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MONTHYEARRS-20-139, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Requests to Adopt TSTF-505, Revision 2, and 10 CFR 50.692020-11-24024 November 2020 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Requests to Adopt TSTF-505, Revision 2, and 10 CFR 50.69 Project stage: Response to RAI JAFP-21-0069, Application to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors2021-07-30030 July 2021 Application to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors Project stage: Request JAFP-21-0070, License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk- Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b2021-07-30030 July 2021 License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk- Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b Project stage: Request ML21246A2112021-09-0303 September 2021 Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-505 Project stage: Acceptance Review ML21246A2072021-09-0303 September 2021 Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action License Amendment Request to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69 Project stage: Acceptance Review ML21285A1492021-10-22022 October 2021 Audit Plan in Support of Review of License Amendment Requests Regarding 50.69/TSFT-505 Project stage: Other JAFP-22-2020, Supplemental Information No. 1 for James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b. and 10CFR 50.69, Risk-Info2022-03-0404 March 2022 Supplemental Information No. 1 for James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b. and 10CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Project stage: Supplement ML22124A2672022-05-0404 May 2022 Request for Additional Information for James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant TSTF-505 Project stage: RAI JAFP-22-0032, Response to Request for Additional Information for James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b..2022-06-16016 June 2022 Response to Request for Additional Information for James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b.. Project stage: Response to RAI ML22196A0612022-08-23023 August 2022 Issuance of Amendment No. 352 Adoption of 10 CFR 50.69 Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors Project stage: Approval ML22238A1202022-08-31031 August 2022 Regulatory Audit Summary Regarding License Amendment Requests to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69 and to Permit the Use of Risk-Informed Completion Times in Accordance with TSTF-505, Rev. 2 (EPIDs L-2021-LLA 0142 and L-2021-LLA-0143) Project stage: Other ML22223A1412022-09-0101 September 2022 Issuance of Amendment No. 353 Adoption of TSTF - 505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4B Project stage: Approval 2022-03-04
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Category:Letter type:JAFP
MONTHYEARJAFP-23-0065, License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-529, Clarify Use and Application Rules, Revision 4, and Administrative Changes to the Technical Specifications2023-12-14014 December 2023 License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-529, Clarify Use and Application Rules, Revision 4, and Administrative Changes to the Technical Specifications JAFP-23-0069, Supplemental Response to Part 73 Exemption Request Withdrawal of Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 73, Subpart B, Preemption Authority Requirements2023-12-0707 December 2023 Supplemental Response to Part 73 Exemption Request Withdrawal of Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 73, Subpart B, Preemption Authority Requirements JAFP-23-0057, and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation - Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation2023-11-22022 November 2023 and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation - Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation JAFP-23-0064, Emergency Plan Document Revision2023-11-15015 November 2023 Emergency Plan Document Revision JAFP-23-0063, Registration of Spent Fuel Cask Use2023-11-13013 November 2023 Registration of Spent Fuel Cask Use JAFP-23-0059, Registration of Spent Fuel Cask Use2023-10-24024 October 2023 Registration of Spent Fuel Cask Use JAFP-23-0048, Supplemental Information for License Amendment Request to Update the Technical Specification Bases to Change the Fuel Handling Accident Analysis2023-08-31031 August 2023 Supplemental Information for License Amendment Request to Update the Technical Specification Bases to Change the Fuel Handling Accident Analysis JAFP-23-0050, Physical Security Plan, Revision 242023-08-31031 August 2023 Physical Security Plan, Revision 24 JAFP-23-0047, Correction to the 2022 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report2023-08-30030 August 2023 Correction to the 2022 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report JAFP-23-0040, License Amendment Request to Update the Technical Specification Bases to Change the Fuel Handling Accident Analysis2023-08-0303 August 2023 License Amendment Request to Update the Technical Specification Bases to Change the Fuel Handling Accident Analysis JAFP-23-0043, 10 CFR 50.46 Annual Report2023-07-31031 July 2023 10 CFR 50.46 Annual Report JAFP-23-0038, License Amendment Request to Modify Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.4.3.1 Safety Relief Valves (S/Rvs) Setpoint Lower Tolerance2023-07-28028 July 2023 License Amendment Request to Modify Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.4.3.1 Safety Relief Valves (S/Rvs) Setpoint Lower Tolerance JAFP-23-0033, License Amendment Request - Technical Specifications (TS) Section 3.3.1.2, Source Range Monitors (SRM) Instrumentation2023-06-28028 June 2023 License Amendment Request - Technical Specifications (TS) Section 3.3.1.2, Source Range Monitors (SRM) Instrumentation JAFP-23-0025, 2022 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report2023-05-10010 May 2023 2022 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report JAFP-23-0023, 2022 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report2023-04-27027 April 2023 2022 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report JAFP-23-0010, 2022 REIRS Transmittal of NRC Form 52023-03-20020 March 2023 2022 REIRS Transmittal of NRC Form 5 JAFP-23-0008, Supplement to Inservice Inspection Summary Report Cycle 252023-02-22022 February 2023 Supplement to Inservice Inspection Summary Report Cycle 25 JAFP-22-0053, Inservice Inspection Summary Report Cycle 252022-12-20020 December 2022 Inservice Inspection Summary Report Cycle 25 JAFP-22-0046, Core Operating Limits Report Cycle 262022-10-17017 October 2022 Core Operating Limits Report Cycle 26 JAFP-22-0040, 10 CFR 50.46 Annual Report2022-07-29029 July 2022 10 CFR 50.46 Annual Report JAFP-22-0033, Core Operating Limits Report Mid-Cycle 252022-06-23023 June 2022 Core Operating Limits Report Mid-Cycle 25 JAFP-22-0032, Response to Request for Additional Information for James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b..2022-06-16016 June 2022 Response to Request for Additional Information for James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b.. JAFP-22-0030, Oswego County and New York State Participation in the Emergency Plan2022-05-13013 May 2022 Oswego County and New York State Participation in the Emergency Plan JAFP-22-0029, 2021 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report2022-05-11011 May 2022 2021 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report JAFP-22-0028, 2021 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report2022-04-27027 April 2022 2021 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report JAFP-22-0026, 2021 REIRS Transmittal of NRC Form 52022-04-0707 April 2022 2021 REIRS Transmittal of NRC Form 5 JAFP-22-2020, Supplemental Information No. 1 for James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b. and 10CFR 50.69, Risk-Info2022-03-0404 March 2022 Supplemental Information No. 1 for James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b. and 10CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed JAFP-22-0017, Amendments to Indemnity Agreements2022-02-15015 February 2022 Amendments to Indemnity Agreements JAFP-22-0007, Summary of Changes to Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Quality Assurance Topical Report, NO-AA-10, and Decommissioning Quality Assurance Program, NO-DC-102022-01-31031 January 2022 Summary of Changes to Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Quality Assurance Topical Report, NO-AA-10, and Decommissioning Quality Assurance Program, NO-DC-10 JAFP-22-0010, Supplemental Information in Response to Order Consenting to License Transfers and Approval of Draft Conforming License Amendments2022-01-24024 January 2022 Supplemental Information in Response to Order Consenting to License Transfers and Approval of Draft Conforming License Amendments JAFP-22-0008, Response to Request for Supplemental Information by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to Support Review of a License Amendment Request to Eliminate Selected Response Time Testing for Reactor Protection System and Primary2022-01-14014 January 2022 Response to Request for Supplemental Information by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to Support Review of a License Amendment Request to Eliminate Selected Response Time Testing for Reactor Protection System and Primary JAFP-21-0093, Propose Change to Eliminate Selected Response Time Testing for Reactor Protection System and Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation2021-10-18018 October 2021 Propose Change to Eliminate Selected Response Time Testing for Reactor Protection System and Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation JAFP-21-0089, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-541 Revision 2, Add Exceptions to Surveillance Requirements for Valves and Dampers Locked in the Actuated Position2021-09-27027 September 2021 Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-541 Revision 2, Add Exceptions to Surveillance Requirements for Valves and Dampers Locked in the Actuated Position JAFP-21-0087, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for Approval of Transfer of Licenses and Conforming Amendments2021-09-16016 September 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for Approval of Transfer of Licenses and Conforming Amendments JAFP-21-0083, Notification of Readiness for NRC 95001 Inspection2021-09-0909 