliary indications such as containment radiation monitor readings. Classifications are based on the number of barriers lost or potentially lost.

3.1.1.2 Event-Based EALs: These EALs address discrete conditions or events that are generally precursors to fission product barrier degradation, or are otherwise degradations in the level of safety of the plant. Events may be external (e.g., severe weather, earthquakes, loss of offsite power) internal (e.g., fires, explosions, instrumentation failure) or may involve radioactivity releases.

3.1.2 The EALs are grouped by recognition category as follows:

Tab 1 Fission Product Barrier Matrix Tab 2 System Degradation Tab 3 Loss of Power Tab 4 Hazards and ED Judgement Tab 5 Destructive Phenomena Tab 6 Shutdown Systems Degradation Tab 7 Radiological 3.1.3 Each of the EAL tabs includes one or more columns that address one initiating condition (e.g., fires). Each column provides EALs for each of the four emergency classifications, as applicable. A notation adjacent to each EAL identifies the plant operating mode(s) for which the EAL is applicable.

3 Revision 1

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 3.1.4 Each EAL is comprised of a CRITERION, printed in bold type, and one or more INDICATORs. The purpose of each is as follows:

3.1.4.1 CRITERION: identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration) All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

3.1.4.2 INDICATOR: is available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.),

operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Upon occurrence of one or more indicators, the Emergency Director performs an assessment against the criterion. Depending on the particular condition, this assessment may be as simple as a review of the criterion, an instrument channel check, or a detailed calculation as in the case of a radioactivity release.

3.1.4.3 Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

3.1.4.4 The INDICATORs were selected with the objective of providing unambiguous guidance to assist with assessment of the CRITERION. There may be other INDICATORs not envisioned by the writers of this procedure that, in the judgment of the Emergency Director, correspond to the CRITERION. In these cases, the Emergency Director should base the declaration on engineering judgment, using the supplied INDICATORs as examples of the severity of the condition.

4 Revision 1

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 3.2 Common Plant Conditions 3.2.1 IF an event occurs such that both reactor units are affected, e.g.,

tornado, toxic gas offsite, etc., THEN the senior Nuclear Shift Supervisor shall make the appropriate classification and assume the role of Emergency Director.

3.2.2 IF the common plant condition results in a higher emergency classification at one reactor unit, THEN the Nuclear Shift Supervisor from that unit shall make the appropriate classification and assume the role of Emergency Director.

3.3 Mode Applicability 3.3.1 The plant operating mode that existed at the time that the event occurred, prior to any protective system or operator action initiated in response to the condition, is compared to the mode applicability of the EALs.

3.3.2 IF an event occurs, and a lower or higher plant operating mode is reached before the classification can be made, THEN the classification shall be based on the mode that existed at the time that the event occurred.

3.3.3 The fission product barrier matrix is applicable only to those events that occur at mode 4 or higher. An event that occurs in modes 5 or 6 shall not be classified using the fission product barrier matrix, even if mode 4 is entered due to subsequent heatup.

In these cases, Tab 6, Shutdown Systems Degradation, shall be used for classification.

3.4 Transient Events 3.4.1 For some EALs the existence of the event, without regard to duration, is sufficient to warrant classification. In these cases, the appropriate emergency classification is declared as soon as the Emergency Director assessment concludes that the CRITERION is met.

3.4.2 Some EALs specify a duration of occurrence. For these EALs the classification is made when Emergency Director assessment concludes that the specified duration is exceeded or will be exceeded (i.e., condition can not be reasonably rectified before the duration elapses), whichever is sooner.

5 Revision 1

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/J-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 3.4.3 IF a plant condition meeting an EAL CRITERION is rectified before the specified duration time is exceeded, THEN the event is NOT classified by that EAL. Lower severity EALs, if any, shall be reviewed for possible applicability in these cases.

3.4.4 IF a plant condition meeting an EAL CRITERION is NOT classified at the time of occurrence, but is identified well after the condition has occurred (e.g., as a result of routine log or record review) AND the condition no longer exists, THEN an emergency shall NOT be declared. However, reporting under 10 CFR 50.72 may be required. Such a condition could occur, for example, if a followup evaluation of an abnormal condition uncovers evidence that the condition was more severe than earlier believed.

3.4.5 IF an emergency classification was warranted, but the plant condition has been rectified (such that the CRITERION is no longer met) prior to declaration and notification, THEN the following guidance applies:

3.4.5.1 For transient events that would have been declared as UNUSUAL EVENTS, no emergency is declared.

However, the event shall be reported to those local, state, and Federal agencies designated to receive the initial notification form. These agencies shall be told that the UNUSUAL EVENT condition was rectified upon detection and no emergency is being declared.

3.4.5.2 For transient events that would have been declared as an ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY, or GENERAL EMERGENCY, the event shall be declared and the emergency response organization activated. The EAL CRITERIA for these events has been set at a threshold that warrants declaration even if the initiating condition has been rectified. Termination can occur when the criteria of EPP/IP-6.2, Termination of the Emergency and Recovery can be satisified.

3.5 Declaration Timing and Assessment Emergency conditions shall be classified as soon as the Emergency Director assessment of the INDICATORs shows that the CRITERION is met. IF the EAL specifies a duration, THEN the event shall be declared as soon as it is determined that the condition cannot be corrected within the specified period. In either case, the assessment time starts from the indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

6 Revision 1

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 3.5.1 The assessment time is limited to 15 minutes, except as follows:

3.5.1.1 IF the EAL specifies a duration (e.g., release exceeds 2x TIS for one hour), THEN the assessment time runs concurrently with the required duration AND is the same length (e.g., in this example, one hour).

3.5.1.2 The assessment time and any required duration are NOT additive.

3.5.2 IF the assessment cannot be completed within the specified period, THEN the event must be declared on the basis of INDICATORs that cannot be reasonably discounted.

3.6 Bases 3.6.1 Chapter 4 of the BVPS EPP provides the bases for these EALs.

The bases can be used for guidance to assist the Emergency Director in classifying events for which the classification is not immediately apparent.

3.7 Defined Terms 3.7.1 In the EALs, words written in bold uppercase letters are defined terms having specific meanings as they relate to this procedure.

Definitions of these terms are provided on the reverse side of most pages in the EAL section of this procedure. Such terms shall be interpreted as provided in the definitions.

E. PROCEDURE 1.0 DETERMINE OPERATING MODE THAT EXISTED AT THE TIME THAT THE EVENT OCCURRED PRIOR TO ANY PROTECTION SYSTEM OR OPERATOR ACTION INITIATED IN RESPONSE TO THE EVENT.

2.0 DETERMINE IF THE CONDITION AFFECTS FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS AND, IF SO, PROCEED TO TAB 1.

2.1 IF the condition involves any of the following AND the initial mode was 1-4 THEN proceed to Tab 1 and follow instructions provided AND continue with Step 2.2.

2.1.1 CSF status tree ORANGE PATH or RED PATH conditions 2.1.2 Core exit thermocouple readings above 719 F 7 Revision 1

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 2.1.3 Reactor vessel full range water level less than 40% (no RCPs) 2.1.4 Elevated RCS activity >300 p.Ci/gm 2.1.5 Elevated Containment High Range Area Radiation Monitor reading 2.1.6 RCS leakrate large enough to require a 2nd charging pump 2.1.7 Loss of RCS subcooling 2.1.8 Steam Generator Tube Rupture 2.1.9 Containment bypass or loss of integrity 2.1.10 Rise in containment pressure or hydrogen concentration 2.2 Consider other related event-based EALs. IF other EALs are applicable, THEN perform Steps 3.0 and 4.0 if necessary. Otherwise, go to Step 5.0 3.0 CATEGORIZE THE EVENT INTO ONE OF THE INITIATING CONDITIONS AND LOCATE THE TAB.

3.1 Locate one of the EAL indices provided at the start of each tab.

3.2 Review the index to identify the tab that addresses the event that has occurred.

3.3 Turn to the appropriate tab.

NOTE:

The assessment of an emergency condition shall be completed as soon as possible and within 15 minutes of the occurance of one or more INDICATORs. IF the assessment cannot be completed within the specified period, THEN the event must be declared on the basis of INDICATORs that cannot be reasonably discounted.

NOTE:

IF the EAL specifies a duration (e.g., release exceeds 2x TIS for one hour),

THEN the assessment time runs concurrently with the required duration AND is the same length.

8 Revision 1

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 4.0 ASSESS THE EVENT AND COMPARE TO THE EALS 4.1 Locate the EAL for the highest severity emergency classification that is applicable for the initiating condition and operating mode 4.2 Review the INDICATORs and CRITERION for that EAL 4.3 IF the specified INDICATORs are not observed, THEN:

4.3.1 Proceed to the next lower severity EAL and re-perform step 4.2

& 4.3.

4.3.2 IF none of the EALs for an initiating condition are met, THEN re perform steps 3.0 and 4.0 for related initiating conditions.

4.3.3 IF the actions above do not identify an applicable EAL, THEN review the observed conditions against Tab 4.7, Hazards and Emergency Director Judgment.

4.3.4 IF, after performing the above, no EAL is identified, THEN proceed to step 6.0.

4.4 IF the specified INDICATORs are observed, THEN:

4.4.1 Perform necessary assessments to validate the instrument readings and/or confirm reported observations.

4.4.2 Initiate any sampling, inspections, or dose assessments specified by the EAL.

NOTE:

IF the CRITERION specifies an event or condition duration, THEN the classification shall be made as soon as the duration is exceeded, OR when it is apparent that the duration will be exceeded, whichever is earlier.

4.4.3 Compare the results of the assessments to the CRITERION.

NOTE A given INDICATOR may apply to more than one CRITERION.

The Emergency Director shall review other related EALs for applicability. q 9 Revision 1

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 4.5 IF the assessment concludes that the CRITERION is met, THEN the classification shall be made. Proceed to Step 5.0 4.6 IF the assessment concludes that the CRITERION is not met, THEN re perform steps 3.0 and 4.0 for other related initiating conditions as applicable.

4.7 IF no classification results from the above, THEN proceed to step 6.0.

NOTE:

The declaration of the emergency classification shall be made as soon as the Emergency Director has assessed that the EAL has been met OR will be met, AND within 15 minutes of occurance of the INDICATOR. Once the emergency is classified, notifications to state and local governments shall be completed within 15 minutes of the declaration.

5.0 DECLARE THE EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND TRANSITION TO RESPONSE PROCEDURES 5.1 IF an UNUSUAL EVENT is declared, THEN proceed to EPP/I-2 5.2 IF an ALERT is declared, THEN proceed to EPP/I-3 5.3 IF a SITE AREA EMERGENCY is declared, THEN proceed to EPP/I-4 5.4 IF a GENERAL EMERGENCY is declared, THEN proceed to EPP/I-5 NOTE:

The step below is implemented only if an emergency classification is NOT made. IF a classification is made, THEN the transition indicated in step 5.0 should have been made.

6.0 EVALUATE THE NEED FOR AND MAKE NON-EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS 6.1 IF the abnormal condition is reportable to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 and NPDAP 5.1, THEN perform the following:

6.1.1 Complete the NRC Event Notification Form, Attachment 4 to EPP/IP- 1.1.

10 Revision 1

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-la Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 1 6.1.2 Notify First Energy Communications of the event per NPDAP 5.3 and provide the information on the NRC Event Notification Form.

6.2 IF directed by station management, THEN make courtesy calls to the following state and local agencies on a timely basis consistent with normal working hours.

6.2.1 BCEMA 6.2.2 PEMA 6.2.3 CCEMA 6.2.4 HCOES F. FINAL CONDITIONS 1.0 For emergency events, the transition to the appropriate response procedure has been made and actions pursuant to that procedure are in progress.

2.0 For non-emergency events, required notifications have been completed.

G. ATTACHMENTS 1.0 Tabs for Classification of Emergency Conditions H. FIGURES 1.0 Figures are identified on the EAL indices 11 Revision 1

1.1 Fue

.2aRCSBarrie Clad arrier 1.3 C arrerModes: 1,2,3,4 INSTRUCTIONS F~cii ta -

Potential LOSS NOTE: An INDICATOR is considered to be MET1.f the stated Potential LOSS CNMT CSF RED PATH threshold has been, or is, reached or exceeded, on the Core Cooling CSF RED Core Potential LOSS CSF Cooling ~ RCS Integrity CSF RED Not Applicable OR basis of confirmed observation or VALID instrument ORANGE PATH OR Heat Not applicable PATH OR Heat Sink CSF readings. The Emergency Director must use judgement PATH PActions of FR-C. I (RED PATH Sink CSF RED PATR PATH) are INEFFECTIVE when classifying parameters that may be transitory (e.g..

CS RE-AT ORnkEDPT oenilLS containment pressure).

i LL2.316e HoihtesCETCs LS ,Potential 12.2 ,,RioatokV.essel:Water,Level

-L~.R Potential LOSS ContC c.N7TE: The INDICATOR should be considered MET if the lLOSS FSullRge<40%'***O**!"* i~ i*~

RVGretertan100Freatetha7S NT pesr >4 parameter is indeterminate due to instruments that are no

• RCPs S running)  !.'I!:*Rapid unexplained drop available or out of range and the eiste t (no Not Applicable CNMT pressure >45 inRS.eCNMT i" NMTresur0can pressure PSIG not be reasonably discounted.

113 ~0 following initial rise OR e V e r .

Potential LOSS Potential LOSS OR CNMT H2 rises >4%

CNMT pressure or sump OR NOTE: An INDICATOR is considered to be 4f MET i th RVLIS Full Range <40% RCS leak results in loss of Unisolable RCS leak that (no RCPs running) ~ RCS subcooling requires an additional level response NOT CNMT pressure >8 PSIG8Judgement of the Emergency Director, the INDICATOR wil Not Applicable be MET imminently (i.e., within I to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> in the absence charging pump be started consistent with LOCA with less than one full with letdown isolated.t conditions train of CNMT spray of a viable success path). The classification shall be madeft

. .. _fety as soon as this determination is made.

OR"k.s a Potential LOSS . INDICATORS in In the matrix to the left, review the LOSSDCATOSSar injection actuation indicated by direct entry into EOP E-1?amorewIt each barrier column. If one or more INDIC required by EOP E-0 CNMT isolation is incomplete creating a Not Applicable met, check the LOSS block at the bottom of the column.

"direct releaseipatheto then 2. If no LOSS is identified for a particular barrier, review the

. -41 ~environment whenba

~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~required ptnilLS NIAOSfrta air foeo

. eco INDICATORSefor thatt Potential LOSS AmPotential LOSSrpotentialeLOSS more INDICATORS are met, check thtluena SGTR that results in a safety actuation Not Applicable RCS activity >300la~igmoseequialet Nt Aplicbleinjection block at the bottom of the barrier column.

V.Ci/gm dose equivalent Not Applicable

- 3. Compare the blocks checked to the CRITERIA below and

-ti sPzoE-OEe SEntry into E-3 required by .-

.kethe ~maEOPs appropriate declaration.

- '~o-'~Potential LOSS f-RUPTURED S/G is also Unexplained VALID rise . *4 PotentAIDrLOSSeadingnexFAULTED Outside of in reading on area or RM-CH101 A or B VALID VALID reading exceeds: CNMT ventilation monitors in GENERAL EMERGENCY Not Applicable OR contiguous areas with reading greater than 3.5E5 Not Applicable P-to-S leakrate > T/S known LOCA LOSS of any Two (2) barriers and Potential LOSS of thin(

cpm with letdown unisolated TieAer RM-202 RM-20* barrier.

with approx. 4-8 hr. OR 0-0.5 i20 1.5 OR 0.5-4 70 1.0 steam release from Hi-Hi Alarm on RM-2-12 40 0.5 affected SIG via RW-IOOA,BC, or D LOSS of all three (3) barriers.

-o ,nonisolable MSSV. AND affected HX is SGADV, or from MSLB NOT isolated of CNMT

• SITE AREA EMERGENCY 7121..- ot'-wrl-"outside

- . ' , . , LOSS or Potential LOSS of any Two (2) barriers.

"Potential LOSS -

Potential LOSS LOSS of one (1) barrier and a Potential LOSS of a second reading exceeds: No plcbeVALID nanet'O Not applicable VALID reading exceeds: barrier.

Time After RM-2i9AIB

/DhrTime M-20i Not applicable -.

After RM-219A RM-201 SID. Jhrs RAhr ALERT

-0.5- 714 3800o a irac Due to streaming thru Rr

-o*D osramirk t 0.5- 1.5E4 .IED 3-0.5 Any LOSS or Potential LOSS of Fuel Clad barrier.

12-24 42 200 airlock 0.5-4 5.2H3 3.464 O e *'*"'.:.

• 4-12u2i~ ~~T*R*""

201.3 E.43 Any LOSS pr Potential LOSS NSA of RCSVNbarrier.

Aycnion that, in the judgement of 6he NSS/ED,*

Any condition that, in the judgement of the NSS/ED, Any conditi'o .UNUSUAL EVENT indicates loss or potential loss of the Fuel Clad barrier indicates loss or potential loss of the RCS barrier_- D NSS/ED, A f te RS brrir ~Any poental lssoabove.A los condition that, in the judgement of the he S D LOSS or Potential LOSS of CNMT barrier.

cornarable to the indicators listed above. indiate coinarable to the indicators listed

,,* * . indicates loss or potential loss of the Containment barrier See also EAL's:

-copal comparable to the indicators listed above.2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation (RCS Specifi

-- '* F*1 * *. - 2.5 RCS Unidentified or Pressure Bouniy Leakage S*, ..*. ,.,.**_ - 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage

___ - ~~~~~9------ -. - 9 il Revisicu I

DEFINITIONS/A CRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SIT E ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violent protesting station operations or activities at the site. structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Pote for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of .

Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment numer " contained therein.

values which define that condition (Le., the basis of the declaration). A classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas that ti condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

ha been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for thes RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) which c indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergenc Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety functior safety injection.

required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to tht environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation Hea of Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one the or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25%

BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will thermal not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100.

Refer tc Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A.

EXPLOSION. A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made of BVPS or one of its vendors. on the force. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., TOXIC GAS: A steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam inhalation or skin contact gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of (e.g., chlorine).

generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not t, such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that not result in corrective constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with if abnormal or emergency large quantities of smoke and heat are observed. procedures are UNPLANNED.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity ensure that demands will be met by the station is UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints.

received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates.

this and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available VALID when it is conclusively verified by (I) an instrument channel check, or (2) to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded.

by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a

the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e.. within 15 minutes).

reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Exnple thermocouple temperatures).

damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g.. paint chipping, protected area without authorization. scratches) should not be included.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.

contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure.

LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger tht the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

public health and safety by exposure to radiation )

EPPI-lA Att I 2.3 ailue o Rx rotetio I S S Criterion / Indicator 2.Ios fInsru enato Mod*I 2.2 Leossnof Fuactioo Monde Criterion / Indicator I . . -.. . ,

Criterion / Indicator Mode Crtterion / Indicator II A-W-Mode I ---------- I AVAv- i ----------- ----------

Reactor power >5 % after VALID trip signal(s) Refer to Tab I "FissionProduct BarrierMatrix'"

Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" Inability to cool the core and loss of core cooling capability

[1 or 2) and Tab 7 "Radiological Effluents" [1 and 2]

( 1. Actions of FR-C.I (RED PATH) are I. Ops personnel report FR-S.1 has been INEFFECTIVE

2. [a and b] entered and subsequent actions do NOT 1 1 result in reduction of power to <5% and 2 a. Five hottest core exit thermocouples 2 decreasing 3 >1200 F; or five hottest core exit 4 thermocouples >719 F with NO RCPs running and RVLIS full range level 2. [a orb]

<40% a Ops personnel report CSF status tree RED PATH terminus exists for core

b. Actions taken have NOT resulted in a cooling or heat sink rising trend in RVLIS full range level or a dropping trend in core exit b. Five hottest core exit thermocouples

>1200 F; or five hottest core exit thermocouple temperatures within 15 thermocouples >719 F with NO RCPs minutes of initiation of restoration actions running and RVLIS full range level <40%

I IIReactor --------- - I Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" I

Loss of function needed to achieve or maintain trip failure after VALID Trip signal(s) Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" i

Inability to monitor a SIGNIFICANT with reactor power >5% and attempts to cause hot shutdown TRANSIENT in progress [1 or21 a manual trip from the control room are

[I and 2 and 3 and 41 unsuccessful.

1. Loss of most (>75%) annunciators pr 1. Ops personnel report a CSF status tree RED PATH terminus for core cooling or heat sink indications exists Ops personnel report FR-S.I has been

2. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress 1 entered and manual reactor trip from control 1 Five hottest core exit thermocouples >1200 2

3. Loss of SER and SPDS 2. room did NOT result in reduction of power to 2 I F; or five hottest core exit thermocouples

4. Inability to directly monitor any of the 2 <5% and decreasing 3 >719 F with NO RCPs running and RVLIS following CSFs: 3 4 full range level <40%

4 Subcriticality Vessel Integrity Also Refer to Tab 2.3 "Failure of Reactor Core Cooling Containment Protection" and Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Heat Sink Matrix"

( I reactor trip did not occur after Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" I I i Inability to achieve cold shutdown when i Automatic Automatic reactor trip did not occur after Refer to Tab I "FissionProductBarrierMalfix UNPLANNED loss of most annunciators oIr VALID trip signal and manual trip from required by Technical Specifications indications for >15 minutes with either a control room was successful 11 and 2and31 SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress or a [1 and 2) loss of non-alarming compensatory indications

1. Loss of decay heat removal capability (RHR,

[I and 2 and 3] l. VALID reactor trip signal received or CCR, or RPRW) 1 required.

1 1. UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%) 2 2 annunciators or indications for >15 minutes 2. Inability to remove heat via the condenser 1 3 2 2. Manual reactor trip from control room was 3 2. NSS judgement that additional personnel successful and power is <5% and decreasing 4 3. Shutdown to mode 5 required by T/S 4 (beyond normal shift complement) are required to monitor the safe operation of the unit

3. [a orb]

a. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress i

t Reactor coolant system specific activity esceeds

b. Loss of SER .dd SPDS Reactor(refer LCO coolant to system BVPS specific activity technical elceeds specification i lUNPLANNED loss of most annunciators or UNPLANNED Loss of communications Not Applicable 3.4.8)

[1 or 21 indications for >15 minutes [1 or 2)

[I and 2) I. In-plant [a and b and cl 1. VALID high alarm on RM-CH-IOA sr B

a. UNPLANNED Loss of All Pax Phones 21 reactor coolant letdown monitor

1. UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%) b. UNPLANNED Loss of All Gaitronics annunciators or indications for >15 minutes (Page/Party) 1 ALL 2. Radiochemistry analysis exceeds Tedmical

c. UNPLANNED Loss of All Radios 4 2 2. NSS judgement that additional personnel Specification 3.4.8.

(Handie-Talkies) 5 3 (beyond normal shift complement) are 4 required to monitor the safe operation of the 2. Offsite [a and b and c]

unit a. UNPLANNED Loss of ENS

b. UNPLANNED Loss of Bell Lines

c. UNPLANNED Loss of Radios to Offsite

- Ji ILKisiou I

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SIT E ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards, -Pant CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violenti ]y structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. F protesting station operations or activities at the site. for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity or )a the affected stawure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numen ic contained therein.

values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). A Ae The PROTECTED AREA encompasses classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that th as within all owner controlled areas the security perimeter fence as shown condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION ha on Figure 4-A.

been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for thes ;e RED PATH:

Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) c)f indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. ýY RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety functionn safety injection.

required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the e SABOTAGE:

environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Hea Y plant Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or equipment with the intent to render the mis-operation of Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity equipment unavailable.

(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% fiuI electrical load: (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A.

The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to force.

interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is mao-&

such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with large quantities of smoke and heat are observed. abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints, received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other minimum dilution flow, minimum release times. maximum release rates.

evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.-.., within 15 minutes).

minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE:

Damage to equipment or structure that is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping.

protected area without authorization. scratches) should not be included.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the fail,"

LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger )

the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance public health and safety by exposure to radiation level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

EPPJI-lz Art I 12.6 RCS Identiried Leakage I Mode Criterion / Indicator Mode Criterion / Indicator I M.oe Criterion I/rInicator I Mode Criterion / Indicator Tab I1 "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Refer to Tab "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission ProductBarrierMatrix" Not Applicable Not Applicable 4- 1.

Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" i

Refer to Tab)I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" Not Applicable Not Applicable I

ii

-- - -- . i I --. 4 Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" Refer to Tab 2.2, "Loss of Function" Not Applicable I i Inability to Reach Required - - -- - -- - .4 Unidentified or pressure boundary RCS Identified RCS leakage >25 GPM Shutdown Mode Safety Limit Has Been Exceeded Within Technical Specification Time Limits [I or 21 leakage >10 GPM

1. Identified RCS leakage (as defined by 11 and 21 Technical Specifications) >25 GPM as 1. The combination of thermal power. RCS

1. Unidentified or pressure boundary leakage indicated below [a orb] 1. A Technical Specification action statement, temperature, and RCS pressure is greater than (as defined by Technical Specifications) >10 requiring a mode reduction, has been entered the safety limit as determined from BVPS GPM as indicated below [a orb]

1 1 a. OST 1.6.2 or 1.6.2A Results 1 Technical Specifications Figure 2.1-1 2 2 2 2. The unit has NOT been placed in the "Reactor Core Safety Limit"

a. OST 1.6.2 results 3 b. UNPLANNED level rise in excess of 3 required mode within the time prescribed by 3

3 4 4 25 GPM total into PRT, DG-TK-l, and 4 the action statement 2. RCS/pressurizer pressure exceeds safety limit 4 b. With RCS temp. and PZR level stable, 5* VCT level dropping at a rate >10 GPM 5* DG-TK-2 5 (>2735 psig)

(>I%/inn indicated on LI-CH-I15 with no VCT makeup in progress)

• Applies to Mode 5 if RCS Pressurized

• Applies to Mode 5ifRCS Pressurized - I .4

-I I Retiim

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Potent CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of ti.

protesting station operations or activities at the site.

affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric contained therein.

values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function safety injection.

required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity (Containment)and Inventory (RCS).

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full elecurical load; (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A.

The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to force. interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or healnh by reason of steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam inhalation or skin contact (e.g.. chlorine).

generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not fl.

expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that

)

such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints.

conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates.

received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).

reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structme that is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Exbmple thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g.. paint chipping.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a scratches) should not be included.

protected area without authorization.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure.

in destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger iih LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified public health and safety by exposure to radiation the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

I- - nr I--- -

Fi ~in- Bea

- .i~i*~~rhi m 1 210 StamFed in EPP/I-la1 I ..V IUF II alu- Attachment

-Mode Criterion / Indicator Mode Criterion / Indicator I Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" 0

Refer to Tab I "Fission ProductBarrierMatrix" 7-- Refer to Tab)I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" C

Table 2-1 i

iI Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" I Plant Areas Associated With Shield Wall Turbine failure generated missiles cause penetration of a missile shield wall of any area Penetra'tion EAL containing safety related equipment

1. Plant personnel report missiles generated by Control Room Cable Tray Mezz Electrical Switchgear Containment turbine failure with casing penetration also results in a through-wall penetration of a Safeguards Primary Aux. Building 1 missile shield wall listed in Table 2-1 Diesel Generator Bldg 1WT-TK-10 2

3 v i UNPLANNED rapid depressurization of the Turbine failure results in casing penetration Main Steam System resulting in a rapid RCS

1. Plant personnel report a turbine failure which cooldown and Safety Injection actuation results in penetration of the turbine casing or

[I and 2] ,4w damage to main generator seals with

1. Ops personnel report rapid depressurization evidence of significant hydrogen or seal oil 1 leakage 1 of Main Steam System that causes SLI (<500 2 psig) 2 3

3 4 2. Ops personnel report Safety Injection has actuated 0 C4

- JI

-'I.

R-vision I

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violentl ly structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Po.

protesting station operations or activities at the site. for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity oi ,le)l affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeri ic contained therein.

values which define that condition (i.e.. the basis of the declaration). A]11 The PROTECTED AREA encompasses classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that th ts within all owner controlled areas the security perimeter fence as shown condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION ha on Figure 4-A.

been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for thesee RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) o)f indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. y RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety functior n safety injection.

required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to thee SABOTAGE:

environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Hea Y plant Deliberate damage, mnis-alignment, or mis-operation of equipment with the intent to render the Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity equipment unavailable.

(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result t reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% fufl electrica] load; (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to

) Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A.

The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to force.

interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. inhalation or skin contact (e.g.. chlorine).

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with large quantities of smoke and heat are observed. abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases,a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints, received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates&

evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).

minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses.

improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern Damage is regarding the continued operability or vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Ekample thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping.

Suspected hostile individual present in a scratches) should not be included.

protected area without authorization.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger I1 the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance public health and safety by exposure to radiation level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

EPP/I-la ILs IoA (Pw 132 Lo o AC 3.3 Losef CriProwerIdcao Attachment 1 I Mode Criterion / Indicator Mode Criterion / Indicator .. r C_

• ,rio_.__n ite.. /_I-ndicator.*

Prolonged loss of offsite and onsite AC power Refer to Tab 6 "Shutdown System Degradation" R'efer to Tao i rission rroauctHarnerMatrix

[( and 2] and Tab 2.2 "Loss of Function", and Tab 6.1 "Loss of Shutdown Systems"

1. AE and DF 4KV emergency buses NOT energized from Unit I sources for >15 minutes 1

2

2. [a or b or c] I 3 a. Ops personnel report CSF status tree 4 RED PATH or, ORANGE PATH terminus exists for core cooling

b. Restoration of either AE or DF 4KV emergency bus is NOT likely from any c.

source within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> of loss Five hottest core exit thermocouples 0.

