IR 05000498/1987064
| ML20237C345 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 12/11/1987 |
| From: | Bess J, Carpenter D, Constable G, Hildebrand E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20237C337 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-498-87-64, 50-499-87-64, IEB-80-06, IEB-80-6, NUDOCS 8712210268 | |
| Download: ML20237C345 (10) | |
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APPENDIX B U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report:
50-498/87-64 Operating License:
NPF-71 50-499/87-64 Construction Permit (CP):
CPPR-129 i
Dockets:
50-498 CP Expiration Date:
December 1989 50-499 Licensee:
Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P)
P.O. Box 1700 Houston, Texas 77001 Facility Name:
South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 (STP)
Inspection At:
STP, Matagorda County, Texas Inspection Conducted:
Octobeg191Z1987
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//!62 Inspectors:
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[f.p CEfpenter, Senior Resident Inspector Date Project Section D, Division'of Reactor Projects s
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EJ K _Hildebrand,_Re_sident Inspector, Project Date Sec, tion ~D{DiQsion'of Reactor Projects J2fil8)
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dr-Er-Bess ~,' Resident Inspector, Project Dat(
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4 Section D, Division of Reactor Projects Other Assisting Personnel:
J. P. Clausner, French Commissariat A L'Energie Atommmique, Institute De Protection Et De Surete Nucleaire
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//g7 Approved:
__G. L. ConTthbTb7 Chief, Project Section D Date Division of Reactor Projects
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Inspection Summary l
Inspection Conducted October 1-31, 1987 (Report 50-498/87-64; 50-499/87-64)
Areas Inspected: Routine. unannounced inspection including licensee action on previous inspection findings and licensee-reported deficiencies, potential incore instrumentation tube leakage and thinning, component cooling water heat exchanger failure, security systems test witnessing, Unit 2 test program, allegation followup, status of incomplete preoperational tests, and site tours.
Results: Within the areas inspected, one violation of NRC requirements was identified (failure to follow the approved procedure for performing plant operation, paragraph 7).
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v DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted ~
- S. M. Head, Supervisory Licensing Engineer
- M. F. Rejcek, Chemical Operations Supervisor
- T. E. Underwood, Chemical Operations and Analysis Manager
- W. H. Kinsey, Plant Manager
- J. R. Walker, Operations Support Manager
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- J. T. Westermeier, Project Manager l
- W. P. Evans, Licensing Engineer In addition to the above, the NRC inspectors also held discussions with various licensee, architect engineer (AE), constructor, and other contractor personnel during this inspection.
- Denotes those individuals attending exit interview conducted on October 30, 1987.
'2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings and Licensee-Reported Deficiencies (Closed) Open Item 8717-01 This open item addressed a concern that the installation and testing of the emergency lighting required for safe shutdown was not completed prior to a previous inspection.
The associated surveillance procedures had not been completed either.
The ceasee t.tt completed the installation of the subject lighting and has successfully completed the associated testing.
Surveillance procedures have been written and approved.
This item is considered closed.
-(Closed) IEB 80-06 and Incident Review Committee (IRC) 395, Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Actuation Signal Reset The licensee has reviewed all the control circuits for components receiving an ESF actuation signal for conformance to STP's criteria.
The control circuits for those valves identified as not meeting the criteria have been modified such that, each valve will remain in its ESF actuation position upon reset of the ESF signal.
This IEB and IRC are considered closed.
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l (0 pen) Open Item'498/8755-01 This open item concerned inadequate fastener torque on pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORV) block valves. The licensee has completed the preliminary investigation of this condition and cannot confirm a specific root cause.
Review of site documentation, including maintenance work request (f1WR), nonconformance reports (NCR), installation travellers, and preoperational test records does not indicate why the fasteners were found at a reduced torque.
Inadequate torque has been identified at several other system locations in the plant including the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system, pressurizer code safety valves and the Safety Injection System.
The licensee is continuing to investigate the possibilities of bolt relaxation resulting from thermo-cycling and Flexatalic gasket compression after thermo-cycling.
They are also reviewing various industry sources for similar conditions at other plants.