September 2021 Notification of Readiness for NRC 95001 Inspection JAFP-21-0081, Supplement to Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-582, Revision 0, Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control (RPV WIC) Enhancements2021-09-0303 September 2021 Supplement to Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-582, Revision 0, Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control (RPV WIC) Enhancements JAFP-21-0075, Proposed Relief Request Associated with Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Level Instrumentation Partial Penetration Nozzle Repairs2021-08-12012 August 2021 Proposed Relief Request Associated with Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Level Instrumentation Partial Penetration Nozzle Repairs JAFP-21-0073, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Application to Revise the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.5.1, ECCS - Operating Surveillance.2021-08-0909 August 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Application to Revise the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.5.1, ECCS - Operating Surveillance. JAFP-21-0069, Application to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors2021-07-30030 July 2021 Application to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors JAFP-21-0070, License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk- Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b2021-07-30030 July 2021 License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk- Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b JAFP-21-0071, 10 CFR 50.46 Annual Report2021-07-29029 July 2021 10 CFR 50.46 Annual Report JAFP-21-0064, Supplemental Information - Proposed Alternative Concerning ASME Section XI Repair/Replacement Documentation for Replacement of Pressure Retaining Bolting2021-07-0707 July 2021 Supplemental Information - Proposed Alternative Concerning ASME Section XI Repair/Replacement Documentation for Replacement of Pressure Retaining Bolting JAFP-21-0053, Emergency License Amendment Request - One Time Extension to TS 3.5.1 Condition a, TS 3.6.1.9 Condition a, and TS 3.6.4.1 Condition a Completion Time to Support Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump Motor Replacement2021-06-14014 June 2021 Emergency License Amendment Request - One Time Extension to TS 3.5.1 Condition a, TS 3.6.1.9 Condition a, and TS 3.6.4.1 Condition a Completion Time to Support Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump Motor Replacement JAFP-21-0052, Emergency License Amendment Request, One Time Extension of Condition a to TS 3.5.1, TS 3.6.1.9, and TS 3.6.4.1 Completion Time to Support Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump Motor Replacement2021-06-13013 June 2021 Emergency License Amendment Request, One Time Extension of Condition a to TS 3.5.1, TS 3.6.1.9, and TS 3.6.4.1 Completion Time to Support Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump Motor Replacement JAFP-21-0051, Emergency License Amendment Request - One Time Extension to TS 3.5.1 Condition a, TS 3.6.1.9 Condition a, and TS 3.6.4.1 Condition a Completion Time to Support Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump Motor Replacement2021-06-13013 June 2021 Emergency License Amendment Request - One Time Extension to TS 3.5.1 Condition a, TS 3.6.1.9 Condition a, and TS 3.6.4.1 Condition a Completion Time to Support Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump Motor Replacement JAFP-21-0050, Emergency License Amendment Request, One Time Extension of Condition a to TS 3.5.1, TS 3.6.1.9, and TS 3.6.4.1 Completion Time to Support Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump Motor Replacement2021-06-12012 June 2021 Emergency License Amendment Request, One Time Extension of Condition a to TS 3.5.1, TS 3.6.1.9, and TS 3.6.4.1 Completion Time to Support Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump Motor Replacement JAFP-21-0044, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for Approval of Transfer of Licenses and Conforming Amendments2021-06-11011 June 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for Approval of Transfer of Licenses and Conforming Amendments JAFP-21-0042, Reply to a Notice of Violation; EA-20-1382021-06-0303 June 2021 Reply to a Notice of Violation; EA-20-138 JAFP-21-0041, Supplement to Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-545, Revision 3, TS Inservice Testing Program Removal & Clarify SR Usage Rule Application to Section 5.5 Testing2021-05-17017 May 2021 Supplement to Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-545, Revision 3, TS Inservice Testing Program Removal & Clarify SR Usage Rule Application to Section 5.5 Testing JAFP-21-0040, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-264-A, Revision 0, 3.3.9 and 3.3.10 - Delete Flux Monitors Specific Overlap Requirement SRs2021-05-14014 May 2021 Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-264-A, Revision 0, 3.3.9 and 3.3.10 - Delete Flux Monitors Specific Overlap Requirement SRs 2023-08-31
[Table view] Category:Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI)
MONTHYEARJAFP-22-0032, Response to Request for Additional Information for James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b..2022-06-16016 June 2022 Response to Request for Additional Information for James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b.. RS-22-027, Constellation, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-541 Revision 2, Add Exceptions to Surveillance Requirements for Valves and Dampers Locked in the Actuated2022-02-23023 February 2022 Constellation, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-541 Revision 2, Add Exceptions to Surveillance Requirements for Valves and Dampers Locked in the Actuated P NMP1L3447, Constellation Energy Generation, LLC - Response to Request for Additional Information - Proposed Relief Request Associated with Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Level Instrumentation Partial Penetration Nozzle Repairs2022-02-0202 February 2022 Constellation Energy Generation, LLC - Response to Request for Additional Information - Proposed Relief Request Associated with Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Level Instrumentation Partial Penetration Nozzle Repairs JAFP-22-0008, Response to Request for Supplemental Information by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to Support Review of a License Amendment Request to Eliminate Selected Response Time Testing for Reactor Protection System and Primary2022-01-14014 January 2022 Response to Request for Supplemental Information by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to Support Review of a License Amendment Request to Eliminate Selected Response Time Testing for Reactor Protection System and Primary JAFP-21-0087, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for Approval of Transfer of Licenses and Conforming Amendments2021-09-16016 September 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for Approval of Transfer of Licenses and Conforming Amendments JAFP-21-0073, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Application to Revise the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.5.1, ECCS - Operating Surveillance.2021-08-0909 August 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Application to Revise the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.5.1, ECCS - Operating Surveillance. JAFP-21-0044, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for Approval of Transfer of Licenses and Conforming Amendments2021-06-11011 June 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for Approval of Transfer of Licenses and Conforming Amendments ML21138A0132021-05-18018 May 2021 NRC Response to Request for Additional Time to Respond to James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant: Final Significance Determination of a White Finding with Assessment Follow Up and Notice of Violation-Inspection No. 05000333/2021090 JAFP-21-0032, Response to Request for Additional Information - Proposed Alternative Concerning ASME Section XI Repair/Replacement Documentation for Replacement of Pressure Retaining Bolting2021-04-20020 April 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information - Proposed Alternative Concerning ASME Section XI Repair/Replacement Documentation for Replacement of Pressure Retaining Bolting JAFP-21-0008, Supplement to Application to Revise Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.5.1.62021-02-18018 February 2021 Supplement to Application to Revise Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.5.1.6 JAFP-21-0005, Response to Request for Additional Information to Support Review of License Amendment Request - Application to Modify Technical Specifications 3.6.1.3 Primary Containment Isolation Valves2021-01-26026 January 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information to Support Review of License Amendment Request - Application to Modify Technical Specifications 3.6.1.3 Primary Containment Isolation Valves ML20315A2452020-11-10010 November 2020 Response to Request for Additional Information to Support Review of License Amendment Request - Application to Modify Technical Specifications 3.6.1.3 Primary Containment Isolation Valves JAFP-20-0030, Response to Request for Additional Information in Support of License Amendment Request - Proposed Changes to the Technical Specifications to Primary Containment Hydrodynamic Loads2020-04-0606 April 2020 Response to Request for Additional Information in Support of License Amendment Request - Proposed Changes to the Technical Specifications to Primary Containment Hydrodynamic Loads JAFP-20-0026, Response to Request for Additional Information to Support Review of a License Amendment Request to Revise the Allowable Value for Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Primary Containment Isolation2020-03-31031 March 2020 Response to Request for Additional Information to Support Review of a License Amendment Request to Revise the Allowable Value for Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Primary Containment Isolation JAFP-20-0020, Response to Request for Additional Information to Support Review of a License Amendment Request to Revise the Allowable Value for Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Primary Containment Isolation2020-02-21021 February 2020 Response to Request for Additional Information to Support Review of a License Amendment