>1200 F 2r five hottest core exit thermocouples >719 F with no RCPs

+

running and RVLIS full range <40% .5. Loss of all vital DC power for >15 minutes Loss of offsite and onsite AC power for >15 Refer to Tab 6 "Shutdown System Degradation" minutes 1. Voltage <110A VDC on DC buses 1-1 and 1 2 and 1-3 and 1-4 for >15 minutes

1. AE and DF 4KV emergency, buses NOT energized from Unit 1 sources for >15 Also Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier minutes 1 Matrix", Tab 2.2 "Loss of Function", and Tab 2.1 1 2 "Loss of Instrumentation" and Tab 6.1 "Loss of 2 3 Shutdown Systems" 3 4 4

( "0 I

i Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix",

4 ______________________

AC power to emergency buses reduced to a UNPLANNED loss of offsite and onsite AC Tab 2.2 "Loss of Function". and Tab 2.1 "Loss of single source of power such that any additional power for >15 minutes Instrumentation" and Tab 6.1 "Loss of Shutdown failure will result in the de-energization of both Systems" buses 1. AE and DF 4KV emergency buses NOT 0

[I and2) energized from Unit 1 sources for >15 minutes

1. Either AE or DF 4KV emergency bus is de 1 energized for >15 minutes 5 Also Refer to Tab 6 "Shutdown System 2 6 Degradation" 3 2. The energized AE or DF 4KV emergency bus De 4 has only one source of power fuel

[a orb]

a. Emergency diesel generator

b. lAor 1D 4KV normal bus R

r UNPLANNED loss of one train of DC power for >15 Loss of offsite power for >15 minutes UNPLANNED loss of offsite power for >15 minutes

[I and 2) minutes (1 and 2) [1 or21

1. IA ad ID 4KV normal buses de-energized 1. IA and ID 4KV normal buses de-energized 1. Voltage <110.4 VDC on DC Buses 1-1 and for >15 minutes for >15 minutes 1 1-3 for >15 minutes 2

1 2. Each diesel generator is supplying power to 5 2. Either diesel generator is supplying power to 3 2. Voltage <110.4 VDC on DC Buses 1-2 and 2 its respective emergency bus 6 its respective emergency bus 4 1-4 for >15 minutes 3 De 4 fuel Refer to Tab 6.4 "Loss of DC (Shutdown)" for modes .5 6. and defiteled

-'a. ReviionI

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. PoteW protesting station operations or activities at the site. for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity ot affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric contained therein.

values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function safety injection.

required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A.

The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner contronled areas in the EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to force. interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not )

expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events tha such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED. ,-L large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s): Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are Are available via instrumentation, calculations, unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g.. alarm setpoints.

received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates.

evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (I) an instrument channel check, or (2) to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).

reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure hat is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (eg.. pint chipping.

scratches) should not be included.

protected area without authorization.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger th LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in public health and safety by exposure to radiation the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

EPP/I-la1 Attachment 4 s Mode __Criterion I Indicator Monde Criterion

. Indicator

/..........

i'-U FIRE in the control room, cable tray -1 Refer to Tab 4.1 "Fire" or Tab I "Fission Product TABLE 4-1 mezzanine, or process control room resulting in BarrierMatrix" PLANT AREAS ASSOCIATED WITH FIRE AND EXPLOSION EALS an evacuation of the control room per 1.56C.4 "Alternate Safe Shutdown" and loss of any Diesel Containment Building required equipment results in an uncontrolled Control Room Cable Tray Mezz. Intake Gen. Room Str Cubicles Prim. Auxiliary Building RCS Heatup Process Cntrol Rm U I/U2 CV3 Cable Tunnel Safeguards Building 1 [I and 2 and 31 Relay Room AE/DF Switchgear Demin Water (IWT-TK-l1) 2 Rod Drive/MG Rm Fuel Building C02 Storage/PG Pump Rm 3 1. 1.56C.4 "Alternate Safe Shutdown" entered RWST (1QS-TK-I) RW Valve Pit DIG Fuel Oil 4 2. Ops personnel report inability to operate at least one of each of the following components of the available train:

Figure 4-A Charging pump AFW pump Diesel generator PROTECTED AREA / SITE PERIMETER RPRW pump BIP Steam relief path

3. Uncontrolled RCS heatup lasting longer than 15 minutes FIRE in the control room, cable tray Refer to Tab 4.1 "Fire" or Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix"

• ~OH-IO mezzanine, or process control room resulting in an evacuation of the control room per 1.56C.4 "Alternate Safe Shutdown"

1. 1.56C.4 "Alternate Safe Shutdown" entered I. r-14 2

4 3

"Protected r iz Area PERIETER 0%

(

I - - . - -- . - - . i EXPLOSION in any of the areas listed in Table FIRE in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that 4-1 that is affecting safety related equipment is affecting safety related equipment [1 and 2]

[1 and 2)

1. EXPLOSION in any of the listed areas in

1. FIRE in any of the listed areas in Table 4-1 Table 4-1

2. [aorb]

All All 2. [a orb]

a. Ops personnel report VISIBLE Ops personnel report VISIBLE DAMAGE to permanent structure or a. 1.q DAMAGE to permanent structure or equipment in listed area due to FIRE equipment in listed area

b. Control room indication of degraded b. Control room indication of degraded system or component (within listed system or component (within listed areas) response due to EXPLOSION areas) response due to FIRE Refer to Tab 4.6 "Security" S.......il *E,

' ' iER~fETERI~iiii~iii~l ii*ii lilii!:*i! i!. l***

,4 i UNPLANNED EXPLOSION in or adjacent to 12 FIRE in or adjacent to those areas listed in those areas listed in Table 4-1 Table 4-1 not extinguished within 15 minutes from the time of control room notification oqr

1. UNPLANNED EXPLOSION in or adjacent qm verification of control room alarm to any of the listed areas in Table 4-1 0,

All All Refer to Tab 4.1 "Fire" or Tab I "Fission ProductBarrierMatrix" Refer to Tab 4.6 "Security" Revision I

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Pot,")

protesting station operations or activities at the site. for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity ot ...e affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric contained therein.

values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function safety injection.

required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine nmback >25% thermal BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full ele cal load; (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A.

The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to force. interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health byr=asonof steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not )

expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s): Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are Are available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints.

received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e. within 15 minutes).

minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g.,paint chipping, protected area without authorization. scratches) should not be included.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger:

the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance public health and safety by exposure to radiation level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

EPP/I-la1 Attachment a I 144

-Mode Toxic Criterion / Indicator TABLE 4-2 HAS BEEN DELETED Criterion/Indicator -r Refer to Tab 4.1 "tire",T ao b4.2 rxplosion, Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" or

--- i Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" I

I II Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" I FIGURE 4-B HAS BEEN DELETED Refer to Tab 4.1 "Fire", Tab 4.2 "Explosion", or Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" I I

T i Release of TOXIC GAS within, or contiguous Release of flammable gas within, or contiguous to, a VITAL AREA which jeopardizes to, a VITAL AREA which jeopardizes operation of systems required to maintain safe operation of systems required to maintain safe operations or to establish or maintain cold operations or to establish or maintain cold shutdown (Mode 5). (1 and 2) shutdown (Mode 5).

1. Report or detection of a TOXIC GAS within,

1. Report or detection of a flammable gas or contiguous to, a VITAL AREA or an area All All required for continued safe operation in within, or contiguous to, a VITAL AREA in concentrations greater than explosive concentrations that will be life threatening to concentrations. plant personnel.

2. Plant personnel would be unable to perform actions necessary for continued safe operation or to establish and maintain cold shutdown (Mode 5) while utilizing appropriate personnel protection equipment.

i Release of flammable gas affecting the iI Release of TOXIC GAS affecting the PROTECTED AREA deemed detrimental to PROTECTED AREA deemed detrimental to the safe operation of the plant.

the safe operation of the plant. (1 or 2)

(1 or2) 1. (a and b)

1. (aand b) a. Report or detection of TOXIC GAS that

a. Report or detection of flammable gas that All could enter the SITE PERIMETER in All amounts that can affect normal operation could enter the SITE PERIMETER in amounts that can affect normal operation of of the plant (Refer to Figure 4-A).

the plant (Refer to Figure 4-A). b. Normal operation of the plant is impeded

b. Normal operation of the plant is impeded due to access restrictions implemented by the Control Room within the due to access restrictions implemented by to PROTECTED AREA (Refer the Control Room within the PROTECTED E Figure 4-A).

AREA (Refer to Figure 4-A).

2. Report by local, county or State officials for a potential evacuation of site personnel based

,U

2. Report by local, county or State officials on an offsite event.

for a potential evacuation of site personnel based on an offsite event. Refer to AOP 1/2 44A.] ."Chlorinetoxic Gas Release", Attachment 3 for a list of chemicals stored, produced, or transported near BVPS and their toxicity limits. Revisku I I1 I

Figure 4-C

)

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY

• EXCLUSION AREA

• / BOUNDARY

EPPII-Ia1 Attachment 4.7 EergecyDrierinIdcatorJugmn Mode Criterion / Indicator S......

L-1 i Events are in process or have occurred which Mode Criterion / Indicator Criterion I indicator involve actual or imminent substantial core Refer to Tab 4.1 "FIRE" Security event resulting in loss of control of the Nv, degradation or melting with potential for loss of systems necessary to establish or maintain cold containment integrity. Releases can be reasonably shutdown

[1 or 2] expected to exceed EPA protective action guidelines exposure levels outside the

1. Hostile armed force has taken control of the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY. (Refer to control room or the remote shutdown panel Figure 4-C on preceding page.)

2. Hostile armed force has taken control of plant All equipment such that Ops personnel report the inability to operate equipment necessary to All maintain the following functions [a orb or c]

a Subcriticality

b. Core cooling C. Heat Sink

.1.

Events are in process or have occurred which

4. involve actual or likely major failures of plant Evacuation of the control room has been Security event has or is occurring which results in actual or likely failures of plant functions functions needed for the protection of the public.

initiated and control of all necessary equipment Any releases are NOT expected to result in needed to protect the public [fI or 2) has not been established within 15 minutes of exposure levels which exceed EPA protective action manning the Shutdown Panel [I and 2] guideline exposure levels outside the EXCLUSION

1. VITAL AREA, other than the control room.

has been penetrated by a hostile armed force AREA BOUNDARY. (Refer to Figure 4-C on

1. AOP 1.33.1 "Control Room Inaccessibility" preceding page.)

has been entered

2. Suspected BOMB detonates within a VITAL AREA All

2. Inability to transfer and operate any single component listed in Table 4-3 within 15 Table 4-3 All EQUIPMENT REQUIRED AT All minutes of manning the shutdown panel SHUTDOWN PANEL Also refer to Tab 4.1 "Fire" One Auxiliary Feedwater Pump One Atmospheric Steam Dump i

Events are in process or have occurred which One Charging Pump Ii Confirmed Security event which indicates an involve an actual or potential substantial Evacuation of the control room is required degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Any One Boric Acid Pump actual or potential substantial degradation in the level of safety of the plant [1 or 2 or 31 releases are expected to be limited to small 1FCV-CH-122

1. AOP 1.33.1 "Control Room Inaccessibility" fractions of the EPA protective action guideline has been entered exposure levels.

1. BOMB discovered within a VITAL AREA

2. CIVIL DISTURBANCE ongoing within the PROTECTED AREA All All 3. PROTECTED AREA has been penetrated All by a hostile armed force Refer to Figure 4-A for a drawing of the PROTECTED AREA Table 4-4 SECURITY EVENTS 1.I Unusual events are in process or have occurred a. SABOTAGE/INTRUSION has M is Occurring Within the 4.

Confirmed Security event which indicates a which indicate a potential degradation of the level PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A) potential degradation in the level of safety of of safety of the plant. No releases of radioactive Not Applicable material requiring offsite response or monitoring the plant [I or 2] b. HOSTAGE/EXTORTION Situation That Threatens W are expected unless further degradation of safety Interrupt Plant Operations

1. BOMB discovered within the PROTECTED systems occurs.

AREA All c. CIVIL DISTURBANCE Ongoing Between the SITE PERIMETER and PROTECTED AREA (Fwmu 4-A)

All 2. Security Shift Supervisor reports one or more of the events listed in Table 4-4 d. Hostile STRIKE ACTION Within the PROTECTED AREA Which Threatens to Interrupt Normal Plant Operations Refer to Figure 4-A for a drawing of the (Judgement Based on Behavior of Strikers an&r nt enc PROTECTED AREA Received) (Figure 4-A)

I cvim I

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launmced towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Poterival CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity (

protesting station operations or activities at the site. affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equiph..zat Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric contained therein.

values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION. (CSFs): A plant safety function safety injection.

required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operafion of environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load. (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A. The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to force. interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is no' FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g.. alarm setpoints, conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rames.

received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (72) to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).

reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or stnrctur that is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. fixample thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g.. paint chipping.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a scratches) should not be included.

protected area without authorization.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger "'e LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in public health and safety by exposure to radiation the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

EPP/1-la1 Attachment Figure 5-A Site Perimeter Iath k.e.

Mode Criterion / Indicator I Mode Criterion / Indicator I I 9 Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" Refer to Tab) "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" z

-- - ---- Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" I-I Tornado .r high wind strikes any structure Earthquake greater than 0.06g acceleration occurs listed in Table 5-1 and results in structural damage [I and 2]

1. Analysis of Accelerograph Recording System 1. Tornado or high wind strikes any structure data indicate ground acceleration >0.06g in listed in Table 5-1 accordance with AOP 1/2.75.3 "Acts of Nature - Earthquake"

2. [a orb]

All a. Confirmed report of any VISIBLE All DAMAGE to specified structures

b. Control room indications of degraded safety system or component response within listed structures due to event Table 5-1 v-I Tornado within the SITE PERIMETER Plant Structures Associated i Earthquake detected by site seismic Tornado/Hi Wind and AircraftWith EALs instrumentation, >0.01g acceleration)[I and 2)

I. Plant personnel report a tornado has been sighted within the SITE PERIMETER Containmenit Building

1. Ann. A11-59 "Seismic Accelerograph (refer to Figure 5-A) Safeguards Building Operation" indicates initiation of the Primary Auk. Building 2.

Accelerograph Recording System

[aorb] All Fuel Handling Building V.

All RWST (1Q3-TK-1)

a. Ground motion sensed by plant C02 Storage/PG Pp Rm personnel Service Building (incl. FW Reg Vlv Rm)

b. Unit 2 reports seismic event detected on Diesel Generator Building unit instrumentation Main Intake Structure Demin. Water Sto. (IWT-TK-10)

-I Revision I

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SIT ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION)

PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a pl-'

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violenl structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Pot )

protesting station operations or activities at the site. for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of we affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any nume:

contained therein.

values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration).

A classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled that th areas condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

h; been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for the: RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) which o indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergenc Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to seconday leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety functio safety injection.

required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to th environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation He: of Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrit plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving the one BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not resul or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load, (3)

Figure 7-A. Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner cormrofled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force tc potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat ol by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the force. BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by mason of generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not tI such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if result abnormalin corrective or mitigative or emergency proceduresactions being taken in accordance with are UNPLANNED.L large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g.. alarm setpoints.

received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates.

evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded.

by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e.. within 15 minutes).

minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability or of affected safety structure, system, or component. Eiample thermocouple temperatures).

damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping.

protected area without authorization. scratches) should not be included.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. contains equipment, systems, components, or material. the failure LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger th the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance public health and safety by exposure to radiation level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

EPP)l-la 5.4 R~~ivrLvlHG I River*eve LO Att I Mod Criterion / Indicator Mode Criterion / Indicator Mode 4-Criterion / Indicator I

l 4 Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product BarrierMatrix'" -- Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" i Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier-- --

Matrix" Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" i Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" Aircraft or PROJECTILE impacts (strikes) River water level > 705 Ft mean sea level __________ 4 any plant structure listed in Table 5-1 resulting [1 or 2] River water level <648.6 Ft Mean Sea Level Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" in structural damage [I or 2) 1 and 21 1. 1LR-CW-101, if accessible, indicates >705

1. Plant personnel report aircraft PROJECTILE 'has impacted any structure or 2.

mean sea level National Weather Bureau (412-644-2882) or

1. ILR-CW-101 indicates < 648.6 Ft Mean Sea Level I ALL listed in Table 5-1 on previous page ALL Montgomery Lock (724-643-8400) reports 2. National Weather Bureau (412-644-2882) or Montgomery Lower Pool stage height >52.48 Montgomery Lock (724-643-8400) Reports

2. [aorb] Ft Montgomery Lower Pool stage height <-3.92

a. Confirmed report of any VISIBLE ALL Ft DAMAGE to specified structures

b. Control Room indications of degraded safety system or component response Note: Mean Sea Level = stage height + 652.52 Ft (within listed structures) due to event Note: Mean Sea Level = stage height + 652.52 Ft I

Aircraft crash or PROJECTILE impact within River water level >700 Ft Mean Sea Level i 4

the SITE PERIMETER [1 or 21 Watercraft strikes primary intake structure Not Applicable and results in a reduction of Reactor Plant or

1. Plant personnel report aircraft crash or 1. 1LR-CW-101 indicates > 700 Ft Mean Sea Turbine Plant River Water Flow PROJECTILE impact within the SITE Level [1 and 2)

PERIMETER (refer to Figure 5-A on 1. Plant personnel report a watercraft has struck ALL previous page) ALL 2. National Weather Bureau (412-644-2882) or the primary intake structure Montgomery Lock (724-643-8400) reports 2. [aorb]

Montgomery Lower Pool stage height

a. RPRW flow reduction indicated by

>47.48 Ft ALL sustained pressure reduction to <20 psig on IPI-RW-113A and/or 113B

b. TPRW flow reduction indicated by sustained pressure reduction (Ann A6 Note: Mean Sea Level = stage height + 652.52 Ft 118 "RAW Water Pump Disch Press Low" <15 psig)

I I -i

-I Revision I

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 1 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Po0,.,ala protesting station operations or activities at the site. for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric contained therein.

values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primay to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function safety injection.

required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity plant equipment with the intent to render the equipmen unavailable..

(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full ekctrical land. (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A.

The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to force. interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to lifeor health by reasor,,

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine). )

UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases,a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints.

received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates.

evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment (i,.. within 15 minutes).

minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structme that is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g.. paint chipping.

protected area without authorization. scratches) should not be included.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL)." Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA wbiwh combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the fail LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in ddestruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger LU, the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance Ipublic health and safety by exposure to radiation level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

EPPII-li AttI 61 Lss f6 htdwnSstm 163 LssfA (S hutown ss(I Soo r Mode Criterion I Indicator Modej -Criterion / Indicator Mode Criterion / Indicator Mode Criterion / Indicator I L-Refer to Tab Z71 "Gaseous Effluents" Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" Refer to Tab 7Z1 C"Gaseous Effluents"

.1 4 Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" Loss of water level in the reactor vessel that has Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" Refer to Tab Z71 "Gaseous Effluents""

or will uncover fuel in the reactor vessel.

71 and 21

1. [a orb]

a. Loss of RHR or CCR or RPRW 5 b. Loss of RCS Inventory with inadequate 6 makeup

2. [aandb]

a Ops personnel report LI-1RC-480, or LI-I RC-482C RCS level instrumentation (if available) in the Control Room indicates a level drop to 0 inches

b. Other confirmed indications of fuel uncoverv I--

.1 UNPLANNED loss of offsite and onsite AC Refrr to Tab 6.1 "Loss of Shutdown Sysums" Inability to maintain unit In cold shutdown Refer to Tab 6.1 "Loss of Shutdown Syste=m" Not Applicable power for >15 minutes]

[I and 2)

1. UNPLANNED Loss of RHR or CCR or 1. AE and DF 4KV emergency buses not RPRW energized from Unit I sources for >15 minutes

2. [a orborc)

a. Core exit thermocouples (CETC) (if 5 5 available) indicate the temperature has 6 6 increased >10 F and has exceeded 200F. De

b. (w/ RHR in service) RHR inlet Fuel temperature has increased >10 F and has Also refer to Tab 6.1 "Loss of Shutdown Systems" exceeded 200 F.

c. (w/o CETCs or RHR), loss has exceeded 30 minutes or there is evidence of boiling in the Rx vessel.

- £ I. i i Loss of Reactor Coolant System Inventory with UNPLANNED loss of all offsite power for >15 UNPLANNED loss of the required train of DC UNPLANNED loss of any function needed for minutes power for >15 minutes cold shutdown that results in a core exit inadequate make-up

[I and 2) [I and 2] [1 or 2) temperature increase of more than 10 F

[I and21 1. IA and ID 4KV normal buses de-energized 1. Voltage <110.4 VDC on DC buses 1-1 and I

1. Ops personnel report LI-IRC-480, or for >15 minutes 3 for >15 minutes if train A is the priority

1. UNPLANNED Loss of RHR or CCR or LI-IRC-482C RCS level instrumentation in train 5 5 the Control Room indicates a level drop to RPRW 6 5 2. Either diesel generator is supplying power to 5 Z Voltage <110.4 VDC on DC buses 1-2 an 1 6 less than 14.5 inches 6 its respective emergency bus 6 4 for >15 minutes if train B is the priority

2. [a orbor c] De De train

a. Core exit thermocouples (CETC) (if 2. Ops personnel report inability to make-up RCS inventory Fuel Fuel available) indicate the temperature has increased >IOF

b. (WI RHR in service) RHR inlet temperature has increased >10 F

c. (w/o CETCs or RHR), loss has exceeded 15 minutes I I Revision I

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. ' tial protesting station operations or activities at the site. for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integritLthe affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric contained therein.

values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function safety injection.

required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermna Shock), Integrity plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A.

The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to force. interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is i FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regardto radioactivity releases,a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition anm procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints.

received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates.

evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).

minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component.- Example thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a rrupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, protected area without authorization. '

scratches) should not be included.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. Ccontains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure.

LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in ddestruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endang the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance t public health and safety by exposure to radiation level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

EPPII-la i

JMode Criterion / Indicator Criterion 7 Indicator Attachment 1 Iefer tao 0 Ta. ZIaseous I rEJJluens" iejer toTa b7. 1 .Gaseous Effluents" I

z Refer to Tab 7.1 Gaseous Effluents" I. -

Refer to Tab 7.1 Gaseous Effluents" rj)

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

(

Major damage to irradiated fuel; or loss of Inadvertent reactor criticality "I water level that has or will uncover irradiated 1. Nuclear instrumentation indicate fuel outside the reactor vessel unanticipated sustained positive startup rate

[1 and 2)

1. VALID Hi-Hi alarm on RM-RM-203 or RM RM-207 or RM-VS-103 A/B or RM-VS-104 3 0

ALL A/B 4

2. [a orb] 5

a. Plant personnel report damage of 6 irradiated fuel sufficient to rupture fuel rods

b. Plant personnel report water level drop has or will exceed available makeup capacity such that irradiated fuel will be uncovered Refer to Tab 6.2 for In-vessel Uncovery i I i

UNPLANNED loss of water level in spent fuel pool or reactor cavity or transfer canal with Not Applicable fuel remaining covered

[1 and 2 and 3]

1. Plant personnel report water level drop in ALL spent fuel pool pr reactor cavity, or transfer canal

2. VALID Hi-Hi alarm on RM-RM-203 or RM RM-207

3. Fuel remains covered with water I -I Re'isza. I Revision I

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. F pial protesting station operations or activities at the site. for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity -. the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric contained therein.

values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by She EOPs wIich assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function safety injection.

required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, nis-alignment, or mis-operation of Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% fail elecrical load; (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A.

The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to force. interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if itis m, FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance, Events that such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not result in corrective or mitigative actions being takea in accordance with constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s): Are available via initrumentation, calculations, Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in ihis definition are procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g.. alarm setpoints.

received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates.

evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e.. within 15 minutes).

minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or stucture that is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. "Example thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g, paint chipping, protected area without authorization. scratches) should not be included.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure.

LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endange:

the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance public health and safety by exposure to radiation level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

TABLE 7-1 EPP/I-la 7.1 Gseou Effuent Attachment I 1E EFFLUENT RADIATION MONITOR EALS I Mode Criterion / Indicator Mode Criterion / Indicator EAB dose resulting from an actual or imminent NOTE: The values below, if exceeded, indicate the need to perform the specified assessment. Ifthe assessment Release of gaseous radioactivity that exceeds 1000 Not Applicable can not be completed within 15 minutes (60 minutes for UE), the declaration shall be made based on mR TEDE or 5000 mR child thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release the VALID reading.

[1 or2 or3j

1. A VALID gas effluent rad monitor reading Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 exceeds the values in Column 4 of Table 7-1 for GENERAL UE ALERT SITE

>15 minutes, unless assessment within this time I period confirms that the CRITERION is NOQ IF A RWDA IS APPLICABLE All exceeded 2x HHSP set 200x HHSP set

2. Field survey results indicate EAB dose >1000 mR by RWDA by RWDA n/a n/a 0-y for the actual or projected duration of the IF A RWDA IS NOT AVAILABLE release

3. EPP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose Vent Vent

>1000 mR TEDE or >5000 mR child thyroid CDE VSi01B 6.00E+3 6.OOE+5 --

for the actual or projected duration of the release VS 109 Ch 5 2.94E+3 2.94E+5 6.01E+5 VS109 Ch 7 .... 6.69E+1 6.69E+2 i -I. VS109 Ch 9 ....-- 1.32E+1 EAB dose resulting from an actual Mr imminent release of gaseous radioactivity that exceeds 100 mR TEDE or 500 mR child thyroid CDE for the actual or Not Applicable VS11I LR SLCRS

--.. 7.32E+3 7.32E+4 z projected duration of the release VS107 B 1.28E+4 ...

[I or2 or 31

1. A VALID gas effluent rad monitor reading VS 110 Ch 5 6.76E+3 6.76E+5 9.08E+5 exceeds the values in Column 3 of Table 7-1 for VS110 Ch 7 .... 7.98E+I 7.98E+2

>15 minutes, unless assessment within this time VS110 Ch 9 ....-- 2.28E+1 period confirms that the CRITERION is NOT VS112HR ....-- 1.53E+1 All exceeded VS112LR .... 1.19E+4 1.19E+5

2. Field survey results indicate EAB dose >100 mR 13-y for the actual or projected duration of the Gas Waste release GW109 Ch 7 4.80E+3 4.80E+5 7.90E+5

3. EPP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose GW109 Ch 9 .... 1.83E+4 1.83E+5

>100 mR TEDE or >500 mR child thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release GWI10HR ..... 1.59E+4 1.59E+5 O GW110LR ......

- -- -- -- -- I Liquid Monitors 0 Any UNPLANNED release of gaseous radioactivity i Any UNPLANNED release of liquid radioactivity LW-104 6.78E+5 ....

that exceeds 200 times the radiological effluent that exceeds 200 times the radiological effluent Technical Specilflcations/Offsite Dose Calculation Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation LW-116 --.....

Manual for 15 minutes Manual for 15 minutes RW-100 3.60E+4 .....

[I or2 or3) [I or 2) RELEASE DURATION, Minutes 60 15 15 15

1. A VALID gas effluent rad monitor reading 1. A VALID liquid effluent rad monitor reading ASSESSMENT METHOD HPM-RP6.12 EFP/IP-2.7 EPP/IP-2.6.x EPP/IP-2.6.x exceeds the values in Column 2 of Table 7-1 for exceeds the values in Column 2 of Table 7-1 for EPP/IP-2.7 EPP/IP-2.6.x All >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time All >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the CRITERION is NOT period confirms that the CRITERION is NOT exceeded exceeded

2. Field survey results indicate >10 mR/hr 13-y at the 2. Sample results exceed 200 times the radiological EAB for >15 minutes effluent Technical Specification/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual value for an unmonitored

3. EPP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose release of liquid radioactivity >15 minutes in

>10 mR TEDE for the duration of the release duration 0'

=

Any UNPLANNED release of gaseous radioactivity Any UNPLANNED release of liquid radioactivity to that exceeds 2 times the radiological effluent the environment that exceeds 2 times the radiological Specifications/Offsite Dose Figure 7-A Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation effluent Technical EXCLUSION AREA Manual for 60 minutes Calculation Manual for 60 minutes fi or 2 or 3) 11 or 21 BOUNDARY

1. A VALID gas effluent rad monitor reading 1. A VALID liquid effluent rad monitor reading exceeds the values in Column I of Table 7-1 for exceeds the values in Column I of Table 7-1 for All >60 minutes, unless assessment within this time All >60 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the CRITERION is NMT period confirms that the CRITERION is NOT exceeded exceeded

2. Field survey results indicate >0.1 mR/hr j3-y at the 2. Sample results exceed 2 times the radiological EAB for >60 minutes effluent technical specification value for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity >60

3. EPP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose minutes in duration

>0.1 mR TEDE for the duration of the release

-d Revision)I

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards "*'t CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. PL.Fia for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the protesting station operations or activities at the site.

affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric contained therein.

values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function safety injection.

required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A bounTdary surrounding the or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A.

The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to force. interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine). )

UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is notthe FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regardto radioactivityreleases, a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g.. alarm setpoints.

received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates.

evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicators operability.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e. within 15 minutes).

minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or stractwe that is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g.. paint chipping, protected area without authorization. scratches) should not be included.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the fa LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endangm .,.

public health and safety by exposure to radiation the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

EPPII-la Attachment I 7.3 RaiationLevel 7 4 l iia 4A

• r a n v Table 7-2 I Mode Criterion!/Indicator Mode Criterion / Indicator Areas Associated With EAL 7.3 Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" or Tab Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" LOCATION C READING INDICATOR Chem Sample Panel (735' PAB) RM-RM-212 >100 nmR/hr general area PASS Sample Pnl (735' PAB) Survey Results >100 mR/hr general area Manual Valve Chg. Pump Survey Resulta >100 mR/hr general area Discharge_(722'_PAB)

Safeguards 752' Valves IHY-110, Survey Result$ >100 mR/hr general area 1 IHY-Il11,_1HY-196,_IHY-197 767' PAB SA9/SAI0 Gas Monitors Survey Results >100 mR/hr general area 752' PAB SPING Monitor RM-RM-210 >100 mR/hr general area 752' Safeguards Valves IRS-157, Survey Results >100 mR/hr general area IRS-159 735' West Cable Vault Valves, Survey Results >100 mR/hr general area 0 - - - . - . -

IIA-90, IHY-101, IHY-102, Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" or Tab Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" IHY-103,_IHY-104 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" 735' Safeguards.(IQSS, AEW) Survey Results >100 mR/hr general area Main Steam Valve Room (752' Survey Results >100 mR/hr general area Safeguards)

A Penetrations (722' Safeguards) Survey Result'; >5 R/hr general area East Cable Vault (735' Safeguards) Survey Results >100 mR/hr general area Normal 4kV Switchgear Survey Results >100 mR/hr general area Process Instrm. Room Survey Results- >100 mR/hr general area AE/DF Switchgear Survey Results >100 mR/hr general area EDG 1-1, 1-2 Survey Results >100 mR/hr general area I

0 i UNPLANNED increases in radiation levels within the Major damage to irradiated fuel; or loss of water facility that impedes safe operations or establishment level that has 9X will uncover Irradiated fuel outside 91 maintenance of cold shutdown the reactor vessel

[1 or 21 11 and 21

1. VALID area radiation monitor readings 9r survey 1. VALID Hi-Hi alarm on RM-RM-203 or RM-RM results exceed 15 mR/hr in the Control Room or 207 gr RM-VS-103 A/B or RM-VS-104 A/B PAF (on U2 DRMS) for >15 minutes 2. [aorb1

2. [a and b] a. Plant personnel report damage of irradiated fuel

a. VALID area radiation monitor readings or All sufficient to rupture fuel rods All b. Plant personnel report water level drop has gr survey results exceed values listed in Table 7-2 will exceed available makeup capacity such

b. Access restrictions impede operation of that irradiated fuel will be uncovered systems necessary for safe operation or the Refer to Tab 6 "Shutdown Systems" for In-vessel ability to establish or maintain cold shutdown Uncovery See Note Below I

i UNPLANNED loss of water level in spent fuel pool or UNPLANNED increase In radiation levels within the facility reactor cavity or transfer canal with fuel remaining covered I. VALID area radiation monitor readings increase [( and 2 and 3]

by a factor of 1000 over normal levels for >15 minutes 1. Plant personnel report water level drop in spent All Note: In either the BUE or ALERT EA1.l the ED nmst fuel pool or reactor cavity, or transfer canal 4

ALL 2. VALID Hi-Hi alarm on RM-RM-203 orRM-RM determine the cause of increase in radiation levels and review other CRITERIAIINDICATORS for 207 Qr U' applicability(e.g., a dose rate of 15 mR/hr in the Control Room could be caused by a release associated with a 3. Fuel remains covered with water more significant event).

