Malfunction of Borg-Warner Pressure Seal Bonnet Check Valves Caused by Vertical Misalignment of DiskML031180730 |
Person / Time |
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Site: |
Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
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Issue date: |
08/31/1989 |
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From: |
Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
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To: |
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References |
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IN-89-062, NUDOCS 8908240375 |
Download: ML031180730 (8) |
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Similar Documents at Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
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Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination 2020-09-03 The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:05000000]] OR [[:Zimmer]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>.
[Table view]The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:05000000]] OR [[:Zimmer]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>. |
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 August 31, 1989 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 89-62: MALFUNCTION OF BORG-WARNER PRESSURE SEAL
BONNET CHECK VALVES CAUSED BY VERTICAL
MISALIGNMENT OF DISK
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power
reactors.
Purpose
This information notice is intended to alert addressees of the potential mal- functioning of Borg-Warner pressure seal bonnet check valves caused by the
misalignment of the valve disk. It is expected that recipients will review
the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. 'However, suggestions contained
in this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.
Description of Circumstances
On April 23 and May 5, 1989, during hot functional testing at Comanche Peak
Unit 1, a combination of procedural errors and malfunctioning check valves
resulted in the backflow of high temperature water from the steam generators
through the auxiliary feedwater system to the condensate storage tank. This -
flow caused abnormally high temperatures, thermal stresses in excess of the
code allowable stresses, and damage to piping supports.
The procedural errors that occurred during testing on both dates involved simul- taneously opening both an auxiliary feedwater pump discharge valve connecting
the pump to the steam generators and an isolation valve in a test line leading
back to the condensate storage tank. During the time period covering both dates, each of the eight 4-inch Borg-Warner check valves in the auxiliary feedwater
supply lines leading to the steam generators :was Jammed partially open as a
result of improper assembly. This combination of circumstances allowed water
from the steam generators to flow back through the check valves, a pump dis- charge valve, and a test line isolation valve to the condensate storage tank.
In a separate incident on April 19, 1989, a 3-inch Borg-Warner check valve
located in the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump miniflow recirculation -
line was found to be inoperable. On examination, the two remaining 3-inch
miniflow recirculation valves in the auxiliary feedwater system also were
fou&e. /I
8908240375 Z e Jya
K)
< IN 89-62 August 31, 1989 Investigation revealed that the valve disks of these three 3-inch valves, well as the eight inoperable 4-inch valves, were all positioned too low as
valve body relative to the valve seats. As a result, when the valve in the
disk moved
toward the seat, the outside upper edge of the disk was caught under the
upper edge of the seat causing the disk to be jammed open with the plane inside
disk at a large angle relative to the plane of the seat (Figure 1). of the
All
of the inoperable valves were of the 900 psi pressure seal bonnet type. eleven
Discussion:
During the two steam generator water backflow events, the operators
made almost
identical errors, although two different sets of valves were involved.
On
April 23 an auxiliary operator intended to realign valves associated
with the
turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump to permit recirculation flow
condensate storage tank. The procedure required closing the normally to the
turbine pump discharge valve (1AF-041) before opening the turbine pump open
lation test line isolation valve (1AF-042). However, the valves were recircu- simultaneously and the recirculation valve which could be opened rapidly,operated
fully open while the discharge valve which took a half hour to close, was
was still
open. In about 10 minutes the levels in steam generators 1, 2, and
noticed to be decreasing rapidly. At about 20 minutes into the event, 4 were
on the pipes in the turbine pump room was reported to be "bubbling and paint
peeling"
and the recirculation valve was closed, terminating the backflow.
On May 5 the operators were conducting an auxiliary feedwater system
ity test. The motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump recirculation test operabil- isolation valve (1FA-055) was opened while the motor-driven pump discharge line
(lFA-054) was still open. Again, this was contrary to the procedure valve
which required closing the discharge valve prior to opening the test in use, isolation valve. During this event, only water from steam generator line
believed to have reached the auxiliary feedwater piping. The backflow1 is
initially stopped when the discharge valve (-054) was fully closed. was
However, when the operators attempted to restore the valves to the original position
to resume pumping to the steam generators, the test line isolation
was inadvertently left partially open, reestablishing the backflow valve
to
(-055)
densate storage tank. This backflow persisted for- the next hour and the con- being interrupted intermittently by the operation of the two auxiliary a half, water motor-driven pumps. The operators observing inconsistencies in feed- to the steam generators finally realized that the test line isolation the flow
valve
was open and closed it, terminating the backflow.