Request to Revise the Allowable Value for Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Primary Containment Isolation JAFP-20-0008, Response to Request for Additional Information Associated with the License Amendment Request for Application of the Alternative Source Term for Calculating Loss-of-Coolant Accident Dose Consequences2020-01-16016 January 2020 Response to Request for Additional Information Associated with the License Amendment Request for Application of the Alternative Source Term for Calculating Loss-of-Coolant Accident Dose Consequences JAFP-19-0105, Response to Request for Supplemental Information by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to Support Review of a License Amendment Request to Revise the Allowable Value for Reactor Water Cleanup (Rwcu)...2019-11-0606 November 2019 Response to Request for Supplemental Information by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to Support Review of a License Amendment Request to Revise the Allowable Value for Reactor Water Cleanup (Rwcu)... ML19279A0012019-10-0606 October 2019 Response to Request for Additional Information by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to Support Review of an Emergency License Amendment Request for One Time Extension to the TS 3.8.1 Action ... JAFP-19-0057, Response to Request for Additional Information - Proposed Alternative to Utilize Code Cases N-878 and N-8802019-06-0404 June 2019 Response to Request for Additional Information - Proposed Alternative to Utilize Code Cases N-878 and N-880 NMP1L3279, Response to Request for Additional Information - Proposed Alternatives to Utilize Code Cases N-878 and N-880 for Plants2019-05-0101 May 2019 Response to Request for Additional Information - Proposed Alternatives to Utilize Code Cases N-878 and N-880 for Plants JAFP-19-0009, End of Interval Relief Request Associated with the Fourth Ten-Year Inservice Inspection (ISI) Interval2019-01-15015 January 2019 End of Interval Relief Request Associated with the Fourth Ten-Year Inservice Inspection (ISI) Interval JAFP-19-0006, Response to Request for Additional Information - Proposed Alternative to Utilize Code Cases N-878 and N-8802019-01-0808 January 2019 Response to Request for Additional Information - Proposed Alternative to Utilize Code Cases N-878 and N-880 JAFP-18-0068, Response to Request for Additional Information: License Amendment Request to Adopt Emergency Action Level Schemes Pursuant to NEI 99-01, Revision 6, Development of Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive Reactors2018-07-12012 July 2018 Response to Request for Additional Information: License Amendment Request to Adopt Emergency Action Level Schemes Pursuant to NEI 99-01, Revision 6, Development of Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive Reactors RS-18-067, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Generic Letter 2016-012018-05-29029 May 2018 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Generic Letter 2016-01 JAFP-18-0038, Response to Request for Additional Information Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-542, Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control, Revision 22018-04-19019 April 2018 Response to Request for Additional Information Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-542, Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control, Revision 2 JAFP-18-0029, Response to Request for Additional Information by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to Support Review of James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant to Address Secondary Containment Personnel Access Door Openings2018-03-15015 March 2018 Response to Request for Additional Information by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to Support Review of James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant to Address Secondary Containment Personnel Access Door Openings JAFP-18-0014, Response to Request for Additional Information on Submittal of Relief Request JAF-15R-05 Concerning Nozzle-to-Vessel Weld and Inner Radii Examinations (Use of Code Case N-702)2018-03-0202 March 2018 Response to Request for Additional Information on Submittal of Relief Request JAF-15R-05 Concerning Nozzle-to-Vessel Weld and Inner Radii Examinations (Use of Code Case N-702) ML18025A7992018-01-25025 January 2018 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Generic Letter 2016-01 JAFP-18-0012, Supplemental Response Concerning License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-542, Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control, Revision 22018-01-22022 January 2018 Supplemental Response Concerning License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-542, Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control, Revision 2 ML17346A1532017-12-11011 December 2017 Submittal of Response to Request for Additional Information on Relief Requests Associated with the Fifth Inservice Inspection (ISI) Interval JAFP-17-0029, Revision to Entergy'S Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report (CEUS Sites) Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights...2017-04-27027 April 2017 Revision to Entergy'S Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report (CEUS Sites) Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights... JAFP-17-0005, Response to 03/12/2012 Request for Information Regarding Recommendations of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident, Recommendation 9.3 for Emergency Preparedness2017-01-23023 January 2017 Response to 03/12/2012 Request for Information Regarding Recommendations of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident, Recommendation 9.3 for Emergency Preparedness JAFP-16-0182, Spent Fuel Pool Evaluation, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident2016-12-22022 December 2016 Spent Fuel Pool Evaluation, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident ML16335A1042016-11-29029 November 2016 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Application for Order Approving Transfer F Renewed Facility Operating License and Proposed Conforming License Amendment JAFP-16-0170, Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications Section 5.5.6 for Extension of Type a and Type C Leak Rate Test Frequencies - Supplement 12016-11-21021 November 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications Section 5.5.6 for Extension of Type a and Type C Leak Rate Test Frequencies - Supplement 1 JAFP-16-0165, Response to Generic Letter 2016-01 - Monitoring of Neutron Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools2016-11-0303 November 2016 Response to Generic Letter 2016-01 - Monitoring of Neutron Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools JAFP-16-0142, Revision to Technical Specification (TS) Administrative Controls for Staffing and Training Upon Permanent Cessation of Operation (CAC No. MF7280) - Supplement 22016-09-19019 September 2016 Revision to Technical Specification (TS) Administrative Controls for Staffing and Training Upon Permanent Cessation of Operation (CAC No. MF7280) - Supplement 2 JAFP-16-0131, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for Approval of a Certified Fuel Handler Training and Retraining Program2016-08-18018 August 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for Approval of a Certified Fuel Handler Training and Retraining Program JAFP-16-0130, License Amendment Request to Revise the Emergency Plan to Address the Permanently Defueled Condition - Supplement 22016-08-10010 August 2016 License Amendment Request to Revise the Emergency Plan to Address the Permanently Defueled Condition - Supplement 2 JAFP-16-0113, License Amendment Request to Revise the Emergency Plan to Address the Permanently Defueled Condition - Supplement 12016-07-0606 July 2016 License Amendment Request to Revise the Emergency Plan to Address the Permanently Defueled Condition - Supplement 1 JAFP-16-0114, Response to Request for Additional Information for Proposed Inservice Inspection Program Alternative in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(2), RR-202016-06-27027 June 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information for Proposed Inservice Inspection Program Alternative in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(2), RR-20 JAFP-16-0077, Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding Revision to Technical Specification (TS) Administrative Controls for Staffing and Training Upon Permanent Cessation of Operation (CAC No. MF7280) - Supplement 12016-06-0303 June 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding Revision to Technical Specification (TS) Administrative Controls for Staffing and Training Upon Permanent Cessation of Operation (CAC No. MF7280) - Supplement 1 JAFP-16-0078, Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding Request for Approval of Certified Fuel Handler Training and Retaining Program2016-06-0303 June 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding Request for Approval of Certified Fuel Handler Training and Retaining Program CNRO-2016-00016, Entergy - Response to RAI Questions and Submittal of Relief Request EN-ISI-15-1 (Updated)2016-06-0202 June 2016 Entergy - Response to RAI Questions and Submittal of Relief Request EN-ISI-15-1 (Updated) ML16071A4412016-03-0707 March 2016 Entergy Fleet Relief Request No. RR-EN-15-1-Proposed Alternative to Use ASME Code Case N-789-1 - E-mail from G.Davant to R.Guzman - Response to Second RAI (MF6340 - MF6349) CNRO-2016-00005, Response to Request for Additional Information Pertaining to a Change to the Entergy Quality Assurance Program Manual (QAPM)2016-02-25025 February 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information Pertaining to a Change to the Entergy Quality Assurance Program Manual (QAPM) CNRO-2016-00002, Entergy - Relief Request Number RR EN-15-1, Rev. 1 - Proposed Alternative to Use ASME Code Case N-789-1, Alternative Requirements for Pad Reinforcement of Class 2 and 3 Moderate Energy Carbon Steel Piping for Raw Water Service, Secti2016-01-29029 January 2016 Entergy - Relief Request Number RR EN-15-1, Rev. 1 - Proposed Alternative to Use ASME Code Case N-789-1, Alternative Requirements for Pad Reinforcement of Class 2 and 3 Moderate Energy Carbon Steel Piping for Raw Water Service, Section Xl, CNRO-2015-00002, Entergy Operations, Inc. - Response to RAI Questions and Submittal of RR EN-15-2, Rev. 12015-12-0404 December 2015 Entergy Operations, Inc. - Response to RAI Questions and Submittal of RR EN-15-2, Rev. 1 JAFP-15-0094, Response to Request for Additional Information for Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report2015-08-0404 August 2015 Response to Request for Additional Information for Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report 2022-06-16