-I I ----------

Ecvism I

DEFINITIONSIACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards - "r structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Pk'. a, CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the protesting station operations or activities at the site. affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric contained therein.

values.which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function safety injection.

required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A.

The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to force. interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of steami or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).I) generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is no. cth FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints.

conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates.

received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).

reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a scratches) should not be included.

protected area without authorization.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the f-' .

destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly rndang, Z LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in public health and safety by exposure to radiation the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

EPP/I-lb Unit 2 A5.735B RECOGNITION AND CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS

'C©§UTOLLED BYm UHMT 2 Revision 1

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 2 EFFECTIVE INDEX Issue 8 Rev. 0 OSC Approved 3-12-87 1 OSC Approved 8-13-87 2 OSC Approved 10-8-87 3 OSC Approved 2-9-88 4 OSC Approved 2-9-89 5 Non-Safety Related 3-15-89 6 OSC Approved 4-18-89 7 OSC Approved 4-12-90 Issue 9 Rev. 0 Non-Intent Revision 10-9-90 1 OSC Approved 4-4-91 2 Non-Intent Revision 12-29-92 3 OSC Approved 1-27-93 Rev. 5 OSC Approved 12-9-93 6 OSC Approved 10-7-94 7 OSC Approved 7-22-98 8 Non-Intent Revision 12-31-99 Rev. 0 OSC Approved 4-17-01 Rev. 1 Non-Intent Revision 12-12-01 Revision 1 i

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS A. Purpose B. References C. Responsibilities D. Action Levels/Precautions E. Procedure F. Final Condition G. Attachments Revision 1 ii

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 2 A. PURPOSE 1.0 This procedure describes the immediate actions to be taken to recognize and classify an emergency condition.

2.0 This procedure identifies the four emergency classifications and emergency action levels.

3.0 Reporting requirements for non-emergency abnormal events are provided.

B. REFERENCES 1.0 Beaver Valley Power Station Emergency Preparedness Plan and Implementing Procedures.

2.0 Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix E.

3.0 NUREG-0654JFEMA-REP-1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants 4.0 Beaver Valley Power Station Operating Manual 5.0 NUMARC/NESP-007, Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels 6.0 ERS-SFL-91-041-REV 1 (U1/U2 Containment Monitor Readings due to LOCA's with various Source Terms).

7.0 Condition Report #992522 8.0 Condition Report #991327-1 9.0 Unit 1 Technical Specification Amendment 205 and Unit 2 Technical Specification Amendment 101.

10.0 EPPOS #2 "Emergency Preparedness Position (EPPOS) on Timeliness of Classification of Emergency Conditions".

11.0 NEI 99-02 "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline" 12.0 Condition Report #00-3939 Revision 1 1

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 2 C. RESPONSIBILITY The Emergency Director (Shift Supervisor, until properly relieved by a designated alternate) has the responsibility and authority for the performance of the actions prescribed in this procedure.

D. ACTION LEVELSIPRECAUTIONS/GUIDANCE 1.0 ACTION LEVELS 1.1 An off-normal event has occurred.

1.2 An action step in a plant operating or emergency operating procedure refers to this procedure for classification of the indicated plant condition.

2.0 PRECAUTIONS 2.1 The Emergency Director must review all applicable EALs to ensure that the event is properly classified since a given INDICATOR may be associated with more than one CRITERION. A particular INDICATOR omitted from the fission product barrier matrix may be addressed as an event-based EAL in one of the other tabs. Event-based EALs may escalate to the fission product barrier matrix. The Emergency Director may need to consider related events (e.g., fire and explosion) or the possible consequences of the event (e.g., fire in an MCC resulting in loss of AC) in classifying an event.

2.2 Continued surveillance and assessment of plant conditions are necessary to ensure that the emergency classification is appropriately revised as conditions change, or as more definitive information is obtained.

2.3 If there is any doubt with regard to assessment of a particular EAL, the EAL Basis Document (i.e., Chapter4 of the EPP)entry for that EAL can be reviewed. Classifications shall be consistent with the fundamental definitions of the four emergency classifications (tabulated in Tab 4.7).

2.4 The Emergency Director shall take whatever mitigative or restoration actions are necessary to protect public health and safety. The Emergency Director shall not reject courses of action solely on the basis that the action would result in escalation of the emergency classification.

Revision 1 2

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 2 3.0 GUIDANCE 3.1 Structure of the EALs 3.1.1 There are two types of Emergency Action Levels included in this procedure:

3.1.1.1 Barrier-Based EALs: These EALs address conditions that represent potential losses, or losses, of one or more of the Fuel Clad, RCS, or Containment fission product barriers. INDICATORs of these conditions include CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION status, fundamental indications such as subcooling or reactor vessel water level, or auxiliary indications such as containment radiation monitor readings. Classifications are based on the number of barriers lost or potentially lost.

3.1.1.2 Event-Based EALs: These EALs address discrete conditions or events that are generally precursors to fission product barrier degradation, or are otherwise degradations in the level of safety of the plant. Events may be external (e.g., severe weather, earthquakes, loss of offsite power) internal (e.g., fires, explosions, instrumentation failure) or may involve radioactivity releases.

3.1.2 The EALs are grouped by recognition category as follows:

Tab 1 Fission Product Barrier Matrix Tab 2 System Degradation Tab 3 Loss of Power Tab 4 Hazards and ED Judgement Tab 5 Destructive Phenomena Tab 6 Shutdown Systems Degradation Tab 7 Radiological 3.1.3 Each of the EAL tabs includes one or more columns that address one initiating condition (e.g., fires). Each column provides EALs for each of the four emergency classifications, as applicable. A notation adjacent to each EAL identifies the plant operating mode(s) for which the EAL is applicable.

Revision 1 3

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 2 3.1.4 Each EAL is comprised of a CRITERION, printed in bold type, and one or more INDICATORs. The purpose of each is as follows:

3.1.4.1 CRITERION: identifies the emergency condition and any numeric values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration) All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

3.1.4.2 INDICATOR: is available via instrumentation, calculations, procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.),

operator knowledge of plant conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Upon occurrence of one or more indicators, the Emergency Director performs an assessment against the criterion. Depending on the particular condition, this assessment may be as simple as a review of the criterion, an instrument channel check, or a detailed calculation as in the case of a radioactivity release.

3.1.4.3 Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

3.1.4.4 The INDICATORs were selected with the objective of providing unambiguous guidance to assist with assessment of the CRITERION. There may be other INDICATORs not envisioned by the writers of this procedure that, in the judgment of the Emergency Director, correspond to the CRITERION. In these cases, the Emergency Director should base the declaration on engineering judgment, using the supplied INDICATORs as examples of the severity of the condition.

Revision 1 4

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 2 3.2 Common Plant Conditions 3.2.1 IF an event occurs such that both reactor units are affected, e.g.,

tornado, toxic gas offsite, etc., THEN the senior Nuclear Shift Supervisor shall make the appropriate classification and assume the role of Emergency Director.

3.2.2 IF the common plant condition results in a higher emergency classification at one reactor unit, THEN the Nuclear Shift Supervisor from that unit shall make the appropriate classification and assume the role of Emergency Director.

3.3 Mode Applicability 3.3.1 The plant operating mode that existed at the time that the event occurred, prior to any protective system or operator action initiated in response to the condition, is compared to the mode applicability of the EALs.

3.3.2 IF an event occurs, and a lower or higher plant operating mode is reached before the classification can be made, THEN the classification shall be based on the mode that existed at the time that the event occurred.

3.3.3 The fission product barrier matrix is applicable only to those events that occur at mode 4 or higher. An event that occurs in modes 5 or 6 shall not be classified using the fission product barrier matrix, even if mode 4 is entered due to subsequent heatup. In these cases, Tab 6, Shutdown Systems Degradation, shall be used for classification.

3.4 Transient Events 3.4.1 For some EALs the existence of the event, without regard to duration, is sufficient to warrant classification. In these cases, the appropriate emergency classification is declared as soon as the Emergency Director assessment concludes that the CRITERION is met.

3.4.2 Some EALs specify a duration of occurrence. For these EALs the classification is made when Emergency Director assessment concludes that the specified duration is exceeded or will be exceeded (i.e., condition can not be reasonably rectifiedbefore the durationelapses), whichever is sooner.

Revision 1 5

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPPII-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 2 3.4.3 IF a plant condition meeting an EAL CRITERION is rectified before the specified duration time is exceeded, THEN the event is NOT classified by that EAL. Lower severity EALs, if any, shall be reviewed for possible applicability in these cases.

3.4.4 IF a plant condition meeting an EAL CRITERION is NOT classified at the time of occurrence, but is identified well after the condition has occurred (e.g., as a result of routine log or record review) AND the condition no longer exists, THEN an emergency shall NOT be declared. However, reporting under 10 CFR 50.72 may be required. Such a condition could occur, for example, if a followup evaluation of an abnormal condition uncovers evidence that the condition was more severe than earlier believed.

3.4.5 IF an emergency classification was warranted, but the plant condition has been rectified (such that the CRITERION is no longer met) prior to declaration and notification, THEN the following guidance applies:

3.4.5.1 For transient events that would have been declared as UNUSUAL EVENTS, no emergency is declared.

However, the event shall be reported to those local, state, and Federal agencies designated to receive the initial notification form. These agencies shall be told that the UNUSUAL EVENT condition was rectified upon detection and no emergency is being declared.

3.4.5.2 For transient events that would have been declared as an ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY, or GENERAL EMERGENCY, the event shall be declared and the emergency response organization activated. The EAL CRITERIA for these events has been set at a threshold that warrants declaration even if the initiating condition has been rectified. Termination can occur when the criteria of EPP/IP-6.2, Termination of the Emergency and Recovery can be satisified.

Revision 1 6

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 2 3.5 Declaration Timing and Assessment Emergency conditions shall be classified as soon as the Emergency Director assessment of the INDICATORs shows that the CRITERION is met. IF the EAL specifies a duration, THEN the event shall be declared as soon as it is determined that the condition cannot be corrected within the specified period. In either case, the assessment time starts from the indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

3.5.1 The assessment time is limited to 15 minutes, except as follows:

3.5.1.1 IF the EAL specifies a duration (e.g., release exceeds 2x TIS for one hour), THEN the assessment time runs concurrently with the required duration AND is the same length (e.g., in this example, one hour).

3.5.1.2 The assessment time and any required duration are NOT additive.

3.5.2 IF the assessment cannot be completed within the specified period, THEN the event must be declared on the basis of INDICATORs that cannot be reasonably discounted.

3.6 Bases 3.6.1 Chapter 4 of the BVPS EPP provides the bases for these EALs.

The bases can be used for guidance to assist the Emergency Director in classifying events for which the classification is not immediately apparent.

3.7 Defined Terms 3.7.1 In the EALs, words written in bold uppercase letters are defined terms having specific meanings as they relate to this procedure.

Definitions of these terms are provided on the reverse side of most pages in the EAL section of this procedure. Such terms shall be interpreted as provided in the definitions.

Revision 1 7

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 2 E. PROCEDURE 1.0 DETERMINE OPERATING MODE THAT EXISTED AT THE TIME THAT THE EVENT OCCURRED PRIOR TO ANY PROTECTION SYSTEM OR OPERATOR ACTION INITIATED IN RESPONSE TO THE EVENT.

2.0 DETERMINE IF THE CONDITION AFFECTS FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS AND, IF SO, PROCEED TO TAB 1.

2.1 IF the condition involves any of the following AND the initial mode was 1-4 THEN proceed to Tab 1 and follow instructions provided AND continue with Step 2.2.

2.1.1 CSF status tree ORANGE PATH or RED PATH conditions 2.1.2 Core exit thermocouple readings above 729 F 2.1.3 Reactor vessel full range water level less than 40% (no RCPs) 2.1.4 Elevated RCS activity >300 gCi/gm 2.1.5 Elevated Containment High Range Area Radiation Monitor reading 2.1.6 RCS leakrate large enough to require a 2nd charging pump 2.1.7 Loss of RCS subcooling 2.1.8 Steam Generator Tube Rupture 2.1.9 Containment bypass or loss of integrity 2.1.10 Rise in containment pressure or hydrogen concentration 2.2 Consider other related event-based EALs. IF other EALs are applicable, THEN perform Steps 3.0 and 4.0 if necessary. Otherwise, go to Step 5.0 3.0 CATEGORIZE THE EVENT INTO ONE OF THE INITIATING CONDITIONS AND LOCATE THE TAB.

3.1 Locate one of the EAL indices provided at the start of each tab.

3.2 Review the index to identify the tab that addresses the event that has occurred.

3.3 Turn to the appropriate tab.

NOTE:

The assessment of an emergency condition shall be completed as soon as possible and within 15 minutes of the occurance of one or more INDICATORs. IF the assessment cannot be completed within the specified period, THEN the event must be declared on the basis of INDICATORs that cannot be reasonably discounted.

Revision 1 8

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 2 NOTE:

IF the EAL specifies a duration (e.g., release exceeds 2x TIS for one hour),

THEN the assessment time runs concurrently with the required duration AN] is the same length.

4.0 ASSESS THE EVENT AND COMPARE TO THE EALS 4.1 Locate the EAL for the highest severity emergency classification that is applicable for the initiating condition and operating mode 4.2 Review the INDICATORs and CRITERION for that EAL 4.3 IF the specified INDICATORs are not observed, THEN:

4.3.1 Proceed to the next lower severity EAL and re-perform step 4.2

& 4.3.

4.3.2 IF none of the EALs for an initiating condition are met, THEN re perform steps 3.0 and 4.0 for related initiating conditions.

4.3.3 IF the actions above do not identify an applicable EAL, THEN review the observed conditions against Tab 4.7, Hazards and Emergency Director Judgment.

4.3.4 IF, after performing the above, no EAL is identified, THEN proceed to step 6.0.

4.4 IF the specified INDICATORs are observed, THEN:

4.4.1 Perform necessary assessments to validate the instrument readings and/or confirm reported observations.

4.4.2 Initiate any sampling, inspections, or dose assessments specified by the EAL.

NOTE:

IF the CRITERION specifies an event or condition duration, THEN the classification shall be made as soon as the duration is exceeded, OR when it is apparent that the duration will be exceeded, whichever is earlier.

Revision 1 9

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-lb Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 2 4.4.3 Compare the results of the assessments to the CRITERION.

NOTE:

A given INDICATOR may apply to more than one CRITERION.

The Emergency Director shall review other related EALs for applicability.

4.5 IF the assessment concludes that the CRITERION is met, THEN the classification shall be made. Proceed to Step 5.0 4.6 IF the assessment concludes that the CRITERION is not met, THEN re perform steps 3.0 and 4.0 for other related initiating conditions as applicable.

4.7 IF no classification results from the above; THEN proceed to step 6.0.

NOTE The declaration of the emergency classification shall be made as soon as the Emergency Director has assessed that the EAL has been met OR will be met, AND within 15 minutes of occurance of the INDICATOR. Once the emergency is classified, notifications to state and local governments shall be completed within 15 minutes of the declaration.

5.0 DECLARE THE EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND TRANSITION TO RESPONSE PROCEDURES 5.1 IF an UNUSUAL EVENT is declared, THEN proceed to EPP/I-2 5.2 IF an ALERT is declared, THEN proceed to EPP/I-3 5.3 IF a SITE AREA EMERGENCY is declared, THEN proceed to EPP/I-4 5.4 IF a GENERAL EMERGENCY is declared, THEN proceed to EPP/I-5 NOTE The step below is implemented only if an emergency classification is NOT made. IF a classification is made, THEN the transition indicated in step 5.0 should have been made.

Revision 1 10

EPP/Implementing Procedure EPP/I-Ib Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions Unit 2 6.0 EVALUATE THE NEED FOR AND MAKE NON-EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS 6.1 IF the abnormal condition is reportable to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 and NPDAP 5.1, THEN perform the following:

6.1.1 Complete the NRC Event Notification Form, Attachment 4 to EPP/IP-1.1.

6.1.2 Notify First Energy Communications of the event per NPDAP 5.3 and provide the information on the NRC Event Notification Form.

6.2 IF directed by station management, THEN make courtesy calls to the following state and local agencies on a timely basis consistent with normal working hours.

6.2.1 BCEMA 6.2.2 PEMA 6.2.3 CCEMA 6.2.4 HCOES F. FINAL CONDITIONS 1.0 For emergency events, the transition to the appropriate response procedure has been made and actions pursuant to that procedure are in progress.

2.0 For non-emergency events, required notifications have been completed.

G. ATTACHMENTS 1.0 Tabs for Classification of Emergency Conditions H. FIGURES 1.0 Figures are identified on the EAL indices Revision 1 11

EPP/I-lbI Attachment Modes: 1,2,3,4 INSTRUCTIONS N )TE: An INDICATOR is considered to be MET if the stated PCore Cooling threshold has been, or is, reached or exceeded, on'he PATH basis of confirmed observation or VALID instrument readings. The Emergency Director must use judgement when classifying parameters that may be transitory (e.g.,

containment pressure).

. I

ýTE: The INDICATOR should be considered MET if the parameter is indeterminate due to instruments that are non of the conditionl available or out of range and the existence can not be reasonablydiscounted.

N* TE: An INDICATOR is considered to be MET if, in the I judgement of the Emergency Director, the INDICATOR wili be MET imminently (i.e.. within I to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> in the absence of a viable success path). The classification shall be madWe as soon as this determination is made.

In the matrix to the left, review the LOSS INDICATORS in each barrier column. If one or more INDICATORS are met.

check the LOSS block at the bottom of the column.

If no LOSS is identified for a particular barrier, review the potential LOSS INDICATORS for that barrier. If one or more INDICATORS are met, check the potential LOSS block at the bottom of the barrier column.

Compare the blocks checked to the CRITERIA below and make the appropriate declaration.

(

(

Revision I

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs'by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towardsPote' a plant CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite.

protesting station operations or activities at the site. for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of ,. /

affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric contained therein.

values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner coitxolled areas condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) ofF indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function safety injection.

required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

(Containment) and Inventory (RCS)

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the or more of the following: (I) Automatic turbine naback >25% thermal BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A.

The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS force. or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with large quantities of smoke and heat are observed. abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g.. alarm setpoints.

received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates.

evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or(2) to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).

minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing. or analyses. Damage is improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing 'trendon core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component.

Example thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping.

protected area without authorization. scratches) should not be included.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA whi&

combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failur, LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the )

the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance public health and safety by exposure to radiation level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

1:

EPP/1-lb AUtI so unto 2.3Falur o RxPrtecio 122 Ls Criterion?/Indicator Mode Criterion / Indicator Mode Criterion I Indicator Criterion!/Indicator Reactor power >5% after VALID trip Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Inability to cool the core 11 or2] signal(s) and loss of core cooling capability Matrix" Matrix" and Tab 7 "Radiological Effluents"

1. Actions of FR-C. 1 (RED PATH) are [1 and 2)

( 1 INEFFECTIVE

2. [aandb]

a, Three max core exit thermocouples i I. Ops personnel report FR-S. I has been entered and subsequent -actions do NOT result in reduction of power to <5% and I

2 3

.4

>1200 F: or three max core exit thermocouples >729 F with NO RCPs 2 decreasing

2. [a orb] z running and RVLIS full range level a Ops personnel report CSF status tree

<40% RED PATH terminus exists for core

b. Actions taken have NOT resulted in a cooling or heat sink rising trend in RVLIS full range level b. Three max core exit thermocouples or a dropping trend in core exit thermocouple temperatures within 15

>1200 F; or three max core exit thermocouples >729 F with NO RCPs 0

minutes of initiation of restoration running and RVLIS full range level actions <40%

-  !.. i 4.

Loss of function needed to achieve or Reactor trip failure after VALID Trip Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Inability to monitor a SIGNIFICANT Matrix" TRANSIENT in progress maintain hot shutdown signal(s) with reactor power >5% and

[( and 2 and 3) [( or 21 attempts to cause a manual trip from the

1. Ops personnel report a CSF status tree control room are unsuccessful.

1. Loss of most (>75%) annunciators or RED PATH terminus for core cooling or indications heat sink exists 1. Ops personnel report FR-S.I has been

.1 2. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in 2. Three max core exit thermocouples >1200 1 entered and manual reactor trip from 2 1 F; or three max core exit thermocouples 2 control room did NOT result in reduction progress 3 2 >729 F with NO RCPs running and of power to <5% and decreasing 4* 3. Inability to directly monitor any of the 3 RVLIS full range level <40%

.4 following CSFs:

Also Refer to Tab 2.3 "Failure of Reactor Subcriticality Vessel Integrity Protection" and Tab I "Fission Product Core Cooling Containment BarrierMatrix" Heat Sink I

____________________ 4 -. 1- i-- -

UNPLANNED loss of most annunciators or Inability to achieve cold shutdown when Automatic reactor trip did not occur after Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier required by Technical Specifications VALID trip signal and manual trip from Matrix" indications for >15 minutes with either a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress m [I and 2 and3]. control room was successful a loss of non-alarming compensatory [I and 2)

Indications 1. Loss of decay heat removal capability

[1 and 2 and 3] (RHS, CCP or SWS) 1. VALID reactor trip signal received or 1 1 required.

2 I. UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%) 2 2. Inability to remove heat via the condenser 1 3 annunciators or indications for >15 3 2 2. Manual reactor trip from control room 4 minutes 4 3. Shutdown to mode 5 required by T/S was successful and power is <5% and

2. NSS judgement that additional personnel decreasing (beyond normal shift complement) are required to monitor the safe operation of the unit

3. [aorb]

a. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in

4. -.......-- '--- I progress Reactor coolant system specific activity

b. Loss of SPDS .1. Not Applicable exceeds LCO (refer to BVPS technical UNPLANNED loss of most annunciators or i UNPLANNED Loss of communications specification 3.4.8) indications for >15 minutes [I or 21 [1 or2]

(l and 2) 1. In-plant [a and band c] 1. VALID high alarm on 2CHS-RQIOIA/B

1. UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%) a. UNPLANNED Loss of All Pax (30511 reactor coolant letdown monitor annunciators or indications for >15 Phones

2. Radiochemistry analysis exceeds Technical 1 minutes ALL b. UNPLANNED Loss of All Gaitronics 1 Specification 3.4.8

.2 (Page/Party) 2

2. NSS judgement that additional personnel c. UNPLANNED Loss of All Radios 3 (Handie-Talkies) 3 (beyond normal shift complement) are 4 4

required to monitor the safe operation of .2. Offsite [a and band c] 5 the unit a. UNPLANNED Loss of ENS

b. UNPLANNED Loss of Bell Lines

c. UNPLANNED Loss of Radios to - a -'I-I Offsite

~.1 - .1 ~ReviionI RevhW= I

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the BOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a pIaIt CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Pot! "

protesting station operations or activities at the site. for damageThe structure. is source sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity o6 .a affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric c contained therein.

values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner contrloed areas condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these I RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the ZQ, s which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) off indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function safety injection.

required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality. Core Cooling, Heat SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or inrs-operation or Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized .Thernial Shock), plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

Integrity (Contaimnent) and Inventory (RCS).

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical loadc (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Figure 7-A.

Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS force. or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. inhalation or skin contact (e.g.. chlorine). )

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED iffit is not'the such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with large quantities of smoke and heat are observed. abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints.

received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rate evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).

minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or smrcture that is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or componem. Example thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g.. paint chipping.

protected area without authorization. scratches) should not be included.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA whicl combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.

LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in contains equipment, systems, components, or material the failut destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the

)

the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance public health and safety by exposure to radiation level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

[ EPPIJ-lb AtII 25d R CS iiriter /Indicrkag IRS IdntiiedLeaag 2.7 TehnialSpcifcaio l

C teion/Indicato Mode 4 Criterion I/Indicator Mode Criterion!/Indicator F- Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Not Applicable Not Applicable Matrix" Matrix"

(

= = i 4

- i,-,, -,. ,

Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier __________ 1' l.

Not Applicable Matrix" Not Applicable Matrix" A

( i I

Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier 4.

Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier ______- -__._-_-__..__. 4...

Matrix" Matrix" Refer to Tab 2.2. "Loss of Function" Not Applicable

- .4 i I Unidentified 2r pressure boundary-RCS Identified RCS leakage >25 GPM Inability to Reach Required Shutdown Mode i

Safety Limit Has Been Exceeded leakage >10 GPM Within Technical Specification Time Limits [I or21

1. Identified RCS leakage (as defined by [I and 21 I. Unidentified or pressure boundary leakage Technical Specifications) >25 GPM as 1. The combination of thermal power, RCS (as defined by Technical Specifications) indicated below [a orb] 1. A Technical Specification action temperature, and RCS pressure is greater

>10 GPM as indicated below [a orb] statement, requiring a mode reduction, has than the safety limit as determined from 21 I a. OST 2.6.2 or 2.6.2A Results 1 been entered BVPS Technical Specifications Figure 2.1 2 2 b. UNPLANNED level rise in excess of 2 1 "Reactor Core Safety Limit"

a. OST 2.6.2A results 3 3 25 GPM total into PRT, 3 2. The unit has NOT been placed in the 4 b. With RCS temp. and PZR level stable, 4 2DGS-TK-2 1, and 2DGS-TK-22 4 required mode within the time prescribed 2. RCS/pressurizer pressure exceeds safety 5* VCT level dropping at a rate >10 5* limit (>2735 psig) by the action statement GPM (>1%/min indicated on 2CHS LI-I15 with no VCT makeup in progress)

• Applies to Mode 5 if RCS Pressurized 5

• Applies to Mode5 if RC'S Pressurized I ----------i --4 1 Revision I

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENF.RAL EMERGENCY, SITE Z ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a p1a*u CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Pot protesting station operations or activities at the site. for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity oi .. e affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric contained therein.

values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity fer these RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function safety injection.

required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or nis-operation of Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the or more of the following:

(1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load, (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A.

The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt force.

normal plant operations to be considered.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. inhalation or skin contact (e.g.. chlorine).. )

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with large quantities of smoke and heat are observed. abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) In the Control Room, or reports exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints.

received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e.. within 15 minutes).

minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g.. paint chipping.

protected area without authorization. scratches) should not be included.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA whir-'

combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. contains equipment, systems, components. or material, the failu )

LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance public health and safety by exposure to radiation level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

j

2.0 SeniFe in6ra Mode Criterion / Indicator 1 -

EPP/I-lb Mode Criterion / Indicator i Attachment I Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier

( Matrix" Matrix"

-4 Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Matrix" CA

." - . . -.. Tab]e 2-1 I Turbine failure generated missiles cause i -

Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier penetration of a missile shield wall. of any Matrix" Plant Areas Associafed With Shield Wall area containing safety related.equipment Penetration EAL

1. Plant personnel report missiles generated by turbine failure with casing penetration Diesel Generator Bldg. Service Bldg 745' and 760' A also results in a through-wall penetration I of a missile shield wall listed in Table 2-I Electrical Switchgear 730' Containment 2 Main Steam Valve Room Primary Aux. Building 3 2FWE-TK210 Turbine failure results In casing penetration UNPLANNED rapid depressurization of the 1 Main Steam System resulting in a rapid RCS

1. Plant personnel report a 'turbine failure cooldown and Safety Injection actuation which results inpenetration of the turbine [I and 2) casing or damage to main generator seals Cu with evidence of significant hydrogen or 1. Ops personnel report rapid I seal oil leakage 1 depressurization of Main Steam System 2 2 that causes SLI (<500 psig) 3 3 4 2. Ops personnel report Safety Injection has actuated C'

1I I-- -- -- --- -- -- -- --

Revision I

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or mnore CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a pla`1 CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently structure. The source of the projectile htay be onsite or offsite. Pot' protesting station operations or activities at the site. for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity oi .,

affected structure- or the operability or reliability of safety equipment Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric contained therein.

values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these RED PATTI: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor nip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function safety injection.

required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core .Cooling, Heat SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A.

The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt force.

normal plant operations to be considered.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine). )

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with large quantities of smoke and heat are observed. abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints.

received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates, evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).

minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structur eiat is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operabiity or vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping.

protected area without authorization. scratches) should not be included.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA whie combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.

LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failu, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the

)

the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance public health and safety by exposure to radiation level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

I Mode Criterion 1Indicator 32 Modew,

-. *iA Lss f6 C(Sudon Criterion v . ....

Indicator

.... / ......