The reason that the disk assemblies of the malfunctioning check valves
positioned too low in the valve bodies was that an essential step was were
from the vendor's reassembly procedure. The disk assembly, as well missing
as
valve bonnet and seal, is suspended from and positioned vertically by the
a threaded
ring that is screwed into the top of the valve neck, called the retainer
ring
(Figure 1). The prescribed assembly procedure for the 3- and 4-inch valves
(Borg-Warner Operation and Maintenance Manual, OMM 1003) was to install
bottom out the retainer ring. This had the effect of locating the and
disk assembly
too low in the valve. The original factory assembly process included
the backing
IN 89-62 August 31, 1989 out of the retainer ring while observing the disk through the valve ports until
the disk had been raised to the correct height. However, the necessary step of
backing out the retainer ring to its original factory assembly height was not
included in the reassembly procedure provided with the 3- and 4-inch valves.
All of the auxiliary feedwater check valves had been disassembled and inspected
in 1983 because of a concern about the adequacy of the disk stud fillet welds.
During the following reassembly using the incorrect procedure, all of the 3- and
4-inch valve disks were positioned lower than the original factory adjusted
position. Larger Borg-Warner check valves (6, 8 and 10-inch) could also be
affected by this error.
The April 23 backflow of high temperature water caused a significant amount of
blistering and flaking of the paint on the auxiliary feedwater supply lines as
well as some unusual stressing of the auxiliary feedwater piping. However, the
May 5 backflow is believed to have caused the most damage. Several areas in the
piping are known to have experienced thermal stresses that exceeded the code
allowable stresses. In addition, one of the piping supports failed and had
to be replaced. As a result, an extensive analysis of the piping, the piping
supports, and the penetrations had to be made to ensure the continued reliabil- ity of the auxiliary feedwater system.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact one
of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts: H. H. Livermore, NRR
(817) 897-1500
M. F. Runyan, NRR
(817) 897-1500
Attachments:
1. Figure 1, Check Valve Shown with
Disk Jammed in Open Position
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Attachment 1 IN 89-62 August 31, 1989 RETAINER RING-
ADJUSTS HEIGHT OF
DISK ASSEMBLY
VALVE NECK
Figure 1. CHECK VALVE SHOWN WITH DISK
JAMMED IN OPEN POSITION
U4 v Attachment 2 IN 89-62 August 31,1989 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
Information Date of
Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to
89-61 Failure of Borg-Warner Gate 8/30/89 All holders of OLs
Valves to Close Against or CPs for nuclear
Differential Pressure power reactors.
88-48, Licensee Report of Defective 8/22/89 All holders of OLs
Supp. 2 Refurbished Valves or CPs for nuclear
power reactors.
89-60 Maintenance of Teletherapy 8/18/89 All NRC Medical
Units Teletherapy Licensees.
89-59 Suppliers of Potentially 8/16/89 All holders of OLs
Misrepresented Fasteners or CPs for nuclear
power reactors.
89-58 Disablement of Turbine-Driven 8/3/89 All holders of OLs
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Due or CPs for PWRs.
to Closure of One of the
Parallel Steam Supply Valves
89-57 Unqualified Electrical 7/26/89 All holders of OLs
Splices in Vendor-Supplied or CPs for nuclear
Environmentally Qualified power reactors.
Equipment
89-56 Questionable Certification 7/20/89 All holders of OLs
of Material Supplied to the or CPs for nuclear
Defense Department by Nuclear power reactors.
Suppliers
89-45, Metalclad, Low-Voltage 7/6/89 All holders of OLs
Supp. 1 Power Circuit Breakers or CPs for nuclear
Refurbished With Substandard power reactors.
Parts
89-55 Degradation of Containment 6/30/89 All holders of OLs
Isolation Capability by a or CPs for nuclear
High-Energy Line Break power reactors.