[Table view] Category:Technical Specifications
MONTHYEARML23095A3762023-04-0505 April 2023 Enclosure 4: Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) Revision 109 ML22196A0612022-08-23023 August 2022 Issuance of Amendment No. 352 Adoption of 10 CFR 50.69 Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors ML22166A4302022-07-15015 July 2022 Issuance of Amendment No. 351 Removal of Selected Response Time Testing for Reactor Protection System and Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation JAFP-22-0032, Response to Request for Additional Information for James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b..2022-06-16016 June 2022 Response to Request for Additional Information for James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b.. ML22090A0862022-04-29029 April 2022 Amendments to Adopt TSTF-541,Rev.2,Add Exceptions to Surveillance Requirements for Valves,Dampers Locked in Actuated Position RS-22-049, Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Supplemental Information to Correct Typographical Errors in Constellation'S Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-541 Revision 2, Add Exceptions to Surveillance Requirements for2022-04-0404 April 2022 Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Supplemental Information to Correct Typographical Errors in Constellation'S Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-541 Revision 2, Add Exceptions to Surveillance Requirements for V JAFP-21-0022, Technical Requirements Manual Specifications - Redacted2022-03-29029 March 2022 Technical Requirements Manual Specifications - Redacted ML21347A0382022-01-13013 January 2022 Issuance of Amendments to Revise Reactor Coolant Leakage Requirements JAFP-21-0089, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-541 Revision 2, Add Exceptions to Surveillance Requirements for Valves and Dampers Locked in the Actuated Position2021-09-27027 September 2021 Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-541 Revision 2, Add Exceptions to Surveillance Requirements for Valves and Dampers Locked in the Actuated Position ML21131A1272021-08-0909 August 2021 Issuance of Amendment No. 343 Modifications to Technical Specification 3.6.1.3, Primary Containment Isolation Valves (Pcivs) ML21166A3662021-06-17017 June 2021 Correction to Amendment No. 342 Issued June 14, 2021, One Time Extension to Technical Specifications 3.5.1, 3.6.1.9, and 3.6.4.1 Completion Times to Support Residual Heat Removal Pump Motor Replacement (Emergency Circumstances) ML21162A0422021-06-14014 June 2021 Issuance of Amendment No. 342, One Time Extension of Completion Times to Support Residual Heat Removal Pump Motor Replacement (Emergency Circumstances) ML21033A5302021-04-0101 April 2021 Issuance of Amendments to Adopt Technical Specifications Task Force TSTF-566, Revise Actions for Inoperable RHR Shutdown Cooling Subsystems ML20140A0702020-07-21021 July 2020 Issuance of Amendment No. 338 Application of Alternative Source Term for Calculating Loss-of-Coolant Accident Dose Consequences ML20094G9032020-06-0202 June 2020 Issuance of Amendment No. 335 Adoption of TSTF-372, Addition of LCO 3.0.8, 'Inoperability of Snubbers' RS-20-016, County, Nine Mile Point, Peach Bottom Atomic and Quad Cities - Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-566, Revise Actions for Inoperable RHR Shutdown Cooling Systems2020-04-13013 April 2020 County, Nine Mile Point, Peach Bottom Atomic and Quad Cities - Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-566, Revise Actions for Inoperable RHR Shutdown Cooling Systems ML20024C6612020-03-0202 March 2020 Issuance of Amendment No. 332 Adopt TSTF-568, Revision 2, Revise Applicability of BWR/4 TS 3.6.2.5 and TS 3.6.3.2, Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process ML19301C5552019-10-28028 October 2019 Technical Specification Bases B.3.3.5.2 and B3.3.6.1 Provided by Licensee to Support a 10/28/2019 Public Meeting to Discuss Draft Response to Request for Supplemental Information to Revise Allowable Value for RWCU System Primary Containment ML19277D5522019-10-0404 October 2019 Draft James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant - Emergency License Amendment Request - One Time Extension to the TS 3.8.1 Action A.3 Completion Time for an Inoperable Offsite Source ML19175A0422019-09-11011 September 2019 Arkansas Units 1 and 2; Grand Gulf, Unit 1; Indian Point 2 and 3; Palisades; River Bend, Unit 1; Waterford Unit 3 - Issuance of Amendments to Adopt TSTF-529, Clarify Use and Application Rules ML18214A7062018-09-19019 September 2018 Issuance of Amendment No. 322, Revise Technical Specification 2.1.1, Reactor Core Sls, to Change Cycle 24 Safety Limit Minimum Critical Power Ratio Numeric Values RS-18-020, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Modify the APRM Channel Adjustment Surveillance Requirement2018-06-15015 June 2018 Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Modify the APRM Channel Adjustment Surveillance Requirement JAFP-16-0142, Revision to Technical Specification (TS) Administrative Controls for Staffing and Training Upon Permanent Cessation of Operation (CAC No. MF7280) - Supplement 22016-09-19019 September 2016 Revision to Technical Specification (TS) Administrative Controls for Staffing and Training Upon Permanent Cessation of Operation (CAC No. MF7280) - Supplement 2 JAFP-16-0077, Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding Revision to Technical Specification (TS) Administrative Controls for Staffing and Training Upon Permanent Cessation of Operation (CAC No. MF7280) - Supplement 12016-06-0303 June 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding Revision to Technical Specification (TS) Administrative Controls for Staffing and Training Upon Permanent Cessation of Operation (CAC No. MF7280) - Supplement 1 ML16062A3882016-04-0606 April 2016 Issuance of Amendment No. 311 Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule ML15014A2772015-02-0909 February 2015 Issuance of Amendment Application to Revise Technical Specifications for Technical Specification Low Pressure Safety Limit ML14202A3722014-12-0101 December 2014 Issuance of Amendment 308 License Amendment Request - Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule Milestone 8 ML14086A1522014-07-16016 July 2014 Issuance of Amendment Change to Renewed Facility Operating License Condition 2.T JAFP-14-0047, Proposed Change to Technical Specification Concerning the Safety Limit Minimum Critical Power Ratio2014-05-0101 May 2014 Proposed Change to Technical Specification Concerning the Safety Limit Minimum Critical Power Ratio ML14085A4462014-04-14014 April 2014 Issuance of Amendment Revision to the Definition of Shut Down Margin, by Adopting the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Approved Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Standard Technical Specification (STS) CNRO-2012-00009, Entergy Responses to Request for Additional Information Regarding Changes to the Quality Assurance Program Manual & Associated Plant Technical Specifications Re Staff Qualifications2012-11-20020 November 2012 Entergy Responses to Request for Additional Information Regarding Changes to the Quality Assurance Program Manual & Associated Plant Technical Specifications Re Staff Qualifications ML1134308512012-02-14014 February 2012 License Amendment, Issuance of Amendment Risk-Informed Justification for the Relocation of Specific Surveillance Frequency Requirements to a Licensee Controlled Program JAFP-11-0046, 2011 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Technical Specification Bases and Technical Requirements Manual Changes Transmittal2011-04-0606 April 2011 2011 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Technical Specification Bases and Technical Requirements Manual Changes Transmittal ML1024604012010-09-27027 September 2010 ME3786, Letter - Issuance of Amendment to Renewed FOL SLMCPR JAFP-09-0132, Application for Amendment to Modify the Technical Specifications Requirements for Testing of Safety/Relief Valves2009-11-23023 November 2009 Application for Amendment to Modify the Technical Specifications Requirements for Testing of Safety/Relief Valves JAFP-09-0131, Application for Amendment to Modify Technical Specifications Section 5.5.7, Inservice Testing Program, to Reference the Current Code of Record2009-11-23023 November 2009 Application for Amendment to Modify Technical Specifications Section 5.5.7, Inservice Testing Program, to Reference the Current Code of Record JAFP-09-0070, Emergency License Amendment Request Application for Technical Specification 3.8.1 Required Action B.4 Completion Time2009-06-0404 June 2009 Emergency License Amendment Request Application for Technical Specification 3.8.1 Required Action B.4 Completion Time ML0915507232009-06-0303 June 2009 Emergency License Amendment Request Application for Technical Specification 3.8.1 Required Action B.4 Completion Time - (Draft) ML0828203902008-10-0303 October 2008 Technical Specification Relocation of Pressure and Temperature Curves to the Pressure and Temperature Limits Report Consistent with TSTF-419-A ML0810102422008-09-0808 September 2008 Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-59 / Appendix a - Technical Specifications JAFP-08-0034, Application for Amendment to Technical Specifications Regarding Relocation of Pressure and Temperature (P-T) Curves to the Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR) Consistent with TSTF-419-A2008-04-22022 April 2008 Application for Amendment to Technical Specifications Regarding Relocation of Pressure and Temperature (P-T) Curves to the Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (PTLR) Consistent with TSTF-419-A JAFP-08-0006, Application for Amendment to Technical Specifications Regarding Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air Consistent with TSTF-501 and Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program Consistent with TSTF-3742008-01-22022 January 2008 Application for Amendment to Technical Specifications Regarding Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air Consistent with TSTF-501 and Diesel Fuel Oil Testing