Mode 33 i

Lss Refer of D Po've Criterion / Indicator to Tab 1 "FIssIon Product Barrier Matrix" V. EPP/I-lbI Attachment I-Prolonged loss of offsite antd onsite AC Refer to Tab 6 "Shutdown System Refer and Tab 2.2 I "Loss to Tab "Fission of Product Barrier Function", and Matrix" Tab 6.1 Degradation" "Loss of Shutdown Systems" power

[I and 2)

1. AE and DF 4KV emergency buses NOT energized, from Unit 2 sources for >15 minutes 2 2. [aorborc!

3 a. Ops personnel report CSF status tree RED PATH or ORANGE PATH

.terminus exists for core cooling

b. Restoration of either AE or DF 4KV emergency bus is NOT likely from any source within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of loss

c. Three max core exit thermocouples

>1200 F or three max core exit thermocouples >729 F with no RCPs I Lms Loss of all vital DC power for >15 minutes I of all vital DC power for >IS minutes running and RVLIS full range;<40% System

-I.-

• I "Shutdown "Shutdown System Loss of offsite LWd onsite AC power for >15 Refer to* Tab 6 1. Voltage <110.4 VDC on DC buses 2-1 Degradation" and2-2and2-3and2-4for>15 minutes minutes AE and DF 4KV emergency buses NOT Also Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier

1. 21 Matrix". Tab 2.2 "Loss of Function", and Tab energized from- Unit 2 sources for >15 minutes 3 2.1 "Loss of Instrnmentation" and Tab 6.1 4 "Loss of Shutdown Systems" 1

2 4

U I- - I v1- Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product Barrier Matrix". Tab 2.2 "Loss of Function", and Tab

.1 I I

- i UNPLANNED loss of offsite and onsite AC 2.1 "Loss of Instrumentation" and Tab 6.1 AC power to emergency buses reduced to a power for >15 minutes single source of power such that any "Loss of Shutdown Systems" additional failure will result In the de 1. AE and DF 4KV emergency buses NOT energization of both buses energized from -Unit 2 sources for >15 (1 and 21 minutes

1. Either AE or DF 4KV emergency bus is 1 de-energized for >15 minutes 5 -Also Refer to Tab 6 "Shutdown System 6 Degradation" 2 De

2. The energized AE gr DF 4KV emergency 3 bus has only one source of power., fuel 4 [a orb)

a. Emergency diesel generator

b. 2A or 2D04KV normal bus ----------t-- UNPLANNED loss of one train of DC power I -

UNPLANNED for >15 minutesloss ofone train of Dc power;:

i Loss of offsite power for >15 minutes UNPLANNED loss of offsite power for >15 [1 or2]

minutes 11 and 21 if and 21

1. Voltage <110.4 VDC on DC Buses 2-1 and

1. 2A and 2D 4KV normal buses de- 1." 2A and 2D 4KV normal buses de 2-3 for >15 minutes energized for >15 minutes energized for >15 minutes 21 3 2. Voltage <110.4 VDC on DC buses 2-2 and 1 2. Each diesel generator is supplying power 5 2. Either diesel generator is supplying power 4 2-4 for >15 minutes to its respective emergency bus 6 to its respective emergency bus 2 De 3 fuel 4

Refer to Tab 6.4 "Loss of DC (Shutdown)" for modes .5, 6, and defieled

- iI

-I p.tevsim I1

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently structure.

protesting station operations or activities at the site. for damageThe source of the is sufficient projectile to cause may be onsite or offsite. Potr) concern regarding the integrity ot ..,e affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric c contained therein.

values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) off indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function safety injection.

required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or nis-operation of Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% fullelecutical ioad- (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A.

The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner contlled areas in the EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt force.

normal plant operations to be considered.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or heaft by reason generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

of

)

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is*not the such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with large quantities of smoke and heat are observed. abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g.. alarm setpoints.

received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other minimum dilution flow, minimum release times. maximum release rates.

evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).

minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core' reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example thermocouple temperatures). daiiage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping.

protected area without authorization. scratches) should not be included.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA whic&

combustible gases will not explode due to ignition.

LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failu, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the

)

the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance public health and safety by exposure to radiation level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

4.1 Fr IMode7 Criterion!/ Indicator Monde Criterion I Indicator TABLE WITH4-1 FIRE A

-....... T I.

Refer to Tab 4t1 "Firex" or TabI "FissionProduct PLANT AREAS ASSOCIATED EPP/I-lb1 Attachment FIRE in the Instrument and Relay Room (CB BarrierMatrix"I ND EXPLOSION EALS 1), Cable Spreading Room (CB-2), Control Diesel Gen. Bldgs Control Room Room (CB-3), West Communications Room Containment Building Prim. Auxiliary Building Inst & Relay Rm 707 Intake Str Cubicles (CB-6), or Cable Tunnel (CB-1) resulting in an Emerg. Switchgear UI/U2 Cable Tunnel (C' V-3) Rod Control Cable Vault Bldg. eT evacuation of the control room per 2.56C.4 "Alternate Safe Shutdown" and loss of any Relay Room Safeguards Building Cable Spreading Room 725 required equipment results in an uncontrolled Main Steam Vlv Rm Fuel Building West Communications Room 707 I

2 3

RCS Heatup [1 and 2 and 3]

Penetrations Area Service Building ERF Substa & ERF DG Bldg RWST 2QSS-TK21 z

4 I. 2.56C.4 "Alternate Safe Shutdown" entered Cable Tunnel 712 Cable Tunnel 735

2. Ops personnel report inability to operate any of the following equipment required by 2.56C.4 "Alternate Safe Shutdown" 2CHS-P21A 2SWS-P21A 2FWE-P23A & 2FWE-P22 EGS-EG2-1 Black DG Alternate S/D Panel 2SAS-C21A 2CCP.P21A 2RHS.P2IA

3. Uncontrolled RCS heatup lasting longer than 15 minutes i Refer to Tab 4.1 "Fire" or Tab I "Fission Product FIRE in the Instrument and Relay Room (CB BarrierMatrix" 1), Cable Spreading Room (CB*2), Control Room (CB-3), West Communications-Room (CB-6), or Cable Tunnel (CB-1) resulting in an evacuation of the control room per 2.56CA "Alternate Safe Shutdown" 1

2 1. 2.56C.4 "Alteniate Safe Shutdown" entered 3

4

(.

I! -- - . - .. . - .. , i EXPLOSION in any of the areas listed in Table FIRE in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that 4.1 that is affecting safety related equipment Is affecting safety related equipment [I and 2)

[I and 21

1. EXPLOSION in any of the listed areas in

1. FIRE in any of the listed areas in Table 4-1 Table 4-1

2. [aorb] 2. [a orb]

All All

a. Ops personnel report VISIBLE a. Ops personnel report VISIBLE DAMAGE to permanent structure or DAMAGE to permanent structure or equipment in listed area due to FIRE equipment in listed area

b. Control room indication of degraded b. Control room indication of degraded system go component (within listed system or component (within listed areas) response due to FIRE areas) response due to EXPLOSION Refer to Tab 4.6"Security" I- I 00 UNPLANNED EXPLOSION in or adjacent to i-i FIRE in or adjacent to those areas listed in those areas listed in Table 4-1 Table 4-1 not extinguished within 15 minutes from the time of control room notification 9X 1. UNPLANNED EXPLOSION in or adjacent verification of control room alarm to any of the listed areas in Table 4-1 E4 All All S,0 Refer to Tab 4.1, "Fire" or Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" Refer to Tab 4.6"Security"

-t Revision lievisim II

-I

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by The EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently structure. The source of the projectile may be orwite or offsite. Pote protesting station operations or activities at the site. for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity oi affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric contained therein.

values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., detennination that the The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that ant Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary 'to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function safety injection.

required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mirs-operation of Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the or more of the following: (1) Automatic' turbine runback >25% thermal BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load- (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A.

The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled aeas in the EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt force.

normal plant operations to be considered.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine). "

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if itis not t,..

such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with large quantities of smoke and heat are observed. abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints.

received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates.

evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e.. within 15 minutes).

minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g.. paint chipping.

protected area without authorization. scratches) should not be included.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failu )

LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger th&./,

the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance public health and safety by exposure to radiation level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

EPP/I-lb Mode Criterion / Indicator Attachment 1 Criterion / Indicator

- ~rrwr Refer to Tab 4.1 "Fire", Tab 4.2 "Explosion, or i

lee 10r_, i r:iss__io nrr_ t oc--

.auc Refer to lTab I "Frission PlroductBDarrterMlv ri.*

TABLE 4.2 HAS I)EEN DELETED Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" r

FIGURE 4-B HAS BEEN DELETED

= i Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" I Refer to Tab 4.1 "Fire". Tab 4.2 "Explosion", or I Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" z

Release of flammable gas within, or contiguous i Release of TOXIC GAS within, or contiguous to, a VITAL AREA which jeopardizes to, a VITAL AREA which jeopardizes operation of systems required to maintain safe operation of systems required to maintain safe operations gr to establish or maintain cold operations or to establish or maintain cold I

shutdown (Mode 5). shutdown (Mode 5). (1 and 2)

1. Report or detection of a TOXIC GAS

1. Report or detection of a flammable gas within, or contiguous to, a VITAL AREA or All within, or contiguous to, a VITAL AREA in All an area required for continued safe operation concentrations greater than explosive in concentrations that will be life threatening concentrations. to plant personnel. N

2. Plant personnel would be unable to perform actions necessary for continued safe operation or to establish and maintain cold shutdown (Mode 5) while utilizing annropriate nersonnel protection equipment.

__________ J.

Release of flammable gas affecting the i

Release of TOXIC GAS affecting the PROTECTED AREA deemed detrimental to PROTECTED AREA deemed detrimental to the safe operation of the plant. the safe operation of the plant.

(1 or2) 0 or 2)

1. (awandb)

a. Report or detection of TOXIC GAS that

-1. (a and b) could enter the SITE PERIMETER in All a. Report or detection of flammable gas that All could enter the SITE PERIMETER in amounts that can affect normal operation of the plant (Refer to Figure 4-A).

amounts that can affect normal operation of b. Normal operation of the plant is impeded the plant (Refer to Figure 4-A). due to access restrictions implemented by

b. Normal operation of the plant is impeded within the the Control Room due to access restrictions implemented by the PROTECTED 'AREA (Refer to the Control Room within Figure 4-A).

PROTECTED AREA (Refer to Figure 4 A). 2. Report.by local, county or State officials for a potential evacuation of site personnel based on an offsite event.

2. Report by local, county or State officials Refer to AOP 112 44A.1 "Chlorine/toxic Gas for a potential evacuation of site personnel Release". Attachment 3 for a list of chemicals based on an offsite event.

stored, produced, or transportednear BVPS and their toxicity limits.

1. - I RewiMon I

Figure 4-C EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY

._* \N7'\N *'/ EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY

/  ;)

• ' Owner Controlled

Property

EPPI-lb Attachment I 4Cr iterion/IicatorJ Mode Criterion / Indicator Mode Criterion / Indicator Criterion / indlcator Refer to Tab 4.1 "FIRE" Security event resulting in loss of control of the Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core systems necessary to establish or maintain cold degradation or melting with potential for loss of shutdown containment integrity. Releases can be reasonably

[1 or2] expected to exceed EPA protective action guidelines I exposure levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA

1. Hostile armed force has taken control of the All BOUNDARY. (Refer to Figure 4-C on preceding All 2.

control room or the remote shutdown panel Hostile armed force has taken control of page.) z plant equipment such that Ops personnel report the inability to operate equipment necessary to maintain the following functions [a or b or c]:

0 a Subcriticality

b. Core cooling

c. Heat Sink S.J. I I

Events are in process or have occurred which Evacuation of the control room has been Security event has or is occurring which results in actual or likely failures of plant functions involve actual or likely major failures of plant Initiated and control of all necessary equipment functions needed for the protection of the public.

has not been established within 15 minutes of needed to protect the public Any releases are NOT expected to result in manning the Shutdown Panel [1 and 21 exposure levels which exceed EPA protective action

[I or 2]

1. AOP 2.33. IA "Control Room 1. VITAL AREA, other than 'the control room, guideline exposure levels outside the EXCLUSION U, Ahas been penetrated by a hostile armed force All AREA BOUNDARY. (Refer to Figure 4-C on Inaccessibility"has been entered All preceding page.)

All

2. Inability to transfer and operate any single 2. Suspected BOMB detonates within a VITAL component listed in Table. 4-3 within 15 AREA minutes of manning the shutdown panel Table 4.3 EQUIPMENT REQUIRED AT Also refer to)Tab4.1 "Fire" SHUTDOWN PANEL One Auxiliary Feedwater Pump C Evacuation of the control room Is required Confirmed Security event which Indicates an Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial One Atmospheric Steam Dump One Charging Pump actual gr potential substantial degradation in the level of safety of the plant degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Any One Boric Acid Pump and Boration Valve

1. AOP 2.33.1A "Control Room releases are expected to be lmited to small fractions 2CHS*FCV122 Inaccessibility"has been entered [1 or 2 or 31

1. BOMB discovered within a VITAL AREA of the EPA protective action guideline exposure levels.

2. CIVIL DISTURBANCE ongoing within the All All All PROTECTED AREA

3. PROTECTED AREA has been penetrated by a hostile armed force Table 4.4 SECURITY EVENTS

a. SABOTAGE/INTRUSION has 2r is Occurring Within the I Refer to Figure 4-A for a drawing of the PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A) qV PROTECTEDAREA

.5 Confirmed Security event which indicates a Unusual events are in process _r' have occurred b. HOSTAGE/EXTORTION Situation That Threatens to potential degradation in the level of safety of which indicate a potential degradation of the level Interrupt Plant Operations Not Applicable the plant of safety of the plant. No releases of radioactive 11 or2] material requiring offsite response M monitoring c. CIVIL DISTURBANCE Ongoing Between the SIT V

1. BOMB discovered within the are expected unless further degradation of safety PERIMETER and PROTECTED AREA (Figure 4-A) " 1 PROTECTED AREA systems occurs.

d. Hostile STRIKE ACTION Within the PROTECTED All 2. Security Shift Supervisor reports one or more AREA Which Threatens to Interrupt Normal Plant of the events listed in Table 4-4 All Operations (Judgement Based on Behavior of Strikers and/or Intelligence Received) (Figure 4-A)

Refer to Figure 4-A for a drawing of the PROTECTED AREA II Raviwm 1

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITEE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violentl Y strAure. The source of protesting station operations or activities at the site. for damage is sufficient the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Pot' to cause concern regarding the integrity 0 -. e affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numericc contained therein.

values which define that condition (i.e.. the basis of the declaration). Al 11 The PROTECTED AREA encompasses classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that thee within all owner controlled aireas the security perimeter fence as shown condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has on Figure 4-A.

been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for thesee RED PATH:

assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) o:f indicates that Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. Y RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondmy leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function a safety injection.

required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heal SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment or mis-operation of Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

(Containmeni) and Inventory (RCS).

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% fullrelectIical load. (3)

Figure 7-A. -Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands-made on the BVPS force. or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten 1o interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine). )

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not the such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with large quantities of smoke and heat are observed. abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is ensure-that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, Discharge Aitthorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints.

received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates.

evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e.. within 15 minutes).

minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or stucture that is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g.. paint chipping.

scratches) should not be included.

protected area without authorization.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA Iwic combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. contains equipment, systems, components, or materiaL the failurt LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the

)

the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance public health and safety by exposure to radiation level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

I

-IErhuk I Mode i

Criterion / Indicator EPPII-lb Attachment I Refer to Tab 1 "Fission Product BarrierMatrix"

( "z 0

z t

i Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" i

Refer to Tab)I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" v-4 I I Earthquake greater than 0.06g acceleration i Tornado or high wind strikes any structure I

occursf11 and 2) listed in Table 5-1 and results in structural damage 11 and 2)

1. A seismic event has occurred as indicated by Ann AI0-5H "Init of Seismic Exceed Preset 1. Tornado pr high wind strikes any structure and/or Spectral Accelerations" listed in Table 5-1 I

2. Ia and b]

a. One or more alarm lamps and horn 2. [aorb]

energized on the Seismic Warning panel a. Confirmed report of any VISIBLE

[2ERS-ANN-.] All DAMAGE to specified structures All

b. Review of the printout on 2ERS-RSA-1 Response Spectrum Analyzer reveals an

b. Control room indications of degraded safety system ar component response a,)

acceleration >0.06g has occurred (see within listed structures due to event "It 20M-45.4F "Seismic Instrumentation Central Control Cabinet[2ERS-CCC-1]

I Running")

Also refer to AOP 1/2.75.3 "Acs of Nature Earthauake"

-I Earthquake detected by site seismic Tornado within the SITE PERIMETER.

Instrumentation >O.Olg acceleration [I and 2)

1. Plant personnel report a tornado has been

1. Ann AIO-5H "Init of Seismic Exceed Preset sighted within the SITE PERIMETER and/or Spectral Accelerations" indicates (refer to Figure 5-A) initiation of the Accelerograph Recording System All 2. [a orb]) All

a. Ground motion sensed by plant personnel

b. Unit I reports seismic event detected on unit instrumentation I

• 1 1. ReviionaI

DEFINITIONS/A(RONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by dhe EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Pote'-4, protesting station operations or activities at the site. for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity oa )

affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equiprnien Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric contained therein.

values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EDPs which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function safety injection.

required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or minsoperation of Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% fMll electrical load; (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A.

The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled arms in the EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt force. normal plant operations to be considered.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is not )

expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g. alarm setpoints.

minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates.

received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).

minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g..paint chipping.

protected area without authorization. scratches) should not be included.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. contains equipment, systems, components, or material the failu.

LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in destruction, or release of which could directly or indirecy endanger 1.

public health and safety by exposure to radiation

)

the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

1. APPfl-lb Alit 5.5 River Level LOW MeCriterion / Indicator 15.4 River Level HIGH Mode Criterion / Indicator Mode Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab)I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" T ejer - 7-A 111Pii L - -

P(J TCU4LL t Mnrirg Mode Refer to Tab I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" Refer to Tab I rNsson ProductiBarrier*a~rk*

Refer to Tab I "Fission ProductBarrierMatrix"

(- Iq i I ,

16 II i .Refer to Tab)I "Fission ProductBarrierMatrix" Refer to Tab)I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" Refer to Tab)I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" Refer to Tab)I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" i

-t C I 1

Aircraft or PROJECTILE impacts (strikes) any I

River water level > 705 Ft mean sea level River water level <648.6 Ft Mean Sea Level

[I or 2]

Refer to Tab)I "Fission Product BarrierMatrix" plant structure listed in Table 5-1 resulting in fV or2]

structural damage I. ILR-CW-101 indicates <648.6 Ft Mean Sea

[I and 2) 1. ILR-CW-101, if accessible, indicates >705 Level mean sea level I. Plant personnel report aircraft or ALL 2. National Weather Bureau (412-644-2882)

PROJECTILE has impacted any structure 2. National Weather Bureau (412-644-2882) or or Montgomery Lock (724-643-8400)

ALL listed in Table 5-I on previous page ALL Montgomery Lock (724-643-8400) reports Reports Montgomery Lower Pool stage Montgomery Lower Pool stage height height < -3.92 Ft

2. [a orb] >52.48 Ft

a. Confirmed report of any VISIBLE DAMAGE to specified structures

b. Control Room indications of degraded safety system or component response Note: Mean Sea Level = stage height + 652.52 Ft (within listed structures) due to event k

• Note: Mean Sea Level = stage height + 652.52Ft P Watercraft strikes primary Intake structure i River water level >700 Ft Mean Sea Level and results in a reduction of Service Water flow I

m Aircraft crash or PROJECTILE impact within Not Applicable the SITE PERIMETER [I or 21 [1 and 21 I. Plant personnel report aircraft crash or 1. ILR-CW-101 indicates > 700 Ft Mean Sea I. Plant personnel report a watercraft has struck PROJECTILE impact within the SITE Level the primary intake structure PERIMETER (refer to Figure 5-A on ALL ALL previous page) 2. National Weather Bureau (412-644-2882) ALL 2. SWS flow reduction indicated by sustained or Montgomery Lock (724-643-8400) pressure reduction to <30 psig on 2SWS-PI reports Montgomery Lower Pool stage ll3A and/or 113B height >47.48 Ft

-L Note: Mean Sea Level = stage height + 652.52 Ft Refer to AOP 2.30.1 "Loss of Service Water"

- I Reiio1

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by The EOPs wrich AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently source of the projeQtile may b: onsite or offsia. P,I*ial protestigig station operations or activities at the site. for damageThe structure. is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integritq he affected structure or the operability or ,eliability of safety equipment Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric c contained therein.

values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) off indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function i safety injection.

required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full rlectrical load: (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A.

The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS force. or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to intemipt normal plant operations to be considered.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health byreason of generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is nouma such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with large quantities of smoke and heat are observed. abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g.. alarm setpoints.

received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release raes.

evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e.. within 15 minutes).

minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structre that is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core rýliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact. denting, penetration.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g.. paint chipping.

protected area without authorization. scratches) should not be included.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA wbirs combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the fai destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger a,

)

LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance public health and safety by exposure to radiation level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

I

, Lo s ---'-AC Sh-t wn

-- EPPII-Ib IA ntI S.. .- n-

-. :_- n,--S,* s!L, F_ , - 6. CSIvetry-Sh tow S-'" -" " " - -" - "'- -

I Criterion / Indicator Criterion / Indicator I Criterion I Indicator Mode Mode Refer to 7.1 Effluents-"

--Tab -"Gaseo-us IF IYIVU-,

-Mo-de Mnde I Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" I ID i, i 4.

--f--

I I

Loss of water level in the reactor vessel that has SRefer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents "

Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" or will uncover fuel in the reactor vessel

[I and 21

1. faiorb]

a. Loss of RHS or CCP or SWS 5 b. Loss of RCS Inventory with inadequate 6 makeup '0,

2. [a andb]

a. Ops personnel report 2RCS-LI-102, LR-102 RCS level instrumentation (if available) in the Control Room indicates a level drop to 0 inches

b. Other confirmed indications of fuel

(. InalllIty inabibiltty to maintain unit in cold shutdown to maintain unit in cold shutdown uncovery Not Applicable

.4' UNPLANNED loss of offeite and onsite AC UNPLANNED loss of o>tsite and onsite AC power for >15 minutesI Ree oTb6. Ls fSutonSses Refer to Tab 6.1 "Loss of Shutdown Systems" (1anMd 2)

2. UNPLANNED Loss of RHS or CCP or SWS 1. AE and DF 4KV emergency buses not energized from Unit 2 sources for >15 0 minutes

2. [a orb or c]

a. Core exit thermocouples (CETC) (if 5 5 available) indicate the temperature has 6 6 increased >10 F and has exceeded De 200F. Fuel

b. (w/RHS in service) RHS inlet temperature has increased >10 F and Also refer to Tab 6.1 "Loss of Shutdown Systems" has exceeded 200 F.

c. (w/o CETCs or RHS), loss has exceeded 30 minutes or there is evidence of boiling in the Rx vessel. I. ... I I - L- Si 4

Loss of Reactor Coolant System Inventory with UNPLANNED loss of all offsite power for >15 UNPLANNED loss of the required train of DC power for >15 minutes UNPLANNED loss of any function needed for minutes inadequate make-up [1 or 21 cold shutdown that results in a core exit [1 and 2)

[1 and 2]

temperature Increase of more than 10 F

[I and 2) I. 2A an 2D 4KV normal buses de-energized 1. Voltage <110.4 VDC on DC buses 2-1 and

1. Ops personnel report 2RCS-LI-102, LR-102 2-3 for >15 minutes if train A is the priority RCS level instrumentation in the Control for >15 minutes

1. UNPLANNED Loss of RHS or CCP or SWS train 5 5 Room indicates a level drop to less than 14.5 2. Voltage <1I10.4 VDC on DC buses 2-2 and 6 inches 56 2. Either diesel generator is supplying power to 6 2. [a orb orc) its respective emergency bus 2-4 for >15 minutes if train B is the priority

a. Core exit thermocouples (CETC) (if De train

2. Ops personnel report inability to make-up 12 available) indicate the temperature has RCS inventory Fuel el increased >10 F

b. (WIRHS in service) RHS inlet temperature has increased >I0 F

c. (w/o CETCs or RHS), loss has exceeded 15 minutes Rcv-isia I

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one- or more CSFs by the EOPs wbicb AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant structure. The source of the projectile may be Wsite or offsite. Potential CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violently for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity )e protesting station operations or activities at the site.

affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equ:i.,enx Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric contained therein.

values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded.

leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function safety injection.

required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load- (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A.

The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in thie EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

-failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work'stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt force. normal plant operations to be considered.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is n, FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints.

conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc,) in the Control Room, or reports minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates.

received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).

reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyse& Damage is improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued opermbility or vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a scratches) should not be included.

protected area without authorization.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the fa;'

LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endangi )

public health and safety by exposure to radiation the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

EPPAI-lb 6.6 Inadvertent Criticality Attachment I i

• I I Mode 4- -

Criterion / Indicator Mode Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents"

(

1 z

0<

M I Refer to Tab 7.1 "GaseousEffluents" Refer to Tab 7 1 "Gaseous Effluents" 3,

INTENTIONALL I' BLANK 4-i Major damage to irradiated fuel;, oor loss of Inadvertent reactor criticality water level that has or will uncover Irradiated fuel outside the reactor vessel 1. Nuclear instrumentation indicate

[I and 21 Iunanticipated sustained positive startup rate

1. VALID HIGH alarm on 2RMF-RQ202

[1031], 2HVR-RQI04A/B [1024, 1028], 3 ALL 2RMF-RQ301AIB [1032, 2032], pr.2RMR 4 RQ203 [1025] 5

2. [a orb] 6

a. Plant personnel report damage of irradiated fuel sufficient to rupture fuel rods

b. Plant personnel report water level drop has go will exceed available makeup capacity such that irradiated fuel will be uncovered Refer to Tab 6.2 for In-vessel Uncovery 4.

i UNPLANNED loss of water level In spent fuel pool or reactor cavity or transfer canal with Not Applicable fuel remaining covered 11 and 2 and 31

1. Plant personnel report water level drop in ALL spent fuel pool 2r reactor cavity, pr transfer canal

2. VALID HIGH alarm on 2RMR-RQ203

.[1025] 2r 2RMF-RQ-202 [103 1]

3. Fuel remains covered with water I - I - ~ I. Revision evisonI I

1 DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown. or bunched towards a plant CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violentl) structure. The source of the projectile may bo onsite or offsita Pot-,*Iai protesting station operations or activities at the site. for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity )e affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric contained therein.

values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these t RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which assessments to-be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of r indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or caus a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function safety injection.

required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable.

(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED even? involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25% thermal BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full elecuical load- (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A.

The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt force.

normal plant operations to be considered.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if It is not I such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with large quantities of smoke and heat are observed. abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.). in the Control Room, or reports exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints.

received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates.

evidence that the associated criterion may'be exceeded. Inherent in this and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).

minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure. system, or component. Example thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint rhipping.

protected area without authorization. scratches) should not be included.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA wbich combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. contains equipment, systems, components, or material the faili

/

LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance public health and safety by exposure to radiation level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

TABLE 7.1 EPPII-lb Attacmment I EFFLUENT RADIATION MON] TOR EALS rM-o~d-e Criterion / Indicator 4-NOTE: The values below, if exceeded, indicate the need to perfori t the specified assessment. If the assessment EAB dose resulting from an actual _U imminent can not be completed within 15 minutes (60 minutes for I ýE), the declaration shall be made based on Release of gaseous radioactivity that exceeds 1000 Not Applicable the VALID reading.

(. mR TEDE or 5000 mR child thyroid CDE for the actual9r projected duration of the release

[for 2 or 31 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4

1. A VALID gas effluent rad monitor reading UE ALERT SITE GENERAL exceeds the values in Column 4 of Table 7-1 for IF A RWDA IS APPLICABLE All >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the CRITERION is NOT 2x HHSP set 20(x HHSP set exceeded by RWDA t yRWDA n/a n/a

2. Field survey results indicate EAB dose >'1000 mR 03-y for the actual or projected duration of the release IF A RWDA IS NOT APPLICABLE Vent Vent/Cond Polishing (pCi/cc unless otherwi. e noted) z 2HVS-RQ-101B [2039] 6.02E-4 6.02E-2 1.72E-1 -

3. EPP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose

>1000 mR TEDE or >5000 mR child thyroid CDE 2HVL-RQ-1 12B [20131 3.22E-3 3.22E-1 ....

for the actual or projected duration of the release

-4.

SLCRS EAB dose resulting from an actual 9r imminent 2HVS*RQ-109 LR [2040] 2.12E-42.12-2 -

release of gaseous radioactivity that exceeds 100 mR Not Applicable 2HVS*RQ-109 MR [3040] J. 3.88E-2 3.88E TEDE ar 500 mR. child thyroid CDE for the actual HR [4040] 3.94E-1 pr projected duration of the release 2HVS*RQ-109 . --

f11or 2 or 31 2HVS*RQ-I09 Eff [5040] pCi/sec 5.90E+3 5.90E+5 1.04E+6 1.04E+7

1. A VALID gas effluent rad monitor reading exceeds the values in Column 3 of Table 7-1 for Decon/WG Vaults

>15 minutes, unless assessment within this time 2RMQ-RQ-301B [2033] 4.48E-2 ....

period confirms that the CRITERION is NOT ....

All exceeded 2RMQ-RQ-303B [2037] 6.30E-3

2. Field survey results indicate EAB dose >100 mR 0-y for the actual or projected duration of the Main Steam Reliefs 3.

release EPP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose 2MSS*RQ101ABC [1005/3005/5005] .... 1.77E-I1 1.77E+0 eqU*

2MSS*RQ101 Effluent pCi/sec- .. 5.10E+5 5.l0E+6

>100 mR TEDE or >500 mR child thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release [2005/4005/6005]

J.

Any UNPLANNED release of gaseous radioactivity i Any UNPLANNED release of liquid radioactivity Liquid Monitors that exceeds 200 times the radiological effluent that exceeds 200 times the radiological effluent 2SGC-RQ-100 [1065] 1.38E-3 -" ""

Technical Specfleations/Offsite Dose Calculation Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation 8.56E-3 Manual for 15 minutes 2SWS-RQ-101 [1068] 5.98E-5 --

Manual for 15 minutes 5.98E-5 *8.56E-3

/I or 21 2SWS-RQ-102 [1067] --

11 or 2 or 31

1. A VALID liquid effluent rad monitor reading I1. A VALID gas effluent rad monitor reading exceeds the values in Column 2 of Table 7-1 for RELEASE DURATION, Minutes 60 15 15 15 exceeds the values in Column 2 of Table 7-I for >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time ASSESSMENT METHOD HPM-RP6.12 ElPP/IP-2.7 EPP/IP-2.6.x EPP/IP-2.6.x Cu .

SAll >15 minutes, unless assessment within this time period confirms that the CRITERIONIis NOT period confirms that the CRITERION is NIOT EPP/IP-2.7 lJ!P/IP-2.6.x exceeded exceeded All

2. Sample results exceed 200 times the radiological

2. Field survey results indicate >10 mR/hr 0-y at the effluent Technical Specification/Offsite Dose EAB for >15 minutes Calculation Manual value for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity >15 minutes in

3. EPP dose assessment results indicate EBB dose duration Figure 7-A

>10 mR TEDE for the duration of the release EXCLUSION AREA Any UNPLANNED release of gaseous radioactivity that exceeds 2 times the radiological ,effluent Any UNPLANNED release of liquid radioactivity to the environment that exceeds 2 times the radiological BOUNDARY 4

Technical SpecificationslOffsite Dose Calculation effluent Technical SpecificationslOffsite Dose Manual for 60 minutes Calculation Manual for 60 minutes '4

'4l

[I or2 or 3] 11 or 21

1. A VALID gas effluent rad monitor: reading 1. A VALID liquid effluent rad monitor reading exceeds the values in Column I of Table 7-1 for exceeds the values in Column 1 of Table 7-i for

>60 minutes, unless assessment within this time >60 minutes, unless assessment within this time All period confirms that the CRITERION-, is NOT period confirms that the CRITERION is NOT exceeded exceeded

2. Field survey results indicate >0.1 mR/hr 0-y at the 2. Sample results exceed 2 times the radiological BAB for >60 minutes effluent technical specification value for an unmonitored release of liquid radioactivity >60

3. EPP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose minutes in duration

>0.I mit TEDE for the duration of the release Revision I

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or mote CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a piant CIVIL IASTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or more persons violentl ,y structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. P protesting station operations or activities at the site. yfor damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrit TM affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeri ic :contained therein.

values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). Al1IeThe.PROTECTED classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that th le within the AREA encompasses al owner controlled areas security perimeter fence as shown on Figure condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION ha 4-A.

been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for thes e RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs whteb assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) o )f .indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergenct Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. "Y. 'RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause areactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety functionn -safety injection.

required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the it e plant SABOTAGE:

equipment with Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation the intent environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Hea to renderthe equipment of Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity y unavailable.