The licensee has replaced gaskets in the PORV block valves and verified torque.
They have a plan that calls for rechecking the torque of both PORV block valves and other selected primary system gasketed fittings after two thermo cycles. That data in conjunction with vendor information and industry experience will be evaluated for root cause identification.
The NRC inspector has reviewed the data available to date and the
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licensee's plan for dealing with the issue and finds their actions
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reasonable and acceptable. This open item will reain open pending completion of thermo testing and root cause determination by the licensee and review by the NRC.
3.
Potential Incore Instrumentation Tube Leakage and Thinning On October 28, 1987, Westinghouse reported an incore tube leak and thinning at the Westinghouse designed Belgian plant, Tihauge 3.
Because of the design similarity between STP and the Belgian plants (Tihauge 3 and Doel 4), a similiar problem could occur at STP, Unit 1.
The same deficiency has been experienced in France, especially on the 14-foot core design (Paluel). The origin of this problem has been determined to be hydraulic excitations because of the flow around the thimble and ensuing vibrations which resulted in premature wear of the thimble and leakage.
To prevent this problem, Westinghouse designed and installed a generic repair consisting of a flow-limiting device around the thimble positioned on the core plate. The connecting piece has a flexible bellows to permit
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continuity of flow from the core plate to the bottom of the fuel assembly.
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This device has been installed at STP and, in June 1987, on Tihauge 3.
j However, on October 28, 1987, Westinghouse reported one tube leak and j
several thinning problems at Tihauge 3 only 4 months af ter the repair.
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A Westinghouse, HL&P, and NRC meeting was held on November 5, 1987.
During this meeting, Westinghouse gave three possible causes for the Tihauge 3 problem; comparisons between STP, Tihauge 3. and Doel 4 (where the same device is installed but no problem has been reported yet);
potential causes of accelerated wear at Tihauge 3; potential corrective measures; and recommended actions for STP, Unit 1.
According to Westinghouse, Tihauge 3 might have a plant specific problem, therefore, Westinghouse recommendations for STP are as follows:
Monitor vibration by installing accelerometers (outside and inside
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the guide tubes)
Measure wear by performing eddy current tests.
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At.this time, STP unlike other plants, does not have any isolation valves installed on the instrumentation guide tubes.
Therefore, only one barrier exists between the fuel element and the instrumentation incore room.
In the event of a leaking thimble, the leak will spill directly into the containment building.
Based on the results of further investigation, possible corrective actions could include':
Establishing thimble capping and freeze plug procedures
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Specifying isolation valve type and installation
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Repositioning thimbles in the core
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Resolution of the potential for vibration induced thimble failure at the STP and review by the NRC will be an open item (498;499/8764-02).
No violations or deviations were observed.
4.
Component Cooling Water (CCW) Heat Exchanger Failure There are three Strothers Wells Company, size 66-588, type TENA-CEN, counter flow CCW-Essential Cooling Water (ECW) heat exchangers (HXs) for each Unit at the STP.
These HXs are approximately 49 feet long and have 3404 titanium tubes each.
On September 14, 1987, Unit 1, Train "A" HX gave indications of a tube leak.
On September 24,1987, Unit 2, Train "C"
HX gave the same indications of tube rupture.
Both HXs were confirmed as
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having two failed tubes in the same relative locations.
Through the use of Eddy Current testing it was determined that all six HXs (three from Unit 1 and three from Unit 2) had excessive wear from tube to tube, j
vibration-induced contact.
The apparent cause of this vibration was the 36-inch impact baffle located between the 24-inch CCW inlet and the HX tubes.
This configuration caused CCW flow diversion which led to flow-induced vibration in the tubes above and below the impact baffle.
Repair of the HXs included the removal of 30 tubes and the rodding of another 264 tubes in each of the six HXs.
After tube removal or rodding, aluminum-bronze " Pop-A-Plug" type plugs were installed in the tube sheets.
Testing has been completed on all HX and they have been returned to service.