89-54 Potential Overpressurization 6/23/89 All holders of OLs
of the Component Cooling or CPs for nuclear
Water System power reactors.
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
4, IN 89-62 August 31, 1989 out of the retainer ring while observing the disk through the valve ports until
the disk had been raised to the correct height. However, the necessary step of
backing out the retainer ring to its original factory assembly height was not
included in the reassembly procedure provided with the 3- and 4-inch valves.
All of the auxiliary feedwater check valves had been disassembled and inspected
in 1983 because of a concern about the adequacy of the disk stud fillet welds.
During the following reassembly using the incorrect procedure, all of the 3- and
4-inch valve disks were positioned lower than the original factory adjusted
position. Larger Borg-Warner check valves (6, 8 and 10-inch) could also be
affected by this error.
The April 23 backflow of high temperature water caused a significant amount of
blistering and flaking of the paint on the auxiliary feedwater supply lines as
well as some unusual stressing of the auxiliary feedwater piping. However, the
May 5 backflow is believed to have caused the most damage. Several areas in the
piping are known to have experienced thermal stresses that exceeded the code
allowable stresses. In addition, one of the piping supports failed and had
to be replaced. As a result, an extensive analysis of the piping, the piping
supports, and the penetrations had to be made to ensure the continued reliabil- ity of the auxiliary feedwater system.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact one
of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts: H. H. Livermore, NRR
(817) 897-1500
M. F. Runyan, NRR
(817) 897-1500
Attachments:
1. Figure 1, Check Valve Shown with
Disk Jammed in Open Position
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
08LZ"w9 OGCB:DOEA:NRR* *NRR *NRR RPB:ARM* *C/O-CB:DOEA:NRR
DCKirkpatrick HHLivermore MRRunyan TechEd CHBerlinger
08/14/89 08/21/89 08/21/89 08/18/89 08/23/89
o-, . 4 .
IN 89-XX
August xx, 1989 out of the retainer ring while observing the disk through the valve ports until
the disk had been raised to the correct height. However, the necessary step of
backing out the retainer ring to its original factory assembly height was not
included in the reassembly procedure provided with the 3- and 4-inch valves.
All of the auxiliary feedwater check valves had been disassembled and inspected
in 1983 because of a concern about the adequacy of the disk stud fillet welds.
During the following reassembly using the incorrect procedure, all of the 3- and
4-inch valves disks were positioned lower than the original factory adjusted
position. Larger Borg-Warner check valves (6, 8 and 10-inch) may also have been
affected by this error.
The April 23 backflow of high temperature water caused a significant amount of
blistering and flaking of the paint on the auxiliary feedwater supply lines as
well as some unusual stressing of the auxiliary feedwater piping. However, the
May 5 backflow is believed to have caused the most damage. Several areas in the
piping are known to have experienced thermal stresses that exceeded the code
allowable stresses. In addition, one of the piping supports failed and had to
be replaced. As a result, an extensive analysis of the piping, the piping
supports, and the penetrations had to be made to ensure the continued reliabil- ity of the auxiliary feedwater system.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact one
of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts: H. H. Livermore, NRR
(817) 897-1500
M. F. Runyan, NRR
(817) 897-1500
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
D/DOEA:NRR
- See previous concurrence CERossi
08/ /89 OGCB:DOEA:NRR* NRR NRR RPB:ARM* C/OGCB:DOEA:NR
DCKirkpatg;ick HHLivermore MRRunyan TechEd CHBerlingef: Mred
08/14/89k&.rC)' 08/at/89 08/,<J/89 08/18/89 08PVV89 t A:se. R
IN 89-XX
August xx, 1989
'%.. i factory assembly process included the backing out of the retainer ring while
observing the disk through the valve ports until the disk had been raised to
the correct height. However, the necessary step of backing out the retainer
ring to its original factory assembly height was not included in the reassembly
procedure provided with the 3- and 4-inch valves. All of the auxiliary feed- water check valves had been disassembled and inspected in 1983 because of a
concern about the adequacy of the disk stud fillet welds. During the following
reassembly using the incorrect procedure, all of the 3- and 4-inch valves disks
were positioned too low in the valve body.