Program Consistent with TSTF-374 ML0800804572008-01-0303 January 2008 Technical Specifications, Issuance of Amendment Technical Specifications Regarding Control Room Envelope Habitability, Consistent with Technical Specification Task Force-448 JAFP-07-0124, Revision to Application for Technical Specifications (TS) Change Based on TSTF-477, Add Action Statement for Two Inoperable Control Room Air Conditioning Subsystems, Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CLIIP)2007-11-0101 November 2007 Revision to Application for Technical Specifications (TS) Change Based on TSTF-477, Add Action Statement for Two Inoperable Control Room Air Conditioning Subsystems, Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CLIIP) JAFP-07-0098, Supplement to Application for Amendment to Technical Specifications Regarding Control Room Envelope Habitability, Consistent with TSTF-448 Revision 32007-08-13013 August 2007 Supplement to Application for Amendment to Technical Specifications Regarding Control Room Envelope Habitability, Consistent with TSTF-448 Revision 3 JAFP-07-0088, James A. FitzPatrick, Application for Amendment to Technical Specifications Regarding Control Room Envelope Habitability, Consistent with TSTF-448 Revision 32007-07-17017 July 2007 James A. FitzPatrick, Application for Amendment to Technical Specifications Regarding Control Room Envelope Habitability, Consistent with TSTF-448 Revision 3 ML0717601272007-06-21021 June 2007 Technical Specifications (Ts), Revised TS 3.10.1, Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation, Consistent with Technical Specification Task Force-484 ML0714303022007-05-17017 May 2007 Technical Specifications, Allow Additional Startup and Operating Flexibility and an Expanded Operating Domain JAFP-07-0023, Application for Amendment to Technical Specifications 3.10.1. Re Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation, Consistent with TSTF-4842007-02-15015 February 2007 Application for Amendment to Technical Specifications 3.10.1. Re Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation, Consistent with TSTF-484 ML0625802332006-09-14014 September 2006 Tech Spec Pages for Amendment 286 Technical Specifications on DC Electrical System Requirements 2023-04-05
[Table view] |
Text
200 Exelon Way Kennett Square, PA 19348 www.constellation.com 10 CFR 50.90 JAFP-22-0032 June 16, 2022 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-59 NRC Docket No. 50-333
Subject:
Response to Request for Additional Information for James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b. and 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed categorization and treatment of structures, systems and components for nuclear power reactors.
References:
- 1. Letter from D. Gudger (Exelon Generation Company, LLC) to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk-Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times
- RITSTF Initiative 4b, dated July 30, 2021 (ML21211A053)
- 2. Letter from D. Gudger (Exelon Generation Company, LLC) to U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Application to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed categorization and treatment of structure, systems and components for nuclear power reactors, dated July 30, 2021 (ML21211A078)
- 3. Letter from J. Poole (Senior Project Manager, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission) James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant - Audit Plan in Support of Review of License Amendment Request Regarding TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4B and 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors (EPID L-2021-LLA-0143 and EPID L-2021-LLA-0142) dated October 22, 2021 (ML21285A149)
By letters dated July 30, 2021 (References 1 and 2), Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon) requested to change the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF) Technical Specification (TS). The proposed amendments would modify TS requirements to permit the use of Risk Informed Completion Times in accordance with TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b, (ADAMS Accession No. ML21211A053) and modify the licensing basis in accordance with the application to adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed categorization and treatment of structures, systems and components for nuclear power reactors.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission RAI Response to Adopt TSTF-505 and 50.69 Docket No. 50-333 June 16, 2022 Page 2 By email dated May 4, 2022 (Reference 3), the NRC provided Requests for Additional Information (RAI) to support their continued review of References 1 and 2. Attachment 1 to this letter provides a response to the RAIs. Attachment 2 to this letter provides the revised TS markups to address the RAIs. The information provided in Attachment 2 to this letter supersedes the information provided in Attachments 2 and 3 of Reference 1 for TS page 3.8.7-1 and the associated Basis pages and inserts. All other information in Attachments 2 and 3 of Reference 1 remains unchanged.
Constellation Energy Generation, LLC (CEG) has reviewed the information supporting a finding of no significant hazards consideration and the environmental consideration provided to the NRC in Reference 1 and 2. The supplemental information provided in this letter does not affect the bases for concluding that the proposed license amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration. Furthermore, the supplemental information provided in this letter does not affect the bases for concluding that neither an environmental impact statements nor an environmental assessment needs to be prepared in connection with the proposed amendments.
There are no commitments contained in this response.
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, "Notice for public comment; State consultation,"
paragraph (b), EGC is notifying the State of New York of this application for license amendment by transmitting a copy of this letter and its attachments to the designated State Official.
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact Jessie Hodge at (610) 765-5532.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the 16th day of June 2022.
Respectfully, David T. Gudger Senior Manager - Licensing Constellation Energy Generation, LLC Attachments: 1. Response to Request for Additional Information
- 2. Revised Technical Specification and Technical Specification Basis Marked-Up Pages cc: USNRC Region I, Regional Administrator w/ attachments USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, FitzPatrick "
USNRC Project Manager, FitzPatrick "
A. L. Peterson, NYSERDA "
ATTACHMENT 1 License Amendment Request James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-333 Response to Request for Additional Information
RAI Response for Attachment 1 License Amendment Request to Adopt Page 1 of 19 Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505 and 10 CFR 50.69 Docket No. 50-333 APLA RAI 01 - Open Phase Condition Section C.1.4 of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.200 states the base (e.g., Model of Record)
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is to represent the as-built, as-operated plant to the extent needed to support the application. Furthermore, the licensee is to have a process that identifies updated plant information that necessitate changes to the base PRA model.
From the revised voluntary initiative1 and resulting industry guidance in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 19-022 on estimating Open Phase Condition (OPC) and Open Phase Isolation System (OPIS) risk, it is understood that the risk impact of an OPC can vary widely dependent on electrical switchyard configuration and design. In light of these observations, provide the following information:
a) Discuss FitzPatricks evaluation of the risk impact associated with OPC events including the likelihood of OPC initiating plant trips and the impact of those trips on PRA-modeled structures, systems, and components (SSCs). Also, explain whether an OPIS has been installed at FitzPatrick and if it has been installed, then discuss its functionality and any operator actions needed to operate the system or needed in response to the system.
b) Clarify whether any installed OPIS equipment and associated operator actions are credited in the PRAs that support this application. If OPIS equipment and associated operator actions are credited, then provide the following information:
- i. Describe the OPIS equipment and associated actions that are credited in the PRA models.
ii. Describe the impact that this treatment, if any, has on key assumptions and sources of uncertainty for the categorization process.
iii. Discuss human reliability analysis methods and assumptions used for crediting OPIS alarm manual response.
iv. Discuss how OPC related scenarios are modelled for non-internal event scenarios such as fire, seismic, flooding, high winds, tornado, and other external events.
- v. Regarding inadvertent OPIS actuation:
- a. Explain whether scenarios regarding inadvertent actuation of the OPIS, if applicable, are included in the Real Time Risk (RTR) model that supports the risk-informed completion time (RICT) calculations.
1 Doug True to Ho Nieh, Ltr re: Industry Initiative on Open Phase Condition, Revision 3, dated June 6, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19163A176).
2 Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 19-02, Guidance for Assessing Open Phase Condition Implementation Using Risk Insights, Revision 0, April 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19122A321).
RAI Response for Attachment 1 License Amendment Request to Adopt Page 2 of 19 Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505 and 10 CFR 50.69 Docket No. 50-333
- b. If inadvertent OPIS actuation scenarios are not included in the RTR model, then provide justification with basis that confirms the exclusion of this inadvertent actuation has no adverse impact to the RICT program.
c) If OPC and OPIS are not included in the application PRA models (whether OPIS equipment is installed or not), provide justification with basis that confirms the exclusion of this failure mode and mitigating system has no adverse impact to the RICT program.
d) As an alternative to part (c), propose a mechanism to ensure that OPC-related scenarios are incorporated into the application PRA models prior to implementing the RICT program.