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6 The NRC inspectors have monitored the licensee's actions during all phases of leak identification, repair, and testing. While there was some initial confusion on what and how repairs were to be made, once an agreed on plan was firmly established the licensee proceeded with the repairs in a thorough and consistent manner. At the conclusion of repairs, the NRC held a review and assessment meeting with the licensee at STP. A complete review of repairs and an engineering analysis of the system performance was presented. The licensee has completed an acceptable repair of the CCW HX problem. There is a need to perform a heat load base line performance test when the plant is at normal operating temperature. Therefore, the performance of this test and evaluation by the licensee, with results review by the NRC inspectors will be carried as an open item (498;499/8764-03) to be closed prior to exceeding 30 percent reactor power. The licensee has also committed to the installation and monitoring of a model side stream heat exchanger in order to determine if system performance degradation is occurring over time.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Security Systems Test Witnessing During this inspection period, the licensee was requested by the NRC security inspector to perform testing of the perimeter intrusion detection system. This was done to allow observation of test methodology and
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evaluation of test performance.
The resident operations inspector assisted in observing the licensee's test.
A site security guard volunteer was used to physically attempt breaching the system.
Some minor comments were provided to the NRC security inspector by the NRC rcsident inspector. Additional information is provided in the Security Inspectors Report 50-498/87-66.
No violations or deviations were observed.
6.
Unit 2 Preoperational Test Program
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STP, Unit 2 construction is about 82 percent complete. Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) turnovers from construction to startup engineering is about 96 percent complete.
System flushing is in progress on several systems. Reactor coolant system (RCS) flushing is in progress using safety injection pumps and flushing the system into the reactor vessel.
Preoperational test procedure development is progressing and procedures are being received for NRC review.
Preoperational system testing has
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commenced on the radiation monitoring (RM), Class 1E 450V Electrical (PK),
j and Class 1E Battery (DJ) systems. CCW heat exchanger tube repairs are
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about 85 percent complete. The positive displacement charging pump (PDP)
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is operable and available to support RCS cold hydrostatic testing.
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Prerequisite testing is in progress on reactor coolant pump motors.
Preparations are being made for motor starts. HL&P Operations Department support for Unit 2 is minimal but appears to be adequate at this time.
No violations or deviations were observed.
7.
Allegation Followup (Technically Closed) Allegation 04-87-A-0067 The NRC inspe'ctor reviewed the concerns of an allegation made to the STP NRC Operations Resident _ Inspector's office and performed a followup inspection. The following is a summary of this activity:
Allegation: The alleger stated that during the performance of a station procedure for mixing of boric acid (IPCP13-PF-0001) by the chemical operations department the operator performing the evolution was directed by his foreman to disregard a field change request (FCR) to the procedure and continue the evolution using the base procedure. He was told that the chemical operations. manager had provided this direction. The alleger further stated that the base procedure was inadequate and would not allow the chemicals to mix properly resulting in the operator stopping the evolution.
The operator was then verbally instructed on what to do by his foreman without regard to the procedure.
Followup Inspection: The NRC inspector interviewed ten (approximately one third of the total) senior qualified chemical operators at STP.
In addition, interviews were conducted with two chemical operations supervisors. The results of personnel interviews did not substantiate the allegation, however, they did reveal that there had been problems with the procedure in the past and that it had been changed several times.
All FCRs to the procedure together with the latest revision of the procedure were reviewed by the NRC inspector. This review revealed that the early revision of the procedure was inadequate in several areas and had required extensive changes. The latest revision to the procedure appeared to be adequate.
The NRC inspector observed the next performance of the procedure of mixing boric acid on October 25, 1987, During this observation the inspector questioned the chemical operator performing the procedure as to whether he was experiencing any difficulties in following the procedure.
The operator stated that the procedure was adequate but that he was not performing step 4.2.10.2 which closes the steam supply or
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Step 4.2.10.1 which stops the agitator. The inspector asked the operator
if a FCR was necessary to allow non-performance of procedural steps. The
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operator replied yes.
The inspector then observed the evolution for a short while and noted that the operator was continuing the procedure without stopping to process a FCR.
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i The NRC inspector then went to the Unit 1 control room to review the boric acid batching lineup checklist which was required by the procedure for performing the evolution. The lineup checklist could not be found and the inspector was told that it was filed in the chemical operations foreman's office.