(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the e SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involvng one or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine runback >25%

BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result thermal in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to t reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load, 0)

Figure 7-A.

Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled areas in the immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of or a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must force. threaten to interrupt normal plant operations to be considered.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is no..

such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with large quantities of smoke and heat are observed. abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regardto radioactivity releases, a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition am procedure Entry (AOPs, EOPs, etc.), operator knowledge of plant unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g., alarm setpoints.

received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates.

evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

protocol is the necessity for these assessments to be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment (iae., within 15 minutes).

minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or componemt. Example thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blenmises (e.g., paint chipping.

protected area without authorization. scratches) should not be included.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the fai' LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly eadaniger the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance public health and safety by exposure to radiation level for equipment required for safe shutdown.

I e Hnln

_ Mode C.riterlon/ Indicator --Mode I Criterion / Indicator Refer to Tab Z7. "GaseousEffluents" EPP/I-lb Refer to Tab I "Fission Product Barrier Matrix" or Attachment I Tab Z71 "Gaseous Effluents" Tabl 7-2 Areas Associatei .With EAL 7.3 LOCATION INDICATOR READING Iq 730' Service Bldg (H2 Analyzers) Survey Results >100 mR/hr general area PASS Cubicle (735' PAB)

Chem Sample Panel (718' PAB) 737' Safeguards (H2 Control System RMP-.Q-204 [1050]

RMP-I Q-210 [1059]

RMP-1Q-205AB

>100 mR/hr general area

>100 mR/hr general area

>100 mR/hr general area I

Operations) [1049] ,1 741' Safeguards (Safe Shutdown Valves) Survey Results >I100 mR/hr general area 738'Cable Vault (RHR Suction Valves) Survey Results >100 mR/hr general area 773' PAB (WRGM Sampling) Survey Results >I00 mR/hr general area 788' Main Steam & Cable Vault Survey Results >100 mR/hr general area Refer to Tab I "'FissionProduct Barrier MatrL" or Refer to Tab 7.1 "Gaseous Effluents" Alternate Shutdown Panel Room Survey Results >100 mR/hr general area Tab Z7. "Gaseous Effluents" West Cable Vault (730') Survey Results >100 mR/hr general area A Penetrations (713') Survey Results >5 R/hr general area U C&D Penetrations (718') Survey Results >100 mR/hr general area Cable Vault (755') Survey Results >100 mR/hr general area 0=,

CNMT Instr Air Room (773') Survey Results >100 mR/hr general area AE/DF Switchgear Survey Results >I100 mR/hr general area Turbine Bldg 735' West Survey Results >100 mR/hr general area -

EDG 2-1, 2-2 Survey Results >5 R/hr general area UNPLANNED increases in radiation levels within Major damage to irradiated fuel; _r loss of water

( the facility that Impedes safe operations &r establishment or maintenance of cold shutdown

[1 or 21 level that has or will uncover Irradiated fuel outside the reactor vessel

[I and 21 L. VALID area radiation monitor readings 2r survey 1. VALID HIGH alarm on 2RMR-RQ203 (1025] or results exceed 15 mR/hr in the Control Room 2RMF-RQ202 [1031] or 2RMF-RQ301 A/B 2RMC-RQ201/202 [1069/1072] or PAF 2RMS (1032/20321 or 2HVR-RQI04A/B [1024/1028]

All RQ223 [1071] for >15 minutes

2. [a and b]

a.

b.

VALID area radiation monitor readings or survey results exceed values listed in Table 7-2 Access restrictions impede operation of All 2.

a.

b.

[a or b]

Plant personnel report damage of irradiated fuel sufficient to rupture fuel rods Plant personnel report water level drop has gr will exceed available makeup capacity such

[r systems necessary for safe operation or the that irradiated fuel will be uncovered ability to establish or maintain cold shutdown Refer to Tab 6 "Shutdown Systems" for In-vessel See Note Below Uncovery I

UNPLANNED increase In radiation levels within the UNPLANNED loss of water level in spent fuel pool facility or reactor cavity or transfer canal with fuel remaining covered I. VALID area radiation monitor readings increase [1 and2 and31 by a factor of 1000 over normal levels for >15 minutes 1. Plant personnel report water level drop in spent fuel pool or reactor cavity, oZtransfer canal All Note: In either the LiE or ALERT E41, the ED must All 2. VALID HIGH alarm on 2RMR-RQ203 (1025] or detenrine the cause of increaseIn radiation levels and review other CRITERIA/INDICATORS for 2RMF-RQ202 (10311 applicability (e.g., a dose rate of 15 niR/hr in the Control Room could be caused by a release associated 3. Fuel remains covered with water with a more significantevent).

- I - I Revisim I

DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT, GENERAL EMERGENCY, SITE ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which AREA EMERGENCY: See EAL 4.7 indicates that a CSF is under severe challenge.

BOMB: A fused explosive device (See EXPLOSION) PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of ten (10) or mors persons violently structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Pc--'wial protesting station operations or activities at the site. for damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity,,

affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment Each CRITERION identifies the emergency condition and any numeric contained therein.

values which define that condition (i.e., the basis of the declaration). All classifications are based on an assessment (i.e., determination that the The PROTECTED AREA encompasses all owner controlled areas condition is VALID) by the Emergency Director that the CRITERION has within the security perimeter fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

been met or exceeded. Implicit in this protocol is the necessity for these RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the EOPs which assessments to be completed within 15 minutes (unless otherwise noted) of indicates that a CSF is under extreme challenge.

indications being available to Control Room operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has been exceeded. RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function safety injection.

required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of environment. There are six CSFs: Subcriticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Vessel Integrity (Pressurized Thermal Shock), Integrity plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable,.*:

(Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): A boundary surrounding the or more of the following: (1) Automatic turbine nmback >25% thermal BVPS units beyond which the postulated UFSAR accidents will not result reactor power, (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load; (3) in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to Reactor Trip; (4) Safety Injection System Activation Figure 7-A.

The SITE PERIMETER encompasses all owner controlled re=as in the EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic immediate site environs as shown on Figure 4-A.

failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or components STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on the BVPS EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of or one of its vendors. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt force. normal plant operations to be considered.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e.,

TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or health by reason of steam or feed line rupture) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam inhalation or skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is n,,

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical *equipment do not result in. corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

HOSTAGE: A person or object held as leverage against the station to With specific regard to radioactivy releases, a release of radioactivity is ensure that demands will be met by the station UNPLANNED if it has not been authorized by a Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization (RWDA). Implicit in this definition are INDICATOR(s): Are available via instrumentation, calculations, unintentional releases, unmonitored releases, or planned releases that procedure Entry (AOPs. EOPs, etc.). operator knowledge of plant exceed a condition specified on the RWDA (e.g.. alarm setpoints, conditions (pressure, temperatures, etc.) in the Control Room, or reports minimum dilution flow, minimum release times, maximum release rates.

received from plant personnel, whichever is most limiting, or other evidence that the associated criterion may be exceeded. Inherent in this and/or discharge of incorrect tank).

protocol is the necessity for these assessments to .be completed with 15 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID minutes (unless otherwise noted) of sufficient indications being available when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check. or (2) to Control Room Operators that an Emergency Action Level (EAL) has indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation been exceeded. by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability.

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 this definition is the need for timely assessment (i.e., within 15 minutes).

minutes from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily PATH TERMINUS. A reduction in the level of severity is an observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is improvement in the applicable parameters (e.g., increasing trend in reactor sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or vessel water level (RVLIS full range) and/or decreasing trend on core reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example thermocouple temperatures). damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration.

INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g.. paint chipping.

protected area without authorization. scratches) should not be included.

LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL): Concentration level below which VITAL AREA is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which combustible gases will not explode due to ignition. contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the fai' LCO, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION: as specified in destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endangea )

the BVPS Technical Specifications, the minimum functional performance public health and safety by exposure to radiation level for equipment required for safe shutdown,

A5.735B Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1/2 EPP/I-2 Unusual Event Document Owner Manager, Emergency Preparedness Revision Number 17 Level Of Use In-Field Reference Safety Related Procedure Yes 1mm"

Beaver Valley Power Station PNmbr e EPP/I-2

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

112 In-Field Reference Number:

Unusual Event Reision: ]Page 17 i Of ii EFFECTIVE INDEX Issue 8 Rev. 0 OSC Approved 3-12-87 1 OSC Approved 8-13-87 2 OSC Approved 6-20-88 3 OSC Approved 9-22-88 4 Non-Safety Revisions 2-23-89 5 Non-Safety Revisions 1-12-90 Issue 9 Rev. 0 Non-Intent Revision 10-9-90 1 Non-Intent Revision 10-11-91 2 Non-Intent Revision 5-15-92 3 Non-Intent Revision 12-29-92 4 OSC Approved 1-27-93 Rev. 5 Non-Intent Revision 1-1-94 Rev. 6 Non-Intent Revision 10-14-94 Rev. 7 Non-Intent Revision 5-26-95 Rev. 8 Non-Intent Revision 10-31-95 Rev. 9 Non-Intent Revision 12-8-95 Rev. 10 Non-Intent Revision 10-23-96 Rev. 11 Non-Intent Revision 1-29-97 Rev. 12 Non-Intent Revision 6-17-97 Rev. 13 OSC Approved 10-15-97 Rev. 14 OSC Approved 4-1-98 Rev. 15 Non-Intent Revision 4-12-00 Rev. 16 Non-Intent Revision 8-8-01 Rev. 17 Non-Intent Revision 12-12-01

Procedure Numnber.

Beaver Valley Power Station EPP/-2

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Unusual Event Revision:

17 1 Page Number:

ii of ii TABLE OF CONTENTS A. Purpose B. References C. Responsibilities D. Action Levels/Precautions E. Procedure F. Final Condition G. Attachments

Power Station e PNmbr Beaver Valley

• EPP/I-2

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1/2 In-Field Reference Unusual Event Revision: Page Number:

17 1 of 14 A. PURPOSE This procedure describes the actions to be taken once an Unusual Event has been declared at the Beaver Valley Power Station. Actions to be completed by the Control Room are outlined in Section E. 1.0 while TSC actions are outlined in Section E.2.0.

B. REFERENCES 1.0 Beaver Valley Power Station Emergency Preparedness Plan and Implementing Procedures.

2.0 Beaver Valley Power Station Operating Manuals.

3.0 Beaver Valley Power Station Health Physics Manual.

S4.0 E.

Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix 5.0 NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants".

6.0 Condition Report #971737.

Condition Report #993020.

Condition Report #00-2202 Condition Report #00-4309 Condition Report #01-0693 Condition Report #01-4468 C. RESPONSIBILITY The Emergency Director (Nuclear Shift Supervisor of the affected Unit, until properly relieved by a designated alternate) has the responsibility and authority for implementation of the actions prescribed in this instruction. If the Nuclear Shift Supervisor of the affected Unit is unavailable, the Nuclear Shift Supervisor of the unaffected Unit SHALL assume the role of the Emergency Director until relieved. Or, if the occurrence is common to both Units (e.g.,

Security compromise, acts of nature), the Senior Nuclear Shift Supervisor (per 1/2-OM 48.1 .A.III.J) SHALL assume the role of Emergency Director.

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17 2'of14 -

D. ACTION LEVELS/PRECAUTIONS 1.0 Action Levels 1.1 An Unusual Event has been declared based on the occurrence of off-normal events which could indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant per EPP/I-1.

2.0 Precautions 2.1 Continued surveillance and assessment of plant conditions are necessary to ensure that the emergency classification is appropriately revised as conditions change, or as more definitive information is obtained.

2.2 Corrective actions to contend with the situation and to mitigate possible deterioration in plant conditions SHALL be conducted in accordance with the BVPS Operating Manual while simultaneously implementing this Instruction.

2.3 Following the declaration of an Unusual Event, Federal regulations require notification of offsite authorities MUST be made within fifteen minutes. (Refer to EPPIIP 1.1) 2.4 Contaminated/injured personnel no longer constitute an emergency declaration.

However, BVPS is required to notify the NRC per 10CFR50.72.

2.5 Faxing of the Initial Notification Form is NOT the "Official" Notification to the Offsite Agencies and does NOT meet the 15-minute notification criteria. The 15-minute notification criteria is met and "Official" notification made when a representative of BVPS speaks with a representative of each Offsite Agency.

Procedure Number.

Beaver Valley Power Station u EPP/-2

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference UnusualUnsa EventRevision:

vn Page Number:

17 1 of 14 E. PROCEDURE NOTE:

If actions are required in an emergency that are immediately needed to protect the public health and safety and departs from the license condition or Technical Specification, the action SHALL be approved, as a minimum, by a licensed Senior Reactor Operator prior to taking the action per 10 CFR 50.54(x) and (y).

1.0 Control Room NSS/ED actions:

NOTE:

Routine/Batch Releases at either Unit need not be discontinued upon declaration of an Unusual Event, UNLESS the release is the cause of the Unusual Event. CHECK 1.1 Implement corrective actions.

NOTE:

Initial Notifications to the Offsite Agencies MUST be completed within 15 minutes of the Emergency Declaration.

1.2 Obtain Notification Package from the sealed EPP drawer.

NOTE:

Attachments designated with an

• are included in the Unusual Event Notification Package.

1.3 Complete INITIAL NOTIFICATION FORM (EPP/IP 1.1, Att. 1 *)

1.4 Begin notifications of Offsite Agencies per EPP/IP 1.1 - On shift Communicator.

Beaver Valley Power Station I EPP/I-2

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17 A f4 1A CHECK 1.5 A SRO (from the unaffected Unit) SHALL complete the 11 blanks below and notify the Emergency Response Organization (ERe).

"This is (Your Name) at Beaver Valley Power Station. At (time) hrs..

Unit has declared an UNUSUAL EVENT due to:

(Choose One and Continue)

a. DO NOT report to your emergency facility. I repeat, DO NOT report to your emergency facility.

b. Report to your emergency facility. I repeat, report to your emergency facility.

OR

c. Report to your alternate emergency facility. I repeat, report to your alternate emergency facility."

1.5.1 If ERG activation is NOT required, proceed to step 1.5.12 to send a Lotus Notes message only.

1.5.2 From a PAX phone, dial 4370. M 1.5.3 Interrupt the greeting by IMMEDIATELY entering XXXXX(.

1.5.4 When prompted, enter scenario number XXXXX.

1.5.5 When prompted, verify scenario number (9 for YES or 6 for NO).

p 1.5.6 When prompted "Do you want to record your on the fly D message 1", Press 9 for YES or 6 for NO.

(Continued)

Beaver Valley Power Station EPP/I-2

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Unusual Event Revision:

17 1 Page Number 5 of 14 CHECK 1.5.7 When prompted "Enter on the fly number 1 segment ID E' or press star to record".

1.5.7.1 PRESS * (A short delay will occur).

1.5.8 When prompted "Please speak your message after the El tone", provide the information from Step 1.5 in your on the fly message.

1.5.8.1 PRESS the # Key when done with message. "

1.5.9 Review message, when prompted "Is that correct" -'

(Press 9 for YES or 6 for NO).

1.5.10 When prompted "You will queue scenario XXXXX. L" It will now be sent. Are you sure this is what you want to do?" (Press 9 for YES or 6 for NO) 1.5.11 Call the Central Alarm Station (CAS) (PAX []

5114/5115) and provide the following information:

"* Your name and title. L

"* EPP CODE WORD _lI

• An UNUSUAL EVENT has been declared. []

ERO pagers have been activated. Call back at []

PAX when pager activates.

• Request Near Site Building Emergency L" Notifications be made.

1.5.12 From Lotus Notes, send a message to "beeper all call" L" with the information from E.1.5 above. Include if ERO is to report or not. (Limit 220 characters) 1.6 Complete UNUSUAL EVENT PAGE ANNOUNCEMENT I" FORM (EPP/I-2, Att. 1 *).

1.7 Announce the Unusual Event Page Party Announcement.

Beaver Valley Power Station

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Unit: Level Of Use: $

-1/2 In-Field Reference Unusual Event Revision:

17 Page Number 6 of 14 "

NOTE:

NRC notifications MUST be completed within 1 (one) hour of Emergency Declaration. (Satisfies 10CFR50.72)

CHECK 1.8 Complete FOLLOW-UP NOTIFICATION FORM (EPP/IP 1.1, Att. 3 *).

1.8.1 On-shift Communications and Records Coordinator to E]

perform Follow-Up Notifications.

1.9 Complete REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET (NRC FORM 361).

NOTE:

(Licensed) Personnel from the opposite Unit should be utilized to complete NRC notifications.

NRC Operations Center 800-532-3469 or 301-816-5100 FAX: 301-816-5151 1.9.1 Provide details from NRC EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET to the NRC.

1.10 For Airborne release:

1.10.1 Complete OPERATIONAL INPUTS FOR DOSE ASSESSMENTS. (EPP/I-2, Att. 2 *)

1.10.2 Provide Attachment 2 to Health Physics personnel.

1.10.3 Instruct Health Physics to initiate dose projections (EPP/IP 2.6).

El 1.10.4 Initiate offsite/onsite radiation surveys (EPP/IP 2.2, 2.3).

1.10.5 Obtain Dose Projection results from Health Physics.

p

Beaver Valley Power Station Procedure Number:

EPP/I-2 "ritle: Unit: Level Of Use:

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CHECK 1.11 For Liquid Release:

1.11.1 Obtain results from Health Physics personnel. ["

1.11.2 Determine if Liquid Release protective action is E" required per EPP/IP 4.1 1.11.3 Notify downstream water treatment plants and relay PAR, if applicable, On-shift Communicator.

1.12 Escalate Emergency Classification, if necessary. []

1.13 Terminate when termination criteria met per TERMINATION []

GUIDELINES (EPP/IP 6.2, Att. 1 *).

2.0 TSC Emergency Director Actions (If activated): [-]

2.1 Coordinate with the Control Room to implement corrective actions.

NOTE:

Attachments designated with an

• are included in the Communications and Records Coordinator Notification Area.

2.2 Instruct the Communications and Records Coordinator to I-]

complete the FOLLOW-UP NOTIFICATION FORM (EPP/IP 1.1, Att. 3 *).

2.2.1 Review and approve completed FOLLOW-UP [

NOTER-CATION FORM-

Beaver Valley Power Station

Title:

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1/2 In-Field Reference Unusual Event Revision: Page Number:

17 R of 14 CHECK 2.3 Instruct the Communications and Records Coordinator to fax L" the completed FOLLOW-UP NOTIFICATION FORM to the Offsite Agencies using the instructions located in the EPP Notification Book.

NOTE:

NRC notifications MUST be completed within 1 (one) hour of Emergency Declaration. (Satisfies 10CFR50.72) 2.4 Instruct the TSC Operations Coordinator to complete LI the REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET (NRC FORM 361).

2.4.1 Ensure that the worksheet is provided to the Operations 1"]

Communicator manning the NRC ENS "RED" phone.

2.4.2 Ensure that the details from the NRC EVENT L" NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET are provided to the NRC.

2.5 For Airborne release:

2.5.1 Instruct EA&DP to initiate dose projections L' (EPP/IP 2.6).

2.5.2 Initiate offsite/onsite radiation surveys L" (EPP/IP 2.2, 2.3).

2.5.3 Obtain Dose Projection results from EA&DP. EL 2.6 For Liquid Release:

2.6.1 Obtain results from EA&DP personnel. EL 2.6.2 Determine if Liquid Release protective action is EL required per EPP/IP 4.1 2.6.3 Instruct the Communications and Records Coordinator EL to notify downstream water treatment plants and relay the PAR, if applicable, per EPP/IP 1. 1, Attachment 2.

Procedur Number:

Beaver Valley Power Station EPP/-2

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1 17 Page Number:

9 of14 CHECK 2.7 Escalate Emergency Classification, if necessary.

2.8 Terminate when termination criteria met per TERMINATION GUIDELINES (EPP/IP 6.2, Att. 1).

F. FINAL CONDITIONS 1.0 On-Call ED/alternate has been contacted.

2.0 Initial and Follow-Up Notifications completed.

3.0 The Unusual Event has been terminated with normal station administration resumed or the emergency reclassified.

4.0 Event termination calls are completed per IP 1.1 G. ATTACHMENTS 1.0 Unusual Event Announcement 2.0 Operational Inputs For Dose Assessments

Title:

Beaver Valley Power Station I Unit:

Pm1-2 Level Of Use:

I In-Field Reference Unusual Event Revision:

i'17 Page Number.

10 of 14 '

INTENTIONALLY BLANK 1

... Beaver Valley Power Station ePNmbr

":EPP/I,2

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11 of 14 A5.715DD Attachment 1 (1 of 1)

UNUSUAL EVENT PAGE ANNOUNCEMENT Should an Unusual Event be declared at BVPS, complete the following steps:

1) Sound the Station Stand-by Alarm one (1) time.

2) Read the following:

"Attention all Site personnel, this is an ACTUAL EVENT, BVPS Unit # _ has declared an UNUSUAL EVENT at (time) due to

_ All shift emergency response personnel should report to the Control Room. All other personnel should remain alert for additional announcements."

Additional Comments:

3) Perform Steps 1 and 2 two (2) additional times within 15 minutes of the first announcement, unless the event is escalated or terminated.

Time Initials

"* First Announcement

"* Second Announcement

"*Third Announcement

"*Date

4) Restore Page System to single unit operation upon termination of the event or upon direction of the Emergency Director.

Beaver Valley Power Station EoP/m-.

Ttle: Unit: Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reeference Unusual Event Revision: Page Number.

1'7 .

14. -/

9 j dQ U.L INTENTIONALLY BLANK I

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- 13 of 14 Attachment 2 (1 of 2)

OPERATIONAL INPUTS FOR DOSE ASSESSMENTS To perform a dose projection, Health Physics personnel will require the following information:

1) Type of accident: (Circle One) If unknown, use (2) LOCA W/GAP Activity.

(1) LOCA W/RCS Activity - Loss of coolant accident and no greater than Tech Spec RCS Activity.

(2) LOCA W/GAP Activity - Loss of coolant accident and core exit thermocouples have exceeded values (e.g., core cooling, RED PATH) that may indicate damage to fuel cladding with ESF's available.

(3) Design Basis LOCA - Double ended shear of RCS piping, rapid RCS depressurization, minimum engineered safety features function.

(4) LOCA W/Failed ESF's (TID14844) - Double ended shear of RCS piping, rapid RCS depressurization, no engineered safety features function and loss of containment.

(5) Small Line Break LOCA - Loss of coolant accident via piping systems outside containment (i.e., letdown) and no greater than Tech Spec RCS activity.

(6) RCCA Ejection - Reactor control cluster ejection causes loss of coolant accident which results in 10% gap release.

(7) Steam Generator Tube. Rupture - SG Tube rupture with offsite power not available and affected SG used for cooldown (condenser not available).

(8) Fuel Handling Accident - The drop of a single fuel bundle affecting another in the Fuel Handling Building.

(9) Loss of AC Power - Loss of offsite power, natural circulation cooldown.

(10) Gas Waste System Failure - Alarms or unplanned pressure loss from waste gas treatment/storage system.

(11) Main Steam Line Break - Technical Specification RCS activity, with accident induced primary-to-secondary leak.

Beaver Valley Power Station EPP/I-2

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14 of 14

• Attachment 2 (2 of 2)

OPERATIONAL INPUTS FOR DOSE ASSESSMENTS

2) Time of plant trip or start of accident:

3) Delay time between accident and start of release: (Hours)

4) Expected, known, or default duration of release: (Hours)

(If unknown, use one (1) hour as default value.)

5) Known or expected release pathway: (Circle One)

Rel. Point Unit 1 Unit 2 RP1 Ventilation Vent Ventilation Vent Condensate Pol.

RP 2 SLCRS SLCRS RP 3 Decon Building Process Vent Waste Gas Building RP 4 Main Steam Main Steam

A5.735B Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1/2 EPP/IP 1.1 Notifications Document Owner Manager, Emergency Preparedness Revision Number 28 Level Of Use In-Field Reference Safety Related Procedure Yes rnvwrD.NInI wwUwaN q

Procedure Number:

Beaver Valley Power Station EPPJPe 1.1

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

28 Page Number:

i of ii EFFECTIVE INDEX Issue 8 Rev. 0 OSC Approved 3-12-87 1 OSC Approved 8-13-87 2 OSC Approved 3-10-88 3 OSC Approved 6-20-88 4 Non-Safety Revisions 2-23-89 5 Non-Safety Revisions 6-30-89 6 OSC Approved 3-22-90 Issue 9 Rev. 0 OSC Approved 9-27-90 1 Non-Intent Revision 6-28-91 2 Non-Intent Revision 12-29-92 3 Non-Intent Revision 1-27-93 Rev. 5 OSC Approved 11-10-93 Rev. 6 Non-Intent Revision 4-22-94 Rev. 7 Non-Intent Revision 7-29-94 Rev. 8 Non-Intent Revision 11-15-94 Rev. 9 Non-Intent Revision 1-20-95 Rev. 10 Non-Intent Revision 5-26-95 Rev. 11 Non-Intent Revision 9-1-95 Rev. 12 Non-Intent Revision 12-8-95 Rev. 13 Non-Intent Revision 2-1-96 Rev. 14 Non-Intent Revision 10-23-96 Rev. 15 Non-Intent Revision 1-29-97 Rev. 16 Non-Intent Revision 6-17-97 Rev. 17 Non-Intent Revision 1-16-98 Rev. 18 OSC Approved 4-1-98 Rev. 19 OSC Approved 7-1-98 Rev. 20 Non-Intent Revision 1-13-99 Rev. 21 Non-Intent Revision 9-28-99 Rev. 22 Non-Intent Revision 12-2-99 Rev. 23 Non-Intent Revision 7-12-00 Rev. 24 Non-Intent Revision 1-23-01 Rev. 25 Non-Intent Revision 5-1-01 Rev. 26 Non-Intent Revision 6-29-01 Rev. 27 Non-Intent Revision 8-8-01 Rev. 28 Non-Intent Revision 12-12-01

Beaver Valley Power Station Procedure Number EPP/IP 1.1

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

28 Page Number.

ii of ii TABLE OF CONTENTS A. Purpose B. References C. Responsibilities D. Action Levels/Precautions E. Procedure F. Final Condition G. Attachments

Procedure Number:

Beaver Valley Power Station EPPIP 1.1

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

S1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications I Revision:

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I of 86 A. PURPOSE This procedure provides guidance for making initial and follow-up notifications during an emergency.

B. REFERENCES 1.0 Beaver Valley Power Station Emergency Preparedness Plan.

2.0 Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Disaster Operations Plan/Annex E.

-3.0 State of Ohio Nuclear Pdwer:Plant Emergency Response Plan.

4.0 West Virginia Radiological Emergency Plan for A Fixed Nuclear Facility.

5.0 Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix E.

".6.0 - NUREG-0654JFEMA-REP-l, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants".

7.07.0: Condition Report #971737.

Condition Report.#980706.

Condition Report #991967.

Condition Report #993020 TCN 1/2-00-020 Nuclear Regulatory Issue Summary 2000-11 Condition Report #01 -1975 Condition Report #01-0693 Condition Report #00-4309 Condition Report #00-2202 Condition Report #01-6697 C. RESPONSIBILITIES The Communications and Records Coordinator (or qualified designated communicator, until properly relieved) is responsible to ensure that all required offsite notifications are completed within the proper time frame following the declaration of an emergency. Security is responsible for initial notifications to near-site buildings.

D. ACTION LEVELS/PRECAUTIONS 1.0,- This procedure is to be initiated upon any of the following conditions:

1.1 An emergency condition has been declared at the Beaver Valley Power Station as defined in the BVPS Emergency Preparedness Plan.

1.2 An existing emergency condition has been reclassified to a higher emergency category, and/or, a significant deterioration in conditions has occurred.

1.3 The emergency situation has been corrected, the emergency terminated, and recovery operations have begun.

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• 2.0 Emergency communications will originate in the BV 1/2 Control Rooms. See EPPJIP 1.2 "Communication and Dissemination of Information" for details of the communication systems available.

3.0 To minimize the spread of rumors and undue public anxiety, the following precautions should be followed:

3.1 All initial and follow-up notifications to County and State agencies SHALL be made with the Bell telephone system as the primary means, with predesignated back-ups available in the event the telephone systems are inoperable. A code word is utilized to ensure only authorized individuals receive the information.

3.2 Information SHALL be provided to only individuals whose identity is known, and whose organization is listed on the Emergency Notification Call-List EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 2. Any requests for information should be relayed to Corporate Communications at 724-682-5201.

3.3 No news announcements on the incident SHALL be made prior to completion of all required notifications. News announcements will be developed as coordinated by the Corporate Communications Department.

4.0 In the event of a forced Control Room evacuation, the Onshift Communications and Records Coordinator will relocate to either CAS or the Communications Area of the TSC area of the ERF building, to make the required emergency notifications.

4.1 The Onshift Communications and Records Coordinator should contact the Emergency Director for form approvals and log the Emergency Director's name on the appropriate form.

Unit #1 - 724-682-5827 Unit #2 - 724-682-5327 NOTE:

If necessary, Security may radio the officer assigned to the Emergency Director/NSS under Appendix R to relay information as needed.

5.0 Upv-rG the initial declaration of an Unusual Event (only when ERO activated), Alert, Site AR'.- Emergency or General Emergency, Security personnel in the CAS will complete Attazliment 6 of this IP.

Beaver Valley Power Station

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28 1 3 of 86 6.0 All event notifications and escalations SHOULD be made to PEMA. Follow-Up Notifications SHOULD be directed to DEP/BRP. PEMA will ensure DEP/BRP is informed of the situation and contacts the plant for verification and assessment of the incident.

7.0 .Should any emergency situation require contacting the Beaver County Emergency Services Center (i.e., fire, ambulance), DO NOT use 9-1-1. NOTIFY Beaver County Emergency Services Center at (724) 775-0880.,

8.0 Once the County Emergency Operations Centers (EOC's) are- activated, the Coordinators may inform the BVPS emergency communicator of an alternate phone number to be utilized.

9.0 Should there be questions concerning the required notifications and/or the appropriate paperwork (notification forms, logs, etc.), personnel from Emergency Preparedness may be contacted for assistance.

E. PROCEDURE NOTE:

Initial Notifications are to be, made to the first six listed Agencies on the Emergency Notifications Call List, EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 2 and MUST be made within 15 minutes of the event declaration. Subsequent notifications MUST still be made.