RAI Response for APLA RAI 01 - Open Phase Condition Response part 1a:
JAF performed a risk evaluation (JF-MISC-012) to support the NEI Voluntary Industry Initiative response to the NRC bulletin 2012-01 regarding the potential impact of an open phase condition. JAF installed open phase detection (OPD, sometimes called Open Phase Isolation System, or OPIS) in accordance with the voluntary industry initiative.
The purpose of the OPD is to detect the presence of an OPC and actuate an automatic trip of the affected circuit and/or actuate an alarm in the main control room. The purpose of the risk evaluation was to evaluate the difference in risk between two different alternatives of using the OPD; enabling the automatic trip function associated with the open phase detection, or rely on the alarm function to cue an operator response to remove the open phase condition from affecting the plants class 1e emergency power distribution.
In the risk evaluation, the potential for a plant trip due to OPC in the offsite power (115kV) system was assessed. In normal configuration, an OPC in the 115kV system will not result in an automatic or immediate manual plant trip, because the class 1e emergency buses are not normally energized by the 115kV power system during normal operations. The 115kV system normally supplies the class 1e emergency buses after plant trip and transfer of those buses to the Reserve Station Service Transformers (RSSTs). An OPC may result in a manual shutdown if the offsite power circuit is declared inoperable and operability is not restored within the technical specification limited condition for operation time limit.
The OPD monitors for the presence of an OPC affecting the input to the RSSTs. The OPD requires a minimum load on the RSST in order to function and during normal operations, the OPD is not enabled due to the low RSST load condition. If a plant trip occurs and the emergency bus loads transfer to the RSSTs with an OPC present, the OPD would activate an alarm in the main control room; operators are to respond to the alarm by removing the RSST supply to the emergency bus and allowing the emergency diesel generators to start and supply the bus.
RAI Response for Attachment 1 License Amendment Request to Adopt Page 3 of 19 Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505 and 10 CFR 50.69 Docket No. 50-333 Response part 1b:
The installed OPD (OPIS) and associated operator actions are not credited in the PRAs that support this application.
Response part 1c:
The exclusion of the failure mode and system has no adverse impact to the RICT program because the original OPC evaluation is conservative and the potential impact to the RICTs using this conservative model is small.
The OPC risk evaluation was used to perform a set of select RICT sample calculations.
Both the full power internal events (FPIE) and fire PRA models were used to quantify the sample calculations. The OPC model was revised to support the quantification of CDF and LERF estimates and refined to represent a more realistic risk contribution relative to the original NEI 19-02 evaluation. Changes to the OPC risk evaluation include:
- 1) Addition of modeling for the DC power supply supporting the OPD. This supply was not required to generate the NEI 19-02 calculation of difference in risk between the automatic trip function and alarm cued operator response for the NEI voluntary industry initiative because failure of the supply would fail both the automatic trip and alarm functions. However, the modeling is needed to reflect the total risk contribution and to facilitate quantification of the fire-induced failure of the OPD for the fire PRA portion of the RICT sample calculations.
- 2) Revision of the OPC probability to add credit for detection of an OPC via operator check of 115 kV phase currents (performed approximately once per every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />) and surveillance of 115kV phase currents (performed weekly). This reduces the probability an OPC is present in the 115kV system after a plant trip and transfer of emergency buses to the RSSTs.
- 3) Addition of the RICT sample calculations and comparison to the original sample calculations and discussion of the results.
An OPC can prevent plant SSCs from starting when demanded because the OPC can prevent automatic transfer of the emergency bus to an alternate power supply if the OPC prevents the plant undervoltage relay logic from being satisfied (failure of one phase does not satisfy logic that requires two or more phase voltages to be low to generate the undervoltage signal). Thus, AC power-related technical specification sample calculations were quantified. Including the OPC and OPD in the PRA model would also increase the total CDF and LERF estimates in the PRA. LERF could be disproportionately impacted in technical specification RICT cases associated with inoperability of containment air locks and containment penetrations. These sample calculations were also quantified. The results of the sample calculations show the OPC has only a small impact on the RICTs. Table 1 shows the OPC sample calculation RICTs compared to the original sample calculation RICTs.
RAI Response for Attachment 1 License Amendment Request to Adopt Page 4 of 19 Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505 and 10 CFR 50.69 Docket No. 50-333 Table 1: Potential Impact to RICTs Technical LCO Condition Original 2017A with %Change Specification 2017A RICT OPC RICT in in RICT in Days days 3.6.1.2.C One or more primary containment air locks 28 (28.81) 27 (26.52) -7.95%
inoperable for reasons other than Condition A or B.
3.6.1.3.A One or more penetration flow paths with one 28 (27.73) 26 (25.60) -7.68%
PCIV inoperable for reasons other than conditions D and E.
3.6.1.3.C One or more penetration flow paths with one 28 (27.73) 26 (25.61) -7.65 PCIV inoperable for reasons other than conditions D and E.
3.6.1.3.E One or more penetration flow paths with 29 (28.81) 27 (26.52) -7.95 LPCI system or CS system testable check valve leakage limit not met 3.8.1.A One required offsite circuit inoperable. 30 (169.73) 30 (166.37) 0.0 3.8.1.B One required EDG subsystem inoperable. 30 (248.99) 30 (239.47) 0.0 3.8.1.C Two required offsite circuits inoperable. 20 (19.74) 20 (19.60) -0.7 3.8.1.D One required offsite circuit inoperable AND 30 (54.07) 30 (52.03) 0.0 One required DG inoperable.
3.8.1.E Two EDG subsystems inoperable. 18 (17.74) 18 (17.55) -1.1 There is potentially small impact (2 days) to the LERF-specific containment airlock and penetration RICTs that are close to the 30-day back stop, and a small impact (<1 day) to two AC power related RICTs. Although there is a potential small impact to the RICTs, these estimates are conservative for the following reasons:
- 1. The OPC is assumed to cause failure of normally running or expected to start three-phase motor loads supplied by the emergency bus during the time the operator diagnoses the presence of the OPC in response to the OPC alarm. The motors may only trip and may be able to re-start. Credit for re-start of tripped motor loads should decrease the risk estimates and increase the RICT estimates.
- 2. Alarms and status lights associated with three phase motor loads that trip or fail to start are expected to aid in diagnoses of the open phase condition. However, the model assumes the operator will fail to diagnose the OPC if the OPD alarm is failed or unavailable. Credit for operator action with the OPD failed or out of service should decrease the risk estimates and increase the RICT estimates.
- 3. The connections between disconnect switches 10015 and 10025 and associated RSST T2 and T3 are walked-by during operator rounds, inspected during a thirty day transformer yard walkdown, and during thermography performed approximately every six months. These inspections are not performed strictly for the purpose of detecting an OPC, but are expected to provide some chance of detecting an OPC.
Credit for detection of the OPC via alternate means should reduce the risk estimates and increase the RICT estimates.
Therefore, with little impact to the sample RICTs and consideration of the conservative nature of the OPC model, including OPC in the PRA model would result in little impact to the RICT estimates and OPC does not need to be modeled in the JAF RICT application PRA model.
RAI Response for Attachment 1 License Amendment Request to Adopt Page 5 of 19 Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505 and 10 CFR 50.69 Docket No. 50-333 APLA RAI 02 - PRA Model for TS LCO 3.3.7.2.A NEI TR 06-09-A (ADAMS Accession No. ML122860402) specifies that where the SSC is not modeled in the PRA, and its impact cannot otherwise be quantified using conservative or bounding approaches, the Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) are not applicable, and the existing front-stop completion time (CT) would apply. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) safety evaluation to NEI TR 06-09-A (ADAMS Accession No. ML18267A259) further specifies under Limitations and Conditions number 9 that the LAR should confirm that the CRMP [configuration risk management program] tools can be readily applied for each TS LCO [Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation] within the scope of the plant-specific RMTS submittal. Furthermore, Section 2.3, Item 11 of TSTF-505, Rev. 2 states in part, [t]he traveler will not modify Required Actions for systems that do not affect core damage frequency (CDF) or large early release frequency (LERF) or for which a RICT cannot be quantitatively determined.