Larger Borg-Warner check valves were not affected by this error. The manual
instructions for the Borg-Warner 6-inch valves correctly identified the need
to set the bonnet elevation (and consequently the disk elevation) by adjusting
the retainer ring to the proper height.
The lack of an adequate procedure apparently also resulted in maintenance per- sonnel being unaware of the need to establish the correct retainer ring height
during the disassembly of the valves so that they could reassemble the valves
correctly. As a consequence, the Comanche Peak personnel found it necessary to
go through a complex dimensional analysis process in order to establish the
correct positions of the retainer rings.
The April 23 backfilow of high temperature water caused a significant amount of
blistering and flaking of the paint on the auxiliary feedwater supply lines as
well as some unusual stressing of the feedwater piping. However, the May 5 backflow is believed to have caused the most damage. Several areas in the
piping are known to have experienced thermal stresses that exceeded the code
allowable stresses. In addition, one of the piping supports failed and had to
be replaced. As a result, an extensive analysis of the piping, the piping
supports, and the penetrations had to be made to ensure the continued reliabil- ity of the auxiliary feedwater system. The 3-inch valve leakage discovered on
April 19 was initially attributed to excessive axial play in the disk assembly
rather than the retaining ring maladjustment. A more detailed investigation
into the root cause of the problem at that time might have precluded the
subsequent events and saved much of the resulting effort.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the Information in this notice, please contact one
of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts: H. H. Livermore, NRR
(817) 897-1500
M. R. Runyan, NRR
(817) 897-1500
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
D/DOEA:NRR
- See previous concurrence CERossi
08/ /89 OGCB:DOEA:NRR* NRR NRR RPB:ARM C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR
DCKirkpatrick HHLivermore MRRunyan TechEd ' CHBerlinger
08/14/89 08/ /89 08/ /89 08//9/89 08/ /89
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list | - Information Notice 1989-01, Valve Body Erosion (4 January 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-02, Criminal Prosecution of Licensee'S Former President for Intentional Safety Violations (9 January 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-03, Potential Electrical Equipment Problems (11 January 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-04, Potential Problems from the Use of Space Heaters (17 January 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-05, Use of Deadly Force by Guards Protecting Nuclear Power Reactors Against Radiological Sabotage (19 January 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-06, Bent Anchor Bolts in Boiling Water Reactor Torus Supports (24 January 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-07, Failures of Small-Diameter Tubing in Control Air, Fuel Oil & Lube Oil Systems Render Emergency Diesel Generators Inoperable (25 January 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-08, Pump Damage Caused by Low-Flow Operation (26 January 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-09, Credit for Control Rods Without Scram Capability in the Calculation of Shutdown Margin (26 January 1989, Topic: Shutdown Margin)
- Information Notice 1989-10, Undetected Installation Errors in Main Steam Line Pipe Tunnel Differential Temperature-Sensing Elements at Boiling Water Reactors (27 January 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-11, Failure of DC Motor-Operated Valves to Develop Rated Torque Because of Improper Cable Sizing (2 February 1989, Topic: Shutdown Margin)
- Information Notice 1989-12, Dose Calibrator Quality Control (9 February 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-13, Alternative Waste Management Procedures in Case of Denial of Access to Low-Level Waste Disposal Sites (8 February 1989, Topic: Shutdown Margin, Authorized possession limits)
- Information Notice 1989-15, Second Reactor Coolant Pump Shaft Failure at Crystal River (16 February 1989, Topic: Shutdown Margin)
- Information Notice 1989-16, Excessive Voltage Drop in DC Systems (16 February 1989, Topic: Shutdown Margin, Battery sizing)
- Information Notice 1989-17, Contamination and Degradation of Safety-Related Battery Cells (22 February 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-18, Criminal Prosecution of Wrongdoing Committed by Suppliers of Nuclear Products or Services (24 August 1990)
- Information Notice 1989-20, Weld Failures in a Pump of Byron-Jackson Design (24 February 1989, Topic: Health Physics Network)