NOTE:

The' BVPS Radio System is the alternate to the commercial phone system for notifications of offsite emergency response organizations. EPP/IP 1.2 Attachment 3, Step 6.0 provides direction in its use.,

NOTE:

If an emergency is reclassified and upgraded during the Follow-Up Notification process, the Communicator SHALL terminate the notification in progress and begin the upgraded Initial Notification process again per appropriate Attachment. If the Initial Notification Conference (INC) call is in progress, then the upgraded notifications SHALL be provided at this time.

The 15-minute clock for the notifications will restart at the time of the upgraded declaration.

NOTE:

IF contact cannot be made with the State of West Virginia, contact Hancock County (WVa) stating West Virginia did not answer and request Hancock County Office of Emergency Services contact the State with the Initial Notification information. It does not need read again.

Beaver Valley Power Station Pocedure Number.

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NOTE:

Faxing of the Initial Notification Form is NOT the "Official" Notification to the Offsite Agencies and does NOT meet the 15-minute notification criteria. The 15-minute notification criteria is met and "Official" notification made when a representative of BVPS speaks with a representative of each Offsite Agency.

1.0 Initial Notifications 1.1 Complete Initial Notifications and document as thoroughly as possible according to the instructions provided.

1.2 Control Room personnel should utilize Part A of the applicable notification Attachment shown below.

• Unusual Event Notification Attachment 8

• Alert Notification Attachment 9

• Site Area Emergency Notification Attachment 10

• General Emergency Notification Attachment 11 1.3 TSC personnel should refer to Attachments 12 and 13.

2.0 Follow-Up Notifications NOTE:

The follow-up notification provides technical information to those qualified to use the data and serves as a means to verify the authenticity of an emergency notification.

The code word also provides verification.

NOTE:

Information for the Gaseous Follow-Up Notification Form is available via a MIDAS printout from Health Physics or EA&DP personnel.

2.1 Control Room personnel should utilize the applicable part of the Notification Attachment shown below.

0 Unusual Event Notification Attachment 8 0 Alert Notification Attachment 9 0 Site Area Emergency Notification Attachment 10 0 General Emergency Notification Attachment 11 2.2 TSC personnel should refer to Attachment 12, Step 3.0.

I

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9-R 5 of 86 3.0 Subsequent Notifications 3.1 If it becomes necessary to reclassify the emergency, the Initial Notification Form is used and notifications are made in the same manner specified in Section E-1 of this procedure.

3.2 The Follow-Up Notification Form should be updated periodically (i.e., 2 times per shift) or at the discretion of the Emergency Director. This notification does not represent a change in classification.

4.0 Transfer of Responsibility 4.1 When TSC personnel are activated and have arrived onsite, a turnover SHALL be performed from the on-shift response organization to the TSC response organization.

4.2 When informed by TSC Communications and Records Coordinator, transfer communication responsibilities from the Control Room to the Technical Support Center.

5.0 Termination 5.1 When the emergency situation at BVPS has been terminated, make the appropriate termination calls per Attachment 5, Emergency Termination Checklist.

F. FINAL CONDITIONS 1.0 Use of this procedure SHALL be terminated when the emergency situation is corrected or when directed by the Emergency Director.

2.0 Attachment 5 (Emergency Termination Checklist) is to be completed for termination calls to offsite agencies for all emergency events.

NOTE:

Upon termination of the emergency situation and the subsequent termination of this IP, All originals of completed Attachments SHALL be forwarded to Emergency Preparedness..

Beaver Valley Power Station SEPP/IP 1.1

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28 Page Number 6 of 96 G. ATTACHMENTS 1.0 INITIAL NOTIFICATION FORM 2.0 EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION CALL-LIST 3.0 FOLLOW-UP NOTIFICATION FORM 4.0 REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET (NRC FORM 361) 5.0 EMERGENCY TERMINATION CHECKLIST 6.0 NEAR-SITE BUILDING EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS 7.0 ACTIVATION OF THE ERO USING BEEPERS AND ERO VOICE MAIL SYSTEM 8.0 UNUSUAL EVENT NOTIFICATIONS 9.0 ALERT NOTIFICATIONS 10.0 SITE AREA EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS 11.0 GENERAL EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS 12.0 TSC EVENT NOTIFICATIONS 13.0 NOTIFICATION FORM FAXING INSTRUCTIONS (Example) 14.0 ERO BEEPER ACTIVATION INSTRUCTIONS (Example) 15.0 ACTIVATION OF THE INITIAL NOTIFICATION CONFERENCE (INC) CALL INSTRUCTIONS (Example) 16.0 INSTRUCTIONS FOR NOTIFICATION OF ERO FOR EVENT ESCALATION/UPDATES

Beaver Valley Power Station Procedure Number:

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1 7 of 86 BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION ATTACHMENT 1 (1 of 1)

INITIAL NOTIFICATION FORM

[- THIS IS A DRILL D-] THIS IS AN ACTUAL EVENT

1. THIS IS BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, MY NAME IS (Name)

THE CODE WORD IS MAY I PLEASE HAVE YOUR NAME (Document on IP 1.1Attachment 2).

I [

THE TIME IS (Document on IP' 1.1Attachment 2V_

(Document on IP I lAttachment 2)

2. EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION

[- UNUSUAL EVENT L] SITE A1MEA EMERGENCY "l .ALERT I-- GENER. AL EMERGENCY

[-] THE EVENT HAS BEEN TERMINATED.

L] UNIT #1 [] UNIT #2 TIME: DAi ['E:

THIS PRESENTS A/AN '- INITIAL DECLARATION

[I ESCALATION 7 IN CLASSIFICATION STATUS F-] NO CHANGE

3. THE EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL) NUMBER IS:

BRIEF NON-TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

4. THERE IS D NO

-' AN AIRBORNE NON-ROUTINE RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE IN PROGRESS E] A LIQUID

5. PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION (PAR)

6. WIND DIRECTION IS FROM: degrees AT 150'; WIND SPEED IS: mph AT 35'

[] THIS IS A DRILL -" THIS IS AN ACTUAL EVENT APPROVED DATE NOTE:

THIS PAPER IS INTENDED TO BE PINK FOR BVPS ONLY, IT IS WHITE TO ACCOMODATE FAXING.

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S. . . . * * ...........- . .. ... , ..* 2 89 o f 86 EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION CALL-LIST ATTACHMENT 2 (1 of 10)

"A5.715DQ INITIAL NOTIFICATION THE AGENCIES LISTED BELOW MUST BE NOTWFED WITHIN FIFTEEN (15) MINUTES AFrER THE EMERGENCY HAS BEEN DECLARED.

1

* , * * ?. * ,*, * .:* ......... % * +*¢*'*,..+ * .......... *.,,* ....... *%..... * * *. *.,k*.:. * *+*.,

• r.

• s:* .** *¸....... * * * , -*

7 "'i*lmli ....

CIRCLE-ONE.`i2..,

.... * ................ +* +'+"'""..... "'+ " ......

I CIRCLE ONE: -

I II I I PjRIMARY ALTERAMTE: EMERGENCY: CONTACT.

.ORGANIZATION -NUMBER,,_. NUMBER C~LASS' NAME TIMPI* I 'FAX INI.

1. Beaver County Emergency 724-775-0880 724-774-1049 Management Agency 9-1-1 Dispatcher BCEMA.Director UE SAE Relay To: IR. Chiodo, Director Beaver, PA Director's Office EOC Number: 724-775-8605-FAX 724-775-1163-FAX ALERT GE _

2. PA Emergency Management 1-717-651-2001 Relay Thru BC-911 Agency Duty Officer 1-717-651-2021-FAX 724-775-0880 UE SAB BCEMA Director ALERT GE

3. Columbiana County 1-330-424-7255 1-330-424-9725 Emergency Sheriffs Dispatcher CCEMA Director UE SAE Management Agency Lisbon, OH Director's Office Relay To: J. Carter, Director 1-330-4-24-9267-FAX ALERT GE EOC Number: 1-330-4243602-FAX

4. Ohio Emergency Management 1-614-889-7150 1-614-466-2660 Agency Duty Officer Columbus, OH Ohio Highway Patrol UE SAE Dispatcher EOC Number: 1-614-764-2742-FAX 1-614-799-9249-FAX ALERT GE .... .

5. West Virginia Office of 1-304-558-5380 1-304-564-4100 Emergency Services Duty Charleston, WV Sheriff's 9- 1-1 . E SAE Officer Dispatcher 1-304-344-4538-FAX New Cumberland, WV ALERT GE

6. Hancock County Office of 1-304-564-4100 1-304-564-4068 Emergency Services Sheriffs 9-1-1 HCOES Dispatcher SAE Relay To: J.P. Jones, Director Dispatcher Dispatcher's Office EOC Number: 1-304-564-4273-FAX ALERT GE N. Cumberland, WV 1-304-564-4031-FAX

• Contact Time = Time of Initial Contact With Individual Comm&Records Coord Siglnature: Date:

Beaver Valley Power Station Procedure Number:

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1 28 10 of 86 EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION CALL-LIST ATTACHMENT 2 (2 of 10)

A5.715DQ FOLLOWUP NOTIFICATION CI]RCLIE ONE, CIRCLEN'E~.

PR1IMARjY, .ALTERNATE EMERGENCYCOT T ORWGArNIZTION NUMER NUMBE-R CLASS' COTATFAEI

1. Beaver County Emergency 724-775-0880 724-774-1049 Management Agency 9-1-1 Dispatcher BCEMA Director UE SAE Y Relay To: R. Chiodo, Director Beaver, PA Director's Office EOC Number: ALERT GE N

2. PEMA / DEP/BRP 1-717-651-2001 Relay Thru BC-911 y 724-775-0880 UE SAE BCEMA Director N ALERT GE

3. Columbiana County 1-330-424-7255 1-330-424-9725 Emergency Sheriff's Dispatcher CCEMA Director UE SAE Y Management Agency Lisbon, OH Director's Office Relay To: J. Carter, Director ALERT GE N EOC Number:

4. Ohio Emergency Management 1-614-889-7150 1-614-466-2660 Agency Duty Officer Columbus, OH Ohio Highway Patrol UE SAE Y EOC Number: Dispatcher ALERT GE N

5. West Virginia Office of 1-304-558-5380 1-304-564-4100 Y Emergency Services Charleston, WV Sheriff's 9-1-1 UE SAE Duty Officer Dispatcher New N Cumberland, WV ALERT GE

6. Hancock County Office of 1-304-564-4100 1-304-564-4068 Emergency Services Sheriff's 9-1-1 HCOES Dispatcher UE SAE Y Relay To: J.P. Jones, Director Dispatcher Dispatcher's Office EOC Number: N. Cumberland, WV ALERT GE N

• Contact Time = Time of Initial Contact With Individual Comm&Records Coord Signature: Date:

K

'rocedure Number:

Beaver Valley Power Station I EPP/IP 1.1

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1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications NaRevision: ge':1 Page Number: f8 28 11 of 86 EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION CALL-LIST (Cont'd). ATTACHMENT 2 (3 of 10)

A5.715DQ The following are to be notified only for the emergency classifications listed in the Emergency Class column.

URCLE ONEft CRLEI'Oi3 PRIMARY 'ALTERNATE EMERENCY. CONTACT-.

ORGANIZATION NUMBER NUBRCASNAME -TIM*, INITIAILS

7. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory NRC/ENS 1-301-816-5100 or Commission 1-301-951-0550 or UE SAE 1-301-415-0550 During Normal Working Hours FAX 1-301-816-5151 ALERT GE

8. Contact one of the following:

Superintendent Unit 1 5111 Albert Hartner Operations or 724-378-2639 Superintendent Unit 2 5104 G. E. Storolis Operations Notifies W. Pearce 724-643-4543 Plant Mgr. Notifies 1895 L. Myers 330-757-7177 Sr. V.P. BVPS 5234 LE ONLY

9. Corp. Comm. (Notify One)

A. J. Fenwick 5201 724-899-2396-(H) 330-761-4055 412-305-1012 (P) UE ONLY T. M. Schneider 419-321-7129 330-659-6216 (H) 440-733-0728 (P)

R. G. Wilkins 440-774-2606 (Pager 1-419-640-3229) 10 BVPS Emergency Preparedness (Notify One) 5767 724-869-7165 UE ONLY S. L. Vicinie H. I. Szklinki 5772 724-457-9210 J. C. Contreras 5773 412-795-4931 S. J. Paletta 5774 304-387-4393 D. W. Skorupan 5808 11 NRC BVPS Site Rep.

(Notify One)

D. Kern 5570 724-728-3135 UE ONLY G. Wertz 5570 724-770-0393

• Contact Time = Time of Initial Contact With Individual Comm&Records Coord Signature: Date:

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A5.715DQ The following organizations are notified only for the emergency classifications listed in the Emergency Class. column.

CIRCLE ONE EMERkGENCY CONTACT

.-ORGANIZATION.NU R " NAME TIME* INITIALS 12.. Bruce Mansfield Power Station 724-643-2300 724-643-5851 ALERT SAE GE

13. Midland Water Plant 724-643-4920 (8:00-11:00 a.m. M thru F) Liquid Release Alternate:

Beaver Co. EMA - 724-775-0880

14. East Liverpool Water Plant 1-330-385-5050 1-330-385-8812 Liquid Release

Contact:

Mr. Clark

15. Chester, W. VA. Water Plant 1-304-564-4100 (24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) 1-304-387-2820 Liquid Release

16. U.S Corps of Engineering

a. New Cumberland Dam 1-740-537-2571 (Downriver) 724-643-8400

b. Montgomery Dam (Upriver)

Alternate: Liquid Release Beaver Co. EMA-724-775-0880

17. U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety 412-644-5808 (Daylight) All offsite 1-800-253-7465 (Night) Releases - Actual 1-800-424-8802 (Nat'l Response) or Imminent Alternate:

Beaver Co. EMA-724-775-0880

18. INPO 1-800-321-0614 (24 hr.) (Switchboard)

FAX 770-644-8549 ALERT FAX 770-644-8567 FAX 770-644-8594 SAE GE

• Contact Tin," - Time of Initial Contact With Individual Comm&Records Cr---! Signature: Date:

rocedure Number:

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2, 13 of 86 EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION CALL-LIST (Cont'd) ATTACHMENT 2 (5 of 10)

A5.715DQ The following organizations are notified only for the emergency classifications listed in the. Emergency Class. column.

EMERGENCY COQNTACT ORANIZATION NUB'CLAS.NM TIME* INITIALS

19. Westinghouse Atomic Power Division

a. 'Site Rep.- (Don Durkosh) 724-682-5461 (W) 412-305-3198 (B) 412-741-1861 (H) 724-544-3010 (Cell)

b. Ken Blanchard 412-374-6605 (W) 724-327-9051 (H) 412-760-4863

b. Ed Dzanis 724-682-5188 (W) ALERT 724-834-2427 (H) 724-493-0793 (cell SAE GE (412-305-0601 (B)

20. American Nuclear Insurers S Radiological Nuclear Emergencies 1-860-561-3433 (Ext. 500)

ALERT

__ SAE GE _

• Contact Time = Time of Initial Contact With Individual Comm&Records Coord Signature: Date:

Beaver Valley Power Station ocd1re1Number:

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128 14 of 86 EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION CALL-LIST (Cont'd) ATTACHMENT 2 (6 of 10)

A5.715DQ The following organizations are not normally notified directly in the event of an emergency at JVPS, but may be contacted if particular emergency conditions warrant.

CIRCLEKONE,'.

EMERG.ENCY .CONTACT ORGANIZATION NUMBER CLASS, -NME TM* IIIL

21. Pennsylvania DEP/BRP 1-717-651-2001 UE ALERT SAE GE

22. Ohio Dept. of Health 614-644-2727 Bureau of Radiation Protection LIE ALERT SAE GE

23. Pennsylvania State Police 724-773-7400 (Brighton Barracks) UE ALERT SAE GE

24. BOC Gases 1-304-387-0889 (24 Hrs.)

Ue ALERT

__SAE GE

25. Ashland Oil Co. 1-800-274-5263 UE ALERT

_SAE GE

26. Freedom Station Valvoline Oil 724-774-2020 IJE ALERT SAE GE

27. Buckeye Pipeline Co. 1-800-523-9420 (24 Hrs.)

1-800-551-1285 (24 Hrs.) LIE ALERT 1-800-331-4115 (24 Hrs.)

I SAE GE

• Contact Time = Time of Initial Contact With Individual Comm&Records Coord Signature: Date:

Procedure Number:

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I 8 I .. ....... . 1-5 of 86 EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION CALL-LIST (Cont'd) ATTACHMENT 2 (7 of 10)

A5.715DQ The following organizations are not normally notified directly in the event of an emergency at BVPS, but may be contacted if particular emergency conditions warrant.

ciRCtLB.NE ':

ORGANIZAION NUMBR CLASS CONTACT MEANT_______

TIONUMBERCLASS NAME ~ TIE INTIALS:

28 Peoples Natural Gas 1-800-300-3333 UE ALERT SAE GE

29. DOE RAP/IRAP Brookhaven Area Office 1-631-344-2200 (24 Hrs.)

UE ALERT SAE GE

30. Medic-Rescue Ambulance Service Relay through Beaver Co. EMA-724-775-0880 UE ALERT "Alternate:

724-773-3104 SAE GE 724-728-3620 (Office) ..........

31. Shippingport Fire Department Relay through Beaver Co. EMA-724-775-0880 UE ALERT Alternate: 724-773-3100 SAE GE

32. Shippingport Borough Relay through Beaver Co. EMA-724-775-0880 Alternate:

Police 724-643-1371 UE ALERT Manager 724-643-4333 (W),

724-643-9661 (H) SAE GE

• Contact Time = Time of Initial Contact With Individual Comm&Records Coord Signature: Date:

Beaver ______________________________________EPP/IP Valley Power Station Procedure Number: 1.1

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I_1 28 16 of 86 EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION CALL-LIST (Cont'd) ATTACHMENT 2 (8 of 10)

A5.715DQ The following organizations are not normally notified directly in the event of an emergency at BVPS, but may be contacted if particular emergency conditions warrant.

EMER~GENCYJ -CONTACT ORGANIZATION NUMB3ER CNSS>< NAI TIME*' INITIALS

33. The Medical Center, Beaver, PA 724-728-7110 Emergency Room 724-773-3401 Alternate: UE ALERT Relay through Beaver Co. EMA-724-775-0880 SAE GE

34. University of Pittsburgh Medical Center Presbyterian Emergency Room 412-647-3333 UE ALERT SAE GE

35. UPMC - Presby Radiation Emergency Response Program, 412-647-3595 Dept. of Radiation Medicine 412-624-2728 UE ALERT Radiation Safety Office SAE GE

36. West Virginia Bureau For Public Health

/Radiation Protection 1-304-558-3526 UE ALERT SAE GE

37. CSX Transportation Chief Dispatcher 1-800-232-0144 UE ALERT SAE GE

• Contact Time = Time of Initial Contact With Individual Comm&Records Coord Signature: Date:

y (/

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28 - 17 of 86 EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION CALL-LIST (Cont'd) ATTACHMENT 2 (9 of 10)

A5.715DQ The following organizations are not normally notified directly in the event of an emergency at BVPS, but may be contacted if particular emergency conditions warrant.

.. CIC t NE EM9RGENCY' -CONTACT

.ORGANIZATION NUMBER CLASS . NAME TIME* INIT IALS

38. US National Weather Service-Pittsburgh 412-262-1882 (24 Hrs.)

Forecast Office Coraopolis Office LUE ALERT SAE GE

39. US Corps of Engineers 412-395-7144 Emergency Management Divisions LUE ALERT SAE GE

40. EPA Region III 215-814-9016 LYE ALERT SAE GE

41. National Response Center-DC (All Hazards) 800-424-8802 (24 Hrs.)

UE ALERT SAE GE

42. PA Dept. of Environmental Protection 412-442-4000 (24 Hrs.)

LYE ALERT SAE GE

43. PennDOT - Bridgeville Office 412-429-5002 (W)

Dist. Maint. Engr. - William Sacco 724-693-8214 (H) UE ALERT SAE GE

44. PennDOT - Rochester Office 724-774-6610 (W)

Maint. Manager - Frank Bologna 724-869-5296 (H) UE ALERT I SAE GE

• Contact Time = Time of Initial Contact With Individual Comm&Records Coord Signature: Date:

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EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION CALL-LIST (Cont.) ATTACHMENT 2 (10 of 10)

A5.715DQ APPENDIX R PAX P1IONES Unit #1 East Cable Vault (BIP Area) 5827 West Cable Vault 5827 Unit #2 Alternate Shutdown Panel 5327 NOTE: If necessary, CAS may radio the officer assigned to the Emergency Director/NSS under Appendix R, to relay information, as needed.

Beaver Valley Power Station IProcedure Number:

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1 28 19 of 86 BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION ATTACHMENT 3 (1 of 5)

A5.715DR FOLLOW-UP NOTIFICATION FORM F-1 THIS IS A DRILL D THIS IS AN ACTUAL EVENT NOTE:

NO IMMEDIATE CALLBACK IS REQUIRED. If you have not received a call verifying receipt of this FAX within 30 minutes, please call (724) 643-8000.

1. THIS IS: AT BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION UNIT 1/UNIT 2, THE CODE WORD IS MAY I HAVE YOUR NAME PLEASE

2. THE FOLLOWING DATA REPRESENT THE MOST CURRENT AND ACCURATE INFORMATION, PROJECTIONS, AND/OR PROGNOSIS AVAILABLE AS OF:

TIME: DATE:

3. EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION:

UNUSUAL EVENT El SITE AREA EMERGENCY D ALERT 11 GENERAL EMERGENCY D-DECLARED AT: TIME DATE

4. CAUSE OF EMERGENCY (EAL -)

APPROVED FOLLOW-UP NOTIFICATION NOTE:

THIS PAPER IS INTENDED TO BE PINK FOR BVPS ONLY, IT IS WHITE TO ACCOMODATE FAXING.

Beaver Valley Power Station Procedure Number:

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BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION ATTACHMENT 3 (2 of 5)

A5.715DR FOLLOW-UP NOTIFICATION FORM

5. CURRENT PLANT STATUS:

CONDITIONS: STABLE El UNSTABLE El REACTOR: SHUTDOWN El AT POWER EQUIPMENT DAMAGE:

NONE F MINOR El MAJOR COOLING: NORMAL COOLDOWN (FORCED FLOW El NORMAL COOLDOWN (NATURAL CIRCULATION) El SAFETY INJECTION COOLDOWN (FEED AND BLEED) 0" N/A El

6. ACCIDENTAL RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE: (TSC Only, See EA&DP)

GASEOUS TO ATMOSPHERE El LIQUID TO OHIO RIVER F N/A E

7. SURFACE CONTAMINATION ESTIMATES:

8. NON-PLANNED RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE: (TSC Only, See EA&DP)

NO ROUTINE BATCH RELEASES WAS IN PROGRESS -'

PRIOR TO DECLARATION.

ANY ROUTINE BATCH RELEASE HAS BEEN DISCONTINUED 1]

N/A I]

9. REQUEST FOR OFFSITE SUPPORT: Specify Needs:

NOTE:

THIS PAPER IS INTENDED TO BE PINK FOR BVPS ONLY, IT IS WHITE TO ACCOMODATE FAXING.

Beaver Valley Power Station Procedure Number:

EPP/JP 1.1

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Ntfctos28 Revision: Page Number:

21 of 86 GASEOUS ATTACHMENT 3 (3 of 5)

A5.715DR FOLLOW-UP NOTIFICATION FORM NOTE: Items numbered to coincide with MIDAS print-out.

[1] Time Prepared:

[2] Type of Accident: (Circle One)

"*LOCA/WITH DBA ACTIVITY e STM GEN TUBE RUPTURE

• FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT

"*SMALL LINE BREAK LOCA

• LOSS OF AC POWER

• WASTE GAS DECAY TANK

"*LOCA/WITH GAP ACTIVITY

• RCCA EJECT

• FSAR BASIS

"*LOCA/WITH RCS ACTIVITY e MAIN STEAMLINE

• TID LOCA

[3] Time of Rx Trip or Accident start:

[4] Release Started: (Y) (N) [5 ] Time: (actual) (proj.)

[61 Release Stopped: (Y) (N) [7 ] Duration: (actual) (proj.)

[81 Potential For Additional Release: (Y) (N)

[9] Projected Release Based on:

[10] Noble Gas: uCi/sec

[11] Iodine: uCi/sec

[12] Total: uCi/sec

[131 I/NG Ratio:

[141 Monitor ID: Ul or U2 (Circle One)

[15] Reading: cpm or uCi/cc (Circle One) [ 16] Flow: __ cfm

[17] 35ft Wind Speed: [ 18 ] Delta-T: [19] Stability:

[20] 150ft Direction: [ 21 ] 500ft Direction: [ 22 ] Precip: (Y) (N)

[23 1 Source:

NOTE:

THIS PAPER IS INTENDED TO BE PINK FOR BVPS ONLY, IT IS WHITE TO ACCOMODATE FAXING.

VEPP/IPPower Station Beaver rValley Procedure Number:

1.1 Title

Unit: Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications N oifcai ns28 Revision: Page Number:

22 of 86 Z GASEOUS ATTACHMENT 3 (4 of 5)

A5.715DR FOLLOW-UP NOTIFICATION FORM Projected Dist Sectors TEDE Thyroid CDE (a) (b) (c)

[241 EAB REM REM

[251 2 mi REM REM

[26] 5 mi REM REM

[271 lmi

-0 REM REM

[28] EDE-TO-TEDE Ratio:

[29] Actual Field Monitoring Results:

Time Point WB RE1 W11 Ir Thy REM/Hr (a) (b) (c) (d)

OFFSITF. PROTFCTIVF ACTION RECOMMENDATION" NOTE:

THIS PAPER IS INTENDED TO BE PINK FOR BVPS ONLY, IT IS WHITE TO ACCOMODATE FAXING.

Procedure Number:

Beaver Valley Power Station EPPJIP 1.1

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

1 28 Page Number:

23 of 86 LIQUID ATTACHMENT 3 (5 of 5)

A5.715DR FOLLOW-UP NOTIFICATION FORM DATE / TIME

1. Potential For Additional Release: Yes FI No VD LIQUID RELEASE ASSESSMENT:

PROCEDURE ATTACHMENT(s)

2. RADIONUCLIDES IN SAMPLE:

H-3 = uCi/ml =_ uCi/ml

=_ uCi/ml = _ uCi/ml

=_ uCi/ml = _ uCi/ml

=_ uCi/ml = _ uCi/ml

=_ uCi/ml = _ uCi/ml

=_ uCi/ml = _ uCi/ml Actual Projected

3. TIME OF RELEASE START TIME OF RELEASE STOP RELEASE DURATION _ Hrs Hrs.

RELEASE FLOW RATE gpm gpm DILUTION RATE (Due to BVPS) gpm gpm OHIO RIVER FLOW RATE cuft/sec cuft/sec

4. TS/ODCM FRACTION (TS/ODCM Limit = 10 x NRC-EC)

U No Emergency Unusual Event (TS/ODCM Fraction is > 2, and release > 60 minutes)

Alert Emergency (TS/ODCM Fraction is > 200, and release > 15 minutes)

5. EPA Mt [C FRACTION No PAR required (EPA-MPC is < 12)

F-1 PAR REQUIRED PER EPP/IP 4.1 (EPA-MPC > 12: NOTIFY THE MIDLAND WATER TREATMENT PLANT AND RECOMMEND THE PLANT STOP INTAKE FROM THE OHIO RIVER UNTIL NOTIFIED BY DEP/BRP. ALSO REFER TO EPP/IP 1.1 ATTACHMENT 2 FOR OTHER NOTIFICATIONS.)

NOTE:

THIS PAPER IS INTENDED TO BE PINK FOR BVPS ONLY, IT IS WHITE TO ACCOMODATE FAXING.

Beaver Valley Power Station Procedure Number:

BEPP/IP 1.1

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

28 Page Number:

24 of 86 -,

INTENTIONALLY BLANK I

BeaverValley

_ev Power Station

_.eEPP/IP Proce I1Number: 1.1

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

.1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

1-- 2 .

Page Number 25 of 86 ATTACHMENT 4 (1 of 2)

A5.715DS REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET (NRC FORM 361)

THIS FORM IS NOW LOCATED ON THE REGULATORY AFFAIRS WEB PAGE.- HARD COPIES ARE MAINTAINED IN THE NOTIFICATION PACKAGES IN THE CONTROL ROOM AND TSC.

Procedure Number:

Beaver Valley Power Station FPP/IP 1.1 a6

Title:

Unit: Level Of t Jse.*

1/2 In-Fieeld Reference Revision: Page Numttber.

Notifications 28 1 226 of R6 i

ATTACHMEI 4T4 (2 of 2)

A5.715DS REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET (NRC FORM 361)

THIS FORM IS NOW LOCATED ON THE REGULATORY AFFAIRS WEB PA4GE. HARD COPIES ARE MAINTAINED IN THE NOTIFICATION PACKAGES IN THE CONTROL ROOM AND TSC.

(

Procedure Number:

Beaver Valley Power Station EPP/IP 1.1

Title:

. Unit: Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision: Page Number:

S... . .. ... ~2 8 .. . .*, . .. , 27 o f 86 . . ... .

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION ATTACHMENT 5 (1 of 2)

A5.715DT EMERGENCY TERMINATION CHECKLIST NOTE: The Offsite agencies DO-NOT maintain the Emergency Termination Checklist. Instruct the agency to log the termination information and inform the cognizant individual of their organization of the termination date and time.

"This is Beaver Valley Power Station. This notification is to inform you that the emergency situation at Beaver Valley Power Station has been terminated on Date hours. Please complete all applicable procedures before terminating."

CONTACT ORGA&NIZATIN PERSON CONTACTED NU BRTIE*INITIALS'..

Beaver County Emergency Management Agency 724-775-0880 PA Emergency Management Agency 1-717-651-2001 Columbiana County Emergency Management 1-330-424-7255 Agency . .. .. .. . ._ _ _ _

Ohio Emergency Management Agency 1-614-889-7150 Hancock County Office of Emergency Services 1-304-564-4100 West Virginia Office of Emergency Services 1-304-558-5380 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1-301-816-5100 Corporate Communications 724-682-5201 Bruce Mansfield Power Station 724-643-2300

• Contact Time = Time of Initial Contact With Individual Approved (ED/ERM) Date:

Beaver Valley Power Station Procedure Number: EPP/P 1.1

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

In-Field Reference Revision: Page Number:

Notifications BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION ATTACHMENT 5 (2 of 2)

A5.715DT EMERGENCY TERMINATION CHECKLIST NOTE: The Offsite agencies DO NOT maintain the Emergency Termination Checklist. Instruct the agency to log the termination information and inform the cognizant individual of their organization of the termination date and time.