- a. For TS 3.3.7.2.A in response to APLA Audit Question 08.e the licensee provides in supplement dated March 4, 2022 (ADAMS Accession No. ML22063A135) for calculating a RICT for TS LCO 3.3.7.2.A, the PRA model will either 1) not include credit for fission product scrubbing by the condenser, or 2) will credit fission product scrubbing by, if justified, creating a condenser scrubbing model to be used for stuck open MSIV scenarios. This implies that a RICT for this equipment out of service (OOS) configuration can be calculated regardless of whether a condenser scrubbing model is available, which is contrary to the comment in LAR Table E1-1 for this LCO that the SSCs are not modeled. The supplement further states that [r]elated to the mechanical vacuum pump isolation function in RICT calculations, if failed or unavailable, this would likely be assumed to fail any credit taken for condenser pathway scrubbing. The implication of this statement is that the condenser scrubbing model would likely not be credited when calculating a RICT for this LCO. The NRC staff is unable to make a determination that the scope of the PRA model and RTR tool are appropriate for the RICT application. Address the following:
- 1. Identify and describe what SSCs modeled in the PRAs are being used as the surrogate for the condenser air removal pump isolation instrumentation and confirm that their failure rate is bounding with respect to the failure rate for the instrumentation.
- 2. Confirm that a RICT can be calculated using the current PRA models without the new condenser scrubbing model consistent with the excerpts provided above from NEI TR 06-09-A and provide an estimate of the RICT for TS LCO 3.3.7.2.A assuming no credit for condenser scrubbing.
- 3. Explain what the purpose is for the condenser scrubbing model proposed with respect to calculating a RICT for TS LCO 3.3.7.2. A.
- 4. Alternatively, remove TS LCO 3.3.7.2.A from the scope of the RICT program.
RAI Response for Attachment 1 License Amendment Request to Adopt Page 6 of 19 Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505 and 10 CFR 50.69 Docket No. 50-333
- b. For TS 3.6.1.6.C in Attachment 6 of the license amendment request the licensee provides an implementation item to update the PRA models to include SSCs prior to exercising the RICT program for this TS.
- 1. Identify and describe what SSCs are presently modeled in the PRA, and the surrogate if applicable, used to assess the failure of the function for TS 3.6.1.6.C.
- 2. Confirm that a RICT can be determined using the current PRA models consistent with the excerpt provided above from NEI 06-09-A and provide an estimate of the RICT for the TS LCO 3.6.1.6.C.
- 3. Alternatively, remove TS LCO 3.6.1.6.C from the scope of the RICT program.
RAI Response for APLA RAI 02.a - PRA Model for TS LCO 3.3.7.2.A Response part a.1:
The current JAF PRA models do not have an adequate surrogate to represent the risk significance of the condenser air removal isolation function.
Response part a.2:
Because the current JAF PRA models do not have an adequate surrogate to represent the risk significance of the condenser air removal isolation function a RICT evaluation cannot be performed without model modification.
Response part a.3:
The condenser scrubbing model was envisioned as a model addition which would provide a surrogate for RICT evaluation of the condenser air removal isolation function. Due to uncertainties associated with crediting the condenser for a severe accident capability which it was not designed for and the level of effort to account for these uncertainties, the development of a condenser scrubbing model has been postponed. Therefore, without an adequate surrogate in existing or updated models, JAF is not planning on performing RICT evaluation of the condenser air removal isolation function.
Response part a.4:
Because the development of a condenser scrubbing model has been postponed, the condenser air removal isolation function (TS LCO 3.3.7.2.A) will be removed from the RICT program.
Response part b.1:
The Technical Specification 3.6.1.6.C condition is One line with one or more reactor building to suppression chamber vacuum breakers inoperable for opening.
RAI Response for Attachment 1 License Amendment Request to Adopt Page 7 of 19 Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505 and 10 CFR 50.69 Docket No. 50-333 The Failure to Open function of Reactor Building to Torus Vacuum Breakers was previously not modeled because this failure mode was screened based on low importance using expert judgement. For the RICT program, it is desired to model this failure mode of these components because the Failure to Open function is included as a specific technical specification.
The Fail to Open Function of the Torus to Reactor Building vacuum breakers has been added to an Application Specific PRA model (Ref. APLA-RAI-2-1) and this modeling is representative of what will be used in the configuration risk management tool. This Application Specific Model (ASM) was developed from the existing model of record (MOR).
The Reactor Building to Torus Vacuum Breakers are designed to normally remain closed and the spurious open failure mode had been included in the MOR PRA as a contributor to Torus vapor suppression bypass.
The Vacuum breakers are also designed to open to prevent dangerously low containment pressure. The Failure to Open on Demand function had not been previously included in the MOR so it has been explicitly added to the ASM. The Open on Demand function of the Reactor Building to Torus Vacuum Breakers is designed to respond to negative primary containment pressure and equilibrate pressure to avoid containment implosion. Such conditions could occur following a LOCA in the drywell followed by prolonged operation of Drywell Spray. Prolonged operation of Drywell Spray could reduce pressure below atmospheric if the 2.7 psig trip of Containment Spray fails AND operators fail to manually control Drywell Spray per step D.4.14 of OP-13B (Reference APLA-RAI-2-2).
Vacuum breaker isolation valves 27AOV-101A and 27AOV-101B must open to allow vacuum relief and remain closed to isolate primary containment. The normally closed, fail closed position of the vacuum breaker isolation valves, along with the vacuum breaker check valves (27VB-6 and 27VB-7) provide the protection for primary containment. Supplying the isolation valves with a safety-related pneumatic supply (N2) through 27SOV-101A and 27SOV-101B provides the capability to maintain primary containment integrity for either high or low containment pressure. The power supplies for 27AOV101A, B; 27SOV101A, B are 71ACA2 and 71ACB2. These are ultimately supplied by EDG-backed buses 10500 and 10600, respectively.
Figure APLA-RAI-2-1 shows the configuration of the vacuum breakers. Figure APLA-RAI-2-2 shows the relevant portion of the Nitrogen system and Figure APLA-RAI-2-3 shows the relevant power supply circuits.
RAI Response for Attachment 1 License Amendment Request to Adopt Page 8 of 19 Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505 and 10 CFR 50.69 Docket No. 50-333 Figure APLA-RAI-2-1 Reactor Building to Torus Vacuum Breakers (FM-18B, Rev 045)
RAI Response for Attachment 1 License Amendment Request to Adopt Page 9 of 19 Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505 and 10 CFR 50.69 Docket No. 50-333 Figure APLA-RAI-2 Nitrogen Supply (FM-18A, Rev. 057)
RAI Response for Attachment 1 License Amendment Request to Adopt Page 10 of 19 Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505 and 10 CFR 50.69 Docket No. 50-333 Figure APLA-RAI-2 Power Supply 71ACA2, 71ACB2 (ESK-7AG, Rev. 020)
RAI Response for Attachment 1 License Amendment Request to Adopt Page 11 of 19 Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505 and 10 CFR 50.69 Docket No. 50-333 Figures APLA-RAI-2-4 through APLA-RAI-2-7 provide the fault tree logic added to represent the Reactor Building to Torus Vacuum Breakers. Note that gate GVSS-RB-TORUS represents the new logic and that common-cause failure groups (e.g., QVSSVBROOA), where applicable, are listed below the basic event probabilities in the fault tree figures.
RAI Response for Attachment 1 License Amendment Request to Adopt Page 12 of 19 Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505 and 10 CFR 50.69 Docket No. 50-333 Figure APLA-RAI-2-4 Reactor Building to Torus Vacuum Breaker Logic (Page 1 of 4)
RAI Response for Attachment 1 License Amendment Request to Adopt Page 13 of 19 Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505 and 10 CFR 50.69 Docket No. 50-333 Figure APLA-RAI-2-5 Reactor Building to Torus Vacuum Breaker Logic (Page 2 of 4)
RAI Response for Attachment 1 License Amendment Request to Adopt Page 14 of 19 Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505 and 10 CFR 50.69 Docket No. 50-333 Figure APLA-RAI-2-6 Reactor Building to Torus Vacuum Breaker Logic (Page 3 of 4)
RAI Response for Attachment 1 License Amendment Request to Adopt Page 15 of 19 Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505 and 10 CFR 50.69 Docket No. 50-333 Figure APLA-RAI-2-7 Reactor Building to Torus Vacuum Breaker Logic (Page 4 of 4)
RAI Response for Attachment 1 License Amendment Request to Adopt Page 16 of 19 Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505 and 10 CFR 50.69 Docket No. 50-333 Response b.2:
To determine the impact of the modifications made to the PRA model, the previous results are compared to the new ASM results. A comparison of the results can be seen below in Table Error!