- Information Notice 1989-21, Changes in Performance Characteristics of Molded-Case Circuit Breakers (27 February 1989, Topic: Health Physics Network)
- Information Notice 1989-23, Environmental Qualification of Litton-Veam Cir Series Electrical Connectors (3 March 1989, Topic: Health Physics Network)
- Information Notice 1989-24, Nuclear Criticality Safety (6 March 1989, Topic: Health Physics Network)
- Information Notice 1989-25, Unauthorized Transfer of Ownership or Control of Licensed Activities (7 March 1989, Topic: Health Physics Network)
- Information Notice 1989-26, Instrument Air Supply to Safety-Related Equipment (7 March 1989, Topic: Health Physics Network)
- Information Notice 1989-27, Limitations on the Use of Waste Forms and High Integrity Containers for the Disposal of Low-Level Radioactive Waste (8 March 1989, Topic: Process Control Program)
- Information Notice 1989-28, Weight and Center of Gravity Discrepancies for Copes-Vulcan Air-Operated Valves (14 March 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-29, Potential Failure of Asea Brown Boveri Circuit Breakers During Seismic Event (15 March 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-30, High Temperature Environments at Nuclear Power Plants (1 November 1990)
- Information Notice 1989-31, Swelling and Cracking of Hafnium Control Rods (22 March 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-32, Surveillance Testing of Low-Temperature Overpressure-Protection Systems (23 March 1989, Topic: Stroke time)
- Information Notice 1989-33, Potential Failure of Westinghouse Steam Generator Tube Mechanical Plugs (23 March 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-34, Disposal of Americium Well-Logging Sources (30 March 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-35, Loss & Theft of Unsecured Licensed Material, Attachment 1 to NRC Information Notice 1990-014: Accidental Disposal of Radioactive Materials. (Also includes Attachments 2 & 3) (30 March 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-35, Loss & Theft of Unsecured Licensed Material, Attachment 1 to NRC Information Notice 1990-014: Accidental Disposal of Radioactive Materials. (Also Includes Attachments 2 & 3) (30 March 1989, Topic: Moisture-Density Gauge)
- Information Notice 1989-36, Excessive Temperatures in Emergency Core Cooling System Piping Located Outside Containment (4 April 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-37, Proposed Amendments to 40 CFR Part 61, Air Emission Standards for Radionuclides (4 April 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-38, Atmospheric Dump Valve Failures at Palo Verde Units 1, 2, and 3 (5 April 1989, Topic: Emergency Lighting)
- Information Notice 1989-39, List of Parties Excluded from Federal Procurement or Non-Procurement Programs (5 April 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-40, Unsatisfactory Operator Test Results and Their Effect on the Requalification Program (14 April 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-41, Operator Response to Pressurization of Low-Pressure Interfacing Systems (20 April 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-42, Failure of Rosemount Models 1153 and 1154 Transmitters (21 April 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-43, Permanent Deformation of Torque Switch Helical Springs in Limitorque SMA-Type Motor Operators (1 May 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-44, Hydrogen Storage on the Roof of the Control Room (27 April 1989, Topic: Coatings)
- Information Notice 1989-45, Metalclad, Low-Voltage Power Circuit Breakers Refurbished with Substandard Parts (8 May 1989, Topic: Commercial Grade Dedication, Coatings)
- Information Notice 1989-46, Confidentiality of Exercise Scenarios (11 May 1989, Topic: Coatings)
- Information Notice 1989-47, Potential Problems with Worn or Distorted Hose Clamps on Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (18 May 1989, Topic: Coatings)
- Information Notice 1989-48, Design Deficiency in the Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Cooling Water Systems (22 May 1989, Topic: Coatings, Temporary Modification)
- Information Notice 1989-49, Failure to Close Service Water Cross-Connect Isolation Valves (22 May 1989, Topic: Coatings)
- Information Notice 1989-50, Inadequate Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Supply (30 May 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-51, Potential Loss of Required Shutdown Margin During Refueling Operations (31 May 1989, Topic: Shutdown Margin, Coatings)
- Information Notice 1989-52, Potential Fire Damper Operational Problems (8 June 1989, Topic: Safe Shutdown, Shutdown Margin, Fire Barrier, Fire Protection Program)
... further results |
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