CONTACT ORG0ANIZATION. PERSON CONTACTED, NUMBE~R TIME *INITIALS Date:

Initial Contact With Individual Approved (ED/ERM)

Contact Time

• Contact Time = Time of

= Time of Initial Contact With Individual Approved (ED/ERM) Date:

StationProcedure Number:

Beaver Valley Power Station EPPIIP 1.1

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

S1/2 IIn-Field Reference Notifications S . .... ..

Revision:

28 Page Number.

29 of 86 BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION ATTACHMENT 6 (1 of 2)

A5.715GP SECURITY NEAR-SITE BUILDING EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION INSTRUCTIONS

1) At the initial declaration of an Alert, or higher, emergency classification or if a Site protective action is required as determined by the Emergency Director (NSS), Security personnel SHALL page each of the following facilities using the building page number shown below or contact a listed individual.

TIME NOTIFIED A Training Building

-PAX 7003 Building Page B Simulator Building PAX 7001 Building Page C Site Engineering Building (SEB)

PAX 7007 Building Page D '-Warehouse 22 PAX 7002 Building Page

Beaver Valley Power Station 1Ilde: Unit: Level Of Use: '

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision: Page Number:

-I

- . - ,;d2 11 all 0" Ll BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION ATTACHMENT 6 (2 of 2)

A5.715GP SECURITY NEAR-SITE BUILDING EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION INSTRUCTIONS

2) Security personnel will circle or complete the following information per the Emergency Director (designee) and provide over the page/phone. Repeat message.

PART I This is an ACTUAL EVENT. Beaver Valley Power Station Unit # 1 / 2 has declared an emergency classification of ALERT / SITE AREA / GENERAL EMERGENCY at (Time)

All Emergency Response Personnel SHALL report to their Emergency Response positions. This is an ACTUAL EVENT.

PART II NOTE: READ ONLY IF A SITE EVACUATION IS REQUIRED.

This is an ACTUAL EVENT. A Site Evacuation has been declared by the Emergency Director.

All non-emergency response personnel:

1) Are dismissed to GO HOME.

2) REPORT TO THE Hookstown Grange Offsite Assembly Area, or

3) REPORT TO THE Western District Headquarters Raccoon Substation) Offsite Assembly Area to await further instructions.

This is an ACTUAL EVENT.

Procedure Number.

Beaver Valley Power Station EPP.IP 1.1

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision: Page Number:

1 28 31 of 96 ATTACHMENT 7 (1 of 8)

ACTIVATION OF THE ERO USING BEEPERS AND ERO VOICE MAIL SYSTEM A. PURPOSE This attachment is for using beepers and the Voice Mail System to make emergency event notifications to Emergency Response Organization (ERO) personnel and to verify that adequate ERO staffing levels are available.

B. RESPONSIBILITY The Onshift Communications and Records Coordinator is responsible to ensure the actions outlined in this attachment are implemented.

C. EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS 1.0 The following beeper notification system equipment is kept in CAS:

1.1 ERO beeper.

2.0 The following are found in the Control Room EPP sealed drawer.

2.1 Event Classification Packages

Beaver Valley Power Station Procedure Nu1.1r:

EPP/IP 1.1

Title:

Unit:

1Nc Level Of Use:

In-Field Reference I

Notifications Revision: Page Number:

1 28 32 of 86 -.

ATTACHMENT 7 (2 of 8)

D. PROCEDURE 1.0 Beeper Activation, using ERO Voice Mail System by CAS.

NOTE:

If at any time prior to beeper activation utilizing the 5080 suffix, the beepers activate with the appropriate message and with 4370 or 4380 as the last four (4) digits, continue with the Initial Notifications in progress.

1.1 Upon the failure of the BVERS to actuate the ERO beepers, or at the discretion of the NSS/Emergency Director, the Onshift Communications and Records Coordinator SHALL call the Central Alarm Station (CAS), providing to the Nuclear Security Shift Supervisor or designee the following:

1.1.1 Your name and position.

1.1.2 EPP Code Word.

1.1.3 Event Classification 1.1.4 Appropriate beeper code:

9999995080 ("Actual Event")

0000005080 ("Actual Event--Site Inaccessible")

1.1.5 Request a call back when CAS pager actuates with proper code.

Procedure Number:

Beaver Valley Power Station EPP/IP 1.1

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications 1 Revision:

28 Page Number:

3-3 of 86 ATTACHMENT 7 (3 of 8) 1.1.6 Instructions as to which message to be used for the ERO Voice Mail System:

"Actual Event" "Actual Event--Site Inaccessible" 1.2 Instruct the Nuclear Shift Security Supervisor to activate the beepers with the appropriate code.

1.2.1 Instruct the Nuclear Shift Security Supervisor to repeat the beeper activation two (2) times, 10 minutes apart to ensure that all appropriate personnel receive the call (i.e., 11:00 original call, 11:10 first recall, 11:20 second recall).

1.3 Once the ERO Voice Mail message has been changed, the Nuclear Security Shift Supervisor, or his designee, SHALL activate the ERO beepers.

NOTE:

The BVPS Radio System is the alternate to the commercial phone system for notification of offsite emergency response organizations. EPP/IP 1.2, Attachment 3, Step 6.0 provides direction in its use.

1.4 Twenty minutes after the CAS pager has actuated, perform the following:

.NOTE:

The EROGVoice Mail System has a maximum of 4 lines available. If no lines are available, a busy signal will be received.

1.4.1 Remove the last three (3) pages of this Attachment "ERO Position List".

1.4.2 From a touch-tone phone or from a PAX phone dial 9-682-5080.

Procedure Number.

Beaver Valley Power Station EPPIP 1.1

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use: I 1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision: Page Number I ATTACHENT 74 of 86 ATTACHMENT 7 (4 of 8) 1.4.3 When the message begins press #.

NOTE:

Any calls responding to the beeper activation that are received by CAS or the Control Room are also to be included in the ERO Beeper Holders List.

NOTE:

Pressing 1 will repeat the voice mail message, pressing 2 will go to the next message. DO NOT ERASE voice mail messages. You do not have to wait for the prompt to press 1 or 2 1.4.4 When prompted to enter a Mail Box Number, enter

• 1 1 3 for an Actual Event or

• 1 1 4 for an Actual Event-Site Inaccessible.

NOTE:

ERO Call List and ERO Beeper Holders List are located on the EP Department Web Page.

1.5 On the "ERO Position List", record the callers name, ETA and if they are "fit for-duty" in the columns beside their ERO position. If a caller reports not "fit for-duty", write N/A in the ETA column.

NOTE:

The first 18 positions on the "ERO Position List" is the "Minimum Staffing" I

for TSC activation.

1.6 When done with messages on the ERO Voice Mail System, press *

• to exit Voice Mail.

Beaver Valley Power Station Procedure Number:

EPP/IlP 1.1

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use.

In-Field Reference Notifications Revision: Page Number:

28 15 of 86 ATTACHMENT 7 (5 of 8) 1.7 Verify the first 18 positions on the "ERO Position List" are filled.

NOTE:

Attempts to contact designated coordinators or alternates of a position should be made using the current Emergency Response Organization Call List.

1.8 If no one for a designated position on the Minimum Staffing Section of the "ERO Position List" has responded, make follow-up calls to the designated coordinator OR alternates UNTIL a person qualified to fill that position has been contacted.

1.9 When all responses have been recorded on the "ERO Position List" AND the Minimum Staffing Checklist, perform the following:

1.9.1 Deliver copies of all paperwork to the ED.

1.9.2 Retain the original paperwork and forward to the Emergency Preparedness upon termination of the event.

1.10 When the emergency terminates or at the direction of the NSS/Emergency Director or Communications and Records Coordinator, have CAS return the ERO Voice Mail message to the NORMAL message.

1.11 In the case of an actual emergency, Control Room personnel SHOULD NOT erase the incoming voice mail messages. They are to be retained for permanent records of the calls received during the emergency.

2.0 Return to EPP/IP 1.1, Notification Attachment in progress.

Beaver Valley Power Station PocedureN1ber.1

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

1/[2 IIn-Field Reference Notifications Revision: Page Number:

EPP/Implementing Procedures EPP/IP 1.1 NOTIFICATIONS ERO POSITION LIST ATTACHMENT 7 (6 of 8)

POSITION NAME ETA FFD EMERGENCY DIRECTOR COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS COORDINATOR COMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANT COMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANT COMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANT EA&DP COORDINATOR TSC COORDINATOR RADCON COORDINATOR MAINTENANCE COORDINATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR OSC COORDINATOR OSC H.P. COORDINATOR COMPUTER COORDINATOR MECHANICAL ENGINEER

.ELECTRICAL ENGINEER NUCLEAR ENGINEER CHEMISTRY COORDINATOR EMERGENCY RECOVERY MANAGER ,,,,,

Y-C (

Procedure Number:

Beaver Valley Power Station EPP/IP 1.1

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Revision: Page Number:

Notifications S28 37 of 86 EPP/Implementing Procedures EPPAIP 1.1 NOTIFICATIONS ERO POSITION LIST ATTACHMENT 7 (7 of 8)

POSITION NAME ETA FFD OSC COORDINATOR ASSISTANT OSC COORD. ASST "_ _ _ _ __-_ _ _ __,_

OSC H.P. COORDINATOR ASSISTANT _

OSC HP. COORDINATOR'ASSISTANT ..... .. ................ . .

OSC H.P, COORDINATOR ASSISTANT .. .. . . . . . . . ... _"__..._'...___

ASSISTNAT TO THE EMERGENCY DIRECTOR ..... .... .

TSC OPS COORDINATOR ....

TSC OPS COORDINATOR ASSISTANT ......

OPS COMMUNICATOR __ __....

OPS COMMUNICATOR .____... ____.. .. . . ... .... . . .

OPS COMMUNICATOR EA&DP ASSISTANT EA&DP ASSISTANT ENVIRONMENTAL COORDINATOR CHEMISTRY COORDINATOR ASSISTANT "__

COMPUTER OPERATOR COMPUTER OPERATOR COMPUTER OPERATOR ._ __....

MATERIALS ENGINEER ... . .........

Beaver Valley Power Station

___ ____ ___ ___EPP/IPProcedure Number: 1.1I

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision: Page Number:

1 28 38 of R6 EPP/Implementing Procedures EPP/IP 1.1 NOTIFICATIONS ERO POSITION LIST ATTACHMENT 7 (8 of 8)

POSITION NAME ETA FFD SYSTEM ENGINEER ASSISTANT TO THE EMERGENCY/RECOVERY MANAGER EOF OPERATIONS COORDINATOR EOF OPS COMMUNICATOR OFFSITE AGENCY LIAISON NUCLEAR COMMUNICATIONS MANGER NUCLEAR COMMUNICATIONS WRITER NUCLEAR COMMUNICATIONS WRITER NUCLEAR COMMUNICATIONS TECHNICAL ADVISOR JPIC MANAGER INFORMATION MANAGER INFORMATION COORDINATOR "

CHIEF COMPANY SPOKESPERSON '

TECHNICAL ADVISOR MEDIA RELATIONS COORDINATOR MEDIA RELATIONS COORDINATOR LOGISTICS COORDINATOR

Beaver Valley Power Station Pd m

__ EPP/IP 1.1

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

S1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision: Page Number:

• 28 39 of 86 ATTACHMENT 8 (1 of 7)

UNUSUAL EVENT NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM A. Onshift Communications and Records Coordinator Initial Notification Actions:

1.0 Obtain completed Initial Notification Form from the NSS/ED.

2.0- Fax the Initial Notification Form to the Offsite Agencies.

2.1 Turn the external speaker located on the rear of the fax machine on".

.. 2.2 Place completedNotification Form(s) on the fax machine (face down).

NOTE:

Not all voice prompts are listed here, only the key ones.

2.3 Press the "HOOK" button or, if external speaker is not functioning, lift the phone receiver.

2.4 Press Speed Dial number "o01 (EPP FAX) on the fax machine (or enter ).

2.5 At the voice prompt "ENTER THE SUBSCRIBER ID AND POUND SIGN",

Press Speed Dial number "02" (or enter__.

2.6 At the voice prompt "ENTER THE PASSWORD AND POUND SIGN", Press Speed Dial number "03" (or enter #).

2.7 You will hear a voice prompt "LOGGING IN, PLEASE WAIT". At the voice prompt "TO SEND A MESSAGE PRESS&" 1", press 1 on the numeric keypad (do not wait for additional prompts).

NOTE:

If Speed Dial "04"1 is used, Step 2.9 does not need to be performed.

(Continued)

1.1 Beaver Valley Power Station I EPP/IP 1. 1

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

1 28 Page Number:

40 of 86 ATTACHMENT 8 (2 of 7)

UNUSUAL EVENT NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM 2.8 At the voice prompt "ENTER RECIPIENT ADDRESS NUMBER, TO FAX TO A LIST PRESS *L", press Speed Dial number "04" (or enter 2.9 At the voice prompt "WHEN FINISHED PRESS THE

• AND # KEYS", press on the numeric keypad.

2.10 A voice prompt will inform you that "YOUR MESSAGE ID IS AND WILL BE SENT TO LIST 2.11 At the voice prompt "PLEASE START YOUR FAX MACHINE", press START.

2.12 Hang up the handset if used.

2.13 Turn "OFF" the external speaker on the rear of the fax machine, if used.

3.0 Activate Off-Site Agency Initial Notification Conference (INC) Call.

3.1 On EP Auto-Dialer, press button marked INC OR dial 9# 1-330-315-4380 (or from a PAX phone, dial 9-1-330-315-4380).

3.2 Interrupt the greeting by IMMEDIATELY entering XXXXXX.

3.2.1 IF unable to activate INC, GO TO PART B of this procedure.

3.3 When prompted, enter the scenario number XXXX.

3.4 When prompted, verify the scenario number (9 for YES or 6 for NO).

3.5 Verify, when prompted, "You will cue SCENARIO XXXX. It will now be sent.

Are you sure this is what you want to do?" (9 for YES or 6 for NO).

3.6 Hang up.

Li Beaver Valley Power Station edure EPP/IP L1

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

.1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications S28 Revision: Page Number:

41 of 86 ATTACHMENT 8 (3 of 7)

UNUSUAL EVENT NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM S4.0 Access Initial Notification Conference Bridge.

4.1 On EP Auto-Dialer, press button marked CONF. Bridge OR dial 9# 724-682-1900 (OR from a PAX phone, dial 9-724-682-1900).

4.2 When prompted, enter XXXX, then the # key.

5.0 Provide Initial Notification to Offsite Agencies.

5.1 As each Agency enters the INC call, state the following:

5.1.1 "This is at Beaver Valley (Your Name)

Power Station, the Code Word is "

5.1.2 Record the contact time and the name of the agency representative.

Contact Agency -Time Contact Name INC FAX Initials Beaver County Y/N Y/N PEMA (State of Pennsylvania) Y/N Y/N Columbiana County ... . . _ . Y/N Y/N OEMA (State of Ohio) Y/N Y/N Hancock County __._.... . Y/N Y/N WVOES* (State of West Y/N Y/N Virginia) ______

Hancock County can notify WVOES (State of West Virginia) if not on the Conference Call or not able to be contacted.

5.2 Ask each agency if they received the Initial Notification Form FAX and if it is legible.

5.2.1 IF YES, ask if there are any questions.

5.2.2 STATE the Protective Action Recommendation.

5.2.3 IF NO, provide information from Initial Notification Form.

(Continued)

V Procedure Number:

Beaver Valley Power Station pRPP/Tlp I

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

Notifications 1/2 Revision:

28 In-Field Reference Page Number:.

42 of 86 .

I ATTACHMENT 8 (4 of 7)

UNUSUAL EVENT NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM 5.3 STATE "A Follow-Up Notification will be provided as information becomes available."

5.4 STATE "Beaver Valley Power Station is exiting the Initial Notification Conference Call. Agencies may remain on the Conference Call for further discussion."

5.5 For any Agency(ies) NOT on the conference call, perform the following:

5.5.1 Contact each remaining Offsite Agency and, 5.5.2 Record the contact time and the name of the agency representative.

5.5.3 STATE "This is (Your Name) EPP Communicator".

5.5.4 STATE "EPP Code Word is "

5.5.5 Ask each Agency if they received the Initial Notification Form Fax and if it is legible.

5.5.5.1 If YES, ask if there are any questions.

5.5.5.2 STATE the Protective Action Recommendation.

5.5.5.3 If NO, provide information from the Initial Notification Form.

6.0 Notify the NSS/ED of ERO Initial Notifications completed.

• Give NSS/ED the Execution Roster qualified Report from BVERS when it arrives on Control Room FAX machine (approximately thirty minutes from ERO activation).

Procedure. Number:

Beaver Valley Power Station EPP.P 1.1

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications S29 Revision: Page Number:

4-3o4 86 ATTACHMENT 8 (5 of 7)

S,'UNUSUAL EVENT NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM 7.0 Document contact of the NRC within one (1) hour of the event declaration on EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 2.

8.0 Contact each of the remaining Personnel/Organizations, as required, per EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 2 9.10 Conduct Follow-Up Notifications.

9.1 Obtain a completed Follow-Up Notification Form from the NSS/ED.

9.2 Fax the Follow-Up Notification Form to the Offsite Agencies using the instructions from Step 2.0.

9.3 20 minutes after FAX was sent, or after return FAX received in the Control Room, notify the six (6) Offsite Agencies INDIVIDUALLY using EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 2 by:

9.3.1 STATE "This is (Your Name) EPP Communicator".

9.3.2 STATE "The Code Word is 9.3.3 Record the contact time and the name of the agency representative on the Follow-Up Notification part of EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 2.

9.3.4 Ask agency if they received the Follow-Up Notification #XX FAX and if it is legible.

9.3.5 If YES, ask if any questions.

9.3.6 If NO, provide information from the Follow-Up Notification Form.

Procedure Njumber:

Beaver Valley Power Station "ITPP/TP 1 1

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifi sRevision: Page Number:

Ntfctos28 44 of 86 ATTACHMENT 8 (6 of 7)

UNUSUAL EVENT NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM 10.0 When contacted, turnover to Communications and Records Coordinator or (Communications Assistant) in the TSC (if ERO activated).

11.0 Upon termination of the emergency:

11.1 When directed by NSS/EI, complete the Emergency Termination Checklist, EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 5.

11.2 Collect all original/completed attachments and forward to Emergency Preparedness.

NOTE:

ONLY perform this part to contact Offsite Agencies individually for Initial Notification.

B. Individual Offsite Agency Initial Notification(s).

1.0 Obtain completed Initial Notification Form from the NSS/ED or Control Room FAX machine.

2.0 Contact each required Offsite Agency per EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 2.

3.0 Record the contact time and the name of agency representative on attachment.

4.0 STATE "This is (Your Name) EPP Communicator".

5.0 STATE "EPP Code Word is "

Beaver Valley Power Station roedure Nmber: 1.1

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

"1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications .. 1 Revision:

28 Page Number:.

45 of 86 ATTACHMENT 8 (7 of 7)

UNUSUAL EVENT NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM 6.0 Ask each agency if they received the Initial Notification Form FAX and if it is legible.

6.1 If YES, ask if there are any questions.

6.2 STATE the Protective Action Recommendation.

6.3 If NO, provide information from Initial Notification Form.

7.0 Return to Part A, Step 5.0 of this attachment.

Beaver Valley Power Station Procedure m.

E IPn-i 1.Ren

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

N/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision: Page Number:

J 28 46 of 86 *-

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

.1

___ _ _Beaver Valley Power Station ProedreNumber:

_EPPJIP1.

11

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

S1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision: Page Number:

28 47 of R6 ATTACHMENT 9 (1 of 7)

ALERT NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM A. Onshift Communications and Records Coordinator Initial Notification Actions:

• 1.0 Obtain completed Initial Notification Form from the NSS/ED.

2.0 Fax the Initial Notification Form to the Offsite Agencies.

2.1 Turn the external speaker located on the rear of the fax machine on".

2.2 Place completed Notification Form(s) on the fax machine (face down).

NOTE:

Not all voice prompts are listed here, only the key ones.

2.3 Press the "HOOK" button or, if external speaker is not functioning, lift the phone receiver.

2.4 Press Speed Dial number "r01 (EPP FAX) on the fax machine (or enter ).

2.5 At the voice prompt "ENTER THE SUBSCRIBER ID AND POUND SIGN",

Press Speed Dial number "02" (or enter #)_.

2.6 At the voice prompt "ENTER THE PASSWORD AND POUND SIGN", Press Speed Dial number "03" (or enter_ _ _ _

2.7 You will hear a voice prompt "LOGGING IN, PLEASE WAIT". At the voice prompt "TO SEND A MESSAGE PRESS "1", press 1 on the numeric keypad (do not wait for additional' prompts).

IfSeedDia"0"i used 2.9 NOTE:

[If Speed Dial '04" is used, Step 2.9 does not need to be performed.

(Continued)

Beaver Valley Power Station PrPdIP 1.1

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

28 1 Page Number.

49 of 96 ,J ATTACHMENT 9 (2 of 7)

ALERT NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM 2.8 At the voice prompt "ENTER RECIPIENT ADDRESS NUMBER, TO FAX TO A LIST PRESS *L", press Speed Dial number "04" (or enter 2.9 At the voice prompt "WHEN FINISHED PRESS THE

• AND # KEYS", press "6(*#3 on the numeric keypad.

2.10 A voice prompt will inform you that "YOUR MESSAGE ID IS AND WILL BE SENT TO LIST__

2.11 At the voice prompt "PLEASE START YOUR FAX MACHINE", press START.

2.12 Hang up the handset if used.

2.13 Turn "OFF" the external speaker on the rear of the fax machine, if used.

3.0 Activate Off-Site Agency Initial Notification Conference (INC) Call.

3.1 On EP Auto-Dialer, press button marked INC OR dial 9# 1-330-315-4380 (or from a PAX phone, dial 9-1-330-315-4380).

3.2 Interrupt the greeting by IMMEDIATELY entering XXXXXX.

3.2.1 [F unable to activate INC, GO TO PART B of this procedure.

3.3 When prompted, enter the scenario number XXXX.

3.4 When prompted, verify the scenario number (9 for YES or 6 for NO).

3.5 Verify, when prompted, "You will cue SCENARIO XXXX. It will now be sent.

Are you sure this is what you want to do?" (9 for YES or 6 for NO).

3.6 Hang up.

Procedure Number:.

Beaver Valley Power Station EPP/IP 1.1

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

S1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision: Page Number:

"1 28 49 of 86 ATTACHMENT 9 (3 of 7)

ALERT NOTIFICATIONS "CONTROLROOM 4.0 Access Initial Notification Conference Bridge.

4.1 On EP Auto-Dialer, press button marked CONE. Bridge OR dial 9# 724-682-1900 (OR from a PAX phone, dial 9-724-682-1900).

4.2: When prompted, enter XXXX, then the # key.

5.0 Provide Initial Notification to Offsite Agencies.

S5.1 As each Agency enters the INC call, state the following:

5.1.1 "This is .... _ at Beaver Valley (Your Name)

Power Station, the Code Word is 5.1.2 Record the contact time and the name of the agency representative.

Contact Agency Time Contact Name INC FAX Initials Beaver County . ...... _ Y/N Y/N PEMA (State of Y/N Y/N Pennsylvania) .....

Columbiana County Y/N Y/N QFEMA (State of Ohio).._._- _ _ Y/N YIN Hancock County Y/N Y/N WVOES* (State of West Y/N Y/N Virginia)

• Hancock County can notify WVOES (State of West Virginia) if not on the Conference Call or not able to be contacted.

5.2 Ask each agency if they received the Initial Notification Form FAX and if it is legible.

5.2.1 IF YES, ask if there are any questions.

5.2.2 STATE the Protective Action Recommendation.

5.2.3 IF NO, provide information from Initial Notification Form.

(Continued)

Procedure Number.

Beaver Valley Power Station EPP/1P 1.1 *

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision: Page Number.

C2 T 50(of76 AT ?TACHMENT 9 (4 of 7)

ALERT NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM 5.3 STATE "A Follow-Up Notification will be provided as information becomes available."

5.4 STATE "Beaver Valley Power Station is exiting the Initial Notification Conference Call. Agencies may remain on the Conference Call for further discussion."

5.5 For any Agency(ies) not on the conference call, perform the following:

5.5.1 Contact each remaining Offsite Agency and, 5.5.2 Record the contact time and the name of the agency representative.

5.5.3 STATE "This is (Your Name) EPP Communicator".

5.5.4 STATE "EPP Code Word is "

5.5.5 Ask each Agency if they received the Initial Notification Form Fax and if it is legible.

5.5.5.1 If YES, ask if there are any questions.

5.5.5.2 STATE the Protective Action Recommendation.

5.5.5.3 If NO, provide information from the Initial Notification Form.

6.0 Notify the NSS/ED of ERO Initial Notifications completed.

Give NSS/ED the Execution Roster qualified Report from BVERS when it arrives on Control Room FAX machine (approximately thirty minutes from ERO activation).

I

Beaver Valley Power Station EPPIIP 1.1

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

S1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision: Page Number:

28 -51of 86 ATTACHMENT 9 (5 of 7)

ALERT NOTIFICATIONS

. CONTROL ROOM 7.0 Document contact of the NRC within one (1) hour of the event declaration on EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 2.

8.0 Contact each of the remaining Personnel/Organizations, as required, per EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 2 9.0 Conduct Follow-Up Notifications.,

9.1 Obtain a completed Follow-Up Notification Form from the NSS/ED.

9.2 Fax the Follow-Up Notification Form to the Offsite Agencies using the instructions from Step 2.0.

9.3 20 minutes after FAX was sent, or after return FAX received in the Control Room, notify the six (6) Offsite Agencies INDIVIDUALLY using EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 2 by:-

9.3.1 STATE "This is (Your Name- EPP Communicator".

9.3.2 STATE "The Code Word is 9.3.3 Record the contact time and the name of the agency representative on the Follow-Up Notification part of EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 2.

9.3.4 Ask agency if they received the Follow-Up Notification #XX FAX and if it is legible.

9.3.5 If YES, ask if any questions.

9.3.6 If NO, provide information from the Follow-Up Notification Form.

10.0 When contacted, turnover to Communications and Records Coordinator or (Communications Assistant) in the TSC (if ERO activated).

Beaver Valley Power Station EPPIIP 1.

EPP/IP 1.1,

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

1/ In-Field Reference Notifications Revision: Page Number:

29 -52of 86 _"

ATTACHMENT 9 (6 of 7)

ALERT NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM 11.0 Upon termination of the emergency:

11.1 When directed by NSS/ED, complete the Emergency Termination Checklist, EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 5.

11.2 Collect all original/completed attachments and forward to Emergency Preparedness (BV-T).

NOTE:

ONLY perform this part to contact Offsite Agencies individually for Initial Notification.

B. Individual Offsite Agency Initial Notification(s).

1.0 Obtain completed Initial Notification Form from the NSS/ED or Control Room FAX machine.

2.0 Contact each required Offsite Agency per EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 2.

3.0 Record the contact time and the name of agency representative on attachment.

4.0 STATE "This is (Your Name) EPP Communicator".

5.0 STATE "EPP Code Word is "

Beaver Valley Power Station

__ _ __ __ _ __ _ __ _ __ _EPPIIP roer Numbe 1.1

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision: Page Number:

53 of 86 ATTACHMENT 9 (7 of 7)

ALERT NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM 6.0 Ask each agency if they received the Initial Notification Form FAX and if it is legible.

6.1 If YES, ask if there are any questions.

6.2 STATE the Protective Action Recommendation.

6.3 If NO, provide information from Initial Notification Form.

7.0 Return to Part A, Step 5.0 of this attachment.

Beaver Valley Power Station E*1.

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision: Page Number:

28 -54of 86 INTENTIONALLY BLANK I

Procedure Number Beaver Valley Power Station EPP/IP 1.1

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision: Page Number.

28 55 of 86 ATTACHMENT 10 (1 of 7)

SITE AREA EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM A. Onshift Communications and Records Coordinator Initial Notification Actions:

1.0 Obtain completed Initial Notification Form from the NSS/ED.

2.0 Fax the Initial Notification Form to the Offsite Agencies.

2.1 Turn the external speaker located on the rear of the fax machine "on".

2.2 Place completed Notification Form(s) on the fax machine (face down).

NOTE:

Not all voice prompts are listed here, only the key ones.

2.3 Press the "HOOK" button or, if external speaker is not functioning, lift the phone receiver.

2.4 Press Speed Dial number "01" (EPP FAX) on the fax machine (or enter ).

2.5 At the voice prompt "ENTER THE SUBSCRIBER ID AND POUND SIGN",

Press SpeedDial number "02" (or enter_ _ _ _ .

2.6 At the voice prompt "ENTER THE PASSWORD AND POUND SIGN", Press Speed Dial number "03"? (or enter #).

-2.7 You will hear a voice prompt "LOGGING IN, PLEASE WAIT". At the voice prompt "TO SEND A MESSAGE PRESS "1", press 1 on the numeric keypad (do not wait for additional prompts).-

I. NOTE:

I!f Speed Dial "04" is used, Step 2.9 does not need to be performed.

(Continued)

Beaver Valley Power Station Procedure Number:

EPP/IP 1.1

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision: Page Number.

28 56 of 96 .

AT TACHIIMENT 10 (2 of 7)

SITE AREA EMERGENCY NOTIFICA[ 'IONS CONTROL ROOM 2.8 At the voice prompt "ENTER RECIPIENT ADDRESS NUMBER, TO FAX TO A LIST PRESS *L, press Speed Dial numb'er "04" (or enter

• ° I' 2.9 At the voice prompt "WHEN FINISHED PRESS THE

• AND # KEYS", press

". 499 on the numeric keypad.

2.10 A voice prompt will inform you that "YOUR MESSAGE ID IS AND WILL BE SENT TO LIST__

2.11 At the voice prompt "PLEASE START YOUR FAX MACHINE", press START.

2.12 Hang up the handset if used.

2.13 Turn "OFF" the external speaker on the rear of the fax machine, if used.

3.0 Activate Off-Site Agency Initial Notification Conference (INC) Call.

3.1 On EP Auto-Dialer, press button marked INC OR dial 9# 1-330-315-4380 (or from a PAX phone, dial 9-1-330-3154380).

3.2 Interrupt the greeting by IMMEDIATELY entering XXXXXX.

3.2.1 IF unable to activate INC, GO TO PART B of this procedure.

3.3 When prompted, enter the scenario number XXXX.

3.4 When prompted, verify the scenario number (9 for YES or 6 for NO).

3.5 Verify, when prompted, "You will cue SCENARIO XXXX. It will now be sent.

Are you sure this is what you want to do?" (9 for YES or 6 for NO).

3.6 Hang up.

Beaver Valley Power Station ProPer N 11 Procedure Number:

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision: Page Number:

I 2R -57of R6 ATTACHMENT 10 (3 of 7)

SITE AREA EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM 4.0 Access Initial Notification Conference Bridge.