No lineup checklist was found in the foreman's of fice.
Apparently, there was no signed lineup checklist available to support the evolution in progress.
Conclusion: The alleger's concerns could not be specifically sub-stantiated by witnesses or other means. However, the inspector's observations that the procedure was not being followed, with or without an FCR, sufficiently parall.els. the allegation to consider it to be generally substantiated.. These observations coupled with the absence of a valve lineup checklist on file to support the evolution is considered to be an apparent violation of NRC requirements (498/8764-01).
8.
Status of Incomplete Preoperational Tests The following is an update of Unit 1 preoperational test completion status during this inspection period. These test procedures were identified as being incomplete in NRC Inspection Report 50-498/87-47, paragraph 3 and updated in NRC Inspection Reports 50-498/87-50 and 50-498/87-55.
Test IR 50-498/87-55 Current (October 31,198_71 1-BR-P-01 99% field complete 99% field complete 1-CN-P-01 100%
100%
1-EW-P-05 100% retest required 100%
1-FW-P-01 99% field complete 100%
1-HB-P-01 99%
99%
1-NK-P-01 60%
99% field complete 1-PS-P-01 99%
99%
1-RA-P-04 100%
100%
1-RA-P-18 100%
100%
1-HC-A-02 100%
100%
1-RC-P-06 99%
99%
1-RC-P-07 99%
99%
1-RC-P-08 99%
99%
1-RC-P-11 98%
98%
1-SP-P-03 95%
95%
1-WL-P-02 0%
50%
1-WL-P-03 99% field complete 99% field complete 1-WS-P-01 0%
50%
1-WS-P-02 99% field complete 99% field complete 1-CV-A-01 100%
100%
1-CV-A-01 100%
100%
1-FW-A-01 99% field complete 100%
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1-LA-A-02 50%
99% field complete 1-LA-A-04 100%
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l 1-LA-A-05 100%
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1-LA-A-06 100%
100%
1-LA-A-08 100%
100%
Some of these tests are restrained by plant conditions.
The required plant operating mode must be established before testing and data collection / reduction can be completed.
The NRC inspectors are monitoring the licensee's specific activities on selected tests only.
No violations or deviations were ident'.fied.
9.
Site Tours During this inspection period, the NRC inspectors conducted site tours of all plant areas of both units. Observations have been discussed with licensee management. Those observations requiring licensee attention were resolved in a responsive and timely manner.
The NRC inspector witnessed the conduct of security department operations during this inspection period. Activities observed were conduct of operations in the Central Alarm Station (CAS) and Secondary Alarm Station (SAS), CAS and SAS log keeping, security response to alarms, badge issue area operation, physical search practices of individuals and vehicles, and compensatory posting of security offices. The above activities witnessed by the NRC inspectors were in compliance with licensee procedures and performed in a professional manner.
The NRC inspector witnessed the conduct of selected health physics (HP)
activities during the inspection period. The STP, Unit 1 went into HP
"lockdown" during this inspection period. As part of the HP lockdown personnel were required to complete a.one hour refresher training course before being granted access to the Radiological Restricted Area (PsRA) or being allowed to sign in on an active Radiation Work Permit (RWP). All of the licensee HP control systems and procedures were in place for some period of time before lockdown but their use was optional except for work involving or potentially involving radionuclides. Use of RWPs and the access control system was difficult and confusing at first due to the
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large volume of plant activities still in progress and debugging of access equipment. After initial problems were overcome, the HP control systems seemed to function acceptably. The NRC inspectors witnessed the use of HP equipment by HP technicians as well as plant workers, use of RWPs, and general conduct of shift HP activities. The HP activities appear to in compliance with licensee procedures and are acceptable.
Plant maintenance activities were witnessed by the NRC inspectors during
the repair process of the various plant system failures during the
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inspection period.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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10. -Exit Intervien i
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The NRC inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) on October 30, 1987, and sunmarized the scope and findings.of the inspection period.
Other meetings between NRC inspectors and licensee i
management were held periodically during the inspection to. discuss identified concerns.
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