NO TEXT OF SPECIFIED STYLE IN DOCUMENT.-1. The truncation limit is 1E-12 for the FPIE CDF and LERF models.
TABLE ERROR! NO TEXT OF SPECIFIED STYLE IN DOCUMENT.-1 ASM CDF/ENDSTATE COMPARISON CDF /
RESULT CUTSETS RESULT CUTSETS ENDSTATE JF2017A JF2017A1 CDF 3.21E-06 43,052 3.21E-06 43,073 LERF 5.66E-07 7,828 5.68E-07 7,870
- The modifications were made to the FPRA as a sensitivity case. The modifications resulted in no change in base fire risk and no delta CDF/LERF for fire risk. The no change in fire risk is because fire events do not results in pipe break LOCAs in containment. Fire induced LOCAs from spurious operations are negligible to the fire risk.
Supplemental Information for Attachment 1 License Amendment Request to Adopt Page 17 of 19 Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505 and 10 CFR 50.69 Docket No. 50-333 RICT estimates are performed with a zero-maintenance model. Results are provided below for T.S. 3.6.1.6.C.
TOTAL TOTAL FIRE CDF LERF T.S. Description IE CDF FIRE CDF DELTA IE LERF DELTA MIN RICT LERF RICT RICT CDF LERF One line with one or more reactor building to suppression chamber vacuum breakers inoperable for 3.6.1.6.C opening. 2.60E-06 1.73E-05 2.50E-06 5.35E-07 3.40E-06 1.00E-06 1459.28 364.56 30.00 RICT estimates were also performed for a subset of the applicable Technical Specifications to ensure that Torus to Reactor Building Vacuum Breaker modeling did not have a broader impact upon the PRA results. Estimates can be seen below and none of the selected cases resulted in different RICT values.
TOTAL TOTAL CDF LERF MIN JF117A T.S. Description IE CDF FIRE CDF DELTA IE LERF FIRE LERF DELTA RICT RICT RICT Estimates CDF LERF ECCS Instrumentation:
As required by Required Action A.1 and referenced in table 3.3.5.1-1 1.c, 1.d, 2.c, 2.d, 2.f, 3.c 3.3.5.1.C (Low RX Pressure) 1.55E-04 1.79E-05 1.56E-04 2.68E-06 3.86E-06 3.66E-06 23.36 99.65 23.36 23.36 AC Sources:
One required EDG subsystem 3.8.1.B inoperable. 2.83E-06 1.81E-05 3.98E-06 5.74E-07 3.58E-06 1.28E-06 913.96 285.07 30.00 30.00 AC Sources:
Two EDG subsystems 3.8.1.E inoperable. 9.26E-06 1.01E-04 9.37E-05 1.37E-06 2.13E-05 1.98E-05 38.95 18.43 18.43 18.43 References APLA-RAI-2-1. JF-ASM-008, Application Specific Model, 06/2022 APLA-RAI-2-2. JAF Procedure OP-13B, RHR-Containment Control, Revision 16.
Supplemental Information for Attachment 1 License Amendment Request to Adopt Page 19 of 19 Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505 and 10 CFR 50.69 Docket No. 50-333 EEEB RAI 01 - TS 3.8.7.A TSTF 505 requires licensees to identify technical specifications being considered for RICTs that may have a potential loss of function to apply a note that specifically states that the RICT does not apply for loss of function. The NRC staff identified TS 3.8.7.A as having a potential loss of function, requests use of RICT, but does not include the required note in the TS markup in Attachment 2 of the LAR.
Provide a revised marked up of TS 3.8.7.A which includes the appropriate note for loss of function.
RAI Response for EEEB RAI 01 - TS 3.8.7.A EEEB RAI 01 - A revised marked up of TS 3.8.7.A and associated bases has been provided to include the appropriate note for loss of function.
ATTACHMENT 2 License Amendment Request James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-333 Revised Technical Specification and Technical Specification Basis Marked-Up Pages
Distribution Systems - Operating 3.8.7 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.7 Distribution Systems - Operating LCO 3.8.7 The Division 1 and Division 2 AC and 125 VDC electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more AC A.1 Restore AC electrical 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> electrical power power distribution distribution subsystems to subsystems OPERABLE status.
inoperable B. One 125 VDC B.1 Restore 125 VDC 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> electrical power electrical power distribution distribution subsystem subsystems to OPERABLE inoperable. status.
C. Required Action C.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and associated Completion Time AND of Condition A or B not met. C.1 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> (continued)
OR
NOTE----------
Not applicable when loss of function can occur.
JAFNPP 3.8.7-1 In accordance with Amendment 329 the Risk Informed Completion Time Program
Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.7 BASES (continued)
ACTIONS A.1 With one or more required AC electrical power distribution subsystems inoperable and a loss of function has not occurred. the remaining AC electrical power distribution subsystems are capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the reactor and Alternatively, a maintain it in a safe shutdown condition. assuming no single failure.
Completion Time can The overall reliability is reduced. however. because a single failure in be determined in the remaining power distribution subsystems could result in the accordance with the minimum required engineered safeguards functions not being Risk Informed supported. Therefore, the required AC electrical power distribution Completion Time subsystems must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
(RICT) Program. A Note has been provided to The Condition A worst scenario is one division without AC power (i.e.,
indicate that a RICT is no reserve or normal power to the division and the associated EDG not applicable when a subsystem inoperable). In this Condition, the plant is more vulnerable loss of safety function to a complete loss of AC power. It is, therefore, imperative that the has occurred. plant operators' attention be focused on minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining division by stabilizing the plant. and on restoring power to the affected division. The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> time limit before requiring a plant shutdown in this Condition is acceptable because of:
- a. The potential for decreased safety if the plant operators' attention is diverted from the evaluations and actions necessary to restore power to the affected division to the actions associated with taking the plant to shutdown within this time limit.
- b. The low potential for an event in conjunction with a single failure of a redundant component in the division with AC power. (The redundant component is verified OPERABLE in accordance with Specification 5.5.12, "Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP).")
This Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." This results in establishing the "time zero" at the time this LCO was initially not met, instead of at the time Condition A was entered. The 16 hour1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is an acceptable limitation on this potential to fail to meet the LCO indefinitely.
(continued)
JAFNPP B 3.8.7-4 Revision 42
Distribution Systems - Operating B 3.8.7 BASES ACTIONS B.1 (continued) With one 125 VDC electrical power distribution subsystems inoperable, the remaining 125 VDC electrical power distribution subsystem is capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, assuming no single failure. The overall reliability Alternatively, a is reduced, however, because a single failure in the remaining 125 Completion Time can VDC electrical power distribution subsystem could result in the be determined in minimum required engineered safeguards functions not being accordance with the supported. Therefore, the required 125 VDC electrical power Risk Informed distribution subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within Completion Time 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> by powering the bus from the associated battery or charger.
(RICT) Program. A Note has been provided to Condition B represents one division without adequate 125 VDC indicate that a RICT is power, potentially with both a battery significantly degraded and the not applicable when a associated charger nonfunctioning. In this situation the plant is loss of safety function significantly more vulnerable to a complete loss of all 125 VDC power.
has occurred. It is, therefore, imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the plant, minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining divisions, and restoring power to the affected division.
This 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> limit is more conservative than Completion Times allowed for the majority of components that would be without power. Taking exception to LCO 3.0.2 for components without adequate 125 VDC power, which would have Required Action Completion Times shorter than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, is acceptable because of:
- a. The potential for decreased safety when requiring a change in plant conditions (i.e., requiring a shutdown) while not allowing stable operations to continue;
- b. The potential for decreased safety when requiring entry into numerous applicable Conditions and Required Actions for components without 125 VDC power, while not providing sufficient time for the operators to perform the necessary evaluations and actions for restoring power to the affected division;
- c. The potential for an event in conjunction with a single failure of a redundant component.
(continued)
JAFNPP B 3.8.7-5 Revision 42