4.1 On EP Auto-Dialer, press button marked CONF. Bridge OR dial 9# 724-682-1900 (OR from a PAX phone, dial 9-724-682-1900).

4.2 When prompted, enter XXXX, then the # key.

5.0 Provide Initial Notification to Offsite Agencies.

5.1 As each Agency enters the INC call, state the following:

5.1.1 "This is at Beaver Valley (Your Name)

Power Station, the Code Word is 5.1.2 Record the contact time and thie name of the agency representative.

Contact Agency Time Contact Name INC FAX Initials Beaver County Y/N Y/N PEMA (State of Y/N Y/N Pennsylvania) .....

Columbiana County Y/N Y/N OEMA (State of Ohio). Y/N Y/N Hancock County Y/N Y/N

.WVOES* (State of West Y/N YIN Virginia)

Hancock County can notify WVOES (State of West Virginia) if not on the Conference Call or not able to be contacted.

5.2 Ask each agency if they received the Initial Notification Form FAX and if it is legible.

5.2.1 IF YES, ask if there are any questions.

5.2.2 STATE the Protective Action Recommendation.

5.2.3 IF NO, provide information from Initial Notification Form.

(Continued)

Beaver Valley Power Station EPP/IP 1.1 1.

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use: '

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision: Page Number:

11 28 -58of 86 .

ATTACHMENT 10 (4 of 7)

SITE AREA EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM 5.3 STATE "A Follow-Up Notification will be provided as information becomes available."

5.4 STATE "Beaver Valley Power Station is exiting the Initial Notification Conference Call. Agencies may remain on the Conference Call for further discussion."

5.5 For any Agency(ies) not on the conference call, perform the following:

5.5.1 Contact each remaining Offsite Agency and, 5.5.2 Record the contact time and the name of the agency representative.

5.5.3 STATE "This is (Your Name) EPP Communicator".

5.5.4 STATE "EPP Code Word is "

5.5.5 Ask each Agency if they received the Initial Notification Form Fax and if it is legible.

5.5.5.1 If YES, ask if there are any questions.

5.5.5.2 STATE the Protective Action Recommendation.

5.5.5.3 If NO, provide information from the Initial Notification Form.

6.0 Notify the NSS/ED of ERO Initial Notifications completed.

• Give NSS/ED the Execution Roster qualified Report from BVERS when it arrives on Control Room FAX machine (approximately thirty minutes from ERO activation).

Procedure Number.

Beaver Valley Power Station EPP/IP 1.1

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

S1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision: Page Number:

S. .. 28 59 of 86 ATTACHMENT 10 (5 of 7)

SITE AREA EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM 7.0 Document contact of the NRC within one (1) hour of the event declaration on EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 2.

8.0 Contact each of the remaining Personnel/Organizations, as required, per EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 2 9.0 Conduct Follow-Up Notifications.

9.1 Obtain a completed Follow-Up Notification Form from the NSS/ED.

9.2 Fax the Follow-Up Notification Form to the Offsite Agencies using the instructions from Step 2.0.

9.3 20 minutes after FAX was sent, or after return FAX received in the Control Room, notify the six (6) Offsite Agencies INDIVIDUALLY using EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 2 by:

9.3.1 STATE "This is (Your Name) EPP Communicator".

9.3.2 STATE "The Code Word is 9.3.3 Record the contact time and the name of the agency representative on the Follow-Up Notification part of EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 2.

9.3.4 Ask agency if they received the Follow-Up Notification #XX FAX and if it is legible.

9.3.5 If YES, ask if any questions.

9.3.6 If NO, provide information from the Follow-Up Notification Form.

10.0 When contacted, turnover to Communications and Records Coordinator or (Communications Assistant) in the TSC (if ERO activated).

I-1Unit:

Procedure Number In-Field Reference Beaver Valley Power Station .PVP"I 1 1

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision: Page Number:

28 1 60 of Ri6 ATTACHMENT 10 (6 of 7)

SITE AREA EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM 11.0 Upon termination of the emergency:

11.1 When directed by NSS/ED, complete the Emergency Termination Checklist, EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 5.

11.2 Collect all original/completed attachments and forward to Emergency Preparedness (BV-T).

NOTE:

ONLY perform this part to contact Offsite Agencies individually for Initial Notification.

B. Individual Offsite Agency Initial Notification(s).

1.0 Obtain completed Initial Notification Form from the NSS/ED or Control Room FAX machine.

2.0 Contact each required Offsite Agency per EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 2.

3.0 Record the contact time and the name of agency representative on attachment.

4.0 STATE "This is (Your Name) EPP Communicator".

5.0 STATE "EPP Code Word is

Procedure N -umber.

Beaver Valley Power Station EPP/IP 1.1

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

"1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision:

I 28 Page Number:

61 of 86 ATTACHMENT 10 (7 of 7)

SITE AREA EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM 6.0 Ask each agency if they received the Initial Notification Form FAX and if it is legible.

6.1 If YES, ask if there are any questions.

6.2 STATE the Protective Action Recommendation.

6.3 If NO, provide information from Initial Notification Form.

7.0 Return to Part A, Step 5.0 of this attachment.

Beaver Valley Power Station EP/mI1..

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use: - I 1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision: Page Number:

28 6:2 of 86 .-

INTENTIONALLY BLANK I

Procedure Number Beaver Valley Power Station EPP/IP 1.1

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision: Page Number:

S...28 63 of 86 ATTACHMENT 11 (1 of 7)

GENERAL EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM A. Onshift Communications and Records Coordinator Initial Notification Actions:

1.0 Obtain completed Initial Notification Form from the NSS/ED.

2.0 Fax the Initial Notification Form to the Offsite Agencies.

2.1 Turn the external speaker located on the rear of the fax machine on".

2.2 Place completed Notification Form(s) on the fax machine (face down).

.. NOTE:

SI Not all voice prompts are listed here, only the key ones.

2.3 Press the "HOOK" button or, if external speaker is not functioning, lift the phone receiver.

2.4 Press Speed Dial number "01" (EPP FAX) on the fax machine (or enter ).

2.5 At the voice prompt "ENTER THE SUBSCRIBER ID AND POUND SIGN",

Press Speed Dial number "02" (or enter __.

2.6 At the voice prompt "ENTER THE PASSWORD AND POUND SIGN",,Press Speed Dial number "03" (or enter __.

2.7 You will hear a voice prompt "LOGGING IN, PLEASE WAIT". At the voice prompt "TO SEND A MESSAGE PRESS "1", press 1 on the numeric keypad (do not wait for additional prompts).

I .NOTE:

If Speed Dial "04" is used, Step 2.9 does not need to be performed. I (Continued)

Beaver Valley Power Station EPP/IP 1.1

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision: Page Number.

28 64 of 86 ATTACHMENT 11 (2 of 7)

GENERAL EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM 2.8 At the voice prompt "ENTER RECIPIENT ADDRESS NUMBER, TO FAX TO A LIST PRESS *L", press Speed Dial number "04" (or enter

1. M.

2.9 At the voice prompt "WHEN FINISHED PRESS THE

• AND # KEYS", press "onthe numeric keypad.

2.10 A voice prompt will inform you that "YOUR MESSAGE ID IS AND WILL BE SENT TO LIST 2.11 At the voice prompt "PLEASE START YOUR FAX MACHINE", press START.

2.12 Hang up the handset if used.

2.13 Turn "OFF" the external speaker on the rear of the fax machine, if used.

3.0 Activate Off-Site Agency Initial Notification Conference (INC) Call.

3.1 On EP Auto-Dialer, press button marked INC OR dial 9# 1-330-315-4380 (or from a PAX phone, dial 9-1-330-315-4380).

3.2 Interrupt the greeting by IMMEDIATELY entering XXXXXX.

3.2.1 IF unable to activate INC, GO TO PART B of this procedure.

3.3 When prompted, enter the scenario number XXXX.

3.4 When prompted, verify the scenario number (9 for YES or 6 for NO).

3.5 Verify, when prompted, "You will cue SCENARIO XXXX. It will now be sent.

Are you sure this is what you want to do?" (9 for YES or 6 for NO).

3.6 Hang up.

Procedure Number:

Beaver Valley Power Station EPPIIP 1.1

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision: Page Number:

A 28 65 of7)

• ATTACHMENT 11 (3 of 7)

GENERAL EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM 4.0 Access Initial Notification Conference Bridge.

4.1 On EP Auto-Dialer, press button marked CONF. Bridge OR dial 9# 724-682-1900 (OR from a PAX phone, dial 9-724-682-1900).

4.2 When prompted, enter XXXX, then the #key.

5.0 Provide Initial Notification to Offsite Agencies.

5.1 As each Agency enters the INC call, state the following:

5.1.1 "This is __at Beaver Valley (Your Name)

Power Station, the Code Word is "

5.1.2 Record the contact time and the name of the agency representative.

Contact Agency Time Contact Name INC FAX Initials Beaver County ........ Y/N Y/N

.PEMA - (Sate of Y/N Y/N Pennsylvania)

Columbiana County Y/N Y/N OEMA (State of Ohio) Y/N Y/N Hancock*County Y/N Y/N WVOES* (State of West Y/N Y/N Virginia).

• Hancock County can notify WVOES (State of West Virginia) if not on the Conference Call or not able to be contacted.

5.2 Ask each agency if they received the Initial Notification Form FAX and if it is legible.

5.2.1 IF YES, ask if there are any questions.

5.2.2 STATE the Protective Action Recommendation.

5.2.3 IF NO, provide information from Initial Notification Form.

(Continued)

• 1 Procedure-Niimber.

Beaver Valley Power Station "PP TPf1 1

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision: Page Number:

28 66 of R6 -

ATTACHMENT 11 (4 of 7)

GENERAL EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS r T-CONTROL ROOM 5.3 STATE "A Follow-Up Notification will be provided as information becomes available."

5.4 STATE "Beaver Valley Power Station is exiting the Initial Notification Conference Call. Agencies may remain on the Conference Call for further discussion."

5.5 For any Agency(ies) not on the conference call, perform the following:

5.5.1 Contact each remaining Offsite Agency and, 5.5.2 Record the contact time and the name of the agency representative.

5.5.3 STATE "This is (Your Name)

EPP Communicator".

5.5.4 STATE "EPP Code Word is 5.5.5 Ask each Agency if they received the Initial Notification Form Fax and if it is legible.

5.5.5.1 If YES, ask if there are any questions.

5.5.5.2 STATE the Protective Action Recommendation.

5.5.5.3 If NO, provide information from the Initial Notification Form.

6.0 Notify the NSS/ED of ERO Initial Notifications completed.

Give NSS/ED the Execution Roster qualified Report from BVERS when it arrives on Control Room FAX machine (approximately thirty minutes from ERO activation).

Procedure Number.

Beaver Valley Power Station EPPPeP 1.1

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Revision: Page Number.

Notifications 1 29 67 of R6 ATTACHMENT 11 (5 of 7)

GENERAL EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM 7.0 Document contact of the NRC within one (1) hour of the event declaration on EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 2.

8.0 Contact each of the remaining Personnel/Organizations, as required, per EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 2 9.0 Conduct Follow-Up Notifications.

. . 9.1 Obtain a completed Follow-Up Notification Form from the NSS/ED.

9.2 Fax the Follow-Up Notification Form to the Offsite Agencies using the instructions from Step 2.0.

9.3 20 minutes after FAX was sent, or after return FAX received in the Control Room, notify the six (6) Offsite Agencies INDIVIDUALLY using EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 2 by:

9.3.1 STATE "This is (Your Name) EPP Communicator".

9.3.2 STATE "The Code Word is 9.3.3 Record the contact time and the name of the agency representative on the Follow-Up Notification part of EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 2.

9.3.4 Ask agency if they received the Follow-Up Notification #XX FAX and if it is legible.

9.3.5 If YES, ask if any questions.

9.3.6 If NO, provide information from the Follow-Up Notification Form.

10.0 When contacted, turnover to Communications and Records Coordinator or (Communications Assistant) in the TSC (if ERO activated).

Beaver Valley Power Station EP I

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision: Page Number:

28 68 of R*6 ./

ATTACHMENT 11 (6 of 7)

GENERAL EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM 11.0 Upon termination of the emergency:

11.1 When directed by NSS/ED, complete the Emergency Termination Checklist, EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 5.

11.2 Collect all original/completed attachments and forward to Emergency Preparedness (BV-T).

NOTE:

ONLY perform this part to contact Offsite Agencies individually for Initial Notification.

B. Individual Offsite Agency Initial Notification(s).

1.0 Obtain completed Initial Notification Form from the NSS/ED or Control Room FAX machine.

2.0 Contact each required Offsite Agency per EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 2.

3.0 Record the contact time and the name of agency representative on attachment.

4.0 STATE "This is (Your Name) EPP Communicator".

5.0 STATE "EPP Code Word is

Procedure Number:

Beaver Valley S* Power Station EPP/IP 1.1

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

1/2 I In-Field Reference Notifications ERevision: Page Number:

L 28 69 of 86 ATTACHMENT 11 (7 of 7)

GENERAL EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS.

CONTROL ROOM 6.0 Ask each agency if they received the Initial Notification Form FAX and if it is legible.

6.1 If YES, ask if there are any questions.

6.2 STATE the Protective Action Recommendation.

6.3 If NO, provide information from Initial Notification Form.

7.0 Return to Part A, Step 5.0 of this attachment.

Beaver Valley Power Station ErP/1P 1.b1

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

-1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision: Page Number.

28 70 of 96 INTENTIONALLY BLANK

Pocedure Number:

Beaver Valley Power Station EPP/IP 1.1

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

S112 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision: Page Number:

28 71 of 86 ATTACHMENT 12 (1 of 7)

TSC EVENT NOTIFICATION A. INSTRUCTIONS 1.0 Comunications and Records Coordinator/Communications Assistant Actions:

1.1 Obtain copies of the forms faxed to the TSC by the Control Room from the TSC Fax machine located on the Communicator's desk.

.1.2 Contact the Control Room for turnover.

I

.1.3 Make copies of previously complete Initial and Follow-Up Notification Forms and distribute to the following:

1.3.1 TSC (9):

0 Communications Assts. (3) 0 Communications and Records Coord.

0 Emergency Director 0 OPS Coordinator 0 OPS Communicator (Red Phone) 0 OEMA Liaison Communicator 0 NRC (Place in NRC cubicle) 1.3.2 EOF (7):

• Emergency/Recovery Manager e DEP/BRP

• Offsite Agency Liaison

• PEMA

• NRC OEMA O

WVOES 1.4 Obtain the EPP Notification Books from the Communicators desk, if not already done.

1.5 Continue with Notifications from the point the Onshift Communications and Records Coordinator'stopped.

Beaver Valley Power Station Procedure Number:

EPPIIP 1.1

Title:

Unit: Level Of Use:

1/2 In-Field Reference Notifications Revision: Page Number.

29 79 of 86 ATTACHMENT 12 (2 of 7)

TSC EVENT NOTIFICATION 2.0 Initial Notifications, Communications and Records Coordinator Actions:

NOTE:

Initial Notifications are to be made to the first six (6) listed Agencies on the EMERGENCY NOTIFICATIONS CALL-LIST, EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 2 and MUST be made within 15 minutes of the event declaration. Subsequent notifications MUST still be made.

NOTE:

The BVPS Radio System is the alternate to the commercial phone system for notifications to offsite emergency response organizations. EPP/IP 1.2, Attachment 3, Step 6.0 provides direction in its use.

NOTE: F If an emergency is reclassified and upgraded during the Follow-Up Notification process, the Communications and Records Coordinator SHALL terminate the notification in progress and begin the upgraded Initial Notification process again per appropriate Attachment. If the Initial Notification Conference (INC) call is in progress, then the upgraded notifications SHALL be provided at this time. The 15-minute clock for the notifications will restart at the time of the upgraded declaration.

2.1 Provide the Emergency Director with the following:

0 Initial Notification Form (EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 1) 0 Follow-Up Notification Form (EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 3) 2.1.1 Provide the NRC Worksheet to the TSC Ops Coordinator for completion.

2.2 Obtain completed INITIAL NOTIFICATION FORM from the Emergency Director.

2.3 Review INITIAL NOTIFICATION FORM for all lines completed.

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Procedure Number:

Beaver Valley Power Station EPP/IP 1.1

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Notifications S28 73 of 86 ATTACHMENT 12 (3 of 7)

TSC EVENT NOTIFICATION 2.4 Make three (3) copies of completed INITIAL NOTIFICATION FORM.

2.4.1 Provide copies of INITIAL NOTIFICATION FORM to Communications Assistants.

2.5 Remove the NOTIFICATION FORM FAXING INSTRUCTIONS from the Communications and Records Coordinator's EPP Notification Book.

2.5.1 Fax the INITIAL NOTIFICATION FORM following the steps on the NOTIFICATION FORM FAXING INSTRUCTIONS (Attachment 13 of this procedure).

2.6 Initiate the INC call, per Attachment 15.

2.7- Instruct another Communications Assistant to dial the INC, on another phone, to assist in monitoring the INC call.

2.8 As each Agency enters the INC call, state the following:

2.8.1 "This is at Beaver Valley (Your Name)

Power Station, the Code Word is 2.8.2 Conduct a roll-call using EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 2, Page 2, for Agencies 1-6 documenting names and contact time.

S2.8.3 Verify from .each Agency receipt of the appropriate Initial Notification Fax (i.e., Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area or General Emergency) and that the Fax is legible.

• IF YES, ask if any Agency has questions regarding the information provided on the fax. Inform the Agency that a Follow-Up Notification will be relayed as information becomes available.

• STATE the Protective Action Recommendation.

IF NO, provide information from the Initial Notification Form AND inform the Agency that a Follow-Up Notification will be relayed as information becomes available.

Beaver Valley Power Station Erceur 1.1 EPP/IP 1.1

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ATTACHMENT 12 (4 of 7)

TSC EVENT NOTIFICATION 2.8.4 STATE "A Follow-Up Notification will be provided as information becomes available."

2.8.5 STATE "Beaver Valley Power Station is exiting the Initial Notification Conference Call. Agencies may remain on the Conference Call for further discussion."

2.8.6 If a party cannot be contacted in a reasonable period of time, bypass that party and proceed down the list. After other required notifications are complete, re-attempt to contact any bypassed parties. Every effort MUST be made to contact the organizations listed in Attachment 2 and all attempts MUST be documented.

2.9 For any Agency(ies) not on the conference call, perform the following:

2.9.1 Contact each remaining Offsite Agency and, 2.9.2 Record the contact time and the name of the agency representative.

2.9.3 STATE "This is (Your Name) EPP Communicator".

2.9.4 STATE "EPP Code Word is 2.9.5 Ask each Agency if they received the Initial Notification Form Fax and if it is legible.

2.9.5.1 If YES, ask if there are any questions.

2.9.5.2 STATE the Protective Action Recommendation.

2.9.5.3 If NO, provide information from the Initial Notification Form.

2.10 Notify the Emergency Director when the Initial Notification calls to the first six (6) Agencies have been made.

2.11 Verify the Ops Coordinator has given the NRC WORKSHEET to the OPS Communicator manning the NRC phone for relaying information. Log time contacted on EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 2.

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1.1 Beaver Valley Power Station EPPII EPP/IP 1. 1

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7-5 of 86 ATTACHMENT 12 (5 of 7)

TSC EVENT NOTIFICATION 2.12 Send Lotus Notes Message to ERO pagers per Attachment 16, this procedure.

2.13 Distribute copies of the current Initial Notification Form per Step 1.3 3.0 Follow-Up Notifications NOTE:

The follow-up notification provides technical information to those qualified to use the data and serves as a means to verify the authenticity of an emergency notification.

The CODEWORD also provides. verification.

NOTE:

The Follow-Up Notification Form should be updated periodically (i.e., 2 times per shift) or at the discretion of the Emergency Director.

3.1 Obtain information for the FOLLOW-UP NOTIFICATION FORM (EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 3).

3.2 Complete the FOLLOW-UP NOTIFICATION FORM and make three (3) copies to give to the Communications Assistants.

3.3 Fax the FOLLOW-UP NOTIFICATION FORM following the instructions on the NOTIFICATIONYFORM FAXING INSTRUCTIONS (Attachment 13 of this procedure).

NOTE:

If an emergency is reclassified and upgraded during the Follow-Up Notification process, the Communications and Records Coordinator SHALL terminate the notification in progress and begin the upgraded Initial Notification process again per appropriate Attachment. If the Initial Notification Conference (INC) call is in progress, then the upgraded notifications SHALL be provided at this time.

The 15-minute clock for the notifications will restart at the time of the upgraded declaration.

Beaver Valley Power Station P 1.1,

Title:

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28 Page Number 76 of 96 -.

ATTACHMENT 12 (6 of 7)

TSC EVENT NOTIFICATION NOTE:

The INC call SHALL not be used for Follow-Up Notifications. Offsite Agencies SHALL be called individually.

3.4 Upon receiving the TSC copy of the Follow-Up Notification Fax, or approximately 20 minutes after sending the Fax, begin Follow-Up Notifications to the first six (6) listed Agencies using EPP/JP 1.1, Attachment 2 "EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION CALL-LIST".

3.4.1 Begin call by stating "This is (Your Name) at Beaver Valley Power Station, the Code Word is This is a Follow-Up Notification verification call."

3.4.2 Record name and time of contact on EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 2.

NOTE:

The Follow-Up Notifications # (Number) is Entered in the lower right comer of Attachment 3, page 1 of 5.

3.4.3 Verify receipt of Follow-Up Notification # XX Fax and that the Fax is legible.

• IF YES, ask if there are any questions.

• IF NO, provide information from the Follow-Up Notification Form.

3.4.4 If a party cannot be contacted in a reasonable period of time, bypass that party and proceed down the list. After other required notifications are complete, re-attempt to contact any bypassed parties. Every effort must be made to contact the organizations listed in Attachment 2 and all attempts must be documented.

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Beaver Valley Power Station Prceur EPP/IP 1.1 1.

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28 77 of 86 ATTACHMENT 12 (7 of 7)

TSC EVENT NOTIFICATION 4.0 Subsequent Notifications 4.1 If an emergency is escalated in classification, the INITIAL NOTIFICATION FORM is used and notifications are made in the same manner specified in Steps 2 and 3 of this procedure.

4.1.1 If an emergency is escalated in classification, and the INC call is ongoing, then confirm the upgraded receipt of the Initial Notification Fax on the current INC call.

4.1.2 If an Agency has not received the upgraded Fax, provide the information.

5.0 - Site Assembly and Personnel Accountability 5.1 Provide information to Near-Site Assembly Area Coordinators per EPP/IP 3.2, Attachment 7.

6.0 Termination, 6.1 Complete the EMERGENCY TERMINATION CHECKLIST (EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 5).

6.2 Collect all originals of the completed attachments and forward to Emergency Preparedness.

B. FINAL CONDITIONS 1.0 Use of this procedure SHALL be terminated when the emergency situation is corrected or when directed by the Emergency Director.

2.0 Attachment 5 (Emergency Termination Checklist) is to be completed for termination calls to offsite agencies for all emergency events.

NOTE:

Upon termination of the emergency situation and the subsequent termination of this IP, All originals of completed Attachments SHALL be forwarded to Emergency Preparedness.

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_EPP/IP Procedure Number:

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79 of 86 ATTACHMENT 13 (1 of 1)

NOTIFICATION, FORM FAXING INSTRUCTIONS EXAMPLE 1.0 Turn external speaker located on rear of fax machine to "ON".

2.0 Place completed Notification Forms on the Fax Machine (face down) and perform the following steps:

NOTE:

Not all voice prompts are listed here, only the key ones.

3.0 Press the "HOOK" button or, if the external speaker is not functioning, lift the phone receiver.

4.0 Press Speed Dial number "01" on the Fax Machine labeled "EPP FAX",

(or enter ). This will connect you to a voice prompt which states "WELCOME TO AT&T'S ENHANCED FAX".

5.0 At the voice prompt "ENTER THE SUBSCRIBER ID AND POUND SIGN",

Press Speed Dial number "02"., (or enter_ _ _ _

6.0 At the voice prompt "ENTER THE PASSWORD AND POUND SIGN",

Press Speed Dial number "03", (or enter_ _ _

7.0 You will hear a voice prompt "LOGGING IN, PLEASE WAIT". At the voice prompt "TO SEND MESSAGE, PRESS 1". PRESS 1 on the Fax number keys (do not wait for additional prompts).

NOTE:

If Speed Dial 04 is used, Step 9.0 does not need to be performed.

8.0 At the prompt "ENTER RECIPIENT ADDRESS NUMBER, TO ADDRESS TO A LIST PRESS *L ", Press Speed Dial Number ("04") or enter (L).

9.0 At the voice prompt "WHEN FINISHED PRESS THE "*" AND "#" KEYS",

press "*#" buttons on the Fax number keys.

10.0 A voice prompt will inform you that "YOUR MESSAGE ID IS XXXX AND WILL BE SENT TO XXXX RECIPIENTS".

11.0 At the voice prompt, "PLEASE START YOUR FAX MACHINE", press the Fax "START button.

12.0 Hang up the phone if used.

13.0 Return to procedure/Attachment step in progress.

Procedure Number:

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Beaver Valley Power Station Procedure Number:

EPP/IP 1.L

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1 28 81 of 86 ATTACHMENT 14 (1 of 2)

ERO BEEPER ACTIVATION INSTRUCTIONS XAMPLE)

CHECK 1.0 A SRO (from the unaffected Unit) SHALL complete the blanks below and EI notify the Emergency Response Organization ERO.

This is at Beaver Valley (Your Name)

Power Station. At (time) hours, Unit _ has Declared an due to:

a. Report to your emergency facility. I repeat, report to your emergency Facility.

OR

b. Report to your alternate emergency facility, I repeat, report to your alternate emergency facility.

NOTE:

If ERO activation is NOT required, proceed to step 1.11 to send a Lotus Notes message.

I 1.1 From a PAX phone, dial 4370 (or dial 9-724-643-4370). El 1.2 Interrupt the greeting by IMMEDIATELY entering XXXX. ["

1.3 When prompted, enter scenario number XXXX. -'

1.4 When prompted, verify scenario number (9 for YES or 6 for NO). El 1.5 When prompted, "Do you want to record your on the fly message El 1", Press 9 for YES or 6 for NO.

SProcedure Number.

Beaver Valley Power Station Po PPure Limer e EPP/IP 1.1

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• ATTACHMENT 14 (2 of 2)

ERO BEEPER ACTIVATION INSTRUCTIONS (EXAMPLE)

CHECK 1.6 When prompted, "Enter on the fly 1 segment ID or press star to El record".

1.6.1 PRESS * (A short delay will occur). ['

1.7 When prompted, "Please speak your message after the tone", provide the El information from Step 1.0 in your on the fly message.

1.7.1 PRESS the # key when done with message. [

1.8 Review message, when prompted "Is that correct?" (Press 9 for YES and 6 E]

for NO).

1.9 When prompted "You will queue scenario XXXX. It will now be sent. F-1 Are you sure this is what you want to do?" (Press 9 for YES or 6 for NO) 1.10 Call the Central Alarm Station (CAS) (PAX 511415115) and provide the El following information:

"* Your name and title. El

"* EPP CODE WORD .-- l

" A/An has been []

declared.

"* ERO pagers have been activated. Call back at PAX E-']

when pager activates.

"* Request Near Site Building Emergency Notifications be made. ["

1.11 From Lotus Notes, send a message "beeper all call" with the information [

from Step 1.0 above. Include if ERO is to report or not. (Limit 220 characters.)

Beaver Valley Power Station Procedure Number:

EPP/JIP 1.1

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R-3 of 86 ATTACHMENT 15 (1 of 2)

ACTIVATION OF THE INITIAL.NOTIFICATION CONFERENCE (INC) CALL INSTRUCTIONS (EXAMPILE)

A. INITIATING INC NOTE:

If BVERS is unavailable, go to Part B. 1 of this Attachment.

1.0 Activate Offsite Agency Initial Notification Conference (INC) Call.

"1.1 On EP Auto-Dialer, press button marked INC OR DIAL 9# 1-330-315-4380 (or from a PAX phone, dial 9-1-330-315-4380).

1.2 Interrupt the greeting by IMMEDIATELY entering XXXXXX.

1.2.1 IF unable to activate INC, GO TO PART B of this procedure.

1.3 When prompted, enter the SCENARIO NUMBER XXXXX.

1.4 When prompted, verify the SCENARIO NUMBER (9 for YES OR 6 for NO).

1.5 Verify when prompted, "You will cue SCENARIO XXXX. It will now be sent.

Are you sure this is what you want to do?" (9 for YES OR 6 for NO.

1.6 Hang up.

2.0 Access Initial Notification Conference Bridge.

2.1 On EP Auto-Dialer, press button marked CONF. Bridge OR dial 9# 724-682 1900 (OR from a PAX phone, dial 9-724-682-1900).

2.2 When prompted, enter XXXXX, then the # key.

3.0 Return to Procedure/Attachment Step in progress.

Beaver Valley Power Station .Prcedu Num er 1 1.

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ATTACHMENT 15 (2 of 2)

ACTIVATION OF THE INITIAL NOTIFICATION CONFERENCE (INC) CALL INSTRUCTIONS (EXAMPLE)

B. Individual Offsite Agency Initial Notification(s).

1.0 Obtain completed Initial Notification Form from the NSS/ED or Control Room FAX machine.

2.0 Contact each required Offsite Agency per EPP/IP 1.1, Attachment 2.

3.0 Record the contact time and the name of agency representative on attachment.

4.0 STATE "This is (Your Name) EPP Communicator".

5.0 STATE "EPP Code Word is__

6.0 Ask each agency if they received the Initial Notification.Form FAX and if it is legible.

6.1 If YES, ask if there are any questions.

6.2 STATE the Protective Action Recommendation.

6.3 If NO, provide information from Initial Notification Form.

7.0 Return to Procedure/Attachment Step in progress.

Beaver Valley Power Station Prceur 1.1 "Title: Unit: Level Of Use:

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28 8-5 of 86 ATTACHMENT 16 (1 of 1)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR NOTIFICATION OF ERO FOR EVENT ESCALATIONS/UPDATES

1. Open Lotus Notes. Select New Memo.

2. In the TO: block, type

3. In the BODY: Type time and Unit followed by a brief description of the event. Message length should be kept to less than 220 characters.

4. Press. SEND and continue with step 10.

OR

5. If Lotus Notes is not working, then access the internet.

6. Go to the web site www.airtouchpaging.com and click on Send A Message.

7. In block for Step 1, enter XXXXXXXXXX.

8. In block for Step 2, enter text message for transient (up to 240 characters, a counter is provided).

9. At Step 3, click on send.

10. Call the Central Alarm Station (CAS) and provide the following information:

• Identify yourself by name

• Your position

11. Inform Security that the ERO beepers are going to be toned out with notification of a Unit Transient.

12. Five minutes after initial contact of CAS, call CAS again (if they have not contacted you) to verify beeper actuation.

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